Terror Throughout the Land: Terrorist Attacks in Western Europe

Ilan Michael Shalev

PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism

Professor John Books

 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
Terror Throughout the Land: Terrorist Actions in Europe

Why do terrorists pick the targets they choose? Can anything significant be

deduced by how an attack is carried out, the weapons and logistics used or the people involved,

targeted or avoided? This paper will look at four terrorist attacks, two nationalist and two

religious that have taken place in Europe and will focus on the more well known groups. First,

we will look at the Provisional Irish Republican Army also known as the Provos or PIRA and the

attack on the Derryard Checkpoint. Next, we will evaluate the Basque separatist group Euskadi

Ta Askatasuna or ETA and the assassination of Francoist Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero

Blanco. Third, we will look at the Black September attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich

Olympics. Finally we will focus on the Glasgow International Airport firebomb attack of 2007.

In evaluating these attacks we will look at the people involved, the target selected, the why and

how of the attack, the logistics and finally the outcome of the attacks.

While there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, the FBI defines it as “the

unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a

government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social

objectives.”1 Other definitions explicitly state that terrorism is a tactic used against civilians.2 If

an action is used against a military target, it may be termed asymmetric warfare defined as “a

broad and unpredictable spectrum of military, paramilitary, and information operations,

conducted by nations, organizations, or individuals or by indigenous or surrogate forces under

their control, specifically targeting weaknesses and vulnerabilities within an enemy government

1
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism 2002-2005. Washington, DC., 2006. http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02_05 (accessed November 21, 2010.)
2
Walter Laqueur. Quoted in Steven Best, Terrorists or Freedom Fighters: Reflections on the Liberation of Animals.
(New York: Lantern Books, 2004), 371.

2
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
or armed force.”3 For the purposes of this paper, I will use the FBI’s definition which may be

interpreted to cover all targets, military or civilian.

The Provisional IRA is not the first, nor the last manifestation of the armed struggle to

secure a united Ireland under sole Irish rule. These roots extend all the way back to the late

1700s, when the Society of United Irishmen instigated an uprising against the Crown.4 While the

rebellion ultimately failed, the desire for self-rule has never left the Irish spirit. The Provos

themselves grew out of another revolutionary group, the Irish Republican Army which was in

turn a descendent of the Irish Volunteers, who carried out the Easter Uprising of 1916.5 While

the IRA was seen as “shrewder and sharper,” the Provos were the “militant” side of the schism.6

It would be the Provos that would develop the “Armalite and Ballot Box Strategy” of armed

action coupled with political gains by Sinn Féin to gain the withdrawal of British forces due to

overwhelming public pressure.7

To affect the Armalite portion of the strategy, the Provos embarked on a campaign of

bombings, sniper attacks and small scale guerrilla combat against the British army and Irish

police units. The inevitable heavy handed reaction of security forces against these actions

however would lead to an upwelling of public support for the Provos.8 This further emboldened

the Provos to take on more complex and dangerous missions. One of the most spectacular actions
3
Michael Kolodzie. “Commentary: The Asymmetric Threat,” Army Logistician 33, no. 4 (July-August 2001).
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug01/MS628.htm (accessed November 22, 2010).
4
“The Irish Uprising of 1798,” History Today, 48, no. 6 (June 1998): 12, https://libproxy.library.unt.edu:9443/login?
url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=wdh&AN=689654&site=ehost-live&scope=site
(accessed November 22, 2010)
5
Peter Hart, “The Social Structure of the Irish Republican Army, 1916-1923, The Historical Journal 42, no. 1
(March 1999): 207, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3020901 (accessed November 21, 2010).
6
Marc Mulholland, “Irish Republican Politics and Violence Before the Peace Process, 1968-1994,” European
Review of History14, no. 3 (September 2007): 400, https://libproxy.library.unt.edu:9443/login?
url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=wdh&AN=27256703&site=ehost-live&scope=site
(accessed November 21, 2010)
7
John A. Hannigan, “The Armalite and the Ballot Box: Dilemmas of Strategy and Ideology in the Provisional IRA”
Social Problems 33, no. 1 (October 1985): 34, http://www.jstor.org/stable/800629 (accessed November 21, 2010).
8
Mullholland, 401.

3
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
would occur in December 1989 when the Derryard Checkpoint was attacked by a Provo unit of

“at least 12 terrorists armed with rockets, flamethrowers, Armalite and AK47 rifles, machine

guns and fragmentation grenades.”9 The checkpoint itself was located in Derryard, Fermanagh

County and was manned by a small detachment of the Kings Own Scottish Borderers as well as a

lone officer of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

In preparing for the attack, the Provo unit was much more heavily armed than the guard

unit. The operation itself would be carried out by a special “flying column” of about twenty

handpicked veterans. To ensure strict secrecy, only a few of the group was told of the plan with

the majority of men would not be told until right before the operation.10 The plan itself was

audacious in its scope. A small unit was tasked to close off the roads into and out of the

checkpoint while the bulk of the flying column was to attack the base itself. To carry out the

attack, the Provos were able to draw on Libyan supplied arms including a flamethrower and

heavy machine guns. The ultimate goal was to provide cover for a 400 pound van-borne bomb

that would be exploded next to the soldier’s living quarters.11

The Provos that were known to operate in the Fermanagh area were not known for spur

of the moment actions. In fact, the Army saw them as highly professional; integrating common

military tactics such as reconnaissance, proper operational planning and ensuring superiority of

firepower before engaging in such an operation. Nor could they be considered cowards.

According to a senior Army officer discussing the Derryard operation; “They are murdering

9
The Kings Own Scottish Borderers, “20th and 21st Centuries,” http://kosb.webs.com/20thcentury.htm (accessed
November 21, 2010)
10
Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York: WW Norton and Co, 2002), 333.
11
Ibid.

4
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
bastards, but they are not cowards. This team actually pressed home a ground attack right into

the heart of the compound. That takes guts when there are people firing back.”12

Initially, the attack was a success. The Provos were able to infiltrate the base and place

the bomb while killing two soldiers in the KOSB: L/Cpl Michael Patterson and Pte James

Houston while wounding a third. What the flying column did not count on was a nearby British

patrol that heard the gunfight and moved to engage. Supported by a helicopter, the British patrol

moved in close to engage, driving the Provo unit off before it could complete its mission.13

At the same time the mission was a success and a failure. A heavily armed, highly trained

and well organized small unit was able to battle their way into a hardened target and plant a large

bomb while killing two professional soldiers and apparently taking no casualties in return.14

However the bomb did not go off and further investigation showed that the fuse had been

sabotaged at some point. The Provos were robbed of a substantial victory because of a traitor, a

common problem for the IRA. This failure would mean an end to the “flying column” after only

one operation.15 Within a few years though, the checkpoint was gone. Though the government

claimed it was not a result of the attack and stated that mobile patrols were more effective, some

believed it was in response to the action.16

In the larger scheme of things, the Derryard operation was hardly out of the norm for the

Provos. One of their primary strategies of this time was to attack British and Loyalist personnel,

so the ability to potentially take out men of both hated institutions at once was probably too

12
Ian Bruce, “Calculating, Professional Enemy that Faces KSOB,” Herald Scotland, December 15, 1989,
http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/calculating-professional-enemy-that-faces-kosb-1.598672
(accessed November 21, 2010)
13
Moloney, 333-334.
14
Bruce, “Calculating Professional Enemy that Faces KSOB.”
15
Moloney, 334.
16
“Northern News,” The Irish Emigrant, March 25, 1991, http://www.emigrant.ie/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=36958&Itemid=200 (accessed November 23, 2010).

5
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
much to ignore. It was also not the only checkpoint attack, coming a few years before the more

successful Cloghogue checkpoint attack where a similar gun battle and bombing successfully

destroyed a vehicle checkpoint and left another British soldier dead.17 The strategy of attacking

defended checkpoints was not as efficient as the sniping campaign, but had the added

psychological and propaganda benefits of appearing to take the fight into the enemy’s lairs.

Francoist Spain was not a pleasant place for anyone who was not of the same

philosophical mindset as the ruling class. Francisco Franco was the product of a tyrannical,

freewheeling father and a devoutly religious mother who would be the major influence over his

life and whose Catholic morals would shape Franco’s ideology.18 Unlike his father and

grandfather who were navy men, Franco was forced to join the Army and attended the officer’s

academy in Toledo where he graduated well in the lower half of his class. However when he

went into battle during the Moroccan crisis he developed a reputation as a cool, brave and

prepared combat officer. Eventually his merits would see him made the youngest general officer

in the Spanish Army.19

While Franco’s star was rising, the Spanish government’s was plummeting. This was a

ripe time for various groups to rise up and demand radical change in the governmental and social

conditions of the country.20 It was during this period the monarchy abdicated and a coup led by

General José Surjano failed. Franco did not take part in the coup, but his associations with hard

right former Prime Minister Primo de Rivera caused his being cashiered first in the Balearic

Islands, then later the Canary Islands far from power.21

17
Paul Rocks. “Watchtower with a History,” BBC News, May 9, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/3014291.stm (accessed November 23, 2010).
18
Paul H. Lewis, Latin Fascist Elites: The Mussolini, Franco and Salazar Regimes (Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishers, 2002), 71.
19
Ibid., 71-72.
20
Ibid., 72.
21
Ibid., 72-73.

6
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
Politically things began to come to a head at this point. With the election of a far left

government, landowners and businessmen began to rally around the most traditional of Spanish

institutions: the Catholic Church. The left government began to crack down on rightist groups

such as the Falangists and Bloque Nacional, arresting, imprisoning and executing leaders such as

Calvo Sotelo, leaders of the Bloque Nacional. It was his murder that finally caused the military

to revolt and Franco to begin mobilizing his former Moroccan troops.22

The Spanish Civil War was a bloody, international affair, with Franco being supported by

Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.23 On the other side, advisors and equipment for the Republicans

were supplied by the Soviet Union.24 In the end, it would be Franco and his Nationalists that

would come out on top. Through savvy political maneuvering and not a little luck, Franco had

managed to get himself proclaimed the Caudillo, or supreme leader of the Nationalists. As the

war wound down, Franco began to set up his government and lay down his view of how the

country was to be run.25

To put into one word the general thrust of policies that Franco instituted, perhaps “ultra-

conservative” is the most apt. His ultimate goal was to save the country from chaos and he

fashioned his political theories on that single basis.26 The chief source of laws were the teachings

of the Catholic Church which now rose to a prominence not seen since before the Republican

government had relegated them to a secondary role in Spanish society. Strikes, political parties

and many forms of free expression were illegalized. The act of striking alone was codified as

22
Ibid., 74.
23
Ibid., 75.
24
James M. Anderson, The Spanish Civil War: A History and Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
2003), 90-91.
25
Lewis, 75-76.
26
Library of Congress. “Spain: Franco’s Political System,” http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/estoc.html#es0033
(accessed November 22, 2010).

7
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
treason against the State, as it was the duty of every Spaniard to serve the State alone. Most

importantly for this paper, he did away with regional autonomy, strengthened the central

government, and severely curtailed the traditions of the Catalan and Basque minorities.27

Perhaps no other group suffered as much as the Basques. For centuries, they had been left

to effectively rule themselves with few exceptions. Fueros, or charters of rights and privileges

given by the Crown, had been granted to the Basques in the Middle Ages and except for a period

after the French invasion of 1812 and again around the Carlist Wars, there had been little effort

to take them away. Franco, however, saw them as a serious impediment to his centralization of

powers. As well, the drive for modernization controlled by a centralized apparatus instituted by

Franco was, if not intentionally designed to, effective in trampling Basque customs and practices.

It was inevitable that the Basque people would begin to push back against these attacks on their

heritage.28

The ETA grew out of the Basque National Party, or PNV, and Ekin, a militant youth

group that saw the PNV as too passive.29 In 1962, the ETA held their First Assembly and laid out

what would be the guiding principles of the movement. Among them were the following:

1. “ETA is a Basque revolutionary national liberation movement.”

2. “Its goal is the creation of an independent Basque Country.”

3. “ETA requests the disappearance of economic liberalism. It calls for the socialization

of basic resources and the development of cooperatives as the basis of the

economy of the new Basque State.”

27
Ibid.
28
Cameron J. Watson, Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual Origins of the
ETA (Reno: University of Nevada/ Center for Basque Studies, 2007), 185.
29
Ibid.

8
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
4. “The way to reach these goals is through ‘armed fight.’”30

The ETA moved fast to implement these ideas. Using bank robbery, kidnapping, murder,

and extortion, they began to push hard against the government.31 But this would not be enough

and the ETA knew they must strike at the leaders of the Franco government. One such possible

target was Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, a trusted confidant and friend of Franco’s as well as his

deputy leader. Carrero Blanco was named as Prime Minister by Franco due to ailing health in

1973; striking at him would also be striking “against the future of the regime.”32

The ETA decided to assassinate Carrero Blanco and began to lay out the plan. He was

known to be very much a “creature of habit, attending Mass daily in the same church in mid-

Madrid near the American embassy.”33 Knowing what car he drove, the small guard he usually

had and the route he would take, the ETA began the hunt.34 The operation was dubbed Operation

Ogre, a play on the nickname given to Carrero Blanco by the ETA. The main goal behind the

mission was to strike the most important person in the Francoist government and shake the

political structure enough that it would fall once Franco, already in failing health, died.35

The group charged with carrying out the assassination chose to use a bomb as opposed to

kidnapping or shooting. Once named Prime Minister, the guard on Carrero Blanco increased

heavily and shooting was too chancy. During the surveillance, the team noticed that the car the

target drove in stopped at the same spot every day. The decision was made to use an explosive

device hidden in a shallow trench. To cover the necessary commotion, the team disguised

themselves as workers building large sculptures. Under this cover, they spent a week and a half
30
Yovnah Alexander, Michael S. Swetnam, and Herbert M. Levine, ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group (Ardsley,
NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001), 4-5.
31
Ibid., 5.
32
Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime: 1936-1975 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 585, 588.
33
Ibid., 588.
34
Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History of the World (New York: Walker Publishing Co., 1999), 253.
35
Ibid.

9
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
digging a tunnel from a small apartment under the street to where Carrero Blanco would park.

After completing the tunnel they packed it with over 150 pounds of dynamite and waited.36

The chosen day was to be December 20, 1973. This was the day that a show trial of

Communist labor leaders was to commence. On that morning and precisely on time the car

carrying Carrero Blanco stopped in its usual place. At 9:30 AM, the bomb was detonated and the

car was thrown over fifty feet in the air, over the cathedral and monastery and landed on a

balcony, the occupants dead. Confusion reigned and in the immediate aftermath, Franco was told

that his friend had died in a gas explosion. However, the truth soon became known and the

Francoist state eventually slid to inevitable ruin.37

With Carrero Blanco dead, the future of the government became a question mark. A new

Prime Minister, Carlos Arias Navarro was appointed, but Francoism was for all intents and

purposes dead. The fact that Francoism died with Franco seems to suggest that the assassination

of Carrera Blanco was a resounding success. The nation itself was relieved and began to make

plans to form a democratic government.38 The people felt enough sense of impending freedom

that they began to make jokes about Carrero Blanco. Two common jokes heard on the street

were that “the Admiral had become the first Spanish astronaut” and “Una bache mas, un cabron

menos” or “one more pothole, one less asshole.”39

On November 20, 1975, the end of the Francoist regime came with the death of its

namesake from several health issues. The proclamation of his death was read by Prime Minister

Arias and the plans for succession began. Two days later, Juan Carlos de Bourbon, personally

named to sit on the throne by Franco himself took the oath as King of Spain and the transition

36
Kurlansky, 253-254; Payne 588.
37
Kurlansky, 254.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.

10
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
from a dictatorship to an open democracy began its first halting steps.40 At first, the Francoists

that remained in government pushed to continue the repression of the Basques but the King,

thought to be little more than a handsome figurehead, eventually prevailed and began granting

limited autonomy to the Basque people.41 Among the wishes of the Basques that were eventually

granted were a general amnesty for political prisoners, the right to display the Basque flag, or

ikurriña, and the right to form an autonomous government approved by the national legislature

was permitted in the new Constitution.42 Among the local functions allowed are local

parliaments, schools, roads and tax systems.43

This seems to have had a deleterious effect on the ETA. The last three decades has seen

sporadic acts of bombings, extortion and murder intermixed with periods of ceasefires. As usual,

the attacks have been directed at such targets as businessmen, politicians, the Guardia Civil, and

important landmarks such as the Madrid airport and Lemoniz nuclear power plant. However, the

Spanish government has been unwilling to give the ETA the complete autonomy that they desire

and for the most part the Basque people have accepted the status quo, undermining the ETA’s

support. This support dipped so low that in September of 2010, the ETA has stated that they will

no longer carry out actions, though the Spanish government does not believe this.44 For now,

though, the Spanish peninsula is in a “wait and see mode” to see what ETA will do next.

The fall of 1972 was a heady time for the world. In Munich, the largest Olympic Games

ever, and the first Games held in Germany since Hitler was in power, opened with more than

7000 athletes marching into the stadium. Among these were a few dozen Israeli athletes who saw

40
Payne, 619-620.
41
Kurlansky, 267.
42
Ibid., 269, 271, 274.
43
Ibid., 274-275.
44
Giles Tremlett, “ETA Declares Permanent Ceasefire,” The Guardian, March 23, 2006.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/mar/23/spain.topstories3 (accessed November 23, 2010)

11
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
this opportunity to raise the blue and white Israeli flag on German soil as the ultimate defeat of

Nazism by the Jewish people. This small group’s return to a place that just thirty years before

was the homeland of the most dangerous threat to the Jewish people was also a grand

opportunity for the world to see that Germany had repudiated its horrific past.45

To facilitate the appearance of a “New Germany,” organizers kept minimal security on

hand and other control features such as the fence around the athlete’s village was notoriously

easy to sneak over.46 This led to widespread unease among everyone concerned as documented in

the Kopel report which stated “the testimony of athletes, delegation leaders, journalists and

television crews makes clear that members of the delegation, other officials, and family members

frequently talked among themselves about the obvious lack of security in the village, particularly

their housing.”47 This lack of security was to have horrific consequences because of the Black

September Organization.

The Black September Group was a new development in the patchwork of Palestinian

militant groups. They formed as a response to Jordanian repression and massacre of Palestinians

with the goal of avenging these killings.48 While a very secret, decentralized organ of Fatah, they

were controlled by Yasser Arafat, who decided to use them to enhance his prestige in the

world.49 For the first several months, the organization focused on Jordanian targets, so perhaps it

can be expected that Mossad would be caught off guard at the high jacking of a Tel Aviv bound

airliner by Black September operatives. However, their continued insistence that this was an

45
Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response, trans. Mitch
Ginsburg (New York: Random House, 2005), 24-25.
46
Ibid., 26.
47
Ibid., 27.
48
Ibid., 31.
49
Ibid., 32.

12
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
anomaly and that Jordan was to remain the prime target shows the indifference of the Israeli

intelligence services towards the BSO.50

The operation itself was very well set up. Those that knew the specifics of the plot were

kept to the barest minimum, numbering about half a dozen. There was also an outer group

responsible for transporting weapons, arranging apartments and cars and obtaining forged

documents were more numerous, but were informed of nothing beyond their specific tasks.51

Two of these people, termed saya’an or “helper,” were responsible for smuggling in the eight

AK-47s, hundreds of rounds of ammunition and ten grenades that would be used to in attack;

stashing them at a train station to be picked up by a member of the operational group.52

The operational group itself consisted of eight men from the age of nineteen and up and

included various pursuits such as a chemistry student and a soccer player. A few had lived in

Germany while others were products of the refugee camps. The leader, Muhammad Massalha

was only twenty-seven and had lived in West Germany for many years, learning to speak fluent

German.53 Regardless of their individual differences, all were devoted to the cause.

At 4:15 AM on September 5, the team struck. Disguised as athletes, they scaled the fence

with the help of a group of American athletes and made their way to the Israeli apartments.54 The

terrorists first entered Apartment 1, which housed the Israeli coaches and referees. Here they lost

the element of surprise. Having trouble opening the door to the apartment, they were discovered

by wrestling referee Yossef Gutfreund who used his 285 pounds to try and keep the door closed

50
Ibid., 33-34.
51
Ibid., 32-33.
52
Ibid., 29-30.
53
Ibid., 37-38.
54
Ibid., 40-41.

13
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
while raising the alarm. Despite this warning, only one person, trainer Tuvia Skolsky would

survive out of the occupants of this apartment.55 (SB 42-43)

Turning to the remaining occupants of the apartment, the terrorists began to bind the

captives and restore order. One, Moshe Weinberg, decided to fight back and was shot in the face

before being overpowered. Once the men in the apartment were taking care of, the group

proceeded to Apartment 3, housing the wrestlers and weight lifters. This group was also

overpowered and marched back towards Apartment 1. Wrestler Gad Tsabari took this

opportunity to escape and succeeded while Moshe Weinberg was killed in his escape attempt,

becoming the first to die. Wrestler Yossef Romano also attempted to overcome the attackers and

was killed, leaving nine surviving hostages.56 A standoff was now underway.

The goal Black September wished to accomplish was the release of 236 prisoners from

jails in Israel and Germany including the founders of the Baader Meinhoff gang, a Japanese

terrorist that had attacked travelers in Tel Aviv and the women who had hijacked the Sabena

airliner that could have tipped off Mossad about the BSO’s change in target.57 Money was

emphatically rejected by Massalha, who was going by the name Issa. When offered “an

unlimited amount of money,” he rejected the offer by stating the “talk of money is demeaning.”58

Instead, the hostage takers demanded the release of the prisoners or they were willing to become

martyrs.59

For their part, the Israeli government chose to leave all matters relating to the crisis in

German hands, expecting that the German traits of efficiency and precision would see the matter

55
Ibid., 42-43.
56
Ibid., 44-47.
57
Ibid., 49.
58
Ibid., 51.
59
Ibid., 52.

14
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
handled in good stead. They did not realize that not only did Germany not have a counter terror

team, but that under the German Constitution the federal government was not allowed to send

any troops into Bavaria for any reason. This was to have grave consequences in the outcome of

the case. Instead of trained professionals, the Bavarian government ultimately had to rely on

police officers that were operating well out of their training.60

The endgame began during the evening of September 5. Becoming more impatient with

delays and requests for time extensions, Issa demanded a plane be made ready to take the

kidnappers and their hostages to Cairo.61 The Germans decided that the transfer to the airport

would be the perfect time to strike. Three teams, one consisting of undercover officers on the

plane would take down the leaders while a team of five snipers would kill the remaining

terrorists. Finally a team of armored vehicles would rush the group and remove the now free

hostages.62 The decision was made to use two helicopters to fly everyone to Fürstenfeldbruck

airport and the pieces began to fall into place.63

What happened next could only be termed a catastrophe. Shortly after 10:30 PM, the

helicopters carrying the hostages and kidnappers landed at the airport. Here things began to go

very wrong. Unbeknownst to everyone involved, the team of undercover officers on the plane

had abandoned their posts out of fear for their lives.64 Issa and his second in command, noticing

the lack of aircrew sensed the trap and began to head back to the helicopters. Here the second

part of the plan went wrong. When setting up the mission, the Germans had expected there to be

only five terrorists, not eight, and had detailed only five snipers to the operation. Assuming that

60
Ibid., 56.
61
Ibid., 61.
62
Ibid., 65.
63
Ibid., 67.
64
Ibid., 72.

15
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
each sniper hit their first target with their first round, there would still be three terrorists capable

of action.65

Of the first two shots fired, one missed. On this signal the other snipers opened fire but it

was too late. The terrorists went to ground underneath the helicopters and returned fire. The

decision was finally made to approach the terrorists, but the police refused to do so except under

cover of armor. Inexplicably, the armored vehicles had never been ordered to leave the athlete’s

village and once sent to the airport, were immobilized in the traffic jam. Consequently, the police

remained in place for more than an hour and a half until the armored units could arrive.66

This was the final straw for the hostage takers. Knowing the end was near, they acted.

One terrorist jumped out of a helicopter and threw a grenade inside, killing four of the hostages

aboard. Another leaned into the second helicopter spraying automatic fire into the bodies of the

other five, killing them as well. At this point the terrorists made their break for freedom. Issa was

killed by a marksman while only three others were able to make it to the trees. These three were

the only survivors of the massacre and were captured within hours.67

Like many terror attacks, the Munich massacre was a tactical success and a strategic

failure. The operation initially went off without a hitch. The terrorists managed to overcome any

resistance by the athletes, force the police to play be their rules and ultimately get out of the

village and to an airport. As Issa desired, the attack had the effect of broadcasting the plight of

the Palestinian people to a billion people around the world.68 Strategically though, the plot was a

failure. No prisoners were released and a hard core group of terrorists was removed from play.

65
Ibid., 73.
66
Ibid., 74-75.
67
Ibid., 75-76.
68
Ibid., 34.

16
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
The massacre also had the effect of sending the Israelis on a rampage. Within a few days,

the Israeli Air Force launched retaliatory airstrikes on Palestinian bases in Lebanon and Syria,

killing and injuring hundreds of people. The Israeli Army sent a battalion size force into Lebanon

killing a reported forty-five terrorists and capturing sixteen.69 But the government knew this

would not be enough. They would have to strike at the hierarchy that planned and completed the

attack.

The operation was to be called Mivtza Za’am Ha’el; Operation Wrath of God. Mossad

officers were directed to find and watch any perpetrator connected to the massacre, then await

the order of a small group of government officials who would decide whether or not the target

was to be assassinated. If the answer was yes, a special Mossad team set up in Paris was

dispatched to carry out the deed. The team was divided into five groups of two assassins, two

guards, and two agents to provide cover, two communications specialists and a team of six to

eight agents to provide logistical support.70

The number of actual hits carried out is not known for sure and range from twenty to

thirty-five.71 But some of the targets were the ones that could be expected on such a list and

included high ranking members of the PLO such as Ali Hassan Salameh who was being groomed

as a possible replacement to Yasser Arafat.72 The group did not just use pistols and bombs to

make their point. Using psychological warfare, obituaries of healthy members of the PLO were

run in newspapers as warnings and others would receive phone calls from strangers that were

well acquainted with the recipient’s family and job.73

69
Ibid., 94-95.
70
Simone Reeve, One Day in September (New York: Arcade Publishing), 162.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid., 162-163.
73
Ibid., 167.

17
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
Another failure of the attack was the realization that highly trained teams of police and

military members had to be set up to deal with terrorist attacks. Germany, stung by a series of

inept moves that resulted in the death of the Israelis set up GSG-9 with the help of the Israeli

government. This extremely professional police organization was just one of many that were

formed, consequently making the success of terror operations involving hostages a chancy thing

at best and a suicide mission at worst.

It’s only within the last few decades that international terrorism has become a problem.

The IRA has generally been a problem for the Irish, the ETA did not act outside of Spain and

France and other groups such as Action Directe, the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction were

problems for their home countries. Only with the rise of militant Islam did terror cross

international boundaries on a regular basis. Attacks such as the Munich massacre and high

jacking of aircraft and ships became the wave of the future. It took the actions of September 11,

2001 to bring the daily realities of the world home to most Americans. Since that day, terrorism

has become the boogie man for us as it has been for much of the world.

As the war between the British government and the IRA began to wind down, the war

between the British people and Islam began in earnest. A small number of homegrown and

immigrant militants among the poor immigrant class began to act. The stated goal among many

of these groups, such as Hizb-ut-Tahir, is to bring about the world wide Islamic Caliphate under

Muslim rule and with Shariah law as the basis for societal conduct and law.74 A key feature in

this movement is convincing mainly second generation children of immigrants that their loyalty

74
Yamin Zakaria, interview with Imran Khan, Newsnight, BBC, August 27, 2003.

18
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
should be to Islam, not the country they’ve been raised in; they seem to have had a large degree

of success based on feelings of exclusion from the larger culture.75

While the 7/7 Metro bombings are one of the most well known actions of Islamic

terrorism in Britain, there have been other attacks against the British people, most of which have

been failures. One such attack was the attempted firebombing of the Glasgow airport in 2007.

The brainchild of Bilal Abdulla, a UK born Iraqi doctor, it was his means of striking back at a

society he saw as “murdering my people.” Therefore, if no one else would dispense justice on the

infidel, it would be his task.76

While he stated in his trial that he did not want to kill people, he obtained a Jeep

Cherokee and filled it with a large gasoline bomb that would have been more than enough to kill

or injure many people.77 Unlike the other attacks looked at in this paper, this attack was almost

amateurish in execution. However, Abdulla did one thing right: he kept the number of people

involved to the bare minimum. In this case, only one other person was privy to the entire plot.

While Abdulla was the brains behind the attack, it was Kafeel Ahmed, an Indian born Muslim

that was to actually drive the vehicle.

Both of these men were not poor, uneducated lackeys that could be led to do anything.

Abdulla was a medical doctor who completed his schooling in Baghdad and was licensed in

London in 2006.78 Ahmed was an engineer who studied at Queen’s University and Anglia Ruskin

75
European Police Office, “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report” (The Hague, 2009),
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2009.pdf
(accessed November 23, 2010).
76
Dominic Casciani, “Iraqi Doctor’s Road to Radicalism,” BBC News, December 16, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7784799.stm (accessed November 23, 2010).
77
Ibid.
78
“Bomb Plot: Arrests and Releases,” BBC News, October 5, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6264230.stm (accessed November 23, 2010).

19
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
University. This implies not only that they were of high intelligence and were capable of doing

great things, but also had the ability to fashion comfortable lives for themselves if they chose to.

Along with the Glasgow attacks, the men were both connected and responsible for the

failed London car bombings.79 In this case, the men were a little more professional conducting

reconnaissance before placing the bombs. In the Glasgow case however, appears to have been a

spur of the moment kamikaze mission. Police on the scene believed the men were determined to

die, and when that did not happen, it confused them.80 Logistically, the attack was

straightforward. Using Abdulla’s Jeep, which was packed with gasoline and nails, they simply

drove into the front entrance of the Glasgow Airport.

Originally, the intent was to ignite the bomb inside the terminal, but the vehicle became

stuck on a steel bollard. Changing up the plan, the men then doused the Jeep in gasoline and lit it

on fire, hoping the bomb would explode.81 To prevent the police from interfering, Abdulla exited

the Jeep and attacked a constable while Ahmed escaped the Jeep in flames. Another constable

put out Ahmed while bystanders came to the aid of police, kicking and subduing the two

suspects.82

Order was quickly restored, though the airport would be shut down for many hours.83

(BBC overview) Both men were arrested and Ahmed was rushed to the hospital with burns over

90% of his body. He would ultimately die from these wounds a month later.84Abdulla was

79
“Behind the London-Glasgow Attacks.”
80
Adam Fresco, “Duo Who Attacked Glasgow Airport ‘Were Resigned to Death’, Say Officers,” The Sunday
Times, July 5, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2033389.ece (accessed November 23, 2010)
81
“Behind the London-Glasgow Attacks.”
82
Fresco; “Blazing Car Crashes into Airport,” BBC News, June 30, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6257194.stm (accessed November 23, 2010).
83
“Blazing Car Crashes into Airport.”
84
“Glasgow Airport Attack Man Dies,” BBC News, August 3, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/glasgow_and_west/6928854.stm (accessed November 23, 2010).

20
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
ultimately charged with conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to cause explosions and sentenced

to two life terms, of which he will have to serve a minimum of 32 years.85

The attack was an unqualified failure on every level. Poorly planned and executed, no

one was seriously hurt except for Ahmed. The Glasgow airport was back in operation within a

few days.86 Abdulla, defiant as he was on the stand, will spend most of the rest of his life in

prison. And in their failure, all that was accomplished was to remind the world that terror was an

omnipresent threat that must be watched for, therefore making it all the more difficult for other,

more sophisticated plots to have a chance of success.

No two terrorist attacks are the same. They may use similar methods, be based on similar

ideologies and have some of the same types of, or in the case of successful attacks, the same

exact people. However, the target, the logistics and the people involved will always have a subtle

effect on how an attack will be carried out. An engineer will more than likely conceive a more

complicated mission than a laborer while a religious terrorist might consider options like suicide

bombing that most ideological terrorist might dismiss.

This is why our understanding of terrorism and its perpetrators is important. For example,

by seeing an escalation from robbery to extortion to assault, to kidnapping to murder, a person

may be able to discern what kind of target may be sought out. And a possible target must be

anticipated to protect it. As the saying goes, “to defend everywhere is to defend nowhere.”

Fortunately, the terror groups that are springing up now as the older ideological groups die are

very good at telegraphing their intentions. By putting themselves in the open, at least when it

85
“Bomb Plot Doctor Jailed for Life,” BBC News, December 17, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7786884.stm (accessed November 23, 2010).
86
“Houses Searched Following Attack,” BBC News, July 1, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6258206.stm (accessed November 23, 2010).

21
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
comes to the generalities of their plans, the ability to pluck that first string that unravels the rest

is greatly enhanced; a thing practically unheard of in more secret groups such as the ETA.

22
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
Bibliography

Alexander, Yovna, Michael S. Swetnam, and Herbert M. Levine. ETA: Profile of a Terrorist
Group. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001.

Anderson, James M. The Spanish Civil War: A History and Reference Guide. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2003.

Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Terrorism 2002-2005. Washington, DC,

2006, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02_05
(accessed November 21, 2010).

EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. The Hague: European Police Office, 2009.
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_
TE-SAT/TESAT2009.pdf (accessed November 23, 2010).

Hannigan, John A. “The Armalite and the Ballot Box: Dilemmas of Strategy and Ideology in the
Provisional IRA” Social Problems 33, no. 1 (October 1985): 31-40.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/800629 (accessed November 21, 2010).

Hart, Peter. “The Social Structure of the Irish Republican Army, 1916-1923.” The Historical
Journal 42, no. 1 (Mar 1999): 207-231.

“The Irish Rising of 1798.” History Today 48, no. 6 (June 1998): 12-13.
https://libproxy.library.unt.edu:9443/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=wdh&AN=689654&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed November 22,
2010)

The Kings Own Scottish Borderers, “20th and 21st Centuries,”

http://kosb.webs.com/20thcentury.htm (accessed November 21, 2010)

Klein, Aaron J. Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly
Response. Translated by Mitch Ginsburg. New York: Random House, 2005.

Kolodzie, Michael L. “Commentary: The Asymmetric Threat,” Army Logistician 33, no. 4 (July-
August 2001). http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug01/MS628.htm (accessed
November 22, 2010).

Kurlansky, Mark. The Basque History of the World. New York: Walker Publishing Co., 1999.

Laqueur, Walter. Quoted in Steven Best, Terrorists or Freedom Fighters: Reflections on the
Liberation of Animals. New York: Lantern Books, 2004.

Lewis, Paul H. Latin Fascist Elites: The Mussolini, Franco and Salazar Regimes. Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 2002.

23
 Ilan M. Shalev
PSCI 4700- Western European Terrorism
Prof. John Books
24 November 2010
Moloney, Ed. A Secret History of the IRA, New York: WW Norton and Co., 2002.

Mulholland, Marc. “Irish Republican Politics and Violence Before the Peace Process, 1968-
1994.” European Review of History 14, no. 3 (September 2007): 397-421,
https://libproxy.library.unt.edu:9443/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=wdh&AN=27256703&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed November
21, 2010)

Payne, Stanley G. The Franco Regime 1936-1975. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1987.

Reeve, Simon. One Day in September. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000.

Watson, Cameron J. Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and
Intellectual Origins of the ETA. Reno: University of Utah, Center for Basque Studies,
2007.

24