SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE marriage void.

Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be

CARIÑO, respondent. invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
Gancayco Balasbas & Associates for petitioner. necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
Atty. Agapito P. Oquindo, Jr.  for respondent. estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
SYNOPSIS upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. The first was with petitioner with whom determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
he begot two (2) children, while the second, during the subsistence of the first, was with documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
respondent with whom he had no issue. When he died in 1988 petitioner and respondent filed absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies. declaring such previous marriage void.
Petitioner collected P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig,
while respondent collected P21,000 from GSIS and SSS. Respondent, in an action for 2. ID.; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; LICENSE, REQUIRED; CASE
collection, sought to recover half the amount collected by petitioner. She claimed that she had AT BAR. — Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
no knowledge of the previous marriage with petitioner and presented evidence that the same Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
was contracted without the necessary marriage license. Judgment was rendered by the trial requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the
court in favor of respondent which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Hence, marriage voidab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner
this recourse. and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
The absence of a marriage license, as a general rule, renders the marriage void ab initio. notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
However, for purposes of remarriage, a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the previous bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
marriage must be obtained. For other purposes no such judicial action is required. Otherwise, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. It is beyond cavil, therefore,
the second marriage would also be void. that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
Article 148 of the Civil Code governs the property regime of bigamous marriages. Only the exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. 3. ID.; FAMILY CODE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID,
While union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND MARRIAGE; WITHOUT SUCH
contract marriage is governed by co-ownership under Article 147 of the Civil Code. Thus, the DECLARATION, SECOND MARRIAGE IS ALSO VOID. — Accordingly, the declaration in the
P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig earned by the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
deceased, in the absence of evidence that respondent contributed money, property or does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits, is owned by the deceased alone and remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. However, petitioner is entitled to one- the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
half of the subject "death benefits" as her share in the property regime and the other half shall respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. SCaITA
pass by to petitioner's children as the decedent's legal heirs.
4. ID.; ID.; BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; WAGES AND SALARIES EARNED BY EACH PARTY
BELONG TO HIM OR HER EXCLUSIVELY. — Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which
SYLLABUS refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in
a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons,
multiple alliances of the same married man, the properties acquired by the parties through
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING PREVIOUS their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
MARRIAGE VOID, NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND MARRIAGE. — Under each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first
Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 from second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to
MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting
PCCUI, are clearly remunerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies way back in 1982.
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to
the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said "death benefits" of the deceased shall claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
them. from "MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig," 3 while respondent Susan
Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from "GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS)." 4
6. ID.; ID.; VOID MARRIAGES OF PARTIES LEGALLY CAPACITATED AND NOT BARRED
BY ANY IMPEDIMENT; PROPERTY RELATIONSHIP GOVERNED BY CO-OWNERSHIP;  
CASE AT BAR. — As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In collectively denominated as "death benefits" which she (petitioner) received from "MBAI,
contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig." Despite service of summons, petitioner
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed "death benefits" were earned by the Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
one-half of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
DECISION —
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married
YNARES-SANTIAGO,  J p: in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as
requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages the records of this archives.
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose "death benefits" is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for
whatever legal purpose it may serve.  6
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632. follows:
 WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage
attorney 's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit. void ab initio. 14
IT IS SO ORDERED.  7 In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that: records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
I. license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the
CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
II.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE. declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
III. explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE cannot stand.
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8 It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such initio.
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the "death benefits" under scrutiny
the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
declaring such previous marriage void. 11 aDCIHE likewise, void ab initio.
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of
of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two
rightfully entitled to the subject "death benefits" of the deceased. marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community
or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code on "Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage."
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where maintenance of the family and of the household.
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17 — xxx xxx xxx

". . . [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions . . ." their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed "death benefits" were earned by the
therefore in order. deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from one-half of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said "death benefits" Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second
deceased is not one of them. wife, holding that:
  ". . .  [S]ince the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she
reads — has an interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute . . ."
ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
co-ownership. declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case
would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage." 21
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why
in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their
existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously
married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree
declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first
marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the
validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for
filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no
prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to
present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which
his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of
the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine
the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus,
in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void " in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney's fees in the
amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-
18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.