COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., PETITIONER, VS.

KEMPER
INSURANCE COMPANY, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N 

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 75895,
entitled Kemper Insurance Company v. Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc.  The CA Decision reversed and set
aside the Order dated March 22, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila, which granted
the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc., and ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.  
cralaw

The antecedents are as follows:

Respondent Kemper Insurance Company is a foreign insurance company based in Illinois, United States of
America (USA) with no license to engage in business in the Philippines, as it is not doing business in the
Philippines, except in isolated transactions; while petitioner is a domestic shipping company organized in
accordance with Philippine laws.

In 1998, respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef (owned by Genosi, Inc.), which
was loaded at a port in Brisbane, Australia, for shipment to Genosi, Inc. (the importer-consignee) in the
Philippines.  However, upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of the shipment was rejected by Genosi,
Inc. by reason of spoilage arising from the alleged temperature fluctuations of petitioner's reefer containers.

Thus, Genosi, Inc. filed a claim against both petitioner shipping company and respondent Kemper Insurance
Company.  The claim was referred to McLarens Chartered for investigation, evaluation, and adjustment of
the claim.  After processing the claim documents, McLarens Chartered recommended a settlement of the
claim in the amount of $64,492.58, which Genosi, Inc. (the consignee-insured) accepted.

Thereafter, respondent paid the claim of Genosi, Inc. (the insured) in the amount of $64,492.58.
Consequently, Genosi, Inc., through its General Manager, Avelino S. Mangahas, Jr., executed a Loss and
Subrogation Receipt[3] dated September 22, 1999, stating that Genosi, Inc. received from respondent the
amount of $64,492.58 as the full and final satisfaction compromise, and discharges respondent of all claims
for losses and expenses sustained by the property insured, under various policy numbers, due to spoilage
brought about by machinery breakdown which occurred on October 25, November 7 and 10, and December
5, 14, and 18, 1998; and, in consideration thereof, subrogates respondent to the claims of Genosi, Inc. to
the extent of the said amount.  Respondent then made demands upon petitioner, but the latter failed and
refused to pay the said amount.

Hence, on October 28, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages[4] against
petitioner before the trial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95561, entitled Kemper Insurance Company
v. Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc.  Respondent alleged that despite repeated demands to pay and settle the
total amount of  US$64,492.58, representing the value of the loss, petitioner failed and refused to pay the
same, thereby causing damage and prejudice to respondent in the amount of US$64,492.58; that the loss
and damage it sustained was due to the fault and negligence of petitioner, specifically, the fluctuations in
the temperature of the reefer container beyond the required setting which was caused by the breakdown in
the electronics controller assembly; that due to the unjustified failure and refusal to pay its just and valid
claims, petitioner should be held liable to pay interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of demand;
and that due to the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to pay the said amount, it was compelled to engage
the services of a counsel whom it agreed to pay 25% of the whole amount due as attorney's fees. 
Respondent prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered in its favor and that petitioner be ordered
to pay the amount of US$64,492.58, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the prevailing foreign
exchange rate, or a total of P2,594,513.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of demand,
25% of the whole amount due as attorney's fees, and costs.

In its Answer[5] dated November 29, 1999, petitioner insisted, among others, that respondent had no
capacity to sue since it was doing business in the Philippines without the required license; that the complaint
has prescribed and/or is barred by laches; that no timely claim was filed; that the loss or damage sustained
by the shipments, if any, was due to causes beyond the carrier's control and was due to the inherent nature
or insufficient packing of the shipments and/or fault of the consignee or the hired stevedores or arrastre
operator or the fault of persons whose acts or omissions cannot be the basis of liability of the carrier; and
that the subject shipment was discharged under required temperature and was complete, sealed, and in
good order condition.

During the pre-trial proceedings, respondent's counsel proffered and marked its exhibits, while petitioner's
counsel manifested that he would mark his client's exhibits on the next scheduled pre-trial. However, on
November 8, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,[6] contending that the same was filed by one Atty.
Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the corresponding certification against forum
shopping.  It argued that Atty. Lat's act of signing the certification against forum shopping was a clear
violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

In its Order[7] dated March 22, 2002, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the
case without prejudice, ruling that it is mandatory that the certification must be executed by the petitioner
himself, and not by counsel.  Since respondent's counsel did not have a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to
act on its behalf, hence, the certification against forum shopping executed by said counsel was fatally
defective and constituted a valid cause for dismissal of the complaint.

Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration[8] was denied by the trial court in an Order[9] dated July 9, 2002.

On appeal by respondent, the CA, in its Decision[10] dated March 23, 2007, reversed and set aside the trial
court's order.  The CA ruled that the required certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the
same must be signed by the plaintiff or principal party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of
corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by specifically
authorized individuals. However, the CA pointed out that the factual circumstances of the case warranted
the liberal application of the rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration[11] was later denied by the CA in the Resolution[12] dated September 3,
2007.

Hence, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, with the following issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT ATTY. RODOLFO LAT WAS PROPERLY
AUTHORIZED BY THE RESPONDENT TO SIGN THE CERTIFICATE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT:

A)  THE PERSON WHO EXECUTED THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY (SPA) APPOINTING ATTY. LAT  AS
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY-IN-FACT WAS MERELY AN UNDERWRITER OF THE RESPONDENT WHO HAS NOT
SHOWN PROOF THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF RESPONDENT TO DO SO.

B)  THE POWERS GRANTED TO ATTY. LAT REFER TO [THE AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT DURING THE] PRE-
TRIAL [STAGE] AND DO NOT COVER THE SPECIFIC POWER TO SIGN THE CERTIFICATE.[13]

Petitioner alleged that respondent failed to submit any board resolution or secretary's certificate authorizing
Atty. Lat to institute the complaint and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on its behalf. Petitioner
submits that since respondent is a juridical entity, the signatory in the complaint must show proof of his or
her authority to sign on behalf of the corporation.  Further, the SPA[14] dated May 11, 2000, submitted by
Atty. Lat, which was notarized before the Consulate General of Chicago, Illinois, USA, allegedly authorizing
him to represent respondent in the pre-trial and other stages of the proceedings was signed by one Brent
Healy (respondent's underwriter), who lacks authorization from its board of directors.

In its Comment, respondent admitted that it failed to attach in the complaint a concrete proof of Atty. Lat's
authority to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping on its behalf. However, there was subsequent
compliance as respondent submitted an authenticated SPA empowering Atty. Lat to represent it in the pre-
trial and all stages of the proceedings. Further, it averred that petitioner is barred by laches from
questioning the purported defect in respondent's certificate of non-forum shopping.

The main issue in this case is whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the
certification against forum shopping on its behalf.

The petition is meritorious.

We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal
parties.[15]  If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must
have been duly authorized.[16] With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be
signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be disclosed in such document.[17] A corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred
on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation
exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it
has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board
of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws
or by a specific act of the board of directors.[18]

In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP),[19] we
ruled that only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. We also required proof of such authority to be presented. The
petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's
authority.

In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or
member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors;
otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed.[20]  The lack of certification against forum shopping is
generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice.[21]  The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person
on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the
complaint on behalf of the corporation.[22]

There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to
sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf.  Accordingly, the certification
against forum shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of
respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages (Civil Case No. 99-95561) against petitioner.

In Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc.,[23] the Court cited instances wherein the lack of
authority of the person making the certification of non-forum shopping was remedied through subsequent
compliance by the parties therein.  Thus,

[w]hile there were instances where we have allowed the filing of a certification against non-forum shopping
by someone on behalf of a corporation without the accompanying proof of authority at the time of its filing,
we did so on the basis of a special circumstance or compelling reason. Moreover, there was a subsequent
compliance by the submission of the proof of authority attesting to the fact that the person who signed the
certification was duly authorized.

In China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc., the CA dismissed the petition
filed by China Bank, since the latter failed to show that its bank manager who signed the certification
against non-forum shopping was authorized to do so. We reversed the CA and said that the case be decided
on the merits despite the failure to attach the required proof of authority, since the board resolution which
was subsequently attached recognized the pre-existing status of the bank manager as an authorized
signatory.

In Abaya Investments Corporation v. Merit Philippines, where the complaint before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila was instituted by petitioner's Chairman and President, Ofelia Abaya, who signed the
verification and certification against non-forum shopping without proof of authority to sign for the
corporation, we also relaxed the rule. We did so taking into consideration the merits of the case and to avoid
a re-litigation of the issues and further delay the administration of justice, since the case had already been
decided by the lower courts on the merits. Moreover, Abaya's authority to sign the certification was ratified
by the Board.[24]

Contrary to the CA's finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the
relaxation of the rules.  There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent
compliance with the requirement of the law.  Neither was there a copy of the board resolution or secretary's
certificate subsequently submitted to the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat was indeed
authorized to file said complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, nor did
respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the rules.  Thus, there exists no cogent reason
for the relaxation of the rule on this matter.  Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if
we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction.[25]

Moreover, the SPA dated May 11, 2000, submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty. Lat to appear
on behalf of the corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings, signed by Brent Healy, was
fatally defective and had no evidentiary value.  It failed to establish Healy's authority to act in behalf of
respondent, in view of the absence of a resolution from respondent's board of directors or secretary's
certificate proving the same.  Like any other corporate act, the power of Healy to name, constitute, and
appoint Atty. Lat as respondent's attorney-in-fact, with full powers to represent respondent in the
proceedings, should have been evidenced by a board resolution or secretary's certificate.

Respondent's allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the defect in respondent's
certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water.

In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals,[26] we held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who
is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce
any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over
the complaint and the plaintiff.[27]  Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file
the complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered
not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to lack of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for hearing and
deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.  Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the
filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's
jurisdiction.[28] Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC, Branch 8, Manila, the same did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.

Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from
challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.  This is so because
the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.[29]

In Regalado v. Go,[30] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy[31] doctrine to
apply, thus:

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,  it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.”

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by
laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is,
lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed
by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the
proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only
when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question
of jurisdiction.[32]

The factual setting attendant in Sibonghanoy is not similar to that of the present case so as to make it fall
under the doctrine of estoppel by laches.  Here, the trial court's jurisdiction was questioned by the petitioner
during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot be said that considerable length of time had
elapsed for laches to attach.  
cralaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
March 23, 2007 and September 3, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75895 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated March 22, 2002 and July 9, 2002, respectively, in Civil
Case No. 99-95561, are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED

A.C. No. 9604               March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA,Complainants, 

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J.
Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics
and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against
them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia
by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied
that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia
showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as
counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to
attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed
signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six
specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary
evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature
of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification
of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as
complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated
1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked
that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and
dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for
various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal
case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other
offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants
alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the
signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints
and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same
person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional
and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional
Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty.
Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered
his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some
minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name
by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment
complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were
meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also
denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were
directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5
May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the
last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law
and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the
complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman
were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the
various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by
respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a
non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all
respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has
ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent
lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its
proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his
law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995
and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as
Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary
diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide
efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had
he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The
Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants
dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of
the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a
pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal
to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it
to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as a certification that
(1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a
pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal
effect to the document. 1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that
he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and
confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to
rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his
innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006.
Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to
allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without
seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit
with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which
IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating
his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty.
Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court
as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.