Daf Ditty Eruvin 41

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MISHNA: With regard to one whom gentiles forcibly took him out beyond the Shabbat limit,
or if an evil spirit took him out, i.e., he was temporarily insane, and found himself outside the
Shabbat limit, he has only four cubits that he may walk from where he is standing.

GEMARA: Since the Gemara discussed one who stepped beyond the Shabbat limit due to an
evil spirit, the Gemara cites a related baraita, in which the Sages taught: Three matters cause
a person to act against his own will and the will of his Maker, and they are: Gentiles, and an
evil spirit, and the depths of extreme poverty.

The Gemara proceeds to analyze the mishna: Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: If one
knowingly went out beyond the Shabbat limit, he has only four cubits that he may walk. The
Gemara asks: This is obvious. Now, if with regard to one whom gentiles forcibly took out
beyond the Shabbat limit, he has only four cubits, with regard to one who knowingly went out,
is it necessary to teach that he has no more than four cubits within which he may walk?

They raised a dilemma before Rabba: If a person who is restricted to an area of four cubits
needed to relieve himself and no secluded spot is available, what is the halakha? He said to
them: The Sages established a principle that great is human dignity, which even supersedes a
negative precept of the Torah, and therefore a person is permitted to overstep the Shabbat limit
fixed by the Sages in order to relieve himself modestly.

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Our Daf cites three lists of three types of people who suffer calamities.

The first is a list of three situations that cause people to go crazy and go against Hashem. They
are people who are oppressed by gentiles, evil spirits, and poverty.

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What difference does this make? – People should pray for mercy concerning these. Three do not
see the face of Gehinnom (because they suffered so much in this world).

They are people who are poor, people who have stomach (intestinal) illnesses, and people who
owe people money. Some say this also applies to one who has a bad wife.

The other opinion maintains that it is appropriate to divorce a bad wife. And the other? — It may
sometimes happen that her kesuvah amounts to a large sum, or else, that he has children from her
and is, therefore, unable to divorce her.

In what practical respect does this matter? — In respect of receiving [these afflictions] lovingly.
Three types of people die suddenly, even while they are talking.

They are: people who have a stomach illness, killed by an animal, or a type of mouth disease. In
what respect can this information matter? — In that of making arrangements for their shrouds to
be ready.

There seems to be a contradiction in the Gemora.1

In the three lists, one of the types of people who go crazy and go against Hashem are people who
are poor.
On the other hand, people who are poor are also cited as one of the three who do not see the face
of Gehinnom.

How can it be that a person goes against Hashem, but will not see the face of Gehinnom?

The Maharsha answers that the people who are poor and who fight hard not to let it get to them
and interfere with their service of Hashem are people who will not see the face of Gehinnom.

Alternatively, the Maharsha answers that this can be answered by the Gemora’s question and
answer. The Gemora asked, why is it important to note that these types of people go crazy and go
against Hashem?

The Gemora answers, this is to teach that one should daven for Heavenly mercy for such people.

The Maharsha explains that if the prayer induces Heavenly mercy these people will not end up
going against Hashem and end up not even seeing the face of Gehinnom.

A FAST THAT OCCURS ON FRIDAY2

The Gemara discusses whether or not a fast that occurs on Friday is observed in its entirety. Does
one fast the entire day until the onset of Shabbos at nightfall, or should one eat before the end of

1
Rav Avrohom Adler, http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Eiruvin_41-1.pdf
2
Rav Mordechai Kornfeld

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the fast in order not to enter Shabbos in a state of hunger? The Gemara concludes that one
completes the entire fast. What is the Halachah?

TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ and other Rishonim explain that the Gemara does not mean that
one is obligated to fast the entire day on Friday. Rather, it means that one is permitted to fast the
entire day. However, l'Chatchilah, it is better to eat before Shabbos begins.

Tosfos Rabeinu Peretz relates that the RI indeed ate on the fast of the Tenth of Teves when it
occurred on Friday (the Tenth of Teves is the only fast that can occur on Friday according to our
fixed calendar). The TUR (OC 249) cites this opinion as well.

RAN in Ta'anis (7a) writes that one is not permitted to eat before Shabbos begins when the Tenth
of Teves occurs on Friday. The Gedolei Ashkenaz also ruled that one is not allowed to eat on a
fast day that falls on Friday until the fast is over.

MAHARIL compromises and rules that on a public fast day, a person should be stringent and not
eat until the fast is over. On an individual's private fast day, however, one is permitted to eat before
the fast is over in order not to enter Shabbos in a state of hunger.
REMA (OC 249) rules in accordance with the Maharil.

FASTING ON "TISH'AH B'AV" DURING THE TIME OF THE SECOND BEIS HA'MIKDASH3

The Beraisa quotes Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Tzadok who relates that it once happened that Tish'ah
b'Av occurred on Shabbos and the fast was deferred to Sunday, the tenth of Av, which was his
family's personal Yom Tov, the day of his "Korban Etzim." When the second Beis ha'Mikdash
was built, his forebears donated wood to the Beis ha'Mikdash, and in recognition for that Mitzvah
they were granted the privilege of bringing wood to the Beis ha'Mikdash every year on the tenth
of Av (as described in Nechemyah 10:35, and Ta'anis 26a). Since that day was his family's personal
Yom Tov, they started the fast but did not complete it.

Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Tzadok presumably lived at the time of the Churban, as we find that his
father, Rebbi Tzadok, was one of the elders at the time of the Churban (Gitin 57b). When, then,
did this incident occur -- before or after the Churban? If it occurred during the time of the Beis
ha'Mikdash (as he donated wood to the Beis ha'Mikdash on the tenth of Av each year), then why
was the rest of the nation fasting on Tish'ah b'Av? If, on the other hand, it occurred after the
Churban, then why did he celebrate a Yom Tov on the day of his Korban Etzim?

TOSFOS in Ta'anis (12a, DH Hasam) writes that it is evident from the fact that Rebbi Elazar
b'Rebbi Tzadok fasted on Tish'ah b'Av that this incident occurred after the Churban. Tosfos

3
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/eruvin/insites/ev-dt-041.htm

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understands, like the TASHBATZ (2:271), that the Jews did not fast on Tish'ah b'Av during the
time of the second Beis ha'Mikdash.

RAV MOSHE STERNBUCH shlit'a proves from here that even after the Churban, they observed
their families' personal Yom Tov in commemoration of the day on which their families used to
bring the Korban Etzim during the times of the Beis ha'Mikdash (see MO'ADIM
U'ZEMANIM 7:212).

RAMBAM (Perush ha'Mishnayos to Rosh Hashanah 1:3) has a novel approach. He maintains that
even during the time of the second Beis ha'Mikdash, the people fasted on Tish'ah b'Av, during the
time that the Jews no longer had dominion in their land. According to the Rambam, it is possible
that the incident of Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Tzadok occurred during the time of the Beis ha'Mikdash.

Sara Ronis writes:4

How should we relate to tradition? How bound should we be to the wisdom of our ancestors? Do
new times call for new approaches? These are questions that people have been asking for hundreds
of years. And indeed, we can see the rabbis explore this very issue on our daf.

The context is a discussion about what happens when a fast day occurs on a Friday.

Rabbi Yosei maintains that one should one fast until the very end even though it would mean being
hungry at the start of Shabbat. Rabban Gamliel disagrees, saying it’s better to end the fast early so
as not to begin Shabbat in a state of affliction.

Following the death of Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua entered the study hall to annul Rabban
Gamliel’s statement [that if Tisha B’Av falls on a Friday, you break the fast early]. Rabbi Yoḥanan
ben Nuri stood on his feet and said: I see that the appropriate policy is that the body must follow
the head, i.e., we must follow the statements of the earlier authorities and not deviate from
established halakha. All of Rabban Gamliel’s life we established the halakha in accordance with
his opinion, and now you seek to annul his statement? Yehoshua, we do not listen to you, as the
halakha has already been established in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. And there
was no one who disputed this statement in any way.

It’s important to note that this debate takes place only after Rabban Gamaliel’s death. This is not
a story of a student standing up to their teacher in their teacher’s lifetime. And yet, even with this

4
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/eruvin-41/

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relatively conservative framing, the text offers two different approaches to tradition in a new world
without Rabban Gamaliel’s presence and authority.

Rabbi Yehoshua seems to think that new times call for new approaches. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri
argues that fidelity to tradition is paramount. If we parse Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri’s response, we
can see four arguments for tradition. First, we must follow the greatest authority, which remains
Rabban Gamaliel. Second, we have already established a consensus around Rabban Gamaliel’s
position. Third, Rabbi Yehoshua apparently never challenged this ruling when Rabban Gamaliel
could have refuted the challenge. And fourth, given Rabbi Yehoshua’s original silence, this ruling
was not merely a consensus position, but a unanimous one.

Given Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri’s robust response, we might have expected his position to win out.
And yet, the Gemara concludes: “In the generation of Rabban Gamliel they acted in accordance
with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, but in the generation of Rabbi Yosei they acted in accordance
with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.” New times apparently do call for new approaches, new leaders,
and the emergence of new consensuses.

Some readers might see this as a case for an ancient kind of liberalism. But the substance of the
argument establishes something more like the opposite. Rabban Gamaliel had said that one could
conclude the fast of Tisha B’Av early on Friday in order to enter Shabbat in a state of full health.
Rabbi Yehoshua’s innovation is to insist that the fast must be continued until the sun has fully set,
requiring that we enter Shabbat in a state of fasting. Not all change leads to greater leniency, and
not all tradition is restrictive relative to the modern world.

Our daf complicates a linear view of history, in which things are always getting better for
communities and for individual human experience. It also complicates a linear view of history in
which our ancestors were the ultimate authority and each successive generation has gotten
progressively less authoritative and less wise. Even though it means they will be hungry come
Shabbat, Rabbi Yosei’s community accepts his position, seeing it as the most relevant source of
wisdom and ritual experience for them. Today’s daf is a reminder that things are complicated, and
that neat little stories rarely match the complexity of human history, or of the Talmud itself.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:5

While the third chapter of Massekhet Eiruvin dealt with the person who has an established place
to spend Shabbat, but desires to change or extend the boundaries of that place, the fourth chapter
introduces us to the individual who does not have a place for Shabbat. For example, such a person
may be "on the road" when Shabbat begins, or, perhaps leaves his city and travels more than 2,000
amot beyond its boundaries.

The first Mishna in our daf teaches that someone who leaves the precincts of the city – even if he
is forced to do so by non-Jews or a ru'ah ra'ah - an "evil wind" (the term can variously refer to
temporary insanity or to an actual wind that creates a storm that drives the individual beyond the
tehum (=limits).

5
https://www.steinsaltz-center.org/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=68446

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Maimonides, in his commentary on the Mishna, argues that any event beyond one's control can be
referred to as a ru'ah ra'ah) – loses his ability to travel and is limited to the four-cubit area in which
he is standing.

Recognizing the difficulties involved in restricting someone in that fashion, the Gemara records
the question that was presented to Rabba. They raised a dilemma before Rabba: If a person who

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is restricted to an area of four cubits needed to relieve himself and no secluded spot is available,
what is the halakha? He said to them: The Sages established a principle that great is human
dignity, which even supersedes a negative precept of the Torah, and therefore a person is
permitted to overstep the Shabbat limit fixed by the Sages in order to relieve himself modestly.

The Sages of Neharde’a add that once he has returned to the city in a permissible manner, he now
can walk freely within the city.

The source for Rabba's ruling is the Gemara's understanding of the passage regarding returning
lost objects:

,‫ ִנָדִּחים‬,‫ֵשׂיוֹ‬-‫ אוֹ ֶאת‬z‫שׁוֹר ָאִחי‬-‫ִת ְרֶאה ֶאת‬-‫א ל ֹא‬ 1 Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his
.z‫ ְלָאִחי‬,‫ ָהֵשׁב ְתִּשׁיֵבם‬:‫ ֵמֶהם‬,‫ְוִהְתַﬠַלְּמָתּ‬ sheep driven away, and hide thyself from
them; thou shalt surely bring them back unto
thy brother.
Deut 22:1

that is interpreted to mean that if returning the object will involve embarrassment to the finder, he
is allowed to ignore the lost object and pass up the opportunity to return it (see Bava Metzia 30a).

The conclusion there is that generally speaking K'vod HaBeriyot can "push aside" all Rabbinic
laws, of which eiruvei tehumim is an example. The rishonim debate whether the concept of K'vod
HaBeriyot is defined by the person's own, personal dignity, and it would be impossible to remain
in the same four cubits after having relieved himself there (the position taken by Rabbenu Hananel
and Rabbennu Yehonatan) or if the concept is defined by one's relationship with others.

According to the Rosh, who bases his position on Rav Hai Gaon, K'vod HaBeriyot applies only
if there are other people in the vicinity whose presence embarrasses him or who will be offended
were the individual to relieve himself in front of them.

Rabah rules that one who walked beyond his Techum of 2000 Amos and thereby became restricted
to an area of four Amos may leave his four Amos in order to relieve himself.

This is because Kavod ha'Beriyos, human dignity, overrides the commandment not to disobey the
Rabanan. The Gemara adds that one who is clever will take advantage of being permitted to go
beyond the four Amos and walk all the way back to his Techum.

In what situation does the allowance to leave one's four Amos in order to go to the bathroom apply?

ROSH cites RABEINU YEHUDAH BARCELONI who maintains that the Gemara's allowance
to leave one's four Amos does not apply to one who merely needs to urinate. It applies only to one
who needs to defecate.

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He bases his ruling on the Gemara in Bechoros (44b) which says that "people urinate in public."
Since people are not embarrassed to urinate in public, there is no concern for Kavod ha'Beriyos
and he may not leave his four Amos.

The Rosh concurs with Rabeinu Yehudah Barceloni and concludes that the allowance to leave
one's four Amos does not apply to one who needs to urinate. (Even though his four Amos will
become soiled with his urine, that is not sufficient reason to allow him to move, since the urine
soon becomes absorbed into the ground and dries.

However, the ARUCH HA'SHULCHAN writes that if he needs to recite Shemoneh Esreh or
Birkas ha'Mazon and the urine has not yet dried, he may leave his four Amos.)

RAV HAI GA'ON, cited by Rabeinu Yehudah Barceloni in the Rosh, suggests that the concern
for Kavod ha'Beriyos does not refer to the person who needs to relieve himself.

Rather, it refers to the people who will see him doing so. It is embarrassing and disgraceful
for others to see him urinating, and therefore he may leave his four Amos.

HALACHAH:

One who went out of the Shabbat barrier unknowingly, he only has four amot, and if he needs to
"go do the bathroom", he is able to leave from there until he finds a private place to turn; and it
is good advice that he approaches the side of the barrier, because if he does not find a private
place until the barrier he can enter, and after he enters, it is like he did not leave since he entered
with permission; but if he found a private place first, he should not enter except to face there, and
he should distance himself from the place he turned until he covers the smell, and there he has
four amot. And if he distances himself from the smell and enters into the barrier, it is like he did
not leave. And if he went out knowingly, he has no fix. This that we said, regarding the need to "go
to the bathroom", there are those who say even for minors and there are those who say specifically
for adults.

‫אורח חיים ת״ו‬

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 SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 406) cites both opinions with regard to leaving one's four Amos in
order to urinate. The MISHNAH BERURAH (406:9) writes that one should follow the more
stringent opinion (and not leave his four Amos in order to urinate).

Regarding how far one may walk in order to relieve himself, the Rosh rules that when the Gemara
says that once he leaves his four Amos in order to find a place to relieve himself, he may walk all
the way back to his city and reclaim his Techum, this refers only to when he does not find a
bathroom before he reaches his city.

If he finds a bathroom or other private place before he reaches his city, he must relieve himself
there and he may not continue walking to his city. The Gemara's intention is that one who needs
to find a bathroom should walk in the direction of his city, and not in any other direction, and if
he does not find a bathroom before he reaches his city, then he may reclaim his Techum.

The Rosh adds that even if he finds a private area in which to relieve himself before he reaches his
city, he may leave those four Amos if the smell is intolerable and continue walking until the smell
ends; if he happens to walk as far as his city, then he may reclaim his Techum.

In the Gemara, R’ Elazar the son of R’ Tzadok relates that he was a descendant of Sanav ben
Binyomin and that his family celebrated the 10th of Av as a Yom Tov, since in the time of Ezra
his ancestors donated wood to the Beis HaMikdash.6

One year Tisha B’Av fell on Shabbos and the fast was pushed off until Sunday.

The members of his family fasted part of the day but did not complete the fast since it was their
Yom Tov. Poskim discuss the obligation for a boy to fast when his bar-mitzvah falls on Sunday
and the day before was the 9th of Av so that the fast is observed on the 10th of Av. Is the bar-
mitzvah boy obligated to fast or not?

The central issue of the question is whether the obligation to fast is on Shabbos and the observance
of the fast on Sunday is merely a makeup date for the missed fast, or whether in a year in which
the 9th of Av falls on Shabbos Chazal’s enactment is to fast on the 10th of Av.

According to the first approach, the bar-mitzvah boy is exempt since on the primary day of the fast
he was not yet bar-mitzvah.

6
Daf Digest

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According to the latter approach, he is obligated to fast since Tisha B’Av is observed on the 10th
of Av in such a year and it is not a make-up for the missed fast on the 9th of Av. Teshuvas Avnei
Nezer1 answered that since according to Ashkenazi practice people observe private aspects of
mourning on that Shabbos, it clearly indicates that the 10th is observed as a make-up date for the
fast that could not be observed on Shabbos.

Thus, the bar-mitzvah boy would not be obligated to fast. Teshuvas Shevet HaLevi2 maintains that
once Chazal ruled that we do not fast on the 9th of Av that falls on Shabbos they uprooted the fast
from that day altogether and thus the bar-mitzvah boy is obligated to fast.

He further explains that the observance of private aspects of mourning is done to be consistent
with other years when the fast is also observed on the 9th but does not prove that the primary day
for the fast is the 9th.

Mental Health and the notion of hell

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Dr Jennifer Gendel writes:7

There is a synagogue we visit from time to time. Every time we have been there, a man sits alone
in the front row. His dress is a bit shabbier than others, his social manner a bit awkward. He comes
early, stays to have a little food at the Kiddush, and then departs. And the entire time, almost no
one speaks to him.

We learned that this gentleman suffers from chronic mental illness. He could benefit greatly from
social interaction and the support of a synagogue community. And this is a synagogue that prides
itself on being welcoming and inclusive. But whether through fear, discomfort, or ignorance of his
circumstances, no one has offered.

People race to hold the door for someone in a wheelchair. Teachers praise the student who sits
with the classmate with Down syndrome. We all rush to feed a family touched by cancer. Yet no
one visits the psychiatric ward when a member is admitted. Congregants recoil from the man who
shows up at services without having showered that week. And most avoid engaging with or
including someone struggling with depression.

Despite the fact that one in four adults suffer from mental illness, including Jews, our synagogue
communities have not been good at supporting or including those with mental illness.

Our rabbis have always had a complicated approach to mental illness. In the Talmud (Eruvin 41b),
mental illness or insanity was described as one who is driven to “act against his own will and the
will of his Creator.” The cause was described as being driven by “an evil spirit.” The rabbis did
recognize the suffering and the need for compassion. The text concludes by asking, “What does
this teach us?” And the answer is: “To request mercy for them.” But only in modern times has
the discussion moved from “mercy” to “inclusion.”

Ben Azzai taught in Ethics of the Fathers, “Treat no one lightly and think nothing is useless, for
everyone has a moment and everything has a place.” We have a Jewish obligation to have mercy
on those in need, but also an obligation to allow all to contribute to the community.

So why is it so difficult for our synagogue communities to act on this obligation?

Mental illness is a ubiquitous but often invisible disability. It is difficult to address because it is
complex and highly personal. People often fear the stigma that may result from telling others about
their disability, which prevents them from seeking support. As our USCJ colleague Rabbi Joshua
Rabin once asked, what might it mean to treat every person as if he or she is "fighting a battle you
know nothing about."

To be inclusive when there is stigma, shame and silence, our synagogues must first speak openly
about the issues. Talking publicly about depression, anxiety, trauma, addiction, and other struggles
helps give people the emotional freedom to seek the help they need, and gives community members
the comfort level to respond. As Rabbi David Schuck of Beth El Synagogue Center in New
Rochelle, NY observed in his work as part of USCJ’s Ruderman Inclusion Action Community,
7
https://uscj.org/blog/when-someone-is-fighting-a-battle-you-know-nothing-about

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“The more I talked about it (mental illness), the more individual people in the community felt like
they could talk to me.” Once people came forward, he was able to connect families dealing with
similar issues, so they could help each other through support groups and individually.

And we need to speak openly about our own discomfort. Do we embrace a person as being
created Btzelem Elohim (in the Divine image) or do we fear them? Without meaning to, we often
isolate and abandon those who may need us most. Speaking openly about mental illness is the best
way to educate and create a level of comfort.

Here are just a few ways our synagogues can become more welcoming and supportive for those
with mental illness:

• Include people with mental illness, if they wish, in the list of those recited in the Mi
Sheberach prayer, asking for the renewal of “body, spirit, and mind”

• For those needing a quiet, comfortable space, provide a sensory calming room such as a
library, classroom, or lounge. Ushers and clergy should know when and how to direct
people to the space, and the synagogue should feature signage and printed directions

• Draw on outside resources. For example, Forest Hills Jewish Center works with an on-site
social worker from New York’s Jewish Board of Family and Children’s Services to support
their efforts at including the mentally ill

• Use existing committees to organize efforts to invite individuals with mental illness to
attend events, visit in the hospital and at home, bring meals, care for children and offer
transportation as you would to anyone with an illness

• Make embracing those with mental illness a public conversation in your kehilla through
sermons, lectures, and programs

We have a Jewish obligation to care for others and to allow them to participate and contribute to
the community. And it is our community that loses out when we do not do so. We must confront
our prejudices and attitudes as well as adapt our programs and activities to reject silence and
isolation and alleviate stigma through acceptance and support. That is the true definition
of kehillah kedoshah, building a thriving, vibrant, compassionate, inclusive and holy community.

Hell anxiety as non-pathological fear8

For religious people, a concept of Hell as a place of eternal torment for the wicked is pervasive.
However, very little research has explored the mental health implications of this belief. We
investigate this by developing the Hell Anxiety Scale (HXS) and testing its relationship with other
well-established measures of psychological functioning. Surprisingly, Hell anxiety was not related
to dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, or overall religiosity, but primarily hinged on self-rated
probability of going to Hell and belief in free will. HXS demonstrated very low correlation with
8
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13674676.2018.1443436?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=cmhr20

15
the fear and anxiety subscales for neuroticism, suggesting that Hell anxiety may not be due to a
tendency towards fear or anxiety, but is perhaps a rational response to personal theological
premises. We also find that fear of Hell has strong relations with negative religious coping and
death anxiety, thus establishing this measure’s distinctiveness and construct validity.

Azim F. Shariff and Lara B. Aknin write 9

Though the psychology of religion has tended to treat religion as a single construct, evolutionary
theories of religion have argued that religion is instead a multifaceted family category – comprised
of different beliefs, teachings and rituals that have emerged for different reasons at different times,
to serve different cultural purposes. ‘Religion’ is many things. Supporting this argument, new
evidence demonstrates that these different aspects of religions have systematically distinct
psychological effects. For example, recent research has explored the divergent impact of
benevolent aspects of religion, such as beliefs in Heaven and comforting, forgiving gods, versus
more malevolent religious beliefs, such as those in Hell and punitive supernatural agents.
Compared to the benevolent aspects, supernatural malevolence has been found to be associated
with stronger rule-following and group coordination at the national level. For instance, in
developing countries (where secular institutions tend to be weaker), a higher proportion of citizens
who believe in Hell is associated with higher GDP growth. Similarly, controlling for the belief in
heaven as well as obvious third variables such as wealth and wealth inequality, a higher rate of
belief in hell is associated with lower national crime rates. These studies suggest that belief in
supernatural punishment may curb unethical behavior, allowing for greater social stability and
economic success.
However, belief in supernatural malevolence may not be without its costs. Research has shown
that people with more malevolent views of God tend to report lower self-esteem, psychological
coping and health resiliency. Thus, beliefs in religious malevolence may have emotional costs,
even as they have norm-following benefits.
Here we present three studies testing the divergent emotional correlates and consequences of
Heaven and Hell beliefs. Specifically, we examine whether these beliefs differentially affect
subjective well-being. Although religiosity is consistently tied to greater well-being little research
has examined which elements of religious belief offer mood benefits, which do not, and which
may in fact be detrimental.
In Study 1, we used a similar method as Shariff & Rhemtulla to measure the relationship between
Heaven and Hell belief and subjective well-being at the cross-national level. In Study 2, we used
data from the World Values Survey to test these relationships at the individual level. In Study 3,

9
The Emotional Toll of Hell: Cross-National and Experimental Evidence for the Negative Well-Being Effects of Hell Beliefs
Azim F. Shariff 1 , * and Lara B. Aknin

16
we used an experimental priming method to test the causal relationships between Heaven and Hell
beliefs and subjective well-being.
We note that this exploration diverges from the growing literature examining the relationship
between religion and well-being. Over the past several years, scholars from various disciplines,
such as sociology, psychology, and economics , have explored the relationship between religious
beliefs and happiness. Results typically reveal that religious beliefs are associated with greater
well-being.
Although this existing work makes great strides in assessing the impact of widespread religious
beliefs with large-scale data sets, the present paper offers two important theoretical extensions.
First, the present work examines the well-being consequences of specific religious beliefs. While
past work has explored the outcomes associated with broad religious devotion or participation, it
has not tested the impact of religious belief, let alone parsed belief into malevolent and benevolent
components. Given the divergent effects of these two sides of religious belief cited in the literature
above, and its important theoretical implications for understanding the origins and functions of the
various facets of religions, we examine the impact of two widely recognized religious ideas:
heaven and hell. Second, the present work presents one of the first direct experimental
investigations of the consequences of such malevolent and benevolent concepts (Study 3), which,
hitherto have been primarily examined with correlational designs.

17
Results
When controlling for each other and potential third variables, Heaven and Hell both emerged as
significant, but divergent predictors of happiness. Notably, this is true regardless of whether
happiness was assessed with the national life satisfaction ranking or the daily affect measure.
Belief in Hell predicted lower life satisfaction ranking (  = −1.51, p<.001) and lower daily
affect (  = −1.38, p<.001), whereas Belief in Heaven predicted higher life satisfaction ranking
(  = 1.74, p<.001) and daily affect (  = 1.49, p = .001). These emerged as the
strongest of all included predictors (see Model 1 in Table 2). Indeed, the two variables of specific
religious beliefs – a belief in Heaven and Hell – alone predicted 53% of the cross-national variance
as measured by life satisfaction rank and 35% of the cross-national variance in daily experiences
well-being (see Figures 1 and and2).2). We note that the predictive ability of these measures
remained when additional controls were entered in the model, suggesting that the relationship

18
between beliefs in Heaven, Hell, and well-being is robust (see Model 2 in Table 2). Furthermore,
the other measures of religiosity – belief in God and religious attendance – did not significantly
predict well-being when questions about specific Heaven and Hell beliefs were included in our
regression model. This underscores the importance of assessing the divergent benevolent and
malevolent aspects of religion, which when combined may mask important differences.

These data indicate that beliefs in Heaven and Hell are strong and opposite predictors of well-
being at the national level. However, while the cross-national comparison in Study 1 is illustrative,
we note that it is based on a relatively small sample size of countries, which only allowed us to
control for national level variables such as per capita wealth. Further, these limitations may have
obscured differences that may result from religious variation. For instance, it is possible that
Heaven and Hell beliefs are only related to well-being among adherents to Abrahamic religious
tradition, which offers a somewhat consistent messages about the positive features of Heaven and
the negative features of Hell. Given that only 8 of the 63 countries examined in Study 1 are
countries in which a religion other than Islam or Christianity is the majority religion, we could not
examine whether the observed relationships between Heaven and Hell beliefs and well-being are
also present in non-Abrahamic countries with sufficient power.

Why Hell?

If the belief in Hell has reliably negative effects on well-being, why has it persisted? In the
introduction, we cited evidence for the association between Hell beliefs and ethical behavior. Thus,

19
the belief in Hell, and religious malevolence more generally, may contribute to the encouragement
of rule following, through the deterrence value of supernatural punishment, but may do so at the
cost of well-being. This creates an intriguing trade-off between the interests of the group, which
benefit from the ethical behavior of the group's members, and the interest of the individual, who
shoulders the emotional costs of a society that follows norms out of fear. From a cultural
evolutionary perspective, different societal circumstances could shift the balance of this tradeoff.
For example, where rule-following is well organized by secular institutions, supernatural
punishment may provide less added value on this front.

In these societies, one might expect religions to shift towards a more benevolent tone – especially
in a competitive religious market where such a benevolent tone may be more attractive to potential
converts than fire, brimstone and other aspects of supernatural malevolence. Future research could
investigate this possibility by examining conversion rates among religious sects that differ on these
dimensions.

In sum, the current findings join a growing literature examining the different psychological impact
of different concepts often conflated together as ‘religion’. Though certain of these religious
concepts may be associated with greater well-being, the belief in Hell appears not to be one of
them.10

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Scott A. McGreal MSc. Writes:11

Social scientists have developed conflicting theories about the role of religion in society. Some
scholars have argued that religion functions to regulate individual behavior in order to ensure that
people abide by normative social rules rather than pursuing their own selfish interests to the
detriment of others. Religious institutions therefore offer supernatural rewards in the afterlife for
good behavior (i.e. Heaven), while threatening bad behavior with supernatural punishment (i.e.
Hell). On the other hand, others have pointed out that religion has often been a divisive force that
promotes in-group loyalty and out-group derogation. That is, religion can foster an “us versus
them” mentality that often escalates into sectarian violence and extremism (Jensen, 2006). Jensen
has argued that religious cosmologies based on the belief in a cosmic struggle between good and
evil forces, such as God and the Devil, Heaven and Hell, facilitate lethal violence by promoting
intolerance and a disinclination to negotiate or compromise. Such a worldview fosters
development of rigid moral boundaries with the result that people become quick to take offense
and hence more willing to punish those they perceive as disrespecting their beliefs.

Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012)12 favour the view that religion functions to promote good behavior
and suppress selfishness. However, they have argued that some religious beliefs are more effective
in this regard than others. Specifically, they have argued that the threat of supernatural punishment
is actually more effective in suppressing bad behavior than offers of supernatural rewards. In fact,
they have argued that belief in supernatural rewards may be counterproductive in this respect. As
evidence they cite an earlier study (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011)13 in which students who believed
in a forgiving God were more likely to cheat on an experimental task than students who believed
in an angry and punishing God. They took this to mean that belief in God’s forgiveness encourages
moral laxity, as people think they can get away with naughty behavior and be let off the hook so
to speak. On the other hand, those who believed in a stern disciplinarian God were scared into
toeing the line. (Strangely enough, participants who did not believe in God at all were not more
likely to cheat than those who did. Maybe positive and negative God-beliefs cancel each other out
among the believers.)

Extending these findings to national levels, they argued that belief in Hell (threat of punishment)
should deter crime, while belief in Heaven, like belief in a forgiving God, might actually have an
opposite effect. To examine this, they looked at national crime data for nine types of crime from
67 countries, along with data from international surveys about national rates of belief in God,
Heaven and Hell. Although belief in Heaven and Hell respectively are very strongly associated as
one would expect, rates of belief in Heaven tend to be higher, sometimes substantially, than rates
of belief in Hell. Considering how many people find the doctrine of Hell repugnant, this hardly
seems surprising. Using multiple regression they found that, as they expected, greater national
belief in Hell predicted lower crime rates, while greater national belief in Heaven actually
11
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/unique-everybody-else/201312/belief-in-hell-does-it-benefit-or-harm-society
12
Shariff, A. F., & Rhemtulla, M. (2012). Divergent Effects of Beliefs in Heaven and Hell on National Crime Rates. PLoS ONE,
7(6), e39048. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0039048

13
Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2011). Mean Gods Make Good People: Different Views of God Predict Cheating
Behavior. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 21(2), 85-96

22
predicted higher crime rates. They still found these same effects even after controlling for a number
of relevant variables, such as gross domestic product and income inequality. To further separate
the effects of each belief, they subtracted belief in Hell from belief in Heaven for each country.
They found that the difference between the two rates of belief was positively correlated with
overall crime rates. See the graph below. In fact, if their analysis is correct, the difference between
the two beliefs explains a massive 54% of the variance in crime rate, which is an extraordinarily
large effect.

They took these results as support for their idea that belief in supernatural reward (Heaven) in the
absence of belief in punishment (Hell) is ineffective in suppressing antisocial behavior. That is, a
big carrot without a big stick does not work very well. This might be because people who believe
in Heaven but not in hell expect to be forgiven for their wrong doings. They did acknowledge the
correlational nature of their study, which makes the direction of causality difficult to assess.
However, they argued that their hypothesis was the most parsimonious explanation of the findings.

Graphic image of relationship between crime rates and belief in Heaven minus belief in Hell.
Source: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/09/daily-chart#comments

23
However, these results have been called into question. Something I found strange about the
reporting of Shariff and Rhemtulla was that they did not report the simple correlations between
their predictor variables, belief in Heaven and Hell, and the outcome variables, i.e. crime rates.
This is interesting because there is evidence that greater belief in Heaven and Hell at national levels
are each associated with higher national homicide rates (Jensen, 2006; Robbins, 2012).14 Similarly,
a survey of first world nations found that the countries that were most socially successful – as
determined by a measure that combined data from such factors as homicide rate, lifespan, poverty
levels, life satisfaction and several other factors – were also the most non-religious.

Specifically, the more successful nations on these measures (e.g. Sweden) generally had lower
rates of belief in God, Heaven, and Hell respectively than the less successful ones (e.g. the USA).

Furthermore, an earlier study testing the theory that “malevolent religious cosmologies” are
associated with lethal violence, found opposite results to those of Shariff and Rhemtulla. That is,
countries with higher national rates of “malevolent” religious beliefs (specifically in Hell and the
Devil) had worse homicide rates, while those with higher national rates of “benevolent” religious
beliefs (specifically in Heaven and God) had lower homicide rates (Jensen, 2006). (An associated
finding was that intensity of religious belief was also associated positively with homicide rates,
indicating that nations that are more serious about religion tend to have more killings.) This is in
spite of the fact that Jensen used a similar methodology to Shariff and Rhemtulla, such as reliance
on data about religious beliefs from the World Values Survey and multiple regression analysis.
Jensen also noted that countries that had high levels of belief in both God and the Devil had
significantly higher homicide rates compared with countries with relatively high belief in God but
low belief in the Devil, and compared with the most secular nations where there is reduced belief
in both God and the Devil respectively.

One scholarly commentator on the Shariff and Rhemtulla study, Blaine Robbins, argued that their
results were most likely due to statistical artifacts rather than genuine trends. Specifically, belief
in Heaven and Hell have an extremely high positive correlation with each other (r = .93). Using
such highly correlated predictor variables in multiple regression analysis can distort the results for
the individual predictors in random ways, due to a problem known as multicollinearity.
Multicollinearity problems might explain why belief in Heaven and in Hell each have positive
correlations with homicide rates, yet in Shariff and Rhemtulla’s study belief in Hell changes from
a positive to a negative predictor, while in Jensen’s study it is belief in Heaven rather than Hell
that changes from a positive to a negative predictor. Additionally, Robbins conducted her own
analyses using slightly different methods and found non-significant results. This suggests that
Shariff and Rhemtulla’s are probably not statistically robust.

In their response to their critics, Shariff and Rhemtulla give various reasons why they think that
multicollinearity was not a problem in their analysis. However, they did not explain why Robbins’
analysis yielded contradictory and non-significant results, or why Jensen found that countries with

14
Jensen, G. F. (2006). Religious Cosmologies and Homicide Rates among Nations: A Closer Look. Journal of Religion &
Society, 8, 1-14.

24
mainly “benevolent” religious beliefs had lower homicide rates than countries with a more even
mixture of “benevolent” and “malevolent” beliefs.

Shariff and Rhemtulla also argued that their use of a composite measure subtracting belief in Hell
from belief in Heaven would have eliminated issues with multicollinearity. One thing I want to
note about this measure is that it considers the difference between the two beliefs but does not
appear to consider the absolute levels of belief for each country. Jensen’s analysis of whether
nations had rates of both malevolent and benevolent beliefs compared to those that had lower rates
of malevolent beliefs compared to benevolent ones did take this into account, e.g. some nations
were classed as “high dualists” (high levels of both beliefs), while others were more “moderate
dualists.” In Sweden for example less than half of the population believes in either Heaven or Hell,
so any difference between rates of the two beliefs would only affect a minority of the population.
This is in contrast to Mexico for instance where more than three quarters of the population profess
such beliefs. Within each of these countries though, the difference between rates of the two beliefs
is somewhat similar, even though the two nations are far apart in terms of overall belief.

Speaking of these two nations, Shariff and Rhemtulla’s chart indicates that Sweden has a higher
crime rate than Mexico. Considering that Mexico has one of the highest murder rates in the world,
not to mention high rates of crime in general, while Sweden has one of the lowest murder rates, I
have serious reservations about the accuracy of the national crime rate data used in this analysis, a
concern also expressed by scholar Gregory Paul.

Even though Shariff and Rhemtulla argue that belief in supernatural punishment can benefit
society by helping to suppress antisocial behavior, I suspect that that such beliefs may have
undesirable social costs. Belief in supernatural punishment as severely harsh as spending an
eternity in Hell implies that some people must be extremely evil to deserve such harsh treatment.
A study on belief in pure evil found that people who believed that some people are completely evil
are more likely to support violent retributive policies such as capital punishment and the use of
torture at Guantanamo Bay (Campbell & Vollhardt, 2013)15.

15
Campbell, M., & Vollhardt, J. R. (2013). Fighting the Good Fight: The Relationship Between Belief in Evil and Support for
Violent Policies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.

25