People VS Quianzon

G.R. No.
42607 September 28, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN QUIANZON, defendant-appellant.
Pedro B. Pobre for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person was being held in the
house of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacion, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with
the usual attendance of the relatives and friends. The incident that led to the filling of these charges
took place between 3 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went
to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the victuals in his
care. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose
whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied ran to the place where the
people were gathered exclaiming that he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to
those present a wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the
tenth day after the incident.
The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have witnessed the wounding of Andres Aribuabo in the
abdomen by Juan Quianzon. However, we find the testimony of this witness so improbable, incongruent
and contradictory that we consider meritorious the claim of the defense that it was an error of the lower
court to have taken it into consideration in formulating the findings of its judgment. Not so with respect
to the testimony of the other witnesses.
Roman Bagabay, one of the persons present at said gathering, testified that he saw Juan Quianzon apply
a firebrand to the neck of Andres Aribuabo who shortly afterwards went toward the place where the
witness and the other guests were gathered, telling that he was wounded and was going to die and
naming Juan Quianzon as the person who wounded him. He also testified that Juan Quianzon, upon
being asked immediately by him about the incident, admitted to him attacked Aribuabo with a bamboo
spit.
Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio lieutenant, who, upon being informed of the incident, forthwith conducted
an investigation, questioned Aribuabo and the latter told him that it was the accused who had wounded
him. He likewise questioned the accused and the latter, in turn, stated that he had wounded the
deceased with a bamboo spit
Upon being brought before Juan Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon confessed
to Llaguno that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded him with a
bamboo spit. Before the chief of police could put this confession of Quianzon in writing, the later
retracted, denying that he had wounded Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit Exhibit B the fact of
having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck appears admitted by Quianzon but not of having wounded
the deceased with a bamboo spit.
It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted the wound which
resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries
because said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had he not twice
removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection.
According to the physician who examined whether he could survive or not." It was a wound in the
abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic peritonitis. The infection was cause by the fecal matter
from the large intestine which has been perforated. The possibility, admitted by said physician that the
patient might have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean that the act
of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal consequence could have
followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical
consequences of the punishable act of the accused.
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury
contributes immediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that the other causes
contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility

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G.R. No.

42607 September 28, 1935

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