BAR

OPERATIONS 1

SUBMISSION # 4

CASE Nos. 45 - 59

Submitted by: YSABELLE M. CARDONA

LLB – IV
Palawan State University – School of Law
S.Y 2020 – 2021

Submitted to: ATTY. ALLAN B. CARLOS

Professorial Lecturer
 Table of Contents

45. JESSIE M. DOROTEO (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY HIS SISTER, LUCIDA D.

HERMIS, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIMARE INCORPORATED, BONIFACIO GOMEZ,
AND/OR FIL CARGO SHIPPING CORP., RESPONDENTS.
[G. R. NO. 184932, MARCH 13, 2017]

46. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALBERTO

ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR AND JOEL ANGELES Y DE JESUS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
GR NO. 225608, MARCH 13, 2017

47. ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JANICE

MONTERO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, RESPONDENT [ A.C.
NO. 11385, MARCH 14, 2017 ]

48. PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES, PLAINTIJF-APPELLEE VS JESSIE GABRIELY

GAJARDO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. NO. 213390, MARCH 15, 2017

49. MERCEDITA C. COOMBS, PETITIONER, V. VICTORIA C. CASTAÑEDA, VIRGILIO

VELOSO SANTOS, SPS. PANCHO & EDITH LEVISTE, BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK
AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 192353, MARCH 15, 2017

50. DEMETRIO R. ALCANTARA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

THRU ITS AGENCY, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REVENUE REGION NO. 11-B,
DAVAO CITY; ET. AL. GR NO. 192536, MARCH 15, 2017

51. SPOUSES BERNARDITO AND ARSENIA GAELA (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY

HER HEIRS NAMELY: BERNARDITO GAELA AND JOSELINE E.
PAGUIRIGAN, PETITIONERS VS. SPOUSES TAN TIAN HEANG AND SALLY TAN,,
RESPONDENTS G.R. NO. 185627, MARCH 15, 2017

52. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ET.AL VS. PS/SUPT. RAINER A. ESPINA

GR NO. 213500, MARCH 15, 2017

53. TSM SHIPPING PHILS., INC. AND/OR DAMPSKIBSSELSKABET NORDEN A/S

AND/OR CAPT. CASTILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. LOUIE L. PATIÑO, RESPONDENT. GR
NO. 210289, MARCH 20, 2017

54. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. AMADO M. MENDOZA AND MARIA
MARCOS VDA. DE MENDOZA. G.R NO. 198799, MARCH 2017
55. FELIX B. TIU, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES JACINTO JANGAS AND PETRONILA
MERTO JANGAS, MARIA G. ORTIZ, MELENCIO ORTIZ, MERLA M. KITANE, PACITO
KITANE, CANDELARIA RUSIANA, RODRIGO RUSIANA, JUANA T. JALANDONI,
ADELAIDA P. RAGAY AND TEOFISTO RAGAY, SR., RESPONDENTS. GR NO. 200285,
MARCH 20, 2017
56. LOURDES C. RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER
VS PARK N RIDE INC.NICEST (PHILS) INC./GRAND LEISURE CORP./SPS. VICENTE &
ESTELITA B. JAVIER, RESPONDENTS GR NO. 222980, MARCH 20, 2017
57. ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS SANTOS AND HER DAUGHTERS, NAMELY,
VIRGINIA, AUREA, AND BINGBING ALL SURNAMED DELOS SANTOS VS. ALBERTO
ABEJON AND THE ESTATE OF TERESITA DINGLASAN ABEJON. G.R. NO. 215820,
MARCH 20, 2017
58.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PALA TOUKYO Y PADEP.
G.R.NO. 225593, MARCH 20, 2017

59. JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN, PETITIONER VS SPOUSES NELSON C. CRUZ AND

CRISTINA P. CRUZ AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF
PANGASINAN, RESPONDENTS. G.R. NO. 220940, MARCH 20, 2017
45. JESSIE M. DOROTEO (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY HIS SISTER,
LUCIDA D. HERMIS, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIMARE INCORPORATED,
BONIFACIO GOMEZ, AND/OR FIL CARGO SHIPPING CORP., RESPONDENTS.
[G. R. No. 184932, March 13, 2017]

FACTS: Philimare is a local manning agency that hired Jessie Doroteo (deceased)
as an engineer on behalf of Fil-Cargo Shipping Corporation. The contract of
employment is for a period of 3 months. Petitioner Doroteo claimed that he felt the
engine room’s temperature rising and he drank cold water to cool himself. To ease
the pain he took antibiotics. Upon arrival in Caribbean, he allegedly requested for a
medical check-up at the hospital but refused by the ship master. While in Denmark
during his medical check-up, a biopsy was conducted due to the presence of lymph
nodes in his voice box. He was then subjected to medical repatriation on order of
Philimare and he arrived in the Philippines. Petitioner was examine by Philimare’s
physician and was advised to undergo biopsy due to possible laryngeal cancer, but
he did not come back to the company physician.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for non-payment of sick leave pay and disability/medical
benefits.
Philimare contested the claim, asserting that Doroteo’s illness is not a compensable
occupational disease because cancer of the larynx or voice box was primarily cause
by excessive and repeated exposure tabacco as well as alcohol consumption. Also
failure to disclose his condition as a violation of his contract and equivalent to
fraudulent misrepresentation. Before resolution of the dispute, Doroteo died.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner deceased is entitled to the sick leave pay and
disability/medical benefits.
RULING: No. As provided in POEA Terms and Conditions governing the
employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels: the employer
shall be liable when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term
of the contract, whether permanent total or partial disability and it must also show
that there is causal connection between seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for
which he had been contracted for.
Doroteo fails to prove the risks present in engine room. He merely claims the he was
exposed to chemicals but failed to substantiate the claim. Philimare claims that
Doroteo was a heavy tobacco and alcohol user. And the company’s physician
diagnose that the cancer seemed to have already existed more than 3 months prior
to the examination. Hence, no clear nexus between the disease Doroteo acquired
and the working conditions he encountered. Therefore, the disputable presumption
of work-relation cannot be applied.
46. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALBERTO
ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR AND JOEL ANGELES Y DE JESUS, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
GR No. 225608, March 13, 2017
FACTS: A total of 3 separate informations were filed charging accused-appellants of
1 count of simple rape and 1 count of homicide. The prosecution alleged that AAA
joined her co-worker for a vacation. On the night of the incident, AAA woke and saw
BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro and Angeles. Thereafter they
raped AAA. Bothe accused-appellants denied the charges against them.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty as charged 1 count of simple rape and 2
count of homicide.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification. Alejandro was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple rape. While Angeles was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of 2 counts of the same crime.
ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
aforesaid crimes.
RULING: In this case, both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to
AAA's positive identification that accused-appellants conspired in stabbing and
mauling BBB, resulting in the latter's death; and that thereafter, Angeles proceeded
to rape her while Alejandro restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting. Absent
any cogent reason to the contrary, the Court defer to the findings of fact of both
courts and, thereby, upholds Angeles's conviction for Rape. In sum, Angeles should
be convicted of 1 count of qualified rape and 1 count of homicide.
47. ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY
JANICE MONTERO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK,
RESPONDENT
[ A.C. NO. 11385, March 14, 2017 ]

FACTS: Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of

land. The complainant alleges that Atty. Tumulak, accompanied by uniformed guards
unlawfully entered and took control of the entrance and exit of the property. Prior to
the incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished several documents to the complainant
including Deed of Assignment as the administrator of the Estate of Don Rodriguez
designated Atty. Tumulak as Assignee.
The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for
claiming to have coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal
and forcible intrusion.The complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak
ought to know that the claim of his principal in the property was barred by res
judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name. Accordingly, his
conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.
After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline Ricardo M. Espina submitted
his Report and Recommendation, [6] wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to have violated
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty.
Tumulak from the practice of law for two years.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he facilitated the implementation of the writ of
execution and the entry into the complainant's property.
RULING: Yes. Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful
and forcible intrusion into the property just because the complainant did not establish
his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact, such physical participation was not
even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal responsibility for the
intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of
assignment and other documents as the source of his authority. Specifically, his
duties under the deed of assignment included "shoulder[ing] all the expenses in the
performance of [securing the property x x x and initiating steps for recovery of the
same parcel] x x x such as x x x or payment for the real taxes, titling, researching,
liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and other
incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the said
transaction;" and "possessing, fencing, [and] guarding" the property.
Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and
disregarding settled rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His
conduct betrayed his Lawyer's Oath "to support [the] Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." He breached
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

48. PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES, Plaintijf-Appellee vs JESSIE GABRIELy

GAJARDO, Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 213390, March 15, 2017

FACTS: The Appellant was indicted for rape. During arraignment he entered
negative plea. AAA and her cousin BBB at the time material to this case is a 17 year
old temporarily resided at the boarding house of Appellant. AAA testified that
Appellant accused them of having stolen items of merchandise from his store located
near the said boarding house. Appellant did not believe them, instead he directed
them to see him in his room to talk about the matter. When AAA went inside
appellant’s room, while explaining her side, appellant told her to sit on his lap and
began caressing her back. AAA demanded that he stop what he was doing because
she did not like it, but he paid no heed to her demand. He then proceeded to unhook
her bra.

ISSUE: Whether AAA’s testimony is sufficient to convict the accused for the crime
rape.

RULING: Yes. When a woman testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect,
that all that is necessary to constitute the commission of this crime has been
committed. When a rape victim's account is straightforward and candid, and is
corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, the same is
sufficient to support a conviction for rape.
49. MERCEDITA C. COOMBS, Petitioner, v. VICTORIA C. CASTAÑEDA,
VIRGILIO VELOSO SANTOS, SPS. PANCHO & EDITH LEVISTE, BPI FAMILY
SAVINGS BANK AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA
CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 192353, March 15, 2017

FACTS: Petitioner Coombs narrated that she is the owner of the real property
located at Muntinlupa City. When she tried to pay the real property tax due relative to
the real property, she was told that said real property was no longer listed under her
name and she came to know that the title had already been cancelled and had been
replaced under the name of respondent. The title was ordered to cancelled by the
RTC in a decision in LRC Case entitled "In Re: Petition for the Issuance of Second
Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6715, [by] Mercedita C.
Coombs, represented by her Atty.-in-Fact Victoria C. Castañeda"; that she neither
authorized Victoria C. Castañeda (Castañeda) to file petition for issuance of a
second owner's duplicate copy.

Petitioner Coombs anchored her prayer for the annulment of the RTC Decision
before the Court of Appeals on the ground that, since the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 6715 had never been lost as it had always been in her custody, the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed outright petitioner
Coombs’ petition for annulment of judgment.

RULING: Yes. Section 7, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides for ground for
annulment. The annulment may be based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud, shall be valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trail or petition for relief.

The Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by petitioner was clearly grounded on
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case, and not extrinsic
fraud.

Simply stated, petitioner Coombs sought to annul the RTC Decision for being
rendered without jurisdiction. According to her, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035—one for the reconstitution of a lost
certificate of title—because the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 was never
lost in the first place, which argument has been upheld by the Court in a catena of
cases that she cited to support her assertion.
50. DEMETRIO R. ALCANTARA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THRU ITS AGENCY, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
REVENUE REGION NO. 11-B, DAVAO CITY; et. Al.
GR NO. 192536, March 15, 2017

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Alcantara was the owner of a parcel of land situated it

Davao City. Appellant filed his income tax returns for the years 1982 and 1983. The
Regional Director of the BIR wrote appellant informing him that he has deficiency
income tax. BIR issued 2 demand letter with respective accompanying income tax
assessment notices. Still there was no response from plaintiff. The CIR issued a
warrant of distraint and/or levy against the properties of appellant. Subsequently, his
property had been levied upon to satisfy the deficient taxes. No bidder appeared
hence, the levied property was forfeited to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines in satisfaction of the tax/taxes due.
Appellant instituted the action before the RTC to demand reconveyance of property
sold upon forfeiture for non-payment of a tax assessment.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No. The remedies available to a tax payer were laid by law. The law in
effect at the time of the disputed assessment, stated that prior to the resort to the
administrative remedies was necessary, otherwise the assessment would attain
finality. Alcantara should have exhaust all the administrative remedies. He
immediately invoked the authority of the courts to protect his rights instead of first
going to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for redress of his concerns about the
assessment and collection of taxes. His judicial recourse thus suffered from fatal
maturity because his doing so rendered the assessment final.
51. SPOUSES BERNARDITO AND ARSENIA GAELA (DECEASED),
SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS NAMELY: BERNARDITO GAELA AND
JOSELINE E. PAGUIRIGAN, Petitioners vs SPOUSES TAN TIAN HEANG AND
SALLY TAN,, Respondents
G.R. No. 185627, March 15, 2017
FACTS: The petitioners claimed that they are the lawful owners of the subject
properties. They said that their daughter took the certificates of title registered in their
names and forged their signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage. Thus, when the
certificates were cancelled and new ones were issued to Wong, Wong sold it to the
respondents. Petitioner sought the annulment of sale in the name of the respondent.
They averred that before the transfer of title from Wong to the respondents, they
were able to cause the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the respondents’ title.
For their part, respondent countered that they are the legal and lawful owners of the
subject properties. Subsequently, they made demands to the petitioners to vacate
the subject properties but the latter refused to do so.
ISSUE: Who between the parties has a better right to possess the subject
properties?
RULING: The respondent has a better right to possess the subject properties. The
court emphasized that when the property is registered under the Torrens system, the
registered owner’s title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally
attacked, especially for unlawful detainer and it does not even matter if the party’s
title to the property is questionable.

52. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN et.al vs. PS/SUPT. RAINER A. ESPINA

GR NO. 213500, March 15, 2017
FACTS: Petitioners filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint
and a supplemental complaint, charging Espina and other PNP officers for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and Grave
Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty arising from alleged anomalies that attended the
PNP procurement of 40 tires and repair and related transportation and delivery
expenses. It averred that the PNP did not comply with the bidding procedure.
Further, it claimed that there were ghost deliveries, the tires were never delivered to
the PNP and no repair and refurbishment works were actually performed.
The Ombudsman Ruling found probable cause to indict Espina and several other
PNP officers. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Espina and held that
his act of affixing his signature could not be considered as Grave Misconduct
because he did not (a) unlawfully use his official position for the purpose of
benefiting himself and (b) exhibit corrupt or depraved motives, clear intent to violate
the law or flagrant disregard of established rules. It observe that Espina had no
participation in the bidding and procurement process as he belonged to the PNP
Management Division whose function is to inspect and note the deliveries to the PNP
after the required bidding and procurement process had taken place.
ISSUE: Whether or not Espina should be held administratively liable for the charges
imputed against him.
RULING: Espina was charged with grave misconduct and serious dishonesty before
the Ombudsman while CA adjudge him guilty of simple misconduct.
In grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate law, or flagrant
disregard of an established rule must be manifest. Without any of these elements,
the transgression of an established rule is properly characterized as simple
misconduct only. Neither can Espina’s acts be considered misconduct, grave or
simple.
The Court finds Espina administratively liable, instead, for Gross Neglect of Duty,
warranting his dismissal from government service. It is his failure to exercise due
diligence in signing the IRFs, which is sufficient to hold him liable for Gross Neglect
of Duty. Neglect of duty is the omission of that care that even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property.

53. TSM SHIPPING PHILS., INC. AND/OR DAMPSKIBSSELSKABET NORDEN

A/S AND/OR CAPT. CASTILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. LOUIE L. PATIÑO,
RESPONDENT.
GR NO. 210289, March 20, 2017
FACTS: While working on board the vessel, respondent injured his right hand while
securing a mooring rope. After extensive medical treatments, company designated
physician rendered an interim assessment of respondent’s disability at POEA-
Standard Employment Contract at Grade 10 or loss of grasping power for small
objects between the fold of the finger of one hand. Respondent filed a complaint with
NLRC against petitioners for total and permanent disability, benefits, damages. He
consulted another physician and assessed him to have permanent disability unfit for
sea duty in whatever capacity as a seaman.
The Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and Court of Appeals considered that respondent’s
disability is considered permanent and total based on the 120-day rule and on his
inability to work resulting in the loss of earning capacity.
ISSUE: Whether the medical finding of the company-designated physician should be
upheld over that issued by the physician appointed by the private respondent.
RULING: The rule is that, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when
the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or
when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration. The
POES-Standard Employment Contract clearly provides that when a seafarer
sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or
unfitness for work shall be determined by the company designated-physician.
54. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Amado M. Mendoza and Maria Marcos
vda. De Mendoza G.R No. 198799, March 2017
FACTS: A Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of Attachment was
filed by BPI against respondent before the RTC. BPI alleged that respondent open a
foreign currency savings and placed the amount of US$2,000 in a time deposit
account. After the lapsed of 30 day clearing period, respondent withdrew the amount
leaving $20 for bank charges. BPI received a notice from its correspondent bank,
Bankers Trust, which the subject check was dishonored due to “amount altered” and
endorsement was cancelled by Bankers Trust as originally copy of the subject check
was allegedly confiscated by the government of the USA. This prompted BPI to
inform respondent of such dishonor and to demand reimbursement. According to
respondent, he would be willing to pay BPI, if only the latter presented proper and
authenticated proof of the dishonour of the subject check.
The RTC ruled in BPI’s favour. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly dismissed BPI’s complaint for sum of money
against respondents.
RULING: Yes. The CA erred in concluding that BPI failed to prove the dishonour of
the subject check by merely presenting a) a photocopy thereof with its dorsal portion
stamped “endorsement cancelled” by Bankers Trust and b) a print-out of the email
advice from Bankers Trust stating that the subject check was returned unpaid
because the amount was altered.
In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisities of best evidence
rule. First, the existence or due execution of the subject check was admitted by both
parties. Second, the reason for the non-presentation of the original copy of the
subject check was justifiable as it was confiscated by the US government for being
an altered check. The subject check, being a US Treasury Warrant, is not an
ordinary check, and practically speaking, the same could not be easily
obtained. Lastly, absent any proof to the contrary and for the reasons already stated,
no bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its failure to present the original of the
subject check. Thus, applying the exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the
presentation of the photocopy of the subject check as secondary evidence was
permissible.
55. FELIX B. TIU, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES JACINTO JANGAS AND
PETRONILA MERTO JANGAS, MARIA G. ORTIZ, MELENCIO ORTIZ, MERLA M.
KITANE, PACITO KITANE, CANDELARIA RUSIANA, RODRIGO RUSIANA,
JUANA T. JALANDONI, ADELAIDA P. RAGAY AND TEOFISTO RAGAY, SR.,
RESPONDENTS.
GR No. 200285, March 20, 2017
FACTS: A complaint for reconveyance of property filed by respondent Sps. Jangas
against petitioner and Rural Bank of Amlan. The subject of this petition is a parcel of
land originally owned by Gregorio.
During Gregorio’s lifetime, he gave a portion of the land to his granddaughter
Lulihala Pajulas who took care of him. When Gregorio died and he was survived by
his 3 daughthers (Pajulas Sisters). When one sister died, her share was inherited by
her heirs (Gadiane Sisters). Gadiane sold to Sps. Jangas another portion of the
property until it was sold to the herein petitioner. Then Sps. Tiu mortgaged the
subject property with Rural Bank. Sps. Jangas file a complaint for reconveyance and
damages against the petitioner and Rural Bank of Amlan.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled to the reconveyance of the subject
property. And whether the petitioner is a buyer in good faith.
RULING: The Court has repeatedly emphasized that one who purchases real estate
with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has
acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an
interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of
facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. the Court is
convinced that the petitioner cannot be considered a buyer and registrant in good
faith and for value. It is apparent from the records of this case that the respondents
have been in actual possession and occupation of the subject property at the time
that it was sold by Bridiana to the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner did not acquire any
right from Bridiana over two-thirds of the subject property since the latter was no
longer the owner of the same at the time the sale was made to the petitioner. The
ownership over the two-thirds-portion of the subject property had already been
vested to the respondents prior to such sale. Hence, reconveyance of the subject
property to the petitioner is unwarranted.
56. LOURDES C. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner
vs PARK N RIDE INC.NICEST (PHILS) INC./GRAND LEISURE CORP./SPS.
VICENTE & ESTELITA B. JAVIER, Respondents GR NO. 222980, March 20, 2017
FACTS: Lourdes Rodriguez was hired by spouses Vicente & Estelita B. Javier as
Restaurant Supervisor for their restaurant at Vicest Phils. Later, when the restaurant
closed, she was transferred to do office work and became an Administrative and
Finance assistant to Estelita Javier.

As the spouses ventured into other businesses, establishing more companies,

petitioner’s duties extended to handling personnel, finance and administrative
matters of these companies without additional compensation. Even substituting as
cashier at their Park N Ride business when the Head Cashier would be on day-off.
She was also tasked to take care of the household concerns of the Javier spouses,
such as preparing payrolls for drivers and helpers, shopping for household needs,
and looking after the spouses’ house whenever they travelled abroad.

She allegedly worked from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., Mondays to Saturdays; was on
call on Sundays; and worked during Christmas and other holidays. She was
deducted an equivalent of two (2) days' wage for every day of absence and was not
paid any service incentive leave pay. Tasked with so much duties and
responsibilities and unable to bear the spouses’ treatment of her, she filed a
resignation letter effective April 25, 2009 however the spouses did not accept her
resignation and convinced her to stay on. However her experience became worse as
Estelita allegedly became more unreasonable, hot-headed and would belittle and
embarrass her in the presence of co-workers.

On September 29, 2009, when she was late in opening the Makati office after going
on her usual “pamalengke” for the spouses, Estelita called her on the phone and
scolded her for it, once again berating her and telling her that if she did not want to
continue work, the company could manage without her. Thus, On September 29,
2009, she wrote a letter to the spouses expressing her grievances at them. She
intimated that they were always finding fault with her to push her to resign.

On October 6, 2009, the Javier spouses replied to her letter, allegedly accepting her
resignation.

On October 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Complaint for constructive illegal dismissal,

non-payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, including claims for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Park N Ride, Vicest
Phils., Grand Leisure, and the Javier Spouses.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and deemed her resigned. The NLRC
reversed the ruling of the LA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not complainant was constructively dismissed.
RULING: Affirming the decision of the Court of appeals with modifications, the
Supreme Court ruled that petitioner was not constructively dismissed.

There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination,

insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to
foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment.71 It exists
where there is involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable
conditions set by the employer.

Strong words may sometimes be exchanged as the employer describes her

expectations or as the employee narrates the conditions of her work environment
and the obstacles she encounters as she accomplishes her assigned tasks. As in
every human relationship, there are bound to be disagreements. However, when
these strong words from the employer happen without palpable reason or are
expressed only for the purpose of degrading the dignity of the employee, then a
hostile work environment will be created.

This is not the situation in this case.

Complainant was not pressured into resigning. It seems that the complainant was
not comfortable anymore with the fact that she was always at the beck and call of the
respondent Javier spouses. Her supervisory and managerial functions appear to be
impeding her time with her family to such extent that she was always complaining of
her extended hours with the company. It is of no moment that respondent spouses in
many occasions reprimanded complainant as long as it was reasonably connected
and an offshoot of the work or business of respondents.

From the representation of petitioner, what triggered her resignation was the incident
on September 22, 2009 when Estelita told her "Kung ayaw mo na ng ginagawa mo,
we can manage! " These words, however, are not sufficient to make the continued
employment of petitioner impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely.

Petitioner was neither terminated on September 22, 2009 nor was she constructively
dismissed. There was no showing of bad faith or malicious design by the
respondents that would make her work conditions unbearable. On the other hand, it
is a fact that petitioner enjoyed the privilege of working closely with the Javier
Spouses and having their full trust and confidence. Spontaneous expressions of an
employer do not automatically render a hostile work atmosphere. The circumstances
in this case negate its presence.
57. Erlinda Dinglasan Delos Santos and her daughters, namely, Virginia,
Aurea, and Bingbing all surnamed Delos Santos Vs. Alberto Abejon and the
estate of Teresita Dinglasan Abejon G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017

FACTS: Respondents filed Complaint for Cancellation of Title with collection of sum
of money against Petitioners before the RTC. The complaint alleged that Erlinda and
her late husband Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro) borrowed money from the former's
sister, Teresita, as evidenced by a Promissory Note. As security for the loan, Erlinda
and Pedro mortgaged their property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. which
mortgage was annotated on the title. After Pedro died, Erlinda ended up being
unable to pay the loan, and as such, agreed to sell the subject land to Teresita. They
executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage, and eventually issued in the
name of "Teresita, Abejon.”
In defense, petitioners denied any participation relative to the spurious Deed of Sale,
and instead, maintained that it was Teresita who fabricated the same and caused its
registration before the Register of Deeds of Makati City. They likewise asserted that
Erlinda and Pedro never sold the subject land to Teresita, and that they did not
receive any demand for the payment, representing the loan, representing the
construction cost of the building. Finally, they claimed that the improvements
introduced by Teresita on the subject land were all voluntary on her part.
The RTC ruled that respondents should be reimbursed for the amount of the loan, as
well as the expenses incurred for the construction of the three (3)-storey building in
view of petitioners' categorical admission of their indebtedness to her, as well as the
construction of the building from which they derived benefit being the actual
occupants of the property.
The CA ruled that since petitioners admitted their indebtedness to Teresita during
the pre-trial proceedings, respondents should be allowed to recover the amount
representing the same, including the appropriate interest.

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly held that petitioners should be held liable to
respondents.

RULING: Petitioners admitted the existence of the loan obligation as well as

respondents' right to collect on the same, it does not necessarily follow that
respondents should collect the loan amount from petitioners, as concluded by both
the RTC and the CA. It must be pointed out that such loan was contracted by
Erlinda, who is only one out of the four herein petitioners, and her deceased
husband, Pedro, during the latter's lifetime and while their marriage was still
subsisting.
Both the RTC and the CA erred in holding petitioners liable to respondents for the
loan obligation.
58. People of the Philippines vs Pala Toukyo y Padep
G.R.No. 225593, March 20, 2017

FACTS: On November 22, 2010, the PDEA-CAR (Philippine Drug Enforcement

Agency) conducted buy-bust operation against the appellant at the area of Burnham
Park, Baguio City wherein PDEA agent Peralta, John Kay-an (Agent Kay-an) and
Santino Awichen (Agent Awichen) were the elements of the buy-bust team to entrap
the appellant. During their transaction, appellant showed to agent Peralta who acted
as the poseur buyer the brick of marijuana thus the latter executed the pre-arranged
signal to his back-up, leading to the arrest of the appellant. On November 23, 2010,
an information was filed before the RTC charging appellant of illegal sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5 of R.A.9165.In a decision
dated March 6, 2012, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged and accordingly, sentence the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine in the amount of Php 5,000,000.00. The RTC found that the PDEA –CAR
agents successfully executed a buy-bust operation which resulted to the arrest of the
appellant. Appellant filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals and in a decision dated
July 3, 2015, the CA modified the appellant conviction finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized
under section 11 of R.A. 9165 and accordingly sentence him the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Php 500,000.00.Contrary to the RTC’s findings,
the CA ruled that there was no valid buy-bust operation took place, especially in the
light of the fact that upon seeing the brick of marijuana, agent Peralta prematurely
executed the pre-arranged signal which led to Toukyo’s arrest.Since no actual
transaction took place before Toukyo’s arrest, he cannot be convicted of the crime of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. Hence, instant appeal was made to Supreme
Court. At the outset, it appears in the records that in a letter dated January 26, 2017 ,
the Director General of Bureau of Corrections informed the court that the appellant
had already died on October 15, 2014. The letter were supported by a certification
issued by Bureau Officer-in-Charge for its rehabilitation operation division as well as
death report issued by Medical Officer III of the Bureau.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11 of
R.A. 9165.

HELD: The criminal case against the appellant including the instant appeal, is hereby
dismissed.
The court cited the Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code paragraph 1 thereof states
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
The court also cited the case of People vs Bayotas, the Court eloquently summed up
the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Thus, upon Toukyo's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
Notably, there is no civil liability that arose from this case, there being no private
complainant to begin with.
59. JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN, Petitioner vs SPOUSES NELSON C. CRUZ
AND CRISTINA P. CRUZ and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE
OF PANGASINAN, Respondents G.R. No. 220940, March 20, 2017

Facts: Nelson C. Cruz, married to Cristina P. Cruz, is the registered owner of a

40,835-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Bogtong-Bolo, Mangatarem.
Sometime in November 2009, Nelson, through his father and attomey-infact and
father, Lamberto P. Cruz, then sold the subject lot in favor of Sebastian with a Deed
of Absolute Sale. Upon Sebastian's payment of the purchase price, Lamberto then
surrendered to her the possession of the subject land. Sebastian then paid the taxes
to transfer the title to her name. However, upon her presentment of the aforesaid
documents to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan, the latter
directed her to secure a Special Power of Attorney executed by Spouses Cruz
authorizing Lamberto to sell the subject land to her. Accordingly, Sebastian
requested the execution of such document to Lamberto, who promised to do so, but
failed to comply.

According to Sebastian, it was only on July 14, 2014 upon her inquiry with Register
of Deeds about the status of the aforesaid title when she discovered that: (a) Nelson
executed an Affidavit of Loss dated September 23, 2013 attesting to the loss of
owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P- 41566, which he registered with the Register
of Deeds; (b) the Spouses Cruz filed before the R TC a petition for the issuance of a
second owner's copy of subject land; and (c) on March 27, 2014, the RTC
promulgated a Decision granting Spouses Cruz's petition and, consequently, ordered
the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of title in their names. In view of the
foregoing incidents, Sebastian filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
CA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the said case.

Held: No, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the case. According to Section
15 of Republic Act No. 26 AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR
THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR
DESTROYED: If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as
supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and that petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate of
title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and that the description, area
and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the
lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The
clerk of court shall forward to the register of deeds a certified copy of said order and
all the documents which, pursuant to said order, are to be used as the basis of the
reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence or basis to justify
the reconstitution, the petition shall be dismissed, but such dismissal shall not
preclude the right of the party or parties entitled thereto to file an application for
confirmation of his or their title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. In
the present case, such document was not actually lost but was in the possession of
the petitioner. When the owner's duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or
destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is
void because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. Hence, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction
over the case.