G.R. No.

70895 May 30, 1986

HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO.,
LTD., and SHUYA NODA, respondents.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondents.

RESOLUTION

FERIA, J.:

Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division of the
Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set
aside the order of respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.

The issue in this case is whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.

Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the period for
appeal from final orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance)
from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and provides a uniform period of fifteen days for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court counted from notice thereof, except
in habeas corpus cases where the period for appeal remains at forty- eight (48) hours. To expedite
appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal is no longer required except in
appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in these exceptional
cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a record on appeal is required. Moreover
Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be required for an appeal, and
Section 4 thereof disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly states, to
avoid the procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice under the Rules of Court
which are intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice.

However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

In the case of Gibbs vs. Court, of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed the petition for
certiorari and ruled that the failure of defendant's attorney to file the petition to set aside the
judgment within the reglementary period was due to excusable neglect, and, consequently, the
record on appeal was allowed. The Court did not rule that the motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration could not be granted.
In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No. 1684, March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA
178), a division of the Court cited the Gibbs decision to support a statement that a motion to extend
the reglementary period for filing the motion for reconsideration is not authorized or is not in order.

The Intermediate Appellate Court is sharply divided on this issue. Appeals have been dismissed on
the basis of the original decision in this case.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court resolved
that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision were applied
prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of
their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly
prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on
certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final
disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for the
guidance of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:

1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal may
be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of
Nantes vs. Court of Appeals, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court denies the motion for
extension, the appeal must be taken within the original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30,
1962, 4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs.
Sta. Maria, November 20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the
expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed within the original period. (Valero vs. Court of
Appeals, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, September 28, 1973, 53
SCRA 228).

All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of, and to set aside, the decision of August 5, 1985 is
granted and the petition is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Neypes vs. CA

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and
Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of
the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and
Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents)
filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by
petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the
respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent
Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the
petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as
against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of
summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and
matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied
because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. [1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their
motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the
issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting
for the trial proper.

In an order [2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners'

complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the
15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July
1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration [3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on
July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal [4] and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late. [5] This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. [6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the
Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their
notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this' was' the day they received the final
order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were
well within the reglementary period for appeal. [7]

 
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled
that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or
the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the 'final order appealable under the
Rules. It held further:

 
Perforce the petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively
renders the judgment final and executory. [8]
 

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This

was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe
the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

 
 
 
 
I
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS'
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS' APPEAL IN
CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS,
ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET
FEES.
 
II
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT
PETITIONERS' APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE
LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE
OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3,
1998.
 
III
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS
'FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M.
MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER
 DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH
COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO
THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. [9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners
should have filed their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the
right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so
often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. [10] The period to appeal is fixed by
both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, [11] as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. ' The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that
in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight
hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
 

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

 
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
 
 The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
 
 

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to
it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or
it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. [12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration should be construed as the 'final order, not the February
12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of
the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the 'final order, receipt of which triggers the
start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal ' the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., [13] the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon
receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When
the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus
motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for
having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the
dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under
the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted
the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman
et al. [14] where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion
for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in
the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order

dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on
time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal
period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead
opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. [15] It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal,
had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of
denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the
Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the 'final order or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the

decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of
the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this
rule in similar cases, [16] premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. [17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error,
the judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed
by law. [18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. ' Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of
order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new
trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.
 
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period
herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which
the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion. [19] (emphasis
supplied)
 

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30

days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations
of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization [20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d
etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal [21] and enhance
the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance
of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of
notices of appeal, [22] and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the
ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of

Libmanan, [23] however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial
system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on
occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the
right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint
of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, [24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which

require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party
due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals,
we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that
merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were
dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity
of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where
procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts
have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity
for the just and proper disposition of his cause. [25]

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. [26] It has the
sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified
and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules
governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules
42, [27] 43 [28] and 45, [29] the Court allows extensions of time, based on
justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions
may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. [30]
 

Henceforth, this 'fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies [31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. [32] The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying
their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15
days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word 'or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. [33] Hence, the use of 'or in the above provision supposes that the notice
of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the 'final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1,
1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of
cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and
the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

 
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-
day appeal period should be counted ' from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3,
1998) or from receipt of notice of 'final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the 'final order') denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse
of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as
already discussed. [34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v.

IAC [35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this
case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
G. R. No. L-60036 January 27, 1987

INVESTMENTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TOBACCO INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and THE SHERIFF
OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The petitioner seeks the nullification by certiorari of two resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. No. Sp.08253-R: one dated December 9, 1981, denying its motion inter alia to declare
void the auction sale held on August 24,1981 at the instance of respondent Tobacco Industries of
the Philippines, Inc.; and another dated January 13, 1982 denying its motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also seeks to compel respondent Court
by mandamus to enforce an earlier resolution in the same case dated December 12, 1979, for the
return to it of the chattels sold at public auction.

The instant petition originated from Civil Case No. 116617, instituted by Investments, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to simply as "Investment's) on July 7, 1978 in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the private respondent, Tobacco Industries of the Philippines, Inc., ("TIP"). 1 The
action was for the annulment of a chattel mortgage executed by Investments in TIP's favor covering five
cigarette-making machines, which were about to be sold on foreclosure by the latter. Initially a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court ex-parte enjoining the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction
sale of the machines. But not long afterwards, the Trial Court promulgated an order denying Investments'
application for a writ of injunction and dissolving the temporary restraining order. 2 Unable to obtain a
reconsideration of the order, Investments brought the matter to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and
prohibition.3

That Court, on December 21, 1978, directed issuance of a writ of preliminary irijunction against the
threatened auction sale upon Investments' posting a bond in the amount of P75,000.00.
Subsequently, however, by resolution dated May 15, 1979, the Court dismissed Investment's petition
and lifted the injunction. Investments filed a motion for reconsideration, at the hearing of which it
argued for the reinstatement of the preliminary injunction since "the hearing on the merits of the main
case below is about to be terminated." The Appellate Court then suggested that the injunction bond
be increased to P650,000.00 to cover the principal obligation. The suggestion having been accepted
by both parties, Investments accordingly filed a bond in the increased amount. The Court approved
the bond on September 24, 1979 and issued a restraining order which in effect reinstated the
injunction earlier granted.

On December 12, 1979 the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution declaring that without
prejudice to the early conclusion of the case in the Trial Court, it deemed the proceedings before it
terminated because it had already "stopped the sale ... of the machines ... until final judgment shall
have been rendered in Civil Case No, 116617."   In due course, the Clerk of Court caused entry of
4

judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-08253-R, but what was inadvertently entered was the dispositive
portion of the previous resolution of May 15, 1979 dismissing the petition for certiorari, and no
reference whatever was made to the subsequent resolutions of September 24 and December 12,
1979. 5

Trial in Civil Case No. 116617 having continued in the meantime, judgment therein was rendered on
December 19, 1980, dismissing Investment's complaint for lack of merit, and awarding moral and
exemplary damages to TIP. Investments appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals.

TIP filed with the Trial Court a motion for execution pending appeal;   and with the Court of Appeals
6

— in CA-G.R. No. SP-08253-R — a motion to lift the writ of preliminary injunction.   Investments
7

opposed both motions on the ground that the injunction issued by the Appellate Court against the
holding of the auction sale was meant to subsist until "final in Civil Case No. 116617," and since the
decision rendered in said case was not yet final and executory, said injunction was still in force.
What the Court of Appeals did, however was to declare, by Resolution dated June 9, 1981, that it
was no longer entertaining the pending incidents on the ground that the case before it (CA-G.R. No.
SP-08253) had long been terminated. In so declaring the Court evidently relied only on the
dispositive portion of its resolution of May 15, 1979 erroneously entered by the Clerk of Court
(dismissing Investment's petition for certiorari and prohibition) and failed to take account of the
injunction it had issued thereafter (upon the filing of a bond in the increased amount of
P650,000.00). TIP then caused the mortgaged chattels to be sold by the Sheriff at a public auction
on August 24, 1981, at which sale it was the successful bidder.

Investments forthwith filed with respondent Court of Appeals a motion for contempt and for
annulment of the sale. The Court's response was to issue on August 28, 1981 a temporary
restraining order stopping TIP from taking possession of the machines, and commanding their return
to Investments if already in TIP's possession.   Subsequently, however, by Resolution dated
8

December 9, 1981, the Court denied Investment's plea for nullification of the sale and for an
adjudication of TIP's liability for contempt. In that resolution of December 9, 1981, the Appellate
Court sustained TIP's position that the restraining order enjoining the sale of the mortgaged chattels
had lapsed upon the rendition of final judgment in Civil Case No. 116617, irrespective of the appeal
taken therefrom. The Court also declared valid the auction sale of August 24, 1981, and dissolved
the restraining order embodied in the Resolution of August 28, 1981 said resolution having been
"intended as a temporary measure pending determination of the status of the main case below."
Finally, the respordent Court dismissed the contempt charges, finding TIP's offer to put up a
counterbond in lieu of returning the machines to be substantial compliance with said resolution of
August 28, 1981. 9

Investments then presented a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
pleading time pressure, 10 which was denied for lack of merit. 11 Hence, the present petition.

As is at once apparent, the crux of the controversy is the effective life of the preliminary injunction of
the Appellate Court as regards the auction sale of Investments' cigarette-making machines, dated
December 21, 1978 which, after having been lifted, was reinstated upon the filing by Investments of
the increased injunction bond of P650,000.00 on September 24, 1979. The parties do not dispute
the fact that the injunction was to subsist "until final judgment shall have been rendered in Civil Case
No. 116617." The point about which they differ is the meaning to be accorded to the term, "final
judgment" in the context of Civil Case No. 116617. Investments theorizes that the judgment
rendered by the Trial Court in said Civil Case No. 116617 on December 19, 1980 was not a "final
judgment" because it was an appealable judgment and had, in fact, been appealed seasonably. TIP,
for its part, asserts that that judgment was in truth a "final judgment" as the term is used in
procedural law, even if appealable and hence, upon its rendition, the preliminary injunction of the
Appellate Court expired, its life having precisely been fixed to endure until such judgment shall have
been rendered.

The concept of "final" judgment, as distinguished from one which has "become final" (or "executory"
as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A "final" judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, 12 leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on
the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorir-ally what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in
the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the
task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing
more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
"final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final and executory."

* * * (A)n order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending
action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, a
final order is that which gives an end to the litigation. . . When the order or judgment
does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the
merits, it is merely interlocutory. 13

A final order or judgment finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or right of the parties,
either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is
reversed or set aside. . . Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact or compliance or non-
compliance with the terms of the judgment or order, such judgment or order is final and appealable. 14

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
"interlocutory," e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents
or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned
on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

** Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal No interlocutory order

shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be subject of appeal until final
judgment is rendered for one party or another. 15

The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing
party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal. 16

Now, a "final judgment" in the sense just described becomes final "upon expiration of the peirod to appeal therefrom if
no appeal has been duly perfected" 17 or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment of the appellate
tribunal in turn becomes final and the records of the case are returned to the Court of origin. 18 The "final" judgment
is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in respect to which, as the law explicitly provides,
"execution shall issue as a matter of right." 19 It bears stressing that only a final judgment or order, i.e., "a judgment
or order that finally disposes of the action of proceeding" 20 can become final and executory.

There is no showing that the parties and their counsel intended to give the term "final judgment" a
special signification, a meaning other than that accorded to it by law and established usage. Their
agreement must therefore be construed to mean exactly what it says, that upon rendition by the Trial
Court. on December 9, 1981 of its judgment on the merits, i. e., its " final judgment," the life and
effectivity of the preliminary injunction came to an end, regardless of the appealability of, or the
actual taking of an appeal froia said judgment. The petitioner's theory of the case, founded on its
concept of a "final judgment" is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-41053. February 27, 1976.]

FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, as

Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch VII, and PABLO SAN MIGUEL, Respondents.

Victoriano B. Aldava, for Petitioners.

Manuel P. Punzalan for Private Respondent.

SYNOPSIS

In 1962, Pedro San Miguel, filed a complaint against Pablo San Miguel seeking the
partition of Lot 4543 of the Lolomboy Estate in Bulacan. In his answer, the defendant
disclaimed co-ownership and asserted exclusive ownership of the lot in question. The
complaint was however, dismissed for apparent lack of interest on the part of the
litigants.

Eleven years thereafter, another complaint for partition was instituted in the same court
by the same Pedro San Miguel against the same Pablo San Miguel praying for the
petition of Lot 4543 and Lot 3269. After preliminary hearing, the respondent judge
dismissed the case insofar as Lot 4543 was concerned in view of the principle of res
judicata, as pleaded in the answer. Petitioners, thereupon, interposed an appeal from
the judgment. Respondent judge approved the record on appeal but insofar only as Lot
3269 was concerned "because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long become
final. . ." Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed petition
for certiorari and/or mandamus before the Court of Appeals which court elevated the
petition to the Supreme Court as only questions of law are raised.

The Supreme Court upheld the applicability of res judicata to the case and thereby
dismissed the petition.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEALS; MATTERS APPEALABLE; TEST TO DETERMINE. — Section 2, Rule 41 of the

Revised Rules of Court provides that" (o)nly final judgments or orders shall be subject
to appeal." Interlocutory or incidental judgments or orders do not stay the progress of
an action nor are they subject of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered for
one party the order." The test to determine whether an order or judgment is
interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be done in trial court with
respect to the merits of the case?"

2. JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS; FINAL JUDGMENT DEFINED.— "In the absence of a

statutory definition, a final judgment, order or decree has been held to be . . . one that
 finally dispossess of, adjudicates, or determines, the rights, or some right or rights of
parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch
thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside." cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, MEANING. — A court order is merely interlocutory in

character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection
with its subject. The word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but it is not a
final decision of the whole controversy."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; FINAL ORDER BE ASSAILED BY CERTIORARI. — When nothing more is left for
the trial court to try or decide, as the conflicting claims of the parties over the subject
lot have already been resolved, the final order of dismissal cannot be assailed
by certiorari. The remedy is appeal.

5. ID.; ID.; FINALITY NOT AFFECTED BY PENDENCY OF ANOTHER MATTER. — The fact
that the order lot, remained under litigation and the respective claims of the parties
thereto yet to be settled by the trial court would not affect the final nature of the
subject order, because a decree is nonetheless final although some independent branch
of the case is reversed for future consideration.

6. ID.; FINALITY; RES JUDICATA; ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT, AN ASPECT. — The

principle of estoppel by judgment, one of the aspects of the doctrine of res judicata,
precludes the re-litigation in another action of a specific question actually litigated and
determined in a former case.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEMANDED BY PUBLIC POLICY. — A right, question or fact distinctly
placed in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be
disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the
second suit is for a different cause, the right, question or fact once so determined must,
as between the same parties or privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as
the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified. Public policy and sound practice
demand that "at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law." Reipublicae ut sit finis litium.

DECISION

MARTIN, J.:

The prime issue presented to Us in this special civil action for certiorari and/or

mandamus, which was certified by the Court of Appeals on July 15, 1975, involves the
rule in determining whether an order is final and appealable or is merely interlocutory.

Sometime in 1962, Pedro San Miguel, 1 the predecessor-in-interest of the herein

petitioners, commenced a "Complaint for Partition of Real Estate" before the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan against private respondent Pablo San Miguel. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2624, sought the partition of Lot No. 4543 of the Lolomboy
Estate, which is a portion of original Lot No. 3237 and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-15369 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. Traversing the complaint,
respondent Pablo San Miguel disclaimed co-ownership and asserted exclusive ownership
of Lot No. 4543.

Subsequently, on March 19, 1964, the then trial judge, Ricardo C. Puno, ordered the
dismissal of the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court for
"apparent lack of interest in the prosecution of the respective claims of the litigants." cralaw virtua1aw library

Eleven years thereafter, another complaint for partition, docketed as Civil Case No.
4300-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, was instituted by the same Pedro San
Miguel against private respondent Pablo San Miguel. This time, the complaint prayed for
the partition of Lot No. 4543 (covered by TCT No. T-15369, Bulacan) and Lot No. 3269
(covered by TCT No. T-15370, Bulacan). In due time, Pablo San Miguel filed his answer,
pleading therein the defense of res judicata. For him, the same subject matter and
cause of action had already been litigated upon and resolved in the previous Civil Case
No. 2624. After preliminary hearing, the respondent Judge issued an order on
December 10, 1973, dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M "insofar as Lot 4543 is
concerned" in view of the principle of res judicata.

The case was ordered to proceed as regards Lot No. 3269, and on July 31, 1974,
respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the parties "as CO-OWNERS to present
to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, a PROJECT OF PARTITION,
dividing Lot No. 3269 (Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15370, Bulacan) into two equal
parts." Petitioners received a copy of this decision on August 13, 1974. cralawnad

On September 12, 1974, petitioners interposed their appeal from this judgment of the
trial court. On said date, their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal were
filed.

On December 9, 1974, respondent Judge approved petitioners’ corrected record on

appeal but "insofar only as Lot No. 3269 is concerned . . . because the case with
respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL, cannot be appealed anymore, and
therefore any record on appeal thereon will be useless, moot and academic. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a "Petition
for Certiorari And/Or Mandamus" before the Court of Appeals on February 5, 1975, but
the latter court elevated the petition to Us upon discovering that only questions of law
are raised.

It is readily discernible that the decisive question in this case is whether or not the
order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973, dismissing Civil Case No.
4300-M as regards Lot No. 4543, is final and appealable.

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that" (o)nly final judgments
or orders shall be subject to appeal." Interlocutory or incidental judgments or orders do
not stay the progress of an action nor are they subject to appeal "until final judgment
or order is rendered for one party or the other." The test to determine whether an order
or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be done in the
trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does
not, it is final." 2 A court order is final in character if it puts an end to the particular
matter resolved or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, 3 such that no
further questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. 4 The
term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the
cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future
determination. 5 The order or judgment may validly refer to the entire controversy or
to some definite and separate branch thereof. "In the absence of a statutory definition,
a final judgment, order or decree has been held to be . . . one that finally disposes of,
adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on
the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which
concludes them until it is reversed or set aside." 6 The central point to consider is,
therefore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties. A court order, on the
other hand, is merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional and leaves substantial
proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. 7 The word "interlocutory" refers to
"something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which
decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." 8

1. We find that the order of dismissal entered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No.
4300-M on December 10, 1973, is a clear final and appealable order. The said order is a
final disposition of the whole controversy between the parties with respect to the
ownership of Lot No. 4543. It is absolute and conclusive on all questions in regard
thereto. 9 The trial court’s order is not a mere narrow acceptance of private
respondent’s plea of res judicata. It has more the far-ranging effect of confirming
private respondent’s claim of exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543, as previously
adjudicated in the prior Civil Case No. 2624. It imports that private respondent is the
sole owner of this specific lot; as a result of which, the deceased Pedro San Miguel or
his successors-in-interest for that matter stand to suffer the loss of what they claim is
their rightful share thereto. 10 After the issuance of this order, nothing more was left
for the trial court to try or decide, as the conflicting claims of the parties over the
subject lot have already been resolved. As a matter of fact, this final order of dismissal
cannot even be assailed by certiorari. The remedy is appeal, which petitioners herein
have failed to undertake. 11 The fact that the other lot, Lot No. 3269, remained under
litigation and the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by the final
court would not affect the final nature of the subject order, because a decree is
nonetheless final although some independent branch of the case is reserved for future
consideration. 12

2. Reason lies in the order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973,
foreclosing the re-litigation of Lot No. 4543 because of the March 19, 1964 order of the
then trial Judge, Ricardo C. Puno, in Civil Case No. 2624, which involves the same lot,
dismissing the case for lack of interest to prosecute. This dismissal order of the said
trial Judge has the effect and consequences of a dismissal on the merits under Section
3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was neither without prejudice nor
based upon lack of jurisdiction. 13 It is worthy to note that the deceased Pedro San
Miguel interposed no appeal therefrom. Instead, he attempted to revive the subject
matter of that Civil Case No. 2624 (Lot No. 4543) eleven years thereafter, when he
commenced Civil Case No. 4300-M, praying for the partition of Lot No. 3629 and Lot
No. 4543. This, the deceased Pedro San Miguel could not do so. Litigation on this
particular Lot No. 4543 must reach a terminal point. The principle of estoppel by
judgment, one of the aspects of the doctrine of res judicata, precludes the re-litigation
in another action of a specific question actually litigated and determined in a former
one. 14 The second case, Civil Case No. 4300-M, is barred by the prior judgment in the
first case, Civil Case No. 2624, insofar as it relates to Lot No. 4543. For, there is
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred as far as Lot
No. 4543 is concerned. Likewise, the judgment in the first case is a final one rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits. 15

3. There is no doubt that access to the courts is a constitutional guarantee. This is,
however, subject to limitations. Once the rights of a party-litigant have been
adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, the party-litigant can no
longer litigate the same again. 16 A right, question or fact distinctly placed in issue and
directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be disputed in a
subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit
is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must,
as between the same parties or privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as
the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified. 17 Public policy and sound practice
demand that "at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law." 18 Reipublicae ut sit finis litium. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

It results, therefore, that respondent Judge did not abuse his discretion when he issued
the order of December 9, 1974, approving petitioners’ corrected record on appeal
"insofar only as Lot 3269 is concerned . . . because the case with respect to Lot 4543
has long became (sic) FINAL . . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

ACCORDINGLY, the order of December 9, 1974, subject matter of this petition, issued
by respondent Judge in his Civil Case No. 4300-M, approving petitioners’ corrected
record on appeal with respect only to Lot 3269, is hereby affirmed. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168985               July 23, 2008

ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST INC., a.k.a. ARTS 21 CORPORATION, and TADAHIKO

HASHIMOTO, Petitioners,
vs.
ERLINDA B. ALABANZA, for and in behalf of her deceased husband, JONES B.
ALABANZA, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision1 dated April 15, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated July 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84206.
 The Facts

The facts of the case, as narrated in the Decision of the CA:

On September 27, 2002, private respondent Erlinda B. Alabanza (Erlinda, for brevity), for and in
behalf of her husband Jones B. Alabanza (Jones, for brevity) filed a complaint against petitioners
Accessories Specialists, Inc. (ASI, for brevity) also known as ARTS 21 Corporation, and Tadahiko
Hashimoto for non-payment of salaries, separation pay, and 13th month pay.

In her position paper, respondent Erlinda alleged, among others, that her husband Jones was the
Vice-President, Manager and Director of ASI. Jones rendered outstanding services for the
petitioners from 1975 to October 1997. On October 17, 1997, Jones was compelled by the owner of
ASI, herein petitioner Tadahiko Hashimoto, to file his involuntary resignation on the ground that ASI
allegedly suffered losses due to lack of market and incurred several debts caused by a slam in the
market. At the time of his resignation, Jones had unpaid salaries for eighteen (18) months from May
1995 to October 1997 equivalent to ₱396,000.00 and US$38,880.00. He was likewise not paid his
separation pay commensurate to his 21 years of service in the amount of ₱462,000.00 and
US$45,360.00 and 13th month pay amounting to ₱33,000.00. Jones demanded payment of his
money claims upon resignation but ASI informed him that it would just settle first the money claims
of the rank- and-file employees, and his claims will be paid thereafter. Knowing the predicament of
the company, Jones patiently waited for his turn to be paid. Several demands were made by Jones
but ASI just kept on assuring him that he will be paid his monetary claims. Jones died on August 5,
2002 and failed to receive the same.

On the other hand, the petitioners contend that Jones voluntarily resigned on October 31, 1997.
Thus, Erlinda’s cause of action has already prescribed and is forever barred on the ground that
under Article 291 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from an employer-employee
relationship shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrues. Since the
complaint was filed only on September 27, 2002, or almost five (5) years from the date of the alleged
illegal dismissal of her husband Jones, Erlinda’s complaint is now barred.

On September 14, 2003, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo V. Abdon rendered a decision ordering the
petitioners to pay Erlinda the amount of ₱693,000.00 and US$74,040.00 or its equivalent in peso or
amounting to a total of ₱4,765,200.00 representing her husband’s unpaid salaries, 13th month pay,
and separation pay, and five [percent] (5%) on the said total award as attorney’s fees.

On October 10, 2003, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal with motion to reduce bond and
attached thereto photocopies of the receipts for the cash bond in the amount of ₱290,000.00, and
appeal fee in the amount of ₱170.00.

On January 15, 2004, public respondent NLRC issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion to
reduce bond and directing the latter to post an additional bond, and in case the petitioners opted to
post a surety bond, the latter were required to submit a joint declaration, indemnity agreement and
collateral security within ten (10) days from receipt of the said order, otherwise their appeal shall be
dismissed. The pertinent portion of such order reads:

After a review however of respondents-appellants['] instant motion, We find that the same does not
proffer any valid or justifiable reason that would warrant a reduction of the appeal bond. Hence, the
same must be denied.

WHEREFORE, respondents-appellants are hereby ordered to post a cash or surety bond in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award of Four Million Seven Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand and
Two Hundred Pesos (₱4,765,200.00) granted in the appealed Decision (less the Two Hundred and
Ninety Thousand Pesos [₱290,000.00] cash bond already posted), and joint declaration, indemnity
agreement and collateral security in case respondents-appellants opted to post a surety bond, as
required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC New Rules
of Procedure as amended within an unextendible period of ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
this Order; otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed for non-perfection thereof.

SO ORDERED.

On February 19, 2004, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the said order. However, the
public respondent in its resolution dated March 18, 2004 denied the same and dismissed the appeal
of the petitioners, thus:

The reduction of appeal bond is not a matter of right but rests upon our sound discretion. Thus, after
We denied respondents-appellants['] Motion to Reduce [B]ond, they should have immediately
complied with our 15 January 2004 Order directing them to post an additional cash or surety bond in
the amount equivalent to the judgment award less the cash bond already posted within the extended
period of ten (10) days. In all, respondents had twenty (20) days, including the ten (10)-day period,
prescribed under Article 223 of the Labor Code and under Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC New
Rules of Procedure, within which to post a cash or surety bond. To seek a reconsideration of our 15
January 2004 order is tantamount to seeking another extension of the period within which to perfect
an appeal, which is however, not allowed under Section 7, Rule VI of the NLRC Rule. x x x

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents-

appellants is hereby DENIED and the instant appeal DISMISSED for non-perfection thereof.

SO ORDERED.

On April 22, 2004, the aforesaid resolution became final and executory. Thus, herein private
respondent Erlinda filed a motion for execution.

On May 31, 2004, the petitioners filed an opposition to the said motion for execution. On June 11,
2004, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo Abdon issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. 3

On May 28, 2004, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA and prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction. On June 30, 2004, the CA issued a TRO directing the respondents, their agents, assigns,
and all persons acting on their behalf to refrain and/or cease and desist from executing the Decision
dated September 14, 2003 and Resolution dated March 18, 2004 of the Labor Arbiter (LA).

On April 15, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. On July 12, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On September 8, 2005, petitioners posted the instant petition presenting the following grounds in
support of their arguments: 1) the cause of action of respondent has already prescribed; 2) the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the
appeal of petitioners for failure to post the complete amount of the appeal bond; and 3) the monetary
claim was resolved by the LA with uncertainty.
 The Issues

The following are the issues that should be resolved in order to come up with a just determination of
the case:

I. Whether the cause of action of respondents has already prescribed;

II. Whether the posting of the complete amount of the bond in an appeal from the decision of
the LA to the NLRC is an indispensable requirement for the perfection of the appeal despite
the filing of a motion to reduce the amount of the appeal bond; and

III. Whether there were sufficient bases for the grant of the monetary award of the LA to the
respondent.

The Ruling of the Court

We resolve to deny the petition.

Petitioners aver that the action of the respondents for the recovery of unpaid wages, separation pay
and 13th month pay has already prescribed since the action was filed almost five years from the time
Jones severed his employment from ASI. Jones filed his resignation on October 31, 1997, while the
complaint before the LA was instituted on September 29, 2002. Petitioners contend that the three-
year prescriptive period under Article 2914 of the Labor Code had already set-in, thereby barring all
of respondent’s money claims arising from their employer-employee relations.

Based on the findings of facts of the LA, it was ASI which was responsible for the delay in the
institution of the complaint. When Jones filed his resignation, he immediately asked for the payment
of his money claims. However, the management of ASI promised him that he would be paid
immediately after the claims of the rank-and-file employees had been paid. Jones relied on this
representation. Unfortunately, the promise was never fulfilled even until the time of Jones’ death.

In light of these circumstances, we can apply the principle of promissory estoppel, which is a
recognized exception to the three-year prescriptive period enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor
Code.

Promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it
was intended that the promise should be relied upon, as in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to
enforce it would virtually sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other
injustice.5 Promissory estoppel presupposes the existence of a promise on the part of one against
whom estoppel is claimed.  The promise must be plain and unambiguous and sufficiently specific so
1avvphi1

that the court can understand the obligation assumed and enforce the promise according to its
terms.6

In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the
following elements: (1) a promise was reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; (2) such
promise did, in fact, induce such action or forbearance; and (3) the party suffered detriment as a
result.7
All the requisites of promissory estoppel are present in this case. Jones relied on the promise of ASI
that he would be paid as soon as the claims of all the rank-and-file employees had been paid. If not
for this promise that he had held on to until the time of his death, we see no reason why he would
delay filing the complaint before the LA. Thus, we find ample justification not to follow the
prescriptive period imposed under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will be committed if
we will brush aside the employee’s claims on a mere technicality, especially when it was petitioner’s
own action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the required period. 8

II

Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal for
failure to post the complete amount of the bond. They assert that they cannot post an appeal bond
equivalent to the monetary award rendered by the LA due to financial incapacity. They say that strict
enforcement of the NLRC Rules of Procedure9 that the appeal bond shall be equivalent to the
monetary award is oppressive and would have the effect of depriving petitioners of their right to
appeal.10

Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in case of a judgment of the LA involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer to the NLRC may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission, in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary
awards from the decision of the LA.11 The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond a mandatory
requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the provision that an
appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The
word "only" makes it perfectly plain that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond
by the employer to be the essential and exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be
perfected. The word "may" refers to the perfection of an appeal as optional on the part of the
defeated party, but not to the compulsory posting of an appeal bond, if he desires to appeal. The
meaning and the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute must be determined from the
language employed; and where there is no ambiguity in the words used, then there is no room for
construction.12

The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be
complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC.13 Non-compliance therewith renders the
decision of the LA final and executory.14 This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if
they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the
employer's appeal. It is intended to discourage

employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and
lawful claims.15

In the instant case, the failure of petitioners to comply with the requirement of posting a bond
equivalent in amount to the monetary award is fatal to their appeal. Section 6 of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC mandates, among others, that no motion to reduce bond shall be
entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount
in relation to the monetary award. The NLRC has the full discretion to grant or deny their motion to
reduce the amount of the appeal bond. The finding of the NLRC that petitioners did not present
sufficient justification for the reduction thereof is generally conclusive upon this Court absent a
showing that the denial was tainted with bad faith.
Furthermore, we would like to reiterate that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory
privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules
allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly
followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders
the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision.16

III

The propriety of the monetary award of the LA is already binding upon this Court. As we have
repeatedly pointed out, petitioners’ failure to perfect their appeal in the manner and period required
by the rules makes the award final and executory. Petitioners’ stance that there was no sufficient
basis for the award of the payment of withheld wages, separation pay and 13th month pay must fail.
Such matters are questions of facts requiring the presentation of evidence. Findings of facts of
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise on specific matters, are
accorded weight and respect by the Court. They are deemed final and conclusive, unless compelling
reasons are presented for us to digress therefrom.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
April 15, 2005 and the Resolution dated July 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
84206 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.