CHAPTER FOUR

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The Concept of National Interest

National interest is not only the key concept in foreign policy but also is a

guide to the foreign policy formulation. The history of the concept of national

interest dates back to the time when the evolution of the modem state system took

place. 1 It was and remains an important element to describe the underlying

rationale for the behaviour of states and statesmen in a threatening international

environment. But the idea of separateness, of differentness from others, and the

consequent idea of preserving and protecting one's values against others, goes

back to antiquity. The word "interest" derives from the Latin, meaning "it

concerns, it makes a difference to, it is important with reference to some person

or thing."2

One common-sense definition describes it as the general and continuing

ends for which the nation acts.3 National interest shows the aspirations of the

state, it can be used also operationally, in application to the actual policies and

programmes pursued; it can be used polemically in political argument, to explain,

rationalise or criticise. Above all, all statesmen are governed by their respective

national interest. 4 Whenever a treaty or summit takes place, the statesmen keep

1
Charles A. Beard, The Idea ofNational Interest: An Analytical Study ofAmerican Foreign Policy
(New York, 1934), p. 20; see also James N. Rosenau, "National Interest", in David L. Sills, ed.,
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), vol. 11, pp. 33-39.
2
Beard, Ibid, p. 21.
3
Joseph Frankel, Internntional Relations in a Changing World (Oxford, 1979), p. 85.
4
Ibid, p. 86.

121
their national interest hung round the neg. If a statesmen agrees to concessions or

preferential treatment, he does so only when he is convinced that this brings some

advantage to his state directly or indirectly. For instance, America's approval of

China as a Most Favoured Nation signifies America's interest to catch the

potential market. So this favourable treatment of China, secured not only trade

openings but also friendship. Wh~n China was admitted in the United Nations

through United States endeavour, it showed a greater political cum economical

interest. Co-operation, conflict, war, competition, rapproachment and all take

place keeping in mind the interest of the nation at a given situation.

The crux of the concept as advanced in the post-war years, was that in a

world in which states are "the major units of political life, which command the

supreme loyalty and affection of great mass of individuals."5 Statesmen who are

responsible for and to their separate publics, and who operate in an uncertain and

threatening milieu, have little choice but to put the interests of their own entity

above those of others or those of the international system. National interest, thus

became a synonym for national egoism. One could not rely on others, nor could

one rely on international institutions and processes to protect one's key values.

See what happened in the inter-war period, despite international institutions, such

as- international law, international organisation and international trade, had been

set up to reduce the harshness of "realpolitik", but had culminated in a disastrous

World War II. International institutions are invariably controlled by powerful

countries. Even these international institutions are acted upon to meet the national

5
Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953), p.l 0.

122
 interest of those powerful and influential countries. The values and interests of a

country is national in scope and the protection is necessary which can be done

only by that country. Osgood put it as follows:

National interests is understood to mean a state of affairs valued solely for

its benefit to the nation. The motive of national egoism, which leads men to
seek this end, is marked by the disposition to concern oneself with the
welfare of one's own nation; it is self-love transferred to the national
group. 6

Robert Osgood was absolutely correct in placing the national survival or self-

preservation at the head of the list, because everything else would clearly depend

on the achievement of this goal. He defined survival or self-preservation in terms

of territorial integrity, political independence, and maintenance of fundamental

governmental institutions. 70sgood categorises other important national interest

too, they are, self-sufficiency, prestige, aggrandisement. 8

Charles Beard was of tlte opinion that territory and commerce are

fundamental aspects of national interest.9

Morganthau defmed national interest as "the survival of a political

unit ...... in its identity" as the irreducible minimum of a state's interest vis-a-vis

other units, encompassing in this the integrity of a state's territory, its political

institutions, and its culture. 10

What the nation is concern about?. The prime concern of the nation may be

security of the nation and its people and protecting the values and cultures. It is

6
Ibid, p. 4.
7
Ibid, p. 5.
8
Ibid, pp. 5-6.
9
Beard, n. I, p. 26.
10
Hans J. Morganthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," The
American Political Science Review (Washington), December 1952, p. 973.

123
often believed that there is an irreducible core of national interest for any state at

any given time. This called the vital interest of a nation. The vital interest is that it

is that on which, if necessary, it is prepared to go to war. In other words, the vital

interest is one which is so important for state that it is normally willing to go to

war immediately or ultimately in order to safeguard that interest. The vital interest

of a country is supposed to be so .basic that it is often regarded as permanent.

Hence, it is also supposed to be primary to which all other aspects of the national

interest remain subordinated. The vital character of national interest invariably has

an emotional appeal to the people. Such vital interests include for all states, as a

minimum, the protection and preservation of their independence and territorial

integrity.

Tne vitai aspect of nationai interest chang~:; under the impact of vcui.ous

factors. Sometimes, a change in the values of the leadership or people brings about

a change in the concept of the vital national interest. Sometimes an interest, which

may not have any intrinsic importance, may become vital if it assumes symbolic

value or if it involves the question of national prestige. For example, Soviet Union

intervention in Yugoslavia, was regarded by the Soviet Union as necessary for the

protection of its vital interest. The US intervention in Vietnam was regarded by the

Unites States as necessary for the protection of its vital interests. Since the Second

World War, the economic, psychological, and ideological aspect had been gaining

in importance as far as the character of vital national interest.

Proletarian Internationalism and National Interests

The nature and the closeness of relations are determined by national

124
interests and by perceptions of common threat. The relations among countries ruled

by communist parties were completely different from that of democratic societies.

National interests were superseded by imperatives of ideological unity, both

against the perceived common enemy, "imperialism," and as reinsurance against

attempts to dislodge communist leadership from within. Although day-by-day

affairs of state were conducted on a government-to-government level, but actually

all major policy decisions were made by party leaders who maintained continuous

liaison through separate party channels. It was through these channels that

communist states co-ordinate their common foreign policy positions, their trade

policies, and even their educational systems, which stress communist values based

on Marxist-Leninist teachings. Even when a party-controlled press would view the

national and international events, there were rarely actual contradictions witt'i

interpretations of similar events in other communist countries.

The?retical foundations for communist unity had been developed in the

Soviet Union long before other socialist states came into being at the end of the

Second World War. The Primacy of the Soviet Union, as the only power able to

withstand the pressures emanating from the hostile 'imperialist" environment, was

recognised by all communist parties, whose sacred duty was to protect and advance

Soviet interests, assumed to be in the interest of all, a sine qua non for survival and

success of the communist cause. This assumption had been the very core of Soviet

foreign policy, if not always shared to the same extent by leaders of other socialist

states.

Since the World War II, the world was polarised into two camps: socialist,

125
comprising those ruled by communist parties, and non-socialist, which

encompassed the rest. The prominent characteristic of the socialist was that they

had all undergone a socialist revolution in which the old capitalist ruling classes

lost power to communists, who then transformed their respective societies

politically and economically accordingly to Marxists-Leninist principles. Having

formed a "socialist camp" by the mid-1950s, these states in their foreign policies

had one common interest: they opposed "imperialism" and favour national

liberation movements struggling against it. Ideally, in Soviet theory-and for a while

in actual practice- it was the Central Committee of the CPSU that was called upon

to provide members of the socialist camp, as they conducted their relations with the

outside world, with general guidelines and day-by-day co-ordination.

The doctrine of proletarian internationalism, whose principles and panefru)

. of action were formed in the Comintern period. 11 It was founded on the common

interest in the struggle against imperialism existed within the revolutionary

workers' movement. Proletarian internationalism was an indivisible concept drawn

· from common values rooted in Marxism-Leninism. Proletarian internationalism

was in fact identical with the process leading to the removal of national
I

contradictions. And anything that hinders and checks the elimination of such

contradictions is an expression of and element of nationalism. In order to be in line

with proletarian internationalisation, nation should outgrow national narrow-

mindedness, isolation and exclusiveness. Internationalism is nothing but shedding

11
Heinz Timmennann, The Decline of the World Communist Movement (Boulder and London,
1987), p. 2.

126
of national narrow-mindedness. Nationalism means insistence on the national

element, and internationalism-inversely- rising above the national element.

Therefore, "proletarian nationalist" must free himself of "national narrowness" and

must distinguish himself by his concern for "wider", "common" interests of

humanity and social progress. 12

The Soviet Union became the symbol of all hope for a revolutionary future,

and the defence of the Soviet land became the duty of every Communist. The

member pa.rties of the Comintem copied the Soviet model in all details-

ideologically, politically, organisationally, following the "bolshevisation" decreed

by Stalin. Upholding the Soviet foreign policy and national interest became an

unquestioned duty by all communist parties. Communist were ruled by Stalin's

maxim of 1927:

He is a revolutionary, who without reservations, unconditionally, openly

and honestly. . . . is ready to protect and defend the USSR is the first
revolutionary proletarian state in the world, which is building socialism. He
is an internationalist, who without reservations, without wavering, without
making conditions, is ready to protect the USSR, because the USSR is the
base of the revolutionary movement in the whole world. 13

Loyalty to the Soviet Union was the touchstone for the loyalty to

proletarian internationalism. Under Stalin, the CPSU succeeded in passing off the

idea that the national interests of Soviet Union was good to the health of the world

communism. CPSU demanded that every communist party should place the

12
Kiro Hadzi Vasilev," Internationalism and the Unity of Socialist Forces, Socialist Thought and
Practice (Beograd), no. 4, December 1961, p. 17.
13
Josef Stalin, Selected Works (East Berlin, 1952), vol. 10, p. 45.

127
interests of the entire movement above its own particular interests. Thus Soviet

interests were given priority and made any criticism impossible. All criticism was

outlawed and suffocated, every change of the CPSU line had to be followed

without reservation.

Until the cleavage set in the communist movement, the communist parties

supported Soviet interests with the tacit assumption that they were not serving the

interests of an ordinary state, but rather the bulwark of the revolution, encircled by

imperialism and threatened in its existence. Defence of the Soviet Union and the

socialist camp thus served their own interests as revolutionary parties, since the

USSR represented both a base for future revolutions and at the same time a symbol

that they too had chance to defeat the bourgeoisie with their own force.

'fhe hold over the communist parties changed when the 20:.': Party Congress

abandoned the thesis of capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union in favour of the

idea that world capitalism had entered into a new third stage in its general crisis,

while the international socialist camp was exerting .an ever greater influence on

events in the world. Khrushchev who not only repudiated Stalin's emasculation of

the communist parties, he also propounded that in an international class struggle

characterised by peaceful co-existence, each party would contribute by its own

strategy to shifting the world balance of power toward socialism. 14 The 20th Party

Congress was based on the conviction that "there can be no serious conflict

between the interests of Soviet power and the interests of world revolutionary

14
Timmermann, n. II, p. 37.

128
expansion by independent communist states and movements." 15 Khrushchev

believed in principle in the concordance of interests of all communist parties, in

power or not.

But Khnlshchev's conception of new line proved to be unrealistic. The

proofs came in the Polish·and Hungarian crises of 1956, the second break with the

League of Yugoslav communist in 1,957, the conflict with the Chinese communists

which broke into the open in 1960, and finally the divergences with the Italian

party. The Stalin-Tito rift in 1948 had already made it clear that a common

Marxist-Leninist ideology was not suited to bridging over differences about the

national conditions and interests of the individual parties. On the contrary, when

used as an instrument to legitimise special roads to communism, a variously

interpreted ideology rekindled smouldering conflicts of interests, most ficrcdy in

the argument between Moscow and Beijing. China felt that Soviet Union was

willing to sacrifice the interests of other communist parties to .the expediencies of

Soviet interests. communist parties believed that their party line served Soviet

interests, was an important source of disaffection. 16

Thus, the proletarian internationalism was unable to suppress national

feelings whatsoever. The conflicts were ascribed to rise of Chinese nationalism.

Slowly, national interest of China predominated in their policies against Soviet

Union. And national identity was the core of· the individual in China. And in

carrying the revolution beyond the bourgeois phase, Maoism was actuated not

15
lbid.
16
Benjamin I. Schwartz, Communism and China (Bombay, 1968), p. 36.

129
merely by ideological commitments but also by a vital national interest. It was

determined to turn China into an integrated and modem nation. This was the seed

of resistance to communism to grow. 17

And the differences started growing by leaps and bounds in all possible

way and the old rifts of national expansion had come more emphatic and

complicated. Both regimes were . no longer interested in their relationship

(especially after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU), but were striving to

dominate each other and the world. As result, they had conflicting national

interests emerging out of common interests. Marx and Lenin did not foresee that

communist countries would succumb to the bacillus of nationalism, and that this

germ shattered the unity of the world communist movement. Of course,

.• .. • • • • • 1 • ~ h
nattonausm was taKJ.ng pn:ct:ut:nce over ilitematiOna. commun.1sm .ucm t..err err.

An identical view was expressed by President Nixon in his foreign policy

message that the international communist unity had been shattered the unified bloc

solidarity had been broken by the powerful forces of nationalism. Thus the Marxist

dream of international communist unity had disintegrated.

The Lenin centenary theses of the CPSU' s CC put the same idea in another

way proclaiming that neither nationalism in any of its forms nor national nihilism

were compatible with socialism.

"Marxists doctrine became a camouflage which more or less concealed

nationalist and Imperialist aims," said the Russian opposition writer and historian

17
Ernst Kux, 'Revolution in Eastern Europe -Revolution in the West?, vol. 40, Problems of
Communism (Washington), May-June, 1991, p. 10; and Issac Deutscher, Ironies of History,
(London, 1966), p.l 08.

130
Andrey Amalrik reflected in his famous essay on the possibility of war between

Russia and China coming in respect to the conflict to the following conclusion:

The absolute antagonism of their national-imperial interests and the

conflicting character of the internal processes in each country-
'proletarisation' and the rise of a fearsome 'revolutionary curve' in China
and 'deproletarisation' and a cautious descent along the same curve in the
Soviet Union-quickly put an end to any pretence ofunity. 18

This is the clear sign of an erosion of communist solidarity because of

national self-interest. The Soviet-Chinese schism was playing a paramount role in

the process. The same socio-economic system could not save communist countries

from disagreement and contradiction as was once held. The ruling Parties were no

longer simply national branches of the communist international. It was very

difficult to conceal the national consciousness and national pride in the socialist

internationalism. The international communist conferences of 1957 and 1960 tried

vainly to surmount the vestiges of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism. ·

Each nation has its own national interest connected with peculiarities of its

history, geographical location, economic development, etc.... In the same way,

every socialist state may have its own national interest pertinent to its history,

geographical location, economic development, etc. . . . An underestimation of

national interests and requirements and a striving to accomplish internationalist

tasks without regard for the specific nature of their refractio~ through the prism of

the national consciousness of socialist peoples can harm the cause of unity of the

fraternal countries.

18
Andrey A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Unti/1984? (New York, 1970), pp. 45and 49;
see also The New York Times, February 19, 1970.

131
 Mutual accusation took priority during their conflictual period. The Chinese

described the Soviet leadership as sunk in the mire of bourgeois national egoism.

The Soviets accused the ideological-political platform of the Mao Tse-tung as

nationalistic big-power policy.

Dean Rusk said, in his statement outlining ten elements in American policy

toward communist China, before a dosed session of the Sub-Committee on the Far

East and the Pacific of the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee:

The essential nature of this conflict ... has, if anything, intensified and
widened. Its Russo-Chinese national aspects have become more
conspicuous. 19

Roger Hilsman, Department of Law and Government, Columbia

University, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, declared at

the hearings held by the same Sub-Committee the previous year:

My feeling is that the Chinese communist price for healing the breach will
be too high for the Soviets to pay. In the first place, the Chinese will
undoubtedly insist on a very large share of the leadership of the bloc and a
very large place for Chinese national interests, as opposed to Russian
national interests, in deciding on bloc policy-in both cases probably too
large a share. 20

Edwin 0. Reischauer, a renowned Orientalist and former U.S. Ambassador

in Tokyo, said in his book:

The Chinese had a deep national pride and long and bitter resentments of
the Occident that made the acceptance of Russian domination extremely
distasteful to them. Two such huge and different nations, even though
joined by the same communist faith, did not necessarily have mutually
compatible national interests. 21

19
The New York Times, Aprill7, 1966.
20
Sino-Soviet Conflict Report.and Hearings: Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 3.
21
Edwin 0. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia (New York, 1967), p. 62.

132
 Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the former Cambodian head of state, said in an

address to a young socialist rally that there was a white communism and yellow

communism, and they would collide when their nationalist interest diverge. 22

Walter Lippmann wrote:

I am convinced it is the same conflict which existed when the Emperor of

all the Russians and the Emperor of China were still on their thrones. It is a
conflict of national interests. between the Russians and the Chinese which
has gone on for generations, and it is due to a collision between the
Russians expanding across Siberia to the Manchuria and Mongolia, across
the path of the Russians. 23

Edgar Snow said in his book, after interviewing Chinese communist leaders

and touring two-thirds of the provinces of China proper:

What recent years have revealed is that nationalism inside the communist
system of states threatens to be at least as powerful a factor as the bonds of
class solidarity . which socialist power would theoretically make
unbreakabie. 24

The true nature of the conflict was confirmed by Tito that the differences

were less ideological and more political in character."25

However, Soviet Union and Communist China were nation-states in the

broadest sense, each with a strong sense of self-identity, or that they were states

which thought in terms of national. interest. One can hardly deny the presence of

nationalism in both states. The nationalism of the Communist Chinese leadership

was indeed virulent in intensity and its beginning could already be clearly

discerned in the Yenan period. The relations between Soviet Union and China,

22
U.S. News and World Report, June 22, 1970.
23
New York Herald Tribune. April9, 1962.
24
Edgar Snow, Red China Today: The Other Side of the River, (London, 1970), p. 101.
25
The New York Mirror, August 14, 1962, p. 18.

133
whole period after the final showdown in the Ussuri river could be adequately

described wholly in tenns of national interest calculus. Soviet-Chinese national

interest is seen in through the prism of identical interests (common interests),

complementary interests and conflicting interests during different periods of

regime.

Identical Interest or Common interest

Identical interests between nations obviously are those national interests

which those nations hold in common. 26The degree to which common interests exist

between two nations depends upon the nature of general international relations and

the particular policies of the states in question at a particular point of time. The

range of common interest between Soviet Union and China in 1949-1956 was

certainly greater than in the following periods. Equally the common interest

between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1944 was certainly greater than

what it was in 1953. Thus, the identical interest or common interest is not always

static. For a proper understanding of the common interests of states, it should be

borne in mind that the area of commonness is always subject to change. Therefore,

it should never be presumed that any existing state of affairs would continue in

future or for any definite period of time. The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in

1950 between Soviet Union and China did not last long, albeit their ideological

affinity. The Russo-Gennan Pact signed in 1939 lasted only up to June 1941 when

Hitler invaded Russia. This is so because that nations tend towards keeping their

26
Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice", in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in The
Cold War (Baltimore, 1959), pp. 188- 191; Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defence of the National
Interest, (Chicago, 1950), p. 146.

134
agreements only as long as their doing so is considered helpful in the furtherance

of their national interest. The reason why the area of common interests undergoes

change is the fact that relations of states are neither simple nor static. It is almost

impossible to find out a case of two nations whose interests are completely

incompatible or identical. At any given time, two states are likely to have a number

of opposed as well as common inter~sts.

Complementary Interest

Complementary interests between nations are those which, although not

identical, at least are capable of forming the basis of agreement on specific issues?7

Soviet Union was against United States influence in Europe and China was against

Unites States influence in Taiwan. Equally, England had an interest in maintaining

the Atlantic Ocean off the Iberian peninsula, while Portugal had an interest in

British maritime hegemony as a means of defence against Spain.

Conflicting Interest

Conflicting interests are those national interests of a country against one or

more countries. In the initial period, the relationship between Soviet Union and

China was one of more amicable and their national interests were one of more

identical and complementary than conflicting one. But in the second half of 1950s,

their conflicting interests started overpowering the identical or common interests. It

should be noted, however, that today' s conflicting interests can be transformed

tomorrow, through diplomacy, occurrence of events, or the passage of time into

27
Jbid, p. 146; and The Impasse ofAmerican Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1962), p. 173.

135
common or complementary interests. 28 The same thing might be said about the

possibility of transforming identical or complementary interests into conflicting

interests. Of course, with the passage of time the number of common and opposed

interests of each nation grows or declines, depending on what the current

exigencies of international relations demand.

Of course; the term 'national interest' is a very vague term29 • Nonetheless,

the term 'national interest' is of great significance to the international relations.

National interest is also defined as that which states seek to protect or achieve in

relation to each other. 301t covers desires on the part of sovereign state and these

desires vary enormously from state to state and from time to time. And more so

ever, it is interesting to find out how national interest played its part in the Soviet-

Chinese relations. Co-operation, conflict and rapprochement played a greater role

in Soviet-Chinese relations keeping in mind the national,interests.

Soviet-Chinese National Interests During Stalin Era

After the death of Lenin in 1924 and Sun Yat-sen in 1925, the CCP and the

KMT began to go their separate ways. At the same time, the policy differences

began to develop between the CCP and Stalin. For Stalin, the CCP was but a pawn

· to be used to keep China weak, divided, and out of the control of other great

powers (e.g., Britain in the 1920s, Japan in the 1930s, and the United States in the

1940s). To achieve this goal, Stalin had deeply involved himself in Chinese

28
Hans J. Morgenthau, The Restoration ofAmerican Politics (Chicago, 1964), p. 198, 203.
29
Raymond Aron, trs., Richard Howard and Anneite Baker Fox, Peace and War: A Theory of
International Relations (New York, 1967), p. 89; see also Rosenau, n. 1, p. 34.
30
See Veron Van Dyke, International Politics (New York, 1957).

136
domestic politics from the 1920s onwards keeping in mind the Soviet national

interests which were vital for the security of the newly born communist nation. 31

During the 1920s, Stalin played with three sides in China. He recognised
. .

the official government in Beijing, but rendered assistance to its challenger, Chiang

Kai-shek.

Meanwhile, he fostered the growth of the CCP against KMT leadership. As

for the strategy of Communist revolution in China, Stalin tried to apply Marxist

doctrine. He assigned the leading role to the urban workers, which led to disastrous

consequences for the CCP. During second half of 1930s, Stalin was wrapped up

with the threat of Nazi Germany. His main goal in Asia was to direct Japan's

expansionist drive toward China and away from Siberia. His China policy

underscored to the Chinese communists that he would readily undermine their

interests in order to promote Soviet national interests. Thus, the Xian Incident of

December 1936 was solved in a way to unite China against Japan, and a neutrality

treaty was signed between Japan and the Soviet Union iii 1941. These moves saved

Siberia from Japan, In the mean time, Xinjiang, under the leadership of Sheng

Shicai, almost became Russia's New Frontier.

After the Second World War, Stalin imposed communism in the Eastern

European countries one after the another. But in the case of China, he was

interested in acquiring monopoly of power rather than promoting communist

31
For Stalin's China Policy, see Conard Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China (Cambridge, MA, 1958);
see also Stephen Unalley, Jr., A History of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford, 1988).

137
revolution. For instance, in Xinjianng he helped to establish the so-called Eastern

Turkestan Republic. By early 1949, when armed revolt appeared hopeless, he

demanded that the Nationalist government cede the mining rights in Xinjiang for

fifty years, Finally, when the communist troops were approaching Xinjiang, the

Soviet consul in Urumchi suggested to a Nationalist gerneral that he declare

Xinjiang independent on the model· of Outer Mongolia and said, "if you will do

this, we will order the Chinese Communists no to continue their advance into

Xinjiang."32 Basically, Stalin preferred weak China against a strong China so that

it was dependent on Soviet Union. At the same time he was for giving China as

little aid as possible to keep her under control and satisfied. Not only that, but also

it would give Stalin a greater and more spacious room to intervene in the internal

matters of CCP to decide the political course of China. However, Mao was quick

to shirk Moscow's control. Thus , he abandoned Moscow's preferred urban

approach to revolution and sought, instead, to develop a revolutionary base in the

expansive and backward countryside.

Notwithstanding the conflictual interests in their early relations, they both

did have identical interests, especially aftermath of the World War II. When

Chinese Communists took power in October 1, 1949, the concept of nonalignment

was in its infancy, and neutrality was a luxury word for small stat~s on the

geostrategic periphery. China's size and location made it the focus of superpower

competition, while its need for economic reconstruction compelled it to seek

32
Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-tsai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? (East Lansing, Ml,
1958), p. 117.

138
foreign help. Mao Tse-tung announced in 1949 that China "must lean either to the

side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor

is there a third road." 33 In 1949, Mao did infact leaned on Soviet side in the cold

war, despite its alliance between the CCP and the Soviet Union was quite

unnatural, from 1921 to the 1950s.34

This was done in keeping its national interests strictly. At the outset, the

need for security against the United States was the raison d'l\etre for the tilt,

because the Americans were aiding the KMT in the civil war. Secondly the CCP ·

was a new and unstable which needed a walking stick for its every step in the

international arena. This could only be done by Soviet Union because of its

affinity of ideological factor. China was against the United States effort to

construct a cordon sanitaire around China's periphery to contain the germs of

revolution with the help of KMT. In the wake of the Korean War, it was also

essential to Chinese defence against the Unites States and its task of national

reconstruction.

During this period, say, after the triumph of Chinese Communism (1949)

and the death of Stalin (1953), most of Soviet-Chinese national interests were

identical and complementary ( common interests). Identical interests were both

negative and positive in character. The negative character of identical interests

were; against the re-emergence of a strong Japan - Stalin and Mao were convinced

33
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1961), vol. 4, p. 415.
34
Chi Su, "The Strategic Triangle and China's Soviet Policy," in RobertS. Ross and Herbert J.
Ellision, eds., China, The United States and the Soviet Union: Tripo/airty and Policy Making in the
Cold War (Annonk, New York, 1993), p. 42.

139
that as soon as Japan regained its strength, it would seek to reclaim the territories

China and Soviet Union had stripped from it at the end of World War II35 , against

the American take-over of North Korea, defence against attack from the United

States and against thermonuclear war with the United States. And the positive

phase of the identical interests of Soviet Union and China were; striving for mutual

increase in power and industrialisation, for expansion by peaceful and violent

means of communist influence throughout the world, for end of the colonial era

and conversion of newly independent cotmtries to socialism and for Chinese

representation on world councils, especially the United States.

The complementary interests of Soviet Union vis-a-vis China was that of

against the Unites States influence in Europe. It had desired to control the regimes

abroad, especially East European countries. And wanted to control over Chinese

resources and over political direction of China. Protection form any possible attack

from the rear (Sino-Soviet border) so as not to be engaged on too many fronts

simultaneously.

The complementary interests of China vis-a-vis Soviet Union was that of

against United States influence in Taiwan. Its desire to control land abroad,

especially Taiwan and Vietnam and to get large amounts of Soviet industrial aid

for rapid economic development to build support at home and as a basis for

military modemisation.36

Albeit, having identical and complementary interests, there were conflicting

15
Andrew J. Nathan and RobertS. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search
for Security (New York, 1997}, p. 38.
16
Ibid, p. 37.

140
interests too. Soviet Union wanted to wield direct control of China, especially

Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and Manchuria, but China sought freedom from such control,

i.e., territorial and political integrity. Moreover, China was prohibited to allow

foreign business activity business activity in Xinjiang and Manchuria. 37 China

wanted to reincorporate Mongolia as a Chinese province but the Soviet Union's

refusal and continuance of "independence" of Mongolia was sought. Soviet

Union's desire to keep the continuation of voice in the management of Chinese

Eastern Railroad (CER) was strongly objected by China, but rather, wanted to

reimpose exclusive Chinese control over the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Each one

was against the domination ofNorth Korea. Moscow wanted to retain its colonial-

era controls over Chinese territory; Beijing tried to eliminate the vestiges of
\ .
colonialism. 38The Chinese desire for the removal of Soviet base at Dairen with end

of Korean War was against the interests of Soviet Far Eastern warm water port on

Chinese territo~9 • Each nation's interest to establish regimes abroad whose

domestic institutions, political philosophy, and societal organisation were similar

as possible was conflicting in nature.

Soviet-Chinese National Interests in Khrushchevian Era

During Khrushchev's tenure, identical interests and complementary interest

took a back seat. The conflicting interests were soaring high in Soviet-Chinese

agenda, although certain conflicting Interests had been removed, especially the ·

direct control Manchuria and Xinjiang was dropped in 1954. Soviet Union was

37
Ibid, p. 38
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.

141
against the Chinese domination of Vietnam and China was against the Soviet

Union domination of Vietnam. Out of fear of Russia, China had mixed feelings

towards communist regimes in Asia that either lean towards the Soviet Union or

seek to balance between Peking and Moscow. For example, that Hanoi was

leaning towards Moscow, Peking had an interest in checking North Vietnamese

expansion in the rest of Indochina• (Particularly in Cambodia), in Thailand and

elsewhere in Southeast Asia. With regard to North Korea, Peking had already

warned about "fence- sitters" who did not sufficiently condemn revisionism.

Therefore, in order to check Soviet influence in Hanoi and in Pyongyang, Peking

refrained from trying to undermine American influence in East and Southeast

Asia. 40

Khrushchev's denigration of Stalin was criticised by Mao and his demand

for the Stalin's ideological authority be kept high was neglected. The peaceful

co-existence of Khrushchev in the 20th Party Congress of CPSU in 1956 which

emph~ised the expansion of communism through peaceful means, was against

the interest of China. Moscow-Beijing conflict was evident in its combination of

divergent positions on central questions: peaceful versus non-peaceful paths to

socialism; peaceful co-existence versus the unavoidability of warlike conflict

between socialism and capitalism/ imperialism. China wanted to keep the United

States as enemy number one. China did not favour the peaceful means of

transition to communism, but rather through violent means. Soviet Union was

40
Donald Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement: A Proposal for US Foreign Policy",
Pacific Community(Tokyo), vol. 8, no. I, October 1976, p. 129.

142
 against even small war with United States in order to stop any nuclear escalation

was viewed suspiciously (e.g., Vietnam). The localised wars would check the

American pr~sence and influence in East and South East Asia. The Chinese

participation in the management of the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in 1956

aroused Soviet opposition and irreparably damaged the psychological accord in

Soviet-Chinese relations, because it was against the interest of the Soviet Union.

It was seen an action of mustering strength to shackle the clutches of Soviet Party

domination. 41 China's challenge to the Soviet ideological primacy as a claim to be

the legitimate centre of the world communist movement was a really severe

conflicting interest for the Soviet Union. China wanted to impose Mao's ideology

to be the legitimate centre of the world communist movement, especially in Asia.

Soviet policy on Taiwan also altered. Earlier Moscow was prepared to

favour China in recovering Taiwan. In October 1959, after meeting with

Eisenhower at Camp David, Khrushchev warned Mao against testing the capitalist

countries with force. He advised China to use "peaceful measures" to unify Taiwan

and to "consider possibly granting temporary independence to Taiwan.'..t 2 Taiwan

was the Chinese vital interest. The unwillingness to confront United States in

supporting Chinese irredenta policy over Taiwan irritated Chinese, rather it wanted

use of Soviet power to forward Chinese irredenta interests in Taiwan. Another

conflicting interest was that Moscow was not willing to side with Beijing in the
I

disputed Sino-Indian Himalayan border war in 1959. Contrarily, Soviet Union

41
Su, n. 34, p. 43.
42
Quoted in Steven M. Goldstein, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937-1962: Ideology and Unity," in
Harry Harding, ed., Patterns of Co-operation in the Foreign Relations of Modern China.

143
helped India in the Sino-Indian war. As differences widened in alarming pace, the

identical interests of Soviet Union and China, which was high during the Stalin

period had fallen sharply. Consequently, the conflicting national interest rose

alarmingly.

National Interest in Brezhnev Era

During Brezhnev era, the relation between Soviet Union and China was one

of strong estrangement. The treaty of friendship, co-operation did not last long. The

national interest of each country was more opposite to each other than the any

period of given time. A significant trend was the progressive break-up of

complementary interests and their precipitation into the list of conflicting interests.

Soviet Union and China viewed each other a big threat to its existence and

regarded as number one enemy and threat to their security43 • As a result, security

interest took precedence over other interests.

National security can easily be said the vital interest of a country. The

traditional definitions of vital national interest is that it is that on which a state is

unwilling to make any concessions and on which, if necessary, it is prepared to go

to war. The national security of a nation is very basic that it is often regarded as

permanent. National security has an emotional appeal to the people. National

security one which is so vital for a nation that it is normally willing to go to war

immediately or ultimately in order to safeguard the country. National security

which is a vital interest on which all other hopes and aspirations of country revolve

43
See Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977, (Boulder,
1978).

144
round. It is axiomatic m international politics that nation-states have neither

permanent enemies nor friends but only permanent interests. The permanent

interest of any country in any given situation is security interest of a nation. The

formula of national interest had become almost synonymous with the formula of

national security because of the impact of cold war and threats of external

aggression.

This proved when the fierce competition of China with Soviet Union,

especially in the Third World, the Chinese ideological challenge to Soviet

revisionism, the challenge of the world communist leadership made Soviet leaders

think China a growing military threat to the survival of Soviet Union. The Great

Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were the mechanisms adopted for its

stringent anti -Soviets that culminated in border clashes in 1969.

The detente with West by Soviet Union was too a great concern to China

and it looked Soviet union very suspiciously. The detente .with the US really placed

China in a tight corner as these two super power countries moved in closer to avoid

the catastrophic nuclear war and to limit the arms expenditure. Both superpower

wanted to give a lease of life for the·humanity as a whole. The Ninth Congress of

the Communist Party of China (1969) gave a call to fight untidily against both

Western imperialism and social imperialism. The two-front war diverted Chinese

efforts from modernisation to a massive defence build-up in its interior. China,

finding itself on the brink of confrontation with both superpowers at once, was

145
obliged to calculate its national interest very carefully. 44 Chinese policy was

marked by a desire to improve relations with all countries not aligned or friendly

with the Soviet Union after the clashes on the border. Fortunately, many

developments in the field of international politics facilitated the application of the

new policy adopted by China after 1969.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia m 1968 and the 1969 Soviet-

Chinese border war and the ensuing Soviet threat to launch a preventive attack on

Chinese nuclear 'installations in Gansu and a limited ground attack into industrial

north-eastern China refocused China's attention on strategic considerations. This

transformation led China to abandon the dual-adversary policy as it sought to

improve United States-Chinese relations in order to offset the escalating Soviet

threat. The fact that China joined the imperialist camp and initiated the "strategic

triangle" portrayed China's genuine fear of a possible attack of Soviet Union.

Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet Union tremendously increased the numbers of

Soviet troops and deployed its most sophisticated nuclear and conventional

weaponry along the Sino-Soviet border. By the end of the decade, China faced

forty-five Soviet divisions in 1973, 150 Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic

missiles, and the Soviet Backfire bomber. 45 At a minimum, Moscow was intent on

coercing China to accommodate itself to Soviet interests. But China was unwilling

44
Lowell Dittmer, "China and Russia: New Beginnings", in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the
World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, 1994), p. 95.
45
See Harry Gelman, The Soviet Far East Build up and Soviet Risk Taking Against China (Santa
Monica, CA, 1982); see also Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East
Military Build up: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass, 1986).

146
to succumb to Soviet line of interest. China scaled down its support for the

Vietnam war to accommodate United States. The- point is that the Chinese

leadership responded to its security dilemma vis-a-vis Soviet Union by allowing

considerations of national interests to override ideological considerations almost

entirely. Following this 'deradicalisation', China could chart its course according

to a more conventional national interest calculus, compromising with capitalist

countries, for example, in order to gain entree into the international market system.

The opening to the West projected Chinese foreign policy into a period of global

engagement. China moved into the mainstream of world affairs-establishing

normal diplomatic relations with over a hundred countries, replacing Taiwan in the

United Nations.

Witnessing the new alliance of China with the United States and the

continued efforts to have a good relations with Japan, Soviet Union saw the

Chinese' threat to its security 'interest of the nation. To diffuse these situations,

Soviet border deployments were complemented by other military and diplomatic

efforts to "encircle China'"'6 • The Soviet Union expanded its spheres of influence

through economic and military aid to other third world nations to shield its national

interest. The United States and the West and China saw the growing influence of

Soviet Union in most of the countries brought geo-political importance in the arena

of international politics.

To the South China, Moscow formed a close relationship with Vietnam,

using economic and military aid to lure Hanoi to its side in the Sino-Soviet

46
Nathan and Ross, n. 35, p. 45.

147
conflict. This strategy not only paid off successfully, but also the Vietnamese

troops invaded Cambodia in 1978, extending Soviet's influence throughout

Indochina. Soviet access to bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang enhanced

Moscow's ability to project naval and air power into the Indian Ocean and the

· South China Sea. The Soviet's strong presence in the sea of Okhotsk, sea of Japan,

and the strait of Malacca was a strong security threat to Chinese national interests.

In South Asia, Moscow signed a treaty of peace , friendship, and co-

operation with India in 1971. Later that same year the Indian army ·assisted the

breakaway rebellion of Pakistan's eastern provinces, which established the new

nation of Bangladesh and weakened one of China's few allies and its lone foothold

in South Asia. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to prevent the

collapse of Moscow's client regime there. Although Afghanistan's eastern

extremity abuts China's Xinjiang province, Afghanistan's real strategic

significance to China derived from its lengthy borders with Pakistan and Iran, two

states China valued as bulwarks against ~oviet expansion. China believed that

Moscow's move into Afghanistan was part of the historical Russian push toward

the south, foreshadowing increased pressure on Islamabad and Teheran to

acquiesce in the expansion of Soviet influence.

To Moscow's encirclement of China, it counter-posed a policy of counter-

encirclement. China sought good relations with Soviet neighbours stretching from

Japan through Pakistan, Mghanistan, and Iran, to Eastern and Western Europe47 • In

1972, China normalised its relations with Japan and in 1978, it signed a peace

47
Zagoria, n. 40, pp. 123-35.

148
treaty. China tacitly backed the United States-Japan security alliance while
\
supported Japan's claim of Kurile Islands (territorial dispute with Moscow). China

feared that Soviet dominance in the Middle East would facilitate its victory over

the West.. Should Iran align with the USSR, it could provide the Soviet navy easy
'

access to the Persian Gulf, jeopardising the West's access to Middle East oil. China

also sought to strengthen its ties with many of the most conservative regimes in

West Asia such as Iran and Saudi Arabia that the US had also long supported.

Indeed, China liked nothing better than to receive CENT0. 48 China developed

close relation with the shah of Iran. Chinese policy toward Africa and Latin

America also followed the logic of its anti-Soviet posture.

The national security issue was gradually brought under control without

unduly alarming such third parties as the Unites States, by the advent of Deng

Xiaoping. Deng's political and economic reform programmes promoted improved

Sino-Soviet relations because the justification for sustaining the ideological

conflict disappeared when China became more 'revisionist' than the Soviet Union.

In May 1982, not long before he died, Leonid Bergen proclaimed Moscow's desire
\

to improve relations with Beijing. He hoped to weaken China's position with the

United States just as the Reagan administration increased its military pressure on

the Soviet Union and challenged PRC Interests in Taiwan. China also took

initiative to settle the outstanding issues between the two countries and improve

bilateral relations. 49

48
Ibid.
49
Tong Yixin, "China and the Soviet Union Start Negotiations on Mutual Relations", Zhongguo
baike nianjian (Chinese encyclopaedia yearbook, 1980), (Beijing, 1980), p. 268.

149
National Interest in Gorbachev Era

The PRC's diplomacy toward the Soviet Union during the Andropov and

Chemenko interregnums between 1982 and 1985 was low-key, methodical, and

totally consistent with the trend set in 1979. Gorbachev's succession to power gave

a new impetus to that process of eradicating those interests which are detrimental

to their relations through his 'ne'-': thinking'. China demanded that the Soviet

Union overcome what they called "three obstacles". China considered these three

obstacles were highly detrimental to its national interests and asked for the removal

of the same. The demanding situation for the USSR was that it was involved in the

fierce competition of arms race with the West, which ate the major portion of the

economy of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet economy looked thin and

feebie. The prime interest of the nation was to make the economy stable and viable.

In order to make the economy stable, the country needed to have good relations

with China and to liquidate his predecessors' bad overseas investments in the form

of military aid and economic aid for the satellite countries.

What made normalisation of relations between the two communist powers

theoretically possible was that the virulence of their bilateral conflicting interest

was slowly and steadily dissipating. Many of the original issues over which they

had fought so bitterly in the past-such as which nation followed true Leninist- and

which had left a legacy of mistrust, appear in retrospect much less significant and

even trivial. And although the accumulated hostility still affected attitudes and

judgements of both leaderships, they knew that they should deal with the new

realities keeping in mind the national interests. The facts that they were aware that

150
 maintaining the conflict at a high-pitched level strains both countries' resources,

played havoc with their national interests. 50 This realisation marked an era of low

conflict and promised for a high co-operation keeping in mind their national

interest. The 'real politik' was the major player in the international environment,

where ideology had found no place. It was economic interest of these tWo nations

which had taken precedence.

Eventually, Gorbachev took the initiative to resolve "three obstacles" as

. part of the "new Thinking" he introduced into Soviet foreign policy. In July 1986

he promised to reduce troop levels in Soviet Asia. In February 1988, Soviet

Defence Minister Dimitrii Yazov announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw

a large number of troops from the Sino1Soviet border areas. 51 By May 1989,

Gorbachev removed all the obstacles which hindered for the normalisation of

relations. 52 Gorbachev's Soviet Union in 1985-89 and Deng Xiaoping's China in

1979-89 were driven toward normalisation by the same domestic imperative. Thus

the three great conflicting interests got demised, however the newer one got

emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Between 1989 and 1991, the world witnessed a series of momentous

changes that completely transformed the cold war power structure. The collapse

Communist Party of Soviet Union, de-sovietisation of Eastern Europe saw the

imminent threat to socialism in China. China now faced a threat from what might

50
Vladimir Petrov, "China goes it Alone", Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol. 23, no. 5, May 1983, p.
582.
51
Nathan and Ross, n. 35, p. 48.
52
Dittmer, n. 44, p. 97.

151
be called "democratic containment". 53 Nevertheless, both China and Russia (after

the disintegration of Soviet Union) now have common interest in preventing the

spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Moscow and Beijing are co-operating each

other to contain fundamentalist influence than to manipulate fundamentalism to

destabilise each other.

Nuclear Weapons and National Interest .

Morgenthau's analysis of national interests, he informed that the nature of

alliances changes in the nuclear age and that alliances between a bipolar core

member and a peripheral member of its system may carry risks unacceptable to the

latter, despite an otherwise large range of common interests. 54 Under the nuclear

era, alliances are less useful instruments for pursuit of the national interest and

nations tend t() be ever mere mutually isolated. N uciear weapons certainly have

deterrent capacity. Even a small nation can challenge a big power if it is a nuclear

power. This is where the importance of being a nuclear power is felt by China.

Nuclear weapons were obviously a discordant issue between the Soviet Union and

China.

Morgenthau had set out in concise terms what the relations among allies

must be when only one possesses nuclear weapons but when each is faced with the

a nuclearly-armed opponent. 55 The possession of nuclear weapons by one or both

53
Su, n. 34, p. 58.
54
Hans J. Morgenthau, "Paradoxes ofNuclear Strategy," American Political Science Review
(Washington), vol. 58, no. l, March 1964, p. 33-35.
55
Ibid.

152
of the alliance partners radically transfonns the alliance relationship. The Soviet

Union, possessing nuclear weapons, wished above all to keep out of nuclear

conflict with the United States. But it was allied to China, it had its own ambitions

and interests different from the Soviet Union's. This is what happened when

Khrushchev declared his peaceful co-existence with the West in his 20'h Party

Congress of the Soviet Union. Bltt China wanted to revolutionary means of

achieving socialism not through peaceful means. The crux of the problem is that in

the nuclear age alliances are highly unreliable devices with which to assure one's

security. Neither the Soviet Union nor China could be assured that the other would

come to its aid, for neither would accept nuclear destruction for the sake of the

other. China was not sure that the Soviet Union would risk her entire existence for

the sake of Chinese goals. So, China wanted to stand by its own legs for its security

and other national interests. Dependency on Soviet Union for its security and

national interests was too high. In course of time China had to forgo certain

national prestige when dealing with either Soviet Union or United States.

Whenever it wanted to deal with United States, China had to keep in mind the

national interest of Soviet Union too, because it was dependent on Soviet Union.

China thought that the possession of nuclear weapon would empower China

to resist American nuclear blackmail. Moreover. it would reduce the need for direct

Soviet involvement in any future Sino-American crises.

But soon after the stiffness in the relationship between the two communist

nations, Soviet Union deserted the New Defence Technical Accord. In early 1958

Moscow began to drag its heels on fulfilling its obligations under the 1957 nuclear-

153
sharing agreement and finally in June 1959 it formally cancelled the agreement..

As per the accord during 1957, Moscow and Beijing signed the New Defence

Technical Accord, USSR proposed to assist China in developing nuclear weaponry

by providing Beij_ing a sample bomb and missiles as well as technical

information. 56 Moscow thought that transfe.rence of the nuclear technology would

impede its negotiations with the United States on a limited test-ban treaty. And it

said, if the West found out about Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear programme,

Soviet efforts to relax relations with the West might be compromised. Moscow

also foresaw that if China acquired the nuclear technology, its reduced dependence

on Moscow would enable Beijing to assert Chinese nationalistic and ideological

concerns. The monolithic Party position in the international communist movement

would be wiped out. And there were already a sign of challenge in the international

communist movement. When Khrushchev visited Beijing, Mao accused him of

encroaching on Chinese sovereignty and seeking to "take away all our coastal

areas." He warned the Soviet leader, "The British, Japanese, and other foreigners

who stayed in our country for a long time have already been driven away by us,

Comrade Khrushchev. I'll repeat it again. We don not want anyone to use our land

to achieve their own purpose anymore. " 57 This irked him and learned that the

repressed differences gradually emerged.

The Chinese nuclear explosion late m 1964 saw them from the pit of

56
The negotiations over nuclear co-operation are discussed in John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,
China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, 1988), pp. 60-65.
57
William Taubman, "Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the
Sino-Soviet Dispute,"( Paper prepared for the Cold War International History Project Hong Kong
Conference on the Cold War in Asia, January 9-12, 1996), pp. 8-9.

154
complete dependence to a point of competition. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of

both superpowers was seen by China a grand design against its improvisation of

nuclear capabilities.58

However, An important aspect of the understanding of international reality

was born. The birth of international reality was related to the problem of survival.

This became serious especially under the impact of nuclear weapons and the·

resultant change in the nature of war. Under this nuclear age, every nation was (is)

concerned not with the security of an individual nation but with the security or

survival of all nations. In the past, nations could hope to achieve policy objectives

even through temporary superiority in armed forces or through alignment with

more powerful nations. 59 But the fear of total destruction made (makes) the

atta!P.ment of the fruit of superiority almost impossible. The whole concept of

victory had (has) become meaningless because it involved (involved) the risk of

total destruction of the enemy's territory and possessions as also one's own similar

destruction. In consequence, all nations -large, small, communist, non-communist-

for the first time had (have) an overriding common interest in the avoidance of

war. 60ln other words, nuclear war involved (involves) the 'danger of mutual

suicide'. Writer like Harold Lasswell and Jacob Viner and many others had drawn

attention to the fact that the use of nuclear weapons for defence would actually

leave nothing to defend. 61

58
G. S. Mishra, 'Nonnalisation of Sino-Soviet Relations', in Indian Centre for Regional Affairs,
New Contours ofSoviet Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1989), p.70.
59
Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago, 1958), p. 178.
60
Morgenthau, n. 29, p. 283.
61
Harlod D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York, 1948), p. 180.

155
 At the same time, nuclear weapons have not modified the range of

traditional interests pursued by powers, nor have they changed the problems

associated therewith. They have, however, modified the means for pursuing those

interests: for the most part these must now be peaceful (and therefore) diplomatic

in character. 62 The nuclear weapons has given the thrust for the process of

diplomatic settlements. As Gorbach'ev described it, the heart of the new thinking

was the priority of common human values in the nuclear age. 63 The real national

intetests in the nuclear age required the creation of an international climate

favourable to a deep socio-political and economic transformation.

62
Morgenthau, n. 29, p. 138.
63
Bruce Parrot, "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev", Prpb/ems ofCommunism", vol. 37,
November-December, 1988, p.27.

156