Title 3 - RPC 2 Reyes-Pub Ord

Title Three
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
What are the crimes against public order?

They are:
1. Rebellion or insurrection. (Art. 134)
2. Coup d'etat. (Art. 134-A)
3. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or
insurrection. (Art. 136)
4. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. (Art. 137)
5. Inciting to rebellion. (Art. 138)
6. Sedition. (Art. 139)
7. Conspiracy to commit sedition. (Art. 141)
8. Inciting to sedition. (Art. 142)
9. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar
bodies. (Art. 143)
10. Disturbance of proceedings of Congress or similar bodies. (Art.
144)
11. Violation of parliamentary immunity. (Art. 145)
12. Illegal assemblies. (Art. 146)
13. Illegal associations. (Art. 147)
14. Direct assaults. (Art. 148)
15. Indirect assaults. (Art. 149)
16. Disobedience to summons issued by Congress, its committees,
etc., by the constitutional commissions, its committees, etc. (Art.
150)
17. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the
agents of such person. (Art. 151)
18. Tumults and other disturbances of public order. (Art. 153)
85
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
19. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances.

(Art. 154)
20. Alarms and scandals. (Art. 155)
21. Delivering prisoners from jails. (Art. 156)
22. Evasion of service of sentence. (Art. 157)
23. Evasion on occasion of disorders. (Art. 158)
24. Violation of conditional pardon. (Art. 159)
25. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed
for another previous offense. (Art. 160)
Chapter One
REBELLION, COUP D'ETAT, SEDITION,
AND DISLOYALTY
1
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection — How committed. —
The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising
publicly a n d t a k i n g arms against t h e Government for the
p u r p o s e of r e m o v i n g from t h e allegiance to said Government
or its laws, t h e territory of t h e Republic of the Philippines or
a n y part thereof, or a n y b o d y of land, naval, or other armed
forces, or d e p r i v i n g t h e Chief E x e c u t i v e or t h e Legislature,
w h o l l y or partially, of a n y of their p o w e r s or prerogatives.
(As amended by RA.. No. 6968, approved October 24,1990)
Elements:
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking arms against the
Government.
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either —
a. to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or
b. to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Rebellion and insurrection are not synonymous.

The term "rebellion" is more frequently used where the object of
the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing
government; while the term "insurrection" is more commonly employed in
reference to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of minor
'The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable.
87
Art. 134 REBELLION
importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with

respect to particular matters or subjects. (30 Am. Jur. 1)
Nature of the crime of rebellion.

The crime of rebellion or of inciting it is by nature a crime of masses,
of a multitude. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues
and plots. (People vs. Almazan, CA., 37 O.G. 1932)
The word "rebellion" evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted
authorities, but also civil war on a bigger or lesser scale. (People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515)
In rebellion or insurrection, the Revised Penal Code expressly declares
that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of arms. (Carino vs.
People, 7 SCRA 900)
Example:
Four hundred (400) Sakdals after fighting the Constabulary soldiers
took possession of the municipal building and proclaimed the independence
of the Philippine Republic. The Constabulary forces suppressed the uprising.
(People vs. Almazan, 37 O.G. 1932)
Note: There is public uprising and taking arms against the government
when they fought the Constabulary soldiers. By proclaiming the Philippine
Independence, they removed the locality under their control from the
allegiance to the Government or its laws.
Actual clash of arms with the forces of the Government, not

necessary to convict the accused who is in conspiracy with others
actually taking arms against the Government.
Although the law provides that rebellion is committed by rising publicly
and taking arms against the Government, an actual clash of arms with the
forces of the Government is not absolutely necessary. Thus, the mere fact
that the accused knowingly identified himself with the Huk organization
that was openly fighting to overthrow the Government w a s enough to make
him guilty of the crime of rebellion. (People vs. Cube, C.A., 46 O.G. 4412;
People vs. Perez, C.A., G.R. No. 8186-R, J u n e 30, 1954)
Note: Those merely acting as couriers or spies for the rebels are also
guilty of rebellion.
Purpose of the uprising must be shown.

The mere fact that a band of forty men entered the town and, after
attacking the policemen, kidnapped the municipal president, secretary and
88
REBELLION Art. 134
others, without evidence to indicate the motive or purpose of the accused

does not constitute rebellion. The crime committed was kidnapping. (U.S.
vs. Constantino, et al., 2 Phil. 693)
It is not necessary that the purpose of the rebellion be accom-

plished.
The crime of rebellion is complete the very moment a group of rebels
rise publicly and take arms against the Government, for the purpose
of overthrowing the s a m e by force. It is not necessary, to consummate
rebellion, that the rebels succeed in overthrowing the Government. Rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government is the normative element
of the offense, while the intent or purpose to overthrow the Government is
the subjective element. (Guevara)
Rebellion distinguished from treason.

(a) The levying of war against the Government would constitute
treason w h e n performed to aid the enemy. It would also constitute
an adherence to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort. (U.S. vs.
Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472)
The levying of war against the Government during peace
time for any of the purposes mentioned in Art. 134 is rebellion.
(b) Rebellion always involves taking up arms against the
Government; treason may be committed by mere adherence to
the enemy giving him aid or comfort.
Giving aid and comfort is not criminal in rebellion.

Appellant was not a member of the Hukbalahap organization which
was engaged in rebellion. He did not take up arms against the Government,
nor did he openly take part in the commission of the crime of rebellion or
insurrection as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
acts he was shown to have performed were the sending or furnishing of
cigarettes and food supplies to a Huk leader, the changing of dollars into
pesos for a top-level communist and the helping of Huks in opening accounts
with the bank of which he was an official.
Held: Unlike in the crime of treason, the act of giving comfort or moral
aid is not criminal in the case of rebellion or insurrection, where the Revised
Penal Code expressly declares that there must be a public uprising and
the taking up of arms. Appellant is, therefore, absolved from the charge.
(Carino vs. People, 7 SCRA 900, supra)
89
Art. 134 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9372
Rebellion distinguished from subversion.

Petitioners contend that rebellion is an element of the crime of
subversion. That contention is not correct because subversion, like treason,
is a crime against national security. Rebellion is a crime against public
order.
The petitioners were accused of rebellion for having allegedly
undertaken a public uprising to overthrow the government. In contrast,
they were accused of subversion for allegedly being officers and ranking
members of the Communist Party and similar subversive groups. (Buscayno
vs. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, 109 SCRA 273)
Rebellion or Insurrection, when considered as Terrorism.

Under Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the H u m a n
Security Act of 2007, approved on March 6, 2007, a person who commits
an act punishable as rebellion or insurrection, thereby sowing and creating
a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand
shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism. (Sec. 3)
Republic Act No. 9372

H u m a n Security Act of 2007
Approved on March 6, 2007
Acts Punishable as Terrorism under Rep. Act No. 9372.

Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following
provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in general and Mutiny in the High S e a s or in
the Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion of Insurrection);
c. Article 134-A (Coup d'Etat), including acts committed by private
persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
(1) Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
(2) Republic Act No. 6 9 6 9 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous
and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
90
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659 Art. 134
(3) Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory and

Liability Act of 1968);
(4) Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
(5) Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and
(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree
Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession,
manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of
Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and
shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the
benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. (Sec. 3)
Terrorism is more severely punished than heinous crimes under

Republic Act No. 7659.
Terrorism is punished by the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment,
without the benefit of parole. (Sec. 3, RA 9372)
Some offenses considered as heinous crimes under Republic Act No.
7659 such as kidnapping for ransom and rape with homicide are punished
by death. However, Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of the
penalty of death, and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibity for parole in lieu of the death penalty. Since the duration of reclusion
perpetua is twenty years and one day to forty years (Sec. 27, RPC) and the
crime of terrorism is punished by a fixed penalty of forty years, terrorism is
now the most severely punished crime.
Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism.

Persons who conspire to commit the crime of terrorism shall suffer the
penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3
hereof and decide to commit the crime. (Sec. 4, R.A. 9372)
Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism as a crime.

Although the general rule is that conspiracy and proposal to commit
a felony is not punishable (Art. 8), conspiracy to commit terrorism is
91
Art. 1U4 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659
punishable under Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 9372. Other crimes where
mere conspiracy is punishable are conspiracy to commit treason (Art. 115),
conspiracy to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection (Art. 136) and
conspiracy to commit sedition (Art. 141).
The conspirators to commit terrorism should not actually commit
terrorism. It is sufficient that two or more persons agree and decide to
commit the crime of terrorism. If they actually commit the crime of terrorism,
they will be held liable for terrorism and the conspiracy they had before
committing terrorism in only a manner of incurring criminal liability. It is
not a separate offense.
Penalty Imposed on an Accomplice in Terrorism.

Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised
Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the
execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen
(17) years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment. (Sec.
5)
Penalty Imposed on an Accessory in Terrorism.

Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having
participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17
and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission
in any of the following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying
the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape
of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten
(10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties provided for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to
their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the s a m e degrees,
with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of
subparagraph (a). (Sec. 6)
Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association on Group of

Persons.
Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for
92
COUP D'ETAT Art. 134-A
that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or
to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to
an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice
before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity
to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of persons
concerned, be declared a terrorist and outlawed organization, association,
or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court. (Sec. 17)
Prosecution under Republic Act No. 9372 Shall be A Bar to Another

Prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any Special Penal
Laws.
When a person has been prosecuted under a provision of this Act, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to
the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be
a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily
included in the offense charged under this Act. (Sec. 49)
With or without civilian participation.

The crime of coup d'etat may be committed with or without civilian
participation.
Art. 134-A. Coup d'etat — How committed. — The crime

of coup d'etat is a swift attack, accompanied by violence,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly
constituted authorities of t h e Republic of the Philippines, or
any military camp or installation, communications networks,
public utilities or other facilities n e e d e d for the exercise and
continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously
carried out a n y w h e r e in the Philippines by any person or
persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any
public office or employment, w i t h or without civilian support
or participation, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing
state power. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 6968)
93
Art. 135 PENALTY FOR REBELLION, INSURRECTION
OR COUP D'ETAT
Elements:
1. That the offender is a person or persons belonging to the military or
police or holding any public office or employment;
2. That it is committed by means of a swift attack accompanied by
violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
3. That the attack is directed against duly constituted authorities of
the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
communication networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for
the exercise and continued possession of power;
4. That the purpose of the attack is to seize or diminish state power.
With or without civilian participation.

The crime of coup d'etat may be committed with or without civilian
participation.
Coup d'etat, when considered as Terrorism.

Under Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the "Human
Security Act of 2007", approved on March 6, 2007, a person who commits
an act punishable as coup d'etat under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code, including acts committed by private persons, thereby sowing and
creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism. (Sec. 3)
Art. 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup

2
d'etat. — Any p e r s o n w h o promotes, m a i n t a i n s , or h e a d s a
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer t h e penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Any person merely participating or e x e c u t i n g the
commands of others in rebellion or i n s u r r e c t i o n shall suffer
3
the penalty of reclusion temporal.
Any person w h o l e a d s or in a n y m a n n e r directs or
commands others to u n d e r t a k e a coup d'etat shall suffer t h e
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable.
'See Appendix "A," Table of Penalties, No. 28.
94
PERSONS LIABLE FOR REBELLION Art. 135
Any p e r s o n i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t service w h o participates,

or e x e c u t e s directions or c o m m a n d s of others in undertaking
a coup d'etat shall suffer t h e penalty of reclusion temporal in
4
its m a x i m u m period.
Any p e r s o n not i n t h e government service w h o
participates, or in a n y m a n n e r supports, finances, abets or
aids in u n d e r t a k i n g a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of
5
prision mayor in its m a x i m u m period.
When t h e rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat shall be
u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of u n k n o w n leaders, any person w h o in
fact directed t h e others, s p o k e for them, signed receipts and
o t h e r d o c u m e n t s i s s u e d in their n a m e , or performed similar
acts, on behalf of t h e rebels, shall be d e e m e d a leader of such
rebellion, i n s u r r e c t i o n or coup d'etat. (As amended by Rep.
Act No. 6968)
Who are liable for rebellion, insurrection and/or coup d'etat?

The following are liable for rebellion, insurrection and/or coup d'etat:
A. The leaders —
i) Any person who (a) promotes, (b) maintains, or (c) heads a
rebellion or insurrection; or
ii) Any person who (a) leads, (b) directs, or (c) commands others to
undertake a coup d'etat.
B. The participants —
i) Any person who (a) participates, or (b) executes the commands
of others in rebellion, or insurrection;
ii) Any person in the government service who (a) participates, or
(b) executes directions or commands of others in undertaking a
coup d'etat;
iii) Any person not in the government service who (a) participates,
(b) supports, (c) finances, (d) abets, or (e) aids in undertaking a
coup d'etat.
4
See Appendix "A," Table of Penalties, No. 28.
r,
95
Art. 135 PERSONS LIABLE FOR REBELLION
Public officer must take active part, to be liable; mere silence or

omission not punishable in rebellion.
U.S. vs. Ravidas, et al.

(4 Phil. 273)
Facts: The only fact disclosed by the evidence adduced in the case
is that Alejo Ravidas knew that there were insurgents in a place called
Manila, within the jurisdiction of the town of Agusan, of which he was
municipal president, and his duty as such president required him to report
this fact to the senior officer of the province, but he did not do so, nor did he
take any steps to pursue or denounce the insurgents or to protect the people
from their probable depredations.
Held: However reproachful the silence of the defendant may be, it
does not in itself constitute the crime of insurrection. Act No. 292 (now Art.
134) defines and specifies the acts which shall be punished as insurrection,
but among those acts, the silence of the defendant is not enumerated. This
silence is not an act; it is, rather, an omission.
Who shall be deemed the leader of the rebellion, insurrection or

coup d'etat in case he is unknown?
When the rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat shall be under the
command of unknown leaders, any person who in fact directed the others,
spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name,
or performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels, shall be deemed a leader
of such rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. (Art. 135, 6th par.)
Application of the penalty for rebellion.

The Hardie Farms in the municipality of Antipolo, province of
Rizal, was raided by Huks, the armed force of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, one of the aims of which is to overthrow by force of arms
the Government of the Philippines. After ransacking the place and taking
therefrom a typewriter and a radio set, as well as stationery, clothing,
foodstuffs and various other articles, the raiders tied the hands of John D.
Hardie and his foreman Donald Capuano and shot them to death, together
with Mrs. Hardie.
Benito Cruz admitted having risen to the rank of Huk Commander
and being known as Commander Saling, with 12 men under him.
Held: Appellants herein are guilty of simple rebellion inasmuch as
the information alleges, and the records show, that the acts imputed to
them were performed as a m e a n s to commit the crime of rebellion and in
96
REBELLION COMPLEXED WITH GRAVE OFFENSE Art. 135
furtherance thereof. Benito Cruz falls under the first paragraph of Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of prision
mayor (now reclusion perpetua) and a fine not exceeding P20.000, whereas
appellant Paterno Cruz, who merely participated in the rebellion, comes
under the second paragraph of said article, which prescribes the penalty of
prision mayor in its m i n i m u m period (now reclusion temporal). (People vs.
Cruz, et al., 3 SCRA 217)
Being a mere assistant to a principal, guilty of the crime of rebellion,

the accused is guilty only as a participant in the commission of the crime of
rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135, Revised Penal Code. (People vs.
Lava, 28 SCRA 72)
It is not a defense in rebellion that the accused never took the oath
of allegiance to, or that they never recognized the Government.
Such a defense would be nothing less than a negation of the right of
the Government to maintain its existence and authority against a certain
class of the population. (U.S. vs. del Rosario, 2 Phil. 127)
Those who killed persons in pursuance of the movement to

overthrow the government are liable for rebellion only.
The proper charge against persons who kill not because of any personal
motive on their part but merely in pursuance of the movement to overthrow
the duly constituted authorities, would be rebellion and not murder. (People
vs. Aquino and Cortez, 108 Phil. 814)
Is there a complex crime of rebellion with murder and other

common crimes?
The Supreme Court decided this question in the negative. The reason
for the ruling is stated, as follows:
"One of the m e a n s by which rebellion may be committed, in the words
of Art. 135, is by "engaging in war against the forces of the government"
and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said "war." These
expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely: resort to arms,
requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions,
restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, x
x x Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing serious
violence," said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction
of life and property, constitutes not two or more offenses, but only one crime
— that of rebellion plain and simple.
97
Art. 135 REBELLION COMPLEXED WITH GRAVER OFFENSE
Inasmuch as the acts specified in Art. 135 constitute one single crime,
it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of
Art. 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. A
mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should not be
placed at a more disadvantageous position. (People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99
Phil. 515)
Any or all of the acts described in Art. 135, when committed as means
to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art. 134, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be regarded or penalized as
distinct crimes in themselves. They are part and parcel of the rebellion
itself, and can not be considered as giving rise to separate crimes that,
under Art. 48 of the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of
rebellion. Thus, the act of the rebels in ambushing and firing upon an army
patrol constitutes engaging in combat with loyal troops; taking funds and
equipment from the Provincial Treasury of Laguna is diverting public funds
from their legitimate purpose; and the killings of civilians are instances of
committing serious violence. (People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90)
The Hernandez ruling applied.

Facts: (1) Sen. J u a n Ponce Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan were charged with the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during
the period of the failed coup attempt from 26 November to 10 December
1990. (2) The Solicitor General claimed that the petitioners' case does not fall
within the Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez charged
murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary m e a n s for
the commission of rebellion, whereas, the information against petitioners
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but
not in the furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General
would distinguish between the complex crime arising from an offense being
a necessary m e a n s for committing another, which is referred to as the second
clause of Art. 8, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez
ruling, and the compound crime arising from a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same
paragraph, in which Hernandez w a s not concerned and to which, therefore,
it should not apply. (3) The parties' oral and written pleas presented the
Court with the following options: (a) abandon the Hernandez doctrine and
adopt the view that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and under
Art. 48 of the R.P.C., rebellion may properly be complexed with common
offenses; (b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary m e a n s for the commission of, rebellion, but
not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute
"common" crimes of grave or less grave character; (c) maintain Hernandez as
98
REBELLION COMPLEXED WITH GRAVER OFFENSE Art. 135
applying to m a k e rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course,

whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
Held: On the first option, eleven (11) members of the court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) members felt that the doctrine should be
re-examined. In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to
repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime
which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez, by enacting a new
provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "when
by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter
(Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), which constitute offenses
upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty
for the most serious offense in its m a x i m u m period shall be imposed upon
the offender." (Executive Order No. 187, issued June 5 , 1 9 8 7 ) In thus acting,
the President in effect by legislative fiat, reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the
same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the

theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses
committed as a necessary m e a n s to the commission of rebellion and that
the ruling should be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion
with other common crimes on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof.
While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were
not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus w a s that they were not sufficient
to overcome w h a t appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48 x x x.
The rejection of both options shaped and determined the primary
ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Thus, based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
the questioned Information filed against Senator Enrile and the Panlilio
spouses must be read as charging simple rebellion only. (Enrile vs. Salazar,
186 SCRA 217)
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion are absorbed in rebellion.

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of
men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance
99
REBELLION COMPLEXED WITH GRAVER OFFENSE
of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single

crime of rebellion. (Enrile vs. Amin, G.R. No. 93335, September 13, 1990)
The act of killing a police officer, knowing only too well that the victim is a
person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act
done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate
charge. (People vs. Dasig, et al., G.R. No. 100231, April 28, 1993)
Membership in a rebel organization does not automatically qualify

criminal acts as absorbed in rebellion.
"Membership of appellant in a rebel organization, by itself, does
not automatically qualify his criminal acts as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion which carries a lighter penalty under the law. The burden was
on the appellant to demonstrate conclusively that his criminal acts were
committed in furtherance of rebellion. (People vs. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389,
395 (1995); People vs. Continente, et al., G.R. Nos. 100801-02, August 29,
2001)
Rebellion, and not murder, where killings are politically moti-

vated.
The crime committed is not murder but a political offense which gives
rise to the question as to whether the same falls under the Anti-Subversion
Act or under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant
admits that he was a member of the N P A t h e n operating in the Cagayan
area with Ka Daniel as their leader. He asserts that the N P A is the military
arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines. (Presidential Proclamation
No. 1081 [1972]; People vs. Hon Simeon Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. L-32613-14,
December 29,1972). There is no question likewise that the killing of Apolonio
Ragual by the appellant and his companions who were also members of the
NPA upon orders of Ka Daniel w a s politically motivated. They suspected
Ragual as an informer of the PC. In fact, after he w a s killed, they left a
letter and a drawing on the body of Ragual as a warning to others not to
follow his example.
In the case of People vs. Agarin (109 Phil. 430), which w a s a prosecution
for murder, like the present case, where the accused Huk member with his
companions killed the victim because he w a s a PC informer, it w a s held
that the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder. (People vs.
Manglallan, et al., 160 SCRA 116 [1988])
100
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT Art 136
COUP D'ETAT, REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
Killing, robbing, etc. for private purposes or profit, without any

political motivation, would be separately punished and would not
be absorbed in the rebellion.
If the killing, robbing, etc., during the rebellion, were done for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crimes would be
separately punished. Thus, in People vs. Geronimo, et al., 100 Phil. 90,
accused w a s convicted of rebellion and murder, two separate offenses.
Political crimes and common crimes, distinguished.

Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a
political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime
usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose
of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then said offense becomes stripped
of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime
of rebellion, the former acquired the political character of the latter. (People
vs. Hernandez, supra)
Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat,

rebellion or insurrection. — T h e c o n s p i r a c y a n d proposal to
c o m m i t coup d'etat s h a l l be p u n i s h e d by prision mayor in
i t s m i n i m u m p e r i o d a n d a fine w h i c h shall n o t e x c e e d e i g h t
t h o u s a n d p e s o s (P8,000.00).
The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or
i n s u r r e c t i o n s h a l l be p u n i s h e d , r e s p e c t i v e l y , by prision
6
correccional in i t s m a x i m u m p e r i o d a n d a fine w h i c h shall
n o t e x c e e d five t h o u s a n d p e s o s (P5,000), a n d by prision
7
correccional in i t s m e d i u m period, a n d a fine not e x c e e d i n g
t w o t h o u s a n d p e s o s (P2,000). (As amended by Rep. Act No.
6968)
"See Appendix "A," Table of Penalties, No. 13.

;
101
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT
COUP D'ETAT, REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
Two crimes are defined and penalized in this article.

Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion are two different crimes,
namely:
(1) Conspiracy to commit rebellion, and
(2) Proposal to commit rebellion.
There is conspiracy to commit rebellion when two or more persons come
to an agreement to rise publicly and take arms against the Government for
any of the purposes of rebellion and decide to commit it.
There is proposal to commit rebellion w h e n the person who has
decided to rise publicly and take arms against the Government for any of
the purposes of rebellion proposes its execution to some other person or
persons.
Merely agreeing and deciding to rise publicly and take arms against
the Government for the purposes of rebellion or merely proposing
the commission of said acts is already subject to punishment.
Persons merely agreeing and deciding among themselves to rise
publicly and take arms against the Government for the purposes mentioned
in Art. 134, without actually rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government, or those merely proposing the commission of said acts to other
persons without actually performing those overt acts under Art. 134, are
already subject to punishment. (People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90)
No conspiracy when there is no agreement and no decision to

commit rebellion.
A witness, who testified for the prosecution in a charge of conspiracy
to commit rebellion, stated that he heard the accused in their conversation
saying: "What a life this is, full of misery, constantly increasing. W h e n will
our wretchedness end? When will the authorities remedy them? What shall
we do?"
Is there conspiracy?
No, because (1) there was no agreement concerning the commission
of rebellion, and (2) there was no decision to commit it. The facts do not
suffice to sustain a conviction of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow the
Government. (U.S. vs. Figueras, et al., 2 Phil. 491)
102
DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS Art. 137
OR EMPLOYEES
Organizing a group of soldiers, soliciting membership in, and

soliciting funds from the people for, the organization, show
conspiracy to overthrow the Government.
When the object of the offenders in organizing Filipino soldiers,

soliciting various persons to become members of the said organization which
held several meetings, and soliciting funds from the people, is to overthrow
the Government, there is conspiracy to commit rebellion. (U.S. vs. Vergara,
et al, 3 Phil. 432)
There was no conspiracy to commit rebellion in the following

cases.
The fact that some of the accused, like the appellants, had made and
designed flags for the "Sakdalista Party" does not necessarily show that
they did it with the intention of joining an uprising against the constituted
government. (People vs. Bautista, et al., CA-G.R. No. 1622-R, January 27,
1938)
The mere fact of giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism
would not make the accused guilty of conspiracy, because there was no
evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there
agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the
democratic government as envisaged by the principles of Communism.
(People vs. Hernandez, 11 SCRA 223)
Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. — The

6
p e n a l t y of prision correccional in its m i n i m u m p e r i o d shall
b e i m p o s e d u p o n p u b l i c officers o r e m p l o y e e s w h o h a v e
failed to r e s i s t a r e b e l l i o n by all t h e m e a n s in t h e i r p o w e r , or
shall c o n t i n u e t o d i s c h a r g e t h e d u t i e s o f t h e i r offices u n d e r
t h e c o n t r o l of t h e r e b e l s or shall a c c e p t a p p o i n t m e n t to office
under them.
Offender must be a public officer or employee.

The offender must be a public officer or employee. Hence, if a private
individual accepts an appointment to office under the rebels, he is not liable
under this article.
103
\rt. 138 INCITING TO REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
Acts of disloyalty which are punished:

1. By failing to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power; or
2. By continuing to discharge the duties of their offices under the control
of the rebels; or
3. By accepting appointment to office under them.
The crime of disloyalty of public officers presupposes the existence

of rebellion by other persons.
Thus, in the case of U.S. us. Ravidas, et al., supra, the accused could
not be held liable even for disloyalty, because there was no actual rebellion
going on in the municipality. There must be rebellion to be resisted or, at
least, the place is under the control of the rebels.
The offender under Art. 137 must not be in conspiracy with the
rebels.
The public officer or employee who performs any of the acts of
disloyalty should not be in conspiracy with the rebels; otherwise, he will be
guilty of rebellion, not merely disloyalty, because in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.
Art. 138. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection. — T h e

9
p e n a l t y of prision mayor in i t s m i n i m u m p e r i o d s h a l l be
imposed upon any person who, without taking arms or being
in open hostility against the Government, shall incite others
t o t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a n y o f t h e a c t s s p e c i f i e d i n A r t i c l e 134
o f t h i s Code, b y m e a n s o f s p e e c h e s , p r o c l a m a t i o n s , w r i t i n g s ,
emblems, banners or other representations tending to the
same end.
Elements:
1. That the offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against
the Government;
2. That he incites others to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion;
104
SEDITION Art. 1 3 9
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations,

writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the
same end.
"Shall incite others to the execution of any of the acts specified in

Article 134 of this Code."
This clause m e a n s that the offender shall incite others to rise publicly
and take arms against the Government for any of the purposes of rebellion.
Inciting to rebellion distinguished from proposal to commit rebel-

lion.
1. In both crimes, the offender induces another to commit rebellion.
2. In proposal, the person who proposes has decided to commit rebellion;
in inciting to rebellion, it is not required that the offender has decided
to commit rebellion.
3. In proposal, the person who proposes the execution of the crime
uses secret means; in inciting to rebellion, the act of inciting is done
publicly.
Rebellion should not be committed.

In both proposal and inciting to commit rebellion, the crime of rebellion
should not be actually committed by the persons to whom it is proposed or
who are incited. If they commit the rebellion because of the proposal or the
inciting, the proponent or the one inciting becomes a principal by inducement
in the crime of rebellion, provided that the requisites of paragraph No. 2 of
Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code are present.
Art. 139. Sedition — How committed. — The crime of

sedition is committed by persons w h o rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to attain by force, intimidation, or by
other m e a n s outside of legal methods, any of the following
objects:
1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any
law or the holding of any popular election;
2. To prevent the National Government, or any
provincial or municipal government, or any public officer
thereof from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent
the execution of any administrative order;
105
Art. 139 SEDITION
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person

or property of any public officer or employee;
4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of
hate or revenge against private persons or any social class;
and
5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person,
municipality or province, or the National Government (or
the Government of the United States) of all its property or
any part thereof. (As amended by Com. Act No. 202)
Elements:
1. That the offenders rise (1) publicly, and (2) tumultuously;
2. That they employ force, intimidation, or other m e a n s outside of legal
methods;
3. That the offenders employ any of those m e a n s to attain any of the
following objects:
a. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the
holding of any popular election;
b. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or
municipal government, or any public officer thereof from freely
exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any
administrative order;
c. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property
of any public officer or employee;
d. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or
revenge against private persons or any social class; and
e. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality
or province, or the National Government of all its property or
any part thereof.
Nature of the crime.

Sedition, in its general sense, is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64)
The ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at
least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it. (People vs. Perez,
45 Phil. 599)
106
SEDITION Art. 139
What distinguishes sedition from rebellion is the object or purpose

of the uprising.
The accused contended that the crime committed by him was only
sedition, because the uprising took place only in a municipality, which was
a small territory.
Held: What distinguishes sedition from rebellion is not the extent of the
territory covered by the uprising but rather the object at which the uprising
aims. The purpose of the Sakdal uprising was to obtain the independence
of certain portions of the territory from the government and withdrawing it
from the authority of the central government. That is one of the purposes of
the uprising in rebellion. It is not one of the objects of sedition as enumerated
in Article 139. (See League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155)
In both rebellion and sedition, there m u s t be public uprising. While
in rebellion there m u s t be taking up of arms against the Government; in
sedition, it is sufficient that the public uprising is tumultuous.
While in sedition, the purpose of the offenders may be political or
social; in rebellion, it is always political.
If the purpose of the uprising is not exactly against the Government
and not for the purpose of doing the things denned in Art. 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, but merely to attain by force, intimidation, or by other means
outside of legal methods, one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge
upon the person or property of a public official, like the town mayor, it is
sedition.
People vs. Umali

(96 Phil. 185)
Facts: On the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal's father,

then being used as his electoral headquarters, Congressman Umali
instructed Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so
that Punzalan would be killed. Pasumbal, complying with the order of his
Chief (Umali), went to the mountains which were quite near the town and
held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and
Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the election the
next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the
electoral fight.
In the evening of the same day, Pasumbal reported to Umali about his
conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to
the proposition and even outlined the manner of attack.
After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about
fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived. Congressman Umali, hold-
ing a revolver, was seen in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about
107
Art. 139 SEDITION
30 armed men. Then shots were heard. Afterwards they saw Umali and his
companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.
Held: We are convinced that the principal and main, though not neces-
sarily the most serious, crime committed here was not rebellion but rather
that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising
publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and
for the purpose of doing things denned in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of the local
Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimida-
tion, etc., one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the per-
son or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan who was then mayor
of Tiaong.
Sedition distinguished from treason.

Treason, in its more general sense, is the "violation by a subject of
his allegiance to his sovereign or liege, lord, or to the supreme authority of
the State." (Century Dictionary) Sedition, in its more general sense, is "the
raising of commotions or disturbances in the State." (U.S. vs. Abad, 1 Phil.
437)
Can sedition be committed by one person?

Note the clause in the opening sentence of Art. 189, which says: "The
crime of sedition is committed by persons who rise publicly and tumultuously."
In Art. 163, the word "tumultuous" is given a definite meaning. It says that
"the disturbance x x x shall be deemed to be tumultuous if caused by more
than three persons who are armed or provided with m e a n s of violence."
Preventing public officers from freely exercising their functions.
People vs. Tahil and Tarson

(52 Phil. 318)
Facts: Commander Green, with a group of soldiers, stationed himself

about 50 meters in front of the fort where he found a red flag flying and
demanded the surrender of Datu Tahil, a warrant of arrest having been
issued against him and his followers. He did not receive any reply to his
intimation, and, in turn, a group of armed Moros appeared at the left flank
of the Constabulary soldiers in the act of attacking them, but were repelled.
It was again intimated that Datu Tahil surrender, but again no answer
was received, and then a large group of Moros appeared in an aggressive
attitude, being likewise repelled.
Held: Having resisted the judicial warrant of arrest by means of
force and thereby prevented the officers, charged with the duty of arresting
108
SEDITION Art. 139
them, from performing it, Datu Tahil and his men committed the crime of
sedition.
Inflicting an act of hate or revenge upon public officers.
People vs. Cabrera, et al.

(53 Phil. 64)
Facts: A policeman posted on Calle Real had an encounter with some

constabulary soldiers, resulting in the death of a constabulary private. This
encounter engendered on the part of the constabulary soldiers a desire for
revenge against the police force in Manila. They escaped from the barracks
with their guns and made an attack upon the police force. They fired in the
direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo, killing a policeman
and a civilian. They also fired upon a passing street car, slaying one and
wounding other innocent passengers. They attacked the Luneta Police
Station and the office of the secret service.
Held: The crime committed is sedition. The object of the uprising was
to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the persons of the policemen who
were public officers or employees.
The object of the uprising in the case of People vs. Cabrera, et al., is
that one stated in paragraph 3 of Article 139. Note also that in sedition, the
offenders need not be private individuals.
"Against private persons or any social class."
U.S. vs. Lapus, et al.

(4 Phil. 148)
Facts: On the night of J u n e 3, 1902, a band composed of about four

hundred men, among whom were the accused, armed with guns, revolvers,
talibones, bolos, and clubs, raided the town, firing shots, yelling and
frightening the inhabitants thereof; that some of said band went to the
house of the municipal president, while others raided several houses, taking
captive sixty or seventy inhabitants thereof; and that they roamed about
the streets of the town threatening and intimidating the people.
The reason for the uprising was that the rich people were loaning
money at usurious terms to their farm laborers, and when the latter were
unable to pay the loan they compelled their children to work for them as
servants; and that since the wealthy landowners continued oppressing the
poor, they had to disturb the town, because the law must be equally applied
to the rich and the poor.
109
Art. 139 SEDITION
The association called "Santa Iglesia," to which the accused belonged,

was organized for the purpose of performing acts of hatred and vengeance
against the authorities and the wealthy people in the town in which were
put in practice and execution acts tending to such political-social ends.
Held: The facts as stated constitute the crime of sedition.
Public uprising and an object of sedition must concur.

1. No public uprising — no sedition.
While the municipal council was in session, some 500 residents
of the town assembled near the municipal building. A large number of
them crowded into the council chamber and demanded the dismissal
from office of the municipal treasurer, the secretary and the chief of
police, and the substitution in their places of new officials, because
those officials took sides in the religious differences between residents
of the municipality. The persons who took part were wholly unarmed,
except that a few carried canes. The crowd w a s fairly orderly and well-
behaved. The council acceded to their w i s h e s and drew up a formal
document, which w a s signed by the councilors and by several leaders
of the crowd.
They were prosecuted for sedition, allegedly for having prevent-
ed the municipal government from freely exercising its functions. The
prosecution contended that by the very threat of their presence in the
council chamber they imposed their will upon the municipal authori-
ties. It was held that there was no sedition, because there w a s no pub-
lic and tumultuous uprising. (U.S. vs. Apurado, et al., 7 Phil. 422)
2. No object of sedition — no sedition.
Five persons, armed w i t h carbine and Tommy gun, attacked a
truck wherein eight policemen, the chief of police, and other passengers
were riding. Two policemen, the truck operator and two children were
killed and two policemen were wounded. The accused were charged
with the crime of sedition with multiple murder and double frustrated
murder.
It w a s held that there w a s no sedition because the purpose of the
attack w a s not known. The accused were held liable for five murders
and two frustrated murders. (People vs. Mendoza, et al., G.R. No. L-
2371, May 5, 1950)
Are common crimes absorbed in sedition?

In People vs. Umali, et al., 96 Phil. 185, it w a s held that the crimes
committed were those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder
and physical injuries.
110
PENALTY FOR SEDITION Arts 140-141
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SEDITION
In the cases of People vs. Cabrera, et al., 43 Phil. 64 and 82, the
constabulary men who, to inflict an act of revenge upon the policeman,
murdered six policemen and two private citizens and seriously wounded
three civilians were found guilty of the separate crimes of sedition in one
case, and multiple murder with grave injuries in the other case.
10
Art. 140. Penalty for sedition. — The leader of a sedition
shall suffer t h e penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
11
period a n d a fine not e x c e e d i n g 10,000 pesos.
Other p e r s o n s participating t h e r e i n shall suffer the
12
p e n a l t y of prision correccional in its m a x i m u m period and
a fine not e x c e e d i n g 5,000 p e s o s .
Persons liable for sedition.

The persons liable for sedition are:
(1) The leader of the sedition, and
(2) Other persons participating in the sedition.
Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. — Persons

conspiring to c o m m i t t h e crime of sedition shall be punished
by prision correccional in its m e d i u m period" and a fine not
e x c e e d i n g 2,000 pesos.
There must be an agreement and a decision to rise publicly and

tumultuously to attain any of the objects of sedition.
Thus, an agreement and a decision to attain an object of sedition
without any agreement to rise publicly and tumultuously is not conspiracy
to commit sedition. Such an agreement and decision may constitute a
'"The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable.

12
13
Ill
Art. 142 INCITING TO SEDITION
conspiracy to commit direct assault of the first form (Art. 148), which is not
a felony.
There is no proposal to commit sedition.

Art. 141 punishes only conspiracy to commit sedition. Hence, proposal
to commit sedition is not punishable.
Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. — The penalty of prision

14
correccional in its m a x i m u m p e r i o d a n d a fine not
exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed u p o n any person
who, without taking any direct part in t h e crime of sedition,
should incite others to t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of any of t h e
acts w h i c h constitute sedition, by m e a n s of s p e e c h e s ,
proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, b a n n e r s , or
other representations t e n d i n g to t h e s a m e end, or u p o n
any person or persons w h o shall utter s e d i t i o u s w o r d s or
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against
the Government (of the U n i t e d States or t h e Government of
the Commonwealth) of t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , or a n y of t h e duly
constituted authorities thereof, or w h i c h t e n d to disturb
or obstruct any lawful officer in e x e c u t i n g t h e functions
of his office, or w h i c h t e n d to instigate others to cabal a n d
meet together for unlawful purposes, or w h i c h s u g g e s t or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or w h i c h l e a d or t e n d
to stir up the people against t h e lawful authorities or to
disturb the p e a c e of t h e community, t h e safety a n d order of
the Government, or w h o shall k n o w i n g l y conceal s u c h evil
practices. (As amended by Com. Act No. 202)
Different acts of inciting to sedition.

1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which
constitute sedition by m e a n s of speeches, proclamations, writings,
emblems, etc.
2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public
peace.
'"See Appendix "A," Table of Penalties, No. 13.
112
INCITING TO SEDITION Art. 142
3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the

Government or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, which
tend to disturb the public peace.
When the words uttered or speeches delivered or scurrilous libels
published have the tendency to disturb any lawful officer in executing the
functions of office, etc., it is not necessary, to constitute a violation of Art.
142, that the purpose of the offender is to accomplish any of the objects
of sedition. The second part of Art. 142, which defines the other modes of
committing the crime of inciting to sedition, does not require it.
Inciting to sedition to accomplish any of its objects.

Elements:
1. That the offender does not take direct part in the crime of sedition.
2. That he incites others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which
constitute sedition.
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings,
emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the
s a m e end.
"Should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts

which constitute sedition."
It is not inciting to sedition w h e n it is not proved that the defendant
incited the people to rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain any
of the ends mentioned in Art. 139. (sedition) (See People vs. Arrogante, 39
O.G. 1974)
Uttering seditious words or speeches.

1. Uttering seditious words —
Illustration:
The accused, municipal secretary, and another person,
happened to meet in the municipal building of the town of Pilar,
Sorsogon, and there they became engaged in a discussion regarding
the administration of Governor General Wood, which resulted in the
accused shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must
use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad
thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence."
Held: The accused uttered seditious words. His conviction must
be sustained. (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil. 599)
113
Art. 142 INCITING TO SEDITION
2. Uttering seditious speech —

Illustration:
At a necrological service on the occasion of the death of a local
communist leader, the accused delivered a speech, in the course of
which he criticized the members of the Constabulary, using words
substantially to the following effect: "They committed a real abuse in
seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad because they
shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. In view of this,
we ought to be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present
government and establish our own government, the government of
the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their sides."
Held: The words used by the accused manifestly tended to
induce the people to resist and use violence against the agents of the
Constabulary and to instigate the poor to Cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious
conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the order
of the Government. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that
the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against
the constituted authorities. The law is not aimed merely at actual
disturbance, as its purpose is also to punish utterances which may
endanger public order. (People vs. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455)
3. Writing, publishing or circulating scurrilous libels against the
Government or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof.
Meaning of the word "scurrilous."

"Scurrilous" m e a n s low, vulgar, m e a n or foul.
Illustration of scurrilous libel:

The accused had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from a tree. He sent
copies of the photograph to newspapers and weeklies of general circulation,
with suicide note allegedly written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera,
and addressed to the latter's supposed wife. The note contained words that
he committed suicide because he w a s not pleased with the administration
of President Roxas; and that our government is infested with many Hitlers
and Mussolinis for which reason he can not hold high brows to the world
with this dirty government. He instructed his children to burn pictures of
Roxas if and when they come across them.
Held: The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Writings
which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or
114
to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the
public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a
breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of the
government itself. (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil. 524)
Uttering seditious words or speeches and writing, publishing or

circulating scurrilous libels are punishable, when —
1. They tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the
functions of his office; or
2. They tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful
purposes; or
3. They suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; or
4. They lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities
or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government. (Article 142, 2nd part)
A theatrical play or drama where the words uttered or speeches

delivered are seditious may be punished under Art. 142.
Thus, the defendant's play "Kahapon, Ngayon at Bukas," exhibited at
Teatro Libertad, which tended to instigate others to cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities
and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the
government, w a s held to be inciting to sedition. (U.S. vs. Tolentino, 5 Phil.
682)
Proposal to throw hand grenades in a public place, intended to

cause commotion and disturbance, as an act of hate and revenge
against the police force, is inciting to sedition.
The defendant, during the meeting of the special police under him,
informed the members of the manhandling of some of them by the members
of the police force of Bacolod City and proposed the throwing of hand grenades
in certain places of the City, where no harm could be done to any person,
for the purpose of teaching the police force of the City a lesson, which was
accomplished as planned. The act was intended to cause commotion and
disturbance against the preservation of peace and order. It was committed
as an act of hate and revenge against the police force.
It was held that the defendant was guilty of inciting to sedition and
illegal possession of hand grenades. (People vs. Quimpo, C.A., 46 O.G. 3784)
115
Art 142 INCITING TO SEDITION
Knowingly concealing such evil practices.

This is one of the ways of violating Article 142.
"Knowingly concealing such evil practices" is ordinarily an act of the
accessory after the fact, but under this provision, the act is treated and
punished as that of the principal.
The use of words, emblems, etc., not performance of act, is punish-

ed in inciting to sedition.
Art. 142 punishes the use of words, emblems, banners, or other
representations tending to disturb the public peace or to disturb or obstruct
any public officer in executing the functions of his office.
Disturbance or disorder, not necessary in inciting to sedition.

It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should
in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities.
The law is not aimed merely at actual disturbance, as its purpose is also to
punish utterances which may endanger public order. (People vs. Nabong,
57 Phil. 455)
There are two rules relative to seditious words:

(a) The clear and present danger rule.
The words m u s t be of such a nature that by uttering t h e m there
is a danger of a public uprising and that such danger should be both
clear and imminent.
Under the clear and present danger rule, it is required that there
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent and that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. There
must be the probability of serious injury to the State.
Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified
with imminent and immediate danger. The danger m u s t not only be
probable but very likely inevitable.
The clear and present danger rule is applied in this case:

A political party applied for a permit to hold a public meeting in
Manila. The Mayor refused to grant permit. The refusal of the Mayor
to grant permit for the holding of a public m e e t i n g w a s predicated
upon fear that in view of the bitterness of the speeches expected from
the minority men who were fresh from a political defeat and were
smarting with charges of fraud against those in power, there might be
breach of the peace and of public order.
116
Held: The danger apprehended was not imminent and the evil
to be prevented was not a serious one. (Primicias vs. Fugoso 80 Phil
71)
The Mayor w a s ordered by the Supreme Court in mandamus
proceedings to issue a permit.
(b) The dangerous tendency rule.
If the words used tend to create a danger of public uprising, then
those words could properly be the subject of a penal clause. (People vs.
Perez, supra)
Under the dangerous tendency rule, there is inciting to sedition
w h e n the words uttered or published could easily produce disaffection
among the people and a state of feeling in them incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the
laws.
Reasons why seditious utterances are prohibited.

Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of
a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the Government without
waiting until there is a present and immediate danger of the success of the
plan advocated. If the State were compelled to wait until the apprehended
danger became certain, then its right to protect itself would come into being
simultaneously with the overthrow of the Government, when there would
be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law.
(Gitlow vs. N e w York, 268 U.S. 652)
Unlawful rumor-mongering and spreading false information.

It is committed by any person who shall offer, publish, distribute,
circulate and spread rumors, false news and information and gossip, or cause
the publication, distribution, circulation or spreading of the same, which
cause or tend to cause panic, divisive effects among the people, discredit of
or distrust for the duly constituted authorities, undermine the stability of
the Government and the objectives of the N e w Society, endanger the public
order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State.
The penalty is prision correccional or 6 months and 1 day to 6 years
imprisonment.
If the offender is a government official or employee, the accessory
penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification from hording any public office
shall be imposed. (Presidential Decree No. 90, which took effect on January
6. 1973)
117
Chapter Two
CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR
REPRESENTATION
What are the crimes against popular representation?

They are:
1. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the National Assembly
and similar bodies. (Art. 143)
2. Disturbance of proceedings. (Art. 144)
3. Violation on parliamentary immunity. (Art. 145)
Section One. — Crimes against legislative b o d i e s

and similar b o d i e s
Art. 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the

Assembly and similar bodies. — The p e n a l t y of prision
1
correccional or a fine r a n g i n g from 200 to 2,000 p e s o s ,
or both, shall be i m p o s e d u p o n any p e r s o n w h o , by force
or fraud, prevents t h e m e e t i n g of t h e National Assembly
(Congress of the Philippines) or of any of its c o m m i t t e e s or
sub-committees, constitutional c o m m i s s i o n s or c o m m i t t e e s
or divisions thereof, or of a n y provincial board or city or
municipal council or board. (As amended by Com. Act No.
264)
Elements:
1. That there be a projected or actual meeting of the National
Assembly or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional
118
DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS Art. 144
committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or

municipal council or board.
2. That the offender who may be any person prevents such meeting
by force or fraud.
Chief of police and mayor who prevented the meeting of the

municipal council are liable under Art. 143, when the defect of the
meeting is not manifest and requires an investigation before its
existence can be determined.
People vs. Alipit, et al.

(44 Phil. 910)
Facts: The election of the municipal president w a s contested on the

ground of minority. He yielded the chair to the vice-president. The meeting
of the municipal council presided over by the vice-president was stopped
by the chief of police and the municipal president by arresting the vice-
president and threatening the councilors with arrest if they would continue
holding the meeting.
The councilors t h e n dispersed, leaving the premises.
Held: Any stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself or
the chief of the municipal police, m u s t respect the meeting of the municipal
council presided over by the vice-president and he has no right to dissolve
it through violence under the pretext of lack of notice to some members of
the council, which^was not apparent, but required an investigation before it
could be determined.
Art. 144. Disturbance of proceedings. — The penalty

2
of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be
imposed u p o n any p e r s o n w h o disturbs the m e e t i n g s of the
National Assembly (Congress of t h e Philippines) or of any of
its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions
or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board
or city or municipal council or board, or in the presence of
any such bodies should b e h a v e in s u c h manner as to interrupt
its proceedings or to impair the respect due it. (As amended
by Com. Act No. 264)
2
119
Art. 144 DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS
Elements:
1. That there be a meeting of the National Assembly or any of its
committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or
committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or
municipal council or board.
2. That the offender does any of the following acts:
a. He disturbs any of such meetings.
b. He behaves while in the presence of any such bodies in such a
manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect
due it.
It must be a meeting of a legislative body or of provincial board or

city or municipal council or board which is disturbed.
Thus, where during a meeting of municipal officials called by the
mayor, the chief of police kept on talking although he had been asked by the
mayor to sit down, and there w a s a heated exchange of words among the
mayor, a councilor and the chief of police, the chief of police is not guilty of a
violation of Art. 144, but only of unjust vexation under Art. 287. (People vs.
Calera, et al., C.A., 45 O.G. 2576)
The reason for this ruling is that it w a s not a meeting of a municipal
council, the chief of police who w a s not a member of the council being a
participant therein.
The complaint for disturbance of proceedings may be filed by a

member of a legislative body.
The crime denned and penalized under Art. 144 of the Revised Penal
Code is not among those which may not be prosecuted de oficio. Hence, it
may be commenced upon the written complaint of a member of the Municipal
Board the proceedings of which were disturbed or interrupted although
such member was not authorized by the rules or a resolution of the Board.
(People vs. Lapid, C.A., 59 O.G. 4059)
One who disturbs the proceedings of the National Assembly may

also be punished for contempt by the Assembly.
The implied power to punish for contempt of the National Assembly
is coercive in nature. The power to punish crime is punitive in character.
Thus, the same act could be made the basis for contempt proceedings and
for criminal prosecution. (Lopez vs. De los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170)
120
VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY Art. 145
Section Two. — Violation of parliamentary

immunity
Art. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity. — The

penalty of prision mayor^ shall be i mp o s ed upon any person
w h o shall u s e force, intimidation, threats or fraud to prevent
a n y m e m b e r of t h e National Assembly (Congress of the
Philippines) from a t t e n d i n g t h e m e e t i n g s of the Assembly
(Congress) or of any of its c o m m i t t e e s or subcommittees,
constitutional c o m m i s s i o n s or c o m m i t t e e s or divisions
thereof, from e x p r e s s i n g h i s o p i n i o n s or c a s t i n g his vote;
4
a n d t h e p e n a l t y of prision correccional shall be imposed
u p o n a n y public officer or e m p l o y e e w h o shall, while the
Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest
or s e a r c h a n y m e m b e r thereof, e x c e p t in case such member
h a s c o m m i t t e d a crime p u n i s h a b l e u n d e r this Code by a
penalty h i g h e r t h a n prision mayor. (As amended by Com. Act
No. 264)
Acts punishable under Art. 145:

1. By using force, intimidation, threats, or frauds to prevent any member
of the National Assembly from (1) attending the meetings of the
Assembly or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional
commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or from (2) expressing
his opinions, or (3) casting his vote.
Elements:
(1) That the offender u s e s force, intimidation, threats or fraud.
(2) That the purpose of the offender is to prevent any member of the
National Assembly from —
(a) attending the meetings of the Assembly or of any of its
committees or constitutional commissions, etc.; or
(b) expressing his opinions; or
(c) casting his vote.

121
VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
Note: The offender is any person.

2. By arresting or searching any member thereof while the National
Assembly is in regular or special session, except in case such member
has committed a crime punishable under the Code by a penalty higher
than prision mayor.
Elements:
(1) That the offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) That he arrests or searches any member of the National
Assembly;
(3) That the Assembly, at the time of arrest or search, is in regular
or special session;
(4) That the member arrested or searched has not committed
a crime punishable under the Code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor.
"To prevent any member x x x from attending," etc.

It is not necessary that a member of the Assembly is actually prevented
from attending the meeting of "the National Assembly," or from expressing
his opinion or casting his vote. It is sufficient that the offender, in using
force, intimidation, threats, or frauds, h a s the purpose to prevent a member
of the National Assembly from exercising any of his such prerogatives.
Parliamentary immunity does not protect members of the National

Assembly from responsibility before the legislative body itself.
Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom
of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional
Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress
have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. (Osmena, Jr. vs. Pendatun, et al.,
109 Phil. 863)
Under the 1987 Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution exempts member of Congress from arrest,
while the Congress is in session, for all offenses punishable by a penalty
less than prision mayor. It provides:
122
VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY Art. 145
"A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in

all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." (Sec. 11, Art.
VI)
Under the 1987 Constitution, therefore, a public officer who arrests
a member of Congress who h a s committed a crime punishable by prision
mayor (6 yrs. and 1 day to 12 years) is not liable under Art. 145.
Note: To be consistent with the 1987 Constitution, the phrase "by a
penalty higher t h a n prision mayor" in Art. 145 should be amended to read:
"by the penalty of prision mayor or higher."
123
Chapter Three
ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS
Art. 146. Illegal assemblies. — The penalty of prision

1
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period shall be imposed u p o n t h e organizers or
leaders of any m e e t i n g attended by armed persons for the
purpose of committing any of t h e crimes punishable u n d e r
this Code, or of any m e e t i n g in w h i c h t h e a u d i e n c e is incited
to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or
insurrection, sedition or assault u p o n a p e r s o n in authority
or his agents. P e r s o n s merely p r e s e n t at s u c h m e e t i n g shall
2
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor, u n l e s s they are armed,
3
in w h i c h case t h e penalty shall be prision correccional.
If any p e r s o n present at t h e m e e t i n g carries an
unlicensed firearm, it shall be p r e s u m e d that t h e purpose of
said meeting, insofar as he is c o n c e r n e d , is to c o m m i t acts
punishable u n d e r this Code, a n d he shall be c o n s i d e r e d a
leader or organizer of the m e e t i n g w i t h i n t h e p u r v i e w of t h e
preceding paragraph.
As u s e d in this article, t h e w o r d "meeting" shall be
understood to i n c l u d e a g a t h e r i n g or group, w h e t h e r in a
fixed place or moving. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 12)
What are illegal assemblies?

They are:
1. Any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of
committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code.

2
124
ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES Art. 146
Requisites:
a. That there is a meeting, a gathering or group of persons,
whether in a fixed place or moving;
b. That the meeting is attended by armed persons;
c. That the purpose of the meeting is to commit any of the
crimes punishable under the Code.
2. Any meeting in which the audience, whether armed or not, is
incited to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or assault upon a person in authority or
his agents.
Requisites:
a. That there is a meeting, a gathering or group of persons,
whether in a fixed place or moving.
b. That the audience, whether armed or not, is incited
to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or
insurrection, sedition or direct assault.
The persons present at the meeting must be armed in the first

form of illegal assembly.
What crime is committed by forty unarmed persons who gather
together in a meeting for the purpose of committing theft of large cattle?
They do not commit any crime. Note that the persons present at the meeting
must be armed to constitute the first form of illegal assembly. If at all, they
only conspire to commit qualified theft which is not punishable.
But not all the persons present at the meeting of the 1st form of
illegal assembly must be armed.
Suppose seven of the forty persons are armed, the rest are not, and
the purpose of the gathering is to commit robbery, must the meeting be
considered an illegal assembly? Yes, because the law does not state how
many of the persons attending the meeting must be armed. It is said that a
good number, say, at least, four must be armed.
The unarmed person merely present at the meeting of the 1st form
of illegal assembly is liable.
If the purpose of the armed persons attending the meeting is to
commit any of the crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, does
an unarmed person merely present incur criminal liability?
125
Art. 146 ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES
The last sentence of the 1st paragraph of Art. 146, says: "Persons merely
present as such meeting shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor, unless they
are armed, in which case the penalty shall be prision correccional." Hence,
the penalty of arresto mayor is intended for persons present at the meeting
who are not armed.
"Any meeting in which the audience is incited to the commission

of the crime of rebellion, sedition, etc.
Suppose the purpose of the meeting was to incite a group of persons
to commit rebellion or sedition, would it be an illegal assembly if before
any actual inciting could take place the Constabulary soldiers stopped the
meeting and dispersed the people?
Note that the law uses the phrases, "the audience is incited."
That the audience is actually incited to the commission of any of the
crimes of sedition, rebellion, etc. seems to be a necessary element of the
second form of illegal assembly.
When there is an actual inciting, the act would not be punishable only
as inciting to rebellion or inciting to sedition, because in illegal assembly "in
which the audience is incited to the commission or rebellion or sedition, the
persons liable are the organizers or leaders of, and persons merely present
at, the meeting; whereas, in inciting to rebellion or to sedition, the person
liable is only the one who "shall incite others" (Art. 138); or "should incite
others." (Art. 142)
If in a meeting the audience is incited to the commission of rebellion
or sedition, the crimes committed are (1) illegal assembly as regards: (a) the
organizers or leaders, and (b) persons merely present; and (2) inciting to
rebellion or sedition insofar as the one inciting t h e m is concerned.
Persons liable for illegal assembly:

1. The organizers or leaders of the meeting.
2. Persons merely present at the meeting.
As illegal assembly is a felony, the persons merely present at the
meeting m u s t have a common intent to commit the felony of illegal assembly.
The absence of such intent may exempt the person present from criminal
liability.
Thus, if a person happens to be present at an illegal assembly out of

curiosity, he is not liable.
126
ILLEGAL ASSOCIATIONS Art. 147
Responsibility of persons merely present at the meeting:

1. If they are not armed, the penalty is arresto mayor.
2. If they carry arms, like bolos or knives, or licensed firearms, the
penalty is prision correccional.
If any person present at the meeting carries an unlicensed

firearm:
1. It is presumed t h a t the purpose of the meeting insofar as he is

concerned, is to commit acts punishable under the Code; and
2. He is considered a leader or organizer of the meeting.
The word "meeting" includes a gathering or group which is

moving.
A gathering or group, whether in a fixed place or moving, is included
in the word "meeting."
Art. 147. Illegal associations. — T h e p e n a l t y of prision

correccional in i t s m i n i m u m a n d m e d i u m periods" a n d a fine
n o t e x c e e d i n g 1,000 p e s o s s h a l l b e i m p o s e d u p o n t h e f o u n d e r s ,
d i r e c t o r s , a n d p r e s i d e n t s o f a s s o c i a t i o n s totally o r partially
o r g a n i z e d for t h e p u r p o s e o f c o m m i t t i n g a n y o f t h e c r i m e s
p u n i s h a b l e u n d e r t h i s C o d e o r for s o m e p u r p o s e c o n t r a r y
t o p u b l i c m o r a l s . Mere m e m b e r s o f s a i d a s s o c i a t i o n s shall
5
suffer t h e p e n a l t y of arresto mayor.
What are illegal associations?

They are:
1. Associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of
committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code.
2. Associations totally or partially organized for some purpose
contrary to public morals.
4
5
127
Art. 147 ILLEGAL ASSOCIATIONS
Persons liable for illegal association:

1. Founders, directors and president of the association.
2. Mere members of the association.
Example of illegal association:

The Lapiang Sakdalista was declared an illegal association, because
it strived to stir up dissatisfaction among the laboring class, instigated them
to break the laws and led them to bloody riots and inflamed them to rise up
against the government. (People vs. Ramos, C.A., 40 O.G. 2305)
The Lapiang Sakdalista was declared an illegal association by the
Court of Appeals, because it was organized for the purpose of overthrowing
the government by force of arms, which is rebellion, a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code.
Illegal association distinguished from illegal assembly.

(a) In illegal assembly, it is necessary that there is an actual meeting or
assembly of armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the
crimes punishable under the Code, or of individuals who, although not
armed, are incited to the commission of treason, rebellion, sedition, or
assault upon a person in authority or his agent; in illegal association,
it is not necessary that there be an actual meeting.
(b) In illegal assembly, it is the meeting and attendance at such meeting
that are punished; in illegal associations, it is the act of forming or
organizing and membership in the association that are punished.
(c) In illegal assembly, the persons liable are: (1) the organizers or
leaders of the meeting, and (2) the persons present at meeting. In
illegal association, the persons liable are: (1) the founders, directors
and president, and (2) the members.
Subversion.
The crime of subversion w a s first punished under Rep. Act No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. P.D. No. 885 (Revised Anti-
Subversion Law) superseded R.A. No. 1700.
Executive Order No. 167 revived Rep. Act No. 1700 and repealed
P.D. No. 885. R.A. No. 1700 was later amended by Executive Order No. 276
(1987).
Rep. Act No. 7636 (1992) repealed Rep. Act No. 1700, as amended.
There is currently no law which punishes subversion.
128
ILLEGAL ASSOCIATIONS Art. 147
Acts punished under the Anti-Subversion Act (Rep. Act No. 1700):
1. Knowingly, willfully and by overt acts (a) affiliating oneself with, (b)
becoming, or (c) remaining a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association as
defined in Sec. 2 of the Act;
2. Conspiring with any other person to overthrow the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines or the government of any of its
political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or other
illegal m e a n s , for the purpose of placing such government or political
subdivision under the control and domination of any alien power;
and
3. Taking up arms against the Government, the offender being a member
of the Communist Party or of any subversive association as denned in
Sec. 2 of the Act.
What organizations are declared illegal and outlawed under Sec. 2

of Rep. Act No. 1700?
The Communist Party, which is declared to be an organized
conspiracy, any other organization and their successors having the purpose
of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to
establish in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the Government
under the control and domination of an alien power are declared illegal and
outlawed.
Violation of Anti-Subversion Act is distinct from that of rebellion.

Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more
commonly called, is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime
of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against
the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700)
punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined
therein. In rebellion, there m u s t be a public uprising and taking of arms
against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a
subversive association is sufficient, and the taking up of arms by a member
of a subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance
which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender. (People vs.
Liwanag, 74 SCRA 473)
129
Art. 147 ILLEGAL ASSOCIATIONS
Acts punished under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law (P.D. No.

885):
1. Knowingly, willfully and by overt act affiliating with, becoming or
remaining a member of a subversive association or organization as
defined in Sec. 2 thereof;
2. Taking up arms against the Government, the offender being a member
of such subversive association or organization.
What are subversive associations and organizations under Sec. 2

of P.D. No. 885?
Any association, organization, political party, or group of persons
organized for the purpose of Overthrowing the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines or for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
government or its laws, the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof,
with the open or covert assistance or support of a foreign power by force,
violence, deceit or other illegal means.
130
Chapter Four
ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE
AND DISOBEDIENCE TO, PERSONS
IN AUTHORITY AND THEIR AGENTS
Art. 148. Direct assaults. — Any p e r s o n or persons w h o ,

w i t h o u t a public uprising, shall e m p l o y force or intimidation
for t h e a t t a i n m e n t of a n y of t h e purposes enumerated
in d e n n i n g t h e c r i m e s of rebellion a n d sedition, or shall
attack, e m p l o y force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
p e r s o n in authority or a n y of his agents, w h i l e e n g a g e d in
t h e performance of official duties, or on occasion of s u c h
performance, shall suffer t h e p e n a l t y of prision correccional
1
in its m e d i u m a n d m a x i m u m periods a n d a fine not e x c e e d i n g
1,000 pesos, w h e n t h e assault is committed w i t h a w e a p o n or
w h e n t h e offender is a public officer or employee, or w h e n
t h e offender lays h a n d s u p o n a p e r s o n in authority. If n o n e
of t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s be present, t h e penalty of prision
2
correccional in its m i n i m u m period and a fine not e x c e e d i n g
500 p e s o s shall be imposed.
Additional penalty for attacking ambassador or minister.

Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds or in any other manner
offers violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, in
violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned not more than three
years and fined not exceeding two hundred pesos, in the discretion of the
court, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code. (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 75)
•See Appendix "A," Table of Penalties, No. 15.

2
131
Art. 148 DIRECT ASSAULTS
Direct assaults are different from ordinary assault without intent

to kill or physical injuries under Arts. 263 to 266.
Direct assaults are crimes against public order; ordinary assaults
under Arts. 263 to 266 are crimes against persons.
Direct assaults are triable by the Court of First Instance (now,
Regional Trial Court). (Villanueva vs. Ortiz, 108 Phil. 493; Salabsalo vs.
Angcoy, 108 Phil. 649)
Two ways of committing the crime of direct assaults :

1. Without public uprising, by employing force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes
of rebellion and sedition.
2. Without public uprising, by attacking, by employing force, or by
seriously intimidating or seriously resisting any person in authority or
any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
or on the occasion of such performance.
Elements of the 1st form of direct assault:

1. That the offender employs force or intimidation.
2. That the aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the
crime of rebellion or any of the objects in the crime of sedition.
3. That there is no public uprising.
Examples of the 1st form of direct assault:
U.S. vs. Dirain

(4 Phil. 541)
Facts: The chief of police, accompanied by four policemen, all armed,

went to the house of the municipal president and compelled h i m by force to
go to the municipal building, where they kept him for four hours, because
their salaries had been in arrears for some time and they had been unable
to secure payment of t h e m from the president. After the relatives of the
president sent him money sufficient to pay the salaries, he w a s allowed to
depart.
Held: That these facts constitute the commission of the crime charged
in the complaint.
There is force in this case. But there is no public uprising. W h e n the
accused, compelled by force the municipal president to go with t h e m to the
municipal building and detained him there, they inflicted an act of hate or
132
DIRECT ASSAULTS Art. 148
revenge upon a public officer. This is one of the objects of sedition which the
accused aimed to attain.
Direct assault to prevent popular election.
The act of the accused in preventing by force the holding of a popular

election in certain precincts, without public uprising, is direct assault (of
the first form). (See Clarin vs. Justice of the Peace, G.R. No. L-7661, April
30,1955)
Is it necessary that the offended party in the first form of direct

assault be a person in authority or his agent?
The first part of Article 148 does not seem to require it. If the aim of
the offender is to attain an object of sedition, the offended party may be a
private individual or person belonging to a social class. (See paragraph No.
4 of Art. 139)
Elements of the 2nd form of direct assault:

1. That the offender (a) m a k e s an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
serious intimidation, or (d) m a k e s a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent
(a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or that he is
assaulted, (b) by reason of the past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.
First element. — (The offender makes an attack, employs force,

etc.)
"Shall attack."
The word "attack" includes any offensive or antagonistic movement or
action of any kind.
"Employ force."
What degree of force is necessary in direct assault?
If the offended party is only an agent of a person in authority, the force
employed must be of a serious character as to indicate determination to defy
the law and its representative at all hazards.
133
Hitting a policeman in the breast with a fist is not direct assault.
U.S. vs. Tabiana

(37 Phil. 515)
Facts: The accused, while being placed under arrest by three policemen,
hit one of them in the breast with his fist. The policemen then seized the
accused by the wrist, whereupon he ceased to resist.
Held: The words in Art. 148 relating to the employment of force
appear to have reference to something more dangerous to civil society than
a simple blow with the hands at the moment a party is taken into custody
by a policeman.
Pushing a policeman and giving him fist blows without hitting him
is not direct assault.
Where the appellant had shouted to the offended party (a policeman)
and accused him of knowing very little about investigation, and while the
offended party w a s taking him to the desk sergeant, he pushed said offended
party and gave him blows with his hands which, however, he w a s able to
evade, the aggression should not be considered as an assault but merely as
resistance to an agent of a person in authority. (People vs. Reyes, 40 O.G.
Supp. 11, 24, cited in People vs. Bustamante, C.A., 52 O.G. 287)
Where the force employed on the agent of a person in authority is

of a serious character, including determination to defy the law and
its representative, the crime committed is direct assault.
Thus, where three American soldiers asked a policeman if he wanted
to fight, and then, without waiting for a reply, seized the latter by the throat,
threw him to the ground, and struck h i m several blows with the club which
the accused, one of the three soldiers, wrested from the policeman, it w a s
held that the accused w a s guilty of the crime of assaulting a police officer.
(U.S. vs. Cox, 3 Phil. 140)
Where a police officer tried to arrest the accused for violation of the
chicken dung ordinance, and the accused punched the police officer on his
face, particularly on his lip, and t h e n grappled with the police officer, there
was direct assault. [Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 138553, J u n e 30, 2005]
134
The force employed need not be serious when the offended party
is a person in authority.
U.S. vs. Gumban

(39 Phil. 76)
Facts: The accused w e n t to the municipal president and protested

to him that the carabao of his brother w a s taken to the police station for
having destroyed a planted area owned by Suliano. The police station
happened to be within the zone affected by the quarantine. The municipal
president promised to intervene in the matter and to find out whether the
carabao could be withdrawn from the zone affected by the quarantine. Upon
hearing this s t a t e m e n t of the municipal president, the accused gave him a
slap on the face striking his left ear. The municipal president w a s a person
in authority t h e n in the performance of his official duties, inspecting the
quarantine of animals.
Held: Laying hands upon a person in authority while in the performance
of his official duties constitutes direct assault.
The reason for the difference in the rule as regards the degree of force
employed w h e n the offended party in direct assault is a person in authority,
is that the penalty is even higher "when the offender lays hands upon a
person in authority."
The intimidation or resistance must be serious whether the

offended party is an agent only or he is a person in authority.
The other w a y s of committing direct assault of the 2nd form are (1) to
seriously intimidate or (2) to seriously resist a person in authority or any
of his agents. Note the word "seriously" describing the words "intimidate"
and "resist."
The law, with regard to intimidation or resistance as other constitutive
element of assault, expressly requires that they be serious. (U.S. vs. Gumban,
39 Phil. 76)
The resistance must be active.

The resistance may be active or passive. Passive, when the one who is
placed under arrest throws himself on the ground and the resistance makes
it necessary to raise him up or drag him along to jail.
But since the resistance here must be grave, it must be active
resistance.
135
Example of serious resistance.

In the course of a quarrel between A and B, the latter called, "Police!
Police!" and a policeman who went to the scene saw B getting up. When the
policeman was about to arrest A, the latter said: "Don't come near, because
I will take your life." As the policeman was approaching him, A struck him
with a knife but was not hit. (U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516)
The intimidation must be serious.

When the constitutive element of direct assault is intimidation,
it must be serious whether the offended party is an agent only or he is a
person in authority.
Example of serious intimidation.

Pointing a gun at a military police captain who is in the performance
of his duty constitutes assault upon an agent of person in authority, because
there is serious intimidation. (People vs. Diama, C.A., 45 O.G. 838)
It would seem that threatening to give a fist blow, made to a policeman
who was arresting the accused, would not constitute direct assault by
intimidating, because the intimidation is not serious.
The intimidation must produce its effects immediately.

The intimidation m u s t produce its effect immediately, for if the threats
be of some future evil, the act would not be an assault. (Albert)
Second element. — (The person assaulted is a person in authority

or his agent.)
Art. 148, the second part, protects only public officers who are either
persons in authority or their agents. N o t every public officer is at the s a m e
time a person in authority or an agent of authority.
Thus, an attack on a clerk in the provincial auditor's office by holding
his neck and inflicting upon him a fist blow, while the said clerk w a s in the
performance of his duty, is not direct assault, because he is neither a person
in authority nor an agent of a person in authority. (People vs. Carpizo, 80
Phil. 234)
Who is a person in authority?

Any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual
or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board, or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and
136
a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. (Art. 152,
as amended)
By "directly vested with jurisdiction" is m e a n t "the power or authority
to govern and execute the laws."
How to determine whether a certain public officer is a person in

authority.
The powers and duties vested in h i m by law should be determined.
1. Division Superintendent of Schools.
Since under Sec. 917 of the Revised Administrative Code, a division
superintendent of schools is given the power of general superintendence over
schools and school interests in his division, with the right to appoint municipal
school teachers and to fix their salaries, and further, since education is a
state function and public policy demands an adequate protection of those
engaged in the performance of this commission, a division superintendent
of schools should be regarded as a person in authority. (People vs. Benitez,
73 Phil. 671)
2. President of Sanitary Division.

Under the law he is, in addition to other duties toward the protection
and preservation of public health and sanitation, expressly vested with
the power to enforce all sanitary laws and regulations applicable to his
division and to cause all violations of the same to be duly prosecuted. He is,
therefore, a person in authority or, at least, an agent of such person. (People
vs. Quebral, et al., 73 Phil. 640)
Teachers, etc., are persons in authority.

Teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be
deemed persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Arts. 148 and
151. (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Art. 152, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1978)
For other purposes, such as to increase the penalty by reason of the
aggravating circumstances where a person in authority is involved, the
teachers and professors are not persons in authority.
The status as a person in authority being a matter of law, ignorance

thereof is no excuse.
Complainant was a teacher. She was in her classroom and engaged in
the performance of her duties. The accused therefore knew that she was a
137
person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. Complainant's

status as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact,
ignorance thereof could not excuse the accused. (Article 3, Civil Code) This
article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna
vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15), and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs.
Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reason of expediency, policy and necessity. (People
vs. Balbar, 21 SCRA 1119)
Attacking a teacher who had inflicted corporal punishment on a

pupil is direct assault.
The corporal punishment (for instance, slightly slapping) inflicted by
the offended party upon her pupil does not in any way strip the teacher
of her being a person in authority. A teacher in public elementary school
has authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil if no bodily harm is
caused and the punishment inflicted is moderate, is not dictated by any bad
motive, is such as is usual in the school, and such as the parent of the child
might expect that the child would receive if he did wrong. Such authority
which is inherent to the position of a teacher, especially in grade schools,
is a complement of that old adage — "spare the rod and spoil the child."
(People vs. Javier, CA-G.R. No. 6203, Oct. 28, 1940; People vs. Padua, C.A.,
49 O.G. 156)
Reasons why teachers and professors are protected in Arts. 148

and 151.
The spirit and purpose behind Commonwealth Act No. 578 is to give
teachers protection, dignity and respect while in the performance of their
official duties. This protection extends not only against pupils or relatives
of pupils, but against all persons who knowingly attack a teacher while
engaged in the performance of his official duties. Respect for a teacher is
required of all persons, whether pupils, parents, or otherwise, if we are
to uphold and enhance the dignity of the teaching profession which the
law similarly enjoins upon all persons for the sake of the pupils and t h e
profession itself. (People vs. Ceprioso, C.A., 52 O.G. 2609)
Who is an agent of a person in authority?

An agent of a person in authority is one who, by direct provision of law
or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with
the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and
property, such as a barrio councilman and barrio policeman and barangay
leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority. (Art.
152, as amended)
138
Examples of agents of person in authority.

The following are agents of persons in authority:
1. Policeman. (U.S. vs. Cox, 3 Phil. 140; U.S. vs. Tabiana, 37 Phil
515)
2. Municipal treasurer, because he is only a deputy ex oficio of the
provincial treasurer, a person in authority within the province
where the latter exercises his jurisdiction. (People vs. Ramos 57
Phil. 462)
3. Postmaster, because he is only an agent of the Director of Posts,
a person in authority. (People vs. Acierto, 57 Phil. 614)
4. Rural policeman, even if he is not provided with a uniform and
does not receive pay, because he is duly appointed by the mayor
of the town and is provided with a badge. (People vs. Dosal, 92
Phil. 877)
5. Sheriff. (People vs. Hernandez, 59 Phil. 343)
6. A g e n t s of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (People vs. Reyes, et
al., C.A., 40 O.G., Supp. 11, 24)
7. Malacanang confidential agent. (People vs. Bustamante, C.A.,
G.R. No. 12950-R, Sept. 2 2 , 1 9 5 5 )
8. Barangay Chief Tanod (People vs. Recto, G.R. No. 129069,
October 17, 2001)
Attacking a special agent of the Manila Railroad Co. even while in

the performance in his duty is not direct assault.
A special agent of the Manila Railroad Co. is not an agent of a person
in authority, because his very appointment as special agent shows that
his duties are limited to violations of law which affect the interests of the
said company. Hence, giving a fist blow to such special agent while in the
performance of his duty is only physical injuries. (People vs. Paras, C.A., 39
O.G. 1253)
Functions of the person in authority or his agent must be clearly

shown in the information.
Even if it is possible that a particular public officer might be clothed
with functions that bring him under the definition of an agent of a person
in authority, still such functions must be clearly shown in the information.
Merely to say that a clerk is an agent of authority is a conclusion of law.
(People vs. Carpiso, 80 Phil. 234)
139
Third element. — {In the performance of duty or by reason

thereof.)
The third requisite of the second form of direct assault requires that
at the time such assault or intimidation or resistance is made, the person in
authority or his agent (1) is engaged in the actual performance of his official
duty, or (2) at least that the assault or intimidation is done by reason of the
past performance of said duty.
While engaged in the performance of official duties.

Examples:
1. U.S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385, where the accused killed the provincial
governor while engaged in the performance of his official duties. It is
a complex crime of direct assault with murder.
2. People vs. Tevez, G.R. No. 41672, May 6, 1935, where the accused
elbowed the provincial governor while the latter w a s going down the
stairs of the municipal building for the purpose of inspecting the office
of the chief of police, producing contusion on the right side of the body
of the governor.
3. People vs. Jalit, C.A., 69 O.G. 3621, where a barrio captain, upon
complaint of several ladies, reprimanded the accused for the
ungentlemanly behaviour during a public dance held in front of
the former's store, said barrio captain actually performed his duty
of maintaining peace and order, although he w a s j u s t clad in an
undershirt and only stayed inside his store, t h e attack made on his
person by the accused on the occasion of the performance of his official
duty constitutes direct assault.
But in the following cases, the person in authority w a s not attacked
while engaged in the performance of official duties:
1. A barrio lieutenant was shot in the head, w h e n he tried to intervene in
a case being investigated by the justice of the peace. It w a s held that
the barrio lieutenant w a s not acting in the performance of his official
duties at the time he w a s shot, because the justice of the peace w a s
already acting on the matter. (U.S. vs. Marasigan, 11 Phil. 27)
2. During a political meeting held by a candidate supported by the
municipal mayor, the accused created a disturbance. The mayor
approached the accused and a personal encounter between the two
ensued. The mayor w a s injured. It w a s held that the accused w a s not
guilty of direct assault, because the mayor approached the accused,
not to maintain order, but to prevent the m e e t i n g from becoming a
failure. (People vs. Sorrano, C.A., 38 O.G. 2243)
140
When a teacher is not in the performance of official duty.
A teacher who goes out of his classroom to talk to a person on matters
not related to the school or his duties is not engaged in the performance of
his official duties as a teacher, and if, on such occasion, he is assaulted by
the person, the latter may not be held liable for the crime punished under
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Gamo, CA-G.R. No. 5110-
R, October 24, 1950)
A teacher who w e n t out of his classroom to talk to his creditor about
his unpaid accounts w a s not engaged in the performance of his official duties
as a teacher. (People vs. Jingco, 63 O.G. 4443, May 22, 1967)
Extent of performance of official duties for purposes of direct

assault.
A provincial fiscal w a s travelling to a certain municipality to investigate
a witness in connection with a treason case upon the instruction of the
Solicitor General. On the way, the accused, driving a service truck, refused
to give way to the car in which the fiscal w a s riding and even zigzagged in
front of the car to obstruct the way to prevent it from overtaking his truck.
The fiscal signalled the truck to stop, which the accused did. The accused
arrogantly refused to be investigated and to show his driver's license. He
grabbed a rifle, cocked it and pointed the s a m e to the fiscal.
Held: The fiscal at the time he w a s seriously intimidated was in the act
of discharging the functions of his office, and, therefore, in the performance
of his official duties. (People vs. Francisco, C.A., 48 O.G. 4423)
From the facts of the case, it would seem that the performance of the
official duty of the fiscal includes his travelling to the place where he was
going to conduct an investigation of a certain treason case.
It will be noted, however, that the accused, before the assault, had
committed an offense, a violation of the traffic regulation, for which he could
be investigated. When the fiscal investigated him and asked him to show
his driver's license, the fiscal w a s in the performance of his official duty as
a prosecuting officer.
A school teacher officially travelling from one place to another to
deliver school reports and school properties in compliance with a directive
of his superiors is considered engaged in the performance of official duty,
and an assault committed against the teacher while on his way is direct
assault upon a person in authority. The duties of teachers are not limited to
the confines of the classroom because there are duties which are discharged
by them outside the classrooms. (People vs. Baladhay, C.A., 67 O.G. 4213)
141
When the persons in authority or their agents descended to

matters which are private in nature, an attack made by one against
the other is not direct assault.
In a special session of the municipal council, while the accused
councilor was making a speech, the offended party, another councilor,
wanted to take the floor and the interruption caused by him w a s disliked by
the accused who went to his place and pushed down his shoulder to make
him sit. Thereafter, the accused threw upon him a flurry of blows which
caused upon the offended party contusions and bruises on his face.
Held: At the time the quarrel took place, the two councilors descended
to matters which are of private nature, and at that very moment they were
not performing their duties. While it is true that the incident took place in
a session of the municipal council, the offended party tried to unreasonably
interrupt the accused while the latter was speaking, thereby provoking the
anger of the latter. The offended party t h e n w a s not performing his duties
as councilor when he was assaulted. The accused w a s guilty of less serious
physical injuries only. (People vs. Yosoya, CA-G.R. No. 8522-R, May 26,
1955)
When the agent of a person in authority agrees to fight.

When the accused challenged a district supervisor of the Bureau
of Public Schools to a fight, for failure of the latter to accommodate the
recommendee of the former for the position of teacher, even if the district
supervisor accepted the challenge, the attack made by the accused constitutes
direct assault, because the character of a person in authority or his agent is
not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to h i m until he ceases to be in
office. (Justo vs. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 463)
When person in authority or his agent is considered not in the

performance of official duties.
The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents
is fixed. If they go beyond it and they violate any recognized rights of the
citizens, then the latter may resist the invasion, especially w h e n it is clear
and manifest. The resistance m u s t be coextensive with the excess, and
should not be greater t h a n w h a t is necessary to repel the aggression. (3
Groizard, p. 456, cited in People vs. Chan Fook, 42 Phil. 230)
People vs. Tilos, et al.

(C.A., 36 O.G. 54)
Facts: Upon instruction of the municipal president, the creditors

having complained that the accused had not paid for their fishing net,
142
the chief of police w e n t to the beach where he found the accused in their
own boat with the fishing net, and commanded them to take the net to the
municipal building. Because the accused flatly refused, the chief of police
become excited and chased t h e m and came to blows with one of them as a
result of which both suffered physical injuries.
Held: The chief of police w a s not exercising the proper functions of his
office in attempting to seize the fishing net from the accused inasmuch as the
municipal president, in instructing him to do so, exceeded his jurisdiction,
not being clothed with judicial power with regard to the seizure of a disputed
property.
In chasing and in attacking the accused, the chief of police became an
unlawful aggressor and the accused in giving him fist blows merely defended
himself against unlawful aggression coming from the chief of police. The
accused w a s justified, as he acted in self-defense.
Self-defense in direct assault.

When a person in authority or his agent is the one who provokes and
attacks another person, the latter is entitled to defend himself and cannot
be held liable for assault or resistance nor for physical injuries, because
he acts in legitimate defense. (People vs. Carado, CA-G.R. No. 12778-R,
November 11, 1955)
In the following cases, the person in authority or his agent is

considered not in the performance of official duties.
1. A person in authority or his agent who exceeds his power or acts
without authority, is not in the exercise of the functions of his office. (People
vs. Hernandez, 59 Phil. 343; People vs. Garcia, et al., 38 O.G. 94; People vs.
Tilos, et al., supra)
When the agent of authority m a k e s unnecessary use of force or violence
to make him respected, he goes beyond the limits of his powers and from
that moment, he acts as a private person. (People vs. Dumo, et al., C.A., 40
O.G. Supp. 5, 58)
2. When the offender and the offended party, who are both persons
in authority or their agents, descend to matters which are private in nature,
the principle of authority is not violated. (People vs. Yosoya, supra)
In any of these instances, if the person in authority or his agent is
attacked, the crime committed is only physical injuries or homicide, as the
case may be.
143
Offender and offended party are both persons in authority or their

agents.
An assault upon a person in authority may be committed by another
person in authority as Art. 148 makes it an aggravating circumstance when
the offender is a "public officer or employee."
However, there can be no assault upon or disobedience to one authority
by another when they both contend in the exercise of their respective duties.
When there is an actual conflict of jurisdiction, there is, properly speaking,
no rebellion against the principle of authority, but an endeavor to enforce
the authority which each of the disputants represent.
Illustration: The chief of police and the lieutenant of the Constabulary,
with their respective men, simultaneously raided a gambling house. The
chief of police contended that he alone should make the raid. The lieutenant
of the Constabulary also claimed that he had the authority to make the
raid. The chief of police attacked the lieutenant of the Constabulary and
inflicted on him physical injuries while directing his men in the raid. The
crime committed by the chief of police is only physical injuries.
Knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority

or his agent, essential.
The accused assaulting m u s t have knowledge that the offended party
was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because
the accused m u s t have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended
party as a person in authority or agent of authority. (U.S. vs. Alvear, et al.,
35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038; People vs. Villasenor, 35 SCRA
460)
The information must allege such knowledge.

The information w a s deficient in that it did not allege an essential
element of the crime of direct assault that the accused had knowledge of
or knew the position of authority held by the person attacked. (People vs.
Court of the First Instance of Quezon, Br. V, 68 SCRA 305)
Defendant must have the intention to defy the authorities.

The defendant had obviously, in the heat of the moment, because of
what previously had happened, rushed upstairs and attempted to force his
way into the sanctum of complainant's dwelling; and on the stairs when
he was blocked by barrio lieutenant Donato Broca, he forthwith took hold
and pulled the latter's hand causing him to fall to the ground. Nevertheless
under the circumstances, he could not be presumed to have the intention of
144
defying the authorities - challenging, acting in such a way as to "constitute

a danger to civil society" - in his automatic use of force in laying hands
upon Broca and pulling h i m down. That Broca had fallen on the ground
- which defendant might not have intended - is not of much consequence.
The fact remains that, considering the state of mind in which defendant
m u s t have found himself at that moment, and the attendant circumstances,
there would s e e m to be no intent on his part to ignore, disregard, much less
defy the authority or its agent. Thus, in the absence of those qualifying
circumstances, we choose to extend the benefit of the doubt in favor of
defendant. He w a s found guilty of resistance, not of direct assault. (People
vs. Baesa, C.A., 55 O.G. 10295-10296)
If a person, while holding a weapon and showing it to a policeman
t h e n in the performance of his duty, said, "If you were not a policeman, I
would use this on you," such person is not liable for direct assault because
he had no intention to defy the authority which the policeman represented.
Disregard of Respect Due to Offended Party on Account of Rank,

Inherent in Direct Assault.
Direct assault is characterized by the spirit of aggression directed
against the authorities or their agents, hence, the circumstance of "disregard
of respect due the offended party on account of his rank" may be considered
inherent therein. (People vs. Manlapat, CA, 51 O.G. 849) Thus, in the case
of People vs. Catacutan, 64 Phil. 107 (1937), wherein the accused who killed
a corporal, an agent of the authority who w a s t h e n conducting a search by
virtue of a search warrant, w a s found by the Court to have committed the
complex crime of homicide and assault upon an agent of the authority, that
circumstance w a s not considered aggravating nor w a s it taken into account
in People vs. Lojo, Jr., 52 Phil. 390 (1928) wherein the Court found the
accused, who ran over a policeman who w a s signaling him to stop, guilty
of two crimes, homicide and assault upon an agent of authority; nor in the
case of People vs. Hernandez, 43 Phil. 104 (1922) wherein the court found
the accused, who killed a policeman, guilty of the complex crime of homicide
accompanied by assault upon an agent of authority, nor in the case of People
vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87 91928) wherein the Court held that two crimes
were committed by the accused in the killing of two constabulary soldiers,
murder and assault against agents of authority. (People vs. Lanseta, G.R.
No. L-30413, January 22, 1980)
By reason of the performance of duty.

Direct assault is also committed when the person in authority or his
agent is attacked or seriously intimidated "on occasion of such performance"
of official duty.
145
The phrase "on occasion of such performance* means that the

impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. The words
"on occasion" signify "because" or "by reason" of the past performance of
official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being
discharged. (Justo vs. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 453)
U.S. vs. Garcia

(20 Phil. 358)
Facts: The justice of the peace who read the decision he rendered
in a civil suit heard the accused, who was not a party in the case, utter
disrespectful and contemptuous remarks, whereupon he turned to him and
said: "What have you to do with this case, w h e n you are not a party to it?
Please get out of here." The accused left but when he reached the stairway he
turned back toward the justice of the peace and said in threatening manner,
"We'll see," and went downstairs. When the justice of the peace started on
his way home, the accused who w a s waiting for h i m nearby, followed h i m
and when he turned to a corner accosted him and attacked him, striking
him with a cane and slapping his face.
Held: The accused committed direct assault, the crime being
aggravated by the fact that he laid hands upon a person in authority.
At the time the justice of the peace w a s attacked by the accused,
the former w a s not in the performance of his duty, because he w a s on the
street and on his way home. But the accused assaulted h i m by reason of the
performance of his duty, that is, his sending out the accused to preserve the
decorum in his court. Even if the motive of the assault w a s the fact that
the accused did not agree with the decision of t h e justice of the peace, the
assault was still by reason of the performance of his duty.
Hence, it is not necessary that the person in authority or his agent

is in the actual performance of his official duty when attacked or
seriously intimidated.
It is not necessary that the person in authority who w a s assaulted w a s
actually performing official duties. The law employs t h e phrase "on occasion
of such performance" and this h a s been interpreted to include cases like
this one where the assault w a s made "by reason of" t h e performance of the
duty of Judge Teodoro. The Supreme Court, citing with approval Groizard's
Commentaries on the Penal Code of 1840 in the case of U.S. vs. Saniel, said,
"the authorities and their agents exercise duties by reason of the offices
they fill. The acts they perform in their official capacity m a y seriously
affect persons. Whenever those acts produce resentment in the latter and
they, on this account, make any serious assault, intimidation, or resistance
against such authorities, the crime in question is committed * * *. If the
146
motives that induced the guilty parties to commit the assaults are the acts
performed by such person in authority or by his agents, whether such acts
immediately preceded the assault or took place some time prior thereto
the crime is committed on the occasion of the performance of public official
duties and, consequently, the characteristic elements of atentado (assault)
exist." (People vs. Torrecarion, C.A., 52 O.G. 7644, citing U.S. vs. Saniel 33
Phil. 646)
People vs. Hecto

135 SCRA 113
Facts: Sometime in January or February 1972, the brothers Jesus

and Pedro Hecto slaughtered a carabao, without paying the corresponding
slaughter fee. Upon learning of the brothers' non-payment, barangay
captain Catalino Pedrosa asked J e s u s to pay the fee. J e s u s replied that they
could not y e t pay the fee as those who bought meat from them had not paid
them yet. Later, w h e n Pedrosa met the municipal treasurer, the latter told
Pedrosa that he w a s informed by the Hecto brothers that they had already
paid the fee to Pedrosa. On 27 February 1972, Pedrosa confronted the Hecto
brothers about the false information they gave the municipal treasurer
on their alleged payment of the slaughter fee to him. A heated discussion
then ensued and the Hecto brothers tried to attack Pedrosa. Mrs. Pedrosa
w a s able to pull her husband away and trouble w a s averted. On 24 March
1972, on his way home from a nephew's house, he was shot by Jesus and
Pedro Hecto and thereafter, stabbed by Marcial Hecto and Roberto Silvano.
The trial court convicted the accused of the complex crime of murder with
assault upon a person in authority.
Held: The accused contends that the trial court erred in convicting
them of the complex crime of murder with assault upon a person in authority.
They pointed out that when the barangay captain was killed, he was not in
actual performance of his official duties. Be that as it may, the fact is, the
attack on the deceased was occasioned by the official duties done by him.
As the barangay captain, it w a s his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances
within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs the enmity of
the people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is
murder with assault upon a person in authority.
When evidence of motive is important in direct assault.

Evidence of motive of the offender is important when the person in
authority or his agent who is attacked or seriously intimidated is not in the
actual performance of his official duty.
Thus, in the cases of U.S. vs. Garcia and People vs. Torrecarion, supra,
the motive of the accused in assaulting the person in authority was the
performance of the latter's official duties done before the assault.
147
Where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then
in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender
assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous
performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would
be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. (People vs.
Puno, G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993), citing People vs. Cadag, et al.,
G.R. No. L-13830, May 3 1 , 1961)
But when a person in authority or his agent is in the actual performance
of his official duty, the motive of the offender is immaterial.
Thus, in a case where a teacher-nurse, who w a s about to pierce an
earring hole on the earlobe of a pupil in the school clinic, w a s hit twice on
the face by the accused, it was held that although the assault w a s sparked
by the act of the teacher-nurse who had closed a pathway across her land
through which the accused used to pass in going to and returning from
the school and the motive for the offense w a s a dispute totally foreign to
her educational labors, the crime committed w a s direct assault because
she was attacked while engaged in the performance of her official duties.
(Sarcepuedes vs. People, 90 Phil. 228)
"Without a public uprising."

This phrase, as used in Art. 148, refers to the two forms of direct
assault. Hence, in direct assault of the second form, there should not be a
public uprising.
If there is public and tumultuous uprising, the crime m a y be sedition.
If the person in authority or his agent who w a s attacked w a s in the
performance of his duty, the object of the uprising may be to prevent him
from freely exercising his functions. If the uprising w a s by reason of the
past performance of his official duty, the object may be to inflict an act of
hate or revenge upon the person or property of the public officer.
Qualified assault.
There are two kinds of direct assault of the second form, namely:
(1) simple assault; and
(2) qualified assault.
Direct assault is qualified-

1. When the assault is committed with a weapon; or
2. When the offender is a public officer or employee; or
3. When the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.
148
INDIRECT ASSAULTS Art. 149
When the assault is committed with a weapon.
Weapon includes not only firearms and sharp or cutting instruments

but also stones, clubs, and any other object with which some physical injury
may be inflicted. (1 Viada 203)
When the offender is a public officer or employee.

A teacher may be guilty of direct assault committed on another
teacher (People vs. Monson, CA-G.R. No. 13855-R, May 20,1958); a sanitary
inspector w a s held guilty of direct assault committed on two policemen.
(U.S. vs. Vallejo, 11 Phil. 193)
Complex crime of direct assault with homicide or murder, or with

serious physical injuries.
W h e n the person in authority or his agent is attacked and killed while
in the performance of his duty or by reason thereof, the crime should be
direct assault with homicide or murder, as the case may be in view of the
provisions of Article 48 of the Code. (People vs. Gayrama, 60 Phil. 796;
People vs. Manigbas, et al, G.R. Nos. L-10352-53, Sept. 30, 1960)
Where in the commission of direct assault, serious or less serious
physical injuries are also inflicted, the offender is guilty of the complex crime
of direct assault with serious or less serious physical injuries. (Art. 48)
The crime of slight physical injuries is absorbed in direct assault.

The slight physical injuries sustained by the policeman, then in the
performance of his duty, is absorbed in the crime of direct assault, as the
same is the necessary consequence of the force or violence inherent in all
kinds of assault. (People vs. Acierto, 57 Phil. 614)
Art. 149. Indirect assaults. — T h e p e n a l t y of prision

3
correccional in i t s m i n i m u m a n d m e d i u m p e r i o d s and
a fine n o t e x c e e d i n g 500 p e s o s shall be i m p o s e d u p o n any
p e r s o n w h o shall m a k e u s e o f force o r i n t i m i d a t i o n u p o n any
p e r s o n c o m i n g t o t h e aid o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o r t h e i r a g e n t s
on o c c a s i o n of t h e c o m m i s s i o n of a n y of t h e c r i m e s defined
i n t h e n e x t p r e c e d i n g article.
149
Art. 149 INDIRECT ASSAULTS
Elements:
1. That a person in authority or his agent is the victim of any of the
forms of direct assault denned in Art. 148.
2. That a person comes to the aid of such authority or his agent.
3. That the offender makes use of force or intimidation upon such person
coming to the aid of the authority or his agent.
Indirect assault can be committed only when a direct assault is

also committed.
Art. 149 says "on occasion of the commission of any of the crimes
defined in the next preceding article." (Art. 148) Hence, indirect assault can
be committed only when direct assault is also committed.
Is the crime indirect assault, if a private individual who is aiding a

policeman in making a lawful arrest is attacked by the person to
be arrested?
It cannot be indirect assault, because the policeman who is being
aided is not a victim of direct assault. The policeman is in the performance
of duty, making an arrest.
Is the crime direct assault?

While it is true that under Sec. 10, Rule of 113 of the Rules of Court,
every person summoned by an officer making a lawful arrest shall aid h i m
in the making of such arrest, yet the private individual in such case is not
an agent of a person in authority, because he is not coming to the aid of a
person in authority (a policeman being an agent of a person in authority
under Art. 152, par. 2). Hence, the crime is not direct assault, the person
attacked not being an agent of a person in authority.
The offended party in indirect assaults may be private person.

It will be noted that Art. 149 states that the u s e of force or intimidation
must be made "upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their
agents."
A private person who comes to the rescue of an authority or his

agent enjoys the privileges of the latter, and any person who u s e s force or
intimidation upon such person under the circumstances is guilty of atentado
(assault) under Art. 149. (Guevara)
150
DISOBEDIENCE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY Art. 150
Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the

National Assembly, its committees or subcommittees, by the
Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees
4
or divisions. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging
from t w o h u n d r e d to o n e t h o u s a n d pesos, or both such fine
a n d imprisonment, shall be i m p o s e d u p o n any person who,
h a v i n g b e e n duly s u m m o n e d to attend as a w i t n e s s before
t h e National Assembly, its special or standing committees
a n d s u b c o m m i t t e e s , t h e Constitutional Commissions and
its c o m m i t t e e s , s u b c o m m i t t e e s , or divisions, or before any
c o m m i s s i o n or c o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n or member authorized
to s u m m o n w i t n e s s e s , refuses, w i t h o u t legal excuse, to obey
s u c h s u m m o n s , or b e i n g p r e s e n t before any such legislative
or constitutional b o d y or official, refuses to be sworn or
p l a c e d u n d e r affirmation or to a n s w e r a n y legal inquiry or
to p r o d u c e any books, papers, d o c u m e n t s , or records in his
possession, w h e n required by t h e m to do so in the exercise
of their functions. The s a m e penalty shall be imposed upon
any p e r s o n w h o shall restrain a n o t h e r from attending as a
w i t n e s s , or w h o shall i n d u c e disobedience to a summons or
refusal to be s w o r n by any s u c h b o d y or official. (As amended
by Com. Act No. 52)
Acts punished as disobedience to the National Assembly or its

committee or Constitutional commission.
1. By refusing, without legal excuse, to obey summons of the National
Assembly, its special or standing committees and subcommittees, the
Constitutional commissions and its committees, subcommittees or
divisions, or by any commission or committee chairman or member
authorized to summon witnesses.
2. By refusing to be sworn or placed under affirmation while being before
such legislative or constitutional body or official.
3. By refusing to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books,
papers, documents, or records in his possession, when required by
them to do so in the exercise of their functions.
151
Art. 150 DISOBEDIENCE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
4. By restraining another from attending as a witness in such legislative

or constitutional body.
5. By inducing disobedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn by any
such body or official.
Note: The National Assembly is now the Congress of the Philippines,
consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
"Refuses, WITHOUT LEGAL EXCUSE, to obey such summons, x x

x or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers,
documents, or records in his possession."
The phrase "without legal excuse" in this article indicates that only
disobedience without legal excuse is punishable.
Hence, Art. 150 may not apply w h e n the papers or documents may be
used in evidence against the owner thereof, because it would be equivalent
to compelling him to be witness against himself. (Uy Khaytin vs. Villareal,
42 Phil. 886)
"When required by them to do so in the exercise of their

functions."
The testimony of the person summoned m u s t be upon matters into
which the National Assembly has jurisdiction to inquire.
Thus, the investigation of a crime with a view to prepare the way
for a court action does not come under the province of any committee of
the House or Senate (now National Assembly) for the power to investigate
and prosecute a crime is vested by law in the prosecuting authorities of
the government. But w h e n the investigation is for the purpose of passing
a legislative measure, such investigation comes under the province of the
committee of the House or Senate. (Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al., 87 Phil.
29)
Refusing "to answer any legal inquiry."

When Arnault refused to divulge the identity of the person to whom
he gave an amount of P440.000, whose identity the Senate investigating
committee believed him to know, the S e n a t e pronounced him guilty of
contempt and ordered his imprisonment until he would be willing to identify
such person. (Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al., 87 Phil. 29)
Hence, any of the acts punished by Art. 150 may also constitute
contempt of the National Assembly.
152
RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE Art. 151
The court may take any action not amounting to a release of a

prisoner of the National Assembly.
Any action not amounting to a release of a prisoner committed by
the Senate to prison, taken by the executive or judicial department with
respect to such prisoner in the legitimate discharge of its functions, is not
impairment of the doctrine of the distribution of governmental powers.
The fact that a person is a prisoner of the Senate or of the House
does not exclude other departments during his incarceration from trying or
investigating h i m in matters pertaining to their spheres, in much the same
way that a prisoner by judgment of a court of justice is not placed beyond
the reach of the legislature and the executive to summon for examination
and to allow in relation to the investigation to go anywhere under guard to
get such evidence as the investigator or the prisoner might deem important.
(Arnault vs. Pecson, 87 Phil. 418)
Reasons for the provisions of Article 150 and the power of the
National Assembly to punish for contempt.
The power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative functions.
Experience h a s shown that mere requests for certain information
are often unavailing and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so, some m e a n s of compulsion is essential to
obtain what is needed. (See Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al., supra)
Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in

authority or the agents of such person. — The penalty of
6
arresto mayor a n d a fine not e x c e e d i n g 500 pesos shall be
imposed u p o n any person w h o not b e i n g included in the
provisions of t h e p r e c e d i n g articles shall resist or seriously
disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person,
while e n g a g e d in the performance of official duties.
When the disobedience to an agent of a person in
authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto
menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed
upon the offender.
5
153
Art. 151 RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE
Elements of resistance and serious disobedience (par. 1):

1. That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance
of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender.
2. That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person in authority
or his agent.
3. That the act of the offender is not included in the provisions of Arts.
148, 149, and 150.
Concept of the offense of resistance and disobedience.

The juridical conception of the crime of resistance and disobedience
to a person in authority or his agents consists in a failure to comply with
orders directly issued by the authorities in the exercise of their official
duties. Failure to comply with legal provisions of a general character or with
judicial decisions merely declaratory of rights or obligations, or violations
of prohibitory decisions do not constitute the crime of disobedience to the
authorities. (U.S. vs Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183)
"While engaged in the performance of official duties."

The phrase indicates the rule that in the crime of resistance and
disobedience, the person in authority or the agent of such person m u s t be in
the actual performance of his official duties. This is so, because there can be
no resistance or disobedience w h e n there is nothing to resist or to disobey.
But when a person in authority or his agent is in the performance of his
duty or gives an order and the performance of duty is resisted or the order
is disobeyed, then the crime is committed.
The disobedience contemplated consists in the failure or refusal

to obey a direct order from the authority or his agent.
U.S. vs. Ramayrat

(22 Phil. 183)
Facts: In the writ of execution issued, the justice of the peace directed
the sheriff to place the plaintiff in possession of the land involved in the
complaint and to make return of the writ to the court.
The accused w a s not willing to deliver to the plaintiff the land as he
was directed to do by the sheriff.
Was the accused guilty of disobedience?
Held: The accused who w a s in possession of the land may have been
unwilling to deliver it, but such unwillingness does not constitute an act
154
of disobedience. The disobedience contemplated consists in the failure

or refusal to obey a direct order. A writ of execution issued by the court
directing the sheriff to place the plaintiff in possession of the property
held by the defendant, is not an order addressed to the defendant — it is
addressed to the sheriff. The duty of the sheriff in this case was to place the
proper person in possession. Instead of doing so, the sheriff merely ordered
the defendant to deliver the property to the plaintiff.
A person cannot be guilty of disobedience to an order which is not
addressed to him.
The accused would have been guilty of the offense had he refused to
surrender possession of the property to the sheriff himself, upon demand
therefor, in order that the sheriff himself might give possession to the person
entitled thereto as indicated in the writ. (Concurring opinion)
The reason for the concurring opinion is that if the sheriff himself
gave the order to the defendant to vacate the premises to comply with the
writ of execution, such order of the sheriff would be a direct order from him
to the defendant.
The accused must have knowledge that the person arresting him
is a peace officer.
Thus, in a case where the accused thought that the persons arresting
h i m were bandits, since they did not identify themselves and state before
hand their mission, it w a s held that his resistance did not constitute an
offense. (U.S. vs. Bautista, 31 Phil. 308)
Justified resistance.
The action of the accused in laying his hands on the customs secret
agent, who had no right to m a k e the search, was an adequate defense to
repel the aggression of the latter, who had seized him by the arm for the
purpose of searching him.
The accused w a s not subject to search because when the customs
authorities permitted him to land in Manila, he ceased to be a passenger
liable to search. (People vs. Chan Fook, 42 Phil. 230)
Example of resistance and serious disobedience.

The case of U.S. vs. Tabiana, 37 Phil. 515, where the accused struck
the policeman on the breast with a fist when the latter was arresting the
said accused, is an example of resistance and serious disobedience.
The policeman was in the performance of his duty when he was
arresting the accused. The violent refusal of the accused to be arrested
made him liable under par. 1 of Art. 151.
155
Elements of simple disobedience (par. 2).

1. That an agent of a person in authority is engaged in the performance
of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender.
2. That the offender disobeys such agent of a person in authority.
3. That such disobedience is not of a serious nature.
"When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority."

In view of the phrase in the second paragraph of Art. 151, it is clear
that in simple disobedience, the offended party must be only an agent of a
person in authority.
The act of lying on the road and refusing, despite the order of
the P.C. major, to get out therefrom constitute the crime of simple
disobedience.
It is unquestionable that Major Emiliano Raquidan of the Philippine
Constabulary, was an agent of a person in authority; that the order he issued
for the strikers to clear the road so as to maintain free passage thereon
pertained particularly to his duty as peace officer to maintain peace and
order; and that for disobedience or resistance to said order committed in his
presence he had the right to arrest or cause the arrest of the offenders.
The defendants-appellants having obstructed the free passage along
the road from the national highway to the plant of the Coca-Cola in Carlatan,
by lying on the road forming roadblocks, Major Raquidan had authority
to order them to clear said road so as to allow free passage thereon; and
defendants-appellants having refused to obey said order, their arrest was
in order. It cannot be said that because they did nothing but lie on the road
they had no criminal intent to violate the law, for it w a s the very act of lying
on the road and refusing to get out therefrom as ordered by Major Raquidan
so as not to obstruct the free passage on said road that constitute the crime
of resistance and disobedience to agents of the authorities with which they
are charged. (People vs. Macapuno, et al., C.A., 58 O.G. 4985)
Note: Each defendant w a s sentenced to pay a fine of P25.
Picketing must be lawful.

Republic Act No. 3600, in its Section 2, provides:
"Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any commanding officer of
troop in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or individual soldier or
any member thereof or any peace officer and/or armed person to bring
in. introduce or escort in any manner any person who seeks to replace
156
strikers, in entering and/or leaving the premises of a strike area or to

work in place of the strikers.
XXX.
Nothing in the Act shall be interpreted to prevent any

commanding officer of troops in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or any member thereof or any peace officer from taking any measure
necessary to maintain peace and order and/or protect life and
property."
In the Macapuno case, there w a s no peaceful picketing. Republic
Act No. 3 6 0 0 does not prevent any peace officer from taking any measure
necessary to maintain peace and order and/or to protect life and property.
Picketing is a legitimate m e a n s of economic coercion if it is confined
to persuasion, if it is free from molestation or threat of physical injury or
annoyance, and if there exists some lawful justification for its existence. It is
lawful if it does not have an immediate tendency to intimidation of the other
party to t h e controversy or to obstruct free passage such as the streets afford,
consistent w i t h t h e rights of others to enjoy the same privilege. (31 Am.
Jur. 944-945) However, picketing carried on w i t h violence, intimidation, or
coercion, or so conducted as to amount to a nuisance, is unlawful. Picketing
m a y be considered a nuisance if it constitutes an obstruction to the free use
of property so as substantially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property, or if it constitutes an unlawful obstruction to the free
passage or use, in the customary manner, of a street. (31 Am. Jur. 955;
People vs. Macapuno, et al., 1 C.A. Rep. 748)
The order must be lawful.

The order given m u s t be lawful; otherwise, the resistance is justified.
Thus, w h e n a policeman w a s absent during the fight, he had no right to arrest
the m a n who had wounded the other, because he might have wounded him
in self-defense. The resistance put up by the man to the arrest was justified.
The order of the policeman that the man should submit to the arrest was
not lawful. (People vs. Dauz, C.A., 40 O.G., Supp. 11, 107)
One who lawfully resists the meddling by a policeman with one's
private business affairs cannot be convicted of resistance against an agent
of authority. (U.S. vs. Panaligan, 14 Phil. 46; People vs. Tilos, C.A, 36 O.G.
54)
The disobedience should not be of a serious nature.

If the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is of a serious
nature, the offender should be punished under the first paragraph of Art.
151.
157
Direct assault distinguished from resistance or serious disobe-

dience.
(1) In direct assault, the person in authority or his agent must be engaged
in the performance of official duties or that he is assaulted by reason
thereof; but in resistance, the person in authority or his agent must be
in actual performance of his duties.
(2) Direct assault (2nd form) is committed in four ways: (a) by attacking,
(b) by employing force, (c) by seriously intimidating, and (d) by
seriously resisting a person in authority or his agent; resistance or
serious disobedience is committed only by resisting or seriously
disobeying a person in authority or his agent.
(3) In both direct assault by resisting an agent of a person in authority
and resistance against an agent of a person in authority, there is force
employed, but the use of force in resistance is not so serious, as there
is no manifest intention to defy the law and the officers enforcing it.
The attack or employment of force which gives rise to the crime
of direct assault must be serious and deliberate; otherwise, even a case
of simple resistance to an arrest, which always requires t h e u s e of force
of some kind, would constitute direct assault and the lesser offense
of resistance or disobedience in Art. 151 would entirely disappear.
(People vs. Cauan, CA-G.R. No. 540, Oct. 11, 1938)
But when the one resisted is a person in authority, the u s e of any
kind or degree of force will give rise to direct assault.
If no force is employed by the offender in resisting or disobeying
a person in authority, the crime committed is resistance or serious
disobedience under the first paragraph of Art. 151.
"Shall resist or seriously disobey."

The word "seriously" in the phrase quoted is not used to describe
resistance, because if the offender seriously resisted a person in authority
or his agent, the crime is direct assault.
When the attack or employment of force is not deliberate, the crime

is only resistance or disobedience.
This is so, because the offender has no intent to ignore, disregard or
defy the authority or his agents.
Thus, in a case where the court issued a writ of injunction, ordering
the accused not to enter the land in dispute, and the sheriff told h i m not to
enter the land, but the accused, who claimed that he w a s the owner of the
land, with his right hand on the handle of his bolo, advanced with rapid
158
PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND AGENTS OF PERSONS Art 152
IN AUTHORITY
strides towards the sheriff, and the chief of police then present intercepted
the accused, grabbed his hands as he w a s about to unsheath his bolo and
wrested the bolo from the accused who w a s resisting, it was held that the
accused w a s guilty of simple disobedience and w a s sentenced to pay a fine
of P25. (People vs. Bacani, C.A., 40 O.G. 981)
In the case of People vs. Baesa, C.A., 55 O.G. 10295, where the accused
in the heat of the moment and under the impulse of obfuscation pulled the
hand of a barrio lieutenant, causing h i m to fall to the ground, it w a s held
that he w a s guilty of resistance and serious disobedience under Art. 151, not
direct assault. The reason for this ruling is that the employment of force by
the accused w a s not deliberate.
In the case of People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 182, where the accused bit a
policeman on t h e right forearm and gave h i m a blow in another part of the
body, which severely injured the policeman, and it required two policemen
to subdue him, it w a s held that he w a s guilty of resistance and serious
disobedience and w a s sentenced to imprisonment for two months and one
day, plus P 2 0 0 fine. In this case, the attack and employment of force were
not deliberate.
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in

Authority — Who shall be deemed as such. — In applying the
provisions of t h e p r e c e d i n g a n d other articles of this Code,
any p e r s o n directly v e s t e d w i t h jurisdiction, w h e t h e r as
an individual or as a m e m b e r of s o m e court or government
corporation, board, or commission, shall be d e e m e d a person
in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman
shall also be d e e m e d a p e r s o n in authority.
Any p e r s o n w h o , by direct provision of law or by election
or by appointment by c o m p e t e n t authority, is charged with
the m a i n t e n a n c e of public order and the protection and
security of life a n d property, s u c h as a barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person w h o
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an
agent of a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151
of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged
w i t h the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the occasion
159
Art 152 PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND AGENTS OF PERSONS
IN AUTHORITY
of such performance shall be d e e m e d persons in authority.

(As amended by BJ>. Big. 873, approved June 12,1985)
A person in authority is one "directly vested with jurisdiction."

By "directly vested with jurisdiction" is meant the power and authority
to govern and execute the laws.
The following are persons in authority:

1. The municipal mayor. (U.S. vs. Gumban, 39 Phil. 761; People vs.
B o n d o c , e * a / . , 4 7 0.G. 412)
2. Division superintendent of schools. (People vs. Benitez, 73 Phil. 671)
3. Public and private school teachers. (Art. 152, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 1978)
4. Teacher-nurse. (Sarcepuedes vs. People, 90 Phil. 228)
5. President of sanitary division. (People vs. Quebral, et al., 73 Phil.
640)
6. Provincial fiscal. (People vs. Francisco, C.A., 48 O.G. 4423)
7. Justice of the Peace. (U.S. vs. Garcia, 20 Phil. 358)
8. Municipal councilor. (People vs. Yosoya, CA-G.R. No. 8522-R, May 26,
1955)
9. Barrio captain and barangay chairman. (Art. 152, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 299)
To be an agent of a person in authority, one must be charged with

(1) the maintenance of public order, and (2) the protection and
security of life and property.
Thus, a policeman or a constabulary soldier is an agent of a person in
authority, because he is charged with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property. The municipal treasurer is
also such agent of a person in authority, because in addition to the fact that
he is a deputy ex oficio of the provincial treasurer, a person in authority, he
is charged with the protection and security of government property.
Any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority is an agent of
a person in authority. (Art. 152, as amended, 2nd paragraph)
160
PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND AGENTS OF PERSONS Art 152
IN AUTHORITY
Professors of private colleges and universities, etc. are persons in

authority for the purpose of Articles 148 and 151.
Teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities are
deemed persons in authority in applying the provisions of Art. 148 and Art.
151.
Are teachers, professors, etc., persons in authority for purposes

of Art. 149?
The third paragraph of Art. 152 states that "in applying the provisions
of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code," they are persons in authority. But
such s t a t e m e n t is not exclusive of Art. 149 for it merely emphasizes the
application of Arts. 148 and 151.
The offender need not be a pupil or the parent of a pupil.

The defense alleged that the appellant cannot be accused of direct
assault upon a person in authority because he is neither a pupil nor the
parent of a pupil in the school where the complainant was teaching at the
time of the attack. Held: The spirit and purpose behind Commonwealth
Act No. 578 is to give teachers protection, dignity and respect while in the
performance of their official duties. This protection extends not only against
pupils or relatives of pupils, but against all persons who knowingly attack
a teacher while engaged in the performance of his official duties. Respect
for a teacher is required of all persons, whether pupils, parents of pupils,
or otherwise, if we are to uphold and enhance the dignity of the teaching
profession which the law similarly enjoins upon all persons for the sake
of the pupils and the profession itself. (People vs. Ceprioso, C.A., 52 O.G.
2609)
161
Chapter Five
PUBLIC DISORDERS
What are the crimes classified under public disorders?

They are:
1. Tumults and other disturbances of public order. (Art. 153)
2. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances.
(Art. 154)
3. Alarms and scandals. (Art. 155)
4. Delivering prisoners from jails. (Art. 156)
Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order

— Tumultuous disturbance or interruption liable to cause
disturbance. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its m e d i u m
1
period to prision correccional in its m i n i m u m period a n d
a fine not e x c e e d i n g 1,000 p e s o s shall be i m p o s e d u p o n any
person w h o shall c a u s e a n y serious d i s t u r b a n c e in a public
place, office or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb
public performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful
meetings, if t h e act is not i n c l u d e d in t h e p r o v i s i o n s of
Articles 131 a n d 132.
2
The penalty next h i g h e r in d e g r e e shall be i m p o s e d
upon persons c a u s i n g a n y d i s t u r b a n c e or interruption of a
tumultuous character.
The disturbance or interruption shall be d e e m e d to be
tumultuous if c a u s e d by more t h a n t h r e e p e r s o n s w h o are
armed or provided w i t h m e a n s of v i o l e n c e .

2
162
TUMULTS AND OTHER DISTURBANCES Art. 153
OF PUBLIC ORDER
3
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed u p o n any
person w h o in a n y meeting, association, or public place, shall
m a k e any outcry t e n d i n g to incite rebellion or sedition or in
s u c h place shall display placards or emblems w h i c h provoke
a disturbance of t h e public order.
The p e n a l t y of arresto menor and a fine not to e x c e e d 200
p e s o s shall be i m p o s e d u p o n t h o s e persons w h o in violation
of t h e p r o v i s i o n s c o n t a i n e d in t h e last clause of Article 85,
shall bury w i t h p o m p t h e b o d y of a p e r s o n w h o h a s b e e n
legally e x e c u t e d .
What are tumults and other disturbances of public order?

They are:
1. Causing any serious disturbance in a public place, office or
establishment;
2. Interrupting or disturbing performances, functions or gatherings,
or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in Arts. 131 and
132;
3. Making any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition in any
meeting, association or public place;
4. Displaying placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of
public order in such place;
5. Burying with pomp the body of a person who has been legally
executed.
"Serious disturbance" must be planned or intended.

Where on the evening of the day before the election, a party of
100 persons composed mostly of partisans of a candidate for the office of
municipal president, marched down the street and stopped in front of a
house where a public meeting of another candidate was being held and
some words passed between the members of the crowd on the street and the
people at the windows upstairs where the meeting was being held, but no
attempt was made by the party outside to enter the house or to disturb the
meeting inside by any concerted action, other than by standing in a large
crowd about the doors of the house in such a way as to disturb the attention
3
163
Art. 153 TUMULTS AND OTHER DISTURBANCES
OF PUBLIC ORDER
of those attending the meeting inside, it was held that there being only some
slight disturbance and that partisan feeling was running very high at the
time, the party outside the house did not plan a serious disturbance or
intend that one should take place. The accused were found guilty only of
alarm (now punished under Art. 155) and were fined P5.00 each. (U.S. vs.
Domingo, 19 Phil. 69)
If the act of disturbing or interrupting a meeting or religious

ceremony is not committed by public officers, or if committed by
public officers they are participants therein, Article 153 should be
applied.
Article 153 has reference to Arts. 131 and 132, which punish the same
acts if committed by public officers who are not participants in the meeting
or religious worship. Hence, if the act of disturbing or interrupting a meeting
or religious worship is committed by a private individual, or even by a public
officer but he is a participant in the meeting or religious worship which he
disturbs or interrupts, Art. 153, not Art. 131 or Art. 132, is applicable.
Meaning of "outcry."
The word "outcry" in this article m e a n s to shout subversive or
provocative words tending to stir up the people to obtain by m e a n s of force
or violence any of the objects of rebellion or sedition.
Inciting to sedition or rebellion distinguished from public dis-

order.
Question: When may an outcry or displaying of emblems or placards

be a crime of inciting to rebellion or a crime of inciting to sedition, and w h e n
may it be considered a simple public disorder under paragraph 4 of Art.
153?
Answer: For an outcry or the displaying of emblems or placards to
constitute inciting to commit rebellion or sedition, it is necessary that the
offender should have done the act with the idea aforethought of inducing his
hearers or readers to commit the crime of rebellion or sedition.
But if the outcry is more or less unconscious outburst which, although
rebellious or seditious in nature, is not intentionally calculated to induce
others to commit rebellion or sedition, it is only public disorder.
Circumstance qualifying the disturbance or interruption.

The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon persons
causing any disturbance or interruption of a tumultuous character.
164
UNLAWFUL USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION
AND UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES
Definition of the term "tumultuous."

The disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be tumultuous if
caused by more than three persons who are armed or provided with means
of violence.
One who fired a submachine gun to cause disturbance, but

inflicted serious physical injuries on another, may be prosecuted
for two crimes.
The one who fired the submachine gun committed two offenses (causing
serious disturbance in a public place, the people present becoming panicky
and terrified, and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence),
although they arose from the s a m e act of the offender. (People vs. Bacolod,
89 Phil. 621)
Art. 154. Unlawful use of means of publication and

unlawful utterances. — The penalty of arresto mayor* and a
fine r a n g i n g from 200 to 1,000 p e s o s shall be imposed upon:
1. Any p e r s o n w h o by m e a n s of printing, lithography,
or a n y o t h e r m e a n s of publication shall publish or cause to
b e p u b l i s h e d a s n e w s a n y false n e w s w h i c h may endanger
t h e public order, or c a u s e d a m a g e to t h e interest or credit of
t h e State;
2. Any p e r s o n w h o by the s a m e means, or by words,
u t t e r a n c e s or s p e e c h e s , shall e n c o u r a g e disobedience to the
law or to t h e constituted authorities or praise, justify, or
extol any act p u n i s h e d by law;
3. Any p e r s o n w h o shall maliciously publish or cause
to be published any official resolution or document without
proper authority, or before they have b e e n published
officially; or
4. Any person w h o shall print, publish, or distribute
or cause to be printed, published, or distributed books,
pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets w h i c h do not bear the real
printer's name, or w h i c h are classified as anonymous. (As
amended by Com. Act No. 202.)
4
165
UNLAWFUL USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION
AND UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES
Acts punished as unlawful use of means of publication and

unlawful utterances:
(1) By publishing or causing to be published, by means of printing,
lithography or any other means of publication, as news any false news
which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest
or credit of the State.
(2) By encouraging disobedience to the law or to the constituted authorities
or by praising, justifying or extolling any act punished by law, by the
same means or by words, utterances or speeches.
(3) By maliciously publishing or causing to be published any official
resolution or document without proper authority, or before they have
been published officially.
(4) By printing, publishing or distributing (or causing the same) books,
pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets which do not bear the real printer's
name, or which are classified as anonymous.
Actual public disorder or actual damage to the credit of the State

not necessary.
Note the phrase "which may endanger the public order, or cause
damage to the interest or credit of the State."
It is not necessary that the publication of the false n e w s actually
caused public disorder or caused damage to the interest or credit of the
State.
The mere possibility of causing such danger or damage is sufficient.
(Albert)
The offender must know that the news is false.

If the offender does not know that the n e w s is false, he is not liable
under this article, there being no criminal intent on his part.
"Which may endanger the public order," etc.

If there is no possibility of danger to the public order or of causing
damage to the interest or credit of the State by the publication of the false
news, Art. 154 is not applicable.
Example of No. 2:
Defendant distributed leaflets urging the people to disobey and
resist the execution of that portion of the National Defense Act requiring
166
ALARMS AND SCANDALS Art. 155
compulsory military training. He was convicted of inciting to sedition by

the trial court.
Held: The crime is not inciting to sedition. The acts charged which
are subversive in nature fall under paragraph 2 of Art. 154. (People vs.
Arrogante, C.A., 38 O.G. 2974)
Republic Act No. 248 prohibits the reprinting, reproduction or

republication of government publications and official documents
without previous authority.
"SEC. 1. The reprinting, reproduction or republication by any private
person or entity of textbooks, manuals, courses of study, workbooks,
tentative objectives, tests, forms, and other instructional aids prepared and
published by the former Bureau of Education, or by the present Bureau of
Public Schools, without the previous consent or permission of the Secretary
of Education, is hereby prohibited.
XXX."
Art. 155. Alarms and scandals. — The penalty of arresto

menor or a fine not e x c e e d i n g 200 p e s o s shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any p e r s o n w h o w i t h i n a n y t o w n or public place,
shall discharge a n y firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other
explosive calculated to c a u s e alarm or danger;
2. Any p e r s o n w h o shall instigate or take an active
part in a n y charivari or o t h e r disorderly m e e t i n g offensive
to another or prejudicial to public tranquility;
3. Any p e r s o n w h o , w h i l e w a n d e r i n g about at night
or w h i l e e n g a g e d in a n y other nocturnal amusements, shall
disturb t h e public peace; or
4. Any person w h o , while intoxicated or otherwise,
shall cause any disturbance or scandal in public places,
provided that the circumstances of the case shall not make
t h e provisions of Article 153 applicable.
167
Art. 155 ALARMS AND SCANDALS
Acts punished as alarms and scandals.

1. Discharging any firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosive within
any town or public place, calculated to cause (which produces) alarm
or danger.
2. Instigating or taking an active part in any charivari or other disorderly
meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public tranquility.
3. Disturbing the public peace while wandering about at night or while
engaged in any other nocturnal amusements.
4. Causing any disturbance or scandal in public places while intoxicated
or otherwise, provided Art. 153 is not applicable.
"Shall discharge any firearm."

Under paragraph No. 1, the discharge of the firearm should not be
aimed at a person; otherwise, the offense would fall under Article 254,
punishing discharge of firearm.
"Calculated to cause alarm or danger" should be "which produces

alarm or danger."
The phrase "calculated to cause alarm or danger" in paragraph No.
1 is a wrong translation of the Spanish text which reads "que produzca
alarma o peligro."
Hence, it is the result, not the intent, that counts. The act m u s t
produce alarm or danger as a consequence.
Art. 155 does not make any distinction as to the particular place
in the town or public place where the discharge of firearm, rocket,
etc. is effected.
The discharge of any firearm, rocket, etc., in one's garden or yard

located in the town is punished under Art. 155, as long as it produced alarm
or danger.
Is the discharge of firecrackers or rockets during fiestas or festive

occasions covered by paragraph 1 of Article 155?
Viada opined that it is not covered by the provision. (3 Viada, Codigo
Penal, 4th Ed., pp. 711-712)
168
DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAIL Art. 156
"Charivari," defined.
The term "charivari" includes a medley of discordant voices, a mock
serenade of discordant noises made on kettles, tins, horns, etc., designed to
annoy and insult.
Note: The reason for punishing instigating or taking active part
in charivari and other disorderly meeting is to prevent more serious
disorders.
Disturbance of serious nature falls under Art. 153.

If the disturbance is of a serious nature, the case will fall under Art.
153, not under Par. 4 of this article.
The act of a person who hurled a general insult at everybody, there
being 30 persons in the hall, and challenged the owner of the billiard hall
to a fight, causing commotion and disorder so that the billiard game had to
be stopped momentarily, constitutes merely a violation of Art. 155, par. 4,
not of Art. 153. While the billiard hall is a public place there was no serious
public disorder caused. (People vs. Gangay, C.A., 40 O.G., Supp. 12, 171)
Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jail. — The penalty of

5
arresto mayor in its m a x i m u m period to prision correccional
in its m i n i m u m period shall be i m p o s e d u p o n any person w h o
shall r e m o v e from a n y jail or p e n a l establishment any person
confined t h e r e i n or shall h e l p t h e escape of such person, by
m e a n s of violence, intimidation or bribery. If other means
are used, t h e penalty of arresto mayor* shall be imposed.
If t h e e s c a p e of t h e prisoner shall take place outside of
said e s t a b l i s h m e n t s by t a k i n g the guards by surprise, the
same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.
Elements:
1. That there is a person confined in a jail or penal establishment.
2. That the offender removes therefrom such person, or helps the escape
of such person.
s
6
169
Art. 156 DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAIL
Prisoner may be under detention only.

The person confined may be a mere detention prisoner. Of course, the
prisoner may also be by final judgment.
Hospital or asylum considered extension of jail or prison.

This article applies even if the prisoner is in the hospital or asylum
when he is removed or when the offender helps his escape, because it is
considered as an extension of the penal institution. (Albert)
Offender is usually an outsider.

The offense under this article is usually committed by an outsider who
removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape.
It would seem that Art. 156 may also apply to an employee of the
penal establishment who helps the escape of a person confined therein,
provided that he does not have the custody or charge of such person. Art.
156 may also apply to a prisoner who helps the escape of another prisoner.
The offender under Art. 156 is "any person."
If the offender is a public officer who had the prisoner in his custody or
charge, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of a prisoner. (Art. 223)
The guard of the jail, who is off duty, may be held liable for
delivering prisoner from jail.
A policeman assigned to the city jail as a guard, who, while he was
off duty, brought recently released prisoner inside the jail to substitute for
a detention prisoner whom he later on brought out of jail, returning said
prisoner inside the jail about 5 hours thereafter, m a y be held liable for
the crime of delivering prisoners from, jail as defined and penalized under
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code and not for infidelity in the custody of
prisoners defined and penalized under Article 223. (People vs. Del Barrio, et
al., C.A., 60 O.G. 3908)
Violence, intimidation or bribery is not necessary.

If the accused removed from jail or penal establishment a person
confined therein or helped the latter's escape by m e a n s of violence,
intimidation, or bribery, the penalty is higher. Hence, it is not an element
of the offense.
170
DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAIL Art. 156
The bribery is not the offender's act of receiving a bribe.

It is true that the crime is qualified w h e n the removal or delivery of the
prisoner is done "by m e a n s of... bribery," as, for instance, when the offender
bribes the prison guard in order to achieve his end; and it is obviously true
that a qualifying circumstance is an integral element of the qualified crime.
But it will be noted that w h a t constitutes the qualifying circumstance in
Article 156, is the offender's act of employing bribery (inter alia) as a "means"
of removing or delivering the prisoner from jail, and not the offender's act
of receiving or agreeing to receive a bribe as a consideration for committing
the offense, which could serve only as a generic aggravating circumstance
under Article 14(11) of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Del Barrio, et
al, C.A., 60 O.G. 3908)
Employment of deceit is not an element of the offense.

The employment of deceit is not an essential or integral element of
the crime of delivery of prisoners from jail as defined in Article 156, such
that w h e n the s a m e is not alleged in the information and duly proved in
evidence, the accused cannot be convicted of said crime. Nowhere is the
employment of deceit made an essential element of the crime defined in said
article. (People vs. Del Barrio, et al., supra)
"By other means."

Is the person, who substituted for a prisoner by taking his place in
jail, liable under Art. 156? Yes, because the removal of the prisoner from jail
is by other means, that is, by deceit.
A person delivering a prisoner from jail may be held liable as

accessory.
But if the crime committed by the prisoner for which he is confined or
serving sentence is treason, murder, or parricide, the act of taking the place
of the prisoner in the prison is that of an accessory and he may be held liable
as such, because he assists in the escape of the principal. (Art. 19, par. 3)
Escape of prisoner outside of prison.

If the escape of the prisoner takes place outside of said establishments
by taking the guards by surprise, the penalty is the minimum period of that
prescribed. (Art. 156, par. 2)
171
Art. 156 DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAIL
Liability of the prisoner who escapes.

If the prisoner removed or whose escape is made possible by the
commission of the crime of delivering prisoner from jail is a detention
prisoner, such prisoner is not criminally liable. A prisoner is criminally
liable for leaving the penal institution only when there is evasion of the
service of his sentence, which can be committed only by a convict by final
judgment.
Chapter Six
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
Three kinds of evasion of the service of the sentence.

They are:
1. Evasion of service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence. (Art. 157)
2. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of disorders. (Art.
158)
3. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence, by violating the
conditions of conditional pardon. (Art. 159)
1
Art. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty
2
of prision correccional i n its m e d i u m a n d m a x i m u m periods
shall be i m p o s e d u p o n a n y c o n v i c t w h o shall e v a d e service of
his s e n t e n c e b y e s c a p i n g d u r i n g t h e term o f h i s imprisonment
by r e a s o n of final j u d g m e n t . H o w e v e r , if s u c h evasion or
e s c a p e shall h a v e t a k e n place by m e a n s of unlawful entry,
by b r e a k i n g doors, w i n d o w s , gates, walls, roofs, or floors,
or by u s i n g picklocks, false k e y s , disguise, deceit, violence
or intimidation, or t h r o u g h c o n n i v a n c e w i t h other convicts
or e m p l o y e e s of t h e penal institution, t h e penalty shall be
3
prision correccional in its m a x i m u m period.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment.
'The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable.

2
3
173
Art. 157 EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
2. That he is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of

liberty.
3. That he evades the service of his sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence.
The sentence must be "by reason of final judgment."

The crime of evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by a
convict by final judgment. Hence, if the convict escapes within 15 days from
the promulgation or notice of the judgment, without commencing to serve
the sentence or without expressly waiving in writing his right to appeal, he
is not liable under Art. 157. Detention prisoners and minor delinquents who
escape from confinement are not liable for evasion of service of sentence.
Detention prisoners are not convicts by final judgment since they are only
detained pending the investigation or the trial of the case against them.
Minor delinquents confined in the reformatory institution are not convicts,
because the sentence is suspended.
If the accused escaped while the sentence of conviction w a s under
appeal, he is not liable under Art. 157, the judgment not having become
final, and this is true even if his appeal w a s later dismissed because he had
escaped. (Curiano vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. L-8104, April 15, 1955)
Petitioner w a s convicted of robbery by t h e Court of First Instance of
Albay. He appealed from the decision, but, as he escaped during the pendency
of the appeal, his appeal w a s dismissed. As a result, he w a s prosecuted
for evasion of service of sentence and w a s sentenced to the corresponding
penalty. While petitioner w a s serving h i s sentence in the robbery case, he
again escaped from his place of confinement. He w a s again prosecuted for
evasion of service of sentence, and pleaded guilty.
The Solicitor General agrees w i t h t h e claim of petitioner t h a t t h e
sentence imposed for the first alleged evasion is null and void for t h e reason
that when he escaped, the decision of t h e trial court in the robbery case
has not yet become final. The petitioner w a s sustained. (Curiano vs. CFI,
[Unrep.] 96 Phil. 982)
Not applicable to sentence executed by deportation.

The accused was found guilty of a violation of the Opium Law and
was sentenced to be deported. The sentence w a s executed. After four
months, the convict returned to the Philippines in violation of the terms
of said sentence. Article 157 is not applicable, because the convict w a s not
sentenced to imprisonment and thereafter broke jail.
In this case, the executive department h a s its remedy by enforcing the
terms of the sentence again. (U.S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil. 867)
174
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE Art. 157
"By escaping during the term of his imprisonment."

The word "imprisonment" in the phrase quoted is not the correct
translation. The Spanish text u s e s the phrase "sufriendo privation de
libertad." Hence, it should be "by escaping during the term of his sentence
which consists in deprivation of liberty."
Meaning of the term "escape."

The three prisoners-accused, with neither escort nor guard, were seen
"loitering in the premises of the courthouse" which w a s about 600 meters
from the city jail.
Did the appellants escape?
The term "escape" h a s been defined as to "flee from; to avoid; to get
out of the way, as to flee to avoid arrest." (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.,
p. 640) As correctly pointed out by appellee in recommending the acquittal
of these appellants, the established facts belie any escape or even mere
intention to escape; indeed, if escape were the purpose of the appellants,
they certainly would not have loitered in the premises of the courthouse
— especially considering its proximity to the city jail — where they could
easily be spotted and apprehended, as they in fact were. (People vs. Lauron,
et al., C.A., 60 O.G. 4983)
Article 157 is applicable to sentence of destierro.

Counsel for the accused contends that person like the accused evading
a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 157 of the said Code for the reason
that said Article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal
institution and completely deprived of their liberty.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text cf the
Revised Penal Code been in the English language, then the theory of the
appellant could be upheld. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling
in case of doubt. The Spanish text of Article 157 in part reads thus:
"Art. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con
prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el sentenciado
que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo
privation de libertad por sentencia firme; * * *"
Held: We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised
Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish
text governs. (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665, 668) It is clear that the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation
of the phrase "sufriendo privation de libertad" used in the Spanish text.
175
Art. 158 EVASION DURING DISORDERS
Destierro is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in

the present case, the appellant, by his sentence of destierro, was deprived of
the liberty to enter the City of Manila.
In conclusion, we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion
of service of sentence under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish
text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final
judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he
entered said City. (People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 174-175)
Compliance with the penalty of destierro should not be excused

upon so flimsy a cause.
The mere fact that, on two occasions, the accused went to the City to
get her pension check, while serving the sentence of destierro from said City,
would not insulate her from criminal liability for deliberately and willfully
evading service of the destierro sentence. The compelling necessity for funds
cannot outweigh considerations of respect for a final judgment, and is not
one of the cases enumerated in the statute books as basis for exemption
from criminal liability. (People vs. Janson, C.A., 59 O.G. 4689)
Circumstances qualifying the offense.

If such evasion or escape takes place —
1. By m e a n s of unlawful entry (this should be "by scaling");
2. By breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors;
3. By using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation; or
4. Through connivance with other convicts or employees of the
penal institution.
"Unlawful entry."
The Spanish text u s e s the word "escalamiento." Thus, the crime is
qualified if committed by climbing or scaling the wall.
Art. 158. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of

disorders, conflagrations, earthquakes, or other calamities.
— A convict, w h o shall e v a d e t h e service of h i s s e n t e n c e ,
by leaving the penal institution w h e r e he shall h a v e b e e n
confined, on t h e o c c a s i o n of disorder r e s u l t i n g from a
176
EVASION DURING DISORDERS Art. 158
conflagration, earthquake, explosion, or similar catastrophe,

or d u r i n g a m u t i n y in w h i c h he h a s not participated, shall
suffer an increase of one-fifth of t h e time still remaining to
b e served u n d e r t h e original s e n t e n c e , w h i c h i n n o c a s e shall
e x c e e d six m o n t h s , if he shall fail to give himself up to t h e
authorities w i t h i n forty-eight h o u r s following t h e issuance
of a proclamation by t h e Chief E x e c u t i v e a n n o u n c i n g the
p a s s i n g a w a y of s u c h calamity.
Convicts w h o , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s m e n t i o n e d i n
t h e p r e c e d i n g paragraph, shall g i v e t h e m s e l v e s u p t o t h e
authorities w i t h i n t h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d period of 48 hours,
shall be entitled to t h e d e d u c t i o n provided in Article 98.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment, who is confined in a
penal institution.
2. That there is disorder, resulting from —
a. conflagration,
b. earthquake,
c. explosion,
d. similar catastrophe, or
e. mutiny in which he has not participated.
3. That the offender evades the service of his sentence by leaving the
penal institution where he is confined, on the occasion of such disorder
or during the mutiny.
4. That the offender fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48
hours following the issuance of a proclamation by the Chief Executive
announcing the passing away of such calamity.
The offender must be a convict by final judgment.

Although Art. 158 is silent, it is required that the convict must be one
by final judgment, because only a convict by final judgment can "evade the
service of his sentence."
The convict must leave the penal institution.

The lower court directed the release of certain prisoners on habeas
corpus and in support of this action made these observations:
177
Art. 158 EVASION DURING DISORDERS
"* * * in the opinion of this court, those prisoners who, havixig all
the chances to escape and did not escape but remained in their prison
cell during the disorder caused by war have shown more convincingly
their loyalty than those who escaped under the circumstances specifically
enumerated in Article 158 and gave themselves up within 48 hours. After
the executive proclamation for the latter, that is, the prisoners who escaped
might have been persuaded to give themselves up merely because they
could see but a slim chance to avoid capture inasmuch as the government
then was functioning with all its normal efficiency. And if those who are
loyal merely in times of conflagration, earthquake, explosion and other
similar catastrophe are considered loyal and are for that reason given in
their favor one-fifth reduction of their sentence, with more reason that those
who stayed in their places of confinement during the war are loyal * * *."
These are considerations that more properly belong to the legislative
department, should an amendment to the law be proposed. They are
likewise equitable pleas, which the executive department could properly
entertain in connection with petitions for parole or pardon of the prisoners.
The special allowance for loyalty authorized by Articles 98 and 158 of the
Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts who, having evaded the service
of their sentences by leaving the penal institution, give themselves up within
two days. As these petitioners are not in that class, because they have not
escaped, they have no claim to that allowance. For one thing, there is no
showing that they ever had the opportunity to escape, or that having such
opportunity, they had the mettle to take advantage of it or to brave the
perils in connection with a jailbreak. And there is no assurance that had
they successfully run away and regained their precious liberty, they would
have, nevertheless, voluntarily exchanged it later with the privations of
prison life, impelled by that sense of right and loyalty to the Government,
which is sought to be rewarded with the special allowance. (Artigas Losada
vs. Acenas, 78 Phil. 228-229)
Note: This is the reason why the third element requires that the
convict should have left the penal institution.
The prisoner who did not escape from his place of confinement during
the war is not entitled to a special allowance of one-fifth deduction of the
period of his sentence. (Fortuno vs. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 178)
What is punished is not the leaving of the penal institution, but the
failure of the convict to give himself up to the authorities within 48
hours after the proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity.
Note the fourth element of Article 158 which states the manner the
offense is committed.
178
OTHER CASES OF EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE Art. 159
Although Art. 158 says, "a convict who shall evade the service of
his sentence by leaving the penal institution," such clause is qualified by
another clause, "if he shall fail to give himself up to the authorities within
forty-eight hours * * *."
If the offender fails to give himself up, he gets an increased

penalty.
The penalty is that the accused shall suffer an increase of 1/5 of the
time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, not to exceed
six (6) months.
If the offender gives himself up he is entitled to a deduction of 1/5

of his sentence.
If he gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours, he shall be
entitled to 1/5 deduction of the period of his sentence. (Art. 98)
"Mutiny" in this article implies an organized unlawful resistance to

a superior officer; a sedition; a revolt.
Mutiny implies an organized unlawful resistance to a superior officer;
a sedition; a revolt. (People vs. Padilla, C.A., 46 O.G. 2151)
Thus, there is no mutiny if the prisoners disarmed the guards and
escaped, because the guards are not their superior officers. In such case,
the prisoners who surrendered to a barrio lieutenant and then to the police
authorities, after slipping away from the escapists, are not entitled to a
reduction of 1/5 of their original sentence.
Such prisoners could be held liable under Art. 157 for evasion of
service of sentence.
In the case of People vs. Padilla, supra, the accused was not held liable
for evasion of service of sentence under Art. 157, because he acted under the
influence of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, the escapists
having threatened to shoot at whoever remained in the jail.
Art. 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence.*

5
— The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
*The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable.

5
179
Art. 159 VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON
shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted

conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any
of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty
remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six
years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of
his original sentence.
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the members of Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution)
He has the specific power — "To grant to convicted persons reprieves
or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to
suspend sentences without pardon, fines, and order the discharge of any
convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose;
and to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who,
in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." (Sec. 64[i] of the Revised
Administrative Code)
Nature of conditional pardon — it is a contract.

A conditional pardon is a contract between the Chief Executive, who
grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it. Since it is a contract,
the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill its conditions and accept all its
consequences, not as he chooses, but according to its strict terms. (People
vs. Pontillas, 65 Phil. 659)
Elements of the offense of violation of conditional pardon.

1. That the offender w a s a convict.
2. That he was granted a conditional pardon by the Chief Executive.
3. That he violated any of the conditions of such pardon.
Two penalties are provided for in this article.

a. Prision correccional in its minimum period — if the penalty remitted
does not exceed 6 years.
180
VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON Art. 159
b. The unexpired portion of his original sentence — if the penalty

remitted is higher than 6 years.
"If the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon."

Illustration:
The accused w a s sentenced to a penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor. He served 2 years, 5 months and 22 days of the sentence and was
granted conditional pardon. The term remitted by the pardon is 3 years, 6
months and 8 days. The law applicable is the first part of Art. 159 which
imposes a penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period. (People vs.
Sanares, 62 Phil. 825)
Can the court require the convict to serve the unexpired portion of
his original sentence if it does not exceed six years?
No, because Art. 159 does not provide that the accused shall serve
the unexpired portion in addition to the penalty of prision correccional
minimum. The remedy is left to the President who has the authority to
recommit h i m to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
Violation of conditional pardon is a distinct crime.

Violation of conditional pardon is a distinct crime so that although the
crime of abduction, involved in the case in which the accused was granted
conditional pardon, w a s committed in Cavite, he should be prosecuted in
Rizal where he committed robbery in violation of the conditional pardon.
(People vs. Martin, 68 Phil. 122)
The violation of conditional pardon is committed in the place where the
subsequent offense is perpetrated, because by committing the subsequent
offense, he thereby violates the condition that "he shall not again be found
guilty of any crime punishable by the laws of the Philippines."
Is violation of conditional pardon a substantive offense?

Violation of conditional pardon is not a substantive offense, because
the penalty imposed for such violation is the unexpired portion of the
punishment in the original sentence.
Dissenting: The dictum of the majority that "violation of a conditional
pardon is not a substantive offense or independent of the crime for the
commission of which the punishment inflicted in the sentence was remitted
by the pardon, because the penalty imposed for such violation is the
unexpired portion of the punishment imposed by the original sentence," is,
181
I think, incorrect. That may have been so before the enactment of Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code; but since that enactment, it is a substantive
offense because the penalty therefor is no longer necessarily the remitted
portion of the sentence, for when the unexpired portion is less than six years,
the convict who violates the conditions of the pardon shall suffer the penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum period. (Concurring and dissenting
opinion of Justice Ozaeta, People vs. Jose, 70 Phil. 623-624)
Condition extends to special laws.

The condition imposed upon the prisoner that he should not commit
another crime, extends to offenses punished by special laws, like illegal
voting under the Election Law. (People vs. Coral, 74 Phil. 357)
Offender must be found guilty of subsequent offense before he

can be prosecuted under Art. 159.
The phrase in the condition that the offender "shall not again commit
another crime" does not m e a n merely being charged with an offense. It is
necessary that he be found guilty of the offense.
A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein who is
recommitted, m u s t of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the
subsequent crime or crimes with which he w a s charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony,
the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions
thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before
he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159. (Torres vs.
Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272)
When the penalty remitted is destierro, is the penalty for violation

of the conditional pardon also destierro?
Under Article 159, w h e n the sentence remitted by the conditional
pardon does not exceed 6 years, the penalty of the grantee who violates
any of the conditions of such pardon is prision correccional in its m i n i m u m
period. It is only when the penalty remitted by the pardon is higher than 6
years that the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original
sentence. Since destierro has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years,
under no circumstance may the penalty for violation of the conditional
pardon be destierro.
The case of People vs. Ponce de Leon, 56 Phil. 386, is not applicable to
a violation of Art. 159.
182
VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON Art. 159
Offender can be arrested and reincarcerated without trial.

Under Sec. 64(i) of t h e Revised Administrative Code, the President
has the specific power to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any
convicted person granted pardon or parole who, in his judgment, shall fail
to comply w i t h the condition or conditions of his pardon or parole. (Tesoro
vs. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil. 154)
One who violates the condition of h i s pardon may be prosecuted and
sentenced to suffer prision correccional in its m i n i m u m period under Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code, without prejudice to the authority conferred
upon the President by Sec. 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to
recommit h i m to serve the unexpired portion, unless it exceeds 6 years in
which case no penalty shall be imposed, but to serve only the unexpired
portion.
The Revised Penal Code does not repeal Sec. 64(i) of the Revised Admi-
nistrative Code. Sec. 64(i) of said Code and Art. 159 of the Revised Penal
Code can stand together and t h a t t h e proceeding under one provision does
not preclude action under the other. (Sales vs. Dir. of Prisons, 87 Phil. 492)
Period when convict was at liberty, not deducted in case he is

recommitted.
The time during which t h e convict w a s out of prison cannot be
deducted from the unexecuted portion of his sentence. (People vs. Tapel, 64
Phil. 112)
Duration of the conditions subsequent is limited to the remaining

period of the sentence.
The duration of the conditions subsequent, annexed to a pardon, would
be limited to the remaining period of the prisoner's sentence, unless an
intention to extend it beyond that time w a s manifest from the nature of the
condition or the language in which it w a s imposed. (Infante vs. Provincial
Warden, 92 Phil. 310)
Illustration:
A w a s convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal. On March 6 , 1 9 3 9 , after serving 15 years, 7 months
and 11 days, he was granted a conditional pardon, the condition being that
"he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." On
April 29, 1949, A was found guilty of driving without a license. When A
violated a penal law, ten years elapsed from the time he was granted a
conditional pardon. When he was granted a conditional pardon, only 1 year,
6 months and 20 days of his sentence remained to be served.
183
Held: The condition of the pardon which A w a s charged with having

breached was no longer operative when he committed a violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law. A's pardon does not state the time within which the conditions
thereof were to be observed. Hence, A had to observe the conditions of the
pardon only within 1 year, 6 months and 20 days. (Infante vs. Provincial
Warden, supra)
Violation of conditional pardon distinguished from evasion of

service of sentence by escaping.
Violation of conditional pardon does not cause harm or injury to the
right of other person nor does it disturb the public order; it is merely an
infringement of the terms stipulated in the contract between the Chief
Executive and the criminal.
Evasion of the service of the sentence is an attempt at least to evade the
penalty inflicted by the courts upon criminals and t h u s defeat the purpose
of the law of either reforming or punishing t h e m for having disturbed the
public order. (Alvarez vs. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 43)
184
Chapter Seven
COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING
SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE
Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service

of penalty imposed for another previous offense — Penalty.
— B e s i d e s t h e p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person
w h o shall c o m m i t a felony after h a v i n g b e e n convicted by
final j u d g m e n t , before b e g i n n i n g to serve s u c h sentence, or
w h i l e s e r v i n g t h e s a m e , shall be p u n i s h e d by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the n e w felony.
Any convict of t h e class referred to in this article, w h o
is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of
seventy y e a r s if he shall h a v e already served out his original
s e n t e n c e , or w h e n he shall c o m p l e t e it after reaching said
age, u n l e s s by reason of h i s c o n d u c t or other circumstances
he shall not be w o r t h y of s u c h clemency.
Art. 160 provides for the so-called quasi-recidivism.

Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance where a
person, after having been convicted by final judgment, shall commit a new
felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same.
He shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by
law for the new felony.
Elements:
1. T h a t t h e offender was already convicted by final judgment of one
offense.
2. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such
sentence or while serving the same.
185
Art. 160 QUASI-RECIDIVISM
"Before beginning to serve such sentence."

A convict by final judgment for one offense may commit a new felony
before beginning to serve his sentence for the first offense, when the
judgment of conviction of the lower court in the first offense having been
affirmed by the appellate court, and his commitment having been ordered,
he committed the new felony while being taken to the prison or jail.
"Or while serving the same."

The other case where Art. 160 applies is when a convict by final
judgment shall commit a new felony while serving his sentence for the first
offense.
Hence, if the offender committed a new felony after serving the
sentence for the first offense, and both offenses are embraced in the same
title of the Code, he is an ordinary recidivist under Art. 14, paragraph 9, of
the Code, because he did not commit the new felony before or while serving
the sentence for the first offense.
Second crime must be a felony.

Note the use of the word "felony" in this article. The second crime
must be a felony.
Thus, if a prisoner serving sentence for one crime is found in possession
of a firearm without license, this article does not s e e m to apply, because the
law punishing illegal possession of firearm is a special law. Must Art. 10 be
made to apply in this case? No, because Art. 160 speaks of "the m a x i m u m
period" of the penalty prescribed by law for the n e w felony. The penalty
prescribed by special law has no periods like the three periods of a divisible
penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
But the first crime for which the offender is serving sentence need
not be a felony.
It makes no difference, for purposes of the effect of quasi-recidivism
under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, whether the crime for which
an accused is serving sentence, at the time of the commission of the offense
charged, falls under said Code or under a special law. (People vs. Peralta, et
al., 3 SCRA 213; People vs. Alicia, 95 SCRA 227)
The new offense need not be of different character from that of the
former offense.
The word "another" in the head note of Article 160 does not m e a n that
the new felony which is committed by a person already serving sentence is
186
QUASI-RECIDIVISM Art. 160
different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Hence, even if the
new offense is murder and he is serving sentence for homicide, Article 160
applies. (People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499)
Quasi-recidivism does not require that the two offenses are

embraced in the same title of the Code.
But Art. 160 does not s e e m to require that the offense for which the
convict is serving sentence and the new felony committed while serving
sentence are embraced in the s a m e title of the Code. While in recidivism,
in paragraph No. 9 of Art. 14, both the first and the second offenses must
be embraced in the same title of the Gode; in quasi-recidivism, it is not so
required.
Quasi-recidivism, distinguished from reiteracion.

The aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the
offender against whom it is considered shall have served out his sentences
for the prior offenses. Here, all the accused were yet serving their respective
sentences at the time of the commission of the crime of murder. The special
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (Art. 160, R.P.C.) was correctly
considered against all the accused. (People vs. Layson, et al., L-25177, Oct.
3 1 , 1969, 30 SCRA 93)
Quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating

circumstances.
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be
offset by any ordinary mitigating circumstance, because Art. 160 specifically
provides that the offender "shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony."
Granting that not only plea of guilty but voluntary surrender
as well, are present, these cannot alter the penalty of death, since even
without evident premeditation, quasi-recidivism, as a special aggravating
circumstance, raises the penalty to the maximum period of that prescribed
by law for the new crime committed. (People vs. Perete, 58 O.G. 8628)
Illustration of the application of penalty in quasi-recidivism.

Suppose a convict serving sentence for serious physical injuries killed
another prisoner with treachery and evident premeditation. Immediately,
the convict surrendered to the guard and during the trial, he pleaded guilty
to the charge of murder qualified by treachery. What penalty should be
imposed upon such convict?
187
Art. 160 QUASI-RECIDIVISM
Death penalty. Reason: Because the maximum of the penalty for

murder is death and the fact that there is one mitigating circumstance
(plea of guilty) left, after offsetting evident premeditation with the other
mitigating circumstance (voluntary surrender), is of no consequence. Quasi-
recidivism cannot be offset by any ordinary mitigating circumstance. (See
People vs. Bautista, et al, 65 SCRA 460)
Note: But if the convict serving sentence is a minor under 16 years old,
the penalty can be lowered by at least one degree. Minority is a privileged
mitigating circumstance.
A quasi-recidivist may be pardoned at the age of 70 years.

The second paragraph of Art. 160 provides that a quasi-recidivist
shall be pardoned when he has reached the age of 70 years and h a s already
served out his original sentence, or w h e n he shall complete it after reaching
said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances, he shall
not be worthy of such clemency.
But only a convict "who is not a habitual criminal" shall be par-

doned.
When he is a habitual criminal, a quasi-recidivist m a y not be pardoned
even if he has reached the age of 70 years and already served out his original
sentence.
188

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Title Three

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

What are the crimes against public order?

19. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances.

Rebellion and insurrection are not synonymous.

'The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable.

importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with

Nature of the crime of rebellion.

Actual clash of arms with the forces of the Government, not

Purpose of the uprising must be shown.

others, without evidence to indicate the motive or purpose of the accused

It is not necessary that the purpose of the rebellion be accom-

Rebellion distinguished from treason.

Giving aid and comfort is not criminal in rebellion.

Rebellion distinguished from subversion.

Rebellion or Insurrection, when considered as Terrorism.

Republic Act No. 9372

Acts Punishable as Terrorism under Rep. Act No. 9372.

(3) Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory and

Terrorism is more severely punished than heinous crimes under

Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism.

Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism as a crime.

Penalty Imposed on an Accomplice in Terrorism.

Penalty Imposed on an Accessory in Terrorism.

Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association on Group of

Prosecution under Republic Act No. 9372 Shall be A Bar to Another

With or without civilian participation.

Art. 134-A. Coup d'etat — How committed. — The crime

With or without civilian participation.

Coup d'etat, when considered as Terrorism.

Art. 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup

Any p e r s o n i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t service w h o participates,

Who are liable for rebellion, insurrection and/or coup d'etat?

Public officer must take active part, to be liable; mere silence or

U.S. vs. Ravidas, et al.

Who shall be deemed the leader of the rebellion, insurrection or

Application of the penalty for rebellion.

Being a mere assistant to a principal, guilty of the crime of rebellion,

Those who killed persons in pursuance of the movement to

Is there a complex crime of rebellion with murder and other

The Hernandez ruling applied.

applying to m a k e rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course,

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the

Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion are absorbed in rebellion.

of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single

Membership in a rebel organization does not automatically qualify

Rebellion, and not murder, where killings are politically moti-

Killing, robbing, etc. for private purposes or profit, without any

Political crimes and common crimes, distinguished.

Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat,

"See Appendix "A," Table of Penalties, No. 13.

Two crimes are defined and penalized in this article.

No conspiracy when there is no agreement and no decision to

Organizing a group of soldiers, soliciting membership in, and

When the object of the offenders in organizing Filipino soldiers,

There was no conspiracy to commit rebellion in the following

Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. — The

Offender must be a public officer or employee.

"See Appendix "A," Table of Penalties, No. 11.