_______________

* EN BANC.

318

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 317

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
*
G.R. No. 83896. Frbeuary 22, 1991. Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE

the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
SECRETARY, respondent.
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
* reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
G.R. No. 83815. February 22, 1991. provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and calculated to effect that purpose.
CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as
Same; Same; Same; Same; The intent of the framers of the Constitution
Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as
was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family
Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary
in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR.,
elsewhere is concerned.—Evidently, from this move as well as in the
as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources; VICENTE V.
different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the
JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDONEZ, as
intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition
Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of
on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National Defense;
TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, Same; Same; Same; Same; Such intent is underscored by a comparison
as Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO of Section 13, Article VII when other provisions of the Constitution on the
ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other
CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE offices or employment.—Moreover, such intent is underscored by a
ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the
R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees
as Secretary of Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO from holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI,
CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA “(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
MONSOD, as Head of the National Economic Development other office or employment in the Government . . .”. Under Section 5(4),
Authority, respondents. Article XVI, “(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall,
at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Executive Order No. 284; of their subsidiaries.” Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by
The Court in construing a constitution should bear in mind the object respondents provides “(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
sought to be accomplished by its adoption and the evils if any sought to be functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
prevented or remedied; A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of employment in the Government.”
the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which
the Constitution was formed.—A foolproof yardstick in constitutional Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition imposed on the President
construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should private office or employment.—It is quite notable that in all these provisions
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-
be examined in owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is
the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that “(T)he President,
Vice-President, the Members
 320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
319
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 319 secretaries to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary prohibiting them from doing so.—In the light of the construction given to
Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
their tenure.” In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to
being qualified by the phrase “in the Government.” The prohibition imposed their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government
on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows
both public and private office or employment. them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The all-embracing prohibition prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
imposed on the President and his official family are proof of the intent of the Constitution itself.
1987 Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said
class stricter prohibitions.—Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; De facto officers; During their
second sentence provides: “They shall not, during said tenure, directly or tenure in the questioned position, respondents may be considered de facto
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.—
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled services rendered. It has been held that “in cases where there is no de jure,
corporations or their subsidiaries.” These sweeping, all-embracing officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office
prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the
such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,
and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem, allowances
or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
Same; Same; Same; Same; While all other appointive officials in the rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the PETITIONS to review the order of the Executive Secretary.
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
itself.—Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are      Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.
tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their      Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, FERNAN, C.J.:
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the 321
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 321
as it allows Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
320
1
August 9, 1988 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits
pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are: public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other
public officials enumerated in the 3
list attached to the petitions as
“SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his Annex “C” in G.R. No. 83815 and as Annex “B” in G.R. No.
4
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or 83896 from holding any other office or employment during their
other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality
his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the
and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the temporary restraining order directing public respondents therein to
Chairman. cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions,
“SECTION 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987
secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems
more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must and other forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return,
in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may
than bis primary position. have received from such positions.
“SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted “absolute and self-
members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or executing” provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.” Justice Sedfrey Ordonez, construing Section 13, Article VII in
relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23,
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, 5
1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, declaring that Cabinet
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
may hold other public office, including membership in the boards of
to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein
government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the
imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
2 Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made
Constitution, which provides as follows:
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They that on the basis of
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any _______________
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or in- 3 pp. 29-30, Rollo.
4 pp. 10-21, Rollo.
5 Annex “A”, Petition, G.R. No. 83815, pp. 21-24, Rollo.
_______________

1 P. 71, Rollo in G.R. No. 83815 and p. 28, Rollo in G.R. No. 83896.
323
2 Italics supplied.
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 323
322
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987, or
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
two (2) days before Congress convened 6
on July 27, 1987,
promulgated Executive Order No. 284.
strumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly
interest in the conduct of their office.”
“lumped together” Section 13, Article VII and the general provision
in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B. This “strained
linkage” between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct
and separate group of public officers—one, the President and her holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily
official family, and the other, public servants in general—allegedly included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate
“abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory positions).
constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being
for the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds
and their deputies and subalterns,
7
who are the leaders of government8 exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in
expected to lead by example,” Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2) the (Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase
provides: “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are
“Sec. 7. xxx     xxx     xxx those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President
“Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their 8 (1), Article VIII.
subsidiaries.” Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice (DOJ)
applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and
Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by
9 that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section
DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155,
10 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-
series of 1988, being the first official con-
President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President,
_______________
Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
6 Thereby, petitioner alleges, eliciting adverse published commentaries from assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government
CONCOM Commissioners Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S. J. and Regalado E. Maambong, admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement between petitioners
Congressman Rodolfo Albano of Isabela, and retired Supreme Court Justice Felix Q. and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the
Antonio, Annexes “D”, “E” and “F”, Petition, G.R. No. 83815, pp. 40-64, Rollo. exception. Petitioners insist that
CONCOM Vice-President Ambrosio B. Padilla, in a published article cited in the
325
annexes, also commented on EO 284.
7 p. 11, Rollo in G.R. No. 83815.
8 Italics supplied. VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 325
9 Annex “I”, Comment, G.R. No. 83896, pp. 62-67, Rollo. Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
10 Annex “2”, Ibid., pp. 68-71, Rollo.

324 because of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution” used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must
be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED President being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of
Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
struction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on
13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article IX-B of the the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise provided
Constitution, involving the same subject of appointments or in the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to
designations of an appointive executive official to positions other Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the appointive officials
than his primary position, is “reasonably valid and constitutionally mentioned therein are concerned.
firm,” and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in
DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed the limitation broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under
imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted
positions which, although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed anew, thus: “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
by the primary functions of the public official, but only to the functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or Particularly odious and revolting to the people’s sense of
controlled corporation or their subsidiaries.” propriety and morality in government service were the data
We rule in the negative. contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies,
intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-
been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Taneo,
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B.
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, Ancheta and Jose A. Roño of twelve (12) each;
and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the _______________
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the 12 R.B. No. 95, Monday, March 11, 1985, Record of the Batasan, Volume IV, pp.
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated 835-836.
11
to effect that purpose.
327

_______________
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 327
11 Maxwell vs. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448,44 L. Ed. 597.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
326
Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Peña of ten (10)
13
each.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the
serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming
and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
various government agencies and instrumentalities, including convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former
government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution the
during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies, governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly observed
instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in these
corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution
presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or during the campaign for its ratification was the assurance given by
assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members
with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances holding multiple positions in the government and collecting
and other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be
remained up to the present time. discontinued.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7,
government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the
took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was strongly subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
12
denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. This Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President,
Commission on Audit, entitled “1983 Summary Annual Audit Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
Report on: Government-owned and Controlled Corporations, Self- from holding any other office or employment during their tenure,
Governing Boards and Commissions” which carried as its Figure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
No. 4 a “Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Evidently, from this move as well as in the different
Government-owned and Controlled Corporations as ofDecember 31, phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent
1983.” of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class
holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere stricter prohibitions.
is concerned.
329
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section
13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the
disqualifications of certain public officials or employees VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 329
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
_______________

13 pp. 11-14. Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter

with the President and his official family was also succinctly
328 articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner
Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and debate
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions,
originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary on the Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, “We
actually have to be stricter with the President and the members of
from holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore, more
VI, “(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may checks and restraints on them are14 called for because there is more
hold any other office or employment in the Government . . .”. Under possibility of abuse in their case.”
Section 5(4), Article XVI, “(N)o member of the armed forces in the Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.” Even Section 7 functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
(2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides “(U)nless and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
employment in the Government.” public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
office or employment in the government and government-owned or This being the case, the qualifying phrase “unless otherwise
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is provided in this Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot
the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that “(T)he possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7,
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the
tenure.” In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-
being qualified by the phrase “in the Government.” The prohibition President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with
imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all- respect to holding other offices or employment in the government
embracing and covers both public and private office or employment. during their tenure. Respon-dents’ interpretation that Section 13 of
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of
provides: “They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or the Execu-
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or _______________
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” These sweeping, all-
embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official 14 Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 553.
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
330
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members
of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and 330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable,
and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
tive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one 20
nugatory.
hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any
is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
other office or position in the government during their tenure.
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
Moreover, respondents’ reading of the provisions in question
holding multiple offices or employment in the government during
would render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive
employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as an
and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B is
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language
absolutely ineligible “for appointment or designation in any capacity
used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
to any public office or position during his tenure.” Surely, to say that 21
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase
the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” found in
“unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” must be given a
Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article
literal interpretation to refer only to those’ particular instances cited
IX-B would render meaningless the specific provisions of the
in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-Presi-dent being appointed
Constitution15authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of
as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or
the Cabinet, and to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-
acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
Presidency where the President shall not have been chosen or fails to
16 (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
qualify. Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section
interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e.,
8 (1), Article VIII.
Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B providing the general rule and the
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
Executive officials specified therein without additional
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so _______________
17
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. 308 Ky 73, 212 SW 2d 521.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and 19 People vs. Wright, 6 Col. 92.
interpreted 18together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the 20 Thomas M. Colley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, p. 128,
Constitution and one section is not to be citing Attorney-General vs. Detroit and Erin Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 114; People vs.
Burns, 5 Mich. 114 ; District Township vs. Dubuque, 7 Iowa 262.
_______________ 21 Varney vs. Justice, 86 Ky 596; 6 S.W. 457; Hunt vs. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, 3
S.W. 233.
15 Sec. 3, Ibid.
16 Sec. 7, Article VII. 332
17 Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. vs. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 51 L Ed 345, 27 S Ct
236; Wallace vs. Payne, 197 Cal 539, 241 P. 879.
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
18 Grantz vs. Grauman (Ky) 320 SW 2d 364; Runyon vs. Smith,
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
331

required22 by the primary functions of said officials’ office. The

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 331 reason is that these posts do no comprise “any other office” within
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
23
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
19 consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines
can be made to stand together.
cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized under
 28
Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the
Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio
29
National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the
30
Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to Light Rail Transit Authority.
exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited. position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board Inspection Board,31 thus: “An examination of section 2 of the
of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and
or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated by the
both of which are attached to his department for policy coordination respective department heads. With the exception of the
and guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and Assistant representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to
Secretaries chair these agencies. The Secretaries
24
of Finance and be designated they must already be holding positions in the offices
Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board. Neither can their mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a
respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the
Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking employees act, be designated a representative from that office. The same is true
in providing
25
policy direction in the areas of money, banking and with respect to the represen-
credit.
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended _______________
such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously
operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as 26 Hirabayashi vs. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 87 L.Ed. 1774, 63 S. Ct. 1375; Opp
demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or Cotton Mills, Inc. vs. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126,85 L. Ed.
absurd consequences, if possible, should 624,61 S. Ct. 524; Gage vs. Jordan, 23 Cal 2d 794, 174 P 2d, 287 cited in 16 Am Jur
2d, pp. 100, 464.
27 Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 516; 15A Words and Phrases, p. 392.
_______________
28 15A Words and Phrases, p. 392.
22 As opposed to the term “allowed” used in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 29 Sec. 7, E.O. 778.
Constitution, which is permissive. “Required” suggests an imposition, and therefore, 30 Sec. 1, E.O. 210.
obligatory in nature. 31 21 SCRA 336 (1967).
23 Martin v. Smith, 140 A.L.R. 1073; Ashmore v. Greater Green-ville Sewer
District, 173 A.L.R. 407. 334
24 Executive Order No. 16, May 9, 1986, 82 O.G. 2117.
25 Sec. 20, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. 334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
333 Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 333 tatives from the order offices. No new appointments are neces sary.
This is as it should be, because the representatives so designated
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those already
32

26
performed under their original appointments.”
be avoided. The term “primary” used to describe “functions” refers to the
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not order of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The
33
to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. The
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the primary functions of the concerned official’s office. required by the official’s primary functions. Examples of
The term ex-officio means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers designations to positions by virtue of one’s primary functions are the
to an “authority derived from official character merely, not expressly Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and
official position.” Ex-officio likewise denotes an “act done in an Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry
34
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any Authority and the Civil Aeronautics Board. If the functions
27
other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.” required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related,
An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary
of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall
28
under the purview of “any other office” prohibited by the no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the
Constitution. An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for
as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
on the cabinet official management functions and/or monetary meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he
compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary
directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and
their subsidiaries. banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice- department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to
President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
skill in their respective executive offices is a practice long- compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on
demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination
among the different offices in the Execu- _______________

35 Section 17, Article VII.

_______________

32 Italics supplied. 336

33 33A Words and Phrases, p. 210, citing Collector of Revenue vs. Louisiana
Ready Mix Co., La. App., 197 S. 2d 141, 145. 336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
34 Sec. 7, P.D. No. 474.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
335
the proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7,
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 335 par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the General
Provisions,36
the exception “unless required by the functions of his
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary position,” express reference to certain high-ranking appointive
37
public officials like members of the Cabinet were made.
tive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing Responding to a query of Commissioner Bias Ople, Commissioner
and implementing laws affecting national interest and general Monsod pointed out that there are instances when although not
welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent required by current law, membership of certain high-ranking
with the power vested on the President and his alter egos, the executive officials in other offices and corporations is necessary by
Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive departments, reason of said officials’ primary functions. The example given by
38
bureaus and35
offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of Trade and Industry.
executed. Without these additional duties and functions being While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople
assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the may be used as authority for saying that additional functions and
governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or duties flowing from the primary functions of the official may be
instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as imposed upon him without offending the constitutional prohibition;
required by their primary functions, they would be deprived of the under consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for
means for control and supervision, thereby resulting in an unwieldy saying that this exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article
and confused bureaucracy. IX-B. This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties the plenary session of September 27,1986. Under consideration then
or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section was Section 3 of Committee Resolution 39
No. 531 which was the
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or proposed article on General Provisions. At that time, the article on
functions must be required by the primary functions of the official the Civil Service 40Commission had been approved on third reading
concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as on July 22, 1986, while the article on the Executive Department,
provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, 41 had also been
therefor. earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986. It was only
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and “styling”
part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has
by the Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by
Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B the people

_______________ _______________

36 The phrase that appears in the Constitution is not “Unless required by the 42 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, 2. 31, p. 105.
primary functions” but “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions 43 Commonwealth vs. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl 220.
. . .”
37 Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, pp 165-166. 338
38 Italics supplied, Ibid., p. 165.
39 Ibid., Vol. V., pp. 80-81. 338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
40 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 94.
Civil Liberties Union us. Executive Secretary
41 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 710.
44
337 adopting it than in the framers’s understanding thereof.
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 337 the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself
and reworded “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional
functions of his position. . .” compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of
which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of Cabinet members (then called Minis-ters) as examples during the
specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
at issue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
qualified and delimited phrase “primary functions” as the basis of an which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the
exception to the general rule covering all appointive public officials. people’ understanding thereof.
Had the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the specific In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in
prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could have re-worded relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of the proposed general Provisions, later placed as Section Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission. undersecretaries or assistant sec-retaries may hold in addition to
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
President and his official family is by reason of the legal principles government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B. At any rate, we direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article
have made it clear that only the additional functions and duties VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
“required,” as opposed to “allowed,” by the primary functions may otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
be considered as not constituting “any other office.” The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates consequences that will result from a strict application of the
and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,
42
resort thereto operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity, by
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the executive official concerned without additional compensation as
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the _______________
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to43 construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper 44 Household Finance Corporation vs. Shaffner, 203, S.W 2d 734 356 Mo. 808.
 339 that “in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 22, 1991 339
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This
doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it
his office do not fall under the definition of “any other office” within seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for
47
other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including such services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments
chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in
corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
impractical consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the
an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby
job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department SO ORDERED.
head’s ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his
duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other      Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded from Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many concur.
positions of responsibility, which may result in haphaz-ardness and           Paras, J., I concur because cabinet members like the
inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this members of the Supreme Court are not supermen.
concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at      Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino, JJ., No part.
this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh
Petitions granted.
the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head
spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can Note.—View that the language of the Constitution should be read
handle. in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, its adoption (People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107).
the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources
45
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local ——o0o——
Government Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V.
Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary _______________
of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their
other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, 47 Patterson vs. Benson, 112 Pac. 801, 32 L.R.A. (NS) 949.
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
341
subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the
petitions have become moot and aca-demic as they are no longer
occupying the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may
be considered de facto officers
46
and as such entitled to emoluments
for actual services rendered. It has been held

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45 Now Department of Interior and Local Governments.

46 Castillo vs. Arrieta, G.R. No. L-31444, November 13, 1974, 61 SCRA 55.

340

340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary