(2000 Bar)

Q: A files an action in the Municipal Trial Court against B, the natural son of
A’s father, for the partition of a parcel of land located in Taytay, Rizal with an
assessed value of P20,000.00. B moves to dismiss the action on the ground that
the case would have been brought in the RTC because the action is one that is
not capable of pecuniary estimation as it involves primarily a determination of
hereditary rights and not merely the bare right to real property. Resolve the
motion.

A: The motion should be granted. The action for partition depends on a

determination of the hereditary rights of A and B, which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation. Hence, even though the assessed value of the land is P20,
000.00, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction (Russell v. Vestil, G.R. No.
119347. March 17, 1999)

Q: Angelina sued Armando before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila to
recover the ownership and possession of two parcels of land; one situated in
Pampanga, and the other in Bulacan.

May the action prosper? Explain.

A: No, the action may not prosper, because under Rep. Act No. 7691, exclusive
original jurisdiction in civil actions which involve title to, or possession or real
property or any interest therein is determined on the basis of the assessed value
of the land involved, whether it should be P20, 000 in the rest of the Philippines,
outside of the Manila with courts of the first level or with the Regional Trial
Court. The assessed value of the parcel of land in Pampanga is different from the
assessed value of the land in Bulacan. What is involved is not merely a matter of
venue, which is waivable, but of a matter of jurisdiction. However, the action
may prosper if jurisdiction is not in issue, because venue can be waived.

(2001 Bar)
Q: How should the records of child and family cases in the Family Courts or
RTC designated by the Supreme Court to handle Family Court cases be treated
and dealt with? Under what conditions may the identity of parties in child and
family cases be divulged?
A: The records of child and family cases in the Family Courts or Regional Trial
Court designated by the Supreme Court to handle Family Court cases shall be
dealt with utmost confidentiality. (Sec. 12, Family Courts Act of 1997) shall not
be divulged unless necessary and with authority of the judge.
 (2002 Bar)
Q: What court has jurisdiction over an action for specific performance filed by a
subdivision homeowner against a subdivision developer? Explain.

A: An action for specific performance by a subdivision homeowner against a

subdivision developer is within the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sec.1 of P.D. 1344 provides that the HLURB has
jurisdiction over cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots and condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman (Manila Bankers Life
Insurance Corp. v. Eddy Ng Kok Wei, G.R. No. 139791, December 12, 2003;
Kakilala v. Faraon, G.R. No. 143233, October 18, 2004; Sec. 1, PD 1344).

(2003 Bar)

(2004 Bar)
Q: Distinguish Questions of Law from Questions of Fact.

A: A question of law is when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact is when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts (Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. of the Phil., G.R. No. L-22533, February 9, 1967).

(2005 Bar)

(2006 Bar)
Q: Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review the Decisions in
criminal and administrative cases of the Ombudsman?

A: The Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases (Sec. 14, RA 6770). In administrative and
disciplinary cases, appeals from the Ombudsman must be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 (Lanting v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 141426, May 6, 2005;
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998; Sec. 14, RA 6770).

Q: Mark filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue a complaint for refund of
taxes paid, but it was not acted upon. So, he filed a similar complaint with the
Court of Tax Appeals raffled to one of its Divisions. Mark’s complaint was
dismissed. Thus, he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over Mark’s petition?

A: No. The procedure is governed by Sec. 11 of R.A. 9282. Decisions of a

division of the Court of Tax Appeals must be appealed to the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc. Further, the CTA now has the same rank as the Court of
Appeals and is no longer considered as a quasi-judicial agency. It is likewise
provided in the said law that the decisions of the CTA en banc are cognizable by
the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Q. Distinguish jurisdiction from venue?

A. JURISDICTION treats of the power of the Court to decide a case on the

merits, while VENUE refers to the place where the suit may be filed. In criminal
actions, however, venue is jurisdictional. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive
law; venue, of procedural law. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent
through waiver upon a court, but venue may be waived, except in criminal cases.
(Nocum et al. v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005; Santos III v.
Northwest Airlines, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992).

(2007 Bar)

(2008 Bar)
Q: Lani filed an action for partition and accounting in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila against her sister Mary Rose, who is a resident of Singapore
and is not found in the Philippines. Upon motion, the court ordered the
publication of the summons for three weeks in a local tabloid, Bulgar. Linda, an
OFW vacationing in the Philippines, saw the summons in Bulgar and brought a
copy of the tabloid when she returned to Singapore. Linda showed the tabloid
and the page containing the summons to Mary Rose, who said, "Yes I know, my
kumare Anita scanned and e-mailed that page of Bulgar to me!" Did the court
acquire jurisdiction over Mary Rose?

A: NO. The court did not acquire jurisdiction over Mary Rose, the defendant.
While serving summons by publication is allowed in this case under Section 15,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the required sending of the copy of the summons
and the order of the Court by registered mail to the last known address of the
same defendant has not been followed; service of summons by publication under
said Rule has not been complied with; thus, there is no valid service.
Q: Give at least three instances where the Court of Appeals may act as a trial
court.

A:
a. In annulment of judgment under Secs. 5 and 6, Rule 47. Should the
Court o£ Appeals find prima facie merit in the petition, the same shall be given
due course and summons shall be served on the respondent, after which trial will
follow, where the procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed.
b. When a motion for new trial is granted by the Court of Appeals, the
procedure in the new trial shall be the same as that granted by a Regional Trial
Court (Sec. 4, Rule 53).
c. A petition for habeas corpus shall be set for hearing (Sec. 12, Rule 102).
d. In a petition for the writs of amparo and habeas data, a hearing can be
conducted.
e. Under Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues cases
which fall within its original and appellate jurisdiction.
f. The Court of Appeals can grant a new trial based on the ground of newly
discovered evidence (Sec. 14, Rule 124).
g. The Court of Appeals, under Section 6, Rule 46, whenever necessary to
resolve factual issues, may conduct hearing thereon or delegate the reception of
the evidence of such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate agency or
office.

Q: Filomeno brought an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay

City against Marcelino pleading two causes of action. The first was a demand for
the recovery of physical possession of a parcel of land situated in Pasay City
with an assessed value of P40,000; the second was a claim for damages of
P500,000 for Marcelino's unlawful retention of the property. Marcelino filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the total amount involved, which is
P540,000, is beyond the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Is Marcelino correct?

A: No, Marcelino is not correct. Under Rep. Act No. 7691, Metropolitan Trial
Court and other courts of the first level have been vested with exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of real
property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00, or in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed P50,000.00 exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Pasay City where the action for recovery of physical possession was filed, is part
of Metro Manila and therefore has exclusive jurisdiction over the parcel of land
situated therein whose assessed value is P40,000.00. The claim for damages of
P500,000.00 for the unlawful retention of the land involved is not determinative
of the court’s jurisdiction which is based on the nature of the action. The claim
for damages of P500,000.00 is just a consequence of the unlawful detention of
the property subject of the action, which should not be taken separately from the
land. Filomeno has only one cause of action which is the action for recovery of
possession of the land against Marcelino, with damages.

(2009 Bar)
Q. Amorsolo, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York City, filed
with the RTC of Lipa City a complaint for Rescission of Contract of Sale of
Land against Brigido, a resident of Barangay San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
The subject property, located in Barangay Talisay, Lipa City, has an assessed
value of 19,700. Appended to the complaint is Amorsolo’s verification and
certification of non-forum shopping executed in New York City, duly notarized
by Mr. Joseph Brown, Esq., a notary public in the State of New York. Brigod
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a) The court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Amorsolo because he is not a
resident of the Philippines; (b) The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action involving real property with an assessed value of
P19,700.00; exclusive and original jurisdiction is with the Municipal Trial Court
where the defendant resides; (3%)

A. The first ground raised lacks merit because jurisdiction over the person of a
plaintiff is acquired by the court upon the filing of plaintiff’s complaint
therewith. Residency or citizenship is not a requirement for filing a complaint,
because plaintiff thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the court.

The second ground raised is also without merit because the subject of the
litigation, Rescission of Contract, is incapable of pecuniary estimation the
exclusive original jurisdiction to which is vested by law in the Regional Trial
Courts. The nature of the action renders the assessed value of the land involved
irrelevant.
Q: Angelina sued Armando before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila to
recover the ownership and possession of two parcels of land; one situated in
Pampanga, and the other in Bulacan.
a. May the action prosper? Explain. (2000 Bar)
b. Will your answer be the same if the action was for foreclosure of the
 mortgage over the two parcels of land? Why or why not?

A: a. No, the action may not prosper, because under Rep. Act No. 7691,
exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions which involve title to, or
possession or real property or any interest therein is determined on the basis of
the assessed value of the land involved, whether it should be P20, 000 in the rest
of the Philippines, outside of the Manila with courts of the first level or with the
Regional Trial Court. The assessed value of the parcel of land in Pampanga is
different from the assessed value of the land in Bulacan. What is involved is not
merely a matter of venue, which is waivable, but of a matter of jurisdiction.
However, the action may prosper if jurisdiction is not in issue, because venue
can be waived.

A: b. No, the action may not prosper, because under Rep. Act No. 7691,
exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions which involve title to, or
possession or real property or any interest therein is determined on the basis of
the assessed value of the land involved, wheth er it should be P20, 000 in the rest
of the Philippines, outside of the Manila with courts of the first level or with the
Regional Trial Court. The assessed value of the parcel of land in Pampanga is
different from the assessed value of the land in Bulacan. What is involved is not
merely a matter of venue, which is waivable, but of a matter of jurisdiction.
However, the action may prosper if jurisdiction is not in issue, because venue
can be waived.
(2010 Bar)

Q: On August 13, 2008, A, as shipper and consignee, loaded on the M/V Atlantis
in Legaspi City 100,000 pieces of century eggs. The shipment arrived in Manila
totally damaged on August 14, 2008. A filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila a complaint against B Super Lines, Inc. (B Lines), owner of
the M/V Atlantis, for recovery of damages amounting to P167,899. He attached
to the complaint the Bill of Lading.

a. B Lines filed a Motion to Dismiss upon the ground that the Regional
Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over "all actions in
admiralty and maritime" claims. In his Reply, A contended that while
the action is indeed "admiralty and maritime" in nature, it is the amount
of the claim, not the nature of the action, that governs jurisdiction. Pass
on the Motion to Dismiss.
 b. The MeTC denied the Motion in question A. B Lines thus filed an
Answer raising the defense that under the Bill of Lading it issued to A,
its liability was limited to P10, 000. At the pre-trial conference, B Lines
defined as one of the issues whether the stipulation limiting its liability
to P10, 000 binds A. A countered that this was no longer in issue as B
Lines had failed to deny under oath the Bill of Lading. Which of the
parties is correct? Explain.

c. On July 21, 2009, B Lines served on A a "Notice to Take Deposition,"

setting the deposition on July 29, 2009 at 8:30 a.m. at the office of its
counsel in Makati. A failed to appear at the deposition-taking, despite
notice. As counsel for B Lines, how would you proceed?

A:
a. A: The Motion to Dismiss is without merit and therefore should be denied.
Courts of the first level have jurisdiction over civil actions where the
demand is for sum of money not exceeding P300, 000.00 or in Metro
Manila, P400, 000.00, exclusive of interest, damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs: this jurisdiction includes admiralty and
marine cases. And where the main cause of action is the claim for damages,
the amount thereof shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court (Adm. Circular No. 09-94, June 14, 1994).

b. A: The Motion to Dismiss is without merit and therefore should be denied.

Courts of the first level have jurisdiction over civil actions where the
demand is for sum of money not exceeding P300, 000.00 or in Metro
Manila, P400, 000.00, exclusive of interest, damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs: this jurisdiction includes admiralty and
marine cases. And where the main cause of action is the claim for damages,
the amount thereof shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court (Adm. Circular No. 09-94, June 14, 1994).

c. A: As counsel for B Lines (which gave notice to take the deposition), I

shall proceed as follows: 1. Find out why A failed to appear at the
deposition-taking, despite notice; 2. If failure was for valid reason, then set
another date for taking the deposition; 3. If failure to appear at deposition
taking was without valid reason, then I would file a motion/application in
the court where the action is pending, for an Order to show cause for his
refusal to the discovery; and 4. For the court to issue appropriate Order
provided under Rule 29 of the Rules, for non-compliance with the
 showcause order, aside from contempt of court.

Q: Anabel filed a complaint against B for unlawful detainer before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Candaba, Pampanga. After the issues had been joined, the
MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after noting that the action
was one for accion publiciana. Anabel appealed the dismissal to the RTC which
affirmed it and accordingly dismissed her appeal. She elevates the case to the
Court of Appeals, which remands the case to the RTC. Is the appellate court
correct? Explain.

A: Yes, the Court of appeals is correct in remanding the case to RTC for the
latter to try the same on the merits. The RTC, having jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case appealed from MTC should try the case on the merits as if the
case was originally filed with it, and not just to affirm the dismissal of the case.
R.A. No 7691, however, vested jurisdiction over specified accion publiciana with
courts of the first level (Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts) in cases where the assessed value of the real
property involved does not exceed P20, 000 outside Metro Manila, or in Metro
Manila where such value does not exceed P50, 000.

(2011 Bar)

(2012 Bar)
Q: A filed with the MTC of Manila an action for specific performance against B,
a resident of Quezon City, to compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance
covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City having an assessed value of
P19,000.00. B received the summons and a copy of the Complaint of 02 January
2003. On 10 January 2003, B filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the
ground that the subject matter of the suit was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The court denied the motion. In due time, B filed with the RTC a Petition for
Certiorari praying that the said Order be set aside because the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case. On 13 February 2003, A filed with the MTC a Motion
to declare B in default. The motion was opposed by B on the ground that his
Petition for Certiorari was still pending.

a. Was the denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?

b. Resolve the Motion to Declare the Defendant in Default.

A:
 a. A: The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was not correct.
Although the assessed value of the parcel of land involved was P19,
000.00, within the jurisdiction of the MTC Manila, the action filed by A
for Specific Performance against B to compel the latter to execute a Deed
of Conveyance of said parcel of land was not capable of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, the action was within the jurisdiction of RTC
(Russel v. Vestil, supra; Copioso v. Copioso, G.R. No. 149243, October
28, 2002; Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction, G.R. No. 146594, June
10, 2002]).

b. A: The Court could declare B in default because B did not obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order from the RTC
prohibiting the judge from proceeding in the case during the pendency of
the petition for certiorari (Sec. 7 Rule 65; Diaz v. Diaz, G.R. No. 135885,
April 28, 2000).

(2013 Bar)

(2014 Bar)
Q: Goodfeather Corporation, through its President, Al Pakino, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for specific performance against Robert
White. Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, Robert White filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of the appropriate board
resolution from the Board of Directors of Good feather Corporation to show the
authority of Al Pakino to represent the corporation and file the complaint in its
behalf. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss and, accordingly it ordered the
dismissal of the complaint. Al Pakino filed a motion for reconsideration which
the RTC denied.

As nothing more could be done by Al Pakino before the RTC, he file an appeal
before the Court of Appeals (CA). Robert White moved for dismissal of the
appeal in the ground that the same involved purely a question of law and should
have been filed with the Supreme Court (SC). However, Al Pakino claimed that
the appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law because there must be a
factual determination if, indeed, Al Pakino was duly authorized by Goodfeather
Corporation to file the complaint. Whose position is correct? Explain.

A: Al Pakino is correct in claiming that the appeal involved mixed questions of

fact and law. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question
of fact, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts. (Mirant Philippines Corporation v. Sario, G.R. No. 197598, November 21,
2012). Since the complaint was dismissed due to the alleged lack of appropriate
board resolution from the Board of Directors of Goodfeather Corporation, the
appeal will necessarily involve a factual determination of the authority to file the
Complaint for the said Corporation. Hence, the appeal before the Court of
Appeals is correct.

Q: The Ombudsman, after conducting the requisite preliminary investigation,

found probable cause to charge Gov. Matigas in conspiracy with Carpinter, a
private individual, for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). Before the information
could be filed with the Sandiganbayan, Gov. Matigas was killed in an ambush.
This, notwithstanding, an information was filed against Gov. Matigas and
Carpintero. At the Sandiganbayan, Carpintero through counsel, filed a Motion to
Quash the information, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, arguing that with the death of Gov. Matigas, there is no public
officer charged in the information.

Is the Motion to Quash legally tenable?

A: No. The Motion to quash is not legally tenable. While it is true that by reason
of the death of Gov. Matigas, there is no longer any public officer with whom he
can be charge for violation of R.A. 3019, it does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their
alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death
of Gov. Matigas is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime
nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and
Carpintero. The requirement before a private person may be indicated for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person
must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicated
together with the public officer. Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-
conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy (People of the Philippines v. Henry
T. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014).

Q: Estrella was the registered owner of a huge parcel of land located in a remote
part of their barrio in Benguet. However, when she visited the property after she
took a long vacation abroad, she was surprised to see that her childhood friend,
John, had established a vacation house on her property. Both Estrella and John
were residents of the same barangay. To recover possession, Estrella filed a
complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), alleging that she
is the true owner of the land as evidenced by her certificate of title and tax
declaration which showed the assessed value of the property as P21,000.00. On
the other hand, John refuted Estrella’s claim of ownership and submitted in
evidence a Deed of Absolute Sale between him and Estrella. After the filing of
John’s answer, the MTC observed that the real issue was one of ownership and
not of possession. Hence, the MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal by Estrella to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a full-
blown trial was conducted as if the case was originally filed with it. The RTC
reasoned that based on the assessed value of the property, it was the court of
proper jurisdiction. Eventually, the RTC rendered a judgment declaring John as
the owner of the land and, hence, entitled to the possession thereof.

a. Was the MTC correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction? Why or why not?

b. Was the RTC correct in ruling that based on the assessed value of the
property, the case was within its original jurisdiction and, hence, it may
conduct a full-blown trial of the appealed case as if it was originally
filed with it? Why or why not? (2014 Bar)

A:
a. No. The Metropolitan Trial Court was not correct in dismissing the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It is well settled that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations contained in the complaint. The contention
of defendant in his Motion to Dismiss has nothing to do in the
determination of jurisdiction. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant (Medical Plaza
Makati Condominium v. Cullen, G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013).

Relative thereto, the Municipal Trial Courts have exclusive original

jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer (Section 33,
B.P. 129). Hence, the Metropolitan Trial Court is not correct in dismissing
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Besides, the rules allow provisional
determination of ownership in ejectment cases when the defendant raises
the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership (Sec. 16, Rule
 70). Accordingly, the inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions
of ownership whenever it is necessary to decide the question of possession
in an ejectment case. (Serreno v. Spouses Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366,
November 10, 2006).

b. A: No. It is settled that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. Moreover, all cases
decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of
the amounts involved (Sec. 22, B.P. 129).

(2015 Bar)

Q: Juliet invoking the provisions of the Rule on Violence Against Women and
their Children filed with the RTC designated as a Family Court a petition for
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Romeo.
The Family Court issued a 30-day TPO against Romeo. A day before the
expiration of the TPO, Juliet filed a motion for extension. Romeo in his
opposition raised, among others, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262 (The
VAWC Law) arguing that the law authorizing the issuance of a TPO violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the 1987 Constitution. The Family
Court judge, in granting the motion for extension of the TPO, declined to rule on
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262. The Family Court judge reasoned that
Family Courts are without jurisdiction to pass upon constitutional issues, being a
special court of limited jurisdiction and R.A. No. 8369, the law creating the
Family Courts, does not provide for such jurisdiction. Is the Family Court judge
correct when he declined to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262?

A: No, the Family Court Judge is not correct when it declined to resolve the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262.
In Garcia v. Hon. Rey Allan Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, the
Supreme Court held that the “Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute. In spite of its designation as a family
court, the RTC remains to possess the authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. This authority is embraced in the general definition of judicial power
to determine the valid and binding laws in conformity with the fundamental
law.”
Q: At the trial, Borrower's lawyer, while cross-examining Lender, successfully
elicited an admission from the latter that the two promissory notes have been
paid. Thereafter, Borrower's lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that as proven only P300, 000.00 was the amount due to Lender and
which claim is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court. He further argued that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. Should the court dismiss the case?

A: No. The court should not dismiss the case. What determines the jurisdiction
of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations
in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are
the ones to be consulted (Navida v. Hon. Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr., G.R. No.
125078, May 30, 2011). Accordingly, even if the defendant is able to prove in
the course of the trial that a lesser amount is due, the court does not lose
jurisdiction and a dismissal of the case is not in order (Paadlan v. Dinglasan,
G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013).

Q: Lender extended to Borrower a P100, 000.00 loan covered by a promissory

note. Later, Borrower obtained another P100, 000.00 loan again covered by a
promissory note. Still later, Borrower obtained a P300, 000.00 loan secured by a
real estate mortgage on his land valued at P500, 000.00. Borrower defaulted on
his payments when the loans matured. Despite demand to pay the P500, 000.00
loan, Borrower refused to pay. Lender, applying the totality rule, filed against
Borrower with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a collection suit for
P500, 000.00. Did Lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder
of causes of action?

A: Yes. The Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of
causes of action because where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of sum of money, the aggregate amount of the claim
shall be the test of jurisdiction [Section 5(d), Rule 2].
Here, the total amount of the claim is P500, 000.00. Hence, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila has jurisdiction over the suit. At any rate, it is immaterial
that one of the loans is secured by a real estate mortgage because the Lender
opted to file a collection of sum of money instead of foreclosure of the said
mortgage.

(2016 Bar)
Q: State at least five (5) civil cases that fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

A: The Regional Trial Courts inter alia shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in the following civil cases:

1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of

pecuniary estimation;
2. In all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
twenty thousands pesos (P20, 000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila where
such value exceeds fifty thousand pesos (P50, 000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts;
3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or
claim exceeds three hundred thousand pesos (P300, 000.00) or, in Metro Manila,
where such demand or claim exceeds four hundred thousand pesos (P400,
000.00);
4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds three hundred thousand pesos (P300, 000.00) or, in probate
matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds four hundred thousand
pesos (P400, 000.00);
5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
7. In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of
Agragrian Relations as now provided by law; and
8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds three hundred thousand pesos (P300, 000.00) or,
in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
abovementioned item exceeds four hundred thousand pesos (P400, 000.00). (Sec.
1 and 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 otherwise known as the “Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980).

(2017 Bar)

(2018 Bar)

(2019 Bar)