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IV
Infrastructure Aspects
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22
Lifeline Seismic Risk

22.1 Introduction
22.2 Brief History of Lifeline Earthquake Engineering
in the United States
22.3 Nonlinearity of Earthquakes
22.4 Indirect Economic Losses
22.5 Cost-Effective Mitigation Strategies
22.6 Federal and Industry Lifeline Initiatives
Ronald T. Eguchi 22.7 Lifeline Seismic Risk
ImageCat, Inc. Defining Terms
Long Beach, CA References

22.1 Introduction
Infrastructure, such as highways, water and wastewater systems, electric power and communication
systems, and natural gas systems, literally make up the arteries and lifeblood of modern society. Deprived
of this infrastructure, such as in a major urban earthquake, mankind is reduced to a primitive existence.
For this reason, we use the term lifeline. The focus of this chapter is on earthquake hazards and the
issues and opportunities associated with the reduction of risks to urban lifeline systems. Even though
the focus is on earthquakes, the concepts and ideas are applicable to all natural hazards. The basic thesis
of this chapter is that the cost of rebuilding lifeline systems after major natural disasters is becoming
prohibitively expensive, even for large federal budgets. As our cities continue to develop and expand
geographically, we increase the chance of “direct hits” — that is, major urban catastrophes. Therefore,
the design of our systems must consider these risks and, perhaps more importantly, develop ways of
effectively reducing these risks through land-use planning, modification of hazardous site conditions,
and increased design and/or retrofit.
Recent disasters have underscored the need to assess the vulnerability of our nation’s lifeline systems
to natural hazard effects. Published estimates of lifeline damage as a result of the 1994 Northridge
earthquake are in excess of $2 billion. While this amount may appear low relative to other types of losses
(e.g., damage to buildings), it only reflects those costs associated with the repair of damaged lifeline
systems. Other costs, which may more accurately reflect the impact of damaged or disrupted systems —
such as business losses due to lifeline disruption or fire damage resulting from loss of water supplies —
may be several factors higher than these repair costs. Also, it must be recognized that the Northridge
earthquake was a moderate-sized event and that the Los Angeles area is capable of generating earthquakes
of much larger magnitude. Therefore, the relatively good performance of lifelines in the Northridge
earthquake should not promote complacency in acceptable design measures for lifeline systems.
This chapter concentrates on five areas relevant to earthquake hazard reduction for lifeline systems.
First, a brief history of lifeline earthquake engineering in the United States is presented in order to identify
important milestones with regard to lifeline seismic design and construction. Second, the nonlinear

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22-2 Earthquake Engineering Handbook

relationship between earthquake impacts and earthquake size and proximity to urban area is discussed.
As will be seen, the United States has been fortunate not to have experienced a catastrophic earthquake
in a major urban area, at least since 1906. The question of how U.S. response systems would function if
a Kobe-type earthquake were to occur here is of particular interest. Third, a discussion of indirect vs.
direct economic losses associated with the failure and disruption of lifeline systems in earthquakes is
presented. As stated earlier, the larger impacts associated with damaged lifeline facilities may depend on
how long these critical lifeline systems are out of service. Fourth, we offer several case histories that
demonstrate where mitigation has been effective in reducing earthquake losses. An important program
in this respect is the Caltrans bridge retrofit program. The cost-effectiveness of this program is reviewed
against the experience of two major earthquakes in California, the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in the
San Francisco Bay area and the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles. Finally, several opportunities
for impacting lifeline earthquake engineering design practices are discussed. We also discuss where these
opportunities might build on federal initiatives. One important initiative focuses on the adoption of
seismic design standards for private and public lifeline systems in the United States, an effort being
spearheaded by the American Lifelines Alliance, a joint partnership between the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).

22.2 Brief History of Lifeline Earthquake Engineering

in the United States
The following chronology provides a brief look at some of the more important milestones related to
lifeline earthquake engineering in the United States. As can be seen, the major impetus to examine seismic
design procedures for lifeline facilities was the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. Even though there had
been prior earthquakes in the United States that highlighted the importance of lifeline systems after major
disasters (e.g., the 1906 San Francisco earthquake), the 1971 San Fernando event resulted in a widespread
and profound recognition of the lifeline seismic risk problem, and led to important changes in design
and construction.

Year Milestone Significance

1971 San Fernando Earthquake Significant damage to lifeline systems. Start of long-term research program to
(M6.4) study the effects of earthquakes on all lifeline systems (primarily funded by
the National Science Foundation). Many changes to lifeline seismic design
and construction initiated by this event.
1974 TCLEE The Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE) of the
American Society of Civil Engineers was formed to address general issues
regarding the state-of-the-art and practice of lifeline earthquake engineering
in the United States. Since its formation, TCLEE has sponsored reconnaissance
of major earthquakes, held five major quadrennial conferences on lifeline
earthquake engineering, endowed the C. Martin Duke Lifeline Earthquake
Engineering award, and published numerous monographs, design guideline
documents, and special reports on lifeline earthquake engineering.
1977 NEHRP National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program established by Congress in
1977 (Public Law 95–124) to “reduce the risks to life and property from future
earthquakes in the United States through the establishment and maintenance of
an effective earthquake hazards reduction program.” [amended 1990 Public Law
101–614]. NEHRP’s mission includes improved understanding,
characterization and prediction of hazards and vulnerabilities; improved
model building codes and land use practices; risk reduction through
postearthquake investigations and education; development and improvement
of design and construction techniques; improved mitigation capacity; and
accelerated application of research results. The Act designates FEMA as the
lead agency of the program, and assigns several planning, coordinating, and
reporting responsibilities. NEHRP has been a major pillar in the building of
a national lifelines seismic risk reduction program.

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Lifeline Seismic Risk 22-3

Year Milestone Significance

1985 BSSC Lifeline Workshop As a result of this major workshop held by the Building Seismic Safety Council,
an action plan for abating seismic hazards to lifelines was developed. The
workshop had recommendations in four areas: public policy, legal, and
financial strategies; information transfer and dissemination; emergency
planning; and scientific and engineering knowledge.
1986 NCEER* In order to address socioeconomic issues related to the seismic performance of
lifeline systems, the NSF awarded a multi-year contract to the State University
of New York at Buffalo to form the National Center for Earthquake Engineering
Research (NCEER). This center has brought together researchers from many
different technical disciplines to focus on multi-dimensional issues (e.g.,
socioeconomic impacts caused by the disruption of lifeline service).
1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake This earthquake reaffirmed the programs initiated in 1971, and the need to
(M7.1) assess and improve seismic design and construction procedures for all lifeline
facilities. Particular attention was subsequently given to the performance of
highway bridge structures, due in part to the damage to the San
Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge.
1990 Port of Los Angeles (POLA) The purpose of this workshop was to develop a set of guidelines to be used by
Seismic Workshop the Port to address seismic design issues in the design and construction of
new landfill areas within the Port. This workshop reflected the culmination
of many months of preparation and meetings among scientists, engineers,
and policy makers.
1990 Public Law 101–614 Passage of this law required the director of the Federal Emergency Management
(Reauthorization of the Agency (FEMA), in consultation with the National Institute of Standards and
National Earthquake Technology (NIST), to submit to Congress a plan for developing and adopting
Hazards Reduction seismic design and construction standards for all lifelines.
Program)
1991 Lifeline Standards Workshop The purpose of this workshop was to (1) obtain comments and suggestions
for revising draft plans prepared in response to Public Law 101–614,
examining lifeline issues, and (2) obtain priorities for various standard
development and research activities.
1991 Workshop Sponsored by the This was one of the first workshops to focus on the effects of earthquakes on
National Science communication lifeline systems. This workshop was followed by a second
Foundation and the meeting in 1992 where different approaches to communication lifeline
National Communications modeling was discussed.
System
1994 Northridge Earthquake Performance of lifelines had significantly improved compared to prior
(M6.7) earthquakes in this region (e.g., 1971 San Fernando earthquake). However,
concern continued over the performance of highway bridges structures. Other
lifelines were generally deemed to have performed satisfactorily even though
the City of Los Angeles experienced a complete loss of electric power for the
first time in its history.
1995 Kobe, Japan Earthquake Performance of lifelines in this earthquake was extremely poor. Considerable
(M6.9) damage was observed in virtually every type of lifeline system with restoration
taking as long as several months in certain cases. This event was a reminder of
what could happen in the United States if mitigation efforts are not continued.
1996 FEMA/NIST Plan for This plan was the result of Public Law 101–614. This plan emphasized the
Developing and Adopting importance of forming public and private partnerships to implement its
Seismic Design Guidelines recommendations.
and Standards for Lifelines
1997 ASCE Lifelines Policymakers Workshop held in Washington, D.C. to solicit input on how to implement the
Workshop recommendations of the FEMA/NIST plan.
1997 Deregulation of the Electric The first real test in examining the impact of deregulation on seismic mitigation
Power Industry activities. In the past, these programs were mandated or strongly encouraged
by state Public Utilities Commissions. Without these requirements and with
economics playing a more important role in capital expenditures, the future
of pro-active seismic mitigation programs is placed in jeopardy.
1998 American Lifelines Alliance Formed as a partnership between FEMA and ASCE, this nonprofit entity was
assigned the responsibility for implementing the FEMA/NIST plan. To date,
there have been a number of documents published by the ALA that help form
the basis of evaluation or design guidelines for different lifelines.

* In 1997 NCEER changed its name to the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER).

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22-4 Earthquake Engineering Handbook

22.3 Nonlinearity of Earthquakes

The United States has been relatively fortunate not to have experienced a major earthquake (M7 or
greater) in a highly urbanized area in modern times. The closest approach to this situation was the
January 17, 1994 Northridge event. This earthquake occurred directly beneath the San Fernando Valley,
a suburban area of Los Angeles. However, because of the depth and size (M6.7) of the earthquake, damage
was generally limited to the suburban, moderately built-up area. A larger event, particularly one that
might occur along one of the blind thrust faults in the Los Angeles area (e.g., the Elysian Park ramp fault
that is located directly under downtown Los Angeles) would definitely cause an order of magnitude more
damage than was observed in the January 1994 event.
California has been host to a whole series of moderate and larger earthquakes. Table 22.1 shows a
reverse chronological list of earthquakes that have affected California in the last 30 years or so. As is
evident from this list, there are three events that dominate the loss picture. These are the 1971 San
Fernando, 1989 Loma Prieta, and 1994 Northridge earthquakes. The total economic loss (only direct
costs or losses) for all earthquakes since the San Fernando event is about $53 billion (in 1994 dollars).
The three earthquakes mentioned previously account for over 98% of this total. The total number of
deaths and injuries for all earthquakes are 190 and 16,000, respectively (see Table 22.1).
The response and recovery from these California earthquakes has been quite effective, particularly
from the standpoint of lifelines. In most cases, service was restored to affected populations in a matter
of days and weeks. For example, as shown in Table 22.2, the longest restoration associated with a damaged
lifeline system (not including transportation systems) in the Northridge earthquake was 12 days (natural
gas system). Further, it is clear from Table 22.2 that the outages that were observed in the Northridge
earthquake affected a very small percentage of the serviced population. It is also interesting to note in
Table 22.2 that those lifeline systems that are eligible for federal assistance (LADWP, MWD, L.A. City
and Caltrans) account for about 95% of the total losses in the table. Therefore, restoration of these
systems is not just a Los Angeles or California problem, but also a federal problem.
In a large event in an urbanized area, the response and recovery efforts may increase by many times.
Unfortunately (or maybe fortunately), we don’t know how response and recovery systems will respond
when demand for resources greatly exceeds available capacity, because we have not experienced a cata-
strophic event in the United States in recent times. In order to understand the resiliency of these systems,
we need to learn from foreign earthquakes.
The earthquake that occurred in Kobe, Japan exactly 1 year after the Northridge earthquake probably
represents the closest available example of a nonlinear earthquake. Nonlinear earthquakes are defined in
this chapter as events where the demand for resources greatly exceeds available capacity. Because manpower
and repair resources will be overextended, restoration times will be stretched and delayed. Resources will
eventually have to come from areas very distant from the affected areas. In addition, damage to local and
regional transportation systems may also add an additional dimension to response times.
In order to demonstrate this point, Table 22.3 shows an illustrative regional earthquake damage index.
This index is nothing more than a qualitative attempt to describe the risk a particular region or area may
have, given certain geographical and earthquake parameters. For example, within this context, it is assumed
that risk or subsequent postearthquake damage can be described by two parameters: earthquake magnitude
and proximity to urbanized region. The underlying theory here is that significant damage or risk only
occurs when unfavorable values of each parameter occur at the same time. That is, risk is high if the
earthquake, whether large or moderate, occurs in a densely populated area.
In order to provide some quantitative scale to these indices, a simple and somewhat arbitrary set of
descriptions are provided for each range of damage indices. In effect, what is being suggested here are
the results of a general or crude seismic risk analysis.
To illustrate this concept of nonlinearity, damage data from five different earthquakes have been
collected from the literature. Table 22.4 presents the author’s best opinion of damage index levels for the
various earthquakes.

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Lifeline Seismic Risk 22-5

TABLE 22.1 Significant California Earthquakes, 1971 to Present

Damage
Location Year Magnitude Deaths Injuries ($ Million)

Northridge 1994 6.7 57 9,000+ 44,000a

Big Bear 1992 6.7 — — 48.5
Landers 1992 7.6 1 402 48.5
Cape Mendocino 1992 7.1 — 356 51.5
Joshua Tree 1992 6.1 — 10 . 04
Sierra Madre 1991 5.8 1 30+ 36
Upland 1990 5.5 — 38 11.2
Loma Prieta 1989 7.1 63 3,757 6,500
Imperial Co 1987 6.6 — 94 3.2
Whittier 1987 5.9 8 200+ 430
Chalfant 1986 6.0 — — 0.5
Oceanside 1986 5.3 1 28 0.9
Palm Spring 1986 5.9 — — 6.6
Morgan Hill 1984 6.2 — 27 13.2
Coalinga 1983 6.4 — 47 42
Eureka 1980 7.0 — 8 2.7
Owens Valley 1980 6.2 — 13 3
Livermore 1980 5.5 1 44 17.5
Imperial Valley 1979 6.4 — 91 50.6
Gilroy-Hol 1979 5.9 — 16 0.8
Santa Barbara 1978 5.7 — 65 13.8
Pt. Magu 1973 5.9 — — 3
San Fernando 1971 6.4 58 2,000 1,766
TOTAL 190 16,226 53,049.54
a Source: Data from Eguchi, R.T. et al. 1998. Earthquake Spectra, 14.

TABLE 22.2 Lifeline Performance During the January 17, 1994 Northridge Earthquake
Lifeline Population w/o Service Restoration Time Damage ($ Million)

LADWP (Power) 100% 90% in 1 day 136

SoCal Edison 25% 99.9% in 1 day 0.5
LADWP (Water) ~15% 8 days 44
MWD — — 5
LA City (Sewer) — — 36
SoCal Gas 3% 12 days 60
PacBell 8 communities — 26
GTE <1% — 3.5
Caltrans — — 1,450
Total 1,761

Source: Eguchi, R.T. 1995. Proceedings of International Symposium on Public Infrastructure Systems Research, C.-K. Choi
and J. Penzien, Eds., September 25–27, Seoul, Korea, pp. 109–118. With permission.

Figure 22.1 shows a plot of repair costs per customer for electric power systems for the five events,
including the Northridge and Kobe events. The repair costs are associated with damaged electric power
systems and represent very coarse estimates at best. Therefore, the figure is more illustrative than scientific.
Figure 22.1 shows that there is a tendency for these normalized repair costs to increase in a nonlinear
fashion with the simplified damage index. All of the U.S. events are well below the Kobe earthquake,
both in terms of normalized repair cost and index. Therefore, perhaps the Kobe event may suggest the
trend if we were to experience a major earthquake (M7 event or higher) in a highly urbanized area of
the United States. It is hoped that this simple illustration points out the need to examine lifeline damage
and restoration issues for large urban earthquakes.

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22-6 Earthquake Engineering Handbook

TABLE 22.3 Regional Earthquake Damage Index

Magnitude Range
Proximity to Urbanized Region <5 5 to 6 6 to 7 7 to 8 >8

Remote 0 1 3 5 7
Close 2 4 6 8 9
Direct hit 2 5 7 9 10

Note: 0 = No impact; 1–3 = Minor regional damage; no major disruption, economic or otherwise. 4–6 = Moderate
regional damage; measurable economic loss; recovery near immediate. 7–8 = Major damage; substantial economic loss;
recovery takes weeks. 9–10 = Catastrophic damage; economic infrastructure significantly damaged; full recovery takes
months and perhaps years.
Source: Eguchi, R.T. 1995. Proceedings of International Symposium on Public Infrastructure Systems Research,
C.-K. Choi and J. Penzien, Eds., September 25–27, Seoul, Korea, pp. 109–118. With permission.

TABLE 22.4 Estimated Repair Costs for Electric Power Systems

Proximity to Repair Cost ($) Damage
Earthquake Magnitude Urbanized Region per Customer Index

1971 San Fernando (SF) 6.4 Direct Hit $30 7

1986 Palm Springs (PS) 5.9 Remote $1 1
1989 Loma Prieta (LP) 7.1 Remote $7 5
1994 Northridge (NOR) 6.7 Direct Hit $100 7
1995 Kobe (KOBE) ~7 Direct Hit $1500 9

Source: Eguchi, R.T. 1995. Proceedings of International Symposium on Public Infrastructure Systems Research,
C.-K. Choi and J. Penzien, Eds., September 25–27, 1995, Seoul, Korea, pp. 109–118. With permission.

10000
Repair Costs ($) per Customer

KOBE

1000

NOR
100

SF
LP
10

PS
1
0 2 4 6 8 10
Regional Earthquake Damage Index

FIGURE 22.1 Repair costs per customer for several recent earthquakes: electric power systems. (From Eguchi, R.T.
1995. Proceedings of International Symposium on Public Infrastructure Systems Research, C.-K. Choi and J. Penzien, Eds.,
September 25–27, 1995, Seoul, Korea, pp. 109–118. With permission.)

22.4 Indirect Economic Losses

The failure of lifeline systems in large earthquakes can be devastating, hampering both response and
recovery. Recent events, such as the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe earthquakes, have demonstrated
that indirect impacts associated with the failure of lifeline systems may far outweigh the direct costs
associated with system repair. As a result, the problem of quantifying possible indirect losses is currently
receiving increased attention.
The performance of electric power systems is generally measured by the repair costs resulting from
actual disasters. In the measurements, the indirect losses associated with factors such as utility outages,
outage time, or the effects on dependent businesses are largely ignored. This is primarily due to the lack
of statistical data or actuarial experience to quantify these impacts. In 1998, the Multidisciplinary Center
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Lifeline Seismic Risk 22-7

TABLE 22.5 Repair Costs and Associated Direct and Indirect Economic Losses Due to the Failure and
Disruption of Electric Power Service in a Large New Madrid Earthquake
Loss Type Amount ($Mill) % of Total Loss Ratio to Repair Costs

Repair costs 401 12 1

Postearthquake direct losses 787 23 2
Postearthquake indirect losses 2,180 65 5
Total losses 3,368 100.0 —

Source: Shinozuka, M. et al. (eds.). 1998. Engineering and Socioeconomic Impacts of Earthquakes, MCEER Mono-
graph 2, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, Buffalo, NY. With permission.

for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER) outlined an approach for simulating these impacts using
electric power systems as an example. These methods are documented in a monograph prepared by
MCEER [Shinozuka et al., 1998].
Table 22.5 contains results from that study. The table lists expected repair costs to electric power
facilities and the direct and indirect losses that would be incurred if a large earthquake in the New Madrid
Seismic Zone were to occur today. The total repair cost was derived from data produced by Chang et al.
[1996]. The results of the Chang report indicate that repair costs to major substations in a large New
Madrid earthquake could be as high as $400 million. Most of this damage would occur in major gate
stations.
The direct and indirect economic losses were taken from Shinozuka et al. [1998]. Direct losses were
interpreted as those associated with gross output losses that consider no bottleneck effect. In other words,
each economic sector in a region (e.g., construction, wholesale, retail, etc.) would be impacted only by
a disruption of electric power service and not additionally by supply input bottlenecks from other sectors.
Indirect losses are then calculated by subtracting these nonbottleneck losses from those gross output
losses that do account for bottleneck effects. These indirect losses model the so-called multiplier or ripple
effects.
A comparison of the various losses in Table 22.5 shows that indirect losses are approximately 5 times
larger than expected repair costs and about 2.5 times larger than direct losses. More importantly, the
combined total of direct and indirect losses is about seven times larger than expected repair costs. This
ratio is significant since, in most earthquakes, the only economic loss data generally reported by electric
power utility companies are the total repair costs. Therefore, the full economic impact of electric power
failure and disruption is, in general, grossly understated.

22.5 Cost-Effective Mitigation Strategies

With the recent wave of natural disasters in the United States (Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, the
Northridge earthquake, and the 1993 Midwest floods), it is becoming imperative that repair programs
and strategies include mitigation elements. That is, the United States, as a nation, should attempt to
improve the resistance of its lifeline structures to natural hazard effects at every opportunity possible. It
has been shown in many examples that damage to structures or systems can be reduced if prudent
planning is implemented.
One of the best examples of cost-effective mitigation measures is the Caltrans program started imme-
diately after the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. A report entitled “The Continuing Challenge: The
Northridge Earthquake of January 17, 1994,” prepared for the California Department of Transportation
by a Seismic Advisory Board formed by the Governor of California, presents a summary of Caltrans’
seismic retrofit program. Two of the major conclusions of the report were:
1. “All structures in the region of strong shaking [in the Northridge area] that were retrofitted since
1989 performed adequately.”
2. “The Board’s conclusion is that if the seven collapsed bridges had been retrofitted, they would
have survived the [Northridge] earthquake with little damage.”
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TABLE 22.6 The Caltrans Bridge Retrofit Program Status as of June 1, 1994
Estimated Total Cost Construction Construction
Category of Structure ($ Million) Complete Under Way Remaining

Single Col. Retrofit $120 87% 13% 0%

Multiple Col. Retrofit $1,650 2% 7% 91%
Toll Bridge Retrofits $650 0% 20% 100%
Total $2,420

Source: Seismic Advisory Board, 1994.

The cost-effectiveness of the retrofit program is further justified by the data contained in one of the
tables of the report. This table, which is reproduced here as Table 22.6, states that the total estimated
cost of retrofit, by category of structure, for all seismically vulnerable bridges is about $2.4 billion. This
total should be compared to the estimated cost of repair to Caltrans bridge structures that were damaged
as a result of the Northridge earthquake ($1.5 billion). If the conclusions of the Caltrans report are valid,
repair costs during Northridge could have been eliminated, or at least greatly reduced, if that money had
been spent to complete the retrofit program. This is just one very real example of mitigation activities
being clearly cost-effective.

22.6 Federal and Industry Lifeline Initiatives

The U.S. federal government has historically played a major role in facilitating research and seismic
evaluation programs for lifelines. With the reauthorization of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction
Program (NEHRP), Congress mandated that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in
consultation with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), develop a plan for assembling
and adopting national seismic design standards for all lifelines, public and private. This plan was devel-
oped and was released in the mid-1990s. Important in this plan was the recommendation that public
and private partnerships be developed in order to effect implementation.
In 1998, FEMA, in partnership with the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), formed the
American Lifelines Alliance (ALA). The goal of the ALA is to establish methodologies for assessing lifeline
performance and to identify actions to reduce their risk from earthquakes. The ALA is currently soliciting,
funding, and managing specific projects that will improve or extend industry practices in the design and
construction of utility systems (electric power, gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, water and
wastewater) and transportation systems (highways, waterways, rail, ports and harbors). The end products
will be incorporated into national consensus guidelines that will be administered by different organiza-
tions (e.g., ASTM). For more information on this initiative, the reader can visit www.americanlifeline-
salliance.org.

22.7 Lifeline Seismic Risk

Several major lessons can be drawn from this brief look at lifeline earthquake engineering:

1. Lifelines have been shown to be extremely vulnerable to earthquakes and failures of these systems
can result in significant direct and indirect loss.
2. This recognition began over 30 years ago, and steady progress has been maintained to develop
broad, practical mitigation programs.
3. The United States has been fortunate in that recent damaging earthquakes have been moderate in
size and/or have not occurred in highly urban areas. The Kobe earthquake is a guide for how
restoration may be affected by inadequate resources, illustrating the nonlinear effects of earthquakes.
4. Indirect losses resulting from the failure or disruption of lifelines are many times the losses
associated with the repair of the damaged systems.

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Lifeline Seismic Risk 22-9

5. Mitigation of future risks through cost-effective retrofit or design strategies has been shown to be
effective, as demonstrated by the performance of Caltrans facilities during the 1994 Northridge
earthquake.
6. One important initiative that is being administered by FEMA and ASCE has the potential for
significantly improving the earthquake performance of lifelines in future events. This initiative —
the American Lifelines Alliance — calls for the development and adoption of seismic design
standards for all public and private lifelines.

Defining Terms
Bottleneck effect — Phenomena in economic flows where a shortage of supply of an item, due perhaps
to damage to a factory manufacturing the item, results in economic disruption greatly out of
proportion to the ordinary value of the item (for want of a nail…the kingdom was lost).
Lifelines — Utilities (water, wastewater, electric power, gas, telecommunications) and transportation
(highways, railroads, air, and water transport) systems whose loss of function in an urban area
results in major disruption and potential loss of life.
NEHRP — Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program established by Congress in 1977 (Public Law
95–124) to “reduce the risks life and property from future earthquakes in the United States
through the establishment and maintenance of an effective earthquake hazards reduction pro-
gram” [amended 1990 Public Law 101–614]. There are four NEHRP agencies: FEMA (Federal
Emergency Management Agency), NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), NSF
(National Science Foundation), and the USGS (United States Geological Survey).
Nonlinear — Earthquakes where the demand for resources greatly exceeds available capacity.

References
Chang, S.E., Seligson, H.A., and Eguchi, R.T. 1996. “Estimation of the Economic Impact of Multiple
Lifeline Disruption: Memphis Light, Gas and Water Case Study,” Technical Report MCEER-96–0011,
Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, Buffalo, NY.
Eguchi, R.T. 1995. “Mitigating Risks to Infrastructure Systems through Natural Hazard Reduction and
Design,” Proceedings of International Symposium on Public Infrastructure Systems Research, C.-K.
Choi and J. Penzien, Eds., September 25–27, Seoul, Korea.
Eguchi, R.T., Goltz, J.D., Taylor, C.E. et al. 1998. “Direct Economic Losses in the Northridge Earthquake:
A Three-Year Post-Event Perspective,” Earthquake Spectra, 14, 245–264.
Seismic Advisory Board. 1994. The Continuing Challenge, The Northridge Earthquake of January 17, 1994,
Report to the Director, California Department of Transportation, Chairman: George W. Housner.
Shinozuka, M., Rose, A., and Eguchi, R. (Eds.). 1998. Engineering and Socioeconomic Impacts of Earth-
quakes, MCEER Monograph No. 2, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research,
Buffalo, NY.

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