A 393361
A 393361
Newport, R.I.
by
Thomas E. Glazer
LtCol, USMC
Signature: _____________________________
18 May 2001
Distribution/Availability Statement
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
Supplementary Notes
Abstract
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29
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1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:
9. Personal Authors:
LtCol Thomas E. Glazer, USMC
15.Abstract: The 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War provides the operational commander
with an excellent opportunity to examine the importance of the application, or
misapplication, of the principles of war in a conflict. This paper does not assert the
principles of war as absolute truths that must be obeyed. It is intended to reinforce
the validity of the principles as operational planning tools and that adherence to them
will not necessarily guarantee success or that the misapplication of one or two will
lead to an irrecoverable situation; but that the complete disregard for their concepts
will almost certainly spell disaster. This paper will review the Middle East’s prewar
strategic setting, then briefly describe the air operation, the battles for the Sinai,
the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Next, using the principles of war as a guide, the
war will be analyzed from both the Israeli and Arab perspectives. The paper will
conclude with some lessons learned from the conflict.
1
Abstract of
for the Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Next,
conflict.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
List of Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Strategic Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Air Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Sinai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
iv
INTRODUCTION
Others believe their utility has past.3 This paper does not
address that debate and does not assert the principles of war
disaster.
for the Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Next,
1
Russell Glenn, “No More Principles of War”, Parameters, Spring 1998, p. 64.
2
John Alger, The Quest for Victory, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. xviii.
3
Col Herbert Tiede, “Principles of War”, Marine Corps Gazette, April 1995, p. 54.
1
paper will conclude with some lessons learned from the
conflict.
STRATEGIC SETTING
Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and Yemen were all very outspoken
2
Emergency Forces from their positions along the 1948-56 cease-
commercial life…”.5
AIR OPERATIONS
there.
The heart of the plan called for the IAF to use the
4
Ernest and Trevor Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, From 3500 B.C. to the Present, (New York:
Harpers & Row, 1977), p. 1230.
5
Richard Humble, Famous Land Battles, From Agicourt to the Six Day War, (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1979), p. 167.
6
Dupuy, p. 1231.
3
In order to deliver a powerful enough blow to the Arab Air
Forces the IAF had to mass almost all its combat aircraft for
ten Egyptian airfields in the first phase and nine more on the
already flown their first morning combat air patrols and the
eight waves. Each wave had four aircraft that spent about ten
minutes over the target. Each wave was followed, usually less
than three minutes later by the next. After the initial eight
waves the Egyptians were allowed to catch their breath for ten
7
Randolph and Winston Churchill, The Six Day War, (Boston: Houghton, 1967), p. 82.
4
minutes then the next eighty-minute attack commenced. By noon
attacked in the Sinai, the Suez Canal Zone, the Cairo Area,
the Nile valley and the western bank of the Red Sea. In the
first three hours of the war, the Egyptian Air Force lost 300
combat aircraft.8
Forces from the war. In a few hours Syria had lost 60 combat
8
Maj Charles Long, Analysis of the Six-Day War, June 1967, (U.S. Air University: Air Command and Staff
College, 1984), p. 6.
9
Ibid, p. 6.
5
allowed the IAF to concentrate on close air support missions
THE SINAI
back from the border with Israel deep into the heart of the
central Sinai.”11
10
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 154.
11
Ibid, p. 154.
12
Nadav Safran, Israel-The Embattled Ally, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 243.
6
sea of sand dunes, between the other two avenues of approach.
The final phase was to capture the mountain passes, Mitla and
the Suez Canal. The Egyptians lost 12,000 men and 700 tanks;
the Israelis, on the other hand, lost 275 men and 61 tanks.15
and 287 tanks.16 These units were deployed along the Judean
match.17
13
Herzog, p. 156.
14
Herzog, p. 154.
15
Safran, p. 246.
16
Dupuy, p. 1231.
17
Safran, p. 248.
7
The Israeli ground offensive, on this front, started at
River. By 2000 on June 7 th, the conquest of the West bank was
missing and had lost 125 tanks; the Israelis had lost 550
men.19
artillery pieces.20
other two fronts assured, the Israelis were able to turn their
18
Herzog, p. 168.
19
Ibid, p. 183.
20
Edgar O’Ballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1972), p. 233.
8
the Golan Heights. On this front, Israel would start with
20,000 troops and would have 30,000 troops and 250 tanks by
areas that offered the most difficult terrain to cross but had
2500 men and 120 tanks; the Israelis lost 115 men and 100
tanks.23
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
21
O’Ballance, p. 236.
22
Herzog, p. 184.
23
Safran, p. 256.
9
principles of war provide a useful template in analyzing a
However, when more than “was not applied” can be written the
SURPRISE
the Israelis raised the bar on the gains that can be achieved
time leading up to the war the Israelis sent out several large
air patrols near the Gulf of Aqaba. This led the Egyptians to
24
O’Ballance, p. 66.
25
Kessing, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, the 1967 Campaign, (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1968), p. 25.
10
taken part in the raids. By using these deceptive techniques
26
O’Ballance, p. 83.
27
Herzog, p. 157.
11
a diversionary attack on another sector of the front. On the
terrain the Israelis were able to catch the Syrians off guard.
few real aircraft were left intact while almost no decoys were
SECURITY
strike that started the war was planned years in advance and
12
rehearsed frequently before June 5th,28 the Israelis were able
what was about to hit them; if they did they failed to take
OBJECTIVE
strike that would destroy the Egyptian Air Force when it was
least ready.
28
Long, p. 5.
13
The Arabs had an objective, the destruction of the state
OFFENSIVE
ground offensive until 1100 on June 5 th. Worst of all were the
UNITY OF COMMAND
Moshe Dayan; who could and did move forces from front to front
when needed.
29
Long, p. 29.
14
Command and control for the air operation was superb.
and employed on the morning of the 5th, the Israelis would have
their Air Forces one at a time. This would have denied or, at
not have enjoyed the freedom of movement that they had and
of their missions.
15
command and their operational command and control was poor.
could be established.
MANEUVER
the Golan Heights the Israelis did the same thing by choosing
rear exposed.30
ECONOMY OF FORCE
every front at the same the time, Israel would not allow
action until the outcomes of the other fronts were secured and
16
example of using only the forces needed, a Paratroop Brigade
the Sinai, where they were no longer needed, to the West Bank
MASS
attacks.
the Arabs did not mass their forces and bring a three front
30
O’Ballance, p. 166.
31
O’Ballance, p. 184.
32
Col Israel Krieger and LtCol Raanan Falk, Do We Debrief Successful Wars The Same Way We Debrief
Failures?, (U.S. Air University: Air War College, 1989), p. 13.
33
Long, p.13.
17
Heights started the Syrians failed to mass their artillery
SIMPLICITY
LESSONS LEARNED
34
Long, p. 42.
35
Alger, p. 174.
18
to the fundamentals conceptualized in the principles of war.
looking back at their last war. One reason the Egyptians were
their easy victory in this war, will learn little from it and
will have contempt for Arab soldiers. The Arabs on the other
hand will learn many lessons, chief among them the necessity
have a very serious impact on how both sides prepare for and
fight the first few days of their next war, the 1973 Yom
Kippur War.
19
20
21
22
23
BIBILOGRAPHY
23