Hailah Dilangalen Cases 85, 89-99

85. Nissan Motors Phils., Inc. v. Sec. of Labor and Employment, 2006
89. Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Forms v. NLRC, 1998
90. Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez, 1993
91.New Pacific Timber and Supply v. NLRC, 2000
92.Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz, 1972
93.Babcock-Hitachi (Phils) v. Babcock-Hitachi, 2005
94.Kimberly Clark Phils v. Lorredo, 1993
95.Davao Integrated v. Abarques, 1993
96.Imperial Textile Miles v. Calica, 1992
97.The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v.
Bureau of Labor Relations
98.Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Dev’t Employees,
1995
99.Panay Electric Co. v. NLRC, 1995
 Nissan Motors Philipppines, Inc. vs. Sec. of Labor
G.R. NOS. 158190-91, June 21, 2006
Garcia, J.

Facts:

The case turns on the labor disputes triggered by a collective

bargaining deadlock between Nissan Motor and the union resulting in the
filing of four notices of strike with the national conciliation and mediation
board. The first notice of strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor
practice, stemmed from the suspension of about 140 company employees
following the disruptive protest action arising from the employees’ demand
for payment of the second of their 13th month pay. The union filed the
second strike notice on the ground of deadlock in collective bargaining
involving a mix of economic and non-economic issues.

The DOLE, upon Nissan motor’s petition, issued an order assuming

jurisdiction over the dispute at Nissan motor. The dole expressly enjoined
any strike or lockout and directed the parties to cease and desist from
committing any act that might exacerbate the situation, and for the union to
refrain from any slowdown and other similar activities that may disrupt
company operations or bring its production to below its normal and usual
levels.

Issue:

WON the slowdown violates the CBA.

Ruling:

The conclusion of the public respondents, secretary of labor and

employment, as confirmed by the CA, is that the union and its members
indeed “engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances in which
they were undertaken constitute illegal strike.” The defiance came in the
form of the continuation of the slowdown enjoined in the underlying
assumption order, by the strike actually staged by the union, its officers and
members, the closure of the company’s offices and plant premises and the
barricading of the main gates. In fact, the Dole Secretary had to ask the
intervention of the Laguna Philippine National Police to assist the company
in opening what appeared to be padlocked and welded gates leading to
company’s hands were not entirely clean, having contributes to the ensuing
deteriorating impasse between labor and management.
 Samahang Manggagawa Sa Top Forms Manufacturing United
Workers vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 113856, September 7, 1998
ROMERO, J
Facts:

Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing —

United Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified collective
bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of private
respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. At the collective
bargaining negotiation, the parties agreed to discuss unresolved economic
issues. According to the minutes of the meeting, Article VII of the collective
bargaining agreement was discussed.
On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order No. 01
granting an increase of P17.00 per day in the salary of workers. This was
followed by Wage Order No. 02 dated December 20, 1990 providing for a
P12.00 daily increase in salary.
As expected, the union requested the implementation of said wage
orders. However, they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-board
basis. Private respondent refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it
implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion.
Consequently, the union filed a complaint with the NCR NLRC
alleging that private respondent’s act of “reneging on its
undertaking/promise clearly constitutes act of unfair labor practice through
bargaining in bad faith.”

Issue:
Whether or not an employer committed an unfair labor practice by
bargaining in bad faith and discriminating against its employees.

Ruling:
To start with, if there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part
of private respondent to obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-
board wage increase, petitioner union should have requested or demanded
that such “promise or undertaking” be incorporated in the CBA. After all,
petitioner union has the means under the law to compel private respondent to
incorporate this specific economic proposal in the CBA. It could have
invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code defining “duty to bargain,” thus, the
duty includes “executing a contract incorporating such agreements if
requested by either party.” Petitioner union’s assertion that it had insisted on
the incorporation of the same proposal may have a factual basis considering
the allegations in the aforementioned joint affidavit of its members.
However, Article 252 also states that the duty to bargain “does not compel
any party to agree to a proposal or make any concession.”
Thus, petitioner union may not validly claim that the proposal
embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms part of the CBA that it
finally entered into with private respondent.
 Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez
GR No. 102132, March 19, 1993
ROMERO, J

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent, THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE

UNIONS (ATU-TUCP), entered into a CBA providing for 2 sections on sick
leave with pay benefits which apply to both the regular non-intermittent
workers or those workers who render a daily eight-hour service to the
company as governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA, and the
intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the
present regular extra labor pool, as governed by Sec. 3 thereof.

Sec. 1, however, of said CBA had a proviso that only those regular
workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to the
commutation of sick leave privilege. A proviso not found in Sec. 3. This
caused the new assistant manager to discontinue the commutation of the
unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of the intermittent
workers or its conversion to cash.

The Union objected and brought the matter for voluntary arbitration
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board with respondent
Abarquez acting as voluntary arbitrator who later issued an award in favor of
the Union. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not intermittent (irregular) workers are entitled to

commutation of their unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefits.

Ruling:

The CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits which
apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioner’s company, namely:
(1) the regular non-intermittent workers or those workers who render a daily
eight-hour service to the company and (2) intermittent field workers who are
members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool.

Sick leave benefits, like other economic benefits stipulated in the

CBA such as maternity leave and vacation leave benefits, among others, are
by their nature, intended to be replacements for regular income which
otherwise would not be earned because an employee is not working during
the period of said leaves. They are non-contributory in nature, in the sense
that the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the benefits. By
their nature, upon agreement of the parties, they are intended to alleviate the
economic condition of the workers.
 NEW PACIFIC TIMBER SUPPLY CO. V. NLRC
G.R. No. 124224. March 17, 2000
Kapunan, J.

Facts:

The National Federation of Labor (NFL), was certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular employees of new
pacific timber. As such, NFL started to negotiate for better terms and
conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit to which
it represented, however, the same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by
petitioner NFL, so the former was prompted to file a complaint for unfair
labor practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of refusal to bargain
collectively.
The then Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim Abdulwahid, issued an order
declaring (a) petitioner co. guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA proposals
submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the regular rank and file
employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner co.
Petitioner appealed the above order to the NLRC. The NLRC
rendered the decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether the private respondents is entitled to benefits under CBA
inspite of the fact that they were not employed by the petitioner.

Ruling:
It is clear from the provision of article 253 of the labor code that until
a new collective bargaining agreement has been executed by and between
the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law
does not provide for any exception nor qualification as to which of the
economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain force and effect;
therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and
conditions in the said agreement.
In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered into by and between
petitioner company and NFL pending appeal of the decision from the
NLRC; nor were any of the economic provisions and/or terms and
conditions pertaining to monetary benefits in the existing agreement
modified or altered. Therefore, the existing CBA in its entirety continues to
have legal effect.
 Mactan Workers Union vs. Don Ramon Aboitiz
G.R. No. L-30241, June 30, 1972
Fernando, J.

Facts:
Defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. in Lapu-Lapu
City is employing laborers and employees belonging to two rival labor
unions. 72 of these laborers whose names appear in the complaint are
affiliated with the Mactan Workers Union while the rest are members of the
intervenor Associated Labor Union. Defendant Cebu Shipyard &
Engineering Works, Inc. and the Associated Labor Union entered into a
CBA. The Company agrees to give a profit-sharing bonus to its employees
and laborers to be taken from ten per cent (10%) of its net profits or net
income derived from the direct operation of its shipyard and shop in Lapu-
Lapu to be payable in two (2) installments, the first installment being
payable in March and the second installment in June, each year out of the
profits in agreement. If unaacepted, the profit-sharing bonus which the said
employee or laborer is entitled under this Agreement, will be returned to the
Company.

The members of the Mactan Workers Union failed to receive their

shares in the second installment of bonus because they did not like to go to
the office of the ALU to collect their shares. In accordance with the terms of
the CBA, the uncollected shares of the plaintiff union members was returned
by the ALU to the defendant corporation. At the same time the defendant
corporation was advised by the ALU not to deliver the said amount to the
members of the Mactan Workers Union unless ordered by the Court. For the
recovery of claim, this case was filed with the lower court and rendered
decision in favor of the plaintiffs.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in requiring literal compliance
with the terms of a collective bargaining contract?

Ruling:

The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute

the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke
its provisions. Nor does it suffice as a defense that the claim is made on
behalf of non-members of intervenor Associated Labor Union, for it is a
well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement
extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit,
including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor
organization. Any other view would be a discrimination on which the law
frowns. The labor union that gets the majority vote as the exclusive
bargaining representative does not act for its members alone. It represents all
the employees in such a bargaining unit. The assignment of error that the
City Court of Lapu-Lapu was bereft of jurisdiction is singularly
unpersuasive.

Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc. v. Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc. Makati

Employees Union
G.R. NO. 156260, March 10, 2005
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Facts:
Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc., is a manufacturing corporation, with
branches at Makati City and Bauan, Batangas. Sometime in December 1997,
petitioner, to improve the operating efficiency and coordination among its
various departments, formulated a plan to transfer the Design Department
from its Makati office to Bauan, Batangas. With this development,
petitioner, on February 24, 1999, sent separate notices to Justiniano G.
Iniego, Xavier Aguila and Bonifacio B. Vergara, who occupied Engineer 1
positions at the Design Department, of their re-assignment and transfer to
Bauan, Batangas effective April 1, 1999. This prompted them to claim for
their relocation allowance provided by Sections 1 and 2, Article XXI of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
However, petitioner refused to implement the CBA, claiming that the
affected employees are not entitled to relocation allowance under Policy
Statement No. BHPI-G-044A dated October 1, 1996 considering that they
are residents of Bauan or its adjacent towns. Thus, the affected union
members (Justiniano Iniego, et al.), represented by Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.),
Inc., Makati Employees Union,  filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) a complaint for payment of relocation allowance
against petitioner. In a Submission Agreement dated March 18, 1999, the
parties stipulated to submit the case for voluntary arbitration.

Issue:
Whether or not union members are entitled to relocation allowance in
light of the CBA between the parties.

Ruling:
Yes, any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between management and
the union members should be resolved in favor of the latter. This is pursuant
to Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provide that in case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety and decent living for the laborer.
Pertinent are Sections 1 and 2, Article XXI of the CBA which
provides that employees transferred from Makati City to Bauan, Batangas
are entitled to a monthly relocation allowance of P1,500.00, provided their
transfer is permanent or for a period exceeding one month. Such provisions
need no interpretation for they are clear. Contracts which are not ambiguous
are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and not beyond their
obvious intendment. In Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz, we held that "the
terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the
law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can
invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not
fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress."
Kimberly-Clark Philippines vs. Voluntary Arbitrator Danilo Loredo
and United Kimberly-Clark Employees-PTGWO
G.R. No. 103090, September 21, 1993
Vitug, J.

Facts:
Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc. (KCPI), seeks to set aside the
Resolutions of 15 October 1991 and 21 November 1991 of public
respondent Voluntary Arbitrator Danilo Lorredo, holding that the nephew of
a retired employee should be employed by KCPI as his replacement pursuant
to Section 1, Article XX, of their Collective Bargaining Agreement
("CBA"). Danilo L. Guerrero, an employee assigned as Operator B in
KCPI's Finishing Section, voluntarily resigned on 02 January 1991, after
thirteen (13) years and three (3) months of employment with the petitioner
corporation. Pursuant to Section I, Article XX, of the aforementioned CBA,
Guerrero, through the Union, recommended for hiring his nephew who is a
collateral relative within the third civil degree. KCPI informed the Union,
through its President, that it could not act favorably on Guerrero's
recommendee. The private respondent argued that, since Guerrero's
legitimate children are still minors, he could validly recommend for hiring
his nephew.

Issue:
Whether or not Guerrero can recommend his nephew for hiring and
the petitioner corporation is obligated to hire him under 1, Article XX, of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Ruling:
No. A collective bargaining agreement, just like any other contract, is
respected as the law between the contracting parties and compliance
therewith in good faith is mandated. The intention of the parties is
primodial; if the terms of the contract are clear, the literal meaning of the
stipulations shall control, but if the words appear to be contrary to the
evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
The company has agreed in its CBA with the employees "to employ
(an) immediate member of the family provided qualified upon the
employee's resignation, retirement, disability or death." Covered by the term
"(an) immediate member of the family" are the employee's legitimate
children and, in default thereof, a collateral relative within the third civil
degree. As we see it, the phrase "in default thereof" has not been intended or
contemplated by the parties as having a preclusive effect within the group. It
simply sets a priority on who can possibly be recommendees for
employment.
 KCPI is not obligated to unconditionally accept the recommendee
since the latter must still meet the required employment standards
theretofore set by it. And even when the recommendee is qualified, he,
nonetheless, shall be hired only, pursuant to the agreement, on a
"probationary status," an added measure, to further prove his worth for
eventual regular employment. The company is not, therefore, left without its
own safeguards under the agreement.
Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez
GR No. 102132, March 19, 1993
Romero, J.

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent, The Association of Trade Unions

(ATU-TUCP), entered into a CBA providing for 2 sections on sick leave
with pay benefits which apply to both the regular non-intermittent workers
or those workers who render a daily eight-hour service to the company as
governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA, and the intermittent
field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present
regular extra labor pool, as governed by Sec. 3 thereof.

Sec. 1, however, of said CBA had a proviso that only those regular
workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to the
commutation of sick leave privilege.A proviso not found in Sec. 3. This
caused the new assistant manager to discontinue the commutation of the
unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of the intermittent
workers or its conversion to cash.

The Union objected and brought the matter for voluntary arbitration
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board with respondent
Abarquez acting as voluntary arbitrator who later issued an award in favor of
the Union. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not intermittent (irregular) workers are entitled to
commutation of their unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefits.

Ruling:

The CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits which
apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioner’s company, namely:
(1) the regular non-intermittent workers or those workers who render a daily
eight-hour service to the company and (2) intermittent field workers who are
members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool.

Sick leave benefits, like other economic benefits stipulated in the

CBA such as maternity leave and vacation leave benefits, among others, are
by their nature, intended to be replacements for regular income which
otherwise would not be earned because an employee is not working during
the period of said leaves. They are non-contributory in nature, in the sense
that the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the benefits. By
their nature, upon agreement of the parties, they are intended to alleviate the
economic condition of the workers.

INDOPHIL TEXTILE WORKERS UNION- PTGWO VS. CALICA

G.R. No. 96490, February 3, 1992,
J. Medialdea

Facts:
In April, 1987, petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-
PTGWO and private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. executed a
collective bargaining agreement effective from April 1, 1987 to March 31,
1990. Subsequently, Acrylic applied for registration with the Board of
Investments for incentives under the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code. The
application was approved on a preferred non-pioneer status. In 1988, Acrylic
became operational and hired workers according to its own criteria and
standards. Sometime in July, 1989, the workers of Acrylic unionized and a
duly certified collective bargaining agreement was executed. In 1990 or a
year after the workers of Acrylic have been unionized and a CBA executed,
the petitioner union claimed that the plant facilities built and set up by
Acrylic should be considered as an extension or expansion of the facilities of
private respondent Company pursuant to Section 1(c), Article I of the CBA,
to wit, c) This Agreement shall apply to the Company's plant facilities and
installations and to any extension and expansion thereat. In other words, it is
the petitioner's contention that Acrylic is part of the Indophil bargaining unit.
Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of Indophil.

Issue:
Whether Indophil Acrylic is a separate and distinct entity from
respondent company for purposes of union representation.

Ruling:
Yes. Under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity, when
valid grounds therefore exist, the legal fiction that a corporation is an entity
with a juridical personality separate and distinct from its members or
stockholders may be disregarded. In such cases, the corporation will be
considered as a mere association of persons. The members or stockholders
of the corporation will be considered as the corporation that is liability will
attach directly to the officers and stockholders.
In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity
of Acrylic, alleging that the creation of the corporation is a devise to evade
the application of the CBA between petitioner Union and private respondent
Company. The fact that the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are
related, that some of the employees of the private respondent are the same
persons manning and providing for auxiliary services to the units of Acrylic,
and that the physical plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same
compound, it is our considered opinion that these facts are not sufficient to
justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic. Hence, the Acrylic not
being an extension or expansion of private respondent, the rank-and-file
employees working at Acrylic should not be recognized as part of, and/or
within the scope of the petitioner, as the bargaining representative of private
respondent.

The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. BLR

G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003
Carpio, J.

Facts:
Solidbank and Solidbank Employees’ Union (Union) were set to
renegotiate the economic provisions of their 1997-2001 CBA to cover the
remaining 2 years (2000-2001). Negotiations commenced but seeing that an
agreement was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of
Strike on December 29, 1999. In view of the impending actual strike, then
DOLE Sec. Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and in an Assumption Order dated January 18, 2000 directed the
parties “to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might
exacerbate the situation”. In another Order dated March 24, 2000, Sec.
Laguesma resolved all economic and non-economic issues submitted by the
parties.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Union held a rally in front of the
DOLE Office in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with the filing of their
MR.
The employees’ work abandonment/boycott lasted for 3 days. On the
3rd day, President of Solidbank, Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a
memorandum declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees
who will report for work starting April 6, 2000. The remaining 199
employees filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, ULP and damages,
which were then consolidated.

Issues:
Whether or not the protest rally and concerted work
abandonment/boycott is equivalent to a strike.

Ruling:
Art. 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage
of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. The term “strike” shall comprise not only concerted work
stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage,
destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar activities.
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v.
NLRC, Union contends that the protests conducted are not within the ambit
of strikes, since they were legitimate exercises of their right to peaceably
assemble on the doctrine laid down in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization. In the present case, there was an on-going labor
dispute arising from Toyota’s refusal to recognize and negotiate with the
Union. Thus, the Union’s reliance on Philippine Blooming Mills is
misplaced.
In the case at bar, considering that the mass actions stemmed from a
bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of jurisdiction had already
been issued by the Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike, there is
no doubt that the concerted work abandonment/boycott was the result of a
labor dispute.
Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of LDB Employees and
Garcia
G.R. No. 120319, October 6, 1995
Romero, J.

Facts:

From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of

Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to
resolve the following issue: Whether or not the company has violated the
CBA provision and the MOA on promotion. At a conference, the parties
agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in
her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper;
LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter
from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995
no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.

Issue: 
Whether or not a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA
and not the Supreme Court.

Ruling: 

The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel

of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter.
The “(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission …” Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act
No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary
arbitrator. Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a petition
for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or
the CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an
unnecessary burden upon it.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a

governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the
Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term
“instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his
functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him
within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial
instrumentality as contemplated therein. In effect, this equates the award or
decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the RTC. Consequently, in a
petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the CA must be deemed
to have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter of policy, this Court
shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for
proper disposition.
Panay Electric Inc. vs. NLRC and Panay Electric Company Employees
and Workers Association
GR No. 102672, Oct 04, 1995
Vitug, J.

Facts:

The EDP/Personnel Manager Panay Electric Company, Inc

recommended Enrique Huyan to assume the responsibility of gathering
accounting and computer data at its power plant who was at the time an
Administrative Personnel Assistant at the head office.

After an administrative investigation Huyan was ordered dismissed

ont the ground of insubordination for his failure to conform with the
recommendation.

Petitioner assails NLRC's decision insofar as it has adjudged monetary

awards to private respondents Huyan and Napiar and in not sanctioning the
dismissal of other union officers and members.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC erred in granting separation benefits to

Huyan and Napiar, in awarding moral and exemplary damages to the former,
and in merely sanctioning the suspension, instead of terminating the
employment status, of other officers and members of respondent labor
union.

Ruling:

No, NLRC did not err in granting benefits to the two above stated
employees.

In the case of the other union officers, the NLRC, having found no
sufficient proof to hold them guilty of "bad faith" in taking part in the strike
or of perpetrating "serious disorders" during the concerted activity, merely
decreed suspension. We see no grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC in
this regard and in not thus ordering the dismissal of said officers.
 In the case of Huyan, we sustain the NLRC in holding that he, during
the period of his illegal suspension should be entitled to back salaries and
benefits plus moral damages, but in the reduced amount of P10,000.00, in
view of the findings of the NLRC. Exemplary damages, upon the other hand,
are awarded only when a person acts in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner NLRC's findings fall short of the
underhandedness required so as to justify this award.