“Nepal is a tuber between two boulders.

” -PN Shah
 2

BATTLE OF NALAPANI

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Introduction of Study

The territory of Nepal expanded up to the Sutlej River in West and the Tista River in the
east during unification period. A well motivated military of Nepal even defeated the well
trained, well equipped and bigger forces of British East India Company in many battles. The
battle of Nalapani was successful defensive battle fought by Nepalese, against British, is
famous in Nepalese history.

The conquest of the Kathmandu valley was only the beginning of an explosion of Gurkhas
power throughout the region. The Gorkhas armies had overrun all of eastern Nepal by
1773. By 1788 Gorkhas forces had also annexed some western portions of Sikkim. In the
west, all rulers as far as the Kali River had been replaced by 1790. On the farther west, the
Kumaon region and its capital Almora, had also succumbed to the Gorkhas. However,
aggressive raids into Tibet (concerning a long-standing dispute over trade and control of
the mountain passes), finally forced the Chinese emperor in Peking to act. In 1792 he sent
a huge army, expelling the Nepalese out of Tibet to within 5km of capital at Kathmandu.
The Nepalese were forced into signing a humiliating treaty revoking their trading privileges
in Tibet and requiring them to pay tribute to Peking every 5 years.
 3

The Tibet affair had postponed a previously planned attack on the Kingdom of Garhwal, but
by 1803 the raja of Garhwal had also been defeated - he was killed in the struggle and all
his land annexed. Further west, general Amar Singh Thapa overran lands as far as the
Kangra - the strongest fort in the hill region – and laid siege to it (although by 1809, Ranjit
Singh the ruler of the Sikh state in the Punjab, had intervened and drove the Nepalese
army east of the Sutlej river). Appendix "A"
 4

The British were also expanding their sphere of influence. The recent acquisition of the
Nawab of Oudh's lands by the British East India Company brought the region of
Gorakhpur into the close proximity of the Raja of Palpa - the last remaining independent
town within the Gorkhas heartlands. Suspicion of the raja’s collusion with the British led first
to his imprisonment by the Gorkhas, then to his assassination. Bhimsen Thapa the
Nepalese Prime Minister (1806 – 1837) installed his own father as governor of Palpa
leading to serious border disputes between the two powers. Warren Hastings since from his
appointment as the governor-general of India sought to impose the British dominance in
India. However it was Hastings who framed the imperial fabric of the political sovereignty of
England over the whole of India. To establish and strengthen the sovereignty the Company
in India, Hastings had to encounter several obstacles. The Gurkhas of Nepal posed the first
resistance to the authority of Hastings in India. The Gurkhas from Western Himalaya had
wrested the control of Nepal from the successor of Ranjit Malla of Bhatgaon in 1768. With
the passage of time the Gurkhas began to expand their control over the region beyond the
mountains but the Chinese offered them resistance. As a result they were pushed towards
the boundaries of Bengal and Oudh. But the English already occupied the Gorakhpur
district in the year of 1801. As a result the territory of the English came in line with the
frontiers of the Gurkhas. The dispute between the company and the Nepalese sparked off
when the Company occupied the districts of Butwal and Seuraj. In response to the
company`s occupation of the territories, Gurkhas attacked three police stations at Butwal.
Lord Hastings, the then Governor General considered it as the open challenge to the
Company`s authority. Therefore he resolved to launch war against the Gurkhas along the
frontier from the river Sutlej to Koshi. Hastings held the office of the Commander in chief of
the army planned for the campaign against the Gurkhas. A large army of 34000 soldiers
was gathered against the Gurkhas army of 12000. The campaigns were a miserable failure.
General Gillespie's attack on the mountain fortress of Khalanga (Nalapani) met with a
crushing defeat. The General lost his life in the action.

1.2 Statement of Problems

 5

Battle of Nalapani was fought when Nepal was at its peak of the unification campaign and
there was no doubt that the initial success achieved by Nepalese troops in the battle had
increased both the morale and ambition of the Nepalese rulers. In first and second attack,
Nepalese troops badly defeated East India Company. Although Nepalese troops were well
experienced, battle tested, but the overall ability of Nepalese troops was far behind their
adversaries. This battle has significant importance in Nepalese history. Following issues
which are yet to be answered are the main aspects of this research. The problems which
the researcher intends to identify and analyze are following issues and therefore research
needed.

 The historical importance of Battle of Nalapani.

 Causes, immediate cause.
 The important military aspect of Battle of Nalapani.
 Why, how, when, the battle was fought?
 Strategies & tactics used in the Battle, there Effects & lessons learned.

1.3 Objectives of Study

This study is under taken with following objectives.

 To analyze the historical import ants of battle of Nalapani.

 To analyze the causes of battle of Nalapani.

 To analyze the strategy and tactics used in battle.

 To analyze the effects of battle.

 To analyze the results of battle and lesson learnt.

 To analyze the military aspects of the battle.

1.4 Theoretical Framework of Study

 6

The research is based on the interrelation of four variables i.e. preparation, strategy and
tactics, relative strength (force level) and the victory in battle. During the review of literature,
researchers found that the British troops had better preparation in terms of logistic, training
and other required fields; they also used better tactics and also had superior force level
which helped to achieve victory over Nepalese troops. Hence on the basis of above
mentioned arguments, the researchers have theorized that better preparation in terms of
logistic, training and other required fields; better strategic and tactics and relative strength
would have positive correlation with the victory in battle.
The theoretical framework is depicted in figure 1.1

PREPARATION OF STRATEGIC & RELAIVE STRENGTH

BATTLE TACTICS FORCE

VICTORY

Figure 1.1 Schematic Diagram of the Theoretical framework.

1.5 Limitations of Study

Despite being of the most significant battle in the history Nepal, there were some limitations
regarding the preparation of the paper. Some of the limitations are.

 Limited time was available to make details field study of the various places where the
battles were exactly fought.
 There are big stockpiles of the papers and books published on the subject matter but
only a few of them are studied for the preparation of the paper.

 Although famous battle in the history, very limited records in internet.

1.6 Research Methodology

 7

This study is based on a descriptive along with analytical study of the historical importance
of Battle of Nalapani, Causes, immediate cause, The important military aspect of Battle of
Nalapani, Why, how, when, the battle was fought?, strategies & tactics used in the Battle,
there Effects & lessons learned. It has mainly used published books, and materials so used
sources are all secondary sources and data which include published books papers,
internet, newspaper and magazines.
 8

Chapter Two

Review of Literature

The study on battle of Nalapani has been carried out with the help of books and various
other sources. While carrying out this research work, books on ‘Nepalko Sainik Itihas’ by
Dr. Baidhe, Tulsi Ram, Sharma, Shiva Prasad, Dr. Manandhar, Triratna and
'Invasion of Nepal' by Pemble, John was studied in detail. These books have dealt
almost all the aspects of battle of Nalapani. The writers have highlighted causes,
preparation, effect and importance of battle.

Similarly, the researchers have also studied the book 'Gorkhas' by Khanduri , Chandra B.
Including above mentioned books, the researchers have referred following books,
during the preparation of this paper.

 Dr. Baidhe, Tulsi Ram, Sharma, Shiva Prasad, Dr. Manandhar, Triratna 2049, Nepal
ko Sainik Itihas, NA H.Q.
 KC, Surendra1989, Diplomatic History of Nepal, Ratna Pustak Bhandar
 Khanduri, Chandra B 1997, A Re-discovered History of Gorkhas, Gyan Sagar
Publications, Delhi;
 Pemble, John 1971, The Invasion of Nepal, Oxford: Cárdenas Press.
 Stiller, Ludwig F.S. J. 1995, The rise of the house of Gorkha, Ratna Pustak Bhandar,
Kathmandu.
 9

Chapter Three

Battle of Nalapani

3.1 Introduction

Battle of Nalapani is a famous battle in Nepalese history. In this battle the small military
force of Nepal proved their bravery in fighting with large and well equipped British troops.
The battle was led by Captain Balabhadra Kunwar in October 1814. It was fought to stop
the ill intention of the British to capture the strategically important fort of the Nalapani
situated at the peak of a ridge on the eastern side of Deharadun with the aim to facilitate
major offensive against Nepal in the time of Anglo Nepal War (1814-16).This battle is also
called battle of Khalanga.

Battle of Nalapani was fought before the declaration of Anglo–Nepal War. According to the
British plan of attack, Nepal was divided into two theatre of war which were western and
eastern theatre. This battle falls under western theatre. Gen Gillespie was overall
commander of that theatre planned to command from Nahan. As situation developed, Gen
Gillespie was compelled to go to the front.

3.2 Relation between Nepal and East India Company

East India Company felt threat from the rise of Gorkhali power under the leadership of king
Prithivi Narayan Shah. Hence, with a view to crush the rising Gorkhali, Company
dispatched captain Kinloch’s expedition to Nepal in 1767 AD, but this British expedition was
badly defeated by newly formed Gorkhas Army. When the British side realized the might of
Prithvi Narayan Shah, they tried to peruse Prithvi Narayan Shah for friendly relation through
many British missions. In this connection James Logan’s mission was dispatched to Nepal
in 1770, likewise another mission under command of Foxcroft was sent in 1784. Another
significant mission was Kirkpatrick’s mission in 1791, Abdul Quadir mission in 1795 and
 10

Captain Knox’s mission in 1801 but all these missions failed because of the great distrust of
the Nepalese side. East India Company was now convinced that their grand design in
Nepal cannot be fulfilled by peaceful means. “They now had started to think to use force for
compelling Nepal to accepts British proposals” (Baidhya, et al.; 1992:381).

3.3 Causes

There were various causes that led to the Battle of Nalapani as well as Anglo Nepal war.
Among them are the:

 Expansionist policy of Nepal and East India Company.

 Nepal's distrust to various British missions.

 British Commercial interest in Trans Himalayan Trade.

 Territory dispute between east India Company and Nepal.

 Failure of Diplomacy.

 Self over estimation of both the powers.

3.4 Immediate Cause

Butwal and Sewraj dispute can be taken as the immediate cause of the battle. When
warren hasting was appointed as the governor General of India, he sought to impose the
dominance in India. Gurkhas of Nepal were the first to stand in opposition to his authority.
The Gurkhas wrested the control of Nepal over the region beyond the mountains. The
English troops had already occupied the Gorakhpur district in the year 1801. So the territory
of English came in line with the frontiers of the Gurkhas. The invasion of the districts of
Butwal and Sewraj by the company sparked off a dispute between the two.

In response to the occupation by the British, the Gurkhas attacked the three police stations
in Butwal in May 1814. Lord Hasting the contemporary Governor General, took it as an
 11

open challenge to their authority. Therefore, he resolved to launch war against Gurkhas
along the frontiers from the river Sutlej to Koshi. A huge army of 34,000 soldiers was
gathered against the Gurkhas army of 12,000. But the Campaign was proved a major
failure. ''The problem could have been solved, and the war could have been avoided, had
not the dispute been merely symptomatic of a far larger problem'' (Stiller, 1995:286). To
the north General Gillespie attack on the mountain fortress of Khalanga met with a crossing
defeat. The general lost his life in the action. On the other hand, Governor Lord Moyra's
excessive desire to become emperor filled him with the idea of defeating Gorkhas in
isolation. They wanted to confine Nepal within hilly region. They were full of supporting
artillery. Their supply system was intact and ensured a chain of food storage was created
throughout the area of operation. But Nepalese were also not less than they were i.e. the
English force. Nepalese were also involved in various preparation of the war.

Nepalese army sought help from the French experts in the field of arms and
communications, bombs and guns. Bhimsen Thapa himself started the modernization of
Nepalese army. Barracks were constructed from the army side. Fortification was done
through the country and nature was the best support in defending Nepal. A French expert
used to cast cannons for Nepal. Some report of the company says "the king of Nepal has
kept fringes in services and was given to change their artillery." Near about 12,000 troops
were deployed under different leaders to different part of the country. The Nepalese army
sought not only helps from the French but created a friendly tie with the neighboring
countries against the common enemy. Bhimsen Thapa made an alliance with Tibet and
tried to get help of Maratha In 1814 A.D. He sent Pandit Padmapani Sharma to Gwalior as
Nepalese en coy to seek military help against the enemy. Thus we can say that the battle of
Nalapani was not a general war in deed. It's one of the well prepared and thoroughly
designed wars. General Amar Singh Thapa was initially reluctant to go to war with the
British. However, after Khalanga fell, he realized that the time was not suitable for the treaty
and conciliation. Nepal could have prevented the war by diplomatic efforts, but “the weakest
side of Nepal at that time was it did not even try to develop a diplomatic relations with the
neighboring and other countries” (KC, 1989:740).

3.5 Development of the fort: The Military Aspect

 12

Amar Singh Thapa, the visionary leader of the time, wanted Balabhadra to protect the water
reservoirs. He also suggested him to stock rations and provisions for at least 5 months. A
man of ingenuity and of cool courage, Balabhadra set about improving the fort which could
bear every damage. But the fort was not shell proof. He built a perimeter of walls and
created sufficient confidence among his force through training and indoctrination. He filled
the mind of the people with the idea that no one could defeat the Gorkhas. He built up his
intelligence by employing the Sadhus and locals as much as possible. His concern in
intelligence was largely upon the European infantry, cavalry and the large caliber guns
which the British would employ against him. ''He also learnt the British technique of assault
by personally visiting Bharatpur and understanding their technique of breaching the fort and
charging through the breach. He realized that he would have to plug into prevent the
attackers from 'flooding' the fort.'' (Khanduri, 1997:109)

3.6 Tactical Features of Nalapani. Appendix "B"

 Dominating feature (The Height).

 Well constructed fort with good observation and fire plan.

 Limited approach for the attacker, hence favorable for defender, based on formidable
obstacles.

 Provides depth to the defender.

 Good cover and concealment because of dense forest of Sal.

 Water point.

"Khalanga fort, also called Nalapani was on the highest point of one of the low spurs
which jut southwards into the Dum from its northern rim of mountains. One its western
side, the Khalanga spurs plunges almost vertically for 1000 feet to the valley floor. The
eastern flank slopes away more gently until, about a mile from the summit, it suddenly
droops 600 feet to the song river. The most accessible approach is the southern, which
is still marked by stony road from Dehra. This climbs steadily, but not too steeply, for
about three miles, before reaching the so-called table land. This is a narrow strip of
 13

fairly level ground10 00 feet below the summit, and separated from it by the deep
furrow of a watercourse (the Nalapani) which comes down from the north and then
turns west I its descent to the valley. The summit itself in the form of a knoll naturally
mated on two sides. Its slopes formed a glacis for the fort, which perched highest
point. The spur was then as now, thickly planted with birch and popular, save in the
vicinity of the fort, where it was clear like a tonsure. The fort was irregular in shape,
following contours of the ground. Its outer defense, no more than twelve feet high,
consisted of a double palisade filled with stones, surmounting a mud rampart."
(Pemble, 1971:141)

Khalanga came to be seen by various writers and observers according to their own
perception. Edward Bishop called it a "sickly wood and stone stockade". Welch Hamilton
described it more partly as he wrote.

"A forest in Garhwal, 26 mile north of Haridwar, Latitude 30 degrees 20 minutes north,
longitude 78 degree 6 minutes east. A little to the north east of Khalanga are many
caves inhabited by a race of people nearly in a state of nature. These caves are low
narrow and are very dark having no aperture but entrance. The food of these troglodytes
is rise of large grain." (Khanduri, op.cit., 106)

3.7 Relative Strength

Gillespie's force was really strong with a British infantry and cavalry regiment each with a
squadron of native cavalry infantry regiments. The actual strength was:

 8th Royal Irish Dragoons.

 7th native cavalry, skinners Horse.

 HM'S 53rd foot.

 Artillery. Two troops of Horsed Artillery.

 Pioneers. 5 and 6 companies with officers from engineers.

''In addition there were 6,688 irregulars, whose strength continued to increase as the
operations advanced. In terms of relative strength, mobility, fire power and logistical
capability, the ratio of force levels of the British when compared with Balbhadra reckon at
 14

least 30 minutes. This glorified stockade was reckoned to harbor some 600 people, of
whom not more than half could have been in any sense soldiers.'' (Pemble, op.cit., 142)

There were altogether three attacks on Nalapani. To analyze fully the Battle of Nalapani, we
must analyze them separately.

3.8 The First Attack

The attack plan made by General Gillespie led British force advance up to the respected
area. General Gillespie ordered lieutenant colonel Carpenter on 19 th October, 1814 even
before the formal declaration of the war against Nepal to capture the areas up to the bank
of the Yamuna River by entering into the Dehradun Valley crossing through the Timaulli
mountain saddle. On 20th October 1814, Gillespie ordered Colonel Mawby to lead 1,000
soldiers and advance through the Mohan mountain saddle. On 22 nd October, Colonel
Mawby wrote a letter to captain Balbhadra Kunwar to vacate the fort. Balbhadra did not
accepted the letter at that late hour, and tore that up and he said, "Gorkhas when furious,
behaves like Hindu lord Shiva, at his death dance.". When Balbhadra did not follow it with
any other response, Mawby sent a courier to Gillespie, at Badshahibagh for further
directions. His plan earlier was to reconirate the axis kalsi, Rumtum and Virat. But Mawby's
message changed the complex battle. On Oct 23 Colonel Carpenter assembled with
Colonel Mawby strengthening his troops with 1300 infantry 300 cavalry and 5 cannons, on
24th October at 4:30 in the morning with him set-out to mount attack against the Nalapani
fort. He blocked the road of Tajpur.'' (ibid)

The British began to fire 6 pounders upon the fort in the early morning. But the wall of the
fort was outside the range of the cannons fire. Both parties were involved in attacking. The
British side continued firing of canons for many hours, but they found that their firing had no
effect on the other side. Colonel Mawby ordered at 11:00am to shift the cannons and place
them more near to the fort. But the cannons could not be taken across stream experiencing
a failure in his effort to mount an attack against the fort; he discontinued the attack and
ordered soldiers to retreat. Before these troops could shake themselves up into an assault
formation and guns from rear could fire, the Gorkhas ran forward crying their battle cry "Ayo
 15

Gorkhali, Ayo Gorkhali". The Gorkhas force included especially the women and children.
Behind them followed Balbhadra with his long word and a flag on a pole, bearing a massive
Hanuman on a yellow clothe. Never had he stood the band playing the tune of "Yo Nepali
Sir Uchali" (Ye Gorkhas keep head high). The attacking Gorkhas swung their Kukris in high
and low angles chopping heads and wounding more. Leaving the dead behind, the
remaining attackers ran back.'' It was on 25 Octoberi1814, while engaged in this
examination, that Gen Gillespie received Mawby’s report of the unsuccessful attempt
against Khalanga. He had not reckoned on having to give his own attention in that direction,
and was vexed at having his plans interrupted by what he thought was Mawby’s timidity''
(ibid: 143) Thus the first attack on Nalapani by the British resulted in a shameful loss for
side. So General Gillespie planned for the second attack. Appendix "C"
3.9 The Second Attack

The failure to capture the fort made General Gillespie to led himself the attack against the
fort. He shifted the Dehradun camp to the fort hill made the ladders. He had an intention of
capturing fort before 1st November. He was sure of the capture in case the fort was attacked
from all four directions simultaneously. It's so because fighting an all our sides would scatter
and weaken the small number of Gorkhali force. Therefore, he divided his troops into five
teams and ordered to launch attack from the following places. Appendix "D"

 Captain John fast would lead 363 soldiers. This team had to pass through the
Lakhaend village. When the team would receive the signal to attack, it would climb
up the far from the north-west side and launch its attack.
 Major Kelly would lead the second team of 521 British troops including 20 pioneers.
The team should move through the route of the kharsali village and launch an attack
advancing toward the fort after receiving the single to attack.

 Captain John Cambell would lead the third team of 283 troops climbing up from the
Asthal village.
 16

 Lieutenant Colonel Carpenter would lead the main invasion team of two companies
of soldiers from the 53 rd British regiment and 588 Indian soldiers. The team should
attack from the south from the route of Tharapani.

 A reserve force of 100 Irish Dragoons, 991 Indian soldiers and major Ludlow would
be kept ready to help it Colonel Carpenter.

The interesting aspects of the plan were the coordination of the assault and certain orders
which Gillespie emphasized to his commanders. He wanted strict fire control, use of
bayonet rather than fire, observance of strict silence, no halting to fire or releasing began
and all attack to be simultaneously. From tactical aspects the plan he evaluated is easily a
modern tactical concept of multidirectional attack attempting to crack a nut with a hammer.
Good terrain intelligence and guidance by locals enabled Gillespie to plan.

Nonetheless, the plan had discrepancies and it warranted a minute to coordination in the
context of the battle. The timing had to be sacrosanct for both the commander controlling
the whole operations and outflanking columns to adhere to the plan of movement. The
other fault which he failed to take into account was the imponderables of battle such as the
weather, the human factor of fatigue, more time for movement and the unpredictable
reactions of the Gorkhas.

On the 30th Oct, the British forces under the command of lieutenant Colonel and Major
Ludlow left the main camp at 3 pm and reached the open guard that existed below the fort.
With the night fall, cannons were transported up at the sites down.

On 31st Oct, Gillespie ordered to fire upon the fort in the early morning 630hrs the firing
continued for one hour, but the fort did not get any damage. The Nepalese were also firing
in return. Gillespie's realization of the plan's failure, made him angry. Suddenly, he ordered
to give signal to attack at 8 am in contrary to at10 as fixed earlier. But the commanders of
the attacking British teams did not recognize the signal.

"He rose at five o’clock. At the first glimpse of day rode up to that able and. At
sunrise the guns exploded into action. After they had been open for an hour and
 17

a half it had again become obvious that field artillery could do little damage flew
over the at so great a distance. Shot after shot either fell short, or fort; and the
few that landed on target had too little impact to damage. Gillespie fidgeted and
fumed and decided he must put an end to all this futile fumbling by spectacular
escalade. Was he not the acknowledged past master of the art of daring assault?
By eight o'clock, dudgeon and vanity had destroyed all self- control and he
ordered the signal for the attack to be given. His forces were aghast and
besought him to delay until the appointer time, urging that breach could yet be
made in the four hours remaining. But the major- general irascibly waved aside
such counsel, and the prescribed discharges had to be made: three intervals of a
minute, and then two in a rapid sequence. This was Gillespie's first blunder. The
officers with the supporting columns, thinking that they did not need to pay
special attention to the pattern of gun fire for another two hours, did not
recognize the signal." (ibid: 146)

Gillespie ordered Ludlow to lead the 53 rd British regiment to the assault. As they advanced
towards fort Nepalese troops started firing shot arrows darts and stones from the defense
by children and women as well as soldiers killed seven British and wounded several. Major
Ludlow was also injured. Nepalese destroyed their 6 pounder. General Gillespie was
transfixed by the Nepalese aggression

The Nepali forces had already been aware of the cannons placement. Therefore, a team of
Nepali forces hid itself in a ridge that was situated east from the British position. They
unexpectedly attack on the British. Carpenter and Ludlow advanced further ahead; about
100 soldiers of the Irish Dragoons were in the forefront of the attack. They could not climb
the hills quickly because of their heavy load of bags and weapons on their back. Could not
move swiftly and so they remain quite behind. Though the Irish Dragoons reached near the
thatched structures, they were attacked by the Nepali forces charging their Khukuri.

The British forces became panic stricken. In the meantime, a group of Nepali soldiers
suddenly came out from the fort, damaged the cannons fixed by Lieutenant Kennedy and
went back to the fort. The British soldiers were stunned from this episode. They had
informed that five cannons would be fired exactly at 10 am with a break of five minutes
each, which would be the single to move. The attack would launch at noon simultaneously.
General Gillespie had devised this plan very carefully talking into consideration of the
possible reactions of the opposing forces. General Gillespie became furious. He himself
advanced towards the fort taking a sword in his hand. As the British forces were moving
forward, the intensity of firing from inside the fort increased. A bullet hit Gillespie and he
 18

died on the spot at about 11:15 am. About 30 NCO and other ranks met death and 225
soldiers became wounded. After Gillespie's death Colonel Sebright Mawby asked for an
immediate withdrawal. The British side suffered heavily in man and material in their second
attack against the Nalapani for.

Gillespie's death was regretted by Moira and the failure of Khalanga was regarded a great
loss which the country had sustained by the distinguished gallant officer who personally
conducted it whose conspicuous military talent must place him in the ranks of those
officers whose exploits have done to the British name in India." Mawby called Gillespie's
death as "Melancholy". ''Balbhadra was indeed, generous to his enemy but he was not
native to stream their weapons. Balbhadra collected all of their scattered weapons arms
ammunition and even flags. The Gorkhas had been reequipped with better rifles with the
150 reinforcement that tricked in and were determined to fight better resolve with the British
muskets against the British.'' (Khanduri, op.cit., 120)

The British after losing in the second attack, was not quite enough. They had not given up
their mission to attack the fort. So they engaged themselves for the next battle which was
the final attack on the fort of Nalapani. Not only the British but the Nepalese forces were
also involved themselves for the preparation of final battle. The British East India Company
intended to encircle the fort as whole. They wanted to cut off the supplies the fort, rather
would like to destroy the walls to go near the fort range cannons. Their main intension was
to force the enemy to surrender for which they had to attack and assault the fort.

3.10 Third Attack

3.10.1 Nepalese Preparation

 Strengthening the defense and fort.

 Storage and increase of more ammunition and supplies

 Strengthening the administration of the fort.

 19

 Conscious about the tactic of British.

 Fort was reinforced by two platoon of Kalanal Company and one platoon of Jwadalal
Company and some quantity of arm and ammunition.

3.10.2 British Preparation

 The storage of more weapons from Bengal, as 4 cannons of 18 pound and 2400
cannons ball, 2 mortar of 8 inches and 400 mortar- shells
 Detail study of geography of Nalapani fort for cut off , encirclement, as well as multi
directional attack

 Plan for seize of fort Construction of roads to open line of communication and
maintenance of axis

3.10.3 Attack Plan of East India Company. Appendix "E"

 In circle the fort as a whole (Lakhand, Asthali and Kharsala)

 To cut off the supplies (water & food)
 To destroy the walls of fort by long range cannons.
 To force the en to surrender
 Commanders- Major Ludlow, Major Baldok ,Captain Bucke ,Captain Caultma

3.11 The Final Assault

The batteries train arrived on 24 November. There were four eighteen-pounders and two
eight-inch mortars. With them came the extra battalion of native infantry which Hasting had
promised Gillespie. Two more companies of light infantry and the remainder of Carpenter
battalion had been left at Meerut for its protection. Mawby started preparing operation plan
for a third assault on the fort of Khalanga. Early on 25th November Mawby deployed troops
round the fort to prevent the escape of the Nepalese troops. Ludlow sent a force to the
table land, Major Baldock to the watercourse on this night. (Pemble, op.cit., 154) With the
 20

full preparation British launch another attack on the fort. On November 25, 1814 all the
teams of the British troop took position is their respective area and the cannon were placed
about 500 feet below the fort on the eastern side.

On 26th four 18 ponder were also placed in position. The British placed their heavy cannons
on the eastern slope of the fort at a distance of about 250 yards. The Nepali troops
executed many measures to strengthen the fort and not to allow the invaders to enter the
fort. Colonel Mawby issued order to shoot cannons at the fort in the afternoon. A team
under the command of major Ingleby was formed spearhead team for the attack. The
cannons firing continued day and night. But the cannons fire failed to make a whole at the
wall. The intensity of cannon fire was raised. On 27 th November, small hole was observed
at the wall. The Gorkhas could observe the movement of the flanking columns for attack.
They resembled every detail of the built up movement and deployment for attack.

British build up of artillery. They inducted much of columns across Nagal Dandagaon
Lakhand, Asthala Nalapani and water resources. The guns were deployed on table land
and north end of the fort. On 27-28 th November, the attack developed along the table land
from where the battering guns breached the fort wall. The British troops moved forward,
crossed the stream, then climbed up 200 yards of the fewer slopes and reached near the
beached portion of the wall of the fort. Parker peeped inside the fort and ordered his troops
move inside. The hidden soldiers of Nepalese side were stopping the Grenadiers to enter
the fort. Harrington came forward put aside parker and then attempted to move forward. He
was stopped by the Parker but died when hit by an arrow. There was no possibility to enter
inside the fort. There were big ditches covered by booby traps. British side again launched
an attack but received a counter attack and suffered heavily. The senior Gorkhas casualties
were Subedar Chandravir Thapa, Nathun Daljet Kumar and Jamadar Daljit Shahi. They
also included hundreds of men and their families and the Garahwalis.

"At about two o’clock in the morning there was a sudden clatter of musket fire as
Captain Buck, guarding the wells on the southern glacis, was attacked by a party of the
garrison which had crept out desperate for water. Buck's men returned the fire and
drove them back into the fort. All was silent for about half an hour; then at about three
o’clock, another, larger party streamed out of the breach and down the southern glacis.
 21

This time they were obviously intent on escaping, under cover of the jungle water
course. A large number were killed, wounded and captured and only a small group of
about 70 got way.' The fort was very small, and the whole place covered with bodies. In
going from one enclosure to another the same kind of objects appeared. Within the
body of the fort we heard groans and cries of “Pani! Pani!” and on descending, never
was anything so shocking. There were 86 dead bodies lying in this small
place.''(ibid:158)

On 29th November the British continued cannon firing upon the fort. All walls of the fort were
already fallen down. The fort was totally destroyed. Only 60 Nepali soldiers were remaining
inside. There was no water to drink, no food to eat and no medicine for treat. Women and
children were crying. The situation was really terrible inside the fort.

On 30th early morning other remaining leaders changu Basnet, Ripumardan and Janga
Singh Thapa forced Balbhadra to left the fort and Nepalese force escaped penetrating
British encirclement. After that British force took hold of Nalapani fort at 4 am in November
1814. Finally East India Company praised the bravery of Nepalese side and made a
movement in Dehradun. In this way the Battle of Nalapani ended. British record showed
difference of Gorkhas strength at Kalanga which varied between 1,000 and 1,500. The
actual strength can be worked out. Mawby cremated 97 men and women on 1 st December,
the counted 90 already buried. The strength that vacated the fort was 84. Reinforcement of
150 was built up. Even if an addition number of 100 is given to it the strength does not go
beyond 600. It must be remembered that of this at least 2000 were Gahrawal fighters and
about 175 were women and children. "One of the letters of Balbhadra gives out his painful
departure leaving behind the wounded. But he had told them that the abandonment of the
fort by men who were fit to fight another day compelled him, to vacate the fort and leave
them behind."(Khanduri, op.cit., 123)
 22

Chapter Four

Strategy, Tactics and Principle of War

4.1 Strategy of East India Company:

 To secure position in Asian sub continent.

 To secure smooth flow of Trans Himalayan trade.
 To get hold of some of the importance Hilly station.
 To exploit resources of Nepal-Man power & Natural resources.
 To confine Nepal within hills.

4.2 Tactics used in battle of Nalapani

British forces applied following Tactics in battle on Nalapani.

 Encirclement.
 Multi directional attack.
 Over whelming attack.
 Use of long range cannons/maximum use of artillery.
 Maximum use of local guide
 Cut off (water, ration, reinforcement)

Nepalese troops applied following tactics in this battle

 Offensive defence: The defence taken by Nepalese troops in Khalanga fort was
defensive in nature and offensive in conduct, raid of small party against enemies
cannon during second battle
 Use of dominating height: There was only uphill axis towards fort from Nahan,
Nepalese troops easily monitored the enemy movement from Nalapani height
 23

 Use of guerilla tactics: Hit and run tactics of small raiding team deploying outside
the fort during second attack.
 Use of local resources: They made fort by using local mud and stones
 Delay: They halted large enemy forces about a month long which zeoparadise
overall plan of British

4.3 Principles of war used in battle of Nalapani

Though the systematic formulation of the present Principles of war used at present was not
existed at the time on Anglo-Nepal war, a number of those principles were used by both the
Nepalese and British side. Some of the main principles of war used by both sides during the
war are as follows:

 Selection and Maintenance of Aim: Nepalese Troops were able to defeat the
British troop in Nalapani, they halted for a month, Balabhadra was able to maintain
his aim of defeating British till the last moment.
 Maintenance of Morale: The morale shown by Nepalese small troops was praised
by British.

 Offensive Action: Although battle of Nalapani was defensive, the quick raid upon
enemy proved Nalapani offensive defence.

 Security: Nalapani was all plans were secretly made and the Forts were made to
secure man and materials. Tactics like fighting from strong position, adopting
delaying position, camouflage, concealment and deception. At the last moment when
whole troops were in dangerous condition he choose right decision to save their life.

 Surprise: Movement at night, surprise attack from concealed position, use of bad
weather conditions are the measure adopted by Balabhadra.

 Concentration of Force: In this battle soldiers were deployed at decisive points

and in defensive battle fight from fortified Forts. This justifies that concentration of
force was taken into consideration.
 24

 Economy of Effort: The relation with locals made by Balabhadra, their help
for making fort, scientific employment of small troops are the examples of economy
of effort.

 Flexibility: Balabhadra had applied flexibility in his command and control,

movement of the troops.

 Cooperation: High degree of cooperation was shown inside the fort by Nepalese.
That was one of the causes of failure of English.

 Administration: Although Nepal was not able to provide adequate administration,

Balabhadra managed administrative arrangement with the suggestion of kaji amar
Singh thapa and with the help of locals food and ammunitions were collected for 6
month.

4.4 Strong and Weak Points of Bothe Sides in Battle of Nalapani

Though Nepal was defeated in the battle, Nepalese troops were able to display outstanding
blow to well equipped and well trained East India troops in this battle. East India vastly
outnumbered the less trained and less equipped Nepalese troops, but the exceptional
bravery of Nepalese troops and the dedicated leadership of the Nepalese commanders
gave tough time for the aggressors. The main weaknesses and good points of the both
sides in the battle are summarized as follows:

4.4.1 British Side

The main weaknesses of the East India troops during battle were as follows:

 Lack of knowledge of adversary.

 Lack of knowledge of the ground.

 Lack of information.

 Lack of detailed and precise planning and also lack of contingency plan.
 25

 Underestimation of the adversary.

 Lack of training in the mountainous terrain.

 Lack of cohesive spirit.

 They failed to take account of weather, the human factor and fatigue, time for uphill
movement and unpredictable reaction of Gorkhas especially during second attack.

The positive points of the East India troops were as follows:

 Good leadership.
 Good logistic support.

 Good fighting spirit.

4.4.3. Nepalese Side

The main weaknesses of Nepalese troops were:

 Lack of knowledge of adversary.

 Lack of information.

 Lack of good logistic backup.

The strong points of Nepalese troops are:

 Good fighting spirits

 Good leadership
 26

Chapter Five

Effects and Lesson Learnt

Every action of ours leaves a foot print for the others. There is a cause and effect relation
everywhere. Naturally war is not an exceptional case. Every war has its effects on the lives
of the people of the country involved in war. The post war situation of a country really
becomes a cruces one/ not only the defeated but the winners also faces a great loss in one
or the other way. In spite of the administration and praise, the winner also had to suffer from
mental or psychological loss as they became mentally stressed. The economy as well as
the social condition of the country got affected. Surely enough the Battle of Nalapani also
left some good and bad effect upon the citizens as well as the leaders of the countries.
Basically on the British side there were two distinct effect of the Battle of Nalapani.

 It set British to rethink about their own strength and tactics. After this battle British
changed their strategy. They adopted the strategy of psychological warfare, use of
long range artillery in other battles (battle of Jaithak, battle of Deuthal).

 British developed a grudging admiration for the Gorkhas, eventually led Gorkhas to
join British army.

At the overall tactical level, the British accepted a sense of morale ascendency of the
Gorkha over their fighting clan. Even though the Gurkhas could not defeat them in the true
sense of the word they could damage their military psyche for years to come. At the
strategic level, it forced Moira to abandon the planned advance to the capital of Garahwal
and instead, adopted a complementary hook in coordination with Ochtorlony's to Nahan.
Capture of Virat and advance to Jaitak were a part of this changed strategy what were
 27

designed to be Kathmandu by Christmas became highly improbable. The overall effect of

the failure at Khalanga is described in "Board of East India Company".

British Court will peruse with regret on account of the failure of the second attempt of
Khalanga on 27 November and of the serious loss which was sustained on the occasion.
The result of the second attempt is considered by C-in-C to be so serious and to effect of
deeply the public interest and the reputation of our arms. You will learn with satisfaction that
three days after the assault the enemy evacuated the fort.The Nepalese as well as the
British both were affected equally.

 The war resulted into the decisive check of the Gorkhali expansion.
 The war ended the possibility of Hindu coalition of Gorkhas marthas and sheikhs as
a threat to the British power in India.

 The treaty deprived Nepal with 1/3 of her territory in East South and West.

 The government of Nepal lost a very important right enjoyed by every independent
state to employing the citizen of any country it likes. It was a question mark to the
Nepalese sovereign status.

 National forces and leaders had lost the chance to begin forceful polities.

 The ideological dispute was brought up in administration which caused the Ranas to
rule over for 104 years.

5.1 Positive Effects on Nepalese Side

 The courage of brave Gorkhalis was reconised throughout the world and even today
are renounced as "brave Gorkhali".
 They could got chance of demonstration of their courage in WWI and WWII.

 The relation with British became smooth.

 28

 Balbhadra Kunwar was appreciated as the great, confident and skilled warrior by his
enemy.

 Few Gorkhali troops were able to control one division troops more than a month
period because of their determination, dedication and appreciable leadership.

5.2 Achievement on the British side

 Position of East India Company became secure in Indian subcontinent.

 They got valuable territorial gain by this war such as:

 Important trade route to Tibet and China.

 Presence of British resident in Nepal enabled the company's government to keep

a constant and close watch over the activities of Nepalese government.

 After the war Gorkhas emerged as the most dependable allies for a safeguarding the
British empire in India.

 During these war British side lost lot of money, men and materials. A lot of questions
were raised against the government General that,

 The war was undertaken without necessary.

 The company might easily have occupied and held he disputed lands without
much expense.

 The management of war was not judiciously conceived.

 The advantage required in the field was not only insisted on in the 3
conditions of peace.
 29

 The operations of war were carried in with wasteful expenditure.

 The revenues of East India Company injured and heavy debt had been
incurred.

With all these positive and negative effects we, the Nepalese people, were left with an
intention and were taught a lesson that the leadership and cooperation among the leaders
should be well coordinated. There should be uniformity in the issues like national interest
and nationality. Adequate logistic support is the most essential factor for the success of
battle. Diplomatic relation with neighbor country should be good enough to establish peace
and security within the country. There should not be personal rivalry between the leaders,
the ego crisis between Bhimsen Thapa and Lord Moyra is route cause of battle of Nalapani
as well as Anglo Nepal war. We should never underestimate our enemy, Bhimsen thapa
underestimated British troops and leadership.
 30

Chapter Six

Conclusion

The battle of Nalapani starting with an expansionist policy was fought in series. It started in
1814. Though the British could win the battle finally, they were very much impressed with
the bravery and courage of the Gorkhas. The Nepalese people showed a great morale.
Although it was defensive, the quick said upon the British proved Nalapani an offensive
defence. The plans were made secretary. There was flexibility in command and control.
Although Nepal was not able to provide adequate administration, Balabhadra managed the
force and other ammunitions for 6 months. There was high degree of cooperation inside the
fort.

The Nepalese force fought until last but finally they have to give up. Balabhadra showed
great bravery when he said "it's better to die with hat bullets than to bow in front of the
enemy". But the British used the inhumane means of blocking the water supply to the fort
and forced the Nepalese to give up. General Gillespie praising Gorkha's referred as Brave
''Gorkhali's." British made monument of Balbhadra in Dehradun for thr respect of his
bravery. Their courage was recognized all over the world because of which they could
enroll even today in the foreign troops. They were even included in the WWI & WWII. Thus,
the battle of Nalapani was historically and strategically very important, which inflicted a
heavy loss on the British side in spite of its small size and lack of weapons. It compelled
British to change their plan and overall view about Nepal.

"Khalanga was never captured. It was entered when evacuated and then
razed to the ground". –Gen Fedrick Young
 31

Appendix 'A'
(Refer to Para 1.1 of Page 2)

MAP OF GREATER NEPAL

32

Appendix 'B'
(Refer to Para 3.6 of Page 9)
 33

Appendix 'C'
(Refer to Para 3.8 of Page 10)

Table Land
34

Appendix 'D'
(Refer to Para 3.9 of Page 12)
 35

Appendix 'E'
(Refer to Para 3.10.3 of Page 15)

THIRD ATTACKTED AGAINST NALAPANI

 36

References

Books and Manuals

 Dr. Baidhe, Tulsi Ram, Sharma, Shiva Prasad, Dr. Manandhar, Triratna 2049, Nepal
ko Sainik Itihas, NA H.Q.
 KC, Surendra1989, Diplomatic History of Nepal, Ratna Pustak Bhandar
 Khanduri, Chandra B 1997, A Re-discovered History of Gorkhas, Gyan Sagar
Publications, Delhi;
 Pemble, John 1971, The Invasion of Nepal, Oxford: Cárdenas Press.
 Stiller, Ludwig F.S. J. 1995, The rise of the house of Gorkha, Ratna Pustak Bhandar,
Kathmandu.