SANTOS, MILES NICKO M.

People of the Philippines v. Rodel Lanuza

G.R. No. 188562
August 17, 2011
Justice Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS:
When reprimanded of his tardiness in attending his working shift as a security guard, Rodel Lanuza,
accused, shot Joel Butay with a shotgun while the latter was just turning over it to him in the morning
of April 1, 2007 at the BIR office in Laoag City. The shot, however, did not cause the victim to his
immediate death as he was hit on his left waist. If not for timely medication which was also attended
by the victim as he rushed himself to a hospital, the victim could have been dead.
Private complainant filed an Information against the accused in the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City
charging him with the crime of frustrated homicide. According to the complainant, he didn’t turn over
the shotgun to the accused but merely placed it on the table. The accused deliberately shot him and
attempted for a second shot but fortunately the said shotgun was only loaded by a single bullet as the
five other bullets was in their office table upstairs. Fearing that the accused may shot him again, he
himself rushed to the hospital for medication.
The Regional Trial Court gave credence to the evidence presented by the private complainant and
convicted Rodel Lanuza of the crime of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from four years of prision correccional as minimum to seven years of prision mayor
as maximum.
Aggrieved, the accused raised his appeal maintaining that the said shooting was only an accident and
contented that if he had the intent to kill, he could’ve killed the complainant with precision. The Court
of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court and denied his appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Regional Trial Court correctly found accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder and
sentenced him the correct penalty? Yes.
RULING:
The Court sustains the verdict of guilt against accused-appellant.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by
his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not
die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Evidence to prove intent to kill
in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, of the means used by the malefactors; the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; the circumstances under which the crime was
committed; and the motive of the accused. These elements are extant in the case at bar.
The prosecution has satisfactorily proven that accused-appellant intended to kill private complainant
based on the method of attack, the weapon used, and the location of the gunshot wound. Accused-
appellant shot private complainant with a shotgun at close range hitting the latter’s abdomen.
Resultantly, private complainant sustained a wound that could have caused his death if not for the
timely medical attention given to him.
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of frustrated homicide is one degree lower than that
prescribed by law for the crime of homicide. Under the indeterminate sentence law, the maximum of
the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances,
and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
Considering that the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal, the
penalty for the crime of frustrated homicide would be prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate
sentence law, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of prision mayor in its
minimum term which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, and that, on
the other hand, the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional which has a duration
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the imposition of imprisonment from four (4)

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years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum, is in
order.
Virgilio Talampas v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 180219
November 23, 2011
Justice Bersamin
FACTS:
At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of July 5, 1995, Virgilio Talampas, apellant, stopped by in the
front of the house of Jose Sevillo, brought out a gun, and poked the same to Eduardo Matic who took
refuge behind Ernesto Matic. The appellant again fired his gun three (3) times, one shot hitting
Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing him to fall on the ground with his face down. Another
shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back. Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while
Jose and his neighbors brought the victims to the hospital. Unfortunately, Ernesto died as the shot
endured by him involved the major organs such as the lungs, liver and the spinal column.
The appellant interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had been Eduardo
Matic Eduardo, not victim Ernesto Matic. He argued that when he noticed Eduardo held a revolver
while they are grappling for the wrench, he immediately struggled to take control of the revolver and
while on the process, it accidentally shot Ernesto.
The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of the appellant, convicted him of the
crime of homicide and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and ruled that in invoking
self-defense, Talampas admitted to the killing of Ernesto Matic and failure to provide evidence to
prove such strengthen his conviction to the crime.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the killing of Ernesto be considered as an accident when the appellant aims for Eduardo?
2. Assuming that such incident did not qualify as an accident, what is the proper penalty of
imprisonment in the crime of homicide in accordance to Inderteminate Sentence Law?
RULING:
1. Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. Article
12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a situation
where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and
prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least
in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal act. Certainly, Talampas’ acts
were by no means lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and
Ernesto.
2. The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court, in imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is mandated to prescribe an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and one
day to 17 years and four months. It is such period that the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence at only 14 years and eight months contravened the express provision of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, for such penalty was within the minimum period of reclusion
temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one day to the maximum term fixed by the lower
courts.
The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence. It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the
minimum term thus fixed was entirely within the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Yet, the addition of one day to the 10 years as the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of
Talampas may occasion a degree of inconvenience when it will be time for the penal
administrators concerned to consider and determine whether Talampas is already qualified to

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enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to simplify the computation
of the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence, the Court deletes the one-day increment
from the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.
People of the Philippines v. Beth Temporada
G.R. No. 173473
December 17, 2008
Justice Ynares-Santiago

FACTS:
Beth Temporada and her three fellows who are still remained at large were charged of large scale
illegal recruitment and estafa when they unlawfully promised employment overseas and charged
money from five victims. Accordingly, two types of information were separately filed against them for
each crime.
The amount so charged in consideration for an overseas employment were classified as follows:
Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr., Php. 57,600.00; Dennis Dimaano, Php. 66,520.00; Evelyn V. Estacio, Php.
88,520.00; Soledad B. Atle, Php. 69,520.00; and Luz T. Minkay, Php. 69,520.00.
The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of the crimes earlier mentioned and sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for
illegal recruitment; and the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum for
the estafa committed against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.; the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one day of
prision mayor as maximum each for the estafas committed against complainants, Dennis Dimaano,
Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correctional as minimum, to eleven (11) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum for the estafa committed against Evelyn Estacio.
For intermediate review of the case, the Court of Appeals modified the indeterminate penalty imposed
on the crime of estafa. For Legaspi, Dimaano, Atle and Minkay, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum; and for Estacio, she is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.

ISSUE:
What is proper indeterminate penalty to be imposed on the five counts of estafa in accordance to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and Revised Penal Code?

RULING:
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded
exceeds P22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term
is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum and medium
(i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the
minimum term for the five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional since this is
within the range of prisión correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of
imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not
exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is not prisión mayor minimum as apparently
assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time
each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC.
Following this procedure, the maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when
proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the
discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and
the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done
starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall
be construed liberally in favor of the accused. The doctrine enunciated in People v.
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Benemerito insofar as the fraction of a year was utilized in computing the total incremental penalty
should, thus, be modified. 

In The Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete C. Lagran

G.R. No. 147270
August 15, 2001
Justice Puno

FACTS:
Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of three counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one year for each
count and to pay a fine of P125,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In his petition for habeas corpus, citing Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, he argued that if the
penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences
emanated from one court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously. Thus, he
allegedly completed his sentence as he was already imprisoned for two years and four months.

ISSUE:
Whether the imprisonment of one year for each of the three counts of violation of B.P. 22 can be
served simultaneously? No.

RULING:
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the
nature of the penalties so permit.  The penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1)
perpetual absolute disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary absolute
disqualification, (4) temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public
censure, (8) fine and bond to keep the peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment
of costs. These penalties, except destierro, can be served simultaneously with imprisonment. The
penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature
of such penalties.  Where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms
should be served successively. 

In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the
offense committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms
simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service of sentence, we find that petitioner has not
yet completed the service of his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence only on February
24, 1999. His prayer, therefore, for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.

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Jose C. Sermonia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 109454
June 14, 1994
Justice Bellosillo

FACTS:
Jose C. Sermonia, petitioner, was charged by the crime of bigamous marriage on May 26, 1992,
when he unlawfully married Ma. Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975 while his marriage to Virginia
C. Nievara remained valid and subsisting.

Petitioner contends that his criminal liability was already extinguished by prescription considering that
15 years had already passed since the commission of the crime, therefore, he moved to quash the
Information filed against him.

However, the Court of Appeals denied his motion to quash and also denied his motion for
reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner challenged the decision of the CA through petition for certiorari and prohibition.
He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil
Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes
notice to the whole world.

The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent
marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was
registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or
before 1990 and not only in 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether the prescription period should be reckoned from the date of registration of marriage to Civil
Registrar in the case of bigamous marriage so as to constitute constructive notice that makes it also
the date of discovery? No.

RULING:
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a
bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a
married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.

The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the
well-entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to
almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however
is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his
previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise
conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the
bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place
may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered
quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime
of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agency.

Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive period for
the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the
violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner
would encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. 
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Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, et al.

G.R. No. 131966
August 16, 2004
Justice Austria-Martinez

FACTS:
Respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco and petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in regard to the
granting of petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines and setting aside the decision
of Ombudsman in dismissing the complaint of the petitioner in charging the said respondents of the
violation of RA 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code.

The respondent contends, among others, that the acquisition by UNICOM of sixteen oil mills was
sanctioned by P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, thus, without finding sufficient evidence of evident bad faith
and malice, he cannot be made criminally liable therefor and that these valid laws cannot be taken
into account in determining whether there is a violation in the RA 3019 and Art. 186 of RPC.

He also averred that there is no evidentiary basis that exists that led the Supreme Court to rule that
such violation had not prescribed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether actions sanctioned by P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, valid laws, precludes the violation RA
3019 and Art. 186 of RPC?
2. Whether prescription of the offense so charged cannot be determined in the absence of evidentiary
basis?

RULING:
The Court ruled negative to both issues.

1. While P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 may have sanctioned UNICOM’s acquisition of the sixteen (16) oil
mills, it does not detract from the fact that such acquisition caused undue prejudice, disadvantage
and injury to the government, or that private respondents had a material and personal interest in the
acquisition thereof, acts which have already been defined as corrupt practices and declared unlawful
under R.A. No. 3019.

If the Court were to adhere to private respondent’s argument that valid laws may not be taken into
account in determining whether there was a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised
Penal Code, then the validity of laws would create a blanket shield and there would be no prosecution
for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, as all acts committed by
public officers will be beyond reach, despite the undue damage, injury and prejudice to the
government, and the personal gain and material interest of the public officers involved.

2. It is also incorrect for respondent to say that there is no evidentiary basis for the Court’s finding that
the offense had not prescribed, as it was resolved in the assailed Decision that since the ten-year
prescriptive period in violation of R.A. No. 3019 is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326, and
applying further the ruling in Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, the complaint in this case, which was filed
on March 2, 1990, was well within the prescriptive period.

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides, “Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the, discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.”

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Benjamin T. Romualdez v. Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo and PCGG

G.R. Nos. 165510-33
July 28, 2006
Justice Ynares-Santiago

FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Romualdez filed a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court after his
previous petition was dismissed. He claims that the recommending by the Ombudsman to file 24
separate informations against him for violation Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act cannot prosper as these are already previously dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan. He also raised that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time
on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a
quo.

The Ombudsman argued, in its Comment, that the dismissal of the informations does not mean that
petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution and that new informations may be filed by
the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation. To
counter the defense of prescription, the Ombudsman stated that the filing of the complaint with the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with
the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from
the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The PCGG avers in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the  Ombudsman Act
of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to
conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 was a nullity?
2. Whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed?

RULING:
1. An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or
double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the same
facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals, that “In fine, there must have been a valid and
sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information
was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not
have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar
in petitioner’s subsequent prosecution.”

Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant cases
was not a violation of petitioner’s right to be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment
that the cases investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those cases which
have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429.

2. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of
the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the
accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference
that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not

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consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Ricardo Rainier G. Cruz III, et al v. Rolito T. Go

G.R. No. 223446
November 28, 2016

FACTS:
Rolito T. Go was convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He began serving his
sentence on April 30, 1996 at the New Bilibid Prison.

On July 30, 2008, Bureau of Corrections Director Oscar C. Calderon granted Rolito T. Go, along with
other 24 inmates a colonist status. Hence, on January 30, 2015, Go filed a petition which pleaded for
his release invoking that upon deduction of lawful and proper allowance for good conduct and colonist
status based on the provisions of Act. No. 2489, his prison sentence should have expired on August
21, 2013.

Ricardo Rainier G. Cruz, in his capacity as the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, argued
that the grant of colonist status of Go did not carry with it the automatic commutation of his sentence
from the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua as it only rests to the President the power to
commute a sentence.

The Regional Trial Court granted the petition and issued writ of habeas corpus for the release of Go.
The lower court ruled that in accordance of BuCor Manual, Section 7 (b), it expressly provides
colonist of an automatic reduction of life sentence to a sentence of 30 years.

Aggrieved, Cruz elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through ordinary appeal. However, the CA
dismissed the appeal on the ground that ordinary appeal is not the proper remedy when the case only
involves a pure question of law.

ISSUE:
Whether the automatic commutation of Go as a result of the grant of penal colonist status is
ineffective without prior approval by the President?

RULING:
As correctly resolved by the trial court, while only the President can commute a prison sentence,
Articles 70 and 97 of the RPC recognize partial reduction or commutation of sentences by providing
that “for penal penalties, the duration shall be computed for 30 years and the allowance of good
conduct must be applied to an inmate with a colonist status.”

Accordingly, to implement the provisions of Article 97, the law has granted the Director of Prisons the
power to grant good conduct allowances. The mandate of the Director of Prisons embodied in Article
99 of the RPC is clear and unambiguous.

The intent and spirit of the law in affording persons the remedy of writ of habeas corpus is to devise a
speedy and effective means to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. To rule otherwise would
render Article 99 of the RPC as a mere surplusage and would duly impose excessive imprisonment
on inmates in violation of the basic right to liberty.

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People of the Philippines v. Rogelio Bayotas

G.R. No. 102007
September 2, 1994
Justice Romero

FACTS:
In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape
and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid
Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment,
the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of
reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending  appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUE:
Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability? Yes.

RULING:
In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is
a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot
survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is
contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action
that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note
of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it
will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil
action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision: "Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only
for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate would be liable."

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article
30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of
the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
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SANTOS, MILES NICKO M.

reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on
the criminal.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

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