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Lenel Onguard Access Control Communication Server Non-Proprietary Security

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Lenel OnGuard Access Control

Communication Server

Non-Proprietary Security Policy


Document Version 2.1

UTC Fire & Security Americas


Corporation, Inc.
www.lenel.com

September 28, 2015

Copyright 2015 United Technologies Corporation.

May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].


Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

Revision History
Revision History

Version Date Author Notes

1.1 8-15-2011 R Pethick Updates from initial revision 1.0 adding newer
versions of OnGuard.

1.2 12-30-2011 R Pethick Updated 6.1 Roles and Services and Table 4 in
Section 6.2

1.3 01-09-2013 R. Martinez Updated OG versions (TITAN & COBRA),


corrected pg # for 6.4; cert # for WIN 2008, pg 4

1.4 07-09-2013 R. Martinez General updates after input from NIST during
listing of COBRA.

1.5 7/31/13 R .Martinez Input from NIST. Added “encrypt & decrypt” to
8.4.A.a.i

1.6 10/01/13 R. Martinez Added Dell Models per NIST request to Table 1

1.7 05/02/2014 M. OBrien Added OnGuard Version 7.0.8xx for Windows 8


and Windows Server 2012

1.8 8/14/2014 R. Pethick Updated version, Company Logo and boundaries


diagram

1.9 10/31/2014 M. OBrien Added certs for new Operating Environments.

2.0 08/11/2015 M. OBrien Changed legal entity name from Lenel to UTC
Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc.

2.1 08/12/2015 M. OBrien Added OnGuard 7.1.481

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REVISION HISTORY ................................................................................................................................................2 

1. MODULE OVERVIEW .........................................................................................................................................4 

2. SECURITY LEVEL ................................................................................................................................................5 

3. MODES OF OPERATION .....................................................................................................................................6 


3.1 FIPS APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION ...............................................................................................................6 
3.2 NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS ............................................................................................................................7 
4. PORTS AND INTERFACES .................................................................................................................................7 

5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY .................................................................................7 

6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ..............................................................................................................................8 


6.1 ROLES AND SERVICES ..........................................................................................................................................8 
6.2 SERVICE INPUTS AND OUTPUTS ...........................................................................................................................9 
6.3 DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS) ..................................................................................9 
6.4 DEFINITION OF CSPS MODES OF ACCESS ...........................................................................................................10 
7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT....................................................................................................................11 

8. SECURITY RULES ..............................................................................................................................................11 

9. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ......................................................................................................................12 


9.1 PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS ...................................................................................................................12 
9.2 OPERATOR REQUIRED ACTIONS .........................................................................................................................12 
10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ...........................................................................................12 

11. REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................13 

12. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS...................................................................................................................13 

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

1. Module Overview
The Lenel OnGuard Access Control “Communication Server” cryptographic module is a
software only multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The Communication Server module's
primary purpose is to provide secure communications with external access control devices. The
module is part of the Lenel advanced access control and alarm monitoring system. The Lenel
advanced access control and alarm monitoring system is built on an open architecture platform,
offers unlimited scalability, database segmentation, fault tolerance, and biometrics and smart
card support. The Lenel advanced access control and alarm monitoring system is fully
customizable, and can be seamlessly integrated into the OnGuard total security solution.
The physical cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer perimeter of the general purpose
computing platform (GPC) running Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2012,
or Windows 8 on which the software only module executes.
The logical cryptographic module encompasses the following runtime components:
 Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider RSAENH.DLL. This is a previously
validated FIPS 140-2 module (Cert. #1330, #1010, and #1894)
 Mercury SCPD_NET.DLL

The FIPS 140-2 Configurations tested:


Operating Communication RSAENH.dll Mercury
Environment Server scpd_net.dll
Dell OptiPlex 755  Software Version:  Reference:   Version: 
Windows 7    6.5.624  CMVP Cert.  4.5.1.103 
Intel Core2 Q6600  6.6.287 #1330  

Dell OptiPlex 760  Reference: 
Windows Server 2008  CMVP Cert. 
Intel Core2 E8400 #1010 

Dell OptiPlex 7010  Software Version:  Reference:  Version: 


Windows 8   7.0.932  CMVP Cert.  4.6.1.148
Intel Core i5‐3470  #1894 
SuperMicro 827‐14 
Windows Server 2012 
Intel Xeon E5620 
Dell OptiPlex 7010  Software Version  Reference:  Version 
Windows 8   7.1.481  CMVP Cert.  4.6.1.161 
Intel Core i5‐3470  #1894 
SuperMicro 827‐14 
Windows Server 2012 
Intel Xeon E5620 

Table 1 - Module Configurations

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

Physical Cryptographic Module Boundary (GPC Hardware) 

Microsoft Operating System 
Logical Cryptographic   
Module Boundary  Lenel 
Lenel’s  ISC 
FIPS Key Generator 
Application  Communication 
Server 

Lenel’s 
FIPS Mode 
Microsoft’s 
Configuration Utility  RSAENH.dll
Application 

Mercury’s 
scpd_net.dll
Dell OptiPlex 
7010 

Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Diagram

2. Security Level
The Lenel OnGuard Access Control cryptographic module meets the overall requirements
applicable to Level 1 security of FIPS 140-2.
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

3. Modes of Operation
3.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation

In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports or uses the following algorithms:
 AES ECB and CBC with 128-bit keys for encryption using Scpd_net.dll (AES
Certificates #1650 and #3088).
 NIST recommended RNG based on ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 using the AES
algorithm (RNG Certificates #882 and #1313)
The following algorithms are provided by RSAENH.DLL validated to FIPS 140-2 under Cert.
#1330, #1010 or #1894
 FIPS 140-2 Cert. #1330
 RSA Cert. #557
 SHA Cert. #1081
 RNG (SP 800-90, vendor affirmed)

 FIPS 140-2 Cert. #1010


 RSA Cert. #355
 SHA Cert. #753

 FIPS 140-2 Cert. #1894


 RSA Cert. #1132
 SHA Cert. #1902
The cryptographic module may be configured for FIPS mode via execution of the “FIPS Mode
Configuration Utility” and turning its “Enable FIPS Mode” checkbox ON. The operator can
determine if the cryptographic module is running in FIPS vs. non-FIPS mode via execution of
the “FIPS Mode Configuration Utility”. When running this utility it will indicate if FIPS mode
is enabled or disabled. If it is disabled you can invoke FIPS mode by selecting Modify and
turning on FIPS Mode. You will also need to select which key is the active key as well as
provide the master key. Once this is done the Lenel Communication Server service will need to
be restarted to use the new settings.

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms

The Lenel Communication Server uses the RC2 algorithm for encrypting and decrypting data
from the database. This data is treated as plain text as far as this module is concerned.

4. Ports and Interfaces


The logical and physical ports and interfaces are summarized in the following
table:

Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces

Interface Logical Physical


Data Input Data that is received from the Ethernet, serial
Intelligent System Controller by the port, modem,
Lenel Communication Server. Remote
Configuration information received via Procedure Calls,
remote procedure calls (RPC). COM COM interfaces,
interface calls from non Lenel ISCs. Reading from
Data read from the database by the Database
Communication Server.
Data Data that is sent from the Lenel Ethernet, serial
Output Communication Server to the Intelligent port, modem,
System Controller. Data returned via Remote
remote procedure calls (RPC). Data sent Procedure Calls,
to non Lenel ISCs via COM interfaces. COM interfaces,
Data written to the database. Writing to
database
Control Input Data entered into the FIPS Mode Keyboard, mouse
Configuration Utility
Status Output All messages either logged to error logs Hard disk,
or displayed in the Alarm Monitoring Monitor, Socket
Interface. Events and status messages connection to
sent to client applications. client
applications
Power Input N/A PC power supply

5. Identification and Authentication Policy


5.1 Assumption of Roles
No authentication is required. Assumption of roles is implied by the selection of service.
 Crypto Officer (CO) Role: This role is assumed to provide the operator key management
and alternating bypass control as well as key generation. The CO role is assumed by the
selection of a CO allocated service.

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

 User Role: This role is assumed to provide the operator access to cryptographic services,
status information, and self-tests service. The user role is assumed by the selection of a
User allocated service.

The module does not support a maintenance role.

6. Access Control Policy


6.1 Roles and Services

The cryptographic module supports the following services:


Crypto Officer Role Services:
 Module Master Key Management: This service allows the master keys to be
entered as well as to indicate which key is the active key.
 Alternating Bypass Enable/Disable: This service allows encryption of data to
be enabled or disabled to a particular ISC.
 Zeroize: This service provides a means to overwrite all temporary copies of
cryptographic modules plaintext critical security parameters
 Configure FIPS mode of Operation: sets the parameter for the FIPS mode of
Operation.
User Role services:
 Secure Data Transmission: This service provides AES encryption/decryption
operations for secure transmission of data. (NOTE: During each session a fresh
session key is generated by the CM via an Approved RNG and is electronically
output to the ISC encrypted with AES).
 Show Status: This service provides the current status of the cryptographic
module.
 Self-tests: This service executes the suite of self-tests required by FIPS 140-2.
 Remote Procedure Call Service: This service provides a means for client
applications to communicate with the Communication Server.
 COM Interface Method Service: This service provides a means for the
Communication Server to interact with device translators via COM method
interfaces.
 Database Interaction Service: This service provides interaction with the
database from the Communication Server.

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

6.2 Service Inputs and Outputs

Table 4 - Specification of Service Inputs & Outputs

Service  Control Input  Data Input  Data Output  Status Output 


Module Master  Header info.  None  None  Success/Fail 
Key 
Management 
Alternating  Header info.  None  None  Success/Fail 
Bypass 
Enable/Disable 

Secure Data  Header info.  Plaintext data  Ciphertext data  Success/Fail 


Transmission 
(Encryption) 

Secure Data    Ciphertext data  Plaintext data  Success/Fail 


Transmission 
(Decryption) 

Show Status  Service Selection  None  Status  Success/Fail 

Self‐tests    None  None  Success/Fail 

Zeroize  Service Selection  None  None  Success/Fail 

Remote    None  Plaintext  Plaintext 


Procedure Call 

COM Interface    None  Plaintext  Plaintext 


Method 

Database    None  Plaintext  Plaintext 


Interaction 

6.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

 Master Key 1 – This key is used to provide encryption of session keys.


 Master Key 2 – This key is used to provide encryption of session keys.
 Session Key – This key is used to encrypt data communication between the module and
the ISC.
 Seed Key for Mercury RNG within the Mercury SCPD_NET.DLL – This seed key is

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

used for generating random numbers.


 Seed Value for Mercury RNG within the Mercury SCPD_NET.DLL – This seed value is
used for generating random numbers.

Definition of Public Keys:

The following are the public keys contained in the module:

 RSA Software Public Key - 1024 bits: This key is the RSA public key that is used to
validate the software integrity.

6.4 Definition of CSPs Modes of Access


Table 6 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The
modes of access shown in the table are defined as follows:
 Generate: the parameter is generated.
 Enter: the parameter is input into the cryptographic boundary.
 Output: the parameter is output from the cryptographic boundary.
 Read: the parameter is used within its corresponding security function.
 Zeroize: the parameter is actively overwritten.

Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation 
Role 
Enter = E, Generate = G, Output= O, Read = R, Zeroize = Z 
Service 
Seed Value 
CO  User  Master Key1  Master Key 2  Session Key  Seed Key (M) 
(M) 

X     Module Master Key  E,O,R, Z  E,O,R, Z       


Management 

X     Alternating Bypass           
Enable/Disable 

   X  Secure Data  R  R  G,O,R  G  G 


Transmission 

  X  Show Status           

  X  Self‐Tests  R  R       

X    Zeroize  Z  Z  Z  Z  Z 

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

  X  Remote Procedure           
Call 

  X  COM Interface           
Method 

  X  Database Interaction           

Table 5 – CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services

7. Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are applicable because the
cryptographic module contains a modifiable operational environment. The following operating
systems were used during the FIPS 140-2 operational testing:

 Windows Server 2008


 Windows 7
 Windows Server 2012
 Windows 8

8. Security Rules
The cryptographic module’s design corresponds to the cryptographic module’s security rules.
This section documents the security rules for the cryptographic module to implement the security
requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide two distinct operator roles. These are the User
role, and the Cryptographic-Officer role.
2. The module does not support operator authentication.
3. The cryptographic module shall encrypt message traffic using the AES algorithm.
4. The cryptographic module shall perform FIPS 140-2 required self-tests
A. Power up Self-Tests:
a. Cryptographic Algorithm Tests:
i. AES (encrypt and decrypt) Known Answer Tests (KATs).
ii. ANSI x9.31 RNG Known Answer Test.
b. Software Integrity Test
i. RSA 1024 with SHA-1 signature verification.
c. Critical Functions Tests: Configuration Parameter Integrity test
B. Conditional Self-Tests:
a. Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test:

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

i. ANSI x9.31 RNG


b. Alternating bypass test
5. At any time the cryptographic module is in an idle state, the operator shall be capable of
commanding the module to perform the power-up self-tests, this is done by restarting the
individual application.
6. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests and error states. The module is logically
disconnected from data output during key zeroization and key generation processes.
7. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
8. The module shall operate on a GPC using a single user configuration of the operating
system specified on the validation certificate, or another compatible single user operating
system.

9. Physical Security Policy


9.1 Physical Security Mechanisms
The cryptographic module is a software only cryptographic module, and as such the physical
security requirements of FIPS 140-2 are not applicable.

9.2 Operator Required Actions


The operator is not required to perform any special actions for inspection, since the physical
security requirements are not applicable.

Table 6 – Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms


Physical Security Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Guidance
Mechanisms Inspection/Test Details

N/A N/A N/A

10. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy


The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate specific attacks outside of the scope
of FIPS 140-2.

Table 7 – Mitigation of Other Attacks


Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations

N/A N/A N/A

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Lenel OnGuard Communication Server Security Policy

11. References
The UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc. Lenel website: http://www.lenel.com

FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.

Windows 7 Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) Security Policy

Windows Server 2008 Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) Security Policy

Security Policy for FIPS 140-2 Validation Microsoft Windows 8 Microsoft Windows Server
2012 Microsoft Windows RT Microsoft Surface Windows RT Microsoft Surface Windows 8 Pro
Microsoft Windows Phone 8 Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH.DLL)

12. Definitions and Acronyms


AES – Advanced Encryption Standard.

ISC – Intelligent System Controller.

CBC – Cipher Block Chaining.

CSP – Critical Security Parameters.

RNG –Random Number Generator.

EMI – Electromagnetic Interference.

FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standards.

GPC – General Purpose Computer.

NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology.

SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm

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