1

Chapter 13
d
¡ì i r': lf ii ii l.lll ,,. '',,1)
'i
ii ii"ii i' ,i,l ii'ii ìi i.jl,'ii , ii u, ti i i r i
'.1'

RICHARD SHAPCOTT

å:::'r.tI rIi r*¿4 {..}ti.l r:s [.å'i't t"l :;

' Do states and their citizens have significant moral duties to the members of other
countries?
I Should states and their militaries be morally constrained in the conduct of war?
* Who is morally responsible for the alleviation of global poverty?

Reader's Guide and individuals in their relations with everybody

else? This chapter examines how these questions
Ethics is the study of what actors ought to do, rather have been answered by different thinkers and actors
than the explanatory study of what they have done in world politics and discusses three significant and
or are doing. Globalization increases the scope difficult ethical issues entailed by globalization. The
and intensity not only of human political and eco- chapter begins by defining ethics and introducing
nomic relationships but also of our ethical obliga- the dominant methods used in thinking about eth-
tions. Globalization makes it harder to draw clear ics. lt then discusses the main frameworks for engag-
ethical distinctions between insiders and outsiders. ing issues in international ethics: cosmopolitanism,
How should we think about ethics, and what prin- statism, and realist ethics. lt concludes by examin-
ciples ought to guide the policies of states, non- ing the ethical dimensions of global poverty and
governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, just war.
 Chapter 13 lnternational ethics 2O5

uction
ethics is not concerned with explaining treated according to the same principles as insiders,
but rather with evaluating and offering it as moral equals. The second examines what treating
about what ought to be done in moral terms. outsiders as equals might mean in substantive terms'
argte that ethics is inherent in all analysis International ethics examines a series of related moral
quandaries. Should we be prepared to go without in
oractice of international politics. Thus in addi-
io obvlout issues such as human rights, states
and order to help outsiders, and if so, how much? Do we
actors face ethical issues in all realms of action owe substantive duties of wealth redistribution or
immigration and the conduct merely charity? Should we be willing to forgo advan-
ethics focuses on the nature tages from a free trade agreement if it causes harm

transboundary duties and responsibilities and

in to others? How should we balance our obligations to
how members of political communities- compatriots with those to others who are affected by
nation-states-ought to treat those beyond their our actions?
Because globalization increases interconnections
Two types of questions lie at the heart of this field between communities, it also increases the variety
stu<ly. The first is whether 'outsiders' should be of ways in which communities can harm each other'

ng Op¡n¡ons 13.1 Should states be morally free to reject as many immigrants, including
as they choose?

Against
sovereignty over their own territory and population State control over immigration is a denial of the human right
gives thern the r¡ght to choose who enters and who becomes of free movement. lf all humans are free and equal or should be
¡ memben. Sovereignty is a basic norm of the international order treated as if they are, then it follows that freedom of movement
and is embodied in international law. lnternat¡onal law asserts is an important human right and that people cannot be free to
ody a right of departure but no corresponding duÇ to permit entry. pursue their ends if they are not free to migrate. lt is inconsistent
on5 Therefore states are not obliged to consider the interests of out- to both uphold human rights and limit immigration.
in niaking their decisions regarding immigration
tors lmmigration restrictions Preserve unjustifiable social and
and need to be able to determine their own mem- economic privileges. Rich states preserve their inherited posi-
-[he tion of pr¡vilege by preventing. people from moving freely. This
The bcrship. most important thing a state can provide is mem-
bership in a political community. One of a statet purposes is to cannot be justified morally: 'Limiting entry to rich democratic
:ing
embody the specific values of its people and give them form states is a crucial mechanism for protecting a birth right privilege.
:th-
in governmental structures and policies. Justice is not global in lf feudal practices protecting birth right privileges were wrong,
iag- nature; ¡t is the product of the practices and values of particular what justifies the modern ones?' (Carens 2013:226).
5m, communities. lt ¡s up to a state's members to determine what will
Members of states have both positive duties to their own
lin- benefit thenr; they have no positive duties to advance the welfare
ofoutsiders or grant them entry. States need to be able to exclude
members and negative duties to outsiders. Recognizing
and negative duties to outsiders requires that members can pursue
from entry those who will pose a threat to their nat¡onal values.
their own goals only if they do not harm outsiders in doing so.
A state cam only achieve social goods such as welfare if it Refugees and asylum seekers may be harmed ¡f they are not
can control the number and type of members of the com- allowed entry into safe states and are instead housed in camps for
nun¡ty. States necessarily need to exclude some people in order long periods or returned to places from which they fled because
to achieve the benefits of social cooperation in a closed system. of a'well founded fear of persecution'. The harm they may suffer
The provision outweighs the benefit received by the host state in refusing them.
of welfare and other benefits such as education can
be provided to members of a defined community.

Does state sovereignty

mean that the members of political communities have no duties to those beyond their borders when it
comes to immigration?
ls freedom of movement as important as other human rights?

What values
should we employ to make decisions about immigration and asylum?
 206 RICHARD SHAPCOTT

either intentionally or not. For instance, globalization In a globalized world, communities are
makes it harder to ignore the impact of day-to-day to develop new principles or refine old ones to
actions, such as driving a car or buying new clothes, ern these interactions. However, the lack of any
on the global environment and in the global econ- standard of fairness and justice among states
omy. Governance of the global economy also raises this task more difficult, because it raises the
ethical issues of fairness associated with the rules of of whose principles should apply. A fundamental
international institutional structures. Globalization cal challenge thus emerges in our globalizing
exacerbates and intensifies these ethical dilemmas by 'Is it possible to define some principles that
increasing the frequency and magnitude of effects that might be able to agree upon?'
different communities and individuals have on each However, not all international ethical questions
other. In particular, it allows for a far greater aware- this form. Others address the problems associated
ness of the suffering of 'distant strangers'. Under these the consequences ofaction, such as how best to
conditions, the ethical framework associated with humanitarian aid, or whether development aid
Westphalian sovereignty-which accords only minor hinders those it is directed towards. While these
moral signifrcance to the suffering of outsiders- debates are important, they assume a positive answer
seems less adequate (see Opposing Opinions f3.l). the question'Should we treat all people as equal?'

The study oi ethics: methods

There are many different approaches to ethics which characterized as between an abstract
outline how to think methodically about ethical method which seeks to identify moral rules
issues. Most academic debate on international ethi- dent of the values of any particular way of life or
cal issues draws on traditions of reasoning from ana- spective, and a deeply contextualized method
lytical philosophy, specifically deontological and sees ethics as extending from the nature ofthe
consequentialist approaches to ethics, and espe- ships among people. Analytical philosophy tends to
cially Kantianism and utilitarianism. Deontological universalistic, while continental approaches are
approaches spell out rules that are always right for tical of abstract universalism. Analytical
everyone to follow because they are right in them- is most associated with liberal ethics, and
selves and not because ofthe consequences they may philosophy is more often connected to Hegelian,
produce. Kantian approaches emphasize rules that are munitarian, and poststructuralist approaches.
right because they can be, in principle, agreed on by Poststructuralist approaches to ethics are
everyone (universalizability). of the vocabulary of universalism, liberalism, and cos-
In contrast, consequentialism judges actions mopolitanism and even of the idea of humanit¡ as
by the desirability of their outcomes. Realism (see as that of statism and the state. They argue that
Ch. 6), for instance, judges a statesperson's actions as terms are at best contradictory and at worst simply allow
right or wrong depending on whether they serve the further forms of domination. Thus while cosmpolitan-
state's interests. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, ism invokes a universal community of humankind,
judges acts by their expected outcomes in terms of poststructuralists argue the content of that community
human welfare and the 'greatest good of the greatest is not universal but the reflection of Western, liberal
number'. Of course, not all ethical codes are derived enlightenment conceptions of what a humari is, there-
from these traditions; religion arguably provides fore justifying exclusion of those who do not fit this
,l
most of the world's moral guidance. Howeyer, most description. They argue that concepts such as hurnan-
everyday ethics, including religious ethics, are often ity and humanitarianism are used to justify war arró
a mixture of both deontological and consequential unequal treatment of non-Western'others'. Proponent$
considerations. of poststructuralism are not necessarily anti'
An alternative style of thinking about ethics cosmopolitan, but in practice their ethics challen$e
draws upon continental philosophy. The difference dominant and taken-for-granted meanings, especially
between analytical and continental philosophy is best those purporting to be universal.
 Chapter 13 lnternational ethics 2O7

be noted that the heritage ofEuropean and necessarily particular, not universal. The more con-
thought dominates academic discussion tested dimension of cosmopolitan thought concerns
ethics. Christianity informs this debate attempts to define exactly what obligations and rules
especiallywith regard to'just war' thinking
dis- ought to govern such a universal community and
below. In contrast, 'non-Western' traditions of guide the policies ofstates and other actors. The advent
thought have been largely absent. Thus a cur- of globalization prompts us to ask whether human
for the field from post-colonial thinkers beings ought to be considered as a single moral com-
challenge
to incorporate and engage with ethical thought munity with rules that apply to all (cosmopolitanism)
or as a collection of separate communities, each with
outside the dominant
canon'
its own ethical standards and with no common moral-
ity among communities,
eúical sign ificance of boundaries: Most ethical thought on international relations
polltanism and statism occurs within a cosmopolitan horizon whereby our
relps
understanding these distinctions is important fundamental moral claims derive from our status as
of methods, a more important distinction human beings, which means that we have at least some
terrns
in practice and theory between cosmopolitan- moral duties to all humans everywhere. At a minimum
(see Box l3.l) and some forms of communitari- this means that there are no good reasons for exempt-
Cosmopolitans, including deontologists and ing any person from ethical consideration a priori: no
argue that morality itself is universal: human should be treated as less than human. In the
1¡uly moral code will be applicable to everyone international realm, cosmopolitan thought is most
what defrnes us morally is our humanity. often expressed in terms of a commitment to human
argue that morality is derived from rights. Universal human rights are appiied to all human
values of particular communities and is therefore beings regardless of morally irrelevant features such as
race, gender, and beliefs-they embody the idea that
13.1 Cosmopolitanism all humans have equal moral standing. More gener-
all¡ a cosmopolitan commitment means one's national
identity and well-being should not come at the expense
should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its
of outsiders. Obligations to friends, neighbours, and
ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first
fellow citizens must be balanced with obligations to
(Martha Nussbaum 1 996: 7) strangers and to humanity.
I, com- Long before the existence of modern states and
cosmopolitanism telecommunications, the Stoic philosopher Diogenes
eptical first, individualism: ultimate units are human beings, or per- claimed he was a'citizen of the world'. Likewise cosmo-
Second, universality: the status of ult¡mate unit of con- politan thought existed in ancient Rome (see Nussbaum
rd cos.
cern attaches to every living human being equally, not merely
as well 1996). However, in modern times, the most compre-
t0 some subset . . . Third, generaliÇ: . .. persons are the ult¡mate
t these of concern for everyone-not only for their compatriots,
hensive defence of cosmopolitanism was provided by
religionists, or such like. Immanuel Kant. The central concept of Kant's thought,
olitan' (Thomas Pogge 1994:9) and his project for a perpetual peace (see Ch. 7) between
nkind, states, is the principle of the categorical imperative (CI)
Ïhe key point is that it is wrong to promote the interest of
nunitY that humans should be treated as ends in themselves
our own society or our own personal advantage by exporting
liberal suffering to others, colluding in their suffering, or benefiting
(see Box 13.2). The effect of this claim is to recognize
from the ways in which others exploit the weakness of the every individual's equal moral standing. The basic
Êt this vulnerable. argument is that treating people as ends in themselves
sÍnall' (Andrew Linklater 2002: 1 45) requires us to think universally. Restricting moral con-
ar and cern to members of onet own state or nation renders
Statism
onent$ any belief in equality incomplete. Therefore national
A world of cliversiÇ in which the varieÇ of national cultures
aíti' xnds expression
borders are 'morally' irrelevant. The major tasks of cos-
in different sets of citizenship rights, and dif-
úlenge Îêrent schenres mopolitanism have been to defend moral universalism,
of socialjustice, in each community.
eciallY (David Miller 2002: 976) to explore what it might mean for individuals and other
actors to follow the CI in a world divided into separate
 208 RICHARD SHAPCOTT

doing something, usually duties to avoid

".P,,*.J,:r4*J-ls",.l¡gg,giigrl,,,Tpg:*ll',våi:i,+.,-i:;,\i harming others. States have traditionally
The categorical imperative states that for a rational being to negative duty of non-intervention that requires
act morally, ¡t must act according to universal laws. Specifically, refrain from certain actions. Problems arise in tþs
one should Act only on that maxim through which you can
cussion ofnegative duties because they rely on a
at the same time will that it shall become a universal law'
(quoted in Linklater
clear line of causation. If one state is harming
1 990: 100). This means that, to act morally,
a rational person must act on a principle that anybody could then it should cease doing so; however , sofiìetir¡gs
wish everybody else to obey in respect of everybody else. For effects of actions are diffuse, or more than one
Kant, the most important expression of this ¡mperative was the may be engaged in a harmful practice, as in the
principle that humans should be treated as ends in themselves:
global warming (see Case Study 13.1). A negative
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in the person of any other, never simply
to cease harming implies only a cessation of
as a means, but always at the same time as an end'(quoted in
however, some argue that there is also a positive
Linklater 1990: 101). An example of a violation of this princi- to prevent other harms occurring, as well as duties
ple is slavery because slaves are humans who are reduced to compensation or redress. This distinction is
the status of the property of others. Warfare between states in understanding responses to global poverty.
is likewise another violation, because it reduces both citizens
Andrew Linklater argues that it helps to think
and non-citizens alike to means of achieving (the states') ends.
cosmopolitan duties in terms of three types of
tionships. First, bilateral relationships: what'we' do
states, and to develop an account of a cosmopolitan 'them' and vice versa. Second, third-party
political order (see Chs I and 3l). what they do to each other. Third, global
Cosmopolitanism takes many forms. Many religious what we all do to each other (2002,2005).
ethics are cosmopolitan in scope; both Christianity and of the first are cases where one community
Islam preach the moral unity of humankind. However, damaging practices, goods, or by-products to
cosmopolitanism is largely dominated by some form In this case, states have a duty to consider the
of liberal deontological ethics, though a spectrum of efiects they have on each other, as well as a duty to
thought exists within this approach, basing ethics on vent and punish harmful actions of non-state
rights (Shue 1980, Caney 2005), capabilities (Nussbaum and individuals for whom they are directly
2007), social contract, utilitarianism (Singer 2002), or For instance, some states recognize their negative
democratic principles (Held 2003). A distinction is by enacting laws that punish citizens who engage in
commonly made between moral and institutionøl cos, tourism' abroad. An example of the second category
mopolitanism, where the first refers to the acts required when a state is involved in harming either members
ofindividuals, and the second to the rules that govern its own community or those of other states, as in case$
societies. Cosmopolitan duties to recognize individual of genocide. Third-party states and the internationat
equality apply to individuals as well as to the global community also have duties to prevent, stop, or punish
institutional/legal order. the perpetrators of these harms. The third relationship
A further important distinction is made between refers to practices or harms to which many communi-
positive and negative duties. Positive duties are duties ties contribute, often in different proportions, as in the
to act, which may include duties to create a just social case of global warming (see Case Study 13.1). States
order, or duties of assistance (beneflcence, mutual aid). have a negative duty not to export harms to the world
Humanitarianism involves a positive duty to aid those as a whole and a positive duty to contribute to the reso-
in dire need or who are suffering unnecessaril¡ wher- lution of issues arising from such harms.
ever they may be and regardless of cause. This includes
aid to the victims of famine and natural disasters, but Thick and thin cosmopolitanism
also to those who suffer during wartime, such as non- While cosmopolitanism has traditionally been jux-
combatants and soldiers retired from the field. The taposed to communitarianism or statism (the view
idea of a positive duty underlies the doctrine of the that states provide the boundaries of our moral con-
international responsibility to protect (see Ch. 3l), cern and are ethical agents in their own right), manf
which spells out the responsibilities of states to uphold thinkers now prefer to distinguish between 'thick' ano
human rights both within their own borders and 'thin'forms of cosmopolitanism because there is a high
abroad. Negative duties are duties to stop or avoid degree of convergence on cosmopolitan principles such
i
 Chapter'13 lnternationalethics 2O9

13.1 Ethics of globalwarming

are also positive duties on the part ofthe richer states to aid the
poorest states and populations, as they will be disproportion-
ately affected and have contributed least to GW For instance, the
Pacific island states are barely industrialized but are likely to be
the first to disappear. lf we have harmed someone, we ought to
help them overcome the harm we have caused them, especially
if they are unable to do so unassisted. That is, there is not only a
negative duty to cease or reduce GHGE, but also a positive duty
to redress the damage done to others. This is an issue of retribu-
tive justice-a duty to aid those most affected by one's harms.
The overall cost to rich states of addressing GW, including the
likely impacts of rising sea levels and other environmental conse-
quences, are proportionally lower than for poor states. This issue
is of course complicated by the fact that the production of GHGE
is so central to economic growth, especially in industrializing
ethics of the
global commons are explicitly cosmopolitan countries. Poorer countries are at a disadvantage in both regards.
sense that they refer to the earth! env¡ronment as a sin- Any attempt to curtail their GHGE entails immediate costs and
community that creates a human community of implies a restriction on the prospects for economic growth in
ile'do This ethics emphasizes that national gains or those countries that need it most. lndeed, there is even an argu-
need to be sacrificed or moderated if environmental ment that'people in the developing world need to increase their
are to be solved and the 'tragedy of the commons' is emissions in order to attain a minimally decent standard of living
avoided. for themselves and their families' (Singer and Gregg\)O{:57). For
warming (GW) is a good example of both positive and rich states, dealing with climate change might only affect the lux-
duties. At face value it seems reasonably clear that there ury or non-necessary aspects of their qualiÇ of life, whereas for
negative dutiesfor those countries that have contributed and poor states, reducing emissions will more likely affect the basic
most to GW to cease doing so. Most people would necessities of life and survival.
that we should all take responsibility for harming someone
especially if we have benefited from doing so. ln the case
this would mean that there is a proportionate respons¡- Question 1: How should we assess and determine moral respon-
sibility for climate change?
for the advanced industrial countries, especially the United
Europe, Japan, and Canada, to reduce their greenhouse Question 2: Should the poorest countries and their citizens be
emissions (GHGE) and to take financial responsibility for the able to continue to increase carbon emissions and the richest
tegor'l that their past and future emissions cause others. There countries reduce theirs dramatically?
mbers

importance of basic human rights. The more sig- persuasive account ofthe practices ofstates. In contrast
differences occur over the extent or demand- to thick cosmopolitans, thin or statist cosmopolitans
but not the existence, of ethical obligations argue that people have at most only minimal duties not
borders. to harm, to aid in case of emergency, and to help uphold
as ln most ambitious 'thick' liberal cosmopolitans minimal human rights standards. Thin cosmopolitans
). that the political institutions of the planet should are usually statists who defend the state as a means to
le global equality ofrights and goods, or global realize national and communal self-determination and
ism. 'Thick' cosmopolitans emphasize autonomy; they are critical of cosmopolitan goals of
positive (i.e. justice and aid) and negative (i.e. replacing state sovereignty with a single global ethic.
duties across borders and these duties Even though our world may be characterized by high
discussion of global distributive justice. levels of interdependence, this perspective suggests we
]-en cosmopolitans emphasize institutional duties still tend to live morally 'constrained' lives, in which
he envision a radically transformed global order in national borders have significant ethical status. Thin
ral states all states conform to principles of global cosmopolitanism often draws upon communitarian
arguments that morality is 'local' to particular cultures,
thick cosmopolitanism in one form or times, and places. It emphasizes 'associational' duties
tends to predominate in academic debate, that arise as a result of membership in a bounded com-
cosmopolitanism or statism tends to be a more munity with shared social goals and practices, such as a
¡i

2'lo RICHARD SHAPCOTT

nation-state. Any duties to humanity are at best attenu- understood, of their actions. For insta¡çs,
ated and mediated by states. As a result, individuals in such as Henry Kissinger may advise
such a communityhave greater and more specific duties state, such as Laos, if this will serve
to their'own kind'before any to outsiders. Compatriot of defeating the enem¡ North Vietnam.
priority means that we have limited, largely negative, this approach may also involve support to
duties to those outside our own community. However, with poor human rights records, süch as
this does often involve a commitment to a sort of cos- the military rule of Augusto Pinochet,
mopolitan 'basic moral minimum', for which the posi- Pakistan toda¡ in order to secure an advantage
tive duty to offer assistance in times of need, such as a military foe, such as the USSR or Al Qaeda.
temporary famine relief or humanitarian emergency the critics say that this can slip into spportunism,
aid, and the negative duty not to harm or inflict unnec- ing it possible to justify almost any actions 6¡
essary suffering are the most important. grounds, realists maintain that statespeople þ¿ys
Poststructuralist approaches to ethics aim to disrupt to their own people first and that ignoring this
this ethical binary by focusing on the ways in which name of some Kantian ideal would be a
both liberal cosmopolitanism and statism invoke strat- that duty (Morgenthau 1948).
egies of exclusion and domination and can also serve Many realists proclaim such self-interested
to unjustifiably limit the nature of responsibility to virtuous and agree with E. H. Carr's scepticism
'others' (Campbell 1995). Some poststructuralists see those individuals and states claiming to act in the
themselves as reframing the meaning of cosmopoli- of universal morality (1939). Thus contemporary
tanism away from abstract individualism (Burke 2011; ists, such as fohn Mearsheimer, are sceptical
Dallmayr 2013). former US President George W. Bushk aims of
ing democracy in the Middle East and the claim in
National Security Strategy of the United States
Realist ethics
American values are universal values' (NSS 2001
The most influential alternative to cosmopolitanism Realists believe that such statements are usually
has been Realism (see Ch. 6), which claims that the a cynical mask or a self-interested delusion. In
facts of international anarchy and sovereignty mean there are no such universal values, and even if
that the only viable ethics are those of self-interest and were, anarchy would prevent states from acting
survival. Many people have charact erizeð.realist ethics accordance with them.
as Machiavellian at worst and amoral at best. Realist Realists are vulnerable to the observation that
ethics seems to contradict universal ethics such as every choice that states face is between survival
human rights. But realists, such as Hans Morgenthau destruction, rather than, sa¡ advantage or
and George F. Kennan, often argue that underlying this It does not stand to reason that seeking advantage
toughness is a different, more pragmatic, morality (see the statesperson to opt out of conventional morality
Box 13.3). The statesperson's duty is to ensure the sur- the same way that survival might. It is a limitation of
vival ofthe state in the uncertain conditions ofinterna- realist writers that they simply favour the national
tional anarchy. To do otherwise would be to risk the lives est over the interests ofoutsiders. In other words,
and interests of his or her own people. Thus self-help is display a preference for the status quo, the state
a moral duty and not just a practical necessity. Realists and nationalism which is not fully defensible. This
therefore advise states to focus on material and strategic ritism reminds us that realism is as much
outcomes rather than on the moralit¡ conventionally and normative as it is descriptive and explanatory.
Some realist theorists have argued that the
ism of Hans Morgenthau lends itself to
Box 13.3 Morgenthau on realism
policy. For instance, Beardsworth contends that
The appeal to moral principles in the internationut ,pfruru conditions of globalization, realist emphasis on respon
has no concrete universal meaning ... that could provide sibility for one's own community and
rational guidance for political action ... it will be nothing but
between the political and moral means there are
the reflection of the moral preconceptions of a particular
empirical and self-interested reasons for
nation.
(Hans Morgenthau) to engage in cosmopolitan policies regarding matters
global concern, such as climate change (2015).
 Chapter 13 tnrernar¡ona! ethics Zl1

support to cosmopolitan ethical theory emphasizes the primacy of duties to fellow

ization lends
idea of a universal human community in nationals.
advances the
everybody is treated as equal. ¡ Realists argue that necessity demands a statist eth¡cs,
duties, restricting moral obligations to the nation-state and its
l¡tans emphas¡ze both positive and negative
to survival, and counsel prudence rather than'moralism'in the
expressed in terms of responsibilities Provide
assistance o r hospitality and responsibilities pursuit of state interests.
¡tarian
to harm
r Some realists argue that under conditions of globalization
the primacy the statesperson's responsibilities now include
Cosmopolitanism emphasizes
to humaniÇ, while thin cosmpolitanism cosmopolitan ism.
obligations

ction
justice, poverty, and starvation
thics
especially since to preyent something bad from happening, without
ølobalizing of the world economy>
produced thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral
i..ond World War, has undoubtedly
inequalities and an increase in the number importance we ought, morally, to do it' (1985: 231)'
proPortion of humans suffering from absolute pov-
Individual people in afiluent countries, and in affluent
sections ofpoor countries, thereby have a positive duty
and starvation (see Ch. 28). CosmoPolitans such
tln point out that globalization also means that of assistance to those who are in danger of losing their
isnow enough wealth and resources to end global lives from poverty-related causes'
relatively quickly and cheaply. The existence To justify this claim, Singer asks us to consider the

both signifrcant inequality and massiYe hunger and following situation: 'if I am walking past a water pond
raises the question of whose responsibility it and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and
either to reduce inequality or to end absolute starva- pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes
especially in the presence of extreme wealth' mudd¡ but this is insignificant' while the death of the
There are three main lines of argument concerning child would presumably be a very bad thing' (1985: 231)'
hat to global poverty. The first is the utilitarian If we think it wrong to let a child die for fear of muddy-
val in favour of demanding individual positive ing our trousers, then we ought also to think it is wrong
ofassistance. The second is the global egalitarian to let a child, or millions of other people, die from hun-
for a globally just distributive system' The ger and poverty when it is in our capacity to prevent it
is the sufficientarian argument that states have without incurring a significant loss. Therefore we, who
positive duties to aid but not to ensure global are able to help, have a positive duty to aid those in need
Cutting across the latter is Pogge's argument by devoting a significant percentage of our discretion-
the powerful have a negative duty to cease violat- ary income to poverty relief' (see Box 13'4)'
human rights by imposing an unjust international Singer's argument is powerful and intuitively plau-
and financial order upon the world's poor sible but it face some serious challenges' The most
important criticism is that this approach is likely to
f,
Singer solution
re
Box 13.4 Peter Singer on poverty alleviation
to Peter Singe¡'globalization means that we
value equality ... at the global level, as much as Each one of us with wealth surplus to his or her essential needs
value political equality within one society' (2002: should be giving most of it to help people suffering from pov-
Singer argues that an impartial and universalist erty so dire as to be life-threatening. That's right: l'm saying that

utilitarian) conception of morality requires that you shouldn't buy that new cat take that cruise, redecorate the
house or get that pricey new suit. After all, a S1,000 suit could
who can help ought to, regardless of any causal
save five childrent lives.
tters with poverty. He argues for a comprehen- (Singer 1999)
principle of assistance where 'if it is in our power
'È,1

:: ).
2'12 RICHARD SHAPCOTT
.:i
l

i be ineffective because it relies upon individuals acting

Box 13.5 Rawls and the'origi
j out of moral obligation. Many argue that this will be
insufficient and some form of state action is required Rawls argues that justice begins with the 'basic
because of the enormity of the problem and general society, by which he means the way in which major
unwillingness to make the sort of sacrifice that Singer tutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and
the division of advantages from social cooperation,(
demands. Furthermore it does not address the issue of
7). To be just, society must have just basic assu mpt¡ons
the wealthy's role in contributing to poverty.
who has rights, or equal moral standing, and duties,
benefits materially from the production of goods and
Rawls's theory ofjustice is both a procedural account
Global egal¡tar¡anism and Liberal of
and a substantive one, concerned w¡th d¡stribution of
institutional cosmopolitanism and advantage. Rawls's social contract is the result of an
ment in which members of a closed society have þss¡
Liberal institutional cosmopolitans, such as Charles
they must design its basic rules. The catch is: no
Beitz, Darrel Moellendorf, and Thomas Pogge, argue know where he or she may end up within this
that global interdependence generates a duty to create be wealthy, poor; black, white, male, female,
a globally just institutional scheme (global egalitarian- ligent, etc. All they know about themselves is that they
ism) in which all people everywhere enjoy the same capacity to conceive of the good'and to think rationally
ends, and that they possess certain basic physical needs.
basic rights and duties and have an equal chance to
describes this as decision-making behind 'a veil of
lead a full life. This goes far beyond poverty relief or
Rawls thinks rational contractors constrained in this way
charity and envisions a total overhaul ofall global and choose a society in which each person would have ,an
domestic institutions so that all people benefit equally right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties
from participation in the world economy. For Beitz patible with a similar scheme of liberties for others' (1971

and Moellendorf, lohn Rawls's substantive account of He also thinks there would be a form of equality of
well opportunity. This he refers to as the difference
as
justice can provide the criteria for justice globally (see
where inequality is unjust except in so far as it is a
Box 13.5). Rawls rejected the possibility of global dis- means to improving the position of the worst-off
tributive justice modelled on his theory. However, most society. For the international realm, a second contracting
Rawlsians argue that Rawls's conclusions do not follow sion takes pface between the representatives of peoples.
from his own premises.
Global egalitarians argue that the basic structure mutual advantage but rather a'modus vivendi'or
of international order should be governed by cosmo- interested coexistence. Furthermore, there is no
politan principles focused on the inequalities between consensus or shared sense of community or
individuals rather than states. Beitz and Moellendorf upon which to ground universally applicable norms
agree with Thomas Pogge's claim that the difference distributive justice.
principle-that 'the terms of international cooperation Instead of being a single global economy or
... should ... be designed so that the social inequali- as envisioned by global egalitarians, statists and
ties ... tend to optimize the worst representative indi- ers argue that the system is comprised ofseparate
vidual share'-should apply globally (Pogge 1989: with their own purposes. Distributive justice
25I).ln practice, this reduces to a claim that the global only within each state and according to its own
original position might require compensation 'for the poses. Therefore, they argue, there are only duties
uneven distribution of natural resources or to rectify assistance to provide sufficient relief to address
past injustices ... and a portion ofthe global product worst aspects ofpoverty for the worldt poor but not
actually attributable to global (as opposed to domestic) justify a permanent arrangement for redistributian
social cooperation should be redistributed' (Beitz 1979: resources, such as a taxation system.
169) (see Box 13.7). The most influential account of a statist
However, not all liberals agree with this claim. itan ethics is fohn Rawls's The Løw of Peoples (19
Instead a number ague along thin cosmopolitan lines According to Rawls, liberal states have no
that the circumstances of justice do not apply globally. tan duties to globalize their own conception of
There is no single global state, or demos, that parallels tributive justice. For Rawls, the conditions
the domestic state. Rawls argues that justice requires a for global distributive justice are not present.
system offair social cooperation for mutual advantage; societies are to be understood as if theyhave onlyminr
and the global international order is not a system for mal impact on each other. Therefore the best that
 Chapter l3 tnrernationai erhies 213

Rawls's'law of PeoPles' Box 13.7 Thomas Pogge on ¡nternational order

The affluent countries and their citizens continue to impose

and
arefreeand independent, and theirfreedom a global economic order under which millions avoidably die
are to be respected by other peoples.
each year from poverty-related causes. We would regard it as a
grave injustice, if such an economic order were imposed within
are to observe treat¡es and undertakings.
a national society.
are to observe a duty of non-intervent¡on. (Pogge 2001)

have the right of self-defense but no right to

war for reasons other than self-defense.
united by a communal bond' (Pogge 1994:97). Pogge
are to honour human rights.
is therefore critical of both Singer's solution and the
are to observe certain specified restrictions in the
-ìn statist alternative, while pointing to the rules and
ual uct of war.
principles of the current international order to show
ey
to assist other peoples living under
PeoPles have
a duty
how the most powerful states fail in their own duties
conditions that prevent their having ajust or
unfavourable as implied in the Universal Declaration of Human
and social regime (mutual aid).
decent Political
(Rawls 1999) Rights (see Box 13.7).
The principal opposition to a thick cosmopolitan
account of global justice derives largely from stat-
ì hoped for is a
'law of peoples', which covers rules ist premises employing what Pogge calls explana-
self-determination, just war' mutual recognition tory nationalism, that the causes of poverty are
non-intervention, mutual aid, and basic largely national rather than international or global.
rights (see Box 13.6) According to this perspective, the primary causes of
poverty are domestic culture, corruption, and lack of
bers
democracy. Therefore there is no global causal respon-
sso lution sibility to address other peoples' mistakes (Miller
Singer, Thomas Pogge emphasizes the causal 2007). However, Pogge and Wenar seek to show that
between the wealth of the rich and the the most powerful states are also complicit in the
or ofthe poor. Pogge argues that the rules ofthe maintenance of undemocratic and corrupt states
:lo order actively disadvantage certain sec- in a number of ways, including the practice of brib-
of the world's population and that the most power- ery and what Pogge calls the international resources
orms states are violating the rights of the world's poor to privilege. This refers to a sovereign state's entitlement
and fair economic system. Indeed, Pogge argues to sell resources and the rights to them, regardless
the richest countries are collectively responsible of the legitimacy of the government (see Box 13.8).
about 18 million deaths from poverty each year Pogge has also argued that the practices ofthe global
the wealthiest states have a negative duty to cease
this order on the poorest people of the world.
Box 13.8 The international resource privilege
Pogge also argues that these negative duties not to
uties others give rise to positive duties to design a , The international resourceprivilege... isthelegal powertocon-
iess international order in such a way that the most i fer globally valid ownership rights in the country's resources'
rt not benefrt. The structure of international trade ... Whoever can take power in ... a country by whatever means
can maintain his [sic] rule, even against widespread popular
rtion economic interdependence should ensure that,
opposition, by buying the arms and soldiers he needs with
an unequal distribution of material resources revenues from the export of natural resources and with funds
no individuals should be unable to meet borrowed against future resource sales. The resource privilege
basic requirements for survival, nor should thus gives insiders strong incentives towards the violent acqut-
suffer disproportionately from a lack of mate- sition and exercise of political power, thereby causing coup
resources. Statist objections do not cancel out attempts and civilwars. Moreover, it also gives outsiders strong
incentives to corrupt the officials of such countries who, no
obligation: 'There is an injustice in the economic
matter how badly they rule, continue to have resources to sell
which it would be wrong for more afflu- and money to sPend.
participants to perpetuate. And that is so quite (Pogge)

y of whether we and the starving are

 I
.t
il 214 RTcHARD sHApcorr
I
1 1
I
I

i
pharmaceutical industry activel¡ and avoidably, con- today has much less significant poverty th¡q
i tribute to poverty-related ill health and mortality in past and that the global economic and politic¿1
I
the world's poorest states (Pogge 2009; Wenar 2008). despite its inequities, has improved the plig51
l
However, at least one critic has argued that the world world's poor (Risse 2009).
l

¡ Discussions of globaljustice are dominated by utilitarian and o Thick cosmopolitans argue thatjustice requires a
Rawlsian theories which emphasize either individual or egalitarian distribution of wealth and resources.
institutional responsibilities for poverty alleviation.
¡ Thin'statisf cosmopolltans argue that there are only
o Cosmopolitans argue that there is a responsibility of the rich humanitarian duties of assistance to the poor rather than
to help the poor, stemmingfrom positive and negative duties. redistributive duties of j ustice.

Just war tradition

The just war tradition (lWT) (often erroneously humanitarian law, such as the Geneva
referred to as just war theory) is a set of guidelines as well as treaties limiting the use and deployment
for determining and judging whether and when a state certain weapons, including chemical weapons,
may have recourse to war and how it may fight that mines, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
war (see Box 13.9, Box 13.10 and Case Study f3.2). ultimate referent is humanit¡ and the rules about
The IWT is concerned with applying moral limits portionalit¡ non-combatant immunit¡ and
to states' recourse to war and to limiting harms that nation all refer to the rights of individuals to be
states can commit against other states, military forces, from harm.
and civilians. It consists of three parts: the jus ad bel- From a realist perspective, the just war
lum (justice of war), the jus in bello (justice in war), imposes unjustifiable limits on statecraft.
and the recently formulated jus post bellum (justice politics is the realm of necessit¡ and in warfare
after war). lus ad bellum refers to the occasion of going means must be used to achieve the ends of the
to war, jus in bello refers to the means, the weapons, Necessity overrides ethics when state survival or
and tactics employed by a military in warfare, and jus itary forces are at risk. The state must judge for
post bellum refers to conditions which follow the war when it is most prudent to wage war and hoq and
(Orend 2002). is necessary for victory.
The just war tradition has both cosmopolitan and Without a doubt the most controversial element of
statist elements. It is associated with Christian the- JWT is the principle of double effect, which holds it
ology since Augustine as well as with what Michael is permissible for non-combatants to be killed as long
Walzer calls the legalist tradition. In this view, what is as they are not targeted and instead are 'collateral
acceptable or unacceptable consists ofrules about and damage'. Many argue that this is simply too perrnis-
for states, concerning what states owe each other. The sive and allows for too much avoidable civilian death.
justifications for war are given not to God or human- For instance, Michael Walzer argues that combatants
it¡ but to other states. The only acceptablejustifications should seek to minimize foreseeable but uniritentional
for war are the defence of individual state sovereignty deaths such as may arise from targeting a munitions
and, arguabl¡ the defence of the principle of a society factory in a heavily populated area (1977).
ofstates itself. Pacifists and others argue that rules such as double
We can compare this with the more cosmopolitan effect provide war with a veneer of legitimacy andpet'
elements of jus in bello, which refer explicitly to civil- missibility. For these critics, not only is killing always
ians and to what is owed to them in terms of harm wrong; the fWT is unethical because its core doctrines
minimization (see Case Study 13.2). The jus in bello enable war by providing the tools to justify it mof'
principle informs and has been codified in international ally (Burke 2004, fochnick and Normand lggÐ. Thß
 Chapter 13 ånëes.natie¡¡¡al ethics 2l 5

The just war

þellum or defence of a third party'

cause
lh is usually means self-defence
onlY statescanwagelegitimatewar.Criminals,corporations,andindividualsareillegitimate.
authoritY'
state leader must be attempting to address an injustice
or an aggression, rather than seeking glory expansion,
the
intention:

otlooÏ ----^-^Lr^ avenues of nr have

rrinn or
resolution
^r.ocnt¡ nô choice because of
harrp no imminent attack
leaders must have exhausted all other reasonable
'

ïUrronthe reasonably expect to win'

of success: states should not begin wars they cannot
ir*^^rt"hope restore the peace or restore the status quo'
....tinn of Ðeace: it is just to Wage a War if the purpose is to
war
"'t'::^:.;;. themeansofwaçincludingthewarirself,mustbeproportionatetotheendsbeingsought
rn . ,¡ tt"' '""hp ' ât DroDorttonate
ProPot ";*"^nr"ndends:
response to the threat. states must use minimal
force in order to achieve their objectives For instance'
rlru"
-,,.r threat to your terr¡tory'
iEell
or their civirian popurations in order to remove a
justifiabre to comptetery destroy enemy forces
it is not

in bello and weaponry. Thus it is not justifiable to completely

of means: states must use minimal, or proporlio nate, force
ProPortionalitY For example, a state should not use a nuclear
forces if you can use enough force to merely defeat them.
destroy thÊ enemYl
a conventi onal one might do.
weapon whetr
including soldiers retired from the field' or civilians
immun¡ty: states should not directly target non-combatants,
r Non-com batant is central to just war theory 'since
immunity
ntions, not required to achieve military aim s. Non-combatant
and civilian ¡nfrastructure
How can a theory that claims to regard wars as an instrument of justice
much of its coherence-
nent of w¡thout ii that theory loses
involved in the systematic suppression of the ri ghts
of non-combatants?' (Coates 1 997 263)'
, land- countenance the injustice "
(but foreseeable) consequences' for
The law oí double effect: actions
may incur non-combatant losses if these are unintended
)). The deaths can really be unintended if they are
examp le civilrans living adjacent to
an arms factory' However the real issue is whether
ut pro- those deaths in the same way as
foreseea ble The dilemma facing
just war theorists is whether responsibility should be ascribed for
icrimi-
for interrcied deaths.
lxempt

Jus post beå[um (ProPosed)

rdition .Propo.tionalityandpublicity:thepeacesettlementshouldbemeasuredandreasonable'
war'
ational ¡ the basic rights, the violation of which originally triggered
Vindication of rights: the peace settlement should secure
.re any civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from
punitive post-war measures. This rules out sweeping socio-economic
¡ Discrimination:
3 StAte, sanct¡otls as part of post-war punishment'
punishment must be meted out'
rr mil- ¡ punishment 1: when the defeated country has been a blatant, rights-violating aggressor, proportionate
r itself trialsforwarcrimes'soldiersalso
r punishment2.theleadersoftheregime,inparticular,shouldfacefairandpublicinternational
to
d what comn¡it war crimes. Justice after war requires that such soldiers,
from all sides to the conf lict, likewise be held accountable
investigatìon and possible trial
proportionality and discrimination'
rent of I Compensation: financial rest¡tution may be mandated, subject to both
olds it . Rehabti¡tat¡on. the post-war environment provides an opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime' Such
in the regime (Orend 2005)'
rs long reforms are permissible but they must be proportional to the degree of depravity

lateral
ermis-
death,
,atants
'i
Box 13.10 lslamic just war tradition
rtionai (limited) times it
the teachings (hadith) of Muhammad that at
I
The ethrcs of war are central to lslam. lt is clear from both the Koran and purpose
litions it often said that while lslam's ultimate
is incurnbe¡rt upon Muslims to wage war if only for defensive reasons. For this reason
is

in lslam. others have argued both that lslam is in

is to bring peace through universai submission to Allah, there is no 'pacifist' tradition
authorities have argued that
Jouble principie compatible with pacifism and that lslamic pacifists exist (Brown, 2006)- At times some Muslim
death' with the establishment
tdPer' there is a cluty to spread the realm of lslam through war, as happened in the centuries after Muhammad's
of the caliphate. others-the majority-argue that the Koran sanctions war only in self-defence
Most lslamic authorities reiect both
ùwaYs 'occupied' or threatened territory of the
Al Qaedal interpretation of defence' and its strategy of attacking civilian targets outside the
)ftines right
there are lslamic equivalents of thejus ad bellum clause'
'. Ínor'
'Dar al tslam,as
illegitimate ¡nterpretations. Most interpreters argue that
authority, right intent, and somejus in bello clauses, including civilian immunity'
). This
216 RICHARD SHAPCOTT

Case Study 13.2 Targeted assassination and drones

these deaths were avoidable. Just war thinking might

tifu these deaths underthe law of double effect. Howeve¡
US policy allows two questionable forms of target
defining any grouping of military-age men as possible
combatants; and defining possible targets according to
tern-of-life analysis'(i.e. based upon a persont patter¡
iour rather than any clear intent or specific intelligence).
practice directly contradicts double effect, but neither
tees not inadvertently targeting no
Walze/s due care argument, that
willing to put ¡ts own members in harrn's way in order ¡e
civilian casualties, there is a case for using more
but higher-risk methods such as special operations forces (l
The use of a Navy seal team to assass¡nate Osama bin Laden
gests that there are alternatives to drones that might result
O www.istockphoto.com/ Warwick Lister-Kaye fewer civilian casualties.
Assessing proportionality is even more difficult and
Just war trad¡tion suggests acts of war need to be necessary be separated from assessments about civilian deaths and
discriminatory and proportionate to the ends. Proponents of importance of individual enemy targets. Perhaps some
drones argue that they provide higher levels of discrimination als indeed pose a high threat risk, but can we be sure this is
and are more proportionate than alternative uses of force. From in all cases, especially for unnamed targets?
the perspective of the military employing them, drones offer a Arguably, the more serious ethical questions concern
clear moral benefit because they reduce the risk of military per- moral status of those targeted for assassination. Are they
sonnel deaths to zero. The proponents argue that drones have and thus morally innocent but legitimate targets, in which
allowed the United States to dramatically increase 'targeted jus in bello rules apply; or are they criminals, in which case
killings'of individuals identified as threats and affiliated wíth Al are morally non-innocent and due process applies? However, the
Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and yemen and process by which individuals are selected and ranked for execu.
currently against so-called lslamic State in lraq and Syria. t¡on without due process (especially in the case of those targets
Assessing how necessary or beneficial it is to use drones for tar- specified by the CIA) cannot be justified by either ¡nternational
geted killing is difficult. For instance, it may generate more hos- humanitarian law or domestic US law.
tility towards the attacker, especially in the event of unintended (Enemark 207 1; Gross 2006)
civilian deaths, and become an ¡mpetus for new enemy recruits.
On the other hand, continual decapitation' of an organization's
leadership could undermine its long-term capacity and therefore Question l: Are there any circumstances that can justify the use
of targeted assassination using drones?
reduce its threat.
Assessing discrimination is also difficult because of the lack of Question 2: Does the advent of drones and remote target¡ng
reliable data. Estimates of civilian deaths from drone attacks in challenge the moral equivalency among soldiers in conventional
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and other countries vary greatly, wa¡{are and therefore the permissibility of killing using these
but it is clear that many civilians have died and at least some of methods?

problem is not solved by the shift to discourses of soldiers on the battlefield are mutually vulnerable to
humanitarian war. According to Zehfuss, it is a con- each other that they can be permitted to kill each other
tradiction in terms to defend humanitarian aims while (1977). The minute that any given soldier is no longer
attacking individual human beings; this serves only to a threat to another, i.e. the minute they lay down their
provide further arguments for expanding the realm of arms, they are no longer permitted to be killed oï io kill.
warfare (2012). The justness of their cause or the unjustness of their
Arguably the biggest ethical problem for just war opponents are not in themselves sumcient b petmit
thinking concerns identifying what circumstances killing.
permit the initial suspension during wartime of the However, feff McMahan has controversially asserted
usual moral prohibition against killing. Michael Walzer that just cause arguments need to be linked to jus irt
argued the 'moral equality of soldiers' allows them to bello: engaging in an unjust cause may permit you to be
kill, that it is legitimate to use lethal force against some- killed but does not allow you to kill others .Discardírtí
one who will do the same against you. It is only because the argument for the moral equivalence of soldiers'
 Chapter 13 lnternationa! ethics 217

states: 'For unjust combatants, therefore,

r,,.rlrii
..iã -:;'i:,
with few exceptions, no legitimate targets of
-';:.r..;-.*-'r ¿",, .,....,,1 -. .,. . .
",.:.*r..

action. In general, noncombatants and just r There are three components of the just war tradition: jus
ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum.
are alike impermissible targets for unjust
(2006 30). o Just war thinking permits war but requ¡res it to be fought
accord ing to certai n restrictions.
speaking, just war thinking tends to be jus-
that it is better to r Just war thinking has both cosmopolitan and stat¡st
on consequentialist grounds, arguments.
most try to abide by and accept lim-
aworldwhere o The rule of double effect is the most controversial aspect of
when and how they wage
war than the alternative
just war thinking.
such restraints. Pacifists tend to invoke deonto-
o Justifying war requires thinking carefully about the
grounds for their opposition to war, which con- circumstances in which killing is permissible.
reject.

:n sug.

lr¡slon

chapter has outlined some of the main approaches international order, most state practices and most people
lividu"
international ethics and applied them to considering continue to give priority to their compatriots' This holds
of the most important ethical issues that char- true especiallywith regard to issues like global warming
rn globalization. Ethical issues confront all actors and immigration, where doing otherwise might entail
ol
the international realm, and especially states because potentially self-limiting compromise' While disagree-
:h
their greater capacity to aid or harm others. Given ment remains, there is nonetheless significant agree-
;e
scope of interdependence occurring under global- ment that basic human rights should be observed, that
for most writers the question is not whether, freedom from poverty and starvation is universally
how, to be ethical in the international realm. While desirable, and that national boundaries should not pre-
are elements of cosmopolitanism present in the vent us from treating all others with respect.

;2006)

:he use

rgeting Questions
ntional
1 these 1. What is the core idea of cosmopolitanism?
2. What are the ethical implications of globalization?
3. Should communities always give more weight to their members' interests, or should outsiders'
interests sometimes come first?
rable
4. Do the leaders of states have responsibilities to the community of humankind as well as their
own people?
5. ls national identity as morally irrelevant as gender or race?

rto 6. In what ways does globalization challenge statist ethics?

7. Does realism provide sufficient ethical guidance under conditions of globalization?
B. ls there a responsibility for rich countries to end global poverty?
9. Are negative duties sufficient for addressing global and international ethical issues?

1 0. ls just war thinking adequate for assessing contemporary ethics af war?

o ius
ou to
 218 RICHARD SHAPCOTT

Further Reading

Hashmi, S. H. (ed.) (2002),lslamic Polítical Ethics: Civil Saciety, pluralism, and Conftict
Princeton University Press). An insightful collection of essays exploring the domestic a¡¿
international ethics of lslam.
Miller, Ð. QA07), National Responsibility and GlobalJustice (Oxford: Oxford University press).
A systematic treatment of li beral nationalist anti-cosmopolitan ism.
Nardin, T., and Mapel, D. (ed$ (1992),Traditions af International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambri
Uníversity Press). The most comprehensive account to date of the ways in which people
thought about international ethics.
Pogge,I (2008), World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms,
edn (Cambridge: Polity Press). Develops the most detailed and rigorous argument in favour
cosmopol itan principles of distributive justice based on negative obligations generated by ricþ
countries' complicity in global poverty.
Rawls,J. $999),The Law of Peoples (cambridge, MA: Harvard university press). Rawls's own
contribution to international ethics develops someth¡ng like an ethics of coexistence among
'reasonable peoples'.
Rosenthal,J., and Barry C. (2009), Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader,3rd edn (Washington;
DC: Georgetown University Press). A useful selection of readings covering important
contemporary topics in the theory and practice of international ethics.
Shapcott, R. (2010), lnternational Ethics: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press). A detai
examination of the differences between cosmopolitanism and its critics, exploring their
ramifications ín the areas of migration, aid, wa¡ and poverty.
Singel P. (2002), One Warld: The Ethics of Globalisation (Melbourne: Text Publishing). The most
important utilitarian argument in favour of positive duties to redistribute wealth from the rich
the poor. lt also examines the ethics of global trade and global warming.
Walzer, M. (2000),Just and lJnjustWars: A Moral Argument with Historical |llustrations (New York:
Basic Books). A classic philosophical and historical study on the just war tradition and ethics of
more generally.

Online Resources

To access more learning resources for this chapter go to www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/

3) baylisTe/