Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE

Belief and unbelief in classical Sunnī theology

(5,840 words)

Belief and unbelief are signi ed by the Arabic verbal nouns īmān and
kufr, respectively. The question “what is ‘belief’?” (mā l-īmān) has been Article Table of Contents
answered in Muslim theology through two di ferent linguistic
1. Systematical origin of the
approaches. One focuses on the relation of name (ism) to sense and
issue
explains the intension of “belief” as a technical term of religion (dīn).
The other focuses on the relation of name to reference and interprets 2. Historical origin of the
issue
“belief” as a general expression that represents the extensional class of
actions of obedience (ṭāʿa) and submission (islām) to God. 3. Elements of doctrines on
belief and unbelief in early
1. Systematical origin of the issue Murjiʾī and Khārijī sources
4. The doctrine of Wāṣil b.
Tenets on belief and unbelief have their origin in moral and religious ʿAṭāʾ
debates on the destinies of sinners in the afterlife. Those tenets arose 5. The doctrine of Jahm b.
from two premises held by early Muslims, that believers go to Paradise Ṣafwān
and unbelievers to Hell, and that Paradise and Hell are permanent 6. The doctrine of Abū
destinations of believers and unbelievers (cf. Crone and Ḥanīfa
Zimmermann, 233). The Qurʾān, however, does not only classify 6.1 “Belief” in the Risāla ilā
people as believers and unbelievers. Rewards are not promised only to ʿUthmān al-Battī of Abū
those who believe in God and all his messengers (Q 4:152); the Qurʾān Ḥanīfa
also says that believing in God and his messenger and participating in 6.2 “Belief” in the Kitāb al-
the struggle ( jihād) in God's path is a kind of commercial transaction ʿĀlim wa-l-mutaʿallim of Abū
(tijāra) by which one is saved from punishment and will enter the Muqātil al-Samarqandī (d.
Garden of Paradise (Q 61:10–12). And punishment in Hell is not 208/823)
proclaimed only for people designated unbelievers (ku fār), but also 6.3 “Belief” in the Kitāb al-
for polytheists/idolators (mushrikūn) (e.g., Q 4:48, 116); hypocrites Fiqh al-absaṭ of Abū Muṭīʿ al-
(munā qūn) (e.g., Q 4:140), such as those who pay homage to Islam Balkhī (d. 199/814)
(aslama) but are not genuine believers (e.g., Q 49:14); murderers (Q 7. The Muʿtazilī response to
4:93; cf. 4:29–30); unjust people (ẓālimūna), such as those who the Ḥanafī doctrine on belief
unjustly “eat up” the property of orphans (Q 4:10); evildoers (al-fujjār) 8. The doctrine of Sunnī
(Q 82:14); transgressors (of the law of God) (al-fāsiqūn); and, in traditionalism
general, those who go astray (ḍāllūn). The problem of how these Bibliography
Qurʾānic names (asmāʾ) and the corresponding Qurʾānic judgements
(aḥkām) concerning a person's fate after death relate to the crucial
( ḥ ) g p

question of who belongs to the people of Paradise and who to the people of Hell gave rise to competing
classi cations of people. Since the time of Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/746) and Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), the
core issue of these classi cations has been formulated as the question “what is belief?”

2. Historical origin of the issue

Historically, the rise of doctrines of belief and unbelief is linked to the con ict among ʿAlī, ʿUthmān, Ṭalḥa,
and al-Zubayr and the subsequent uprisings, in particular the Kufan Khārijī revolt led by al-Mukhtār
against the Umayyad caliph Marwān II (r. 127–32/744–50), and the Murjiʾī reaction against Khārijī
extremists, who denied to grave sinners the legal status of a member of the Muslim community. The
earliest extant sources on the problem refer to the case of ʿAlī and ʿUthmān, to the First Civil War ( tna)
(36–41/656–61), and to the First Schism (al-furqa al-ūlā). These sources either promulgate the doctrine of
the “suspension of judgement” (irjāʾ)—to the e fect that one should leave to God the decision of who in the
Muslim community (ahl al-qibla) goes to Paradise and who to Hell—or argue from an anti-Murjiʾī, Khārijī
position that all sinners go to Hell.

3. Elements of doctrines on belief and unbelief in early Murjiʾī and Khārijī sources

Thoroughly reasoned explanations of the terms “belief” and “unbelief” did not exist before Jahm b. Ṣafwān,
Abū Ḥanīfa, and the Muʿtazilīs, who developed their opposing views in response to the approach of Jahm
and Abū Ḥanīfa (sections 5 and 6, below). However, formative elements of the doctrines of Jahm and Abū
Ḥanīfa on one side and of the Muʿtazilīs on the other are found in the earliest extant sources on the
teachings of the Murjiʾa: the poetry of ʿAwn b. ʿAbdallāh (d. 120/738), Thābit Quṭna (d. 110/728), and
Muḥārib b. Dithār (d. 116/734); the Kitāb al-Irjāʾ, attributed to al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥana yya (d.
c.100/718); and the Sīrat Sālim b. Dhakwān (Cook; van Ess, TG 1:163–79; Crone and Zimmermann). The rst
four of these sources argue from a Murjiʾī standpoint, the last from a Khārijī position. The authors take the
key terms of their arguments from the Qurʾān and furnish evidence of their opinions in the form of
allusions to Qurʾānic verses. The defenders of the Murjiʾī view emphasise the distinction between believing
and sinning; their Khārijī opponent emphasises requital in the Hereafter for the deeds of sinners.

ʿAwn b. ʿAbdallāh stresses that God will decide whether and how He will punish sins. Thābit Quṭna (d.
110/728) argues that transgressing God's commands does not lead to shirk (the setting up of partners with
God, i.e., polytheism), that neither ʿAlī nor ʿUthmān worshipped anyone but God after they became
servants of God, and that they will be rewarded according to their e forts. Muḥārib b. Dithār also holds that
sinning (dhanb) does not give rise to shirk (cf. van Ess, TG 1:165, 170; 5:18, 21). Hence, all three of them
presage the very important Murjiʾī and Sunnī Qurʾānic reference regarding the question of who will forever
be in Paradise and who in Hell: “God does not forgive the setting up of partners with Him [in worship], but
He does forgive whomever He will [any sin] except that (mā dūna dhālika)” (Q 4:48, 116) (cf. Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī, on Q 2:81). On this basis they hold that shirk—that is, polytheism and idolatry—is the only deed that
God will surely never forgive.

The Kitāb al-Irjāʾ, attributed to al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥana yya, asserts that the earliest followers of
the Prophet rst came to know (ʿarafū) and then acknowledged (iʿtarafū) the legitimate claim of God (ḥaqq
Allāh), sacri ced their lives and property, destroyed the arrows used in their divinations, and gave up their
veneration of idols. God subsequently prescribed “ways” (sharāʾiʿ) of submission (islām) and legal precepts
( f āʾiḍ) l i (ḥ dūd) d h h h i f h Pil i ( ā ik) A di
( farāʾiḍ), set penalties (ḥudūd), and taught them the ceremonies of the Pilgrimage (manāsik). According to
this argument, knowledge (maʿrifa) came rst, followed by acknowledgement (iʿtirāf ), and only then were
the ways of submission, the legal precepts, and the penalties established. Abū Ḥanīfa also follows this
chronology in his Risāla ilā ʿUthmān al-Battī (section 6.1, below) in arguing that belief is knowledge and
acknowledgement (in Ḥanafī terminology, iqrār) and that it does not include works.

Opposed to this view, the Ibāḍī Sīrat Sālim b. Dhakwān frequently contrasts “those who are well guided” (al-
muhtadūna) with “those going astray” (al-ḍullāl), identifying the former with those who believe and go to
Paradise and the latter with those who go to Hell. The author repeatedly alludes to the Day of Resurrection
(yawm al-qiyāma) (e.g., Q 2:85) and the Day of Reckoning (yawm al-ḥiṣāb) (Q 38:26), when God “will set up
the just scales (al-mawāzīn al-qisṭ), and no soul shall be treated unjustly” (Q 21:47); the wages (ajr) of those
who believe (man āmana) in God and the Last Day and do what is good (ʿamila ṣāliḥan) (e.g., Q 2:62); the
reward of the other world (thawāb al-ākhira), which God grants those who are grateful (al-shākirūna) for
His blessings (niʿamihī) (e.g., Q 3:145); and the recompense ( jazāʾ) (e.g., Q 4:93), retribution (ʿiqāb) (e.g., Q
41:43), punishment (ʿuqūba) (e.g., Q 4:14), and chastisement (ʿadhāb) (e.g., Q 33:8; 61:10) of unbelievers and
sinners.

4. The doctrine of Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ

The doctrine of Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ was, like the Murjiʾī doctrine, a reaction to Khārijī extremism. Like the early
Khārijīs and Murjiʾīs, Wāṣil did not yet deal with the question “what is ‘belief’?” He attempted instead to
nd a solution to the problem of who is rightly to be called “believer” (muʾmin) and who “unbeliever”
(kā r). According to Muʿtazilī doxography his approach was juridical and took its departure from
ordinances (ḥudūd) and judgements (aḥkām) in Qurʾānic imperatives and statements such as: “and those
who (wa-lladhīna) accuse honourable women but bring not four witnesses, og them with eighty stripes
and never [again] accept any testimony from them! They are the transgressors [of the laws of God] (al-
fāsiqūn)” (Q 24:4); and, “those who unjustly eat up the property of orphans will eat up re into their bellies
and su fer in Hell” (Q 4:10); and, “those who repent and believe and do good (man tāba wa-āmana wa-
ʿamila ṣāliḥan), these will enter Paradise” (Q 19:60). Like the grammarian Sībawayh (d. 180/796), Wāṣil held
that in Qurʾānic imperatives and statements such as these, the rst part is a condition (sharṭ) and the
second part a consequence ( jawāb/jazāʾ) and that the consequences will follow whenever the conditions
are met (cf. Schöck, Discussions, 59–63). From verses such as these Wāṣil concluded that anyone who
commits a grave sin will enter Hell—whether he prays in the direction of the Kaʿba, participates in the
struggle ( jihād) in God's path (cf. Q 61:10–12), and behaves in this respect like “those who believe and do
good,” or does not pray in the direction of the Kaʿba and denies the laws of God, just like those who do not
believe and deny (kafara) that there is no god but God and that God has ordained laws and precepts that
must be observed. On this basis Wāṣil argued that there are three classes of people, one going to Paradise
and two going to Hell, named, respectively, “believer” (muʾmin), “unbeliever” (kā r), and “transgressor [of
the law of God]” ( fāsiq).

5. The doctrine of Jahm b. Ṣafwān

Jahm was perhaps the rst Muslim scholar to answer the question “what is ‘belief’?” by explaining the
meaning of the term or de ning the concept of “belief.” He explained and de ned “belief” as a particular
kind of knowledge and “unbelief” as a particular kind of ignorance. According to the doxographers, he said,
“Belief is nothing but the knowledge of God, and unbelief is nothing but the ignorance of Him” (al-īmān
huwa l-maʿrifa bi-llāh faqaṭ wa-l-kufr huwa l-jahl bihī faqaṭ) (al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 279), and, “there is no
unbeliever (kā r) except one who is ignorant of God ( jāhil bi-llāh)” (al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 477). Jahm also
held that knowledge of God is e fected in man by God to the exclusion of man's free choice (ikhtiyār) (Abū
Yaʿlā, Muʿtamad, 30) (cf. van Ess, TG 2:497; 5:212–3; Izutsu, Concept of belief, 84). That is to say, Jahm taught
that it is impossible for someone not to believe—that is, to be ignorant of God—when God has e fected
knowledge of Him in that person. Further, Jahm's doctrine that knowledge of God (that is, belief) does not
arise from man's free choice (ikhtiyār) admits the conclusion that he understood “belief” as an immediate,
intuitive, primary, unprovable, necessary knowledge, in contrast to an assent (taṣdīq) that presupposes a
judgement-making capacity (quwwa) to choose between the two contraries (ḍiddān), “to hold to be true”
(ṣaddaqa) and “to hold to be false” (kadhdhaba). Jahm thus does not hold that “belief” is “thinking with
assent” (cum assensione cogitare), as it is to the Christian church father Augustine and to Abū Ḥanīfa (see
below).

6. The doctrine of Abū Ḥanīfa

Abū Ḥanīfa shared with Jahm the de nitional, intensional approach, but he taught that the intension of
“belief” is wider, encompassing more elements that constitute the meaning or concept of belief. He held
that belief is knowledge (maʿrifa) and then assent (taṣdīq) or acknowledgment (iqrār) (see below). Also, his
restriction (taqyīd) regarding the objects of the knowledge that constitutes belief is broader. According to
him, not only God but also God's messenger and His revelation are the objects of the knowledge and the
assent that constitute belief. The doxographers have condensed his doctrine as follows: “Belief is the
knowledge and the acknowledgement of God (al-maʿrifa bi-llāh wa-l-iqrār bi-llāh) and the knowledge and
acknowledgement of the messenger of God and of what has arrived from God in its entirety, without
explanation (al-maʿrifa bi-l-rasūl wa-l-iqrār bi-mā jāʾa min ʿindi llāh bi-l-jumla dūna l-tafsīr).” And further,
“He did not think that something taken out from religion (shayʾ min al-dīn mustakhrajan) is a single belief
(īmān), and he held that belief cannot be divided, and does not increase and decrease, and that people do
not excel one another in belief” (al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 138–9). Knowledge and belief here are not
interchangeable, as they are in Jahm's doctrine. Knowledge is instead the precondition of
acknowledgement. The belief in “what has arrived from God” is, in particular, belief in the “the ways of
submission” (sharāʾīʿ al-islām) and in the legal precepts ( farāʾiḍ) ordained by God (see below). Given this,
Abū Ḥanīfa did not explain the lexical meaning of the term “belief” but rather determined and de ned the
meaning of “belief” as a technical term of religion (dīn).

Further, Abū Ḥanīfa held that belief in “what has arrived from God in its entirety” does not presuppose
knowledge of its explanation (tafsīr). One who has mastered a language is able to understand the meaning
of terms, phrases, statements, commands, questions, and other expressions articulated in that language,
even if he does not know the particular referents intended. For example, we understand the meaning of the
command “Go home!” without knowing the home of the person addressed. It is likewise possible to
understand and hence to know the meaning of the command to make the Pilgrimage to the Kaʿba and to
acknowledge this command without knowing the intended referent of the term “Kaʿba,” and it is possible to
understand and hence to know the sense of the statement, “God has sent Muḥammad, and he is the
messenger of God” without knowing the referent of the name “Muḥammad,” that is, without knowing
precisely to whom the name “Muḥammad” refers (cf. Schöck, Aussagenquanti zierung, 21–6). Further, Abū
Ḥanīfa denied that the term “belief” (al-īmān) signi es a totality of actions, each one of which is an
element of belief as a whole and is called “a belief” (īmān), or, in Muʿtazilī terms, “an act of belief” (sec. 7,
 ( ) (

below). Abū Ḥanīfa held instead that “belief” is a name/noun (ism) that means the same when attributed to
anyone for whom this name is appropriate. And when a particular person is called a “believer,” this does
not signify a sum of acts of belief that can be more or fewer. That is to say, in the terminology of later Arabic
logic and linguistics, because the name “believer” (muʾmin) is derived (mushtaqq) from the primary form
(aṣl) “belief” (īmān), “belief” is a name (ism) that is shared (mushtarak) by each individual who is called
(yusammā) “believer” (muʾmin).

Three extant early Ḥanafī sources shed light on this doctrine on belief.

6.1 “Belief” in the Risāla ilā ʿUthmān al-Battī of Abū Ḥanīfa

The letter to ʿUthmān al-Battī (d. 143/760) seems to have been drafted by Abū Ḥanīfa himself. In it Abū
Ḥanīfa argues explicitly against the Muʿtazilī doctrine of “the status between the two statuses” (al-manzila
bayna l-manzilatayn), distinguishing the "transgressor" from both the "believer" and the "unbeliever.” He
reasons that a “believer” (muʾmin) who commits a sin is not deprived of “the name ‘belief’ and the
inviolability that is connected with this name” (ism al-īmān wa-ḥurmatuhū), because “belief” means
“knowledge” (maʿrifa), “acknowledgement” (iqrār), and “assent” (taṣdīq). Further, “assent” does not di fer
and is not more or less with respect to anyone called “believer” (muʾmin). “Believer” here is taken as an
appellation (tasmiya) and as a class name having the same meaning in any case in which this name is
applied. In contrast to Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ, Abū Ḥanīfa accepts only “believer” and “unbeliever” as names (asmāʾ),
holding that “disobedient” (ʿāṣī) and its equivalents are attributes (ṣifāt) that qualify “believer.” In linguistic
terms, he understands muʾmin ʿāṣī as the combination of a noun and an attribute, meaning “a disobedient
believer.” Likewise, muʾmin ḍāll means “a believer who goes astray,” muʾmin ẓālim “a believer who acts
unjustly,” muʾmin mudhnib “a believer who commits a minor sin,” muʾmin mukhṭiʾ “a believer who is
mistaken,” and muʾmin jāʾir “a believer who commits an outrage.” The attribute that follows the name does
not nullify the name. According to this view, only “unbeliever” (kā r) can nullify “believer,” inasmuch as the
terms are mutually exclusive and thus cannot combine as name and attribute. Like the author of the Kitāb
al-Irjāʾ (see section 3, above), Abū Ḥanīfa based his argument on the distinction between two stages of
Muḥammad's missionary activity. The rst step was the call to believe in God and to give up polytheism
(shirk), the second was the enactment of legal precepts. And like the Khārijīs and the Muʿtazilīs, Abū
Ḥanīfa, in order to support his position, refers to Qurʾānic verses that contain the terms “believing” and
“acting” side by side. However, in contrast to the Muʿtazilīs he does not understand the particle “and” in the
Qurʾānic phrases “those who believe and do good works [these are those of the Garden]” (e.g., Q 2:82) and
“and the one who believes in God and does good [He will remove from him his evil and cause him to enter
Gardens beneath which rivers ow] (e.g., Q 64:9) as joining two parts of one thing, but rather as joining two
di ferent things, namely “assent” (taṣdīq) and “action” (ʿamal) (Abū Ḥanīfa, Risāla ilā ʿUthmān al-Battī; van
Ess, TG 1:192–200; 4:24–31).

The letter to ʿUthmān al-Battī explains the term “belief” through a de nitional approach that was the
starting point of the development of an Arabic-Muslim concept of belief. For the chronology of the Arabic-
Muslim history of thought, however, it is important to note that the letter does not mention the
relationship between “expression” (lafẓ) and “meaning” (maʿnā), which would come to be a basis for the
Arabic-Muslim theory of meaning and concept.

6.2 “Belief” in the Kitāb al-ʿĀlim wa-l-mutaʿallim of Abū Muqātil al-Samarqandī (d.
8/8 )
208/823)
Approximately half a century after the letter to ʿUthmān al-Battī is thought to have been written, the
conceptual approach of Ḥanafī doctrine was made explicit in K. al-ʿĀlim wa-l-mutaʿallim. Abū Muqātil
explains “belief” (īmān) by the terms “assent” (taṣdīq), “knowledge” (maʿrifa), “conviction” (yaqīn),
“acknowledgment” (iqrār), and “submission” (islām), and he understands these terms as synonyms: “These
are di ferent names, which have one and the same reference” (inna hādhihī asmāʾ mukhtalifa wa-maʿnāhā
wāḥid), in the same way as when a speaker addresses someone as “Human! So-and-so! Man!” (yā insān yā
fulān yā rajul), “and the speaker refers to one and the same person but has called him by di ferent names.”
The term “belief” here is understood as the linguistic sign for an object of reference (maʿnā) that is
equivalent to a concept. Abū Muqātil also explains that the Arabic term kufr (“unbelief”) means “denial”
( juḥūd) and that the Arabs have coined this term for “non-acknowledgement” (inkār) and “non-assent”
(takdhīb) (K. al-ʿĀlim wa-l-mutaʿallim, 56, 80). “Unbelief” is thus explained as the contradictory of “belief.”

6.3 “Belief” in the Kitāb al-Fiqh al-absaṭ of Abū Muṭīʿ al-Balkhī (d. 199/814)

The third early source for the Ḥanafī doctrine on belief, the Kitāb al-Fiqh al-absaṭ (van Ess, TG 1:192–211),
contains two distinctions that were formative for later classical doctrines of belief, that between “believing
in God” (āmana bi-llāh) and “acting for the sake of God” (ʿamila lillāh), and that between “belief” (īmān),
“submission” (islām), and “right action” (iḥsān). The rst distinction is part of Abū Muṭīʿ's exposition of Abū
Ḥanīfa's doctrine that to believe is “to acknowledge the entirety of [the ways (sharāʾīʿ) of submission”
(aqarra bi-jumlat al-islām), without explanation (cf. above). Abū Muṭīʿ argues that someone can believe “in”
(bi-) a particular Qurʾānic verse without knowing its explanation (tafsīr) and interpretation (taʾwīl). The
second distinction is part of a famous ḥadīth, in which the angel Gabriel asks Muḥammad rst “what is
belief?” (mā l-īmān), second “what is submission?” (mā l-islām), and third “what is right action?” (mā l-
iḥsān) (cf. Izutsu, Concept of belief, 59). Abū Muṭīʿ quotes a non-canonical version of this ḥadīth in which
belief (īmān) is explained as the testimony (shahāda) and the belief that there is no other god but God and
that Muḥammad is His servant and messenger; as the belief in His angels, His books (i.e., the books that
God has sent down to His messengers), His messengers, and the Last Day; and as the belief that the decree
(qadar)—and thus whatever comes to pass—is from God, whether it is good or bad. “Submission” (islām),
on the other hand, is explained as “the ways of submission” (sharāʾīʿ al-islām), namely performing the ritual
prayer, giving alms, fasting during Ramaḍān, making the pilgrimage to the House of God, and carrying out
the major ritual ablution to restore one's ritual purity after acts that nullify it. Right action (iḥsān) is
explained as acting “for the sake of God (an taʿmala lillāh) as if you saw God, albeit you do not see Him, but
He sees you.” Abū Muṭīʿ further reports that Abū Ḥanīfa understood “belief in” (al-īmān bi-)—in the sense
of an assent (taṣdīq) that those things enumerated as legal prescriptions are indeed legal prescriptions—as
being opposed to the denial (kufr) that they are legal prescriptions. “Belief” here is explained as an assent
(taṣdīq) in the form “that a is p” and is opposed to kufr, as a negation and denial in the form “not: that a is
p”; it does not include works.

7. The Muʿtazilī response to the Ḥanafī doctrine on belief

The Muʿtazilīs reacted with three major teachings against the Ḥanafī doctrine on belief. All three were
developed in defence of the doctrine of Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ (section 4, above).
The rst is the teaching that “belief is the sum of the acts of obedience” (al-īmān huwa jamīʿ al-ṭāʿāt) (al-
Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 266–7). The Muʿtazilīs grounded this understanding on Arabic grammar, arguing that a
noun, when preceded by the article al-, signi es either generality (ʿumūm) or a de nite (muʿayyan) object
or action, whereas the noun without the article signi es an inde nite object or action (cf. Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī, on Q 2:81; Schöck, Koranexegese, 34). Given this, the verbal noun īmān (belief), when preceded by al-,
signi es either the entirety ( jumla) of all actions of belief or a determined, particular action of belief,
whereas īmān when used without the article signi es an inde nite action of belief. In other words, the term
al-īmān denotes either the whole class of actions of obedience (ṭāʿa) and submission (islām) to God in its
full extension or a single de nite act of obedience and submission, whereas īmān without the article
denotes an inde nite single act of obedience and submission. Given this, the relation between the term al-
īmān and that which is indicated by this term is not the relationship of linguistic expression to meaning
but rather the relationship of linguistic expression to referent. The Muʿtazilīs did not explain the meaning
or de ne the concept of “belief.” Their approach was extensional, inasmuch as they held that each action of
submission to God and each action of observance of a legal precept ordained by God is a constituent of the
whole class of actions called “belief.”

The second important Muʿtazilī teaching on belief was put forward as a response to the Ḥanafī scholars
Abū Shamir and Abū Muʿādh al-Tūmanī (both . second half of the second/eighth century). Abū Shamir
distinguished between the absolute (muṭlaq) and the restricted (muqayyad) use of a name derived from a
verbal noun. He argued that the term “transgressor” ( fāsiq), which is derived from the verbal noun
“transgression” ( sq/fusūq), must not be used absolutely (muṭlaqan/bi-l-iṭlāq), without restricting it to a
particular action, because there is no general transgressor, but only a transgressor “of such and such” ( fī
kadhā). Abū Muʿādh al-Tūmanī argued that the term fāsiq must not be used as a name (ism), which does
not specify a time, but only as a description (waṣf ), that is, as a term with the progressive sense
“transgressing,” which cannot be used to denote the subject of an action after the action has ended. Both
men argued, against Wāṣil b. ʿAtāʾs threefold classi cation of people, that fāsiq (“transgressor” or
“transgressing”) cannot be used as a class name. In response to this challenge, the Muʿtazilīs Abū ʿAlī al-
Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916) and Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931) distinguished between “names of the language”
(asmāʾ al-lugha)—that is, names in grammatical terms—and “names of the religion” (asmāʾ al-dīn), that is,
class names used in religious terminology.

The third important Muʿtazilī teaching regarding belief and unbelief was put forward by ʿAbbād b.
Sulaymān (d. after 260/874). He distinguished between “belief in God” (al-īmān bi-llāḥ) and “belief for the
sake of God” (al-īmān lillāh). The rst is the belief that the precepts of law ordained by God are indeed legal
precepts—in Ḥanafī terminology, an assent (taṣdīq). The second kind of belief is acting according to those
precepts. An unbeliever (kā r) is one who holds neither kind of belief. A transgressor of the law of God
( fāsiq) is one who “believes in” (āmana bi-) God but does not “believe for the sake of” (āmana li-) God, that
is, who fails to perform the acts of obedience and submission to God. A believer (muʾmin) is one who both
believes in God and believes for the sake of God (cf. Schöck, Koranexegese, 155–72). This distinction
concedes that “to believe in” is something other than accomplishing works of obedience (ṭāʿa) and
submission (islām) to God, and it was a crucial step toward a synthesis of the intensional approach of the
Ḥanafīs and the extensional approach of the Muʿtazilīs (see below).

8. The doctrine of Sunnī traditionalism

The doctrine of those who consider themselves ahl al-sunna is in no respect uniform. The Ḥanbalī view
and, in general, the view of the ahl al-ḥadīth accord with the Muʿtazilī view: all three hold that “believing”
(īmān) is “holding as true” (taṣdīq) with the mind, “professing” (iqrār) with the tongue, and “acting” (ʿamal)
with the limbs. The Ashʿarī view, on the other hand, accords with the Ḥanafī view: both hold that
“believing” is only “holding as true” (cf. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, on Q 2:3; Frank). Of the many variants of Sunnī
teachings on belief and unbelief we will mention here only two: an early, somewhat awkward attempt, and
a later, more sophisticated attempt to integrate into one comprehensive doctrine of belief the distinction
between “believing in God” (āmana bi-llāh) and “acting for the sake of God” (ʿamila lillāh) (cf. 6.3, above).

Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām (d. 224/839), a representative of early Sunnī traditionalism and a friend of
Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, challenged the Murjiʾī and Ḥanafī argument that actions are not elements of belief,
because during the rst stage of Muḥammad's missonary activity no legal precepts had as yet been
ordained (cf. above 6.1). If belief included actions, the Murjiʾīs and Ḥanafīs argued, the Muslims before the
time of the imposition of the duties to perform actions could not be called believers, because they did not
perform them. Abū ʿUbayd objected that “at the beginning of Muḥammad's mission and throughout the
time of his preaching in Mekka… faith was constituted merely by the confession that there is no god but
God and that Muḥammad is the messenger of God. Whoever a rmed this was a believer (muʾmin). None of
the religious duties like almsgiving and fasting were incumbent upon them... Only some time after the
Prophet's migration to Medina were the other duties gradually imposed on the Muslims… In imposing the
new duties, God addressed the Muslims as believers on the basis of their previous confession of faith, since
no other duty was yet incumbent on them. These duties now became an integral part of faith” (Madelung,
Early Sunnī doctrine, 235–6). This increase in the number of elements of belief corresponds to that of the
degree of perfection (istikmāl) of belief in the believers (cf. Madelung, Early Sunnī doctrine, 236–7). Abū
ʿUbayd compares this change in the meaning of the term “belief” with the change in the prescribed
direction of prayer (qibla). Hence, the change in the meaning of “belief” is understood as an abrogation
(naskh) of the original meaning and its substitution by a di ferent meaning.

Another, more sophisticated, teaching intended to integrate “belief” (in the Ḥanafī sense) with works was
advanced by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). He grounded his doctrine neither on the chronology of the
revelation, as did the Ḥanafīs (see section 6, above) and Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām, nor on the relation
between the Qurʾānic names (asmāʾ) and judgements (aḥkām), as did Waṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ and his followers, but
rather on tradition, namely on the Gabriel ḥadīth quoted in the Kitāb al-Fiqh al-absaṭ. He integrates three
terms taken from this ḥadīth, namely belief (īmān), submission (islām), and right action (iḥsān) (section
6.3, above), and interprets them as terms that signify three degrees of perfection. Submission (islām) “with
regard to itself” (min jihat nafsihī)—i.e., in modern logical and linguistic terminology, with respect to the
intension and connotation of the concept and term “submission”—is the narrowest of the three; it
encompasses fewer characteristics than do the other two terms. However, “with respect to its bearers” (min
jihat aṣḥābihī), that is, with respect to the bearers of the name “submission”—i.e., in modern terminology,
with regard to the extension and denotation of the concept and term “submission”—it is broader than
“belief” (īmān) and “right action” (iḥsān). More people are denotated (musammā) by the name derived
from the verbal noun islām than by those derived from the verbal nouns īmān and iḥsān. Accordingly,
“belief” (īmān) “with respect to itself”—i.e., with respect to its intension and connotation—is broader than
“submission” but narrower than “right action.” And “with respect to its bearers”—i.e., with respect to its
extension and denotation—“belief” is broader than “right action” but narrower than “submission.” More
people are Muslims than believers, and more people are believers than are doers of good. Consequently,
“right action” is the broadest of all three terms “with respect to itself” but the narrowest with regard to “its
bearers” (cf. Izutsu, Concept, 58–9).

The term that signi es the highest degree of perfection, “right action,” was not considered in the early
debates on belief and unbelief. In Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine it serves to distinguish between submission
(islām) without belief (īmān) and belief without right action (iḥsān). By this threefold distinction Ibn
Taymiyya is able to integrate the Ḥanafī as well as the Muʿtazilī approach into his traditionalist position.
According to Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ submission is the rst stage in becoming a Muslim who does not necessarily
belong to the people of Paradise, which God has only promised to the believer (muʾmin), who does not
transgress God's legal precepts and hence is a perfect Muslim. According to Abū Ḥanīfa, belief
encompasses the acknowledgement of the ways (sharāʾiʿ) of submission and the legal precepts, once they
are ordained by God, but does not include action in accordance with these ways and precepts; on this basis
a believer is not a perfect Muslim. According to Ibn Taymiyya belief is instead the intermediate stage
between outward submission and right action—that is, acting according to the ways of submission and
God's legal precepts as explained in the Gabriel ḥadīth: “that you act for the sake of God (an taʿmala lillāh)
as if you saw God, albeit you do not see Him, but He sees you” (see section 6.3, above). Ibn Taymiyya thus
retains the intensional and de nitional approach to “belief”; works are not part of belief. It is not belief
“with respect to itself” that increases or decreases, but rather the degree of perfection between the lowest
level, submission, and the highest, right action.

Cornelia Schöck

Bibliography

Overview

Toshihiko Izutsu, The concept of belief in Islamic theology. A semantic analysis of îmân and islâm, Tokyo 1965,
repr. Salem, New Hampshire 1988

Louis Gardet, Dieu et la destinée de l'homme (Paris 1967), 353–79.

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(Cairo 1368/1949), 34–8

Abū l-Layth al-Samarqandī, see Hans Daiber, below

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Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn wa-khtilāf al-muṣallīn, ed. Helmut Ritter, Wiesbaden 19803
 q yy f

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Sālim b. Dhakwān, see Patricia Crone and Fritz Zimmermann, below.

Studies

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Josef van Ess, TG

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Cornelia Schöck, Aussagenquanti zierung und -modalisierung in der frühen islamischen Theologie, in
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Cornelia Schöck, Discussions on conditional sentences from the year AH 17/AD 638 to Avicenna (d. AH
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Cite this page

Schöck, Cornelia, “Belief and unbelief in classical Sunnī theology”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, Edited by: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas,
Everett Rowson. Consulted online on 05 November 2019 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_23871>
First published online: 2010
First print edition: 9789004183964, 2010, 2010-2