Soolot Gyt

i
MARCUS AURELIUS
In this new study, John Sellars offers a fresh examination of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations as a
work of philosophy by placing it against the background of the tradition of Stoic philosophy
to which Marcus was committed.
The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius is a perennial bestseller, attracting countless readers
drawn to its unique mix of philosophical reflection and practical advice. The emperor is usu-
ally placed alongside Seneca and Epictetus as one of three great Roman Stoic authors, but he
wears his philosophy lightly, not feeling the need to state explicitly the ideas standing behind
the reflections that he was writing for himself. As a consequence, his standing as a philosopher
has often been questioned. Challenging claims that Marcus Aurelius was merely an eclectic
thinker, that the Meditations do not fit the model of a work of philosophy, that there are no
arguments in the work, and that it only contains superficial moral advice, Sellars shows that
he was in constant dialogue with his Stoic predecessors, engaging with themes drawn from all
three parts of Stoicism: logic, physics, and ethics. The image of Marcus Aurelius that emerges
is of a committed Stoic, engaging with a wide range of philosophical topics, motivated by the
desire to live a good life.
This volume will be of interest to scholars and students of both Classics and Philosophy.
John Sellars is Lecturer in Philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London, a Visiting

Research Fellow at King’s College London, and a member of Wolfson College, Oxford. His
previous books include The Art of Living, Stoicism, Hellenistic Philosophy, and Lessons in Stoicism.
He is also the editor of The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition.
ii
PHILOSOPHY IN THE ROMAN WORLD
Cicero
The Philosophy of a Roman Sceptic
Raphael Woolf
Marcus Aurelius
John Sellars
https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-in-the-Roman-World/book-series/PHILROM
iii
MARCUS AURELIUS
John Sellars
iv
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 John Sellars
The right of John Sellars to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks,
and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Sellars, John, 1971–author.
Title: Marcus Aurelius /John Sellars.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020006226 (print) | LCCN 2020006227 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Marcus Aurelius, Emperor of Rome, 121–180. Meditations.
Classification: LCC B583.S455 2020 (print) |
LCC B583 (ebook) | DDC 188–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020006226
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020006227
ISBN: 978-0-367-14606-1 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-14607-8 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-05265-1 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Newgen Publishing UK
v
CONTENTS
Preface vii
References and abbreviations ix
Introduction 1
PART I
Marcus and his Meditations 5
1 Marcus the Stoic philosopher 7
2 The Meditations, a philosophical text 20
PART II
Logic 37
3 Impressions and judgements 39
PART III
Physics 55
4 Nature and change 57
5 Fate and providence 68

vi
vi Contents
6 Soul and emotion 81
7 Time and death 90
PART IV
Ethics 105
8 Virtue and justice 107
9 The cosmic city 117
Conclusion 127
Appendix 128
Bibliography 130
Index of passages 138
Subject index 145
vii
PREFACE
This book is a study of the philosophy of Marcus Aurelius, as presented in his work widely
known as the Meditations. Its aim is to present Marcus as a serious philosopher. It tries to do
this in a number of ways. First, it tries to show that Marcus was a committed Stoic philosopher
and not, as some have suggested, a confused eclectic thinker. Second, it reflects on how Marcus
understood what it meant to do philosophy, rather than anachronistically judging him by
present-day standards. Third, it examines the unique literary form of the Meditations and asks
what sort of philosophical text this might be. Fourth –and most important of all –it examines
the philosophical content in the Meditations, placing it within the wider context of previous
Stoic philosophy. As we shall see, Marcus is engaged with a wide range of material spanning
the three traditional parts of Stoic philosophy –logic, physics, and ethics –and bringing this
out will hopefully also challenge the claim that Marcus was merely interested in what is some-
times called “practical ethics”.
I was first invited to write this book some years ago by Steven Gerrard, founder and
editor of Acumen Publishing. I was happy to accept the commission but at the time found
myself unsure about how best to proceed. As a consequence, other projects jumped the queue.
Marcus was not forgotten, however, and a series of smaller commissions gave me a number
of opportunities to write about him in the interim. For these opportunities I should thank
Diskin Clay, Marcel van Ackeren, Will Shearin, Christopher Moore, and Matthew Dennis.
The acquisition of Acumen by Routledge reinvigorated the project, but the final impetus to
completing it came in 2018–19 when I had the opportunity to teach Marcus’s Meditations at
Royal Holloway, University of London, as part of a course entitled “The Good Life in Ancient
Philosophy”. I thank all the students who participated in that course and embraced Marcus
as a philosopher who had valuable things to say. I should also particularly like to acknow-
ledge Christopher Gill, my PhD examiner many years ago and more recently collaborator on
a number of projects. I have learned much about Marcus from Chris over the years, both in
conversation and through his publications.
Chapter 2 draws on material published in Sellars (2012a, 2018b), and a chapter due to
be published in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Philosophy (a version of the latter appeared
in German in 2016, in a volume entitled Philosophie als Lebenskunst). Part of Chapter 3 was
viii
viii Preface
read to seminars in Paris and London in 2017 and 2018, and an earlier draft of Chapter 8 was
presented at the Gesellschaft für antike Philosophie conference in Frankfurt in September
2019; I thank all these audiences for their helpful comments. Robin Waterfield read more or
less the final version, catching some minor errors and making some helpful suggestions, for
which I am very grateful.
ix
REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS
I have consulted a variety of editions of the Meditations. The most recent complete critical
edition is Dalfen (1987). I have often used Farquharson (1944), which includes a translation
and the only substantial modern commentary on the entire text. I have also had to hand
Haines (1916), which offers a convenient portable parallel Greek–English text, even if the
translation is now somewhat dated.
I refer to the Meditations by book and section number. All otherwise unattributed references
are to the Meditations. Some of the longer sections have been subdivided by editors and the
three editions noted above all do this in slightly different ways. Because of this, I generally
avoid citing those further subdivisions, although where on occasion it seemed helpful I have
followed the system used by Dalfen, which is the most finely grained, putting these in square
brackets.
I have read and re-read the Meditations in multiple translations over the years, including
Staniforth (1964), Hammond (2006), and Hard (2011), as well as those by Farquharson and
Haines in the editions mentioned above. In general, I quote from Farquharson’s translation,
often modifying it, but occasionally from the others too. In a few instances I have translated
a passage afresh myself. I have not attempted to keep track of all this, which would have
generated a cumbersome and not especially interesting apparatus.
Other ancient authors and texts are cited by fairly standard abbreviations, often those used
in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (for Galen, see the list in Singer 2013: 429–42); further infor-
mation is given in the Index of passages. Note also the following abbreviations:
DK H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols

(Berlin: Weidmann, 1964)
DPhA Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antique, ed. R. Goulet, 7 vols and suppl.
(Paris: CNRS, 1989–2018)
EK L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd, Posidonius I: The Fragments
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972)
Kühn C. G. Kühn, Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia, 20 vols in 22 (Leipzig: Knobloch,
1821–33)
newgenprepdf
x References and abbreviations
LCL Loeb Classical Library

LM A. Laks and G. W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy, 9 vols, LCL (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016)
LS A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
LSJ H. G. Liddell, and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. H. S. Jones
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940)
SVF Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. H. von Arnim, 4 vols (Leipzig: Teubner,
1903–24)
1
INTRODUCTION
Marcus Aurelius is primarily remembered for two things: he was Roman Emperor and he
wrote a work of philosophy, the Meditations. His role as Emperor is uncontroversial and a
matter of historical record.1 He took up the role in ad 161, at the age of forty, and stayed in it
until his death in 180. His status as a philosopher, however, is far more complex and contested.
Although he has consistently attracted a large number of general readers who unproblemat-
ically regard him as a philosopher, professional philosophers have by and large ignored him.
Whatever it was that Marcus was doing when writing the Meditations, it was certainly not
what professional philosophers do today. Even among specialists in ancient philosophy, few
would be prepared to rank the Meditations alongside the dialogues of Plato or the treatises
of Aristotle. Indeed, some have denied that Marcus was a philosopher at all. Although he is
widely presented as a Stoic philosopher, a number of influential sceptical voices have either
dismissed him as an unsophisticated eclectic or charged him with reducing Stoic philosophy
to an unthinking religious faith.2
He was not always judged so harshly by philosophers. In the nineteenth century John Stuart
Mill described Marcus as “the best and most enlightened among his contemporaries” and the
Meditations as “the highest ethical product of the ancient mind”.3 In the century before, the
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Francis Hutcheson translated the Meditations in collab-
oration with James Moor, writing in their introduction that Marcus’s book presents “a great
soul, adorned with the soundest understanding, the most amiable sweetness and kindness of
affection, the most invincible meekness, steady justice, humility, and simplicity”.4 Earlier in the
same century the moral philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury,
drew extensively from the Meditations in his own notebook reflections,5 while in the seven-
teenth century the Cambridge Platonist Henry More made great use of the Meditations in his
own handbook of ethics, praising the clarity and quality of his ethical guidance.6
Indeed, many people have found Marcus’s ethical guidance compelling and the Meditations
continues to attract new readers drawn to his thoughtful reflections on how to live. In pre-
vious generations Marcus was often presented as a kind pagan saint, either closely aligned with
Christian teaching or offering a “gospel” for those “who have no faith in the supernatural”.7
These days he is more often presented as a writer of psychological therapy, offering practical
2
2 Introduction
tips on how to cope with the stresses and strains of daily life.8 There is certainly much in the
Meditations that people can and have found useful when reflecting on their own lives.
The aim of this book is to approach the Meditations as a work of philosophy and to defend
Marcus’s standing as a philosopher. It will try to do this in a number of different ways. The
opening chapter argues that Marcus was a committed Stoic philosopher, well versed in the
literature of the Stoic tradition, and not, as some have suggested, a confused eclectic thinker.
It will do this by considering the biographical evidence for his interest in philosophy and
his own education in philosophy under a series of Stoic teachers, including Apollonius of
Chalcedon, Sextus of Chaeronea, and Junius Rusticus. It also considers his relationship with
Cornelius Fronto and the evidence in Marcus’s correspondence with Fronto that sheds
light on Marcus’s interest in philosophy. It then examines Marcus’s debts to previous Stoic
philosophers, including Chrysippus, Aristo, Cleanthes, Seneca, and Epictetus. It also considers
Galen, whom Marcus knew personally. Although their interactions may have been minimal,
Galen’s own therapeutic works add valuable context to the Meditations.The chapter concludes
by asking what it meant to be a Stoic in the second century ad.
The second chapter examines the unique literary form of the Meditations, asking what
sort of philosophical text this might be and how Marcus understood what it meant to do
philosophy. It presents the Meditations as a private notebook, never intended for publication,
in which Marcus engaged in a series of written exercises aimed at self-examination. In par-
ticular, these exercises were aimed at assimilating and digesting key philosophical principles.
Central to this process was the practice of paying close attention to principles at all times.
This activity is then placed within the wider context of the Stoic conception of philosophy
as an art of living, understood in analogy with medicine as involving two distinct stages: first,
a grasp of theoretical principles, followed by training aimed at digesting those principles. It
is argued that the Meditations ought to be read as text focused on the second stage of such
an education. In this context, the notion of a spiritual exercise is introduced and its use
by Musonius Rufus and Seneca is examined; then some specific spiritual exercises in the
Meditations are discussed.
The subsequent chapters turn to the philosophical content in the Meditations. For the sake
of presentation, I have divided themes under the traditional Stoic headings of logic, physics,
and ethics. As we shall see, many themes central in the Meditations cut across these divisions,
involving more than one part of philosophy at once. Yet this division is, I hope, helpful in
that it helps to show that it would be a mistake to approach the Meditations as merely a
work of practical ethical advice. It has often been claimed that Marcus was not interested in
logic or physics, but instead with “shaping the life of the individual”.9 That seems like a false
dichotomy, and the claim of this book will be that Marcus’s concern with self-transformation
presupposes Stoic logic and physics as much as it does ethics. Although there is of course much
practical advice in the work, it is built upon foundations found in all three traditional parts of
Stoic philosophy.
With that claim in mind, Chapter 3 considers the presence of logical themes in the
Meditations. It begins by outlining the way in which logic was understood in antiquity, in
particular the Stoic account of logic, encompassing rhetoric and dialectic. Within the con-
text of this broad conception of logic, the chapter examines the notions of impressions and
judgements as they appear in the Meditations. It looks at the way in which Marcus sees some
impressions as reliable and some as deceptive and compares this with the earlier Chrysippean
account. The role of judgements in the Meditations is placed against the background of early
3
Introduction 3
Stoic epistemology and the ways in which Roman Stoics such as Epictetus and Marcus shift
attention to value judgements. The chapter concludes by showing the close connection
between the notions of impressions and judgements.
Chapters 4–7 examine a range of themes in Stoic physics. This is the largest part of the
book, reflecting the fact that physical themes are by far the most common in the Meditations.
Chapter 4 begins by considering the place of reflections on physics and Nature in Marcus’s
thought, along with central themes such as the unity of Nature and the presence of two basic
causal and material principles. These themes are then discussed in the light of early Stoic
physics. It then moves on to consider Marcus’s reflections on perpetual change, relating this
to Heraclitus’s doctrine of flux. The question of Heraclitus’s influence on Marcus is discussed.
Finally, it asks why Marcus might have thought it useful to reflect on change in Nature, and
how such reflections fit within his wider philosophical project.
Next, Chapter 5 examines the concepts of fate and providence as they appear in the
Meditations, placing both concepts against the background of early Stoic accounts of both, and
discussing their relationship. After looking at how Marcus uses these two concepts, the chapter
considers those passages where Marcus draws the contrast “providence or atoms” and appears
not to commit to either view. It argues that this ought not to be taken as deviation from a
Stoic commitment to providence. The chapter concludes by summarizing the variety of ways
in which Marcus characterizes the cosmos in these passages and identifies his own view from
among the options.
In Chapter 6, a range of issues broadly connected to the theme of the self are discussed.
Central to Marcus’s thinking on this topic is the concept of hêgemonikon. This is considered
within the wider context of Stoic psychology, as the ruling part of the Stoic soul. It argues that
Marcus adopted the Stoic psychological model, notwithstanding a few passages that appear to
express heterodox views. It also examines Marcus’s thoughts about emotions, which take place
in the ruling part of the soul, along with the idea that the ruling part ought to be treated as
an inner citadel. It concludes by considering a way in which Marcus might be seen to expand
the traditional Stoic scale of nature.
One of the central themes in the Meditations is reflection on the shortness of human life.
Chapter 7 examines this theme via an analysis of Marcus’s reflections about time and about
death. It has been argued that Marcus developed a distinctive theory of time in response to
early Stoic ideas, drawing a distinction between time and eternity. This chapter argues against
that interpretation, suggesting that Marcus’s principal aim was simply to highlight the brevity
of human life. Marcus’s reflections on death are also examined, and an echo of Epicurus’s
famous argument concerning death is noted. It asks why Marcus was so concerned with death
as a topic and considers how it relates to his equally common reflections about living in the
present moment.
The final two chapters turn to ethical and political themes. Chapter 8 considers ethical
themes in the Meditations against the wider context of early Stoic ethics. It examines his
references to living consistently with Nature against the backdrop of early Stoic debates about
the telos formula. It also considers Marcus’s many references to the traditional virtues, again
against the backdrop of the early Stoic focus on four cardinal virtues of wisdom, moderation,
courage, and justice. Among all the virtues he mentions, Marcus reflects on justice more than
any other. Potential Platonic influences are considered, but discounted, and his concern with
justice is connected back to his commitment to the Stoic telos of living consistently with
Nature. Finally, it considers passages that advocate spontaneous ethical action.
4
4 Introduction
The last chapter looks at broadly political themes in the Meditations. It begins by placing
these against the background of the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis, as expressed by the Roman
Stoic Hierocles, and early Stoic cosmopolitanism. These set the scene for an examination of
Marcus’s comments presenting Nature as a cosmic city. Connected to this are his claims that
individuals ought to put the concerns of this city ahead of narrowly conceived individualistic
needs.This leads to reflection about different part–whole relationships and the claim that indi-
viduals ought to see themselves as organic parts or limbs of an integrated whole.
As in the Meditations itself, there is a certain amount of repetition in what follows, with
some key passages discussed more than once. Marcus has a particular skill in compressing
almost all the key themes running through his thought into a single brief paragraph and he
does this on many occasions. There are consequently a handful of passages that will appear in
multiple chapters below, each time discussed from a different angle. The compressed way in
which Marcus writes his thoughts to himself makes this almost inevitable, and certainly diffi-
cult to avoid.Yet, as we shall also see, the repetition in the Meditations –and perhaps also here
too –serves a deliberate purpose in helping readers to digest the key ideas through repeated
exposure.
Notes
1 For modern biographies, see Birley (2000) and McLynn (2009).
2 See, for example, Rist (1982: 43) (an “unphilosophical religion”) and Cooper (2004: 368) (“a sort
of religious faith”). In Cooper (2012: 217), Marcus is presented as engaged in a rhetorical practice
aimed at resignation and avoidance of emotion, based on imagination rather than reason. In this sense,
according to Cooper, Marcus does not rationally comprehend Stoic first principles and so fails to live
Stoicism as a philosophical way of life. For a survey of the some of the most common objections see
Gill (2012: 382–3).
3 These come from Mill’s On Liberty, in Mill (1859: 48–9).
4 See the introduction in Hutcheson and Moor ([1742] 2008: 4). (I have slightly updated their text
here.) For the wider context see Maurer (2016).
5 See the recent critical edition of his notebooks in Ashley Cooper (2011). His interest in Marcus
Aurelius is discussed in Sellars (2016) and Collis (2016).
6 See More’s Enchiridion Ethicum, first printed in 1668, for example, 2.8.16, translated in More
(1690: 143). See further Sellars (2017: 923).
7 On Marcus’s sanctification see Richlin (2012). The quotation comes from Renan (1904: 134), who is
discussed in Sellars (2012b).
8 For an early presentation of Marcus in these terms, see Rutherford (1989: 13). For a more recent
account, focused on extracting useful therapeutic material from the Meditations, see Robertson (2019).
9 This comment, just one representative example among many, is from Edelstein (1966: 46).
5
PART I
Marcus and his Meditations

6
7
1
MARCUS THE STOIC PHILOSOPHER
Marcus the philosopher

One popular and quite common image of Marcus Aurelius is as a wise old man writing his
Meditations late in life while on campaign.1 At the end of Book 1 (or the beginning of Book
2) of the Meditations there is a note that reads “Written among the Quadi on the river Gran”, a
tributary of the Danube.2 At the end of Book 2 (or the beginning of Book 3) there is a similar
note that says “Written in Carnuntum”, which was close to the border between Germany and
the Roman Empire.3 These notes seem to confirm this image, for Marcus was on campaign in
this area during the 170s, the last decade of his life. Marcus was born in 121, so he was prob-
ably in his 50s when writing the Meditations. A less flattering image would present him not as
an accomplished sage but instead a world-weary man in late middle age, half-remembering a
few scraps of philosophy he had studied as an adolescent.4
Marcus did indeed study philosophy in his youth. The biography of Marcus in the Historia
Augusta opens with the statement that Marcus was “devoted to philosophy as long as he lived”
(HA 4.1.1).5 It goes on to say that Marcus’s education in philosophy began at an early age (HA
4.2.1). He was, we are told, committed to philosophy as a youth and “when he was twelve
years old he adopted the dress and, a little later, the hardiness of a philosopher, pursuing his
studies clad in a rough Greek cloak and sleeping on the ground” (HA 4.2.6). We have a list
of his philosophy teachers, to whom we shall turn shortly, but it is worth noting that all this
predated his adoption into the Imperial family. Although Marcus was born into the upper
echelons of Roman society, he was by no means destined to become Emperor. It is difficult
to know to what extent, if any, he may have anticipated his later role during his early years.
Marcus’s natural father was an important person –prefect of the city of Rome –and the
family were intimates of the then Emperor Hadrian. Hadrian had a reputation as an intellec-
tual, interested in Greek culture, and a passing interest in philosophy. We are told that he was
an admirer of Epictetus (HA 1.16.10), and there survives a generic question-and-answer dia-
logue between Hadrian and Epictetus.6 Hadrian was childless and, after looking around for a
potential heir, decided to adopt Antoninus Pius as his successor. Antoninus, Marcus’s uncle, was
himself without heir, so at the same time Hadrian arranged that Antoninus should adopt two
8
8 Marcus and his Meditations
sons himself as potential successors, Commodus and Marcus.The historian Dio Cassius reports
that Hadrian chose Marcus “because he was already giving indication of exceptional strength
of character” (Dio Cassius 69.21.2). In short, Marcus’s interest in philosophy began during his
childhood, predated his elevation into the Imperial family, and may have even contributed to
him being chosen for the role.
Marcus’s philosophy teachers

Marcus was taught philosophy by Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic (HA 4.2.7), and the
Historia Augusta makes a point of saying that he continued to seek instruction from Apollonius
even after joining the Imperial family (HA 4.3.1–2), which might be taken to imply that
Apollonius was one of his childhood instructors in philosophy.7 Marcus acknowledges
Apollonius in Book 1 of the Meditations, writing that from him he learned what we would
now think of as archetypal Stoic lessons: to remain firm in the face of fortune and “to look
to nothing else, even for a little while, except to reason” (1.8). Elsewhere, in a letter to Fronto,
Marcus called Apollonius “my master in philosophy” (Ad M. Caes. 51).8
As well as studying with Apollonius, the Historia Augusta tells us that Marcus “attended the
lectures of Sextus of Chaeronea, the nephew of Plutarch, and of Junius Rusticus, Claudius
Maximus, and Cinna Catulus, all Stoics” (HA 4.3.2). He also attended the lectures of Claudius
Severus, a Peripatetic (HA 4.3.3). Of all these teachers, the Historia Augusta reports that Junius
Rusticus was the most important influence on Marcus, a man “exceedingly well acquainted
with the Stoic system” (HA 4.3.4).9 Marcus himself acknowledges his debt to Rusticus in
Book 1 of the Meditations, noting that it was from him that he learned the need “for reform
and treatment of character” (1.7),10 as well as an attitude of suspicion towards rhetoric and
towards speculative writing or the production of commentaries on texts. At the same time,
Marcus tells us that Rusticus encouraged him to read books carefully and deeply, and that he
lent Marcus his own copy of the Discourses of Epictetus.
Marcus also acknowledges his teacher Sextus of Chaeronea in the Meditations, from whom
he says he learned what we would now think of as core Stoic doctrines: “the notion of life
according to Nature” and “to be at once entirely passionless and yet full of natural affection”
(1.9).The Historia Augusta describes Sextus as a Stoic while also noting his more famous uncle,
Plutarch, who of course wrote a number of extended polemics against the Stoics (HA 4.3.2).11
Dio Cassius reports that Marcus took on Sextus as a teacher after he had become Emperor, as
evidence for his lifelong commitment to philosophy (Dio Cassius 71.1.2). By that point, it is
likely that Marcus was already committed to the philosophy of the Stoa. Philostratus, in his
Lives of the Sophists, reports an anecdote from one Lucius, who visited Marcus in Rome when
he was Emperor.When Lucius found Marcus going out one day, he asked where the Emperor
was going, to which Marcus is reported to have replied, “It is a good thing even for one who
is growing old to acquire knowledge. I am going to Sextus the philosopher to learn what I do
not yet know” (VS 2.11.1). The impression we begin to get, then, is of someone with a life-
long interest in philosophy, stretching from early childhood to old age. The other noteworthy
feature of this anecdote is that, as Emperor, Marcus did not summon Sextus to visit him, but
made the trip to visit Sextus himself.This tells us something about both Marcus’s character and
the nature of his relationship with his teacher.
The remaining teachers mentioned in the Historia Augusta are also all acknowledged in
Book 1 of the Meditations. Claudius Maximus, another Stoic, held a number of important
9
Marcus the Stoic philosopher 9
governmental posts, including consul sometime around 142. Marcus’s description of him
lists a whole series of positive character traits that feature throughout the Meditations – self-
mastery, coping with adversity, dignity, generosity, and so on (1.15) –that suggest that he
was an important influence on Marcus’s own outlook on life. Indeed, at 1.17 he mentions
Maximus alongside Apollonius and Rusticus as a formative influence. We do not know that
much about Maximus but, if the identification is correct, he appears in the Apology of the
Platonist Apuleius.This text, written as a defence speech in response to charges of using magic,
is addressed to one Claudius Maximus who, as proconsul of Africa, presided over the court
proceedings.12 Here he is presented as a Stoic (Apol. 19) who had read widely in the works
of ancient philosophers (Apol. 38). Although, in a text like this, it should come as no surprise
to see Apuleius praise Maximus, he describes him as a most honourable (sanctissimus) man
(Apol. 85).
Cinna Catulus is mentioned only briefly by Marcus (1.13), and we do not know anything
else about him beyond the comment in the Historia Augusta that he was a Stoic.13 When we
turn to the last of these teachers, Claudius Severus, we meet the only one not described as
a Stoic. As we have seen, the Historia Augusta describes him as a Peripatetic. He too, like a
number of Marcus’s other teachers, was a high-ranking Roman active in politics. Marcus’s
description of him presents an image of a close friend rather than a formal teacher and this
is perhaps borne out by the fact that Severus’s son married Marcus’s daughter.14 Beyond that
we do not know very much. But one thing that comes through very clearly from this brief
survey of Marcus’s teachers in philosophy is that the dominant influence during his education
was Stoicism.
Marcus and Fronto
Alongside philosophy Marcus also studied rhetoric in his youth. The Historia Augusta names a
number of teachers –Aninius Macer, Caninius Celer, Herodes Atticus, and Cornelius Fronto
(HA 4.2.4) –the most important of whom, we are told, was Fronto.15 Marcus’s relationship
with Fronto gained even greater significance when, in the early nineteenth century, Angelo
Mai discovered in Milan fragments of a correspondence between Fronto and Marcus as a pal-
impsest, on manuscript leaves partly erased and reused for another text. A few years later, in
Rome, Mai found further leaves from the same original manuscript of Fronto and Marcus,
reused for another text. The combined discoveries were first published together in 1823.16
Many of the letters that were recovered date from Marcus’s youth, but some are from later,
when Marcus was Emperor. The correspondence was, however, over before the Meditations
were written. Fronto was around 25 years older than Marcus, so when Marcus was a pupil
of 15, his teacher was around 40 years old. Fronto was originally from Africa and in the cor-
respondence describes himself as “a Libyan of the Libyan nomads” (Ad M. Caes. 2.3).17 Their
relationship, then, was one of master and pupil, even if the pupil was of high social rank. The
letters are often personal, with regular references to each other’s physical ailments, and very
affectionate in places, leading some to see them as evidence for a homosexual relationship.18
The younger Marcus we find in the letters is quite different from the popular image of the
austere sage: he often alludes to Latin comedy and can be, in the words of Fleury, “light-
hearted and emotional” (2012: 74).
It has been commented that, given the close relationship often in evidence in the letters,
the brevity of Marcus’s note on Fronto in Book 1 of the Meditations is somewhat surprising.19
10
An explanation might be found in the fact that the portraits Marcus paints in Book 1 are pri-
marily of moral exempla embodying traits that he admires. Although Fronto may have been
an important teacher of rhetoric, by the time Marcus was writing the Meditations that was
not uppermost in his mind. There his concern is not with how to write well, but how to live
well. As Rutherford has commented, the overarching theme in Book 1 is Marcus’s “awakening
to philosophic self-awareness”, which explains his only brief comment on Fronto, not to
mention the “damning omission” of his other teachers of rhetoric (1989: 103). By contrast,
the fuller descriptions that Marcus gives of his Stoic teachers itself tells us something about his
focus of attention at the time he was writing.20
Although the correspondence with Fronto is a valuable window into the earlier part of
Marcus’s life, that is not our main concern here. It is, however, also an important source of
information about Marcus’s philosophical interests at various points in time. Consequently,
we shall return to it often in the following sections focused on Marcus’s relationship with
Stoicism.
Marcus and the early Stoics

Marcus makes few references to the early Stoics in the Meditations. In fact, he only mentions
Chrysippus and he does so just twice. In one passage (7.19), Chrysippus is named along-
side Socrates and Epictetus as an example of an admirable person long since dead. In the
other (6.42), Marcus refers to a play mentioned by Chrysippus –a mere passing reference,
although one that implies that Marcus had been reading his works.There are, however, further
references to early Stoics in the correspondence with Fronto.
In a letter that Fronto wrote to Marcus around 162, he refers to “your Chrysippus” (Fer. Als.
3.6),21 while in another letter from around the same time he discusses the tensions between
Marcus’s devotion to philosophy and his newly acquired duties as Emperor. Fronto writes,
“Suppose that you, Caesar, succeed in attaining to the wisdom of Cleanthes or Zeno, yet
against your will you must put on the purple cloak, not the philosopher’s cloak of coarse
wool” (De eloqu. 2.11).22 Here Fronto, the master of rhetoric, carefully chooses examples that
Marcus takes to be the very height of wisdom, namely the two earliest heads of the Stoa. In
the same letter Fronto continues by noting –perhaps against most modern expectations –that
Marcus was more fascinated by the sorts of logical paradoxes that occupied Chrysippus than
he was with practically oriented oratory that has a real impact on the world (De eloqu. 2.13).23
In order to win Marcus round from the dry logical treatises of Chrysippus to the eloquence of
a Plato or Xenophon, Fronto appeals to examples where Chrysippus acknowledges the value
of rhetorical techniques. He says, “if Chrysippus himself has shown that these should be used,
what more do I ask, unless it be that you should not employ the verbiage of the dialecticians
but rather the eloquence of Plato?” (De eloqu. 2.14).24 The important point in the present con-
text is that Fronto clearly regarded Marcus to be a devoted admirer of the early Stoics and, in
particular, Chrysippus.25
To put this into context, Chrysippus had by this time become the canonical Stoic. Authors
roughly contemporary with Marcus such as Plutarch, Galen, and Aulus Gellius all engaged
with Chrysippus, quoting his works sometimes at length, indicating that they were still readily
available.26 A little earlier, Epictetus made plain that studying the works of Chrysippus was a
standard part of his classroom practice in Nicopolis.27 Slightly earlier still, we hear of members
of the circle around Seneca signalling their ownership of a complete set of Chrysippus’s works.28
11
Equally noteworthy is that critics of Stoicism, such as Plutarch and Galen, paid relatively little
attention to contemporary Stoics, instead directing their arguments against Chrysippus. He
had clearly become the authoritative point of reference for Stoics in the second century ad.29
Indeed, much of our evidence for the thought of Chrysippus comes from authors active in
this period, indicating that he was being widely read and studied. It is a commonplace to pre-
sent Marcus as the last of the Stoics and so, implicitly, to see the second century as a period of
decline and fall for Stoicism. While in some respects –and with hindsight –that seems to be
true, it is also worth noting that there was intense study of Chrysippus’s works at this time.This
was in some respects a vibrant period in the history of Stoicism. Fronto’s remarks indicate that
Chrysippus was also an authority for Marcus.
We also hear from Marcus himself, this time some 20 years earlier when he would have
been in his mid-20s. In a letter written in the 140s, Marcus reports to Fronto that he has been
reading the work of the Stoic Aristo of Chios. Despite his reputation as a heterodox Stoic,
Aristo appears to have remained popular among Roman Stoics such as Seneca.30 Marcus was
clearly impressed by what he read, commenting that it made him feel uneasy because “they
truly show me how far my character is left behind by these better ideas” (Ad M. Caes. 4.13).31
By way of context, Fronto had asked Marcus to write pro and contra a topic as an exercise in
rhetoric. Marcus responded by saying that he can write for one side or the other, but not
both, because Aristo would not approve of him arguing for opposed views in the manner of
a sophist.32
Some commentators have taken this letter as evidence for a sudden conversion of Marcus
from the study of rhetoric to philosophy, although others have suggested that this would be
overstating it.33 Marcus was already interested in philosophy, and his interests in rhetoric did
not disappear completely.The identity of Aristo has also been questioned, with some claiming
that Marcus is referring to a legal expert of the same name.34 Yet that seems unlikely: Marcus
is explicit that the Aristo that he is reading is outlining ideas about having an ideal char-
acter, which is what one would expect from a philosopher noted for concentrating on ethics.
Indeed, a number of aspects of Aristo’s thought resonate with what we find in both Marcus
and Epictetus, such as a relative neglect of the distinction between preferred and non-preferred
indifferents, the comparison between a sage and an actor playing a role, and limited interest in
the technical aspects of logic and physics (Diog. Laert. 7.160).35 The first two of these are espe-
cially striking in Epictetus; the third is true to a point although, as we shall see in later chapters,
there are a number of logical and physical themes running through the Meditations. Where a
potential Aristonian influence stands out is in Marcus’s relative disinterest in the distinction
between preferred and non-preferred indifferents. For Marcus, everything that happens is in
harmony with Nature, even non-preferred indifferents such as disease and death (e.g. 5.8,
9.3, 12.23), while at 11.16 he exhorts himself to live “indifferent to indifferent things (ta
adiaphora)”, seemingly unconcerned by any finer grained distinction. On this point Aristo may
well have been an influence on Marcus, but he was not the defining influence on his thought.36
A third early Stoic worth mentioning here is Cleanthes. He also appears to have remained
popular among Roman Stoics. Musonius Rufus draws on him and Seneca and Epictetus both
quote his otherwise lost Prayer to Zeus.37 Marcus does not mention him in the Meditations, but
he does appear in the correspondence with Fronto, where Fronto mentions him as an exem-
plar of Stoic wisdom admired by Marcus (De eloqu. 2.11).38 There are a number of themes in
Cleanthes’ thought that resonate with what we find in Marcus, such as a belief in the provi-
dential ordering of Nature and the use of parallels between the microcosm and macrocosm.39
12
More intriguingly, Cleanthes is remembered for his interest in Heraclitus and he is reported
to have written a four-volume commentary on Heraclitus.40 Marcus too appears to have been
interested in Heraclitus: he mentions him as an eminent philosopher in a number of places
alongside Socrates, Diogenes, and Pythagoras (6.47, 8.3) and he preserves a number of lines
from him not otherwise known (at 4.46, 6.42).41 Marcus was evidently reading something,
now lost, that contained texts by Heraclitus. It is conceivable that it could have been a work
by Cleanthes, although there is no firm evidence for this.
One other feature of the Roman Stoic reception of Cleanthes is repeated note of the
way in which he managed to combine his commitment to philosophy with a need to work.
Epictetus holds him up as a role model to his students in this regard (Diss. 3.26.23), while
Seneca uses it in an argument to show that anyone can study philosophy, no matter what their
personal circumstances (Ep. 44.3). In both cases they allude to the biographical tradition that
reports that Cleanthes studied with Zeno during the day while supporting himself by drawing
water in gardens at night (Diog. Laert. 7.168). Although Marcus makes no mention of this
himself, one can see a certain parallel with his own situation.
Marcus and Seneca
Moving significantly closer to Marcus’s own time, although still a full century earlier, we might
also consider the potential influence of Seneca. At first glance this might seem minimal to say
the least, given that there are no references to Seneca in the Meditations. While, on the one
hand, this might not come as much of a surprise, given that Seneca wrote in Latin and the
Meditations was composed in Greek, on the other, Seneca was without doubt the preeminent
Stoic in Rome from the previous century. Surely Marcus was aware of his works. We do find
references to Seneca in the correspondence with Fronto. They are in general not very com-
plimentary, but it is Fronto, not Marcus, who is critical of Seneca and it is worth adding that
he is primarily critical of Seneca’s literary style rather than his philosophy.42 Fronto the rhet-
orician disliked Seneca’s style of Latin prose.43 Yet the sense we get is that Fronto is warning
Marcus about Seneca’s style precisely because Marcus was reading his works. Indeed, in one
letter Fronto describes Seneca to Marcus as “your Annaeus”, implying that Seneca was already
one of Marcus’s favourites (De orat. 3).44 This should come as no surprise given what we have
already seen regarding Marcus’s interest and education in Stoicism.What it does do is confirm
that Marcus was familiar with at least some of Seneca’s works. There are numerous passages in
the Meditations that repeat or echo ideas that can already be found in Seneca, and a number
of these will be discussed in subsequent chapters. In general, commentators have tended to
put these down to their shared Stoic commitments, but it is at least possible that in some cases
Marcus may have been drawing directly on Seneca.
Marcus and Epictetus

We are on much firmer ground when it comes to Epictetus.As we saw earlier, Marcus borrowed
a copy of the Discourses of Epictetus from Rusticus (1.7). Presumably this was a copy of the
full eight books compiled by Arrian and not just the four that survive today, given that Marcus
quotes passages from Epictetus that are not in the extant books (at 4.41, 11.37, 11.38, 11.39).45
An alternative is that these were Rusticus’s own notes taken at Epictetus’s lectures, rather than
Arrian’s notes by which we know Epictetus today. A further, intermediate, possibility is that
13
this was Rusticus’s personal copy of Arrian’s Discourses, with his own annotations. Marcus
refers to the hupomnêmata of Epictetus, “notes”, a term that also appears in Arrian’s prefatory
letter attached to the surviving four books (Diss. Praef. 2).46 Whichever it was, it is widely
assumed that Epictetus was an important –and perhaps the decisive –influence on Marcus’s
philosophical development. Indeed, Marcus quotes from Epictetus more often than he does
any other author.47
Epictetus’s reputation was already firmly established during this period. A number of
ancient sources comment on his fame. Marcus’s contemporary Lucian ridiculed an admirer
of Epictetus who paid a large sum of money for the philosopher’s clay lamp (Ind. 13). Origen,
writing some decades after Marcus, commented that while Plato was read by the learned,
“Epictetus is admired even by common folk, who have an inclination to receive benefit
because they perceive the improvement which his words effect in their lives” (C. Cels. 6.2).48
Yet, as we have already seen, many discussions of Stoicism during this period tended to refer
back to the canonical early Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, as the main points of refer-
ence. Marcus’s explicit mention of Epictetus in the Meditations, combined with a sparsity of
references to other Stoics, has led some to present Epictetus as the defining influence on the
Meditations.49 While he was no doubt one important influence, it may be overstating things
to claim that, for instance, the Meditations were consciously shaped by certain features of
Epictetus’s thought.50 A number of central themes in Epictetus, such as his focus on prohairesis,
barely feature in the Meditations. Nor does Marcus take up Epictetus’s tendency to use person-
alist language when referring to the Stoic God. The influence is clearly there, but it does not
seem overbearing. For someone just reading the Meditations, the reference to Marcus having
borrowed a copy of Epictetus’s Discourses stands out, but if one takes into account the corres-
pondence with Fronto, one finds a much wider range of Stoic influences on Marcus, including
Aristo, Chrysippus, and Seneca.
Marcus and Galen
Perhaps the most significant philosopher with whom we know Marcus directly interacted is
Galen.51 There is frustratingly little information about the nature of their relationship, beyond
the fact that Marcus requested Galen to be his personal physician.52 In one of his works, Galen
recounts his successful diagnosis and treatment of Marcus with some pride (Praen. 11.1-8),53
reporting at the end that Marcus respected him as both a physician and a philosopher, calling
him “unique among philosophers” (monon tôn philosophôn). However, a passing comment by
Galen suggests that he found his imperial commitments to be an unwanted burden (Ind. 49-
50), and rather than welcome the opportunity to attend Marcus on campaign, he managed
to make his excuses and remain in Rome, where he focused on his writing (Praen. 9.5-8).54
There is certainly no evidence for any influence between the two of them either way. Even so,
some of Galen’s philosophical concerns shed light on the immediate philosophical context in
which Marcus wrote his Meditations, and so are worth mentioning here.
Galen was well versed in the ideas of all the major philosophical schools. He was schooled
in philosophy from an early age and he tells us that as a teenager he attended lectures in
Pergamum –“mostly those of a Stoic, a pupil of Philopator” (Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.8.3).55 Later,
Galen would write works on Epictetus and Chrysippus, although his works on Chrysippus
were certainly critical.56 He also wrote on Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus. In his major work
on the nature of the soul, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, he argued for an agreement
14
between Plato and Hippocrates on the physical location of parts of the soul and, along the way,
launched into a major polemic against the Stoic psychology of Chrysippus.57 In a later work,
The Soul’s Dependence on the Body, he appears to shift towards a more Peripatetic view (QAM
3), while elsewhere he doubts the veracity of the views of all the major philosophical schools
(Foet. Form. 6.31), leading him to adopt what one commentator has called a position of “prin-
cipled agnosticism”.58 On questions of psychological theory, Galen was certainly interested
in Stoic and other accounts of the soul, without being fully committed to any one of them.
More relevant in the present context is his contribution to psychological therapeutics. In
various works, Galen offered advice for people dealing with anger and grief.59 But he also
reflected on the techniques involved in therapeutic practices. We see this in his The Affections
and Errors of the Soul.60 Here he explicitly says that he will be drawing on the therapeutic works
of Chrysippus, even though he distances himself from the Stoic account of emotions and the
underpinning psychology (Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.1.4). He goes on to stress the importance of self-
examination and training for the soul. In a passage reminiscent of Marcus or Epictetus, he writes:
In the first place, you should not trust your judgement, however carefully it has been
arrived at, if it tells you that the criticism is insulting, false, or ignorant, and that you have
done no wrong. This is the first rudiment of philosophy, to put up with unfair criticism.
Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.3.10
He goes on to characterize the task of taking care of one’s soul as a discipline that must con-
tinue throughout one’s life. His insistence on the need for “constant training (askêsis)” (Aff.
Pecc. Dig. 1.4.4) parallels Marcus’s own many reminders to himself to maintain a state of con-
tinual vigilance (e.g. 4.36, 4.40, 4.46, 4.48).61 Galen comments on the value of repetition in
the practice of this training –“if a proposition is of great importance, there is no harm in
repeating it twice or even three times” (Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.5.1) –which is something Marcus
practices throughout the Meditations. Galen continues with further advice that could easily
come from the Meditations:
First, on rising in the morning one should pose oneself this question, before embarking
on the day’s tasks: is it better to live a constant slave to the affections, or to employ reason
on every occasion? […] One must, further, keep constantly in mind, every day and every
hour of the day, the desirability of counting oneself amongst the good and the upright.
Similarly,
One should remind oneself of this, preferably many times a day, or, failing that, at least
at dawn before beginning one’s daily activities and in the evening when one is about
to take one’s rest.
There is much more in Galen’s discussion that echoes what we find in Marcus’s Meditations, no
doubt because they were both drawing on the same works that formed the ancient tradition
of philosophical therapeutics, running from Pythagoras and Socrates down to Epictetus and
into their own day. The most significant difference, of course, is that Galen’s treatise is offering
15
advice, while Marcus’s notebook is an attempt to enact such advice. Even so, it is striking how
close these two works come to one another at certain points. Here is just one more passage
from Galen:
All we must do is keep the doctrines regarding insatiability and self-sufficiency con-
stantly to hand (procheiros) and commit ourselves to the daily cultivation of the particular
actions which follow from these doctrines.
There is no firm evidence about when Galen wrote this treatise, and certainly none to indi-
cate that Marcus ever read it, but putting that question to one side it is clear that Marcus’s
practice of philosophical reflection in the Meditations did not come out of nowhere; it was
part of a wider interest in this period for this kind of therapeutic attention to the disturbances
and errors of the soul. Indeed, one of the most interesting works dealing with this topic is
also by Galen. In a short text entitled Avoiding Distress, Galen recounts to an old friend how
he coped with the loss of many of his possessions –and not least his library, containing copies
of his own works –that perished in a fire that engulfed the centre of Rome in 192.62 What
is distinctive about this text is that Galen does not merely impart advice; he reports that he
has used these techniques himself and that they worked. In particular, he recommends the
technique usually referred to as the premeditation of future evils: “I schooled my imagin-
ation to prepare for the total loss of everything that I had” (Ind. 54), adding “I advise you
to train your soul’s imagination to cope with almost any turn of events” (Ind. 56). Although
he lost a lot of important things in the fire, he did not suffer any great distress, he reports,
because although he lost much, what he had left was still sufficient for his needs (Ind. 46).
Galen puts this down in part to his upbringing, during which he was never encouraged to
place excessive value on external goods (Ind. 65). But it is the philosophical technique of
reflecting on how much worse it could have been that he insists has enabled him not to be
distressed by the loss. Although this text was written after Marcus’s death, it also helps to put
the Meditations into a wider context.
Marcus the Stoic
In the light of what we have seen in this chapter, it seems clear that Marcus was well versed
in and felt a commitment to Stoicism. So, should we call him a Stoic? Before trying to answer
that question, we might want to reflect on what it really meant to be a Stoic in this period.The
original community of Stoics in Athens was, by this point, a distant memory, having come to
an end in the first century bc. Its demise was part of a wider decentralization of philosophy
that happened in this period, with Athens no longer being the central geographical point of
focus.63 In the wake of this, there was a shift of focus away from communities of like-minded
people living together and towards the study of texts. In the first and second centuries ad, it
was no longer possible to travel to Athens and join the official Stoic community –not that
it is clear precisely what that would have ever entailed –but it was certainly possible to read
increasingly canonized Stoic texts and to identify with the ideas they contained. To be a Stoic
in this period simply meant to be a part of what has been called a “textual community” of
readers who read the same texts and accepted their central doctrines.64 In this sense, Marcus
was clearly a Stoic as much as anyone could be in this period.
16
The more substantive issue of the extent to which Marcus can be seen as a Stoic hinges
on how close his ideas align with what one might take to be central Stoic doctrines. In
antiquity the Stoics had a reputation for a certain freedom of thought, with Seneca famously
proclaiming that, unlike the Epicureans, Stoics were free to think independently rather than
slavishly follow the thoughts of the school’s founder (Ep. 33.4). Indeed, the history of ancient
Stoicism is full of figures who in one respect or other have been judged heterodox, from Aristo
to Boethus, Panaetius, and Posidonius.65 In the context of a decentralized textual community,
the attempt to canonize the writings of Chrysippus may have been an attempt to offer a clear
doctrinal standard of what counted as Stoic. The question concerning Marcus’s philosoph-
ical alignment with Stoicism, then, will depend in large part on how one defines orthodox
Stoicism and the degree of intellectual autonomy tolerated within the tradition. This will of
course be our primary concern in the chapters that follow, but Marcus’s education by Stoics
and reading of Stoic texts is beyond doubt.
Notes
1 On the long history of this “sanctification” of Marcus Aurelius, see Richlin (2012).
2 In Xylander (1559), one of our two key witnesses for the text, this appears within Book 1. His Book
1 continues to include our 2.1-3 and his Book 2 opens with our 2.4. Casaubon (1643), based on
Xylander’s text, does the same.
3 The inscription “Written in Carnuntum” is usually placed at the end of Book 2, following the only
complete manuscript, Vaticanus Graecus 1950, but in Xylander (1559) (the other key witness for
the text), it is printed at the head of Book 3. Whether that was an editorial decision or accurately
represents the lost Palatine manuscript on which Xylander’s text was based, it is impossible to know.
4 For just one example of this not uncommon view, see Arnold (1911: 122–7).
5 The biography of Marcus Aurelius in the Historia Augusta (or Scriptores Historiae Augustae) is credited
to Julius Capitolinus, with other biographies in the collection attributed to other authors. This is
now widely disputed and the collection as a whole is thought to be the work of one (unknown)
individual, perhaps writing in the 390s. While its authority as a historical source has often been
challenged, especially for the later Emperors, the life of Marcus is thought to be fairly reliable. See
further Barnes (1978: 13–18 and 25).
6 For further discussion of Hadrian’s relationship with Epictetus, see Birley (1997: 58–61). The no
doubt spurious dialogue, Altercatio Hadriani Augusti et Epicteti Philosophi, is edited and discussed in
Daly and Suchier (1939).
7 On Apollonius see DPhA I, 285-6; Hadot and Luna (1998: xc–xcv). Gill (2013: 61) suggests that
Apollonius was invited by Antoninus Pius to instruct Marcus “possibly when Marcus was about
30 years old”. This is based on HA 3.10.4 (and cf. Lucian, Demon. 31), which recounts Antoninus
summoning Apollonius. However, it is far from clear that this describes their first encounter.
Instead it might be taken to refer to Antoninus calling an existing teacher back at a moment when
assistance was needed. Birley (2000: 44) dates their first meeting to 136, when Marcus was around
15 years old.
8 Hout (1988: 79); Haines (1919–20: I, 235). Here “master” (magister) could be understood as a com-
pliment or could simply be referring to his role as Marcus’s teacher.
9 On Rusticus, see DPhA Vb, 1817–18; Hadot (1998: 8–11). See also Dio Cassius (72.35.1), who
describes Rusticus as a follower of Zeno’s doctrines.
10 Farquharson (1944: II, 443) connects this reference to therapeia of êthos with the wider use of a med-
ical analogy for philosophy in antiquity and cites a number of parallel texts. Gill (2013: 59) makes a
similar connection.
11 Plutarch’s most important texts arguing against the Stoics are Comm. not. and St. rep.; his relationship
with the Stoa is discussed at length in Babut (1969).
17
12 The identification of Marcus’s teacher Claudius Maximus with Apuleius’s man of the same name
has been questioned by some. Butler and Owen (1914: 1), doubt it, writing “there is no reason to
identify” them. However, later (ibid. 56) they take the phrase austerae sectae (Apol. 19) to suggest that
he was a Stoic, which offers at least some reason to make the connection. Brunt (2013: 328) calls the
identification “immensely plausible”. See further DPhA IV, 363–5.
13 Champlin (1980: 119, with n. at 174) suggests that his name alone indicates that he was probably a
senator. See further DPhA II, 399–400. Gill (2013: 67) suggests the same.
14 See Gill (2013: 67). On Severus, see further DPhA VI,  241-4.
15 On Fronto in general see Champlin (1980). On his relationship with Marcus see Kasulke (2005) and
Griffin (2018: 707–21). For further references see DPhA III, 428–30.
16 See Mai (1815) for the first publication of the finds in Milan, and Mai (1823) for the combined finds
from Milan and Rome.The most recent critical edition of the correspondence can be found in Hout
(1988), and see Hout (1999) for a detailed commentary on the text. The only complete translation
into English is in Haines (1919–20). A selection is translated in Richlin (2006) with helpful notes.
There is also a selection translated by R. B. Rutherford in Farquharson (1989). On its rediscovery
and its contents, see Fleury (2012).
17 Hout (1988: 24); Haines (1919–20: I, 136).
18 See especially Richlin (2006). For some reservations see Gill (2013: 65), Griffin (2018: 717–21). For
an emphatic rejection, see McLynn (2009: 52–3, 579–80).
19 See, for example, Richlin (2012: 512) and Griffin (2018: 709).
20 For a similar conclusion see Gill (2013: 65).
21 Hout (1988: 230); Haines (1919–20: II, 10–11). Hout (1999: 521) takes Fronto to be mocking
Marcus here.
22 Hout (1988: 140); Haines (1919–20: II, 62–5).
23 Hout (1988: 141); Haines (1919–20: II, 66–7. Hout (1999: 337) doubts whether Marcus would have
still been interested in dialectics at this point in his life, even if he had been in his youth, but there is
no obvious evidence either way.
24 Hout (1988: 142); Haines (1919–20: II, 68–9).
25 It is also worth noting that in another letter, De eloqu. 1.3 (Hout 1988: 134; Haines 1919–20: II,
48–51), Fronto mentions Zeno twice, although here he simply figures as one of a series of examples
among many.
26 On Plutarch’s references to Chrysippus see Babut (1969: 225–37) and, more briefly, Morford
(2002: 222–6). On Galen and Chrysippus see Tieleman (1996). For Aulus Gellius and Chrysippus
see Holford-Strevens (2003: 274–5).
27 See for example Epictetus, Diss. 1.17.13-18 and 2.17.34-40 as just two examples among many.
28 The ancient biography of the Stoic poet Persius (traditionally attributed to Suetonius but now
credited to Valerius Probus) reports that he had a collection of around 700 works by Chrysippus
(who is reported to have written 705 books) that, in his will, he left to his fellow-Stoic Cornutus.
See further Boys-Stones (2018: 200–1) for text, translation, and discussion.
29 See Babut (1969: 15–18); Gould (1970: 13); Tieleman (1996: xxvii).
30 See for example Seneca, Ep. 36.3 (SVF 1.388); 94.1-18 (SVF 1.358–9); 115.8 (SVF 1.372).
31 Hout (1988: 67–8); Haines (1919–20: I, 216–17). This letter is also translated with notes in Richlin
(2006: 139–41) and I quote her translation here. For discussion see Kasulke (2005: 230–41).
32 On Aristo’s dislike of dialectic, see Diog. Laert. 7.161 (SVF 1.333). In the list of Aristo’s works in
Diog. Laert. 7.163, we find Against the Rhetoricians and, in three books, Against the Dialecticians.
33 See for example Haines (1919–20: I, 218) with reservations in, for example, Champlin (1980: 121),
Griffin (2018: 715). See also Hout (1999: 188).
34 See Champlin (1974: 144). Both Haines (1919– 20: I, 216) and Richlin (2006: 140), writing
before and after Champlin, take Marcus to be referring to the Stoic Aristo of Chios. See also Hout
(1999: 188). Fleury (2012: 72) lists the many others who have rejected the suggestion.
35 The ancient evidence for Aristo is in SVF 1.333–403. For an overview and references to further
studies, see DPhA I, 400–3.
18
36 For further discussion of Marcus and Aristo, see Roskam (2012), who, 93, offers a brief survey of
earlier views on the extent of Aristo’s influence, and, 95–6, examines the topic of indifferents. For a
more sceptical attitude see Hadot (1998: 11–14 and 71–2).
37 See Musonius Rufus 1 (Hense 1905: 4,5–5,2; SVF 1.611); Seneca, Ep. 107.11 and Epictetus, Ench.
53.1 (both SVF 1.527). On Cleanthes and Musonius see Harriman (forth.b).
38 Hout (1988: 140); Haines (1919–20: II, 63).
39 On microcosm-macrocosm parallels in Cleanthes, see Cicero, Nat. D. 2.40-1 (SVF 1.504), with
Harriman (forth.b).
40 See Diog. Laert. 7.174 (SVF 1.481) and note also Eusebius, Praep. evang. 15.20.2 (SVF 1.519),
discussed in Long (1975–76: 150–51).
41 These are the source for DK 22B71-75; cf. LM Her. R54-5.
42 On Fronto’s attitude towards Seneca, and the suggestion that in some respects Fronto may have seen
his relationship with Marcus as analogous to Seneca’s with Nero, see Griffin (2018: 716–17).
43 On Fronto’s attack on Seneca’s style, placed within a wider context of similar attacks, see Holford-
Strevens (2003: 276–7).
44 Hout (1988: 154); Haines (1919–20: II, 102).
45 These passages are Epictetus frr. 26–28a (Schenkl 1916: 471–2). The claim that the Discourses were
originally in eight books is based on a statement in Photius, Bibl. cod. 58 (17b11-20 = test. 6 Schenkl
1916). That the surviving four books are incomplete is confirmed by Aulus Gellius’s reference to
and quotation from Book 5 (NA 19.1.14 = fr. 9 Schenkl 1916). See further Souilhé (1975: xi–xix).
Marcus’s quotations from Epictetus in Book 11 of the Meditations are discussed briefly in Sellars
(2018a).
46 See further Farquharson (1944: II 446), Hadot and Luna (1998: lxxxvii–lxxxix), Gill (2013: 60).
Although Farquharson translates the passage to suggest that Marcus borrowed a copy of Arrian’s
Discourses, in his commentary he suggests that it more likely refers to Rusticus’s own notes on
Epictetus, a suggestion taken up by Hadot.
47 See Rigo (2010: 339–344). The full list is: Diss. 1.28.4 (in 7.63), Diss. 3.22.105 (in 11.36), Diss.
3.24.86-7 (in 11.33), Diss. 3.24.88 (in 11.34), Diss. 3.24.91-2 (in 11.35), Diss. 4.6.20 (in Med. 7.36).
Not mentioned by Rigo are fr. 26 Schenkl, from 4.41, and fr. 28b (added by Oldfather 1925–28),
from 4.49.
48 This passage is Epictetus test. 26 (Schenkl 1916: viii). On the date of Origin’s work, see Chadwick
(1953: xiv–xv).
49 This is, in effect, the central thesis in Hadot (1998).
50 See for example Hadot (1978) and Hadot (1998: 43–7) where he suggests that Epictetus’s three topoi
(Diss. 3.2.1-2) “are the true key to the Meditations” (47).
51 For an overview of Galen’s work see Hankinson (2008); for a recent biography see Mattern (2013).
In referring to his works, I have followed the abbreviations listed in Singer (2013: 429–42). Many of
the texts referred to here are translated in Singer (1997) or Singer (2013).
52 Galen, Lib. Prop. 3.1 (XIX, 17 Kühn), with Boudon-Millet (2007: 193–4) and Mattern (2013: 195).
53 Text and translation in Nutton (1979: 126–9). Note also the accounts of this episode in Birley
(2000: 196–7) and Mattern (2013: 212–3).
54 For further discussion see Mattern (2013: 219–22).
55 Philopator, who was probably roughly contemporary with Epictetus, is remembered for his contri-
bution to Stoic discussions of fate and compatibilism, on which see Bobzien (1998: 358–412). See
also DPhA Va,  454.
56 Galen, Lib. Prop. 14.21 (XIX, 44 Kühn; Singer 1997: 20) and 18.1-2 (XIX, 47 Kühn; Singer 1997: 22).
His work on Epictetus, To Favorinus Concerning Epictetus, was likely a defence against the attacks of
Favorinus who had written a work entitled Against Epictetus, our only evidence for which also
comes from Galen (Opt. Doct. 1.2, in Barigazzi 1991: 92; see also Barigazzi 1966: 191–2 and Amato
2010: 151–3).
57 Text and translation in De Lacy (1978–84). For a thorough discussion see Tieleman (1996) and, more
briefly, Donini (2008). On Galen’s complex relationship with Stoicism, especially on topics in psych-
ology, see Gill (2010).
19
58 See Donini (2008: 197–8). Note also Aff. Pecc. Dig. 1.8.8, where he writes “I do not declare alle-
giance to any sect, rather subjecting them all to a thorough examination” (Singer 1997: 120).
59 See the discussion in Mattern (2013: 258–60 and 266–72).
60 This work is edited in De Boer (1937). It is translated in Singer (1997) and, revised and annotated,
in Singer (2013). De Boer prints it as two distinct works, Aff. Dig. and Pecc. Dig., but Singer treats it
as a single work, Aff. Pecc. Dig. in two books, which I follow here; see his note in Singer (2013: 315).
I have consulted both versions of Singer’s translation and tend to quote from the earlier one, some-
times amended.
61 On the idea of askêsis in ancient philosophy, with a focus on the Roman Stoics, see Sellars (2003: 107–
28). On the theme of constant attention and vigilance in Marcus and also Epictetus, see Sellars
(2018b).
62 Galen’s Avoiding Distress (Ind.) was only discovered in 2005 and published for the first time in 2007.
I have used the edition in Boudon-Millot et al. (2010). It is translated, by Vivian Nutton, in Singer
(2013). For further discussion, see the detailed introductions in both of those volumes and the essays
in Petit (2019).
63 On decentralization of philosophy in the first century BC, see Sedley (2003).
64 I borrow this notion of a textual community from the very helpful discussion in Boys-Stones
(2018: 9–13).
65 This image of early Stoicism has in part been challenged by Sedley (1989), who argues that in fact
Zeno remained a canonical authority for the early Stoa, and that subsequent internal disputes were
primarily about how best to understand what Zeno had said. A good example of this is the debate
concerning the Stoic telos, on which see Chapter 8.
20
2
THE MEDITATIONS, A PHILOSOPHICAL TEXT
A notebook
The Meditations is a unique and idiosyncratic text, quite unlike a typical work of philosophy.
It takes the form of a series of private notebook jottings that Marcus wrote to himself. The
opening book is slightly different from the other 11 books: it has its own structure, serves a
specific purpose of paying respects to individuals who had been formative influences, and
may have been composed separately.1 The subsequent books contain a series of thoughts,
reflections, and quotations from other authors, all in no apparent order.2 Themes and topics
recur again and again, and there is little sense that the text was ever revised or edited after first
being written down. It has all the appearance of being Marcus’s private notebook rather than
a work intended for publication. What we find is Marcus in dialogue with himself.3
The English title Meditations was effectively coined in the seventeenth century by Meric
Casaubon when he published his translation in 1634 under the title Meditations Concerning
Himselfe.4 This was his attempt to render into English the title that he found printed in editions
of the Greek text, tôn eis heauton, “to himself ”.5 While subsequent translators rendered the title
in other ways –Conversation With Himself (Collier 1708), Thoughts (Long 1890) –Casaubon’s
proved most popular and was often shortened to just Meditations, with the unfortunate con-
sequence of losing the connection with the original Greek title. While some later translators
tried to reverse the trend (e.g. Rendall 1898), it was too late: the title Meditations had stuck.6
In other European languages, it has been given a variety of titles, including Pensées, Reflexions,
and Ricordi.7 None of these really capture the sense of the Greek title, Ta eis heauton, which
might best be translated as To Himself.8 Although it is fairly unlikely that this title was devised
by Marcus himself,9 it is nevertheless apt and offers a way in to thinking about what Marcus
was doing when he was writing these notes.
Attending to oneself
With a private text like this it can be difficult to know for sure what the author was trying
to do. Helpfully, in a particularly important passage (4.3), Marcus gives us his own extended
21
The Meditations, a philosophical text 21
account of what he was doing.10 Some people look for escapes from the pressures of everyday
life by retreating to the countryside but as a philosopher Marcus can simply retreat into him-
self (eis heauton anachôrein). He writes “Continually, therefore, grant yourself this retreat and
repair yourself (ananeou seauton)”. This is not a permanent retreat but simply a brief period of
rest and reflection before returning to the business of everyday life. What is the purpose of
this retreat? It is to reflect on “brief and fundamental truths” (brachea kai stoicheiôdê) already
within the mind, in order to “wash away all distress” (to pasan lupên apoklusai), to attain “per-
fect ease” (eumareia), which he identifies with “good behaviour” (eukosmia). He then gives us
a couple of examples of what he has in mind, such as reminding himself that he is by nature a
social animal, in order to keep in check any anger he might feel towards people who behave
poorly. He goes on to suggest that there are two fundamental ideas that must be kept “ready
to hand” (procheiros): (i) that mental disturbances are the product not of things but of our
judgements (hupolêpsis), and (ii) nothing is stable and everything passes, subject to universal
flux (metabolê). He then summarizes these two principles as concisely as possible, presumably
in order to aid memorization: ho kosmos alloiôsis, ho bios hupolêpsis, which we might translate
expansively as “the cosmos is in continual change; the concerns of human life are the product
of opinion” (4.3[12]).11 When Marcus was writing the Meditations he was engaged in a practice
of reminding himself of these and other central philosophical principles, in order (as he tells
us) to overcome distress (lupê) and to cultivate a state of complete ease (eumareia).12
In a second, equally important, passage (potentially confusingly, 3.4), Marcus reminds him-
self to avoid distractions that might take him away from what he ought to be doing, namely
paying close attention to his “governing self ” (hêgemonikon). This involves attending to his
impressions (phantasiai) and habituating himself (ethisteon heauton) to think only of things he
would be unashamed to share with others if they asked. Someone who manages to reach this
level of attention to one’s internal mental processes will, he suggests, be “dyed with justice
to the core” and will welcome “all that comes to pass”. They will pay little attention to
the opinions of others, which they cannot control, focusing squarely on their own thought
processes, which they can.
This concern with paying attention to oneself probably reflects the influence of Epictetus.
In his Discourses Epictetus says that “the first and greatest task of the philosopher is to test
the impressions and discriminate between them” (Diss. 1.20.7). This is achieved by a con-
tinual attitude of attention to one’s thought processes (Diss. 1.20.10). Elsewhere he exhorts an
interlocutor to “pay attention to yourself ” (prosochê eph’ hauton), which he suggests primarily
involves careful observation of one’s impressions (Diss. 3.16.15). In his account of the ideal
Cynic, he suggests that although such a person is indifferent to external circumstances, they
pay considerable attention on their own impressions and judgements (Diss. 3.22.104).
Epictetus gives a fuller discussion in a chapter of the Discourses entitled “On Attention”
(Peri prosochês, Diss. 4.12), which is the only extended discussion of this notion in any sur-
viving ancient text. As such, it may be worth discussing in some detail. This chapter opens by
insisting on the importance of attention for all human activities. Whatever we might intend
to do, it will be better done with an attitude of attention. By contrast nothing is improved by
inattention (Diss. 4.12.4). Epictetus illustrates this in his typical Socratic fashion by referring
to examples of craftsmen:13
22
Does the inattentive carpenter do his work more accurately? The inattentive helmsman
steer more safely? And is there any other of the lesser functions of life which is done
better by inattention?
Diss. 4.12.5
So, attention improves everything.That is one reason to maintain an attitude of attention at all
times. Another reason, Epictetus suggests, is that once we lose our attention and let our minds
wander off, we are no longer easily able to recover it:
When you relax your attention for a little while, do not imagine that whenever you
choose you will recover it, but bear this in mind, that because of the mistake which you
have made today, your condition must necessarily be worse as regards everything else.
Diss. 4.12.1; cf. 4.12.6
Before long, he adds, a habit of inattention develops, which will require considerable work to
undo. At first glance this might look like it is encouraging an attitude of attention to whatever
task someone might be undertaking. However, the sort of attention he is concerned with is
not on the task at hand, even if he claims that greater attention will improve whatever one
happens to be doing at the present moment, but in fact on something else. The things to
which we ought to pay attention are, he says:
First, these general principles, and you ought to have them at your command (procheiros),
and without them neither go to sleep, nor rise up, nor drink, nor eat, nor mingle with
men; I mean the following: [1]‌No man is master of another’s moral purpose (prohairesis);
and [2] In its sphere alone are to be found one’s good and evil. It follows, therefore, [3]
that no one has power either to procure me good, or to involve me in evil, but I myself
alone have authority over myself in these matters.
Diss. 4.12.7-8
Epictetus is suggesting that in whatever task a person undertakes they ought to keep these
three philosophical principles ready to hand (procheiros). The continual attitude of attention
that Epictetus insists is vital is not to the task itself but to these principles that ought to inform
everything a person does. The goal underlying and uniting these principles is autonomy or
freedom (eleutheria), which for Epictetus is an essential component of a good life. If someone
is able to live a life informed by these principles then no external agent or event will have
the power to upset their equanimity. If anyone suffers from mental disturbance, this is simply
due to a lack of training in developing the appropriate attention to these fundamental philo-
sophical principles (Diss. 4.12.13). This is a skill that can be learned, like any other art or craft,
echoing Epictetus’s wider conception of philosophy as an art of living (Diss. 4.12.14; cf. Diss.
1.15.2).
In this spirit of training, Epictetus repeats the point he has just made and his three principles.
We ought to keep these principles ready to hand (procheiros) and do nothing without them
(Diss. 4.12.15). These principles should always come first. However he adds some further
guidance that also ought to be continually kept in mind:
23
And next we must remember [4]‌who we are, and [5] what is our designation, and [6]
must endeavour to direct our actions, in the performance of our duties, to meet the
possibilities of our social relations.
Diss. 4.12.16
This second set of principles is concerned with our social roles and relations. Throughout
the Discourses Epictetus says that one ought to conform to such roles. It is worth noting,
though, that here he puts them in second place. He also insists on the primacy of the first set
of principles by describing them as God-g iven (Diss. 4.12.11-12), which for a Stoic could
equally be rephrased as given by Nature. The fundamental principles that ought to inform
all our actions refer to our natural constitution, but we ought to pay attention to our social
obligations as well.
Epictetus concludes by acknowledging that it is impossible for a human being to be com-
pletely free from fault. However it is possible to strive to be as free from fault as one can. In
order to do that, one must never relax one’s attention (Diss. 4.12.19). A continual state of vigi-
lance is required.Yet as we have seen, this vigilant attention is not to oneself in a very general
sense but specifically to the philosophical principles that ought to guide one’s actions.14
We have already seen Marcus effectively putting this into practice in 4.3 where he
summarizes the key principles that he wants to keep ready to hand (procheiros). There are fur-
ther examples throughout the Meditations. Indeed, the Meditations as a whole might be read as a
series of written exercises designed to remind the author of the central philosophical ideas that
he wants to keep ready to hand. Like Epictetus, Marcus warns against the dangers of letting
one’s attention wander off:
Do externals tend to distract you? Then give yourself the space to learn some further
good lesson, and stop your wandering.
2.7
He also takes up the analogy with craftsmen:
Just as doctors always have their instruments and knives at hand (procheiros) for any emer-
gency treatment, so you should have your doctrines (dogmata) ready for the recognition
of the divine and human, and the performance of every action, even the smallest, in
consciousness of the bond which unites the two.
3.13
In one passage, particularly interesting in the present context, Marcus picks up on the funda-
mental principles outlined by Epictetus:
Whenever you suffer pain, have ready to hand (procheiros) the thought that pain is not
a moral evil and does not harm your governing intelligence (dianoia): pain can do no
damage either to its rational or to its social nature. […] Remember too that many things
we find disagreeable are the unrecognized analogues of pain –drowsiness, for example,
oppressive heat, loss of appetite. So when you find yourself complaining of any of these,
say to yourself, ‘You are giving in to pain.’
7.64
24
Despite using different words (e.g. dianoia, in place of prohairesis), Marcus is making the same
basic points as Epictetus: (i) pain, in so far as it is external, is neither good nor evil, and (ii) pain
cannot damage or control the ruling part of the soul. If someone can attend to these principles
at all times, then they will maintain their autonomy and freedom from mental disturbance.
A couple of paragraphs later, Marcus comments:
The way nature has blended you into the compound whole [of soul and body] does
not prevent you drawing a boundary around yourself and keeping what is your own in
your own control. Always remember this: remember too that the happy life depends on
very little.
7.67
Here Marcus is reminding himself to pay attention to some key philosophical ideas, taking
up the content of Epictetus’s basic principles, namely that: (i) the ruling part of the soul is
completely within one’s control, and (ii) that nothing else is required for a good life. Although
Marcus and Epictetus formulate things slightly differently, the basic underlying ideas are
the same.
An art of living
Throughout the Meditations Marcus makes a number of oblique references to the idea that
he is engaged in an activity that is an art or craft. At 4.2 he tells us not to undertake any
action that is not in accord with the principles of the art. By art (technê) it seems reasonable
to assume he means philosophy, if philosophy embodies those principles according to which
one ought to act, and a recent translation expansively renders technê here as “the art of life”
(Hammond 2006: 23). At 5.1 Marcus draws a comparison between what he must do and what
practitioners of other arts do, the implication perhaps being that he too is the practitioner of
an art –one devoted to becoming a complete human being. At 6.16 we find a more explicit
parallel between what Marcus is doing and what other craftsman do. Just as the horse trainer
takes care of horses, for instance, making them fit for their task, so too Marcus must train him-
self to act or refrain from acting according to the appropriate principles. Like other arts and
crafts, Marcus’s task has a clear practical goal, and the reference to horse trainers and to taking
care of oneself is reminiscent of the technê analogy drawn by Socrates in the Apology (esp. 25a-
b). We find a similar parallel with other examples of craftsmen at 6.35. At 7.68 Marcus says
that his art, the art of humankind, is the exercise of rational and social virtue, while at 11.5
he responds to the question “what is your art?” with the reply “to be good”, adding that it is
only with the aid of a theoretical understanding of both Nature and humankind that he will
be able to achieve this.15
These passages indicate that Marcus conceived his own activity as some sort of craft-like
activity with a specific set of closely inter-related goals, including making correct judgements,
choosing the right actions, becoming virtuous, and fulfilling his proper function as a rational
human being. We never find an explicit formal definition of philosophy as an art or craft
devoted to these goals but it would perhaps be unrealistic to expect one in this sort of text.
Instead what we find are a series of reminders and “notes to self ” in which Marcus tries to
keep in focus the nature of the task he has at hand.
25
Although Marcus may not be as explicit as we might like, Epictetus is a little more forth-
coming. It is in the Discourses that we see Epictetus explicitly present philosophy as an art and,
in particular, as an art concerned with how to live:
Philosophy does not promise to secure anything external for man, otherwise it would be
admitting something that lies beyond its proper subject-matter (hulê). For just as wood is
the material (hulê) of the carpenter, bronze that of the statue maker, so each individual’s
own life is the subject-matter/material (hulê) of the art of living.
Diss. 1.15.2
This notion that philosophy might be conceived as an art of living (technê peri ton bion) sounds
as if it might be a very broad notion, potentially encompassing a wide variety of ancient
philosophers, but almost all of the references to an art of living in ancient sources have some
connection to the Stoics.16 Beyond Epictetus there are references connected to Chrysippus,
Posidonius, and Arius Didymus’s epitome of Stoic ethics, while the only sustained analysis of
this idea in antiquity is to be found in Sextus Empiricus, as part of his polemic against Stoic
ethics.17 The most obvious Latin equivalents (ars vitae and ars vivendi) can be found in Cicero
and Seneca, again in contexts connecting the idea with the Stoics.18 The idea that philosophy
might be conceived as a technê, then, and in particular as a technê devoted to transforming one’s
bios, was a Stoic idea and one that Marcus would have learned from his reading of Epictetus
and others.
The Stoic conception of philosophy as an art of living combines two ideas: first that phil-
osophy is fundamentally concerned with how one should live, and second that it ought to
be conceived in analogy with other arts and crafts. Both of these ideas were inherited from
Socrates.
In Plato’s Apology, Socrates makes clear that his philosophical mission is directed towards
the transformation of his life: his divine mission is to live as a philosopher and this means
subjecting his life to criticism because the unexamined life is not worth living (Ap. 28e, 39c,
38a). In order to complete this divine mission Socrates goes in search of those with a repu-
tation for knowledge and, given his own practical goal, focuses his attention on practitioners
of arts and crafts. This, of course, becomes a central concern throughout the early Platonic
dialogues, but the most sustained analysis of arts and crafts appears in the Gorgias, where
Socrates draws a distinction between arts that take care of the body and arts that take care of
the soul (Grg. 463a-466a). This analysis lays the foundations for an analogy between medicine,
the art that cures the body, and philosophy, the art that cures the soul. This analogy would
prove to be an important influence on the Stoics and would gain a wider currency in the sub-
sequent history of philosophy via Cicero’s account in the Tusculan Disputations.
One of the central features of philosophy conceived as an art (of living or of curing the
soul) is brought out well in the analogy with medicine. This analogy is highly appropriate
because medicine is an art that is built upon a complex body of theoretical knowledge and yet
is primarily concerned with delivering practical outcomes. Knowledge of medicine requires
not only a grasp of the theoretical principles involved but also a period of training or exer-
cise in which those principles can be digested or assimilated into oneself. When learning an
art or craft like medicine it is necessary not only to study the formal principles underpin-
ning the art but also to embark on a lengthy apprenticeship during which one learns how
to apply those principles in practical situations. This applies to all those activities that are
26
craft-like, as opposed to purely theoretical activities where understanding the key principles
alone constitutes knowledge. Thus, the shoemaker, for instance, needs not only to grasp the
principles behind his trade but must also train in order to master putting those principles into
practice, during what we would naturally call his apprenticeship. The education of the shoe-
maker, or the doctor, or any other type of craftsman, will thus require two distinguishable
stages: a theoretical education in the classroom followed by a period of practical training or
apprenticeship. Mastery of any art or craft requires these two stages.
Philosophy conceived as an art will also presumably require these two stages: first, a period
of learning or discovering philosophical ideas, and then a second stage designed to digest those
ideas so that, just like in other arts and crafts, those ideas can be put into practice. In the Gorgias
Socrates himself hints at the need for some form of training or exercise (askêsis) that would
form this second stage (Grg. 514e, 527d).
These Socratic ideas were taken up and developed by the early Stoics. As is often the case,
however, our knowledge of the early Stoic position is fragmentary and it is only in later texts
that we find these ideas discussed in any detail. For example later Stoics such as Seneca and
Epictetus took up and developed the idea that philosophy be thought of as an art of living,
while the only extended critical discussion of the idea came a little later still from Sextus
Empiricus, repeated in both his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (3.25) and Against the Professors (Book
11, also known as Against the Ethicists). However, the idea was clearly in circulation much
earlier as numerous references in the works of Cicero attest. Indeed, it is in Cicero that we find
an account of the way in which the Stoics took up Socrates’ analogy between philosophy and
medicine (Tusc. 3.1-21) and it has been suggested that Cicero’s discussion draws directly on
the works of Chrysippus.19 We have further, explicit evidence for the claim that Chrysippus
took up the Socratic analogy in Galen’s On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, who reports
that for Chrysippus philosophy is an art concerned with curing the diseased soul and that the
philosopher is the physician of the soul (PHP 5.2.22-3). The idea of taking care of one’s soul
is of course also a central theme in the Meditations because, as Marcus puts it, “those who fail
to attend to the motions of their own soul are necessarily unhappy” (2.8).
For the Stoics, then, philosophy was conceived as an art analogous to the art of medicine
and, like medicine and other arts and crafts, mastery of philosophy conceived as an art will
involve an education in two stages. While the first stage will be devoted to understanding the
theoretical principles underpinning the art, the second stage will involve a period of training
or exercise devoted to the assimilation and mastery of those principles. Thus, it will not be
enough merely to grasp complex philosophical ideas in the classroom; one must also engage
in a period of training in order to digest those principles so that one is ready to put them into
practice. The point behind this is forcefully put by Epictetus when he laments that although
many of his Stoic students will be able to express eloquently the central doctrines of the Stoic
Chrysippus, few will be able to display those same doctrines in their behaviour (Diss. 2.19.20-
5). He predicts that most will in fact turn out to be Epicureans, with perhaps a few feeble
Peripatetics, but he doubts he will find any Stoics among these students who are nevertheless
perfectly able to recite Stoic doctrine. Theoretical understanding on its own is not enough.
Epictetus’s students read treatises by Chrysippus and presumably works by other canon-
ical Stoic authors as well. These texts, so far as we can know, probably met many of our
expectations about what a philosophical text should contain: the presentation of key doctrines
supported by argument, perhaps responding to objections raised by others or responding to
alternative views articulated in the works of earlier philosophers.
27
The Meditations clearly do not fall into this genre of philosophical writing. Indeed, at first
glance the Meditations do not look much like what we usually think of as a philosophical text.
What we encounter is a notebook containing private thoughts and reflections, along with a
few quotations copied from other authors, with no immediately obvious structure or chain of
reasoning, often repeating similar ideas across its different books.Via the quotations and other
passing references we do find mention of a number of earlier philosophers, but their views are
not subjected to any critical analysis or sustained commentary.
Although the Meditations might not take the form of a philosophical treatise that does not
automatically mean it is not a serious philosophical text. If theoretical treatises correspond
only to one half of the sort of philosophical education outlined above, there may well be other
forms of philosophical writing associated with the second half. The Meditations look like a
good candidate for an example of a text devoted to this second stage.
Assimilation and digestion

What exactly will this second stage of philosophical education involve? Seneca, Epictetus, and
Marcus himself all offer some helpful analogies. For Seneca and Epictetus the preferred ana-
logy is with digestion. Seneca suggests (Ep. 2.2-4) that in order to digest properly the ideas of
an author one must read slowly and one ought not to jump too quickly from one author to
another. If one is too greedy or has too varied or rich a diet one runs the risk of vomiting the
whole lot up and failing to digest anything at all. Epictetus pursues this unsavoury image by
comparing the hasty discourses of his students to vomit (Diss. 3.21.1-4), in which they throw
up philosophical ideas out of their mouths before they have had the opportunity to digest
them properly. If they had digested them properly then those same doctrines would not come
back out of their mouths but rather would be expressed in their actions. Epictetus illustrates
this with more palatable example:
Do not, for most part, talk among people about your philosophical principles, but do
what follows from your principles […] for sheep do not bring their fodder to the
shepherds and show how much they have eaten, but they digest their food within them
and on the outside produce wool and milk. And so you, therefore, make no display to
people of your philosophical principles but let them see the results that come from the
principles when digested.
Ench. 46
Marcus himself takes up this theme, with a different analogy, probably borrowed from Seneca.20
As we saw earlier in 3.4, he suggests that we should dye our souls in a manner akin to the way
in which we might dye a piece of cloth a new colour. Our aim is to become “dyed to the core
with justice” as he put it, and in order to produce such a complete transformation we shall
need to repeat the process again and again. The more we think or reflect on a particular idea,
the more that idea will become a permanent feature of our mind, just as a piece of cloth will
permanently bear the colour of a dye the more it is exposed to it:
As are your repeated impressions so will your mind be, for the soul is dyed by its
impressions. Dye it, then, in a succession of impressions like these: for instance, where it
28
is possible to live, there also it is possible to live well: but it is possible to live in a palace,
therefore it is also possible to live well in a palace.
5.16
Here we have an explicit philosophical explanation for the repetition of certain key ideas again
and again in the Meditations. While this feature of the text has often been explained away as
an unfortunate consequence of this being a private text never properly edited or prepared for
wider circulation, we can now see that far from being a structural or stylistic fault, this may
well be an essential and necessary characteristic of the text. If what Marcus was trying to do
when writing in his notebooks was dye his soul by repeatedly reflecting upon key ideas, then
it is inevitable that the text should be marked by repetition. Without the repetition Marcus
would not be able to complete the task at hand. As Galen put it, when discussing the nature
of the exercise (askêsis) involved in becoming a good human being, “in matters of the greatest
importance, there is no harm in repeating the same things twice or even three times” (Aff. Pecc.
Dig. 1.5.1).21 And in his treatise on character, lost in Greek but preserved in the Arabic trad-
ition (Mor.), Galen writes “a character is developed through being constantly accustomed to
things that man sets up in his soul and to things that he does regularly every day”.22
Spiritual exercises
So far we have seen that the Meditations ought to be approached as a private notebook in which
Marcus tries to remind himself of key philosophical principles. This practice presupposed a
conception of philosophy as an art of living and it formed a second stage in philosoph-
ical training, aimed at digesting and assimilating key principles. This second stage might be
described as a process of training or exercise (askêsis), and earlier we saw Galen do just this.
Famously, Pierre Hadot called this sort of training a “spiritual exercise” and he went to develop
an interpretation of Marcus Aurelius shaped by the claim that the Meditations is in effect an
extended spiritual exercise.23 Hadot borrowed the phrase “spiritual exercise” from Ignatius of
Loyola,24 but the word “spiritual” has unsettled a number of commentators who have been
concerned that it obscures the fundamentally rational nature of philosophy.25 Despite those
concerns, both the phrase and the sorts of practices it refers to have ancient precedent.This can
be seen most clearly in one of the Discourses of Musonius Rufus, whose lectures in Rome were
attended by, among others, Epictetus. Notes from those lectures were recorded by Musonius’s
student Lucius and the notes from one of those lectures have come down to us under the title
On Exercise (Peri askêseôs).26
Musonius’s interest in exercise (askêsis) stems from his conviction that philosophy is not
merely a theoretical discourse but, fundamentally, an activity aimed at transforming one’s life.
The study of virtue, he suggests, ought to be conceived as something akin to the study of
medicine or music, namely something we study in order to gain a practical skill.27 Like a stu-
dent of medicine or music, “a man who wishes to become good not only must be thoroughly
familiar with the precepts which are conductive to virtue but must also be earnest and zealous
in applying these principles”.28 This is where exercise comes in: first, one studies the principles
or precepts (mathêmata); then one undertakes a period of training or exercise (askêsis), as we
saw earlier.29 Musonius goes on to claim that this period of exercise is more important for the
student of philosophy than it is for the student of any other art or craft in so far as philosophy
29
is the most difficult discipline to master.30 By philosophy he means the task of becoming a
good, virtuous person.
What form should this exercise take? Musonius notes that because human beings are
comprised of both body and soul it will be necessary to undertake exercises appropriate to
both. It is at this point that Musonius introduces the idea of what he calls askêsis tês psuchês,
which we might translate as “exercise of the soul”, “mental training”, or, indeed, “spiritual
exercise”. We might expect this to be contrasted with a fairly straightforward notion of phys-
ical exercise but instead Musonius proposes a composite form of training: “there are two kinds
of training, one which is appropriate for the soul alone, and the other which is common to
both soul and body”.31 This second type of training works on both the body and the soul at
once and includes things like avoiding physical pleasures, testing oneself in extremes of cold
and heat, training to cope with thirst and hunger, and practising endurance in the face of
suffering. These sorts of practices benefit the body and soul at once. But what of purely spir-
itual exercises? These work on the soul alone and, although Musonius thinks both types of
exercise are essential for anyone who aspires to become a good human being, these spiritual
exercises are, he suggests, fundamental to philosophy. Musonius gives us an extended definition
of what these spiritual exercises involve:
Training which is peculiar to the soul consists first of all in seeing that the proofs
pertaining to apparent goods as not being real goods are always ready at hand and like-
wise those pertaining to apparent evils as not being real evils, and in learning to recog-
nize the things which are truly good and in becoming accustomed to distinguish them
from what are not truly good. In the next place it consists of practice in not avoiding any
of the things which only seem evil, and in not pursuing any of the things which only
seem good; in shunning by every means those which are truly evil and in pursuing by
every means those which are truly good.32
The central task of spiritual exercises, then, is to keep philosophical principles (in this case, Stoic
principles regarding what is and is not good) “ready to hand” (procheiros).33 In so doing one
will be better placed to become accustomed (ethizesthai) to acting in accordance with those
principles. It will also involve the practice (meletê) of actions that embody those principles. In
short, spiritual exercises offer the training necessary to transform oneself according to a set of
philosophical ideas so that one consistently lives according to those ideas.
Musonius does not mention any sources for his account, although we might note that
the distinction between mental and physical/mental exercises had been made well before by
Diogenes of Sinope, who was eulogized at length by Musonius’s pupil Epictetus.34 We shall
come back to this Cynic ancestry later. It is striking, though, that Musonius makes no mention
of his near contemporary in Rome, Seneca.Yet Seneca also engaged in spiritual exercises and
he tells us that this was a practice he learned from someone called Sextius:
All our senses must be toughened: they have a natural endurance, once the mind has
ceased to corrupt them; and the mind must be called to account every day. This was
Sextius’s practice: when the day was spent and he had retired to his night’s rest, he asked
his mind, ‘Which of your ills did you heal today? Which vice did you resist? In what
aspect are you better? Your anger will cease and become more controllable if it knows
that every day it must come before a judge. […] I exercise this jurisdiction daily and
30
plead my case before myself. When the light has been removed and my wife has fallen
silent, aware of this habit that’s now mine, I examine my entire day and go back over
what I’ve done and said, hiding nothing from myself, passing nothing by.
Ira 3.36.1-3
This is an example of keeping one’s guiding precepts “ready to hand” and it also pre-empts
the practice of self-dialogue that Marcus engaged in when writing the Meditations.The Sextius
mentioned by Seneca is Quintus Sextius, founder of a philosophical school in Rome where
two of Seneca’s own teachers, Fabianus and Sotion, had studied.35 The practice of daily self-
examination that Seneca recounts and attributes to Sextius appears to have been Pythagorean
in origin and it is described in the Pythagorean Golden Verses:
Do not welcome sleep upon your soft eyes

before you have reviewed each of the day’s deeds three times:
‘Where have I transgressed? What have I accomplished? What duty have I neglected?’
Beginning from the first one go through them in detail, and then,
If you have brought about worthless things, reprimand yourself, but if you have
achieved good things, be glad.
Carm. Aur. 40-4436
As well as recommending this practice of evening self-examination, the Golden Verses also
describe a series of mental and physical/mental exercises of the sort outlined by Musonius,
exhorting the reader to become accustomed (ethizesthai) to acting in accordance with a series
of moral precepts.37
A number of scholars have suggested that the Golden Verses is a relatively late text, perhaps
dating from the Imperial Period.38 However, as Thom has pointed out, there is evidence to
suggest that the text is earlier than that and that it was known to early Stoics such as Cleanthes
and Chrysippus, both of whom draw on it.39 If the early Stoics did know this relatively short
text then no doubt they would have been familiar with its recommendation of this spiritual
exercise.
As well as appealing to these Pythagorean practices, Seneca also comments with approval
on Cynic exercises. According to Seneca, Demetrius the Cynic held that it was far better to
have just a few philosophical doctrines (praecepta sapientiae) ready to use than many of no prac-
tical purpose and so, like a wrestler, one ought to be carefully trained (diligenter exercuit) in just
a handful of essential skills (Ben. 7.1.3-4). The beginning philosopher, says Demetrius, must
make those few, essential doctrines “a part of himself, and by practising them daily (cotidiana
meditatione) to get to the point that healthy thoughts come of their own accord” (Ben. 7.2.1).
We can see connections, then, between later Roman Stoic accounts of spiritual exercises
by Musonius and Seneca on the one hand, and earlier Pythagorean and Cynic traditions of
mental training on the other. Although it is difficult to be sure given the fragmentary nature
of the evidence, the presence of both Pythagorean and Cynic influences on the early Stoics
makes it not unreasonable to suppose that they too may have been concerned with spiritual
exercises as an important part of philosophical education.40 We do know that some early Stoics
wrote books devoted to the topic of askêsis, notably Herillus and Dionysius (Diog. Laert.
7.166-7). If this is right then the concern with spiritual exercises that we find in Roman Stoics
31
such as Musonius Rufus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius was not a late innovation but rather a
theme running through Stoicism from the outset.
Spiritual exercises in the Meditations

While we find descriptions of spiritual exercises in a number of ancient texts, the Meditations
stands out as a text that is itself an extended spiritual exercise.What we find is Marcus engaging
in the sort of self-dialogue proposed in the Golden Verses and taken up by Sextius and Seneca.
Rather than merely mentally rehearsing the difficulties of everyday life, Marcus’s mode of self-
dialogue involves writing his thought processes down. It may well be that others produced
these sorts of written exercises as well, but the Meditations is unique as the only example of
such writing to come down to us. In this sense the Meditations taken as a whole is an example
of a series of written spiritual exercises. There are various features of the text that support this,
such as the repetition of phrases like “always remember”,41 and it also helps to explain the
lack of structure and the repetition of topics. Indeed, the repetitive character of the text, once
judged a stylistic weakness, can now be seen as an essential feature of the work.42
As well as being able to consider the Meditations as a whole as a form of spiritual exercise,
it is also possible to pick out a number of specific exercises in the text. Putting aside Book 1,43
the Meditations open proper with the first chapter of Book 2, which begins: “Say to yourself
in the early morning: I shall meet today inquisitive, ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious,
uncharitable men” (2.1; see also 5.1, 10.13). This mental rehearsal of potentially unpleasant
events to come is an example of the premeditation of future evils, something that we saw
earlier in Galen. This was a common theme in Hellenistic philosophy and discussed at length
by Cicero, who reports that Chrysippus had made use of this technique.44 Cicero notes that
Chrysippus held the view that “what is unforeseen strikes us with greater force” than what we
have already rehearsed in our minds (Tusc. 3.52). Although, as Cicero makes plain, the tech-
nique was not original to the Stoics, it was an established Stoic practice long before Marcus
took it up in the Meditations.45
In Marcus’s version here, he responds to his opening rehearsal of the difficulties he might
expect to encounter in the coming day by reminding himself of a number of key Stoic
doctrines that ought to inform his response. He opens with the thought that the behaviour
of the unpleasant people he might encounter is ultimately the product of their ignorance
(agnoia), and so not deliberate on their part. Marcus himself, however, is not ignorant of how
he ought to behave so he has no justification to respond in kind. On the contrary, he knows
that he and these others share the same nature and that all share in a divine nature, and so, no
matter how they behave, he ought to treat them as kinsmen (suggenês). Using an analogy with
parts of a single organism, Marcus suggests that to work against other people is to act contrary
to Nature (para phusin), and he concludes by saying that to respond to the negative emotions
of others with negative emotions of one’s own would also be against Nature.
As we can see, Marcus is implicitly drawing on a range of Stoic ideas in a way that highlights
the interconnectedness of the Stoic system. He appeals to: (i) central ideas in Stoic physics, to
give him the resources (ii) to avoid jumping to rash judgements that might generate negative
emotions, which will in turn mean that he can (iii) act towards those whom he meets in the
ethically appropriate way. In particular, he presupposes a number of Stoic claims: that only
virtue is good, that emotions are the product of errors in judgement, and that all humans
are part of a single, rational community. By pre-rehearsing encounters with the worst sorts
32
of people he might meet and reminding himself of both the appropriate way to behave in
response and the philosophical principles that underpin that response, Marcus is training him-
self not to rush into making negative judgements about unpleasant people that would, in turn,
generate negative emotions, lead to inappropriate behaviour, and, ultimately, compromise the
integrity of his character and the rationality of his soul. This early morning reflection on the
day ahead compliments the evening review of the day described by Seneca and both offer very
practical examples of philosophical training in action.
Another specific exercise we find in the Meditations is often called “the view from above”.46
There are a number of examples throughout the text,47 of which here is just one representa-
tive example:
Watch and see the courses of the stars as if you ran with them, and continually dwell
in mind upon the changes of the elements into one another; for these imaginations
wash away the foulness of life on the ground. Moreover, when discoursing about man-
kind, look upon earthly things below as if from some place above them –herds, armies,
farms, weddings, divorces, births, deaths, noise of law courts, lonely places, divers for-
eign nations, festivals, mournings, market places, a mixture of everything and an order
composed of contraries.
7.47-848
This passage and others like it appear to be doing a number of things at once. First, there is a
meditation on universal flux and the impermanence of all things, designed to offer consolation
for loss of various kinds and ultimately consolation for death. Second, there is an attempt to
see Nature as a whole and to grasp it as a single interconnected system.Third there is an effort
to put into a much wider context everyday human cares and concerns in order to minimize
their significance.49 This goes hand in hand with offering a series of dispassionate, physical
descriptions of things that are often taken to be very important in everyday human life, again
in order to downplay their significance. Thus, for example countries, over which wars are
fought, are merely lumps of mud around a pond (6.36).This single mental exercise of viewing
things from above does, then, a number of things at once, implicitly appealing to a range of
claims from Stoic physics along the way. The frequency with which Marcus repeats or alludes
to this vision from above in the Meditations highlights the significance he attached to it. In one
passage, 12.24, he includes it among three things that he must keep “ready to hand” (procheiros),
confirming its central place in his repertoire of spiritual exercises.
Marcus’s reflections on “the view from above” also form an example of the way in which
many of his spiritual exercises ultimately depend on doctrines in physics and, although his aim
is entirely practical, it is potentially misleading to characterize his exercises as merely practical
ethics, if that is taken to mean the practical application of ethical principles. In the Meditations
it is the practical application of logical and physical doctrines that recur again and again.50 In
one particularly striking passage, Marcus reflects on the contrast between seeing objects from
a purely physical perspective and seeing them overlaid with cultural significance:
Surely it is an excellent plan, when you are seated before delicacies and choice foods,
to grasp the impression that this is the dead body of a fish, that the dead body of a bird
or a pig; and again, that the Falernian wine is grape juice and that robe of purple a
lamb’s fleece dipped in a shell-fish’s blood […]. Surely these are excellent impressions
33
(phantasiai), going to the heart of actual facts (pragmata) and penetrating them so as to
see the kind of things they really are.
6.13
Elsewhere, Marcus offers a description of this technique of describing objects from a physical
perspective, a technique clearly aimed at undermining excessive attributions of value to such
things:
Always make a figure or outline of the imagined object as it occurs, in order to see dis-
tinctly what it is in its essence (kat’ ousia), naked, as a whole and parts; and say to yourself
its individual name and the names of the things of which it was compounded and into
which it will be broken up. For nothing is so able to create greatness of mind as the
power methodically and truthfully to test each thing that meets one in life, and always
to look upon it so as to attend at the same time to the use which this particular thing
contributes to a Universe of a certain definite kind, what value it has in reference to the
Whole, and what to man […].
3.11
This technique of physical description has the virtue not only of ensuring that objects are
valued correctly but also of enabling one to grasp objects as they are in themselves, which is
an important end in itself. Many of the spiritual exercises we find in the Meditations, including
“the view from above”, employ this kind of physical perspective on the world, both for its own
sake and for its therapeutic benefits.51
Summing up
In this chapter we have considered what sort of text the Meditations is and what Marcus was
trying to achieve in writing it. In order to do this we have considered the wider context
of Stoic thinking about practical exercises in Seneca, Musonius, and Epictetus, while also
touching on Pythagorean, Socratic, and Cynic ideas predating the Roman Stoics.52 Yet it is
worth stressing that these practical exercises come after the study of philosophical theories,
upon which they are grounded. Philosophy remains an activity devoted to rational inquiry
into what exists and what has value. The point that Musonius Rufus insisted upon is that the
study of, say, virtue ought to be not merely for the sake of being able to supply a definition
of virtue but ultimately for the sake of becoming a virtuous person.53 In this he was at one
with Socrates. Spiritual exercises to do not challenge or replace the sort of rational inquiry
usually identified with philosophy; they supplement it. As we have seen, in the Meditations
Marcus refers to philosophy as an art which, following Musonius and Epictetus, may be best
understood as a two-stage process. First one studies philosophical theory and only after that
does one undertake the exercises necessary to digest that information and so transform one’s
behaviour. Spiritual exercises are the practical training that forms just one part of philosophy
conceived as an art of living.
As a book of such exercises, it is important also to remember that Marcus’s Meditations is
an idiosyncratic and partial book. It comprises a series of spiritual exercises about topics that
were of particular importance to him at the time he was writing. It does not pretend to offer
a complete or comprehensive account of all the possible spiritual exercises a Stoic philosopher
34
might deploy, much less the theoretical principles upon which those exercises are grounded. In
so far as these exercises are designed to put philosophy to work in order to overcome some of
Marcus’s personal problems, it inevitably focuses on a range of negative issues in his own life.
These ought not to be taken as a complete account of either Marcus’s outlook on life or his
conception of Stoicism. Indeed, it would be a mistake for detractors or admirers to think that
the Meditations straightforwardly presents us with Marcus’s own version of Stoic philosophy.
The philosophical precepts, doctrines, and arguments upon which Marcus’s spiritual exercises
depend remain on the whole unstated.54 The task of the rest of this book is to try to unpack,
so far as is possible, the philosophical views standing behind Marcus’s notes to himself.
Notes
1 On the distinctive character of Book 1 see Rutherford (1989: 48–125), Hadot and Luna (1998: xli–
clxxxiii), Gourinat (2012a: 318–20), Gill (2013: lxxv–lxxxiv).
2 See further Gourinat (2012a: 320–30). I do not subscribe to Hadot’s view (1998: 232) that the
Meditations is “organized in accordance with a threefold structure”, namely the three topoi outlined
by Epictetus (Diss. 3.2.1-2).
3 On the Meditations and self-dialogue see Ackeren (2011: I, 206–87).
4 See Casaubon (1634), who went on to publish an edition of the Greek text in 1643.
5 Casaubon prints the title as tôn eis heauton at the beginning of his “Notes Upon Antoninus” in
Casaubon (1634).
6 One odd case is the translation by John Jackson which was issued simultaneously by Oxford
University Press in 1906 under the titles Thoughts (in “The World’s Classics”) and Meditations (in the
“Oxford Translation Series”). See Jackson (1906a and 1906b).
7 For titles of translations up to 1908 see Wickham Legg (1910).
8 The title is recorded in the editio princeps, which was based on the now lost Palatine manuscript (on
which see Ceporina 2012: 55–6). Many have assumed that the title was taken over from the manu-
script, although Ceporina (2012: 47) suggests that it may have been added by Xylander (however,
see the next note). When translated into Latin it is usually, though not universally, rendered literally
as ad se ipsum.
9 The title is first mentioned by Arethas of Caesarea (c. 850–935), Schol. in Lucianum 207,6-7 Rabe,
quoted in Farquharson (1944: I, 158). An earlier mention of the text by Themistius, Or. 6.81c
(dated 364; see Farquharson 1944: I, xv) does not use the title but instead calls the work Precepts or
Admonitions (paraggelmata). In the Meditations Marcus refers to his own writings as hupomnêmatia (little
notes), at 3.14.
10 For commentary on 4.3, see Farquharson (1944: I, 309–11), Gill (2013: 120–22). Brunt (1974: 3)
says of this passage “Here surely is the key to the Meditations”.
11 It is worth noting that these two fundamental principles that Marcus thinks he ought to keep ready
to hand are not ethical principles relating to conduct. Instead one is logical (conceived broadly),
the other physical. Marcus is interested in logic and physics –not logical and physical theory, but
rather living in accord with a series of logical and physical claims central to Stoicism (contra Roskam
2012: 94–5). In 4.3, as a whole he shows us how reflecting on doctrines in Stoic epistemology and
physics might contribute to the cultivation of a mind at complete ease and in good order.
12 Distress (lupê) is one of the four principal types of emotion (pathê) the Stoics sought to avoid. It is,
on their account, a belief (or the product of a belief) in a present evil. See for example Diog. Laert.
7.110-11; Cicero, Tusc. 3.24-5 (SVF 3.385), 4.14 (SVF 3.393) where it is rendered into Latin as
aegritudo, with discussion in Sorabji (2000: 29–32).
13 On Epictetus’s admiration for Socrates and his debts to the early Socratic dialogues of Plato, see Long
(2002) and Jagu (1946), respectively.
14 On this point I differ from the views in Bonhöffer (1894: 147) and Sorabji (2000: 13, 252).
35
15 Cf. Farquharson (1944: II, 860).

16 For a fuller discussion of the idea of an art of living, with further references, see Sellars (2003).
17 For a full list of ancient references see Sellars (2003: 5).
18 See Cicero, Acad. 2.23; Fin. 1.42, 1.72, 3.4, 4.19, 5.16, 5.18; Tusc. 2.12; Seneca, Ep. 95.7–9.
19 See further Sellars (2003, 64–5).
20 See Seneca, Ep. 71.31, with Newman (1989: 1507).
21 See De Boer (1937: 15,16–18) and Singer (2013: 256).
22 This is his Peri êthôn (De moribus) 31 Kr., translated in Mattock (1972: 241) and Singer (2013: 144).
23 On Marcus and spiritual exercises, see Hadot (1972). The idea is examined more widely in Hadot
(1977) and both are reprinted in Hadot (1993).
24 See Hadot (1977), citing Rabbow (1954), with discussion in Sellars (2003: 110–18).
25 See for example Cooper (2012: 402).
26 The text is preserved in Stob. 3,648–51 and excerpted in Hense (1905: 22–7). The title may well
have been added by Stobaeus. It is translated in Lutz (1947: 53–57). For discussion of this passage see
Geytenbeek (1963: 40–50).
27 See Musonius Rufus 6 (Hense 1905: 22,7-9).
28 Musonius Rufus 6 (Hense 1905: 23,1-3).
30 See Musonius Rufus 6 (Hense 1905: 23,17–24,1). He explains why this is the case: “men who enter
the other professions have not had their souls corrupted beforehand […] but the ones who start out
to study philosophy have been born and reared in an environment filled with corruption and evil,
and therefore turn to virtue in such a state that they need a longer and more thorough training”.
32 Musonius Rufus 6 (Hense 1905: 25,14–26,5).
33 The topic of keeping principles procheiros recurs throughout the works of Musonius’s pupil Epictetus
(see e.g., the titles of Diss. 1.27 and 1.30) and is echoed in the title of Epictetus’s Encheiridion
compiled by Arrian (a connection noted by Simplicius, in Ench. Praef. 18-20 Hadot).
34 See Diog. Laert. 6.70, with Goulet-Cazé (1986: 195–222). Diogenes draws a distinction between
mental and physical exercises but goes on to suggest, like Musonius, that physical exercises also
benefit the soul. For Epictetus on Cynicism see Diss. 3.22.
35 On the school of Sextius see Lana (1992); on Seneca’s teachers see Sellars (2014: 99–102).
36 As Thom notes (1995: 37), these lines are quoted or alluded to by a wide range of ancient philo-
sophical authors, including Cicero (citing Cato the Elder as his source), Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus,
Galen, Porphyry, and Diogenes Laertius.
37 See for example, Carm. Aur. 9, 14, 35.
38 Thom (1995) suggests that Nauck’s proposal of the fourth century AD is the opinio communionis.
39 See Thom (2001) elaborating on points first made in Thom (1995). For Chrysippus compare Aulus
Gellius, NA 7.2.12 (SVF 2.1000) with Carm. Aur. 54, and for Cleanthes compare Hymn to Zeus 23-5
(SVF 1.537) with Carm. Aur.  55-6.
40 See in particular the previously unpublished essay “Chrysippus on Practical Morality” in Brunt
(2013: 10–27). Brunt suggests that Chrysippus may have shared more in common with Epictetus
than is usually supposed, and that “by systematically omitting homiletic material von Arnim induces
a false conception of old Stoic morality” (11).
41 Brunt (1974: 3) (repr. in Brunt 2013: 365) notes that phrases such as “always remember” (memnêso
aei) are repeated some 40 times; see the Index Verborum in Schenkl (1913) s.v. memnêsthai, memnêso
to which Brunt refers, and Rigo (2010: 129) who lists 46 instances s.v. mimnêskô.
42 See further Giavatto (2012a: 339–42).
43 Some have suggested that Book 1 was composed separately from the rest of the work. It is far more
coherent and structured than the subsequent books. Even so, a case can be made for treating it too
as an example of spiritual exercise. See further Gill (2013: lxxv–lxxvii).
36
44 See Cicero, Tusc. 3.29. For the mention of Chrysippus, see Tusc. 3.52 (SVF 3.417). For further
discussion see Newman (1989: 1477–78). On its prehistory see Hadot (1969: 60–2) referring to
Pythagorean practices described in Iamblichus, Vita Pythagorae 196 (DK 58D6).
45 See for example Seneca Ep. 78.29, 91.3-4; Vit. Beat. 26.1. For further discussion, see Newman
(1989), who contrasts Stoic meditatio with earlier versions.
46 See for example Hadot (1995: 238–50) discussing Marcus Aurelius alongside a wide range of other
thinkers, and also Rutherford (1989: 155–61) focusing on parallels with earlier ancient literature. For
this phrase in Marcus, see 9.30.
47 As well as 7.47-48 quoted below, see for example 3.10, 5.24, 6.36, 9.30, 9.32, 10.15, 11.1, 12.24.
48 In modern editions this passage is divided into two chapters but this dates back only to Gataker
(1652). In the earlier edition by Casaubon (1643), they are printed as a single chapter, “7.27”. There
are no chapter divisions in the Greek text printed in Xylander (1559), although his Latin translation
is divided into unnumbered paragraphs, where he prints 7.47-49 as a single paragraph. The earliest
edition containing chapter divisions is Sally (1626).
49 In a number of passages (e.g., 3.10, 5.24, 6.36, 9.30, 9.32), human life is put into a wider temporal as
well as spatial context.
50 Compare with the different view of Roskam (2012: 94–5).
51 For further discussion of this kind of physical description see esp. Hadot (1972), but note also Hadot
(1998: 104–5) and Gill (2013: xl–xliv).
52 In this context, it is interesting to note that Marcus mentions Pythagoras, Socrates, and Diogenes the
Cynic as role models at various places in the Meditations; see for e xample 6.47, 7.19, 8.3.
53 The same point is made throughout Epictetus; see for example Diss. 2.19, 3.21.
54 A similar view is expressed in Brunt (2013: 447).
37
PART II
Logic
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39
3
IMPRESSIONS AND JUDGEMENTS
Marcus and logic
It is not uncommon to see the Meditations described as a work of practical ethics.1 This is hardly
surprising given the focus on techniques of self-transformation of the sort we have considered
in the last chapter.Yet there is much in the Meditations that goes beyond the confines of ethics.2
In this chapter and a number that follow we shall consider a range of themes that naturally fall
under the headings of logic and physics. Ethics, physics, and logic were, of course, the three
central parts of philosophy according to the Stoics.3 At first glance, Marcus does not seem to
have any interest in the logical part of Stoic philosophy; at least this is how it has seemed to a
number of commentators.4 In part this is because there are only a few places where he expli-
citly makes reference to logic as a subject. In one of these, 1.17[22], he expresses relief that
he has not wasted time on syllogisms, while in another, 8.1, he reminds himself that he will
not find the good life that he is seeking through the study of syllogisms. Yet these seemingly
negative judgements are balanced by another passage, 7.67, where he expresses regret that he
never managed to master dialectic. He was clearly not uninformed about the subject, though,
as Fronto makes plain in one of his letters. There, Fronto notes Marcus’s interest in logical
problems such as horn dilemmas, heap fallacies, and the liar paradox (De eloqu. 2.13).5 It is
unclear whether this was just something that Marcus studied in his youth or if he retained this
interest into later life.6 Either way, there is little trace of any interest in that sort of thing in the
Meditations which, as we have seen, is a very specific kind of text with a very different purpose.
In one passage that has confused some commentators,7 Marcus says the following:
Continually and, if possible, on the occasion of every impression (phantasia), test it by

natural science (phusiologein), by psychology (pathologein),8 by dialectic (dialektikeuesthai).
8.13
This has sometimes been taken to be a clear reference to the Stoic division of philosophy
into physics, ethics, and logic.9 Indeed, the terms Marcus uses have sometimes been translated
as “physics, ethics, logic” (e.g. Hays 2003: 103). But what does Marcus mean by it? Does he
40
40 Logic
actually do anything approaching this in the Meditations? Before tackling those questions dir-
ectly, it may be useful to say something about what the Stoics took the term “logic” (logikê)
to cover.
Stoic logic
According to the account in Diogenes Laertius, Stoic logic was usually divided into the two
branches of rhetoric and dialectic, with some adding further parts dealing with definitions and
criteria (Diog. Laert 7.41).The Stoics, who seem to have relished detailed taxonomies, divided
rhetoric and dialectic further into subsections.They divided rhetoric into deliberative, forensic,
and panegyric, and dialectic into “what is signified and what is uttered” (ibid. 7.43).10 Within
what is signified fall impressions, sayables, propositions, and arguments, including the sorts of
paradoxes and fallacies that, according to Fronto, had occupied Marcus’s attention (ibid. 7.43-
4). One striking element of Diogenes’ summary is his report that the Stoics regarded dialectic
as a virtue and a skill essential for a sage (ibid. 7.46-7).11 As Diogenes puts it, overhastiness in
assertion can lead one to fall into unseemly conduct.
This view was not restricted to the early Stoa and later Epictetus also insisted on the
necessity of the study of logic.12 Indeed, Epictetus is an interesting case in the present con-
text because, like Marcus, he both warns against the dangers of being distracted by logical
problems while at the same time insisting on the necessity of logic. To someone who says
they want to learn about Chrysippus’s work on the liar paradox, Epictetus replies “Go hang,
you wretch! What good with knowing that do you?” (Diss. 2.17.34). Elsewhere he comments
that there is nothing to prevent someone from “analysing syllogisms like Chrysippus, and yet
being wretched, sorrowing, envying, disturbed, miserable” (Diss. 2.23.44). This is clearly in
line with Marcus’s comments on the futility of wasting time with syllogisms (1.17[22], 8.1).
Despite these excessively harsh judgements, elsewhere Epictetus emphatically insists on the
importance of logic. It supplies a standard of judgement against which the claims of others
can be assessed, and this is an essential skill acknowledged not only by Stoics such as Zeno and
Chrysippus but also by Antisthenes and Socrates (Diss. 1.17.1-12).13 Many people, he notes
elsewhere, do not realize that the study of arguments is essential for knowing how to live well
(Diss. 1.7.1).To the interlocutor who says that making a logical error is unimportant compared
to, say, acting unjustly, Epictetus recounts being rebuked by Musonius Rufus for saying just this
at one of Musonius’s lectures (Diss. 1.7.32; Musonius Rufus 44). By error in logic Epictetus
says he means, among other things, failing to follow an argument, falling into inconsistency,
and making poor use of impressions (phantasiai).14 Attention to such things is, according to
Epictetus, essential for anyone who is trying to learn how to live well.
Marcus is by no means neglectful of such things in the Meditations. As Giavatto has noted,
there is a wide variety of argument forms throughout the text, including modus ponens, sorites,
and disjunction (2012b: 415–18).15 Indeed, there are probably far more arguments in the
Meditations than readers might initially suppose.16 Here is just one example:
If mind is common to us all, then also the reason, whereby we are reasoning beings, is
common. If this be so, then also the reason which enjoins what is to be done or left
undone is common. If this be so, law also is common; if this be so, we are citizens; if this
be so, we are partakers in one constitution; if this be so, the cosmos is a kind of state (polis).
4.4
41
Impressions and judgements 41
Although Marcus, like Epictetus, had no time for logical puzzles for their own sake, he cer-
tainly grasped and indeed made use of logical reasoning, even lamenting that he did not make
further progress in this part of Stoic philosophy (7.67). Marcus’s claim not to be a dialectician
might be put into further context by noting that Alexander of Aphrodisias –writing perhaps
just a few decades after Marcus –reported that the Stoics claimed that only a sage will be a
real dialectician (in Top. 1,8-14). With that in mind, it is unsurprising that Marcus would resist
claiming expertise in this part of philosophy.
Introducing impressions
As we saw earlier, Epictetus took the correct use of impressions (phantasiai) to be one of the
things made possible by a proper grasp of logic. According to the summary of Stoicism by
Diocles of Magnesia –a key source for Diogenes Laertius –the Stoic account of dialectic begins
with their doctrine of impressions. Impressions are the foundation for everything else: “impres-
sion arises first; then thought, which is capable of discourse, articulates the subject’s response
to the impression” (Diog. Laert. 7.49). Marcus spent a lot of time thinking about the nature of
impressions. In order to get a better sense of why he took them to be so important, we need to
say a bit about the concept in general and the way in which it was used in the early Stoa. As we
shall see, Marcus used the term quite differently to some of his Stoic predecessors.
In translations of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations into English, the term phantasia is often
rendered by a number of different English words –including “impression”, “conception”,
“imagination”, “thought”, “image”, and “representation” –in part depending on the context
in which it appears. In fact, all these different renderings can be found in just one transla-
tion (Farquharson 1944), obscuring the fact that a single term is being used in a variety of
different contexts.Wider literature on Stoicism has also rendered phantasia as “appearance” and
“presentation”. What all these English words share is that they all refer to something mental,
namely, something that is in the mind and is distinct from the external world. Some of these
words suggest a mental item that is produced by and reflects accurately some feature of the
external world, while others suggest a mental item produced by the mind itself. This variety
of English translations for phantasia reflects the way in which the term can refer quite broadly
to an impression that is either generated by something outside the mind or generated by the
mind itself.
Marcus seems to use the word phantasia, or “impression”, to refer to mental items in this
broad way, generated either by something external to the mind or by the mind itself. That is
why translators have sometimes felt the need to translate it as “imagination”. In this he differs
from some of his Stoic predecessors. Chrysippus, for instance, distinguished between impres-
sion (phantasia) and imagination (phantastikon). Our source, Aetius, says:
An impression (phantasia) is an affection occurring in the soul, which reveals itself and
its cause. Thus, when through sight we observe something white, the affection is what
is engendered in the soul through vision; and it is this affection which enables us to
say that there is a white object which activates us. […] Imagination (phantastikon) is
an empty attraction, an affection in the soul which arises from no impressor, as when
someone shadow-boxes or strikes his hands against thin air; for an impression has some
impressor as its object, but imagination has none.
Aetius 4.12.1-5, SVF 2.54, LS 39B
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42 Logic
In early Stoic sources, as Long and Sedley note (1987: I, 240), it is common to affirm the usual
reliability of impressions. In normal conditions and for the most part, all other things being
equal, we can trust and rely upon our impressions, which are the source of our knowledge of
the external world. In Marcus, however, we find a quite different attitude. By using the notion
of impression to cover mental items both externally generated and internally generated, his
attitude towards impressions is much more cautious. Impressions are, for Marcus, something
to be examined and interrogated. They demand our careful attention. While some can be
approached quite positively, and can even be curative, others are seen as deceptive and not to
be trusted. For Marcus, then, impressions are in themselves neutral; they can be either positive
or negative, reliable and beneficial or deceptive and dangerous. And this is why he continually
insists that they require careful examination.17
This is one reason why impressions are important to Marcus in the Meditations. A second
reason is that impressions shape our minds. He writes:
As are your repeated impressions (phantasiai) so will your mind be, for the soul is dyed
by its impressions. Dye it, then, in a succession of impressions like these: for instance,
where it is possible to live, there also it is possible to live well: but it is possible to live in
a palace, therefore it is also possible to live well in a palace.
5.16
There are a number of things to note about this passage.18 As we saw in the last chapter, there
is a justification for the repetition of key ideas. In particular, it is the repetition of phantasiai
that does the work. Because Marcus uses the term to cover internally generated items as well
as externally generated ones, it means that individuals are able to create impressions that can,
in turn, shape their soul (psuchê). The sort of impression he has in mind is, in this instance, a
logical argument, and here we see Marcus making explicitly use of syllogistic reasoning to
make his point.19 It is once again worth remembering that this is not a case of Marcus trying
to persuade anyone else; he is using this syllogistic argument to remind himself of the logical
coherence of the conclusion that he wants to embrace.
So, if, for a Stoic, the condition of one’s soul is of fundamental importance (i.e. whether it
is virtuous or vicious), and if one’s soul is shaped by impressions, then attending to impressions
will also be of fundamental importance –especially if, as with Marcus, impressions are seen to
be things that can be either reliable or deceptive.
Reliable impressions and first impressions

What does Marcus have to say about reliable impressions? As Giavatto has noted (2012c: 135),
in general Marcus follows Stoic orthodoxy in holding a positive view of the epistemological
relationship between humans and the external world. In 6.13 Marcus refers to excellent
impressions that get “to the heart of actual facts, penetrating them so as to see the kind of
things they really are”.
Particularly interesting in this context are Marcus’s references to what he calls “first
impressions” (proêgoumenai phantasiai). This expression seems to be unique to him:20
Do not say more to yourself than the first impressions report. You have been told that
someone speaks evil of you. This is what you have been told; you have not been told
43
that you are injured. […] In this way then abide always by the first impressions and add
nothing of your own from within.
8.49
In his commentary, Farquharson defines these first impressions as “the immediate presentations
which are the material precedent to your judgement” (1944: II, 777). In other words, they are
neither composite impressions informed by judgements, nor impressions solely generated by
the mind. Instead they are impressions as defined by Chrysippus: a perceptual impression of
something external that makes plain its cause. However, as 8.49 makes clear, Marcus’s concern
is not with the straightforwardly epistemological question concerning the reliability of the
senses, but rather a slightly different question about the way in which impressions can become
infected with value judgements that we add to them before they are presented to the mind
for assent or rejection.
So, the phrase “first impressions” helps us to distinguish between purely perceptual
impressions and impressions informed by our judgements. This helps to restore some of the
precision lost by Marcus’s indifference to Chrysippus’s distinction between impression and
imagination, although as we have seen, here we are dealing with a slightly different distinction,
namely one between impressions and judgements. As Hadot as noted, “Marcus has a frequent
tendency to confuse judgment and representation [i.e. impressions]” (1998: 103).When Marcus
uses a phrase like “Wipe out impressions” at 8.29, what he really means is wipe out impressions
that have become infected by judgements, which is to say, wipe out judgements. Elsewhere,
for example 8.40, he makes the same point referring directly to judgements. We ought not to
be too surprised about this terminological imprecision given that Marcus was not a technical,
professional philosopher, and that he was writing for himself. Hadot acknowledges that in
passages such as 8.49 quoted above Marcus is “quite capable” of making the correct distinc-
tion. Indeed, it is interesting to note the order of these three passages within the Meditations.
They are all from Book 8. In the first, 8.29, Marcus targets impressions as the problem. A few
paragraphs later, in 8.40, he realizes that in fact judgements are the problem, not impressions.
Then, in 8.49, he gives a fuller account distinguishing between impressions and judgements,
and using the phrase “first impressions” in order to help himself do so. So, rather than simple
confusion, perhaps what we see here is Marcus’s developing thought process.
Although that may be the case, Marcus was not really innovating here. As Hadot notes
(1998: 104), the essential point had already been made by Epictetus:
He was carried off to prison. What happened? He was carried off to prison. But the
observation ‘He has fared ill’ is an addition that each man makes on his own responsibility.
Diss. 3.8.5
For Marcus, then, some impressions, namely first impressions, are reliable and trustworthy.The
task thus becomes to distinguish between these trustworthy impressions and those that are not.
Consequently impressions must be examined and tested. To return to a passage we considered
earlier, Marcus writes, again in Book 8:
Continually and, if possible, on the occasion of every impression, test it by natural

science, by psychology, by dialectic.
8.13
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We can see how this sort of testing might help someone to distinguish between first
impressions and impressions infected by judgements, and between impressions and imagin-
ation. Knowledge of nature and human emotions will enable someone to distinguish between
bare statements of fact (“He was carried off to prison”) and value judgements (“He has fared
ill”). Statements about nature ought always to be value neutral; as such, they ought not to gen-
erate an emotional response. Knowledge of nature and dialectics will help one to distinguish
between impressions and imagination, for both will be able to judge whether an impression
could plausibly be the product of the external world rather than something created in the
mind. These might not be definitive tests, but one can see how they might help in weeding
out many potentially misleading impressions.
To sum up thus far, we can make a number of observations. Marcus remains committed,
like Chrysippus, to the idea that perceptual impressions are reliable sources of knowledge. His
central concern, however, is quite different, and this is not merely due to terminological impre-
cision. We have seen that Marcus conflates Chrysippean impressions and imagination under the
single heading of impressions, but more important is his distinction between first impressions
and impressions infected by judgements –a distinction that, as we have also seen, he probably
inherited from Epictetus.This involves the claim that many impressions that might appear at first
glance to be unproblematic perceptual impressions have in fact been tampered with by the mind.
Deceptive impressions
Reliable impressions are contrasted with deceptive impressions. As we have seen, these fall into
two types: impressions infected by judgements and impressions completely generated by the
mind (i.e. Chrysippean imagination). In both cases the problem arises from the activity of the
mind; trustworthy first impressions, by contrast, remain untouched by the mind.
Marcus often warns himself to be wary of impressions. He writes:
How simple to reject and to wipe away every disturbing or alien impression, and
straightaway to be in perfect calm.
5.2
What are you doing here, impression? Depart, in God’s name, the way you came; I have
no need of you.
7.17
Although not always explicit, in these sorts of passages Marcus is usually concerned with
disturbing or upsetting impressions. Those sorts of impressions, by definition cannot be first
impressions, for they presumably already include some kind of value judgement that makes
them disturbing. So the deceptive impressions he seems concerned with here are impressions
infected by judgements.
But he is also concerned about impressions that are solely the product of the mind:
Do not allow the impression of the whole of your life to confuse you, do not dwell
upon all the manifold troubles which have come to pass, but ask yourself in regard to
every present piece of work: what is there here that can’t be borne and can’t be endured?
8.36
45
These sorts of impressions –what we might call thoughts and memories –are quite different
from the previous kind, in so far as they do not have an immediately present external
cause.
To these we can add a third kind of potentially dangerous impression:
Do not waste the balance of life left to you on impressions about other people […]
I mean if you imagine to yourself what so and so is doing, and why; what he is saying or
thinking or planning, and every thought of the kind which leads you astray from close
watch over your governing self (hêgemonikon)?
3.4
Here the impressions that Marcus wants to reject are not deceptive or tainted in any way, it
is just that they are distractions from the most important task at hand, namely attending to
his own judgements. So this is a further, quite different, way in which Marcus urges us to be
extremely cautious about impressions, separate from questions about their formation. Here
Marcus might be following Epictetus, who, in the opening chapter of the Handbook (Ench.
1.5), urges people to reject impressions, and he says the criterion for rejecting impressions
is whether they have to do with things “up to us” (eph’ hêmin). Any impressions concerned
with things not up to us ought to be nothing to us. As in Marcus, the issue seems to be
one of distraction: do not devote too much attention to the opinions of other people, or
the body, or material possessions; instead give one’s focus squarely on the ruling part of
the soul.
We now have three types of potentially deceptive impressions: (i) impressions infected by
judgements, (ii) impressions generated by the mind, and (iii) distracting impressions. Opposed to
these three types of deceptive impressions we have so far only encountered one type of positive
impression, namely first impressions. We can try to redress the balance by pointing to a second
type of positive impression in Marcus. These are like first impressions in so far as they are free
from added judgements and accurately reflect the external cause that created them. But they
differ from first impressions in an important way. It may be best to begin with some examples:
Surely it is an excellent plan, when you are seated before delicacies and choice foods, to
grasp the impression that this is the dead body of a fish, that the dead body of a bird or
a pig; and again, that the Falernian wine is grape juice and that robe of purple a lamb’s
fleece dipped in a shell-fish’s blood […]. Surely these are excellent impressions, going
to the heart of actual facts and penetrating them so as to see the kinds of things they
really are.
6.13
What is distinctive about the impressions Marcus has in mind here is that they come after
the initial impression of seeing fine food or fine clothes. So they are not first impressions.
Instead they require some work on the part of the mind, to dig behind the immediate super-
ficial appearance of an object and to grasp its material nature. These impressions are, like first
impressions, reliable, and trustworthy, but they are not immediate and unthinking; they require
some mental effort, at least at first.
We might call this a second type of positive impression. There is also a third type. Consider
the following two passages:
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Watch and see the courses of the stars as if you ran with them, and continually dwell in
mind upon the changes of the elements into one another; for these impressions wash
away the foulness of life on the ground.
7.47
Let your impression dwell continually upon the whole of eternity and the whole of
substance, and realize that their several parts are, by comparison with substance, a fig-
seed; by comparison with time, the turn of a drill.
10.17
These passages share something in common with the previous one: they all involve adopting
what we might call the perspective of physics. But these new ones are different in so far as
they are simply the product of imagination. When Marcus sees a fine meal and trains himself
to see merely a dead fish, he is seeing an object before him in a different way. But when he
tries to grasp the immensity of space and time, adopting what is usually called a cosmic per-
spective, he is engaged in an act of imagination, and has an impression generated by the mind.
So we now have three types of potentially dangerous impression –(i) with added judgements,
(ii) imaginations, and (iii) distractions –and three types of potentially beneficial impression –(iv)
first impressions, (v) of objects stripped back, and (vi) from a cosmic perspective. These two sets
do not neatly correlate with one another, but the fact that there are three negative and three
positive types does underline the way in which Marcus sees impressions as potentially either
good or bad, and not intrinsically one or the other (quite different from the early Stoic view).
And that further underlines the importance to Marcus of paying close attention to impressions.
Both of these thoughts are quite nicely expressed by Simplicius, in his commentary on Epictetus:
Impressions are sometimes revelatory of truths, and of what is truly beneficial or

pleasant, but are sometimes idle dream-fictions. So just by our being disposed to keep
in mind straightaway that the object of the impression is not always such as it appears,
the intensity of the impression is relaxed. As a result, it doesn’t impede the judgement
of reason.
in Ench. 6,15-20 Hadot
Here Simplicius, explicating Epictetus, offers a helpful parallel to Marcus’s view that impressions
can be either good or bad, and he explains the importance not just of attending to particular
impressions but also developing a general, sceptical attitude towards impressions, something
that Epictetus himself describes in Discourses 2.18.23-5 (and cf. 1.28). Elsewhere, in Discourses
1.27.1, Epictetus identifies four different types of impression, outlining two ways in which
they can be reliable and two ways in which they might be deceptive, but his attempt at classi-
fication is quite different from Marcus’s implicit distinction between impressions that can be
dangerous and those that might be beneficial. Yet in the same chapter, Epictetus goes on to
insist that the epistemological concerns of Pyrrho and the Academy are mere idle pursuits of
leisure; what really matters is addressing those impressions that cause us distress, such as “death
is a terrible misfortune”. In fact, Epictetus’s opening classification of “things that are and seem
to be, things that are not and do not seem to be, things that are and do not seem to be, and
things that are not but seem to be” should perhaps be taken as a parody of epistemological
hair-splitting that he will go on to say is irrelevant for someone who is suffering from mental
turmoil (“trembling and perplexed and whose heart is broken”, Diss. 1.27.21).
47
Impressions and impulse

There is one final feature of Marcus’s various references to impressions that is worth exam-
ining. In a good number of the passages where he refers to impressions, he does so in con-
junction with mentioning impulse, hormê (see e.g. 2.7, 3.6, 4.22, 6.16, 8.7, 9.7). That he does
so ought not to be a great surprise, given that both are central aspects of the hêgemonikon, the
governing part of the human soul, and indeed are features of all animal souls.21 Here are a few
examples from Marcus:
Those who are sick to death in life, with no mark on which they direct every impulse
or in general every impression, are triflers, not in words only but also in their deeds.
2.7
Do not wander without a purpose, but in all your impulses render what is just, and in
all your impressions preserve what you apprehend.
4.22
Wipe out impression: check impulse: quench desire: keep the governing self
(hêgemonikon) in its own control.
9.7
These show that attention to impressions ought to go hand in hand with attention to impulses.
The fact that Marcus mentions these two aspects of the Stoic ruling part of the soul side
by side in this way suggests that he did have the formal account of Stoic psychology in his
mind when he was writing. If that is right, then it would suggest that when Marcus refers
to impressions, not just in these passages but throughout the Meditations, he is taking it to be
a technical Stoic term. Yet that sense is often obscured by translators who, as noted earlier,
sometimes translate phantasia with half a dozen different English words, depending on context.
Introducing judgements
Alongside impressions, another key concept in Stoic dialectic that appears throughout the
Meditations is judgement. In this case, Marcus’s immediate debt was probably to Epictetus for
whom judgement is also a key concept. In his Handbook, Epictetus famously said “It is not
things that disturb people, but their judgements (dogmata) about things” (Ench. 5). In a similar
spirit, Marcus writes:
If you suffer distress because of some external cause, it is not the thing itself that troubles
you but your judgement (krima) about it, and it is within your power to cancel that
judgement at any moment.
8.47
Epictetus used the term dogma here, while Marcus uses krima. Both of these words are often
translated as “judgement”. So is a third term, hupolêpsis, which is perhaps the most important
of the three terms, and has sometimes been translated as “value-judgement”.22 Marcus uses
the term hupolêpsis throughout the Meditations.23 We also find it in the opening section of
Epictetus’s Handbook (Ench. 1.1) where hupolêpsis is listed as one of the few things that is “up
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to us” (eph’ hêmin). It was already a technical term for the early Stoa and can be found in a
number of reports of their views.24
Marcus on judgements
Marcus is emphatic about the importance of judgements: at 2.15 he writes “everything is
judgement” (hoti pan hupolêpsis) and he more or less repeats these words at 12.8 and 12.26,
suggesting that it was an idea he was keen to keep uppermost in his mind. In 4.3, a lengthy
passage in which Marcus outlines what he is doing in the Meditations as a whole,25 he writes
that there are two fundamental ideas that must be kept “ready to hand” (procheiros): (i) that
mental disturbances are the product not of things but of our judgements (hupolêpseis) and (ii)
nothing is stable and everything passes, subject to universal flux. At the end of the passage
he summarizes by saying ho kosmos, alloiôsis; ho bios, hupolêpsis, literally, “the cosmos, change;
life, judgement” (4.3[12]). The concerns of everyday human life, he reminds himself, are
simply the product of judgements. Here Marcus also makes explicit why judgements are so
important: they are the source of mental disturbances (ochlêsis).26
Stoic epistemology
In order to put what Marcus has to say about judgements into context, it will be useful to say
something about Stoic epistemology.The early Stoics outlined a three-stage process, involving
impression (phantasia), assent (sunkatathesis), and belief or cognition (katalêpsis). First comes
an impression, either from sensation or produced by the mind (Diog. Laert. 7.49-51). This
impression is presented to the mind in the form of a proposition. The mind then accepts or
rejects this proposition in an act of assent. That act of assent generates a belief, which can be
either true or false. According to Cicero, this model was first developed by Zeno (Acad. 1.40).
The resulting belief is thus the product of an impression over which we have no control and
an act of assent over which we do. The challenge, of course, is to know which impressions are
worthy of assent, and Zeno argued that some impressions present themselves as self-evidently
true.These sorts of impressions are said to demand our assent.There was much debate between
members of the early Stoa and sceptically-minded members of the Academy over how one
could be sure that one was only assenting to reliable impressions.
Roman Stoic developments

The early Stoic theory was primarily epistemological. It was concerned with giving an
account of how we generate beliefs and how they come to be either true or false. It was
concerned more with matters of fact than ones of value and it does not seem to have been
concerned with accounting for value-judgements.Yet as we have seen, Marcus and Epictetus
were more concerned with examining the judgements that have some psychological or
ethical impact. For example Epictetus was primarily concerned with how judgements
generate value:
The essence of the good is a certain kind of moral purpose (prohairesis) and that of
the evil is a certain kind of moral purpose. What, then, are the external things? They
are materials for the moral purpose, in dealing with which it will find its own proper
49
good or evil. How will it find the good? If it does not admire the materials. For the
judgements (dogmata) about the materials, if they be correct, make the moral purpose
good, but if they be crooked and awry, they make it evil.
Diss. 1.29.1-3
The early Stoic account does not seem to be able to account for this, or at least not the account
that has come down to us.27 Thus, what we find in both Marcus and Epictetus is, in effect,
an expansion of the early Stoic view, adding further stages to the process. Both suggest that
mental disturbances are produced by assenting to impressions that contain value-judgements,
such as “this is good” or “this is terrible”. But where do these value-judgements come from?
They cannot come from external impressions, on the Stoic view, because those simply present
matters of fact about the world. Thus, they must have been added to impressions by the mind
before they are presented for assent. It is in this context that Marcus introduces his notion of
“first impressions” (8.49) which, as we have already seen, enable him to distinguish between
purely perceptual impressions and impressions infected by value-judgements. As we saw earlier,
the basic idea expressed by this notion had already been articulated by Epictetus (Diss. 3.8.5).
What both Epictetus and Marcus do is add two further stages to the early Stoic account in order
to explain how some impressions come to contain value-judgements before they are presented
to the mind for assent. If the early Stoic account goes from (i) impression to (ii) assent to (iii)
belief, then the Roman Stoic account adds two new preliminary steps and goes from (i) first
impression to (ii) value-judgement to (iii) impression to (iv) assent to (v) belief. Although the
concern with value judgements in impressions can be found throughout Epictetus, it seems to
have been Marcus who introduced the phrase “first impressions” in order to distinguish prop-
erly stage (i) from stage (iii) in the expanded version.28
It is possible that the difference between these two models is not quite so great. In the case
of the early Stoa it is worth noting that before an impression is presented to the mind for
assent, it is turned into propositional form. Thus, even for the early Stoa, the mind intervenes
with impressions before they face assent. Of particular interest in the present context is a brief
summary in Diogenes Laertius that says “For impression (phantasia) comes first; then thought
(dianoia), which has the power of expression, articulates the subject’s response to the impres-
sion” (Diog. Laert. 7.49).Thus, there is (i) the impression that comes first (or “first impression”
as Marcus puts it), then (ii) the process of turning it into a proposition, then (iii) the pres-
entation of that proposition to the mind, then (iv) assent, and finally (v) belief. Comparing
this with the five-stage process outlined above might suggest that it is during the process of
turning initial impressions, which in many cases will be sensations (aisthêseis), into propositions
that value-judgements creep in.
Testing impressions and avoiding judgements

One of the consequences of this expanded model is that impressions need to be tested to see
if they contain value-judgements before they reach the mind for assent. In a passage that we
have encountered more than once already, Marcus writes, “continually and, if possible, on the
occasion of every impression, test it by natural science, by psychology, by dialectic” (8.13).
Elsewhere he adds “nothing is so able to create greatness of mind as the power methodically
and truthfully to test (elenchein) each thing that meets one in life” (3.11). This is not primarily
a matter of testing them to assess their epistemological reliability (although, of course, that
50
50 Logic
also matters); instead it is an interrogation in search of value-judgements that might generate

mental disturbances or lead one astray in what one values.
Part of the problem is that these first stages happen very quickly, almost unconsciously.
Impressions already containing value-judgements can often appear as if they are straightfor-
wardly the product of the external world, untouched by the human mind. The task of testing
impressions, then, involves paying careful attention to this often rapid process. As Epictetus
comments:
Don’t allow yourself to be dazed by the rapidity of the impact [of an impression], but
say, ‘Wait a while for me, my impression, let me see what you are, and what you’re an
impression of; let me test you out’.
Diss. 2.18.24
If Marcus’s use of the term elenchein brings to mind Socrates, Epictetus makes the connection
explicit when he comments “just as Socrates used to tell us not to live a life unsubjected to
examination, so we ought not to accept an impression (phantasia) unsubjected to examination”
(Diss. 3.12.15).29
In the early Stoic context there was much discussion about what the criteria might be for
distinguishing between true and false impressions. In this, slightly different context, one might
equally ask by what standard does one test impressions in the way Marcus and Epictetus pro-
pose. The answer to this appears to be relatively simple: any impression that contains a value-
judgement about an external object or state of affairs ought to look suspicious, given the Stoic
view that such things are mere “indifferents” (adiaphora), without any inherent value.Thus, the
claim that any given event is a misfortune will have “no basis in reality” and will necessarily
rest upon a mistake, namely adding a “false value-judgement” (Hadot 1998: 85). Marcus puts
it like this:
Get rid of the judgement (hupolêpsis), and you are rid of ‘I am hurt’. Get rid of ‘I am
hurt’, and you are rid of the hurt itself.
4.7
Elsewhere he counsels himself not to resist a bodily sensation (aisthêsis), which will be nat-
ural, but to make sure that the governing part of his soul (hêgemonikon) does not add to it
“the judgement (hupolêpsis) that it is either good or bad” (5.26). Thus what we have are
value-neutral sensations provided by the body –what Marcus calls “first impressions” –and
judgements made by the mind that add either positive or negative value. It is clear throughout
the Meditations that Marcus sees human life –our everyday experience –to be the pro-
ject of our judgements; these shape and colour how we experience the world and how we
react to it. This was captured in Marcus’s brief summation of, in effect, his entire philosophy,
in 4.3[12]: “the cosmos, change; life, judgement” (ho kosmos, alloiôsis; ho bios, hupolêpsis). In
12.22 he writes that “all things are what we judge them to be”; if one can stop making such
judgements, then things will be calm. The first part of this statement ought not to be taken
too literally; Marcus does not think that all things are actually created by our judgements.
As we can see from his line “the cosmos, change; life, judgement” he wants to draw a con-
trast between how things are in themselves and how they appear to people most of the time
through a veil of value-judgements. There are a number of reasons why Marcus thinks one
51
ought to avoid such judgements. One is simply that they involve making a mistake, attributing
value to an “indifferent” that is in fact value neutral. Another, expressed in the second part of
12.22, is that by so doing one will attain a state of calm. Indeed, just a couple of paragraphs
later he writes “cast out the judgement (hupolêpsis); you are saved” (12.25).30
Judgements, then, of the sort that Marcus is preoccupied with can be said to be against
Nature in a number of ways: first, they mispresent the external natural world, and second, they
often lead to mental disturbances that undermine our rational nature as human beings. Thus,
they inhibit our ability to live in harmony with Nature. Correct judgements, by contrast, are
in accord with Nature:
Venerate your faculty of judgement (dunamis hupolêptikos). For it depends entirely on

this that there should never arise in your governing part (hêgemonikon) any judgement
(hupolêpsis) that fails to accord with Nature or with the constitution of a rational being
(logikon zôon).
3.9
What techniques might one use to avoid such judgements? It is within this context that
Marcus engages in the practice of re-describing things in purely physical terms. We have
already considered some examples where Marcus outlines what he has in mind (6.13, 3.11).
At 12.8 he suggests that by engaging in this kind of practice, trying to see things as they are
in themselves, stripped of their usual value-judgements, it will be possible to see that all of the
usual things that disturb people –pain, pleasure, death, fame –are in fact self-created.They are,
in effect, self-inflicted wounds.
One can see in this practice the way in which aspects of Stoic logic, ethics, and physics all
come together in a way that makes it difficult to separate them out. Marcus’s concern with
impressions and judgements, key concepts in Stoic dialectic (Diog. Laert. 7.49), is intimately
bound up with trying to grasp Nature as it is in itself, the purview of Stoic physics, all done
for the sake of an ethical goal of avoiding mental disturbances and leading a life appropriate to
a rational animal. Although the logical element in this may seem somewhat limited compared
to the prevalence of ethical and physics themes, it is in fact foundational.
Notes
1 See for example Edelstein (1966: 46) and Gill (2012: 383–8).
2 See esp. Giavatto (2012b), which surveys logical material in the Meditations but also, 409, acknow-
ledges the ubiquity of topics from physics throughout the work. For a fuller account see Giavatto
(2008) and also Ackeren (2011: II, 553–610).
3 See for example Diog. Laert. 7.39 (SVF 2.37). Strictly speaking, Diogenes reports that philosoph-
ical discourse was divided in this way, not philosophy itself. That this is accurate seems confirmed
later at 7.41, where Diogenes reports that some later Stoics (he names Zeno of Tarsus) disputed this,
claiming that it is philosophy itself that is so divided. See further Hadot (1991) and Ierodiakonou
(1993). For a wide range of relevant ancient texts see Hülser (1987: I, 2–22).
4 Thus, Edelstein (1966: 46) who comments that Marcus was “not concerned with logic and physics”
and Barnes (1997: 1) who writes “Marcus would love neither physics nor logic”. A little later in his
study of logic in the Roman Stoics Barnes adds “I shall say no more about Marcus, who is a hopeless
case” (11).
5 Hout 1988: 141; Haines 1919–20: II, 66–7. For these three logical puzzles, see Diog. Laert. 7.187
(SVF 2.279), 7.82 (SVF 2.274), and Epictetus, Diss. 2.17.34 (SVF 2.280) respectively.
52
52 Logic
6 Hout (1999: 337) doubts whether Marcus would have been interested in dialectics at the time that
Fronto was writing –the 160s –even if he had been in his youth. There does not seem to be any
clear evidence on this either way.
7 See for example Barnes (1997: 11) who says that he does “not know what to make of ” this passage.
8 I have simply followed Farquharson in using “psychology” here. It is usually taken to refer to the
ethical part of Stoic philosophy. Thus, Long (1890: 39) “I have translated pathologein by using the
word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here”; see also Hays (2003: 103) “ethics” and Nickel
(2010: 187) “ethische”. It is also often taken to refer to the emotions (pathê); see for example Hard
(2011: 72) “the passions”, Trannoy (1925: 85) “des passions”, Cassanmagnago (2008: 305), “alle
affezioni”, hence Farquharson’s “psychology”. However, the conjunction of the terms phusiologein
and pathologein echo a passage in a text traditionally attributed to Galen but sometimes thought to
be spurious, the Introductio sive medicus, which says (Chapter 8; XIV, 690–1 Kühn; Petit 2009: 15,16–
23) “Giving an account of the natural course of things (phusiologein) is necessary, because it is not
possible to know what is contrary to nature if one does not have prior knowledge of what is in
accordance with nature, diseases being things that establish themselves contrary to nature. Giving
an account of the causes and of the pathological aspect of these (pathologein), too, is necessary, the
former in order that we see the causes of the pathological states against which we need to set up
the treatment, the latter in order that we get to know the pathological states themselves” (trans. Eijk
2014: 470). In the light of this, we might simply translate pathologein here as “pathology”, understood
in a broader sense to cover the analysis of any disease, even if Marcus primarily has mental diseases
in mind. Something like “psychotherapy” might fit better than either “ethics” or “psychology”.Thus,
Hammond (2006: 73) has “identify the emotion”; Rendall (1898: 110) opts for “subjective effect”.
9 See for example Farquharson (1944: II, 759) and Hard (2011: 157).
10 On Stoic dialectic see further Gourinat (2000). All of the relevant ancient texts are gathered together
in Hülser (1987).
11 On dialectic as a virtue see Long (1978), Gourinat (2000: 69–87), and Giavatto (2008: 65–88).
12 On Epictetus’s attitude towards and interests in logic see Long (1978: 119–21), Barnes (1997: 24–
125), and Crivelli (2007). Beyond the texts mentioned below, note also Ench. 52.
13 Epictetus takes Antisthenes and Socrates to be exemplars of philosophers primarily focused on living
a good life. The chapter as a whole, as well as defending the necessity of logic, also defends the study
of Chrysippus against the doubts of an interlocutor sympathetic to a broadly Cynic (or perhaps
Aristonian) view, while at the same time warning against getting lost in the textual interpretation of
Chrysippus. See further Dobbin (1998: 161–8).
14 On the “use of impressions” (chrêsis tôn phantasiôn) see also Diss. 1.6.13; 1.20.15; 1.28.11-12. For dis-
cussion see Bénatouïl (2009: 102–15).
15 These are also discussed in greater detail in Giavatto (2008: 207–34).
16 The following list is merely a random selection of examples: 4.4, 5.16, 7.75, 8.58, 9.39, 9.40, 10.33,
10.35, 11.1, 12.5, 12.14.
17 It would probably be a mistake to overstress the difference between Marcus and the early Stoa here.
Note Diog. Laert. 7.46, where it is said that the Stoics held that there were two types of impression,
reliable (katalêptikê) and unreliable. Unreliable impressions, he reports, either do not come from a real
object or, if they do, are misleading.
18 Here I follow the very helpful analysis in Giavatto (2012b: 415).
19 The argument takes the form: if x then y; x; therefore y. This, as Bobzien (2003: 102) notes, is a “typ-
ical Stoic argument”. Indeed, it is an example of the first Stoic indemonstrable syllogism (see Diog.
Laert. 7.80; Sextus Empiricus, Math. 8.224).
20 The nearest thing to it I have found is in Diog. Laert. 7.49, which refers to an impression coming
first (proêgeitai gar hê phantasia), before being turned into a proposition. We shall discuss this passage
later on. I thank Jean-Baptiste Gourinat for alerting me to the parallel.
21 See for example Diog. Laert. 7.159, which identifies impressions (phantasiai), impulses (hormai), and
reason (logos) as the three features of the hêgemonikon. As Inwood (1985: 22) notes, although animal
souls do not possess reason, they also have impressions and impulse as key features. (In Hierocles, El.
53
Eth. 1.31-3 animals are defined as possessing sensation (aisthêsis) and impulse (hormê).) For more on
both the hêgemonikon and the difference between human and animal souls in the scale of nature, see
Chapter 6 below.
22 Both dogma and hupolêpsis are also sometimes translated as “opinion” or “belief ”. Hadot (1998: 110)
translates hupolêpsis as “value-judgement” (“jugement de valeur”; cf. Hadot 1992: 128). In the con-
text of the early Stoa is has also been translated as “assumption” (Pomeroy 1999: 158). Marcus uses
both hupolêpsis and dogma, the former slightly more often, while Epictetus overwhelmingly prefers
dogma. Bonhöffer (1894: 267) suggests that they are synonymous. Note also Diss. 1.11.33 where
Epictetus uses them together to mean the same thing.
23 See 2.12, 2.15, 3.9, 4.3, 4.7, 5.26, 7.62, 8.40, 8.44, 9.6, 9.13, 9.21, 9.32, 10.3, 10.33, 11.16, 11.18,
11.21, 12.1, 12.4, 12.8, 12.22, 12.25, 12.26.
24 See Plutarch, St. rep. 1055f (SVF 2.994), Stob. 2,111,18–113,11 = Ar. Did. 11m (Pomeroy 1999: 94,
SVF 3.548, LS 41G), Stob. 2,88,8–89,3 = Ar. Did. 10 (Pomeroy 1999: 56, SVF 3.378, LS 65C). It
also features in the title of a book by Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. 7.201, SVF 2.17).
25 See Chapter 2 above.
26 This is the only place where Marcus uses ochlêsis. It appears just once among the fragments for the
early Stoics, in a list of definitions from Pseudo-Andronicus’s Peri pathôn (SVF 3.414), and just once
in Epictetus, in one of the short sayings attributed to him (Schenkl 1916: 494). Neither are particu-
larly reliable sources.
27 One of our principal sources is Cicero’s Academica whose account is shaped by the debate between
the early Stoa and the sceptical Academy and so focused on issues of epistemology. It is conceivable
that other, non-epistemological aspects of the early Stoic position were omitted by Cicero because
they were not relevant to that dispute.
28 Another key passage relevant here is the story in Aulus Gellius (NA 19.1.1-21) that surrounds his
report of a passage from the now-lost fifth book of Epictetus’s Discourses (fr. 9 Schenkl), discussed
briefly in Sellars (2003: 155–7).
29 Compare with Plato, Ap. 38a and see also Diss. 1.26.18. On Socratic themes in Marcus Aurelius, see
Sellars (2019).
30 Compare this with 4.3[2]‌, discussed in Chapter 2 above, where this is said to lead to “perfect ease”
(eumareia).
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55
PART III
Physics
56
57
4
NATURE AND CHANGE
As we noted at the beginning of the previous chapter, it is not uncommon to see the Meditations
described as a work of practical ethics. Yet as we have seen, there is certainly material in the
Meditations that falls under the traditional Stoic heading of logic in their tripartite division of
philosophy. The same can be said in the case of physics. To repeat a passage that we considered
there, Marcus comments at one point:
Continually and, if possible, on the occasion of every impression, test it by natural

science, by psychology, by dialectic.
8.13
What does he mean by testing impressions by natural science, or physics (phusiologia)? We shall
come back to that idea towards the end of this chapter, once we have a better sense of his
interests in physics. That interest permeates the Meditations. He describes himself at one point
as a phusiologêtos, a student of Nature (10.9; see also 8.50, 10.11),1 and topics in physics crop up
again and again. Indeed, phusis is one of the most common words that Marcus uses.2 Although,
as with logic, Marcus does not claim any technical expertise, his insistence on the importance
of at least some understanding of how Nature works is unambiguous. For example he writes:
He who does not know that the comsos exists, does not know where he is. He who
does not know the purpose of the cosmos, does not know who he is nor what the
cosmos is.
8.52
This implies that knowledge of Nature via the study of physics is a vital part of what we might
call Marcus’s ultimately Socratic project, in so far as it contributes to the development of self-
knowledge.3 The person who does not understand how Nature works is, he suggests, like a
stranger in their own country (12.1; see also 12.13). Someone who is surprised or shocked
by what happens to them during their lives reacts in this way because they do not adequately
58
58 Physics
understand how Nature works. In this sense, the study of Nature, Marcus argues, has direct
practical and therapeutic benefits.
We might also connect this with the Stoic telos of living harmoniously or consistently with
Nature. Marcus alludes to this key element of Stoic doctrine a number of times (see 10.15,
12.1). According to the doxographical reports in Diogenes Laertius and elsewhere, there were
a number of different elaborations of the telos formula put forward by different members of
the early Stoa, and there has been some debate regarding whether these indicate doctrinal
innovation or are simply different attempts to articulate more clearly the same underlying
idea.4 One of those formulations stresses the idea of living “in accordance with experience of
the actual course of Nature” (Diog. Laert. 7.87), and Diogenes credits it to Chrysippus. This
version of the telos –or perhaps one should say this aspect of what it was taken to entail –in
particular resonates with the point that Marcus wants to emphasize.
Marcus also makes use of physics in his practice of examining impressions. In particular he
draws on knowledge of how objects are constituted into order to challenge some of his own
unwarranted value-judgements. He puts it like this:
Always make a figure or outline of the imagined object as it occurs, in order to see
distinctly what it is in its essence, naked, as a whole and parts; and say to yourself its
individual name and the names of the things of which it was compounded and into
which it will be broken up. For nothing is so able to create greatness of mind as the
power methodically and truthfully to test each thing that meets one in life, and always
to look upon it so as to attend at the same time to the use which this particular thing
contributes to a cosmos of a certain definite kind, what value it has in reference to the
Whole, and what to man […]. What is this which now creates an image in me, what is
its composition? how long will it naturally continue …
3.11
Elsewhere, as we saw earlier, he gives examples of this procedure of supplying physical

descriptions in action:
Surely it is an excellent plan, when you are seated before delicacies and choice foods, to
grasp the impression that this is the dead body of a fish, that the dead body of a bird or
a pig; and again, that the Falernian wine is grape juice and that robe of purple a lamb’s
fleece dipped in a shellfish’s blood; and in matters of sex intercourse, that it is attrition
of an entrail and a convulsive expulsion of mere mucus. Surely these are excellent
impressions, going to the heart of actual facts and penetrating them so as to see the kind
of things they really are.You should adopt this practice all through your life, and where
things make an impression which is very plausible, uncover their nakedness, see into
their cheapness, strip off the profession on which they vaunt themselves.
6.13
While this kind of re-description is partially motivated by a therapeutic desire to avoid making
the sorts of value-judgements that will lead to excessive attachments, it is also worth stressing
that there is –as importantly –a motivation simply to see things correctly, as they truly are
in themselves. It is not that any alternative description will do, so long as it has a suitable
59
Nature and change 59
therapeutic benefit. The goal is to comprehend things aright, and that requires a decent
understanding of the physical world.
So, physics understood as the study of Nature is a vital part of Marcus’s philosophical pro-
ject. Given that the Meditations is not a technical treatise, he does not spell out the fine details
of Stoic physical theory –indeed, why would he feel the need to do so if he was simply
writing for himself? But he often mentions in passing, alludes to, or presupposes aspects of
Stoic physics in his reflections. In the remainder of this chapter and ones that follow we shall
unpack some of these connections.
The unity of Nature

Throughout the Meditations Marcus present Nature as a single, unified dynamic system:
All things are woven together and the common bond is sacred, and scarcely one thing
is foreign to another, for they have been arranged together in their places and together
make the same cosmos. For there is one cosmos out of all, one God through all, one
substance and one law, one common reason of all intelligent creatures and one truth, if
indeed the perfection of creatures of the same family and partaking of the same reason
is one.
7.9
Here Marcus makes reference to there being a single god running through all of Nature.
Elsewhere he is more explicit in seeing Nature as a whole as not only a unified system but
also a living organism:
Constantly think of the cosmos as one living creature (zôion), embracing one substance
and one soul; how all is absorbed into the one consciousness of this living creature; how
it compasses all things with a single purpose, and how all things work together to cause
all that comes to pass, and their wonderful web and texture.
4.40
Here Marcus follows the orthodox Stoic view, which claimed that the whole cosmos is an
ensouled, rational animal (Diog. Laert. 7.139). This idea dated all the way back to Zeno, who
offered a range of arguments for this view. One of these argued that if something possesses
reason, then it is better than something that does not; nothing can be better than the cosmos,
so the cosmos must possess reason (Sextus, Math. 9.104, SVF 1.111). Another argued that
nothing devoid of sensation can produce things with sensation; the cosmos produces animals
with sensation; therefore, the cosmos itself must also possess sensation (ibid. 9.110, SVF 1.113).5
Causal and material principles

When Marcus reflects on the physical world, he often refers to two fundamental principles
out of which everything is comprised. He calls these the causal (to aitiôdês) and the material
(to hulikon).6 In a passage reflecting on questions related to the immortality of the soul, he
concludes the discussion by writing that the only way to investigate the truth of the matter is
60
60 Physics
by “distinguishing between the material and the causal” (4.21). Elsewhere, touching on more
or less the same issue, Marcus writes:
I am composed out of the causal and the material; and of these neither will pass away
into nothingness, just as neither came to exist out of nothingness.Thus, every part of me
will be assigned its place by change into some part of the cosmos, and that again into
another part of the cosmos, and so on to infinity. By a similar change both my parents
and I came to exist, and so on to another infinity of regression. For there is no reason
to prevent one speaking so, even if the cosmos is governed according to finite periods.
5.13
In another passage in which he lists to himself a series of fundamental exhortations –wipe

away impressions, focus on the present moment –he includes the reminder to “divide and
analyse any given object into the causal and the material” (7.29). This is, in effect, a reminder
to himself to practise the use of physical descriptions of everyday objects of the sort discussed
earlier, although here it is not a re-description in terms of physical components but instead
a more basic one in terms of these two fundamental principles. Marcus describe this process
himself:
What is this by itself in its own constitution? What is its substance or material [compo-
nent]? What is its causal [component]? What is its function in the cosmos? How long a
time does it persist?
8.11; see also 9.25, 12.18
This sort of analysis is, Marcus suggests, essential for anyone aspiring to live a satisfying life.
It is also the mark of a philosopher and one of the things that distinguishes philosophers
from other people.7 In one passage he notes three necessary tasks: (i) this kind of physical re-
description, (ii) acting justly, and (iii) speaking truthfully. This might be taken as an implicit
reference to the three parts of Stoic philosophy, physics, ethics, and logic, and so a passage that
ought to be read alongside 8.13, quoted above:
The security of life is to see each object in itself, in its entirety, its material [component],
its causal [component]; with the whole heart to do just acts and to speak the truth.What
remains except to enjoy life, joining one good thing to another, so as to leave not even
the smallest interval unfilled?
12.29
Either way, this pair of fundamental principles, the causal and the material, crops up again and
again throughout the Meditations and was clearly foundational for how he understood the
physical world.
The Stoic principles

The claim that everything in the physical world is comprised of two fundamental principles
was a core doctrine of early Stoic physics.8 The doctrine, first articulated by Zeno, posited
two principles (archai), the active (to poioun) and the passive (to paschon). The passive principle
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was identified with matter (hulê), while the active principle was identified with reason (logos)
and with god (see Aetius 1.3.25, SVF 1.85). These two principles are ungenerated and indes-
tructible. They are both bodies, for only bodies exist, and they are that out of which every-
thing is made. The active principle, god, was further identified with intellect (nous) and fate
(heimarmenê; see Diog. Laert. 7.135). Nature as a whole is governed by the active principle,
which penetrates every part of the physical world, just as the human soul penetrates every
part of the human body (ibid. 7.138). As another source puts it, god is mixed with matter,
extending through it, shaping and forming it (Alex. Mixt. 225,1-2).
Some formulations connect the active principle with fire (pur),“an intelligent, designing fire”
(Aetius 1.7.33).This primordial fire was taken to be distinct from the element of fire that stands
alongside the other elements of earth, air, and water. It was closely associated with their doctrine
of periodic conflagration (ekpurôsis), in which everything is destroyed back into this fire, before
being reborn at the beginning of a new cosmic cycle.9 Other accounts connect it with breath
(pneuma), perhaps in order to make a connection with discoveries in contemporary anatomy.10
In both cases, fire and breath were often associated with life; in primitive thought heat and
breath were the characteristics that distinguished a living body from a corpse. The Stoic use of
similar terms at a cosmological level reflects their desire to present Nature as a whole as a living
creature, leading one commentator to describe their physics as a “cosmobiology”.11 Nature
(phusis), the cosmos (kosmos), the whole (to holon) –these terms are used interchangeably –is a
living creature, comprised of a body permeated with a soul. While some sources call the active
principle permeating nature “God” (the soul of the world), others present Nature as a whole as
“God”, a combination of soul and body. Either way, Nature for the Stoics is alive, animate, and
self-moving. There is nothing beyond or outside it, except infinite void.12
Marcus and the Stoic principles

The resonances between the early Stoic theory and Marcus’s two principles are multiple
and seem unambiguous. One principle is identified with matter, while the other is causal
or active. In both cases the principles are ungenerated and indestructible, and in both cases
a connection is drawn between these two wider principles in Nature and their expression as
body and soul in an individual human being (cf. 5.13). Even so, one might raise doubts about
whether Marcus really had the orthodox Stoic theory in mind, given that he did not use the
standard Stoic terms.13 Indeed, when he refers at 8.3 to great philosophers of the past who
comprehended the world in terms of its matter (hulê) and cause (aitia), he names Diogenes,
Heraclitus, and Socrates, none of whom were Stoics. Was he really thinking of the formal
Stoic theory of principles when he referred to things being composed of matter and cause?
In response to these doubts we can point to evidence in Seneca that explicitly makes the
connection between the Stoic doctrine and Marcus’s own way of putting it:
Our Stoic philosophers, as you know, say that there are two things in nature from which
everything is produced –cause and matter (causa et materia). Matter lies inert, an entity
ready for anything but destined to lie idle if no one moves it. Cause, on the other hand,
being the same as reason, shapes matter and directs it wherever it wants, and from matter
produces its manifold creations. Hence a thing must be made from something, and by
something. The latter is its cause, the former its matter.
Seneca, Ep. 65.2, LS 55E
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Here Seneca explicitly presents the Stoic account of principles using the language of cause
and matter (causa et materia).14 Given that we know Marcus was an admirer of Seneca, he may
have taken this terminology from him, or they may have both been following some other
common source.
Another objection that might be raised is that Marcus does not consistently hold on to this
twofold distinction into fundamental principles. There is one passage in particular that might
be taken as evidence for this:
One light of the sun, even though it be sundered by walls, by mountains, by a myriad
other barriers. One common substance (koinê ousia), even though it be sundered in a
myriad individual bodies. One soul (psuchê), even though it be sundered in a myriad
natural forms and individual outlines. One intelligent soul (noera psuchê), even though it
appears to be divided.
12.30
Here Marcus appears to introduce a threefold distinction between substance, soul, and intelli-
gent soul. The passage might be taken as a cosmic counterpart to other passages dealing with
humans, which divide them in a similar threefold way into body, soul, and intelligence.15 As we
shall see later, in the case of humans, Marcus’s threefold distinction can easily be accommodated
with the early Stoic view. The passage here might equally be accommodated with the Stoic
scale of nature, outlining a progression from cosmic substance (i.e. matter), to animal soul, to
rational soul.16 In short, this passage makes more sense when read in the light of the Stoic scale
of nature than with reference to the Stoic principles.
Perpetual change
Nature, for Marcus, is in a continual process of change. It is, he writes on a number of occasions,
like a river:
Of man’s life, his time is a point, his existence a flux, his sensation clouded, his body’s entire
composition corruptible, his vital spirit an eddy of breath, his fortune hard to predict, his
fame uncertain. Briefly, all the things of the body, a river; all the things of the spirit, dream
and delirium; his life a warfare and a sojourn in a strange land, his after-fame oblivion.
2.17; see also 4.43, 6.15
This river imagery brings to mind the earlier Greek philosopher Heraclitus,17 who is fam-
ously associated with the phrase, “it is impossible to step into the same river twice”.18 He is
also remembered for claiming the fundamental principle in Nature is fire. He is reported to
have stated that the cosmos is ungenerated and indestructible, a “fire ever-living, kindled in
measures and extinguished in measures”.19 In one extended doxographical account Heraclitus
is credited with holding that fire is the fundamental principle, that all things come into being
through a process of condensation and rarefaction, and that they dissolve back into fire, all of
which happens according to a fixed necessity.20 Some sources credit Heraclitus with the claim
that everything is resolved back into fire at the same time, creating a moment of conflagration
(ekpurôsis) that marks the end of one cosmic cycle and the beginning of the next.21 As the
ancient sources note, the Stoics would come to hold the same doctrine.
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It should come as no surprise, then, that the Stoics had a particular interest in Heraclitus.22
Cleanthes is reported to have written a four-volume commentary (exêgêsis) on his work
and his own Hymn to Zeus is often said to echo Heraclitean ideas and language.23 One of
Cleanthes’ pupils, Sphaerus, also wrote on Heraclitus.24 It is not clear that Heraclitus was an
influence on the development of Stoic thinking; instead they appear to have recognized him
as a precursor, sharing some of the views they had arrived at independently. Again, it may have
been Cleanthes who first recognized similarities between Heraclitus and the new philosophy
developed by his teacher Zeno. Stoic admiration for Heraclitus continued into the Roman
period. Both Musonius Rufus and Seneca refer to him, perhaps drawing on Cleanthes.25 So
too does Marcus. Indeed, Marcus seems to have had a particular interest in Heraclitus.26 He
mentions him as an eminent philosopher in a number of places alongside Socrates, Diogenes,
and Pythagoras (6.47, 8.3). He also quotes from him a number of times, preserving fragments
not known from other sources (at 4.46, 6.42).27 It is conceivable –although there is no evi-
dence for this –that he may have taken these passages from Cleanthes’ commentary.
The most important passage on this topic is 4.46. It is worth considering this within its
immediate context, for Marcus develops a string of closely related thoughts that highlight the
way in which Heraclitean themes permeate this thought. As we saw earlier, at 4.40 Marcus
describes the cosmos as a single living animal, embracing one substance (ousia) and one soul
(psuchê), and given the context it seems plausible to take this as a reference to the two Stoic
principles, with ousia standing in for hulê.28 This sets the scene for a series of passages, from 4.42
to 4.46 all focused on the ubiquity of change.29
In 4.42 Marcus stresses the value-neutrality of processes of change: “what comes to pass
in the course of change (metabolê) nothing is bad (kakon), as nothing is good (agathon)”. This
reflects the standard Stoic view that such value comes from judgements, a point often repeated
by Epictetus (e.g. Ench. 5). This is primarily a claim about Nature, the province of physics, but
the albeit implicit allusion to the role of human judgements touches on a theme in logic, while
the references to what is good and bad connect with ethics. As such this brief remark nicely
illustrates the way in which Marcus draws on all three parts of Stoic philosophy throughout
the Meditations. The point behind it is clearly consolatory, and so it also shows how Marcus
puts to work theoretical claims from all three parts of Stoic philosophy for his own psycho-
logical benefit. In the present context, though, the important point is that Marcus is reflecting
on the nature of change.30
The next section, 4.43, is even more explicitly Heraclitean in so far as it draws on the river
imagery that we have already seen elsewhere in the Meditations:
There is a kind of river of things passing into being, and eternity is a violent torrent. For
no sooner is each seen, then it has been carried away, and another is being carried by,
and that, too, will be carried away.
4.43; also 2.17
This image of continual change is combined with the consolatory tone of the preceding
section in Marcus’s next thought, 4.44, where he draws a parallel between the inevitable nat-
ural change from one season to the next and what can often seem to be challenging changes
affecting human life. In particular he notes that some things belong to one season rather than
another –“the rose in the spring and the grape in the summer” –and that this is a familiar fact
that people accept without further thought, much less complaint.31 He goes on to compare
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these with sickness and death which, like roses and grapes, have their own appropriate season
within human life. Only the foolish, he concludes, are disturbed by these things.This is a good
example of Marcus adopting what we have referred to elsewhere as the perspective of physics
in order to devalue typical human anxieties. Although commentators have tended not to make
an explicit connection with Heraclitus here,32 one might note that one source attributes to
him a reference to the “seasons which bring all things to birth” in the context of natural cycles
of change.33 Whether or not Marcus had this in mind, once again the ubiquity and inevit-
ability of change is his primary theme.
In the next section, 4.45, Marcus extends this concern with change over time by connecting
it back to his image of Nature as an organic unity in 4.40. Not only are the various parts of
Nature united in a single organic unity, so too are the events that take place in Nature over
time. They are not, he writes, isolated events connected together by necessity but instead they
are in a rational combination (eulogos sunapheia) and inter-relation (oikeiotês).This is all standard
Stoic doctrine.
It is with all these thoughts in mind –the organic unity of Nature, the inevitability of
change, the organic unity of events –that Marcus then explicitly invokes Heraclitus:
Always remember what Heraclitus said: ‘the death of earth is the birth of water, the
death of water is the birth of atmosphere, the death of atmosphere is fire, and conversely’.
Remember, too, his image of the man who forgets the way he is going; and: ‘they are
at variance with that with which they most continuously have converse (Reason which
governs the Universe), and the things they meet with every day appear alien to them’;
and again: ‘we must not act and speak like men who sleep, for in sleep we suppose that
we act and speak’; and ‘we must not be like children with parents’, that is, accept things
simply as we have received them.
4.46
Marcus implicitly draws connections between these statements by Heraclitus and the Stoic
view of Nature that he has been describing in the preceding sections. As has been argued in
relation to the early Stoa, what we have here is probably less a case of influence and more
Marcus simply recognizing shared themes running through Heraclitus’s physics and his own
Stoic physics. Rather than see Marcus as particularly Heraclitean, his attitude towards him
simply appears to follow an already established Stoic practice of acknowledging him as a pre-
cursor and kindred spirit.
Reflecting on change
It has been suggested that Marcus’s stress on perpetual change ought to be understood in the
context of the rise of Platonism during the second century, which prioritized unchanging
intelligible Forms over the impermanent physical world.34 The contrast between Stoicism
and systematic Platonism is well taken, but there does not seem to be much evidence in the
Meditations to suggest that Marcus was paying much attention to those wider philosophical
developments. Instead, his concern remains focused on himself and the ways in which he can
draw on a physical theory of perpetual change for therapeutic ends.
Its central role seems to be to stress that any event one might think of as bad is simply part
of a natural process of change. For example:
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Dwell upon everything that exists and reflect that it is already in process of dissolution
and coming into being by change and a kind of decay and dispersion, or in what way it
is born to die, in a manner of speaking.
10.18; see also 9.35, 12.21
He repeatedly applies this to death and, more widely, to thinking about the transience of life:
Through the matter of the whole, as through a winter torrent, all bodies are passing,
connatural with the whole and cooperating with it, as our members work with one
another. How many a Chrysippus, a Socrates, an Epictetus has eternity already sucked
down! Let the same thought strike you in the case of any single individual or object.
7.19
In many of these reflections on change Marcus’s aim appears to be to present such transform-
ations as value neutral: entities are formed, they develop, decay, and ultimately break back
down into their constituent parts. This is a purely natural process, neither good nor bad in
itself. This is how Marcus makes use of the doctrine of continual flux as a therapeutic tool to
challenge the habit of making positive or negative value judgements about material entities
or physical processes of change. This is all in accord with Stoic ethical theory, which argues
that only virtue (aretê) is good, while external events and states of affairs are simply indifferents
(adiaphora), even if some may be preferred over others.
However, elsewhere Marcus suggests that whatever happens is good, in so far as it is a
product of divine providence. Thus, at 12.23 he says that whatever happens is good (agathon)
“because it is in due season for the whole, benefiting it and itself benefited by it”. At first
glance there appears to be a tension between these two views. Are events value neutral
or are they good? Is this an inconsistency and, if so, is it Marcus’s or is it one that he has
inherited from the Stoa? One way to think about the relationship between the two claims is
that the first derives from Stoic value theory (i.e. ethics) while the second depends on their
commitment to providence (i.e. physics). So, do these two claims imply a tension between
Stoic ethics and Stoic physics? That may be an unhelpful way to put it. The tension can be
explained better by connecting the two views to different stages of philosophical develop-
ment and understanding. The person at an earlier stage of training will do well to adopt the
first view that events are value neutral, in order to combat their existing habits of making
unwarranted value judgements. Someone at a more advanced level, who has a better grasp of
the workings of Nature, will see the interconnectedness of events and how they all contribute
to the perfection of the Whole. Such an individual will not merely be indifferent about what
happens but will welcome whatever comes to pass as a necessary and essential part of Nature’s
divine order.
Notes
1 It should be noted that phusiologêtos is a contested reading. Although it is found in the two principal
witnesses for the text, Xylander (1559) and Vaticanus Graecus 1950, it was amended to aphusiologêtôs
by Gataker (1652) in a marginal note and many modern editors have followed him (e.g. Dalfen
1987). However, some editors have kept phusiologêtos (e.g. Haines 1916).
2 See Rigo (2010: 235). Setting aside things such as articles, prepositions, and the like, phusis is the most
common word with any substantial meaning.
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3 On the Socratic nature of Marcus’s project, see Sellars (2019).

4 For the Stoic telos formula see Diog. Laert. 7.87-9 and Stob. 2,75,11-76,23, with discussion in
Chapter 8 below.
5 See also the account in Cicero, Nat. D. 2.21-2, with further discussion in Hahm (1977: 136–84).
6 For “causal” and “material” see 4.21, 5.13, 7.29, 8.11, 12.29 where both are used; note also 4.20, 9.9,
9.25, 12.2, 12.8, 12.18 where just one or the other appears.
7 See 8.3, where Marcus says that Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates all saw the world in terms of its
matter (hulê) and cause (aitia), unlike men of action such as Alexander, Julius Caesar, and Pompeius.
8 See for example Diog. Laert. 7.134 (SVF 2.299), with further texts in SVF 2.299-328 and LS 44.
For discussion of the Stoic principles (archai), see Gould (1970: 93–9), Lapidge (1973), and Hahm
(1977: 29–56).
9 On ekpurôsis see for example Stob. 1,171,2 (SVF 2.596), along with the other texts gathered in SVF
2.597-632. Some Stoics rejected this doctrine, notably Boethus, Panaetius, and Diogenes of Babylon;
see Philo, Aet. mundi 76-7 (SVF 3.Diog.27, LS 46P). Marcus uses the word just once, in connection
with Heraclitus at 3.3, but note also 11.1 where he refers to periodic rebirth.
10 See further Chapter 6 below. For a summary of these developments, with further references, see
Sellars (2018c: 93–9).
11 See for example Hahm (1977: 136).
12 The Stoics drew a distinction between “the whole” (to holon) and “the all” (to pan). The former
includes unified Nature while the latter includes both Nature and the surrounding infinite void. See
for example Aetius 2.1.7 (SVF 2.522); Sextus Empiricus, Math. 9.332 (SVF 2.524). Marcus alludes
to this Stoic doctrine at 11.1.
13 Marcus does use the words poioun and paschon, but in other contexts; see for example 6.8 and 12.1
respectively.
14 For commentary on this passage see Inwood (2007: 138–9) and the note in Graver and Long
(2015: 535–6).
15 On this threefold division see further Chapter 6 below.
16 On the Stoic scale of nature, see Chapter 6 below. On the equivalence of substance and matter in
Marcus, see Farquharson (1944: II, 898).
17 So Crossley (1882: 35) commenting on 4.43.
18 This is the formulation attributed to Heraclitus by Plato in Cratylus 402a (DK 22A6); other sources
phrase it slightly differently. See the texts gathered together in LM Her. D65-6 (in vol. 3.2). For
Heraclitus I supply references to what probably remains the standard collection of texts, DK, but
I have primarily used the more recent collection in LM, which includes many texts not in DK.
19 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.105.2 (LM Her. D85, DK 22B30).
20 See Simplicius, in Phys. 23,33–24,11 (LM Her. R45, cf. DK 22A5). This summary of Heraclitus has
been taken to be a potentially unreliable account deriving from the doxography of Theophrastus, but
that is an issue I put to one side here. See further Long (1975–76: 138–41).
21 See Simplicius, in Phys. 480,27-30 (LM Her. R62) and in Cael. 294,4-7 (LM Her. R63). In both
passages Simplicius notes the parallel with Stoicism.
22 On Heraclitus and the Stoics see in particular Long (1975–76). The ancient evidence is gathered
together in LM Her. R50-66.
23 See Diog. Laert. 7.174 (SVF 1.481, LM Her. R1d). On Heraclitus and Cleanthes’ Hymn see Thom
(2005: 22–4) and Harriman (forth.b).
24 See Diog. Laert. 7.178 (SVF 1.620, LM Her. R1e).
25 Musonius quotes Heraclitus in 18a (Hense 1905: 96,8-10, LM Her. D103, DK 22B118); note also
9 (Hense 1905: 47,7-9). Seneca refers to him in Ep. 58.23 (LM Her. D65d); he is also mentioned in
passing at Ep. 12.7; Ira 2.10.5; Tranq. 15.2. On Musonius’s debt to Cleanthes, who may have been his
source here, see Harriman (forth.b).
26 On Marcus and Heraclitus, see for example, Long (1975–76: 153) and Cortassa (1989: 41–54).
27 Meditations 4.46 is the source for DK22B71-4, while 6.42 is the source for DK 22B75. In LM they
are Her. R54 and 55, respectively, and LM take only one of the five DK fragments to be genuine (DK
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22B74, which they also print as Her. D7), preferring different versions of the same passages in other
authors. Whether these are direct quotations or not is of less significance in the present context.
28 Farquharson (1944: II, 898) suggests the same, in the context of 12.30.
29 It is worth noting again that the division into sections currently in use only dates back to Gataker
(1652). In Casaubon (1643), 4.43–45 are printed as a single numbered section, “4.28”, while in
Xylander (1559), it is all printed as continuous text.
30 Farquharson (1944: II, 628) draws a further connection between this passage and Heraclitus by refer-
ring to DK 22B102 (LM Her. D73), where Heraclitus contrasts god, who sees all things as just, with
humans who see some things just and others unjust (and cf. Gill 2013: 139). The connection seems
weak; the parallel with Epictetus is much stronger. Even so, the broader focus on the nature of change
still brings Heraclitus to mind here.
31 Compare with Lucretius 1.174-9, who also refers to the produce appropriate to each season.
32 For example, Farquharson (1944: II, 629–30) and Gill (2013: 139).
33 See Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. 1007d-e (DK 22B100, not in LM), and discussed in Kahn (1979: 155–6).
34 See Sedley (2012: 399).
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5
FATE AND PROVIDENCE
A proper understanding of the workings of Nature will, Marcus suggests, enable one to embrace
whatever happens as both necessary and beneficial to Nature as a whole. This brings us on to
our next pair of topics: fate and providence. Marcus refers to providence (pronoia) throughout
the Meditations; he also regularly refers to fate (heimarmenê), although not quite as often.1 There
are also numerous other passages that touch on the same theme without explicitly using either
term. Both terms are important technical terms in Stoic philosophy, so before turning to con-
sider the passages where Marcus uses them, it will be useful to give a brief account of how
Stoics before Marcus understood these two terms and how they relate to each other.
The Stoics on fate and providence

According to Cicero, the early Stoics defined fate (heimarmenê) as “an ordering and sequence
of causes” (Div. 1.125-6); another source describes it as “an inescapable ordering and inter-
connection” (Aetius 1.28.4).2 According to Aulus Gellius, Chrysippus said that “fate is a cer-
tain everlasting ordering of the whole: one set of things follows on and succeeds another, and
the interconnection is inviolable” (NA 7.2.3). This view of fate was the standard early Stoic
view, but was often associated with Chrysippus who, as the most influential of the early Stoics,
probably did most to disseminate it. It was also Chrysippus, we are told, who identified fate so
understood with providence (pronoia). Calcidius reports the following:
Providence will be God’s will, and furthermore his will is the series of causes. In virtue
of being his will it is providence. In virtue of also being the series of causes it gets
the additional name fate. Consequently everything in accordance with fate is also the
product of providence, and likewise everything in accordance with providence is the
product of fate. That is Chrysippus’ view.
in Tim. 144, SVF 2.933, LS 54U
We find further evidence in the works of Augustine, who grappled with the Stoic theory at
length. He reports that, for the Stoics, fate is “the connected series of causes which is respon-
sible for anything that happens” (De civ. D. 5.8). He goes on to say that “they ascribe this
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Fate and providence 69
orderly series, this chain of causes, to the will and power of the supreme God […] what is
meant by ‘fate’ is principally the will of this supreme God, whose power extends invincibly
through all things” (ibid.). Augustine then quotes from Seneca (Ep. 107.11), who was him-
self quoting Cleanthes, to whom we shall turn in a moment. According to Augustine, then,
drawing on Seneca, the Stoics identified fate with providence and the will of God. Elsewhere
Seneca also affirms the identification of fate with providence and God:
Do you want to call him fate? You will not be mistaken: he it is on whom everything
depends, the cause of causes. Do you want to call him providence? You will be right: he
it is by whose deliberation provision is made for this world, so that it can advance unhin-
dered and unfold its actions.
Nat. Quaest. 2.45.2
This, then, was the more or less orthodox Stoic view, set out by Chrysippus and later restated
by Seneca. However, not all Stoics agreed. Calcidius’s report, quoted above, goes on to note that
Cleanthes held a different view, admitting that some things that come about by fate may not be
the product of providence (e.g. a natural disaster may be inevitable, but not part of the divine
plan).3
Cleanthes is important in this context as the author of the Hymn to Zeus that describes
God’s governance of the cosmos,4 and his shorter Prayer to Zeus, quoted by both Seneca and
Epictetus (Ep. 107.11; Ench. 53.1), with Seneca’s Latin version reappearing in Augustine’s dis-
cussion of Stoic fate (De civ. D. 5.8). The shorter Prayer reads:
Lead me, Zeus and Destiny, wherever you have ordained for me. For I shall follow
unflinchingly. But if I become bad and am unwilling, I shall follow none the less.
SVF 1.527
Cleanthes thus insists that we shall follow fate –the unbreakable order of causes –no matter
what, but we do have a choice whether to do so willingly or resentfully. On this point he
seems to have been in harmony with his fellow early Stoics, and a similar thought is attributed
to Zeno and Chrysippus:
When a dog is tied to a cart, if it wants to follow it is pulled and follows, making its
spontaneous act coincide with necessity, but if it does not want to follow it will be com-
pelled in any case. So it is with people too: even if they do not want to, they will be
compelled in any case to follow what is destined.
Hippolytus, Haer. 1.21, SVF 2.975, LS 62A
We might compare these early Stoic statements about the unavoidability of fate with what we
find in Marcus’s Meditations:
Picture to yourself every person who gives way to pain or discontent at any thing at all
as like a pig being sacrificed, kicking and squealing. Such also is the man who groans on
his bed, alone and in silence.Think of the chain we are bound by, and that to the rational
creature only is it given to obey circumstances of his own will, while mere obedience
is necessary for all.
10.28
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What all these passages imply is a distinction between unwilling compliance and an attitude
of acceptance. We might draw a further distinction between different types of acceptance,
some more positive than others. A person with an attitude of what we might call resigned
acceptance, for instance, might acknowledge that there is nothing they can do about what is
happening to them, and so accept that there is no point in complaining, even if they judge it
to be bad. Someone with a more positive attitude of acceptance, by contrast, might embrace
whatever happens as, say, part of the divine providential order of Nature.The former might be
a suitable response to blind fate, while the latter might be taken to imply a belief in providence.
Yet, as we have seen, the majority of Stoics insist on the identification of fate with providence.
As we saw at the end of the last chapter, perhaps the differences here correlate with different
stages of philosophical development. The irrational creature –whether that be the squealing
pig or the groaning human –is at the lowest level, comprehending nothing. A basic grasp of
cause and effect and necessity of events will lead to an attitude of resigned acceptance, while a
fuller understanding of the rational and providential ordering of things will generate a positive
acceptance of whatever happens –amor fati, to borrow a phrase. The lowest level will cor-
relate with a belief that some external events are genuinely bad; the intermediate level will see
them as subjectively bad for the individual but value neutral in themselves; while the higher
level will see them as good, in so far as they benefit the whole, and, as such, something to be
welcomed. One might say that the person at the intermediate level accepts fate but does not
yet comprehend providence, while the person at the higher level grasps that fate and provi-
dence are one and the same thing.
This sets out some of the Stoic background regarding fate and providence and how one
might understand their relationship. It is now time to turn to Marcus and to consider those
passages where he explicitly discusses these two key terms.
Marcus on fate
Marcus refers to fate (heimarmenê) a number of times in the Meditations, with a couple of
instances standing out and worth looking at closely.5 At 3.6 he refers to the importance of
being satisfied with fate and, in particular, with “what is assigned to you and is not yours to
choose”. At 8.35 he goes further, suggesting not mere acceptance of what has been assigned,
but turning whatever that might be into something useful:
As each reasonable creature receives the rest of his abilities from the Nature of the
Whole, so have we received this ability, too, from her. Just as she converts every obstacle
and resistance, puts it into its place in the order of necessity (heimarmenê) and makes it
a part of herself, so, too, the reasonable creature can make every obstacle material for
himself and employ it for whatever kind of purpose he has set out upon.
8.35
Far more significant however is 5.8, where he says that there is one connecting harmony
running through Nature, and all the causes in Nature connect to create one interconnected
cause, which is fate (heimarmenê).6 We ought to accept fate even if it seems unpleasant, for the
sake of the good of the whole but also for our own benefit: “Accordingly let us accept these
orders as we accept what Aesclepius orders. Many of them, too, are assuredly severe, yet we
welcome them in hopes of health” (5.8[7-8]). One might compare this with Seneca’s claims
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about the benefits of adversity in his On Providence. Marcus goes on to state at length why one
ought to embrace what happens according to fate:
Thus there are two reasons why you must be content with what happens to you: first
because it was for you it came to pass, for you it was ordered and to you it was related,
a thread of destiny stretching back to the most ancient causes; secondly because that
which has come to each individually is a cause of the welfare and the completion and in
very truth of the actual continuance of that which governs the Whole. For the perfect
Whole is mutilated if you sever the least part of the contact and continuity alike of its
causes as of its members; and you do this so far as in you lies, whenever you are disaf-
fected, and in a measure you are destroying it.
5.8[12-13]
There are, he says, two reasons why we must accept fate: (i) because whatever happens was
necessarily due to happen to us, produced by the chain of causes and (ii) because it is necessary
for the perfection of the Whole, and if we do not accept it then we shall damage the Whole.
Compare the first thought with 10.5, which does not use the term “fate” but is nevertheless
highly relevant: “Whatever befalls you was prepared for you beforehand from eternity and the
thread of causes was spinning from everlasting both your existence and this which befalls you”.
It has been suggested that the first of these two claims ultimately turns out to be the same as
the second.7 While that is ultimately true –for reasons we shall see in a moment –it is also
useful to hold on to the distinction. These two claims can be taken to relate to the distinction
between fate and providence or, to be more precise, the distinction between the intermediate
attitude of acceptance based on a grasp of fate and the higher attitude of affirmation based on
understanding the identification between fate and providence. While for the Stoics these two
positions are strictly speaking the same –fate is identified with providence –it is nevertheless
still possible to draw a distinction between someone who only grasps (i) and someone with a
higher understanding who grasps both (i) and (ii). Marcus is of course reminding himself of
both reasons in his continued attempt to reach that higher level of comprehension, but one
can easily imagine someone accepting one without necessarily accepting the other.
Alongside 5.8, another key passage is 12.14:
Either the necessity of fate (heimarmenê) and an order none may transgress, or provi-
dence (pronoia) that hears intercession, or an ungoverned welter without a purpose. If
then a necessity which none may transgress, why do you resist? If a providence admit-
ting intercession, make yourself worthy of assistance from the Godhead. If an undirected
welter, be glad that in so great a flood of waves you have yourself within you a directing
mind; and, if the flood carry you away, let it carry away flesh, breath, the rest of you, for
your mind it shall not carry away.
12.14
Here Marcus draws a threefold division between (i) necessary fate (heimarmenê), (ii) provi-
dence (pronoia) that can assist, and (iii) blind chaos. He goes on to say that if fate is true, there
is no point resisting; if providence is true, act worthy of receiving assistance; if chaos is true,
follow your own inner reason. While at first glance this distinction between fate and provi-
dence might seem to go against Stoic doctrine, it does not. The Stoic account of providence
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does not admit of divine intervention within the order of causes, something that would be a
problem for some later Christian readers who wanted to retain space for miracles.8 Within the
terms of the division that Marcus makes, the Stoic position is squarely (i). We might identify
(ii) with traditional Greek and Roman theology,9 and (iii) with Epicurean atomism. The real
point Marcus wants to make here, though, is that whichever of these positions might be true,
simply complaining about what happens is never an appropriate response.
Marcus on providence
In 12.14 just considered, Marcus appears to be using the term providence (pronoia) in a way
that is out of step with early Stoic theory. As we have seen, they identified providence with
fate, understood as an unbreakable chain of causation that did not admit acts of divine inter-
vention. In order to get a better sense of how Marcus understood the term, we shall need to
consider the other passages where he uses the term.10
In the first of these, 2.3, Marcus wants to remind himself that events that appear to be the
work of chance or fortune (tuchê) are in fact part of the divine providential order. All events
flow – panta rhei, an allusion to Heraclitus –from providence (pronoia).11 He also reminds him-
self of the two key ideas expressed in 5.8, namely the necessity of all things and that events are
arranged for the sake of the wellbeing of the whole of Nature. In sum, he reminds himself that
nothing escapes providence and he take this to be a consolatory thought.
Not long after, in 2.11, he contemplates the possibility that there is no providence.
Reflecting on his own fear of death, he argues that (i) if the gods exist, there is no reason
to fear death for they would not have planned anything unpleasant, but (ii) if they do not
exist, why would one want to continue living in a world not governed by divine providence?
Either way, there is no reason to fear departing his current life. But Marcus does not leave
it there; he goes on simply to assert that the gods do exist and “do care for men’s lives”. He
offers no argument here but it is clear that, despite the opening disjunction, he is committed
to a belief in providence. If his references here to “the gods” (theoi) might seem to take him
away from Stoic physics, it is worth noting that he quickly shifts to talking more impersonally
about “the nature of the whole” (tôn holôn phusis) which he presents as the directing agent.
His focus here, though, is on his own fear of death and he concludes with an argument along
the following lines: (i) nature is providentially ordered; (ii) death falls to good and bad people
alike; therefore, (iii) death is not inherently good or bad. There is no argument for the exist-
ence of providence here; it is presupposed as a premise in an argument about indifference
towards death.12
Marcus’s claim that death –along with a whole series of other “indifferents” (adiaphora) –
is neither good nor bad in itself is picked up in another passage, 9.1, which is an extended
reflection on what it means to live in harmony with Nature. For Marcus this means living
sociably, given that we have been created by nature as social animals, but it also means not
placing value on indifferents such as pleasure and pain, which Nature clearly judges to be nei-
ther good nor bad given the way it distributes them randomly. He then adds that the natural
order comes from “an original impulse of providence” (archaia tês pronoias) and it is from this
“original cause” (archê) that everything flows. As in 2.11, Marcus presupposes the existence
of providence in order to make an argument about the lack of inherent value in pleasure and
pain, life and death, and other things that the Stoics classify as “indifferents”. While there has
been much discussion about whether Stoic ethics depends upon Stoic physics, it is clear that
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Marcus regularly appeals to claims in Stoic physics in order to buttress his own commitment
to central claims in Stoic ethics.13
There is a flurry of references to providence in Book 12 of the Meditations.We have already
considered 12.14. In 12.1 Marcus counsels himself to forget the past, entrust the future to
providence, and focus on the present. In 12.24 he remarks that external events are the product
of either chance (epituchia) or providence (pronoia), but chance cannot be blamed, and provi-
dence cannot be criticized. Here he does not, as he did earlier in 2.3, insist that the former are
in fact a product of the latter; instead he just leaves the disjunction hanging. Although it does
not explicitly mention providence, it is also worth noting 12.5, which opens with the claim
that the gods ordered all things. Whatever comes to pass is thus necessarily just, and if things
ought to have been other than they are, then they would have been: “therefore from its not
being so, if indeed it is not so, you should believe that it ought not to come to pass” (12.5[4]‌).
This is the closest Marcus comes to giving an argument for the existence of providence: given
that the gods exist, the world must be providentially ordered. In this passage Marcus slides
between referring to plural gods (theoi), a singular god (theos), and impersonal Nature (phusis),
suggesting that theological precision was not uppermost in his mind. Even so, one thing comes
through loud and clear, namely his commitment to the view that the world is providentially
and justly organized.
Providence versus atoms
As we have seen, although Marcus does not go too far into the details of what providence is
and he does not offer any independent arguments in favour of its existence, in these passages
at least he does seem to be firmly committed to its existence.Yet there are a number of other
places where Marcus has been taken to be far more sceptical about whether Nature is arranged
according to some kind of rational, providential order. There are a number of passages where
Marcus explicitly contrasts providence with chance or atomic chaos; other passages not expli-
citly mentioning providence make the same contrast as well.14 In some of these passages, at
first glance Marcus seems either indifferent or unsure about how Nature is organized: either a
chaotic and indifferent swirl of atoms (i.e. Epicurean physics) or a rational and ordered unity
(i.e. Stoic physics). Some commentators have used these passages to question Marcus’s ortho-
doxy as a Stoic.15 If he really were a Stoic, so the argument goes, there would be no residual
doubt in his mind between these two options, and he would be fully committed to the Stoic
doctrine of providence. But others have rejected this, arguing that it would be a mistake to
base one’s assessment on just a handful of anomalous passages taken out of context.16
It is also worth noting that this contrast was by no means new with Marcus and can be
found in a number of earlier Stoics. In one of his letters, Seneca outlines a contrast between
determined fate and unpredictable chance.17 Either way, Seneca argues, philosophy can offer
consolation, encouraging us to welcome a providential order, if there is one, or endure chaos,
if that turns out to be the case. His nephew Lucan, pupil of the Stoic Cornutus, made a similar
point too.18 The theme also appears in Epictetus:
What do I care, says Epictetus, whether all existing things are composed of atoms, or
of indivisibles, or of fire or earth? Is it not enough to learn the true nature of the good
and the evil […]?
Stob. 2,13,5-7; Epictetus fr. 1 Schenkl
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This passage, as it continues, is quite complex to interpret, but for present purposes it at least
also shows that reflection on competing physical explanations was not new with Marcus.19 If
reflections such as these call into question Marcus’s status as a Stoic, then the same might be
said for Seneca and Epictetus as well. Rather than being a peculiar and potentially heterodox
theme in the Meditations, this was evidently a wider topic of reflection among Roman Stoics.
In order to get a clearer sense of how Marcus handled this topic, we shall need to look at the
relevant passages.
The first of these, 4.3, is a lengthy and particularly important passage in the Meditations as a
whole and has been discussed already.20 In it Marcus reminds himself of a series of “brief and
fundamental truths” that he considers to be essential for his therapeutic project of overcoming
sorrow. It is in this context that he reminds himself of the following: “Revive the alterna-
tive: either providence (pronoia) or atoms (atomoi), and the many proofs that the cosmos is a
kind of city (polis)” (4.3[5]‌). Here Marcus considers the options of rational order or chaos and
plumps firmly in favour of the former, appealing to (although not explicitly stating) arguments
in favour of his choice. His reference to reviving or renewing (ananeôsamenos) this distinction
suggests that it was already established rather than a new innovation, and we have already
seen earlier Stoics make use of it.21 Although the disjunction “providence or atoms” is now
primarily associated with Marcus –and taken by some commentators as a mark of his philo-
sophical indecision –he himself implicitly says that it was not new with him. In any case, there
is no indecision here and Marcus is clear that there are good reasons why he ought to see the
cosmos as a rationally ordered entity, governed by law like a city.
In 4.27 Marcus addresses the choice directly:
Either an ordered cosmos (kosmos) or a medley heaped together mechanically, but still an
order (kosmos); or can order (kosmos) subsist in you and disorder (akosmia) in the whole?
And that, too, when all things are so distinguished and yet intermingled and sympathetic.
4.27
The choice here is between two types of order within Nature: (i) some kind of inherent
organization (the Stoic position); or (ii) an order generated out of chaos (the Epicurean
view).22 That there must be some kind of order in the whole is shown by the fact that there
is order within us, he claims. There is a play on words here: the kosmos by definition cannot
be akosmia (disordered). But given that Marcus has acknowledged that the second view also
embodies some kind of randomly generated order within Nature, that point on its own does
not settle the matter. Although it is far from explicit, taking the final line into account as well,
the passage as a whole might be taken to imply the following kind of argument: the kosmos is
by definition ordered (it cannot be akosmia), and the order within us confirms this. The sym-
pathy and interconnection between things adds further evidence for the order within Nature.
Now, which is more likely, that this order is inherent within Nature or that it is the chance
by-product of the interaction of atoms? The more reasons that Marcus can give why we ought
to see Nature as ordered might be taken to weigh against the claim that this order could have
simply come about by chance. In other words, Marcus is prepared to concede to an atomist
opponent that their physics offers an account of the origins of order within Nature, but the
extent and complexity of that order makes it far more likely that the order is inherent.
The disjunction comes up again in Book 6 in three passages all reflecting in slightly different
ways on dissolution and death. In 6.4 Marcus comments that everything is subject to continual
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change; when objects are finally dissolved they either “pass into vapour” (ekthumiathêsetai)
or they are “dispersed into atoms” (skedasthêsetai).23 The passage ends there, with no further
comment, although it is immediately followed in 6.5 with a reference to the controlling
reason (logos) in Nature. The disjunction, then, does not seem to imply any wider indecision
on Marcus’s part. Indeed if one takes into account 6.3 as well, a fuller picture emerges. In
6.3 Marcus reminds himself to focus on what is within, and then in 6.4 that what is external
will quickly be transformed. Taken together, his point is that one ought not to pay too much
attention to externals. Leave those, he continues in 6.5, to the controlling reason that governs
all things.Taken on its own, 6.4 might at first glance look like indecision with regards to phys-
ical theory, but if one reads 6.3-5 as a continuous text, a quite different impression emerges.24
In 6.10 Marcus opposes “a medley, interlacing, and scattering” to “unification, order, provi-
dence”. If the former, he asks himself, why be concerned about anything (cf. 2.11 discussed
above), but if the latter, one can be calm in the knowledge that there is an order. Marcus does
not come down on one side or the other in this instance; his aim is to offer consolation which-
ever might be true.25 Either way, there is no good reason to be troubled.
A similar suspension of judgement can be seen in the next passage:
Alexander the Great and his stable boy were levelled in death, for they were either taken
up into the same life-g iving principle (spermatikos logos) of the cosmos or were scattered
without distinction into atoms.
6.24
His main point here is of course that death is the great leveller, no matter what death might
actually involve. There is no further comment about which of these two outcomes is most
likely. Yet this apparent suspension of judgement again needs to be placed in its immediate
context: the very next passage, 6.25, describes the way in which all events take place within
the cosmos, described as a single (heis) and united (sumpas) entity. Nature is a unified whole,
not a conglomeration of atoms.
This primary concern with consolation continues in 7.75. Nature has created itself either
according to a necessary plan or without any discernible reason. Marcus makes no explicit
judgement either way but suggests that reflecting on this will enable him to remain calm. It
has been suggested that the second option is plainly impossible:26 how could the ruling prin-
ciple (hêgemonikon) of the cosmos be devoid of reason? Therefore, the calmness is produced by
seeing that Nature must clearly be arranged according to some rational principle. This would
involve inserting an unstated argument into the middle of the passage: either the cosmos is
rational or irrational; [but the cosmos clearly cannot be irrational; therefore, the cosmos is
rational]; and thus there is no reason not to remain calm. The argument follows a standard
Stoic form: either “a” or “b”; not “b”; therefore “a”.27
In 9.28 we find something more complex, with two distinct disjunctions:
Now either the mind of the whole has an impulse to each individual; and if that is so,
welcome what it initiates; or else it had an impulse once for all and what follows is con-
sequential upon that; and why are you anxious? And whether the whole be God, all
is well –or whether it be chance, somehow molecules or atoms, be not yourself then
ruled by chance.
9.28
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The first disjunction is between whether the mind of the whole (dianoia tou holou) is concerned
with the wellbeing of each individual (cf. option (ii) in 12.14 above), or whether it had a
single initial impulse from which everything else follows. The second disjunction is between
whether the whole (to holon) ought to be identified with god or with chance. As Marcus
presents them here, they are distinct, and he responds to them separately. It has been suggested
that the first disjunction ought to be placed under the second, creating a single, complex argu-
ment.28 It is certainly possible that this is what Marcus had in mind, but equally it may just be
two related but unconnected thoughts.
A few paragraphs later, at 9.39, we find a similar line of thought again, this time probably
with death in mind. Reflecting on change within Nature, he comments that either such
change comes from a directing mind, and what happens does so for the good of the whole,
or it is a mere mechanical movement of atoms. Either way, why be troubled, Marcus asks.29
The single longest discussion of this issue can be found in a pair of passages in Book 10
that are worth considering together and may have been composed at the same time.30 These
are 10.6 and 10.7. The first, 10.6, opens with the following:
Whether there are atoms (atomoi) or nature (phusis), the first postulate must be: ‘I am
part of the whole (to holon) which is governed by nature’; the second: ‘I am allied
(oikeiôs) in some way to the parts that are of the same kind with me.’
10.6[1]‌
Although this appears to propose an open choice between Epicurean and Stoic physics, it
immediately slides into insisting on two key Stoic principles, using technical terms from
Stoic physics and ethics.31 Marcus continues by reminding himself that if he holds on to these
two postulates then he won’t be disturbed by anything that is assigned by the whole because
“nothing which benefits the whole is injurious to the part” (10.6[2]‌). He continues by adding
“by remembering, therefore, that I am a part of a whole so characterized, I shall be well-affected
to all that results from it” (10.6[3]). To this he adds a brief reminder of another key theme we
find throughout the Meditations, namely that he shares a kinship with parts of Nature similar
to him –other rational beings –and so ought always to act in manner appropriate to a social
animal. He concludes by drawing a parallel with the behaviour of a citizen of a city, whose life
is smooth when he “acts to benefit his fellow citizens and welcomes whatever his city (polis)
assigns” (10.6[5]). The implication is clear: Marcus conceives “the whole” as something analo-
gous to the city, and in particular as something (i) unified, (ii) that acts for the benefit of the
whole, and (iii) in which the parts benefit when the whole is benefitted.32 None of these claims
are really compatible with the opening option that everything might be composed of atoms.
Despite apparently offering an open-ended choice between two physical theories, the bulk of
the passage emphatically endorses the Stoic view that Nature is a unified and organized whole.
In the passage that immediately follows, 10.7, Marcus reflects on the nature of dissolution,
which he characterizes as simply a type of change. At one point he writes:
For this dissolution is either a dissipation of the elements out of which they were
compounded or else a turning of the solid into its earthy and of the vital spirit
(pneumatikos) into its airy part, so that these too are caught up into the reason of the
whole (logos tou holou), whether the whole returns periodically to fire or is renewed by
eternal exchanges.
10.7[5]‌
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Either way, he consoles himself, do not be indignant about what happens. But again this is
not a real, open-ended choice. The opening of the passage has already affirmed that Nature
would never injure its own parts or produce changes for the worse –all change in some way
benefits Nature as a whole. Marcus is merely considering the possibility that this might not be
so, only to make the point that either way there are no grounds to complain about anything
that happens: change is either for the benefit of the whole or random and without meaning;
in neither case can a change be described as inherently bad.
Given the clear priority assigned to Stoic physics in 10.6 and 10.7, we might wonder why
Marcus even raises the possibility of an alternative view of Nature.Why does he consider, even
hypothetically, the possibility that atomism might be true? Perhaps the answer to this question
can be found by reflecting on the context in which Marcus makes these remarks. It is usually
within the context of thinking about change, which in fact usually means dissolution, the
most extreme case of which is death –either his own or the death of a loved one.This is what
Marcus seems to be really thinking about in these passages: how to come to terms with those
sorts of changes that have the potential to disturb one’s equanimity. The point that Marcus
really wants to make is that change of this sort is natural and inevitable. Now that very broad
point is true whether one believes in either providence or atoms. Both Stoic and Epicurean
physics embrace the constant flux of the material world, which for both is the only thing that
exists. So, whether it be providence or atoms, change is inevitable, Marcus insists. But when
he goes on to flesh out the precise working of change, he always draws on the Stoic view of
Nature to which he is unambiguously committed.
Summarizing Marcus
In the preceding sections a fairly clear sense of Marcus’s own views on fate and providence
has emerged. Even so, it may be useful to conclude by summarizing the variety of different
positions he entertains in the passages that we have considered.There appear to be five distinct
positions:
i. The kosmos is rationally ordered by a divine providence (2.3, 4.3, 4.27, 6.10, 10.7, 12.5,
12.24).
ii. The kosmos is controlled by a divine providence that can intervene into the causal chain
(2.11, 9.28, 12.14).
iii. The kosmos was prompted by a providential first cause but subsequently runs mechanically
(9.1, 9.28).
iv. The kosmos runs mechanically according to fate or necessity (5.8, 7.75, 10.5, 10.7, 12.5,
12.14).
v. The kosmos is completely random and chaotic (4.3, 4.27, 6.10, 7.75, 12.14, 12.24).
This list includes all the different positions that Marcus mentions, but what is his own view?
In some passages Marcus emphatically affirms the existence of providence (2.3, 2.11, 5.8, 9.11,
12.1, 12.5). By contrast, there do not seem to be any passages where he explicitly affirms that
the kosmos is in fact disorderly and chaotic. In passages where he mentions multiple possibil-
ities, it is almost always to make the point that whichever way the kosmos is arranged, (i) we
ought not be troubled by events, or (ii) that we ought nevertheless to act rationally. The prin-
cipal motivation for his repeated references to both fate and providence is to remind himself
that external events are out of his control. This is an application of Epictetus’s dichotomy of
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control (Ench. 1.1): external events are not “up to us” (eph’ hêmin) and so there is little to be
gained from worrying about them, let along trying to resist them. Moreover, change is natural
and inevitable, and so ought never to be seen as something inherently bad, and this applies
whether Stoic or Epicurean physics is true. At the same time, he is also clearly committed to
the view that whatever happens is for the benefit of the whole –a claim we might associate
with a belief in providence –and that whatever happens to us is necessary and cannot be
altered –a belief in causal determinism or fate (see e.g. 5.8, 10.5). Marcus’s commitment to
both providence and fate is, as we have seen, completely in line with orthodox Stoic doctrine.
Notes
1 For providence (pronoia), see 2.3, 2.11, 4.3, 6.10, 8.3, 9.1, 12.1, 12.14, 12.24. For fate (heimarmenê), see
3.6, 5.8, 5.24, 7.46, 8.35, 9.28, 12.14.
2 These passages are SVF 2.921, LS 55L and SVF 2.917, LS 55J respectively. For fuller selections of
texts see SVF 2.912-1007 and the rest of section 55 in LS. For a detailed study of Stoic thought on
this topic see Bobzien (1998).
3 It has been suggested that Posidonius also held a heterodox view involving a hierarchy of God,
Nature, and Fate. However, Kidd (1988: I, 417) argues that this is merely a logical or explanatory
order, not an ontological one, and he notes that it mirrors the order of exposition in Diog. Laert.
7.148-9. See further Posidonus fr. 103 EK (Aetius 1.28.5) with Kidd (1988: I, 414–18) for further
discussion and references.
4 This is preserved in Stob. 1,25,3–27,4 (SVF 1.537, LS 54I). For a detailed study see Thom (2005).
5 Marcus refers to fate (heimarmenê) at: 3.6, 5.8, 5.24, 7.46, 8.35, 9.28, 12.14. Of these, 3.6, 5.8, 8.35, and
12.14 will be discussed here (but note that Dalfen brackets heimarmenê in 12.14). Of the others, 5.24
will be quoted at the beginning of the next chapter, 7.46 is in a quotation from Plato’s Gorgias 512d-
e, and at 9.28, the text is corrupt and the instance of heimarmenê is merely a conjecture put forward by
Rendall. (See Rendall 1898: 192 who suggests it “provisionally”. It was not adopted by Farquharson
but is by Dalfen. For a fuller argument in favour of the emendation, drawing a parallel with 12.14, see
Rendall 1895: 150–51.) It is also worth noting that some translations hide this technical Stoic term
by not translating it consistently. For example, Farquharson (1944) translates heimarmenê as “destiny”
at 3.6, “the order of Nature” at 5.8, “the chain of causation” at 5.24, and “the order of necessity” at
8.35. This can contribute to the mistaken impression that Marcus was not engaging with the details
of Stoic doctrine.
6 On 5.8, see the commentary in Gill (2013: 149–51) and note also Ackeren (2011: II, 412–20).
7 See Gill (2013: 150).
8 This was raised as an objection against Stoicism by Justus Lipsius in his dialogue De Constantia (1.20),
published in 1584, although Lipsius himself was sympathetic to the Stoic view.
9 It is equally compatible with a broadly Christian theology that admits of miracles, but it is highly
unlikely that Marcus had that in mind.
10 Marcus refers to providence (pronoia) at: 2.3, 2.11, 4.3, 6.10, 8.3, 9.1, 12.1, 12.14, 12.24. We have
already discussed 12.14. We shall come back to 4.3 and 6.10 later, in the next section. We shall pass
over 8.3, which uses the word in a different sense.
11 Farquharson translates panta ekeithen rhei in 2.3 as “all flows from that other world” and Rutherford,
in his note in Farquharson (1989: 152) takes this as evidence for a Platonic element in Marcus’s
thought. But ekeithen might better be rendered as “from there”, with “there” referring to providence,
not some supernatural realm.The point being made is that there are no events outside the providen-
tial order of Nature. In his commentary, Farquharson (1944: II, 503) glosses it as “from the divine
reason”, which is closer to the mark and, in a Stoic context, does not imply anything supernatural.
12 For more on the topic of death, see Chapter 7 below.
13 On the relationship between Stoic physics and ethics, see Inwood (2009) containing further
references. It is worth noting that the Stoics do give independent arguments for their central ethical
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claims, including their views about “indifferents” (see Diog. Laert. 7.103-4, LS 58A-B), so the appeal
to physics does not seem to be essential. Even so, Marcus gives good examples of the way in which
claims in the different parts of the Stoic system inter-relate and mutually support one another.
14 See esp. 4.3, 4.27, 6.4, 6.10, 6.24, 7.75, 9.28, 9.39, 10.6, 10.7, 12.24. Ackeren (2011: II, 429) also notes
6.44, 7.32, 8.17, 11.18, 12.14.
15 See for example Rist (1982: 28–30) and Cooper (2004: 346–7). Annas (2004: 111) takes it to be a
case of Marcus suspending his commitment to Stoicism.
16 See for example Gill (2013: lxix–lxxiv). For a recent discussion see Harriman (forth.a).
17 See Seneca, Ep. 16.4- 6. On these Stoic precursors to Marcus’s contrast, see Reydams Schils
(2012b: 115) following Gourinat (2012c: 79) who is, in turn, following Hadot (1998: 151).
18 See Lucan’s De bello civile 2.7-15.
19 This passage as a whole (Epictetus, fr. 1 Schenkl) opens with the part quoted here. As it continues,
it turns into a dialogue with an interlocutor. Even if knowledge of Nature is not essential, surely
self-knowledge is required, Epictetus argues. But humans are social animals, part of society, created
by Nature and trying to live in harmony with Nature. The line of argument points to the conclu-
sion that knowledge of Nature may well be required after all. Oldfather (1925–28: II, 443, and cf.
Hard 2014: 279) translates the final line as “What Nature is, and how she administers the universe,
and whether she really exists or not, these are questions about which there is no need to go on to
bother ourselves.” This is an odd conclusion to draw from the preceding line of argument and, as
Gill notes (in Hard 2014: 344), it is out of step with what Epictetus says elsewhere. It would make
much better sense if it were taken as a rhetorical question: is there really no need to bother ourselves
about the study of Nature? Indeed, this last line is punctuated as a question in Schenkl (1916: 456).
(For a quite different construal of the text see Wachsmuth and Hense 1884–1912: II, 14.) It is also
worth noting that in the part quoted I follow Oldfather and Hard in printing “says Epictetus” but
the Greek is simply phêsi, and it may make better sense of the passage as a whole to attribute this
opening statement to the interlocutor, a statement that Epictetus then argues against. Both points are
taken into account by Reydams-Schils (2012b: 115–16), who gives a good account of the passage.
For a similar interpretation, see Barnes (1997: 25–7) but resisted by Long (2002: 149–51).
21 Gourinat (2012c: 77–9) argues that it may well go back to Chrysippus’s On Providence. He also notes
that disjunctions were a standard argument form in Stoic logic, in which one of the two options
would be expected to be true, the other false.
22 Farquharson (1944: II, 616) notes what he calls the two senses of kosmos in this passage, citing
Aristotle, [Mund.] 391b9-12 as a parallel.
23 I follow Farquharson’s translation here, who comments on his rendering of these two terms at
Farquharson (1944: II, 677–8). He takes them to be clear references to Stoic and Epicurean processes,
respectively. See also Gill (2013: 169).
24 In Casaubon (1643: 133–5) our 6.3 and 6.4 are printed together as a single passage. The wider point
worth stressing once again is that the modern subdivisions of the Meditations date back only to
Gataker (1652); in Xylander (1559) based on one of the two primary witnesses for the Meditations,
this passage is all printed as continuous text.
25 Compare with Seneca, Ep. 16.4-6.
26 See Rutherford in Farquharson (1989: 169).
27 In the Stoic schema of arguments, this is the fifth indemonstrable syllogism. See Diog. Laert. 7.81.
On Stoic disjunctive arguments in connection with Marcus’s discussions of “providence or atoms”,
see Gourinat (2012c: 77). It is also worth noting that the reason why the additional argument
remained unstated is that it might have been taken to be obvious, for by definition the kosmos cannot
be akosmia (cf. 4.27, discussed above).
28 See Hadot (1998: 151–2). Although Hadot’s analysis is rich and suggestive, I am not entirely
convinced. He divides the first disjunction into three distinct positions rather than two, which does
not seem warranted. Having said that, I am in agreement with his broader line of interpretation of
these passages.
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29 We shall come back to Marcus’s reflections on death in Chapter 7.

30 As I have commented elsewhere above, the current divisions into chapters dates back only to Gataker
(1652) and the first printed edition, Xylander (1559), based on one of the two key witnesses for the
text, does not contain numbered divisions.
31 Thus, to holon in Stoic physics refers to all of Nature (cf. SVF 2.522-5); oikeiôs refers to the theory of
oikeiôsis, the foundational doctrine in Stoic ethics (cf. SVF 3.178-89).
32 We shall come back to the idea of the cosmos as a city later in Chapter 9.
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6
SOUL AND EMOTION
There are a number of central themes in the Meditations, each of which is tempting to high-
light as the most important. One candidate for this would be the relationship between the
individual and Nature.1 Many of Marcus’s comments dealing with aspects of physics or ethics
are primarily concerned with the place of the individual within a larger entity, whether that
be wider society or the cosmos as a whole. Here is just one of many examples:
Call to mind the whole of substance (ousia) of which you have a very small portion, and
the whole of time (aiôn) whereof a small hair’s breadth has been determined for you, and
of the chain of causation (heimarmenê) where of you are how small a link.
5.24
Given the personal nature of the text, what Marcus is primarily reflecting on is his own place
within these larger entities. So, how did Marcus understand himself, and how did that bear on
how he understood his place within Nature? In this chapter we shall approach these questions
by looking at Marcus’s reflections on notions of the self and how he conceived himself as an
embodied human being. This will involve looking at this passing remarks about the nature
of the soul and in particular the ruling part of the soul. As we shall see, as well as seemingly
downplaying himself by contrasting his smallness against the immensity of Nature, he also
often seems to valorize and isolate himself, such as when he counsels himself to turn inwards,
retreating into what he calls his citadel (akropolis). At first glance, there might appear to be a
tension here. In what follows we shall try to make sense of this.
A note on terminology
Before starting, a brief note on terminology. We noted earlier that Epictetus was an important
influence on Marcus and it has sometimes been claimed that he was Marcus’s most important
point of reference.2 Indeed, we have already seen a number of ways in which Marcus echoes
themes in Epictetus. A key concept in Epictetus, especially in the context of discussions about
the nature of the self, is prohairesis.3 This means something like “choice” or “will”, but is
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sometimes translated as “moral purpose”, “mind”, or even “self ”.4 For Epictetus, our prohairesis
is the only thing that is “up to us”, the only thing that is truly free. In a sense, you are your
prohairesis, even if you are also an embodied human being.5 Epictetus argued that all our
attention ought to be directed towards our prohairesis, because: (i) that’s where all good and
evil reside (i.e. virtue and vice), and (ii) it is the only thing within our control, so by doing so
we can avoid frustration and disappointment.
It might be natural to think that Epictetus’s reflections on the self, understood as prohairesis,
would be an important influence on Marcus’s own thoughts on the topic. Perhaps surprisingly,
the word prohairesis appears just once in Marcus Aurelius (11.36), and that is in fact a quotation
from Epictetus (Diss. 3.22.105).6 When Marcus talks about the self, he tends to use a different
term, hêgemonikon, which appears over 40 times in the Meditations.7 This is a technical term in
early Stoic psychology. Before looking more closely at the role that this notion plays in the
Meditations (and its relationship with the notion of prohairesis), it may be useful to begin by
considering the wider background of Stoic psychology.
Stoic psychology
As we have seen, the Stoics held that there are two fundamental principles in Nature, the active
and the passive.8 The same applies in the case of human beings, who are of course merely
fragments of Nature as a whole. A human being is thus a combination of portions of the two
principles in Nature, active and passive. These are pneuma and matter, which in the context of
a human being refer to the soul (psuchê) and the body. The soul is the pneuma or “breath” that
permeates and animates the whole body.
According to early Stoic theory, the pneuma that is present in all things in Nature can exist
at varying degrees of tension (tonos). Different levels of tension account of the different proper-
ties that material objects can have.This led the early Stoics to outline a scale of nature, running
from simple entities up to the most complex. In particular, they are reported to have posited
four different levels of pneumatic tension: (i) cohesion (hexis), the power or force that holds
physical objects together giving them their unity; (ii) nature (phusis), the power of growth
associated with biological organisms such as plants; (iii) soul (psuchê), the powers of percep-
tion and movement associated with animals; and (iv) rational soul (psuchê logikê), the power of
rational deliberation enjoyed by humans.9 There is thus no difference in kind between inani-
mate and animate entities, and no difference in kind between animals and humans, just varying
degrees of tension within the same fundamental principle permeating all things.10
In the light of this, one can see that for the early Stoics the soul proper (psuchê) is not
comprised of all the pneuma in the human body, but only that portion of pneuma that is at the
appropriate degree of tension. According to Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics claimed that the
soul has eight parts: the five senses, the powers of speech and reproduction, and the power of
reasoning.11 Other sources identify the last of these with the commanding faculty or ruling
part of the soul (hêgemonikon).12 The ruling part (hêgemonikon) was itself said to have its own
parts or capacities: impression, impulse, and assent.13 The last of these corresponds more or less
to what Epictetus calls choice (prohairesis). There was some debate about the physical location
of the ruling part of the soul. Chrysippus argued that it was located in the heart, which he
took to be the seat of the emotions, but others argued that it was located in the brain.14 The
rest of the soul –the other seven parts –were said to “grow out of the leading part and extend
to the body, just like the tentacles from the octopus”.15 It is tempting here to think of a brain
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connected to the nervous system spreading out through and controlling the body, and it may
be that early Stoic thought was shaped by developments in the study of human anatomy in
the Hellenistic period.16
A threefold division?
Having briefly outlined the early Stoic view of the soul, the first question to ask is whether
Marcus shared it. This question has been raised in the past because in a number of passages
Marcus appears to commit himself to a threefold distinction between body, mind, and soul,
rather than the twofold distinction described by the early Stoics.17 Here are a couple of
examples:
This whatever it is that I am, is flesh (sarkia) and vital spirit (pneumation) and the
governing self (hêgemonikon).
2.2
There are three things of which you are compounded: body (sômation), vital spirit
(pneumation), mind (nous).
12.3
Such passages might be taken to imply some sort of Platonic influence on Marcus, whereby
the ruling part of the soul (hêgemonikon) is seen as something distinct (and so potentially separ-
able) from the spirit (i.e. pneuma) and flesh (i.e. the body).18 That Marcus sometimes uses nous
in place of hêgemonikon (as in 12.3 above; see also 3.16) might add to this impression. However,
it has been argued that it would be a mistake to take this as an attempt to articulate some new
hybrid Platonic–Stoic account of the soul.19 Instead, Marcus makes these distinctions in order
to underline Stoic ethical views to which he is committed.Thus, as 2.2 continues, Marcus adds
dismissive remarks about the body or flesh compared with the soul, reflecting the fact that the
body is an “indifferent” (adiaphoron) in the language of early Stoic ethics and “not up to us”
(ouk eph’ hêmin) according to Epictetus. The further distinction between soul or pneuma and
the hêgemonikon, on which Marcus also elaborates in 2.2, is not an attempt to claim that the
latter is not in fact part of the former, but rather simply an attempt to highlight the import-
ance of paying attention to the hêgemonikon above all else.20 Indeed, elsewhere, 5.26, Marcus
acknowledges the standard Stoic view when he refers to the hêgemonikon as the ruling part
of the soul (psuchê). Our other passage, 12.3, continues after making its threefold division by
adding “Two of these are your own in so far as you must take care of them, but only the third is
in the strict sense your own”. The contrast Marcus wants to make here is again the Epictetean
one between things that are and are not “up to us”. The hêgemonikon is singled out from the
other parts of the soul not in order to make an ontological point about the constitution of the
individual but instead simply to highlight where his attention ought to be directed.
A further passage, 3.16, is more complex. This opens with a threefold distinction: sôma,
psuchê, nous. These are then associated with sensation (aisthêsis), impulse (hormê), and doctrines
(dogmata), respectively. The body is connected with sensations, and to be overwhelmed by
these is no different from being an animal. Base humans are dominated by their impulses,
while even rational humans, able to grasp doctrines, might use these in immoral ways. At first
glance this looks as if it might map on to the Stoic scale of nature, although it fails to do so
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in its details. For that to work properly, sensation would have to be aligned with the soul, not
the body, alongside impulse. The point Marcus goes on to make is that what matters most is
not merely avoiding the puppet strings of sensations and impulses, but also becoming a good
person, whom he describes as someone who embraces whatever fate brings. Once again, his
aim in this passage as a whole is not to make a claim about the nature or structure of the soul
but instead to focus attention on how one ought to act.
It looks as if it would be a mistake, then, to place too much weight on the few passages
where Marcus draws this threefold division. If they serve any purpose within the context
of thinking about human psychology, in general they simply underline the centrality of the
hêgemonikon as the most important part of the soul.
The hêgemonikon
So, the hêgemonikon is the ruling part of the soul. As we noted earlier, the Stoics claimed it was
divided into parts dealing with impression (phantasia), impulse (hormê), and assent (sunkatathesis).
As such, it is that from which our beliefs, desires, and actions spring, and so the most important
thing to which we can attend. As Marcus puts it in 4.39, our own hêgemonikon is of paramount
importance because that is where good and evil reside, namely in our judgements. In so far
as it refers to the ruling part of the soul, the term hêgemonikon has sometimes been translated
as “mind” (e.g. Staniforth 1964). As we can see, this is something broader than Epictetus’s
prohairesis, which corresponds to just one part of the hêgemonikon, namely assent. In this sense,
Marcus’s focus on the hêgemonikon is broader in scope than Epictetus’s much narrower con-
cern with just prohairesis or choice. This is in part borne out by Marcus’s regular reflections on
impressions that we considered earlier.21
It has been argued that because Marcus uses hêgemonikon with reflexive pronouns, similar
to the way in which we might now with the word “self ”, this is what he really had in mind
when he used the term.22 Similar arguments have often been made about Epictetus’s use of
prohairesis.23 In a sense, what we truly are is the ruling part of the soul, claims Marcus, or, even
more restrictedly, our power of choice, claims Epictetus. However, it is also worth noting that
when Marcus does this, he talks about the hêgemonikon as if it were a thing, not as if it were
himself. For example:
What is my ruling part (hêgemonikon) to me, and what sort of thing am I making it now,
and for what purpose am I employing it now?
10.24; see also 6.8, 12.33
If he really thought of himself as his hêgemonikon, why would he talk about it in this way as a
thing distinct from himself? (A similar question applies to Epictetus’s use of prohairesis, which
he sometimes refers to as a thing; see e.g. Diss. 1.2.33.) The answer (in both cases) is fairly
simple: Marcus is not his hêgemonikon; he is an embodied human being, a psychophysical unity
of body and soul, in line with the standard Stoic view.24 One might compare passages such as
10.24 quoted above with colloquial phrases such as “my mind is playing tricks on me”, and
it would perhaps be a mistake to try to take that kind of phrase as evidence for a particular
conception of the self.
There is one especially interesting passage where Marcus comments explicitly on the rela-
tionship between the hêgemonikon and himself conceived as a psychophysical unity:
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See that the governing and sovereign (hêgemonikon kai kurieuon) part of your soul (psuchê)
is undiverted by the smooth or broken movement in the flesh, and let it not blend
therewith, but circumscribe itself, and limit those affections within the (bodily) parts.
But when they are diffused into the understanding by dint of that other sympathy, as
needs must be in a united system, then you must not try to resist the sensation, which is
natural, yet the governing part (hêgemonikon) must not of itself add to the affection the
judgement that it is either good or bad.
5.26
This is an important passage in the present context because it makes a number of relevant
points: (i) the hêgemonikon is a part of the soul, in line with the standard Stoic view;25 (ii) it is
part of a single united system with the body, following Stoic psychophysical holism, even if it
ought to circumscribe itself; (iii) it will inevitably receive impressions from the body, but must
resist making unwarranted value judgements about them. It is precisely because the ruling
part of the soul is intimately connected with the body, via the tentacles of the soul’s nervous
system, so to speak, that it must be careful not to be overwhelmed by the sensations of pleasure
and pain that it receives. It is, as he puts it in 10.24, “melted into and blended with the flesh”,
although not to the extent that it is controlled by the movements of the body (it is, after all, the
ruling part). The hêgemonikon can never isolate itself from the rest of the psychophysical unity
of which it is a part; but what it can do –what is within its own power –is avoid making mis-
taken judgements about the impressions it receives over which it has no control.
Emotions
One reason why Marcus is concerned about the hêgemonikon making mistaken judgements is
that they can generate emotions (pathê). The Stoics were of course famous for their analysis
of emotions. Our most important sources report the way in which Chrysippus distinguished
between four basic types of unwanted emotions, all of which are the product of mistaken
judgements.26 Thus, the judgement that something good or bad is present will generate the
emotions of pleasure (hêdonê) or distress (lupê), while the judgement that something good
or bad may come along in the future will generate the emotions of desire (epithumia) or
fear (phobos). By avoiding making mistaken judgements it is possible to avoid the negative
emotions that they produce, reaching a state of apatheia.27
Marcus alludes to the Stoic account a number of times.28 In 11.19 he mentions four
aberrations of the hêgemonikon, and in 11.20 he describes these as a severance from Nature.29
In particular he mentions anger (orgê), distress (lupê), and fear (phobos), alongside the vices of
injustice and intemperance. At 6.16 he refers to apatheia, contrasting it to being pulled around
on puppet strings.30
Perhaps the most interesting passage in this context is 11.18, immediately before 11.19
and 11.20 just noted. This is primarily concerned with dealing with other people and, in par-
ticular, with Marcus’s own emotional responses arising out of his interactions with others. It is
not, he reminds himself, what other people do that matters (that belongs to their hêgemonikon,
not one’s own), but rather his own judgements about other people’s actions.31 It is these
judgements that generate emotions such as anger (orgê).32 If he can change his judgement,
then he can avoid his feelings of anger.Towards the end of the same passage Marcus reflects on
the thought that not getting angry might look like a sign of weakness to others. He reminds
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himself that there is nothing manly about losing one’s temper. On the contrary, the most
admirable human trait is strength of character, and it is apatheia that expresses this far more
than emotions such as anger (orgê) or distress (lupê), which are ultimately signs of weakness.
Another string of passages where emotions are uppermost in Marcus’s mind are 2.10-13.
The first of these draws on material from the Peripatetic Theophrastus.33 Marcus describes,
seemingly with approval, Theophrastus’s claim in his account of emotions that some vices
are worse than others, and at first glance this looks as if Marcus is rejecting the Stoic view
that all vices are equal. However, it has been argued that if anything Marcus re-describes
Theophrastus’s view using Stoic terminology.34 Either way, this excerpt from Theophrastus on
emotions prompts Marcus in the subsequent sections to reflect on the same theme. In 2.11
he considers his own fear of death and in 2.12 he warns against fear of inevitable and natural
change.Then, in 2.13 he exhorts himself to remain untouched by emotion. In general Marcus
warns himself against responding in anger (orgê) towards other people and experiencing fear
(phobos) or distress (lupê) in the face of natural events out of his control. His goal is to attain a
state of Stoic apatheia.
An inner citadel
In places Marcus presents the hêgemonikon as a place of retreat into which one can and ought
to withdraw:
Withdraw into yourself: the governing part (hêgemonikon) is by its nature content with
its own just actions and the tranquillity it thus secures.
7.2835
Remember that the governing part (hêgemonikon) becomes invincible when it withdraws
into itself and is satisfied with itself, doing nothing which it does not will to do […] On
this account the understanding free from emotions (pathê) is a citadel of refuge (akropolis);
for man has nothing stronger into which to retreat and be thereafter unassailable.
8.48
This image of turning oneself into an akropolis or “inner citadel” has become a powerful one in
the wider reception of Marcus’s thought, despite the fact that he only uses the word once, in
the passage quoted above.36 It is an interesting, but potentially misleading, image. First, Marcus
is sometimes thought to be advocating a permanent retreat inwards, turning his back on the
external world. In the important passage 4.3 discussed earlier,37 Marcus also outlines a pro-
cess of retreat inwards but there he is explicit that this ought to be a period of rest and repair
before returning to the affairs of everyday life. Second, it is worth thinking about what is in the
hêgemonikon, so to speak. As we have seen, it is the seat of impressions (of the external world)
and judgements (about the external world), along with impulses (to act in the external world).
Although a focus on the hêgemonikon certainly involves a shift of emphasis, from external
objects to our judgements about those objects, it would be difficult to sustain the claim that
this “turn inwards” implies turning one’s back on the external world in any significant way
at all. Instead it might better be described as developing a new relationship with the external
world. The distinction at work here is not between the internal and the external, but instead
Epictetus’s distinction between what is and is not “up to us” (eph’ hêmin).
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This way of understanding what Marcus is proposing here effectively takes the hêgemonikon
to be the “mind” rather than the “self ”: the aim is not to retreat into oneself, but instead to
attend to the impressions, judgements, and choices within one’s mind. As we have seen, he
often writes about the hêgemonikon as if it were a thing, his mind, but not himself. He remains
an embodied human being, fully part of the world.
Expanding the scale of nature

In order to underline the fact that Marcus’s wider reflections on the self ought not to be taken
as excessively self-obsessed or inward looking, there is one further passage worth considering.
Earlier we saw the Stoic scale of nature, comprised of four different levels reflecting different
degrees of tension within pneuma. These were cohesion (hexis), nature (phusis), soul (psuchê),
and rational soul (psuchê logikê). In one passage where Marcus explicitly alludes to this theory,38
he extends it by adding a fifth level:
Most of the objects which the vulgar admire may be referred to the general heads
of what is held together by ‘cohesion’ (hexis), like minerals and timber, or by ‘nature’
(phusis), like figs, vines, olives; those admired by slightly superior folk to things held
together by ‘[animal] soul’ (psuchê), for instance flocks and herds or bare ownership
of a multitude of slaves; those by persons still more refined to things held together by
‘rational spirit’ (logikê psuchê), not, however, rational as such but so far as to be technical
or skilled in something else. But one who reveres spirit in its full sense of reasonable and
political (logikê kai politikê psuchê) regards those other objects no longer, but above all
continually keeps his own soul rational and sociable in itself and in its activity, co-oper-
ating with a fellow being to this end.
6.14
There are a number of ways in which one might take this: (i) to see politikê psuchê as a fifth
level above logikê psuchê; (ii) to see logikê kai politikê psuchê as a fifth level above logikê psuchê on
its own, or (iii) to see logikê kai politikê psuchê as simply an elaboration of the existing fourth
level of logikê psuchê. The second of these options seems to be what Marcus has in mind,
distinguishing what one might call mere instrumental reason from rationality in the fuller,
Stoic sense of the word. But Marcus is quite explicit that this higher sense of rationality is at
once social as well. It is co-operation with other human beings that Marcus takes to be the
highest stage in the scale of nature, the highest stage of development in a human being. The
ideal Stoic sage with perfect rationality, he implies, is not locked away in isolated contempla-
tion, but is actively engaged in the world, working with other people. That is the highest goal
towards which Marcus thinks he ought to aspire.39 If at the same time he stresses the import-
ance of turning inwards in order to attend to the judgements made by the ruling part of his
soul, it is precisely because these judgements shape his ethical character and his actions.
Notes
1 Thus, Stephens (2012) devotes two of his five chapters (3 and 4) to this theme broadly conceived.
2 See especially Hadot (1978) and, at greater length, Hadot (1998).
3 On prohairesis in Epictetus see Dobbin (1991), Asmis (2001), and Sorabji (2007).
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4 Oldfather (1925–28) has “moral purpose”; Hard (2014) has “choice”. Dobbin (1998: xxiv) suggests
“moral character”, while Long (2002) opts for “volition”. On the idea of prohairesis as “self ” (with
qualifications), see Sorabji (2007).
5 Although in places Epictetus appears to identify prohairesis with the self (e.g. Ench. 9), other passages
count against this (e.g. Diss. 1.2.33). It is not literally the self, but simply the most important part of
oneself: the part over which one has control, the location of good and evil, and so where all one’s
attention ought to be directed.
6 This is one of a string of quotations from Epictetus at the end of Book 11, on which see Sellars
(2018a).
7 See Rigo (2010: 91). Epictetus also uses this term (although not as frequently as prohairesis); see
Schenkl (1916: 587).
9 See Philo, Leg. alleg. 2.22-3 (SVF 2.458, LS 47P); note also the texts in LS 47Q, 53A, and 53B, and
further passages in SVF 2.439-62.
10 See further Long (1982) who glosses differing degrees in tension as differences in organizational
complexity.
11 See Diog. Laert. 7.157 (SVF 2.828).
12 See Aetius 4.21.1-4 (SVF 2.836, LS 53H).
13 Our source, Aetius (see previous note), also mentions sensation (aisthêsis), but for present purposes we
might subsume that under impressions.
14 For Chrysippus’s view see for example Galen, PHP 3.1.25 (SVF 2.886, LS 65H).
15 Aetius 4.21.2 (SVF 2.836, LS 53H); see also Calcidius, in Tim. 220 (SVF 2.879, LS 53G).
16 For further discussion, including the wider context of Hellenistic anatomy, see Sellars (2018c: 93–
99), which contains further references.
17 As well as 2.2 and 12.3 quoted below, see also 3.16, 5.33, 7.16, 8.56, 12.14. For discussion, prompted
by 2.2, see Gill (2013: 88–90).
18 See for example Asmis (1989: 2240). For an extended discussion of the issue see Ackeren (2011: II,
479–502).
19 See in particular Gill (2007: 192–206).
20 Annas (1992: 63) notes that earlier Stoics sometimes distinguished between two senses of “soul”
along similar lines.
22 See Long (2012: 469).
23 See for example Long (2002: 28).
24 On Stoic psychophysical holism see Gill (2006).
25 Marcus’s use of kurieuon here also has early Stoic precedent: Chrysippus used it in passages quoted
by Galen, where he referred to “the sovereign part of the soul” and “the sovereign and ruling part of
the soul”. See Galen, PHP 2.5.16 (SVF 2.894) and 3.5.28 (SVF 2.896).
26 See Cicero, Tusc. 3.24-5 and Stob. 2,88,8–89,3 = Ar. Did. 10 (SVF 3.378, LS 65A). For a full discus-
sion see Graver (2007).
27 The Stoics also acknowledged a series of eupatheiai, “good emotions”, produced by correct
judgements. See for example Diog. Laert. 7.116 (LS 65F).
28 On emotions in Marcus see Engberg Pedersen (1998), Hadot (1998: 115–17), Ackeren (2011: II,
660–69), and Gill (2013: xlvii–xlix).
29 Compare this with Stob. 2,88,6 (SVF 3.378), where an emotion is described as “a movement of the
soul against nature”.
30 Compare this with 3.16, discussed above, and also 12.19. On puppet string imagery in Marcus see
Berryman (2010).
31 Compare this with Epictetus, Diss. 1.15.1-5, also dealing with anger.
32 According to the Stoic classification, anger (orgê) is a species of desire (epithumia); see Stob. 2,90,19–
91,1 = Ar. Did. 10b (LS 65E), with Graver (2007: 56).
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33 Thus, 2.10 is Theophrastus fr. 441 in Fortenbaugh et al. (1992). It is discussed in Farquharson (1944: I,
288–9), Fortenbaugh (2011: 261–3), and Gill (2013: 94–5).
34 See Fortenbaugh (2011: 261–3).
35 The transmitted text has to logikon hêgemonikon but I follow Dalfen in bracketing logikon as it seems
redundant here.
36 The phrase “inner citadel” was taken up as the title of Hadot (1998).
38 As both Farquharson (1944: I, 343) and Gill (2013: 175) note, Marcus’s main aim in 6.14 is to con-
trast different types of objects valued by different people, with the vulgar admiring objects at the
lower end of the scale of nature.
39 For more on Marcus’s stress on being a social animal, see Chapter 9 below.
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7
TIME AND DEATH
Our place in nature

As we saw at the beginning of the last chapter, a central theme in the Meditations is the place
of the individual within the larger whole. Marcus approached this theme both spatially and
temporally. Thus, a recurrent theme in the Meditations is the relationship between the lifespan
of the individual and the immensity of time. Marcus repeatedly reminds himself of the rela-
tive shortness of his own life and the futility of worrying about future posterity.1 For example:
Of man’s life, his time is a point, his existence a flux, his sensation clouded, his body’s entire
composition corruptible, his vital spirit an eddy of breath, his fortune hard to predict, his
fame uncertain. Briefly, all the things of the body, a river; all the things of the spirit, dream
and delirium; his life a warfare and a sojourn in a strange land, his after-fame oblivion.
2.17
Indeed, this is often seen as a distinctive feature of the Meditations, an idiosyncratic concern
setting it apart from other ancient Stoic texts. However, here too Marcus was working within
an established tradition of thought. One might compare passages such as the one above with
the following extract from one of Seneca’s letters, which Seneca appears to present as a quota-
tion from Cato the Younger:2
The whole race of man, both that which is and that which is to be, is condemned to die.
Of all the cities that at any time have held sway over the world, and of all that have been
the splendid ornaments of empires not their own, men shall someday ask where they
were, and they shall be swept away by destructions of various kinds. […] Why then should
I be angry or feel sorrow, If I precede the general destruction by a tiny interval of time?
Seneca, Ep. 71.15
Seneca prefaced this passage with his own reflections on the same theme.3 Everything is born,
grows, and is then destroyed. This applies to all things, even the earth and the stars. Given this,
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everything that now exists must at some point perish, which in fact means being broken down
into its constituent elements. Life and death are merely these inevitable processes of generation
and destruction.
These reflections from Cato and Seneca stress transience and the shortness of human life.
They highlight the way in which doctrines from physics –in this case universal flux –can
play their role in ethical reflections, broadly conceived.4 Both of these themes, along with the
wider idea that physical doctrines have their own practical, existential consequences, are ever
present in the Meditations. Human life, Marcus writes at one point, is little more than a single
breath:
Some things are hastening to be, others to have come and gone, and a part of what is
coming into being is already extinct. Flux and change renew the world incessantly, as
the unbroken passage of time makes boundless eternity ever young. […] Truly the life
of every man is itself as fleeting as the exhalation of spirit from his blood or the breath
he draws from the atmosphere. For just as it is to draw in a single breath and to return
it, which we do every moment, so is it to render back the whole power of respiration,
which you acquired but yesterday or the day before, at birth, to that other world from
which you first drew it in.
6.15
We have already considered the role that reflections on flux play in the Meditations;5 here we
shall focus on Marcus’s treatment of time and death.
Thinking about time
Time is an ever-present theme in the Meditations, approached in a variety of ways: the length
of human life, its brief length in comparison to the vastness of what we might call cosmic
time, continual change through time, to name the most common. In the passages just quoted
and others like them, Marcus uses two different words to refer to time, especially when he
is reflecting on the immensity of cosmic time. These are chronos and aiôn, which are best
translated as “time” and “eternity”, respectively.6 When referring to the length of a human life-
span, he sometimes refers to it as a point or pinprick (stigmê).7 In one passage we see all three
of these words together: pan to enestôs tou chronou stigmê tou aiônos (6.36), which is translated
by Farquharson as “every instant of time, a pinprick of eternity” and Hard as “the whole of
present time is but a point in eternity”. That might lead one to think that Marcus intended
to draw a distinction between time (chronos) and eternity (aiôn), with “time” referring to the
present moment and “eternity” referring to what I earlier called cosmic time.
Indeed, a number of commentators have suggested just that. In particular, Goldschmidt
argued that Marcus’s use of the terms chronos and aiôn was a deliberate attempt to clarify a dis-
tinction in earlier Stoic thinking (1953: 39). According to him, Chrysippus had already begun
to distinguish between time understood as the present moment and time understood as the
past and future stretching infinitely backwards and forwards, but had failed to introduce terms
to make this distinction clear. By using chronos to refer only to the present and introducing aiôn
to refer to the infinite past and future, Marcus helped to clarify and make explicit the Stoic
position. If that were the case, Marcus might be seen to pre-empt Plotinus, who also drew a
distinction between time and eternity, although to make a quite different point.8
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Goldschmidt’s claim that both Marcus and the earlier Stoics were committed to, in effect,
two distinct ways of thinking about time has been taken up by a number of subsequent
commentators, such as Hadot and Brunschwig.9 In order to assess this claim properly, we shall
need first to get a clearer sense of early Stoic views about time. In the light of that, we can
consider in more detail passages where Marcus refers to time and eternity. These will be the
tasks of the next two sections.
Early Stoic accounts of time

As I have noted, Goldschmidt’s account of Marcus’s approach to time involves the claim
that he was responding to earlier Stoic thinking about time. In particular, it involves the
claim that the Stoics held what we might call a dual theory of time, conceiving it in two
different ways at once. The first way focuses on the idea that there is an extended present
moment that we all experience.The second way focuses on the idea that time extends infin-
itely into the past and future, with the two separated by a limit. In the first case, the present
moment is extended in some sense, while in the second it is conceived as a durationless,
mathematical limit.
Is this how the early Stoics understood time? The most common interpretations of the
evidence for the early Stoa focus on the second of these two ways of thinking about time,
rejecting the idea that there might be some kind of extended present moment as specious.10
So was Goldschmidt correct to claim that the early Stoics, and following them Marcus, held
a dual theory of time? In order to answer this question, we shall need to consider the ancient
evidence.
There are three main sources for our knowledge of early Stoic thinking about time.The first
is a very brief remark in Diogenes Laertius stating that time (chronos) is something incorporeal
(asômatos) which is the measure or dimension (diastêma) of the change or motion (kinêsis) of
the cosmos. The past and future, it continues, are infinite or unlimited (apeiron), while the pre-
sent is finite.11 The first part of that description is repeated by the second source, Stobaeus, this
time explicitly attributed to Chrysippus.12 It continues by saying that, like the unlimited void,
time too is unlimited on either side, the two sides being the past and the future. Chrysippus
claimed that no time is ever wholly present, for continuous things are infinitely divisible and
time is itself something continuous. Thus, any period of present time can in fact be divided
into part of the past and part of the future. Having said that, Stobaeus continues his account
of Chrysippus’s view by adding that while the past and future merely subsist (huphestanai), the
present moment belongs (huparchein) in some stronger sense. This is explicated by drawing an
analogy with predicates: the predicate “walking” belongs to someone when they are walking,
but not when they are lying down or sitting.
One can immediately see the problem with this report by Stobaeus. On the one hand,
the present moment does not really exist at all, for it is really just part of the past and part of
the future; on the other hand, the present moment exists in a way that the past and future
do not. The third source, Plutarch, also thought that the Stoic view was problematic.13 It is at
odds with common sense, he commented, to hold that the past and future exist, but not the
present. Whenever one thinks they have grasped the present, he continued, it turns out that
all they have is part past and part future, according to the Stoics. The present moment, then,
is not a period of time but instead simply a limit between past and future. This they called
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“now” (nun), “a kind of joining and meeting of the past and future”, which is not itself part
of time but simply a limit of time.14 Plutarch also credits to Chrysippus the view reported
by Stobaeus, namely that while the past and future subsist (huphestêkenai), only the present
belongs (huparchein). He goes on to neatly summarize the tension in these various statements:
It turns out that he [Chrsyippus] divides the existing part of time [i.e. the present] into
parts that are non-existent [i.e. the past and future] and what does exist, or rather that
he leaves absolutely nothing of time existing if what is present has no part that is not
future or past.
Plutarch, Comm. not. 1082a
Unsurprisingly, there have been a number of different attempts to reconstruct a plausible

theory from these bits of evidence. One view proposes an extended present moment in
between an unlimited past and unlimited future; another holds the same view, adding that
the extended present can be divided by a mathematical limit into part of the past and part of
the future.15 However, the most common interpretation rejects both of those views, arguing
instead that for the Stoics the present moment has no real extension at all, and when one talks
about the present moment in such terms this is merely specious.16 Although talking about the
present in this way is perfectly common, under strict analysis one can see that in reality what
one is talking about is in fact part past and part future. Thus, any talk about an extended pre-
sent moment is ultimately mistaken and not part of a formal theory of time.
There is, however, one piece of the ancient evidence that this interpretation does not
take into account. It is the claim reported by both Plutarch and Stobaeus that while the
past and future “subsist” (huphestanai), the present moment “belongs” (huparchein).17 This word
translated as “belong” (huparchein) has sometimes been translated as “exist”.18 The present
moment belongs or exists in the same sense that the statement “I am walking” belongs to me
when I am actually walking but not when I am sitting.The important point is that the present
is said to have a greater ontological status than the past and future, and this seems at odds with
the claim that the present is merely specious.
Goldschmidt’s way out of this problem, as we have noted, was to claim that the early
Stoics held a dual theory of time. The seemingly opposed ideas of an extended present
moment and a durationless limit between past and future were both held by Chrysippus,
just as the ancient sources imply.19 Chrysippus’s error, Goldschmidt argued, was not to be
philosophically inconsistent, but merely to be unclear in his use of terminology and not
adequately to differentiate between two distinct ways of conceiving time. In Chrsyippus’s
defence one might also add that the evidence is thin, to say the least, and one of our key
sources, Plutarch, was deliberately trying to present him in an unfavourable light. This is
where Marcus comes in. Goldschmidt argued that by introducing aiôn as a new technical
term, Marcus was able to distinguish between two quite distinct ways of thinking about
time: chronos understood as an extended present and aiôn referring to the unlimited past and
future separated by a limit. All this looks like one possible way to explain what is going on
in the evidence for Chrysippus and the early Stoa, although as we have seen this interpret-
ation by no means secure and is rejected by many other commentators.The more important
question in the present context is whether it captures something important at work in the
Meditations.
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Marcus on time and eternity

How does Marcus use the terms chronos and aiôn? In particular, does he use them in a con-
sistent manner to refer respectively to the present moment and an infinite past–future? In
support of his claim that Marcus does, Goldschmidt cited Meditations 4.3, in which aiôn is
linked with infinity (apeiros):
Shall mere glory distract you? Look at the swiftness of the oblivion of all men; the gulf
of infinite eternity (apeiros aiôn),20 behind and before; the hollowness of applause, the
fickleness and folly of those who seem to speak well of you, and the narrow room in
which it is confined. This should make you pause. For the entire earth is a point (stigmê)
in space, and how small a corner thereof is this your dwelling place, and how few and
paltry those who will sing your praises here.
4.3[7-8]
However, there are other passages where Marcus conjoins chronos with the idea of infinity
(apeiros), suggesting that he did not have in mind a strict distinction between a finite present
time (chronos) and an infinite past–future labelled eternity (aiôn):
Always remember, then, these two things: one, that all things from everlasting are of the
same kind, and are in rotation; and it matters nothing whether it be for a hundred years
or for two hundred or for an infinite time (apeiros chronos) that a man shall behold the
same spectacle; the other, that the longest-lived and the soonest to die have an equal loss;
for it is the present alone of which either will be deprived, since (as we saw) this is all he
has and a man does not lose what he has not got.
2.14
For in this way you will continually see that man’s life is smoke and nothingness, espe-
cially if you remind yourself that what has once changed will be no more in infinite
time (apeiros chronos).
10.31
There are many other passages where Marcus uses the terms chronos and aiôn, but just these
two passages here are enough to show that Marcus was not using these terms in a con-
sistent technical way to explicate the theory of time that Goldschmidt attributed to the early
Stoics. In particular, his references to the vastness of infinite time, stretching back into the
past and forward into the future involve as we have just seen the use of both aiôn and chronos,
without any obvious discrimination between the two. Instead, he uses them synonymously
and interchangeably.
So, what is Marcus doing in these passages? As we can see, his principal aim is to stress
how small a portion of time each person is allotted when compared with the infinite expanse
of cosmic time. These passages serve to highlight the brevity and relative insignificance of a
human lifespan, but there is no evidence to suggest any engagement with a more technical
theory of time, of the sort alluded to by the fragments for the early Stoa. We can see this in
one further passage where Marcus uses both terms:
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Let your impression dwell continually upon the whole of eternity (aiôn) and the whole
of substance (ousia), and realize that their several parts are, by comparison with substance
(ousia), a fig-seed; by comparison with time (chronos), the turn of a drill.
10.17
Here, aiôn and chronos are both used to refer to the totality of time, and many translators have
rendered both terms as “time” in their versions of this passage.21 Once again, Marcus’s real
concern here is with stressing the brevity of human life. This is confirmed by the passages that
immediately follow the one above:
Dwell upon everything that exists and reflect that it is already in process of dissolution
and coming into being by change and a kind of decay or dispersion, or in what way it
is born to die, in a manner of speaking.
10.18; see also 10.1922
In defence of Goldschmidt’s thesis, one can point to passages that use chronos to refer to a
human lifespan in contrast to the immensity of cosmic time,23 but again the primary motiv-
ation in these passages seems to be to highlight the transience and brevity of human life. As
we have already noted, there are other passages that use chronos to refer to infinite cosmic time
as well.24
The present moment
Marcus may not have been engaging with early Stoic thinking about time, but nevertheless
reflections on time remain a recurrent theme throughout the Meditations. Alongside passages
reflecting on the transience and brevity of human life, Marcus also often exhorted him-
self to keep his focus on the present moment. This is a central theme in Hadot’s account of
the Meditations, which also picks up on aspects of Goldschmidt’s account.25 Hadot suggested,
following Goldschmidt, that what we find in the evidence for the early Stoa are “two diamet-
rically opposed conceptions of the present”: on the one hand, the present is merely a limit
between past and future, without any extension; on the other hand, the present does have a
certain duration, reflecting the intention and attention of the individual subject.26 Rather than
dismiss the idea of an extended present moment as specious, as the majority of commentators
have done, Hadot flipped the order of priority, treating the extended present as more real than
the limit between past and future. Taking inspiration from the philosophy of Henri Bergson,
Hadot takes the present conceived as a mathematical limit as pure abstraction; it is the lived
present moment that we experience that is truly real.27 In effect he prioritizes the ancient
report that the present “belongs” to us over the other ancient report that the present can be
dissolved into part of the past and part of the future.
Hadot, again following Bergson, suggested that the lived present moment can expand and
contract, depending on our focus or attention. When Marcus exhorts himself to pay attention
to the present, he is referring to this expandable and contractible present, Hadot argued. On
this view what one refers to as the present can vary considerably: this year, this week, this
day, this minute, and all the way down to right now. One way in which Goldschmidt had
connected the two ways of thinking about the present moment was to suggest that with
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suitable attention the present moment can be reduced right down to an instant without
duration, namely the mathematical limit between past and future.28 His evidence for this in
Marcus came from the following passage:
Remind yourself that it is not the future or the past that weighs heavy upon you, but
always the present, and that this gradually grows less (katasmikrunetai), if only you isolate
it and reprove your understanding, if that is not strong enough to hold out against it,
thus taken by itself.
8.36
There is nothing here to support the claim that the present can be reduced to a durationless
instant. It is true that Marcus does often refer to the present moment as a point or pin-prick
(stigmê) in order to indicate its smallness, but that still might be taken to imply some degree of
size.29 Thus, Hadot rejected this part of Goldschmidt’s interpretation, insisting that the present
moment for Marcus was always a lived, extended present.
What ought we to make of all this? Marcus is indeed keenly interested in the present
moment, but he seems to have little interest in these more theoretical concerns about the
ontology of time. His prioritization of the present moment is motivated by two thoughts.The
first is to avoid dwelling on the past and future if so doing might generate negative emotions.
The second is to focus on the present because that is where we have the ability to act. These
two thoughts are naturally quite closely inter-related. There is no point dwelling on what has
happened in the past, or feeling anxious about what might happen in the future; instead one
ought to focus on what we can do right now, because only that is within our control. That,
combined with his reflections on the brevity of human life, shapes his reflections on time.
Death
Closely connected to Marcus’s reflections on the transience and brevity of human life are his
comments about death. At first glance he appears to offer a number of competing accounts of
death at various points in the Meditations. For instance, in some places he presents death as a
welcome release from the troubles of life:
Death is rest from the recalcitrance of sensation, from the stimulus of impulse, from
intellectual analysis, and the service of the flesh.
6.28; see also 9.2, 9.3
Elsewhere, in a more dispassionate frame of mind, he contemplates three possible options for
what happens at death: (i) atomic dispersal, (ii) extinction, or (iii) movement to another place
(7.32). This threefold division is noteworthy because it is one of the few places where Marcus
appears to entertain the possibility of some kind of afterlife. Elsewhere (4.21), he considers
the possibility that after death souls “pass on and continue for so long” before being fully
reintegrated into the generative principle (spermatikos logos) of Nature. In this he was following
Stoic doctrine, which, as it is reported, claimed that the souls of perhaps only the wise survive
their separation from their bodies, at least for a while, presumably due to being held together
by greater tension than typical souls.30 However, despite this being an established Stoic position,
in general Marcus discounts it. His focus of attention is mainly on the other two options: death
is either (i) a dispersal of atomic elements or (ii) extinction, understood as reabsorption into
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Nature.These of course echo his wider reflections on the choice between atoms or providence
when thinking about Nature as a whole.31 As we saw earlier, it is fairly clear that Marcus decides
against atomism. In the present context, then, it seems that Marcus is committed to the idea of
death as extinction, conceived as a reabsorption into Nature. As he puts it:
You came into the world as a part.You will vanish in that which gave you birth, or rather
you will be taken into its generative principle (spermatikos logos) by a process of change.
4.14; cf. 10.7
The spermatikos logos mentioned here and in 4.21 noted above is a technical Stoic concept,
and in the passages where Marcus contrasts this sort of reintegration into Nature with atomic
dispersal he is clearly alluding to his commitment to Stoicism.32 However, in general his
reflections on death are less concerned with the details of physical theory and more simply
reminders of the inevitability of change. Death is no more than a natural process of trans-
formation,33 innocuous, and uninteresting when approached dispassionately.This is one of the
contexts where he makes use of physical descriptions to describe things that are often heavily
invested with value:
Universal Nature out of its whole material, as from wax, models now the figure of a
horse, then melting this down uses the material for a tree, next for a man, next for some-
thing else. And these, every one, subsist for a very brief while.Yet it is no hardship for a
box to be broken up, as it was none for it to be nailed together.
7.23
Marcus also stresses that the time of our death is out of our control, drawing an analogy with
an actor taking stage directions:
Mortal man, you have been a citizen in this great City; what does it matter to you
whether for five or fifty years? For what is according to its laws is equal for every man.
Why is it hard, then, if Nature who brought you in, and no despot nor unjust judge,
sends you out of the City –as though the master of the show, who engaged an actor,
were to dismiss him from the stage? ‘But I have not spoken my five acts, only three.’
‘What you say is true, but in life three acts are the whole play.’ For He determines the
perfect whole, the cause yesterday of your composition, today of your dissolution; you
are the cause of neither. Leave the stage, therefore, and be reconciled, for He also who
lets his servant depart is reconciled.
12.36
This analogy with an actor taking directions was probably inspired by Epictetus, who makes
the same point in very similar terms: “Remember that you are an actor in a play, which is as
the playwright wants it to be: short if he wants it short, long if he wants it long” (Ench. 17).
Echoes of Epicurus
Marcus’s echo of Epictetus is hardly surprising. Perhaps less expected is his engagement with
Epicurean ideas about death.34 Marcus mentions Epicurus just twice in the Meditations: at
7.64 he acknowledges the value of Epicurus’s reflections on coping with pain (cf. 7.33), and
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he picks up the same theme at 9.41, where he quotes an otherwise unknown fragment.35
There are numerous other allusions to Epicurean doctrine throughout the Meditations, the
most obvious of which are his references to atomism. Marcus also echoes aspects of Epicurean
thinking about death, and there is one passage (8.58) where it seems fairly clear that he was
familiar with the Epicurean doctrine, even though he does not name Epicurus explicitly.
Marcus was certainly not alone among Roman Stoics in drawing on Epicurean material when
he found it useful. A similar approach can be found in Seneca, and especially in his corres-
pondence with Lucilius.36
The Epicureans were well known for reflecting on death. Epicurus himself famously
argued that death ought to be “nothing to us”, for we shall never be dead in order to experi-
ence it. In particular, he argued that because all good and bad come via sensation (aisthêsis),
the absence of sensation can be neither good nor bad in itself (Ep. Men. 124). He insisted that
we ought not to fear death because “when we exist death is not present, and when death is
present we do not exist” (Ep. Men. 125). Nor, he argued, is there any reason to be concerned
about the length of one’s life: one only ever lives in the present moment, so adding further
time cannot increase one’s wellbeing in the here and now. This last thought was elaborated
upon by a later Epicurean, Philodemus, who argued that when assessing one’s life, quality is
more important than quantity.37 His argument involved reference to the Epicurean account
of static pleasures, which were thought to be not the sort of thing that can be increased by
addition. If that is the case, then a life enjoying static pleasures in the here and now is com-
plete in itself and cannot be improved upon by increasing its duration. As Epicurus himself
had claimed, finite time and infinite time contain equal pleasure, if one understands pleasure
correctly (Rat. Sent. 19).
Marcus echoes these Epicurean arguments at a number of points. He stresses that the length
of life is unimportant, for at death all one loses is the present moment:
Even were you about to live three thousand years or thrice ten thousand, nevertheless
remember this, that no one loses any other life than this which he is living, nor lives
any other than this which he is losing. Thus the longest and the shortest come to the
same thing. For the present is equal for all, and what is passing is therefore equal: thus
what is being lost is proved to be barely a moment. For a man could lose neither past
nor future; how can one rob him of what he has not got? Always remember, then, these
two things: one, that all things from everlasting are of the same kind, and are in rotation;
and it matters nothing whether it be for a hundred years or for two hundred or for an
infinite time that a man shall behold the same spectacle; the other, that the longest-lived
and the soonest to die have an equal loss; for it is the present alone of which either will
be deprived, since (as we saw) this is all he has and a man does not lose what he has
not got.
2.14; see also 3.7, 6.49
He also more or less repeats Epicurus’s argument that one ought not to fear death because
death is the absence of sensation (aisthêsis), and the absence of sensation is neither good nor bad:
He who fears death fears either total loss of sensation (anaisthêsia) or a change of sen-
sation. Now if you should no longer possess sensation (aisthêsis), you will no longer be
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aware of any evil; alternatively, if you possess an altered sensation, you will be an altered
creature and will not cease from living.
8.58
A number of translators have rendered aisthêsis in this passage as “consciousness”, which

captures well the point that Marcus wants to make, but has the unfortunate consequence of
obscuring the connection with Epicurus.38
It would be a mistake, however, to see these allusions to Epicurean arguments about death as
a sign of philosophical eclecticism on Marcus’s part. Another passage makes a further reference,
this time more explicit, but in part in order to highlight his own philosophical distance from
Epicureanism: “This is a stirring call to disdain of death, that even those who judge pleasure
to be good and pain evil, nevertheless disdain death” (12.34). If even a hedonist like Epicurus
can overcome fear of death, then a Stoic like Marcus should have no problem in cultivating the
appropriate attitude of indifference. One might say that Marcus is happy to take something from
Epicurus when it serves as a useful reminder for his own Stoic purposes, but that is as far as it
goes.We might compare this practice with Seneca’s use of Epicurean material. In his correspond-
ence with Lucilius, Seneca insisted that one ought to think of Epicurean sayings as common
property of all, rather than belonging to a particular school (Ep. 8.8). Elsewhere, Seneca was often
openly hostile towards Epicureanism, and he described his ventures into Epicurean material as
an expedition into an enemy camp (Ep. 2.5). In short, Seneca was happy to take from Epicurus
or to acknowledge common ground where it suited him, while remaining firmly sceptical about
Epicurean philosophy as a whole. A similar approach may well be in play in the Meditations: on
the topic of death Marcus can find some valuable thoughts in Epicurus without feeling com-
pelled to identify with Epicureanism any further. Indeed, this might help to explain why in these
passages Marcus does not name Epicurus directly. Like Seneca, Marcus appears to approach this
material as common property rather than something distinctively Epicurean.
Why think about death?

Like Epicurus, one reason for Marcus to think about death is to try to overcome anxiety
about his own mortality. He also thinks that it concentrates the mind, prompting him to focus
attention on things that matter most, rather than getting distracted by trivialities. In this sense,
reflecting on death is a positive mental exercise.
We can see this especially clearly in one passage where all these ideas are expressed together
along with the suggestion that one ought to focus on the present moment. In 10.11, he
exhorts himself to develop a proper understanding of the way in which all things change and
then to exercise himself in this. One starts with a theoretical understanding of the way in
which Nature changes, and then one pays attention and engages in training, in order to digest
that understanding. This is a fairly explicit example of a physical exercise, based on physical
theory. With this grasp of the transience of all things properly digested, Marcus suggests that
one will abandon pursuit of ephemeral external things, including other people’s opinions,
and instead focus on acting justly. This can only be done in the present moment (to nun). The
person who fully grasps and digests the fact that everything is continually changing will, he
suggests, be content with focusing on two things: acting justly in the present moment and
accepting whatever happens in the present moment.
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Many of the ideas in 10.11 recur throughout the Meditations. The suggestion that one
ought not to worry about the opinions of others is closely tied to Marcus’s evident preoccu-
pation with his posthumous reputation. This was clearly something often on his mind, given
how often he touches on it, although this is perhaps unsurprising given the preeminent public
role he held.39 Here is just one example:
The man in a flutter for posthumous fame fails to picture to himself that each of
those who remember him will himself also very shortly die, then again the man who
succeeded him, until the whole remembrance is extinguished as it runs along a line of
men who are kindled and then put out. And put the case that those who will remember
never die, and the remembrance never dies, what is that to you?
4.19
Once again, the key to overcoming excessive concern with one’s reputation, either now or
in the future, is to grasp fully the physical doctrine of continual flux. His reflections on death,
then, are simply part of a wider strategy of reflecting on the transitory nature of all things. As
we saw in 10.11, this can also contribute to a better grasp of the Stoic ethical attitude towards
“indifferents” (adiaphora). Stoic ethical theory offered arguments for the claim that externals
such as wealth and health ought to be seen as mere “indifferents”, because they do not con-
sistently benefit people; only virtue does that, and so only it deserves to be called good.40
Epictetus later added another reason not to attend too much to externals, namely that they
are not “up to us” (eph’ hêmin), and so pursuit of them is likely to lead to frustration and disap-
pointment.41 Now Marcus adds a third reason: these externals are merely ephemeral, destined
to be destroyed before too long, and so it would be misguided to invest them with great
importance. Thus, it is not merely his own death that he is reflecting on, or the mortality of
other humans, but the “death” of all physical things, which are presented as but momentary
conglomerations of matters within the vastness of cosmic time.
Living in the present moment

The most substantial lesson that Marcus takes away from his reflections on death is that one
ought to live in the present moment. As we saw in 10.11, this was the conclusion of his line of
thought there. Elsewhere, he reminds himself that although he might appear to be concerned
by events in the past or the future, in fact on closer examination all of his concerns relate to
the present moment (e.g. 8.36). What matters is how one acts in the present moment, which
thankfully is the one thing within one’s control. By analysing concerns and reducing them
to matters that can be attended to in the here and now, Marcus suggests that it is possible
to transform what at first might look like insurmountable problems into things that can be
acted upon.
Part of Marcus’s strategy here it to highlight the fact that, in a sense, the past and future do
not exist: “each of us lives only in the present, this brief moment; the rest is either a life that
is past, or is in an uncertain future” (3.10). Consequently, one ought to limit one’s attention
to the present moment (7.29). In one passage, 12.3, he comments that one ought to strive
to live only the life that is one’s own, namely the present moment. Although these sorts of
reflections might seem a world away from the details of early Stoic accounts of time that we
considered earlier, Marcus is in effect saying that the past and the future do not really exist;
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only the present moment belongs to us, echoing the claim made by Chrysippus. This onto-
logical devaluation of the future in particular also leads Marcus to suggest that one ought to
treat each day as if it were one’s last (7.56, 7.69).
Thus, Marcus has two reasons to propose focusing one’s attention on the present moment.
The first, drawing on lessons from Epictetus, is that only the present moment is within our
control or, to put it more precisely, it is only in the present moment that we are able to act, and
there is little to be gained by directing one’s attention at things where one is unable to effect
a change. The second, echoing Chrysippus, is that only the present moment belongs to us; it
exists in a way that the past and future simply do not.
Actions not outcomes

As we have seen, death highlights the pointlessness of pursuing fame and posthumous
reputation, while the transitory nature of all things highlights the same for the pursuit of
“indifferents”. The goals of fame or wealth are directly challenged by Marcus. These thoughts,
combined with his focus on the present moment, lead him to the conclusion that one ought
to focus attention on one’s actions rather than the outcomes or consequences of one’s actions.
As we saw earlier in 10.11, Marcus suggests that acting justly ought to be one’s main concern
(also 4.37), and we can probably take this reference to justice as simply one example of ethical
action in general. It is the quality of our actions –completely within our control in the pre-
sent moment –that matters, and not the longer-term consequences of those actions. In this,
Marcus is completely in line with Stoic ethical thought.
Probably the best-known illustration of this is the archery analogy credited to Antipater.42
The goal (telos), Antipater argued, ought to be not attaining certain ends but doing all one
can to reach those ends. Like an archer, one ought to do everything one can to hit the target,
without making one’s success dependent on hitting the target. One’s focus of attention ought
to be not on whether the arrow hits the target –a goal that is ultimately out of one’s control –
but instead on shooting as well as one can. This places the goal within one’s control, and shifts
the focus of attention from the outcome to the action itself.
Although there is no evidence to suggest that Marcus had this analogy in mind, it is clearly
in line with his own focus on shifting attention from outcomes to actions. In both cases, this
is ultimately a consequence of the Stoic claim that real goodness lies in virtuous actions rather
than external goods. The difference is that Marcus reaches this conclusion not with reference
to Stoic ethical theory but via his reflections on Stoic physics.
Dealing with time and death

On first encounter, some readers may find passages such as the one with which this chapter
opened (2.17) pessimistic or even nihilistic. Indeed, some commentators have used these
passages as the basis for diagnoses of depression or even drug abuse.43 Yet, in general Marcus
develops a thoroughly dispassionate approach to death by treating it as but one more natural,
physical process of change, using his technique of physical descriptions. He also draws ethical
conclusions from his reflections: do not value transitory “indifferents” (adiaphora) or future
outcomes; instead focus on acting virtuously in the here and now.
It is also worth noting that the passage with which this chapter opened, 2.17, ought not to
be read in isolation. In fact, the part quoted then is just the beginning of a longer section in
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the Meditations which goes on to offer a remedy for the situation it describes. The transitory
nature of human life might at first look like a problem, but there is a cure for such thoughts:
What then can be his escort through life? One thing and one thing only, Philosophy.
And this is to keep the spirit within him unwronged and unscathed, master of pains
and pleasures, doing nothing at random, nothing falsely and with pretence; needing no
other to do aught or to leave aught undone; and moreover accepting what befalls it, that
is, what is assigned to it, as coming from the other world from which it came itself. And
in all things awaiting death, with a mind that is satisfied, counting it nothing else than a
release of the elements from which each living creature is composed. Now if there is no
hurt to the elements themselves in their ceaseless changing each into other, why should
a man apprehend anxiously the change and dissolution of them all? For this is according
to Nature; and no evil is according to Nature.
2.17
It is through knowledge of the workings of Nature that it becomes possible to accept the
shortness of human life when measured against the vastness of cosmic time and the inevitable
transformation from life to death.
Notes
1 See, for example, 2.17, 5.24, 7.10, 8.21, 9.32, 10.17, 12.7, 12.32.
2 Seneca’s precise intention here is unclear, due to a textual difficulty, discussed in Inwood (2007): 191–
2. Gummere (LCL) presents this passage as the words of a sage following what Cato would say;
Inwood (2007) has it as what a mind like Cato might say; Graver and Long (2015: 217–8) present it
as a block quote from Cato.
3 See Seneca, Ep. 71.13-14, with commentary in Inwood (2007: 190).
4 Inwood (2007: 190–1) suggests one might see this as a reintegration of physics and ethics.Alternatively,
one might present it as highlighting the practical, existential consequences of physics.
6 For aiôn see 2.12, 4.3, 4.21, 4.43, 4.50, 5.24, 5.32, 6.15, 6.36, 6.59, 7.10, 7.19, 7.70, 9.28, 9.32, 9.35,
10.5, 10.17, 11.1, 12.7, 12.32; for chronos see 1.17, 2.4, 2.14, 2.17, 3.7, 3.11, 4.6, 4.32, 4.48, 5.10, 6.15,
6.18, 6.23, 6.25, 6.36, 6.49, 7.29, 7.35, 7.46, 8.5, 8.7, 8.11, 8.44, 9.14, 9.25, 10.1, 10.17, 10.31, 12.3,
12.18, 12.35.
7 See 2.17, 4.3, 6.36, 8.21.
8 See Plotinus, Enn. 3.7.1: “Eternity and time, we say, are two different things, the one belonging to
the sphere of the nature which lasts for ever, the other to that of becoming and of this universe”
(trans. Armstrong, LCL). The contrast that Plotinus has in mind is thus different from the one that
Goldschmidt attributes to Marcus.
9 See Hadot (1998: 135–6), and Brunschwig (2003: 214–15).
10 See for example Sorabji (1983: 21–6), Long and Sedley (1987: II, 307), and Schenkeveld (1999: 191).
11 See Diog. Laert. 7.141 (SVF 2.520).
12 See Stob. 1,106,5-23 (SVF 2.509, LS 51B).
13 See Plutarch, Comm. not. 1081c-1082a (SVF 2.517-19, LS 51C). On this passage, and many of the
issues it raises, see Schofield (1988).
14 See Plutarch, Comm. not. 1081e. Plutarch credits this point to the Stoic Archedemus, and so this
passages is Archedemus fr. 14 in SVF 3. A similar view is credited to Posidonius by Stob. 1,105,17–
106,4 (fr. 98 EK, LS 51E).
15 See Sorabji (1983: 25), who describes these views as “two rival interpretations of Chrsyippus”. Kidd
(1988: I, 400) credits the first of these views to Zeno.
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16 See for example Sorabji (1983: 21–6), Long and Sedley (1987: I, 307), Schenkeveld (1999: 191).
17 On this distinction see for example Long (1971: 89–93), Goldschmidt (1972), Sandbach (1985: 79–
80), and Long and Sedley (1987: I, 164).
18 See for example Long (1971: 89) and Sorabji (1983: 22).
19 See Goldschmidt (1953: 36–40).
20 Farquharson (1944) translates apeiros aiôn as “endless time”; Haines (1916) has “infinite time”; Hard
(2011) has “boundless time”. Clearly, none of them thought that a contrast between aiôn and chronos
is implied here.
21 This is the case in Haines (1916), Farquharson (1944), and Hard (2011).Trannoy (1925) renders both
as “durée”; Cassanmagnago (2008) uses “tempo” for both.
22 10.17-19 all address the theme of transience and perhaps ought to be read together. In editions
predating Gataker (1652), they are often printed together as a single section; see for example Sally
(1626), where they are “10.22”, and Casaubon (1643), where they are “10.19”.
23 Marcus uses chronos to refer to a finite human lifespan at 2.4, 2.17, 3.7, 4.48, 6.49, 7.46.
24 Marcus uses chronos to refer to infinite time at 2.14, 10.17, 10.31.
25 See Hadot (1998: 131–7).
26 See Hadot (1998: 135). On the idea of an extended present, distinct from the present conceived as
a mathematical limit, see Augustine, Conf. 11.26.33, perhaps inspired by Plotinus, Enn. 3.7.11. Hadot
in effect sees Marcus as a precursor to this Neoplatonic way of thinking about time.
27 See Hadot (1998: 136). Hadot draws on a lecture given by Bergson in Oxford, which was first
published in Bergson (1911), reprinted in Bergson (1934: 143–76), and is translated in Bergson
(1946: 153–86).
28 See Goldschmidt (1953: 195).
29 See 2.17, 4.3, 6.36, 8.21. It is worth noting, however, that Aristotle used stigmê to refer to a mathem-
atical limit; see for example Phys. 4.13, 222a10-19. But there is nothing to indicate that Marcus had
this usage in mind.
30 See for example Eusebius, Praep. evang. 15.20.6 (SVF 2.809, LS 53W); Diog. Laert. 7.157 (SVF
2.811); Sextus Empiricus, Math. 9.71-4 (SVF 2.812); with further texts in SVF 2.809-22. Diogenes
Laertius credits to Chrysippus the view that only the souls of the wise survive separation from
the body.
32 On spermatikos logos see for example Diog. Laert 7.135 (SVF 1.102, 2.580, LS 46B) and Aetius 1.7.33
(SVF 2.1027, LS 46A).
33 See for example 2.12, 4.5, 4.14, 4.21, 5.13, 7.19, 7.50, 8.18, 8.25, 9.3, 9.21.
34 On Marcus and Epicurus, see further Cortassa (1989: 147–62).
35 Meditations 7.64 (with 7.33) is fr. 447 in Usener (1887); 9.41 is fr. 191 in Usener (1887) and fr. 259
in Arrighetti (1973).
36 This has attracted a variety of interpretations. For a brief overview, with further references, see Sellars
(2014: 106–7).
37 Philodemus’s treatise On Death is edited and translated in Henry (2009).
38 See for example Farquharson (1944) and Hard (2011). Among other options, Hays (2003) opts for
“experience”; Grube (1983) has “awareness”. Older translations, such as Jackson (1906a) and Haines
(1916), use “sensation”.
39 See for example 2.17, 3.10, 4.6, 4.19, 6.47, 7.21, 7.34, 8.21, 8.44, 9.30, 10.34.
40 For these arguments, see Diog. Laert. 7.101-5 (SVF 3.117, 119, LS 58A-B), more or less repeating
arguments made in Plato’s Euthydemus 278e-281e.
41 See for example Epictetus, Ench. 1.1, Diss. 1.22.10.
42 See Cicero, Fin. 3.22 (SVF 3.18, LS 64F). This is usually taken to be an attempt to illustrate
Antipater’s formulation of the Stoic telos (Stob. 2,76,9-15, LS 58K). For brief discussion see Sellars
(2018c: 111–12).
43 See for example Africa (1961), discussed and debunked in Hadot (1984) (and cf. Hadot 1998: 95–114).
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PART IV
Ethics
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8
VIRTUE AND JUSTICE
Marcus’s Meditations is often taken to be primarily a work of ethics, a guide to how to live.
The previous chapters have tried to show the role played by logical and physical themes in
the Meditations, although the practical consequences of those themes have never been far away.
Indeed, one of the striking features of the work is the way in which logical, physical, and eth-
ical themes are closely interwoven together. In this chapter, we turn to look directly at some
of the explicitly ethical material in the Meditations.
Living consistently with Nature

In Book 1 of the Meditations, Marcus thanks his Stoic teacher Sextus for teaching him “the
notion of life according to Nature (ennoia tou kata phusin zên)” (1.9).This idea of a life according
to Nature was one of the core doctrines in Stoic ethics. As we shall see shortly, it was often
expressed using the word homologoumenôs, “consistently”, and Marcus uses this term to capture
the same idea elsewhere. For instance, in 3.4 he reminds himself “to cling not to the opinion
of all men, but only of men who live consistently with Nature (homologoumenôs têi phusei)”.
But, in general, he prefers to use the shorthand kata phusin. At 7.11 he writes, “for a reasonable
creature the same act is according to nature (kata phusin) and according to reason (kata logon)”.
This reflects the Stoic view that what following Nature actually involves is following the right
reason (orthos logos) pervading all things, which they identify with universal law (koinos nomos)
and Zeus.1 At 7.56, he imagines wiping the slate clean of his life up to the present moment and
then proposes that he “use the balance remaining to live henceforward according to Nature”.
At 10.15, he exhorts himself to live as a true human being (alêthinos anthrôpos), which he then
defines as one who lives according to Nature (kata phusin). At 12.1, he lists living according to
Nature (kata phusin zên) as one of a handful of things to which one ought to aspire. It seems
fairly clear, then, that the idea of living in tune with Nature was central to Marcus’s thinking
about how he ought to live his life.2 But what precisely did it involve? What did Marcus think
it involved? Before we turn to those questions, it might be useful to consider how this idea
was formulated by the early Stoics and what they took it to mean.
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It is fairly common to see the statement that the goal (telos) of human life for the Stoics was
to live in agreement with Nature. In fact, we find the early Stoics offering number of different
versions of this telos formula. Our principal sources of evidence for the Stoic telos formula are
the Stoic doxography appended to the biography of Zeno of Citium in Diogenes Laertius,
and the epitome of Stoic ethics attributed to Arius Didymus and preserved in the anthology of
Stobaeus.3 Diogenes Laertius reports that Zeno, in his book On the Nature of Man was the first
person to define the telos as “living in agreement with Nature” (to homologoumenôs têi phusei
zên). Diogenes goes on to report that Cleanthes, Posidonius, and Hecato all defined the telos
in this way. Chrysippus, he tells us, glossed this by saying that living virtuously (kat’ aretên zên)
is equivalent to “living in agreement with experience of the actual course of Nature” (Diog.
Laert. 7.87). Diogenes continues with an explication of what he takes the Stoic telos to mean,
which probably derives from Chrysippus, before then noting slightly different formulations
by Diogenes of Babylon and Archedemus (ibid. 7.88), and then signalling a potential diffe-
rence between Chrysippus and Cleanthes. According to Diogenes, Chrysippus took “Nature”
(phusis) in the formula “living in agreement with Nature” to refer to both universal (koinê)
Nature and human nature (idiôs tên anthrôpinên), whereas Cleanthes took it to refer to uni-
versal (koinê) Nature only (ibid. 7.89). Although there were some later innovations, Diogenes’
account suggests that Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Posidonius all defended the same telos
formula as “living in agreement with Nature” (to homologoumenôs têi phusei zên).
When we turn to Arius Didymus (6a), we find a broadly similar account, with some
minor but significant differences. He reports that Zeno defined the goal as simply “to live in
agreement” (to homologoumenôs zên), which he glosses as living according to a single reason
(kath’ hena logon) and in harmony (sumphônon).4 Arius then comments:
Those after him, adding further detail, expressed it thus: ‘to live in agreement with
Nature’, assuming that Zeno’s statement was insufficient as a predicate. So Cleanthes, the
first to take over the sect after him, added ‘with nature’ and interpreted it thus: ‘the goal
is living in agreement with Nature’. Chrysippus, wanting to make this clearer, expressed
it in this way: ‘to live in accord with experience of what happens naturally’.
Stob. 2,76,1-8, SVF 1.552, 3.12
The significant difference with the report in Diogenes Laertius is of course the different
telos formulation attributed to Zeno. But Arius agrees with Diogenes in suggesting that the
three early heads of the Stoa –Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus –were in broad philosophical
agreement about what the Stoic telos was. Where they differed was in how best to express and
explicate it.
Here we come to a key question: what was the shared telos that they were all trying to
express? Was it “to live in agreement” (to homologoumenôs zên) or was it “to live in agreement
with Nature” (to homologoumenôs têi phusei zên)? According to Arius, the addition “with
Nature” (têi phusei) was added by Cleanthes, who did so because “Zeno’s statement was insuf-
ficient as a predicate” (Stob. 2,76,2-3). This might be taken to imply that Zeno’s original for-
mulation, as reported by Arius, was thought to be grammatically incomplete and so required
revision. As Pomeroy puts it in his notes on this passage, “the predicate ‘in agreement’ (with
what?) was therefore expanded by Zeno’s successors to give a more complete definition”
(1999: 113, n. 75).This takes us to the grammatical use of the key word in the all the different
formulations: homologoumenôs. Can this word be used on its own –i.e. is it complete by
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itself –or is it necessarily incomplete, demanding a noun to complete its sense? Pomeroy
thinks it is incomplete. In this he is following the statement by Arius, who may himself have
been following Cleanthes (it is unclear whether Arius is attributing the expansion of the
formula to Cleanthes’ judgement that Zeno’s formulation was incomplete, or whether that
is Arius’s (or some intermediate source’s) attempt to explain the reason for the expansion).
Grammatical rules are of course simply attempts to codify existing use, so the question effect-
ively becomes whether other authors before or around the time of Zeno used the word
homologoumenôs on its own without further specification. Some, including Xenophon and
Plato, certainly did.5 The word was used both with the dative and on its own (see LSJ 1226).
Perhaps, the best way to take Arius’s comment that homologoumenôs was “insufficient as a predi-
cate (katêgorêma)”, then, may simply be that Cleanthes thought it was insufficient to convey
fully the idea that Zeno had in mind.6
All this bears on how best to understand the Stoic telos and also how to translate it. If
Zeno did indeed use homologoumenôs on its own, then we ought to translate it in a way that
can work both with and without anything further. In that case, translating the fuller version
as “to live according to Nature” won’t do. The slightly more neutral “in agreement with
Nature” is also far from ideal. Better would be “to live consistently with Nature”, because
the first part, “to live consistently” can work equally well with or without the addition “with
Nature”. However, one can also immediately see why it might have been judged too concise
and might benefit from further expansion, hence the additions and expansions by Cleanthes
and Chrysippus: “to live consistently with Nature”, “to live consistently with universal and
human nature”, “to live consistently with the experience of what happens naturally”. These
are all glosses on a single idea, rather than innovations in doctrine. The core idea, expressed by
Zeno, is to live consistently.7
This account of the Stoic telos involves a number of assumptions. It prioritizes Arius’s
version of Zeno’s formulation over Diogenes’s. At the same time, it rejects Arius’s claim that
the reason for Cleanthes’ expansion of Zeno’s formulation was due to its incompleteness,
because it rejects the claim that homologoumenôs is incomplete. While I have tried to justify
the second of these, it is difficult to justify the first, especially when Diogenes names one of
Zeno’s books where he (or more likely his source) claims to have found the fuller formulation.
Yet Arius’s report is clearly no mere slip, given that he explicitly comments on the formu-
lation straight afterwards. A little later in his account he adds that “they”, the Stoics, say that
“agreement is the goal (tên homologian legousi telos einai)” (Stob. 2,76,18-19), again stressing
doctrinal unity despite the various expansions and glosses on the first version. No doubt much
could be said about the potential unreliability of both of these doxographical accounts.8 In its
defence, however, this interpretation makes sense of the Stoic position, and it makes sense of
the various reformulations, understood as clarifications rather than modifications of Zeno’s
original statement. While the Stoic telos formula makes reference to Nature in its expanded
forms, the core of the idea is to live consistently. When we read that the telos is “to live con-
sistently with Nature”, perhaps the stress ought to be on “consistently” rather than “Nature”.
What we have, then, are a number of different formulations all taken to express a single
fundamental idea. Each formulation expresses a different aspect of the basic idea.These are: (i)
internal consistency, (ii) consistency with human nature, and (iii) consistency with external,
universal Nature, often understood as an acceptance of what happens.
We find all three of these aspects throughout the Meditations. With regard to the first, the
desire to avoid inner disturbance is a constant theme throughout the work. With the second,
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as we shall see in due course, Marcus places considerable emphasis on living in harmony with
human nature. For Marcus humans are rational, social animals, and a good life is one in har-
mony with these characteristics. Reflecting on social virtues, Marcus writes at 7.74 that “to
benefit another is to act according to Nature (kata phusin)”. As for the third, reflections on
accepting what comes to pass according to Nature are also ubiquitous.
The virtues
As well as engaging with the Stoic telos of living consistently with Nature, Marcus also takes
up the Stoic account of the virtues. Central to the Stoic account is the claim that virtue or
excellence (aretê) is the only good, its opposite, vice, is the only thing inherently bad, and
everything else falls into the category of “indifferents” (adiaphora), some of which we naturally
pursue and others we prefer to avoid.9 Virtue, according to the Stoics, is a consistent dispos-
ition, something choice-worthy for its own sake, and something that makes the whole of one’s
life consistent (Diog. Laert. 7.89). In general, virtue –or perhaps better “excellence” –is the
perfection of something, and as such there can be a whole host of virtues, some intellectual
and some non-intellectual.Thus, health and strength can be “virtues” of the body. As on many
topics, the early Stoics offered different taxonomies of the virtues, with some referring to dis-
tinct logical, physical, and ethical virtues (ibid. 7.92). But the standard Stoic view emphasized
four primary virtues of wisdom (phronêsis), courage (andreia), moderation (sôphrosunê), and
justice (dikaiosunê), with other virtues subordinate to these four.10 These were classified as good
because, the Stoics claimed, they are consistently beneficial.
There are a number of passages where Marcus refers to the four principal virtues highlighted
in the early Stoa. For example at 3.6 he writes “If you can discover in human life anything
better than justice (dikaiosunê), truth (alêtheia), moderation (sôphrosunê), and courage (andreia)”.
At 7.63, he lists truth (alêtheia), justice (dikaiosunê), moderation (sôphrosunê), benevolence
(eumeneia). At 8.1, he says, “nothing is good for a human (anthrôpos) except what makes him
just (dikaion) and moderate (sôphrona), courageous (andreion) and free (eleutherion)”.11 In another
passage he lists the four principal Stoic virtues, stressing that these are the only real goods:
You could apprehend the character of what the majority of men fancy to be ‘goods’ like
this. If a man were to conceive the existence of real goods, like wisdom (phronêsis), mod-
eration (sôphronsunê), justice (dikaiosunê), courage (andreia), he could not with those in his
mind still listen to the popular proverb about ‘goods in every corner’, for it will not fit.
5.12
As we can see, although in 5.12 Marcus list the four principal Stoic virtues, elsewhere his list
sometimes includes variations. To give one further example:
Does the light of the lamp shine and not lose its radiance until it be put out, and shall
truth (alêtheia) and justice (dikaiosunê) and moderation (sôphrosunê) be put out in you
before the end?
12.15
Here and in a number of the passages noted earlier Marcus prefers to list “truth” (alêtheia)
in place of “wisdom” (phronêsis), although that can hardly be taken to be a significant devi-
ation from the early Stoic view. It has been suggested that this substitution might reflect the
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influence of Plato, and that is certainly possible.12 But ultimately this is mere terminological
variation. Although early Stoics such as Chrysippus embraced a variety of virtues, others such
as Aristo stressed the unity of virtue.13 All the virtues were, for the Stoics ultimately different
names expressing different aspects of the same thing, namely a soul in an excellent state. Thus,
the virtues are inseparable, “for whoever has one has all, and whoever acts in accordance with
one acts in accordance with all.They differ from one another by their own perspectives” (Stob.
2,63,8-11, SVF 2.280, LS 61D).
It has been suggested that when Marcus lists truth (alêtheia) and justice (dikaiosunê) and
moderation (sôphrosunê), together, as we have just seen him do in 12.15, this is not a minor
deviation from the standard list of Stoic virtues but instead a conscious development of his
own list of virtues, inspired by Epictetus’s list of three topoi, or areas of study.14 In the Discourses
Epictetus had proposed that there are three areas (topoi) in which people ought to be trained:
The first has to do with desires and aversions, that he may never fail to get what he
desires, nor fall into what he avoids; the second with cases of choice and of refusal, and,
in general, with duty, that he may act in an orderly fashion, upon good reasons, and not
carelessly; the third with the avoidance of error and rashness in judgement, and, in gen-
eral, about cases of assent.
Diss. 3.2.1-2
Hadot (1998: 234–6) argued that these three areas of study can help to explain Marcus’s
references to truth, justice, and moderation, and in support of this claim he focuses on one
extended passage, 9.1. There Marcus warns against acts of injustice, of lying, and the pur-
suit of pleasure. In each case Marcus describes these as impious acts against universal Nature.
Hadot takes these as expressions of Epictetus’s three areas: desire, duty, and judgement. Thus,
he argues that injustice correlates with duty, lying with judgement, and the pursuit of pleasure
with desire.The three things that Marcus reminds himself to avoid are the three areas in which
Epictetus thinks one ought to be trained, in order to cultivate the three virtues that Marcus
mentions elsewhere, justice (dikaiosunê), truth (alêtheia), and moderation (sôphrosunê).
While those connections can certainly be made, and while Epictetus was no doubt an
important influence on Marcus, this account seems to look for a degree of systematicity in the
Meditations that may not be there. Although it is true that on occasion Marcus lists together the
three virtues of justice, truth, and moderation, as we have already seen elsewhere, he produces
a number of other lists too. At 3.6, he lists those three along with a fourth, courage (andreia).
At 7.63, he swaps courage for benevolence (eumeneia). At 8.1, he swaps truth for freedom
(eleutheria), and, at 5.12, he lists the four principal Stoic virtues without any alteration. While
Hadot may be correct to discern an echo of Epictetus’s three topoi in 9.1, the further claim that
“Marcus makes the virtues correspond to each of the disciplines” (Hadot 1998: 232) does not
seem warranted by the texts. Indeed, in all the passages just noted we get lists of four virtues,
not three. All this seems to count against the claim that Marcus was engaged in a conscious
development of a new system of Stoic virtues.15
The pre-eminence of justice

Putting that issue to one side, the one feature that stands out in Marcus’s many references
to the virtues is the pre-eminence of justice, which is mentioned far more often than any
of the others.16 This is not merely an unconscious preference to talk about this particular
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virtue, motivated perhaps by practical issues arising from his role as emperor. At 11.10, he is
quite explicit about its pre-eminence, suggesting that justice is foundational for all the other
virtues: “it is from justice that all the other virtues spring”. It is unclear whether he means that
justice is the origin of all other virtues, in the sense of being their source, or their origin in the
sense that the other virtues exist for the sake of justice. Either way, Marcus is clear that justice is
the most important of the virtues.
Why does Marcus give this pre-eminence to justice? One suggestion has been that this
betrays the influence of Plato, who in the Republic accorded a special status to justice as the
virtue that co-ordinates the relationship between the three other virtues that correspond to
the three parts of the soul and city.17 Justice, for Plato, involves each part of a thing fulfilling
its function (“doing its own business”) and not encroaching into a territory not its own (Resp.
433b). This leads Plato to state, like Marcus, that justice is the foundation of the other virtues
(ibid.).
However, there is no evidence to suggest that Marcus adopted that Platonic model
of justice, and the reason why Marcus prioritizes justice is fairly plain throughout the
Meditations. Fundamentally, it is because it is the virtue that connects most closely with
our nature as rational and social beings, and so brings us into accord with Nature as a
whole. Throughout the Meditations he insists that this is our defining characteristic: see for
example 4.24 (“a creature that is sociable by nature”), 7.55 (“rational beings exist for the
sake of one another”), 9.1 (“universal Nature has created rational creatures for the sake of
one another”), and 9.42 (“a human being is formed by nature to benefit others”). Indeed,
as we saw earlier, Marcus presents our social and political instinct as the highest point of
development in a human being, and he makes this point within an explicitly Stoic account
of the scale of nature.18
This is closely connected to his arguments regarding the benefits of acting justly. These
benefits come automatically from being part of a larger organic whole, which might be taken
as a reference to either the community of all humankind or to Nature as a whole. He writes:
No one wearies of receiving benefits, and to benefit another is to act according to

Nature. Do not weary then of the benefits you receive by the doing of them.
7.74
At first glance the claim that acting to benefit others is in accordance with Nature might not
seem immediately obvious. Here, we should perhaps take this reference to the telos formula to
imply human nature and, in particular, our nature as social animals. To act for the benefit of
others is to act in accordance with our social nature. By acting in this way we shall also benefit
personally, by avoiding internal dissonance with our own nature. As he puts it:
Withdraw into yourself: the governing self (hêgemonikon) is by its nature content with its
own just actions and the tranquillity it thus secures.
7.28
The mind gains tranquillity or calm (galênê), Marcus writes, by acting justly, precisely because
just actions are in accord with our nature as social beings. The anti-social person will never
enjoy the contentment and smooth flow of life towards which the Stoics strived because of
their fundamental internal disharmony with their own human nature. By contrast, as he puts
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it elsewhere, “a human being finds his delight in doing what is proper to a human being; and
what is proper to him is to show goodwill to his own kind” (8.26).
Thus, the agent directly benefits from acting justly in two ways: (i) by being part of the
whole, they benefit whenever the whole benefits, and (ii) by acting consistently with their
own human nature, they avoid internal conflict and take pleasure in fulfilling their proper
function. In this way the just agent is living in accord with Nature in all three of the ways
outlined earlier. They achieve (i) internal consistency and tranquillity, (ii) consistency with
human nature, and (iii) consistency with the larger whole of which they are a part. Marcus’s
focus on the virtue of justice, then, enables him to draw out the connections between the
Stoic account of the virtues and the Stoic telos of living consistently with Nature in his own
distinctive way. Yet, the orthodoxy of his position should never be in doubt, as is clear if we
compare what we have seen him say with the following statement from Arius’s summary of
Stoic ethics (§ 6):
As man is a rational mortal animal, political by nature, they [the Stoics] also say that
every virtue which is associated with man and the happy life is consistent with and in
agreement with Nature.
Stob. 2,75,7-10
Spontaneous ethical action
In all this, there is one passage that stands out among Marcus’s various reflections on ethical
action. It is worth quoting at length:
It is the way of one person, when he has done someone a good turn, to count as a matter
of course on being repaid in kind. Another is not as quick to do so, but all the same,
in his own mind, he regards the beneficiary as being in his debt, and he is conscious of
what he has done. A third is, in a sense, not even conscious (oude oiden) of what he has
done; he is rather like a vine which has produced its grapes, and seeks for no further
reward once it has borne its proper fruit, as with a horse when it has run its race, or a
dog when it has followed its trail, or a bee when it has made its honey. And so such a
person, when he has done a good deed, does not shout about it, but passes straight on to
the next one, as the vine yields new clusters of grapes when the season comes around.
5.6
Marcus distinguishes between three different types of people: (i) the person who expects a
favour in return whenever they act well towards someone; (ii) the person who does not expli-
citly expect a favour but still thinks that the beneficiary of their action is in some sense in their
debt; and (iii) the person who benefits others with absolutely no thought at all of receiving
anything in return. The third type of person is, of course, the most admirable and the one to
be emulated.
Thus, Marcus champions almost unconscious ethical action over ethical acts where the
agent is fully aware of what they have done and, even if only implicitly, expect some kind
of reward or praise for their action. The analogies he draws with vegetative processes and
animal behaviour underline that he thinks this kind of spontaneous ethical action is entirely
natural. We might call this “almost unconscious” because Marcus carefully qualifies his claim
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by writing “in a sense” and “in a way” (tropon tina). He does not want to be taken too liter-
ally here; it is the broader point that matters. Indeed, the passage continues with an exchange
with an imaginary interlocutor who objects that surely a social being will be aware that their
actions are appropriate to their nature. Marcus accepts this but objects that it takes his main
point too literally. Moreover, once one goes down that path, one easily falls back into one of
the other two types that Marcus wants to reject. As soon as an agent becomes conscious that
they are acting appropriately as a social being, the implicit desire for reward or recognition is
likely to creep back in. The way to avoid this, Marcus suggests, is to focus on natural spontan-
eity in ethical action.
Indeed, the naturalness of this sort of spontaneous ethical action is stressed elsewhere in
the Meditations too:
For when you have done good, what more, oh man, do you wish? Is it not enough
that what you did was in agreement with your nature and do you seek a recompense
for this? As if the eye asked a return for seeing or the feet for walking; for just as these
were made for this which they effect according to their proper constitution, and so get
what is theirs, even thus man is made by Nature to be benevolent, and whenever he
contributes to the common stock by benevolence or otherwise, he has done what he
was constituted for, and gets what is his own.
9.42
When you have done good and another has been its object, why do you require a third
thing besides, like the foolish –to be thought to have done good or to get a return?
7.73
At first glance this might appear to be at odds with standard Stoic thinking about ethical
action, which is often said to stress the role of intentions. It is the intention standing behind an
act that matters most, and it is tempting to assume that this is a conscious intention. Moreover,
if intentions are the sorts of things that belong only to rational animals, then it looks as if
Marcus’s appeal to the vine that unconsciously produces grapes is somewhat out of step.
Seneca, for instance, stresses the importance of (conscious) intentions in ethical action:
So what is a benefit? It is a well-intentioned action that confers joy and in so doing

derives joy, inclined towards and willingly prepared for doing what it does. And so it
matters not what is done or what is given, but with what attitude, since the benefit
consists not in what is done or given but rather the intention of the giver or agent.
Ben. 1.6.1
For Seneca, then, such acts are willingly prepared with a deliberate attitude and intention,
nothing like the unconscious act of the vine producing grapes. But here Seneca is addressing
someone at an early stage in the process of learning how to develop the appropriate attitude,
someone who will need to deliberate carefully. Marcus, by contrast, is describing someone
at a far more advanced stage of ethical development who has attained a virtuous character
from which virtuous actions flow automatically, without need for further deliberation. (There
might, of course be deliberation about means –about how to do what one is doing –but not
about ends –not about what to do.) The genuinely virtuous person does not need to stop and
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think before, say, offering assistance to someone in need; they just do it. Although the process
of training required to develop the virtues might require quite a lot of thought, the goal is to
reach a point where virtuous actions themselves are, in a sense, thoughtless. They are simply a
natural expression of a person’s virtuous character.
Indeed, elsewhere Seneca comes closer to Marcus’s view, praising the person who forgets
what they have given to others, even while they are giving it (Ben. 2.6.2). The best person
(optimus), he comments, never seeks anything in return for what he gives to others, forgetting
what he has given (Ben. 2.17.7). The good man (vir bonus) does not act well, he adds, because
he has deliberated about how best to act, but rather cannot help but act in the way that he
does (Ben. 6.21.2), just as the vine cannot help but produce grapes. On this, then, Marcus is in
line with his Roman Stoic predecessor.
Notes
1 See the account in Diog. Laert. 7.88 (SVF 3.4, LS 63C).
2 There are numerous other passages throughout the Meditations that allude to the same idea.
See for e xample 5.3, 5.9, 7.74, 9.1. On this topic see also Ackeren (2011: II, 613–26); Gourinat
(2012b: 421–2).
3 See Diog. Laert. 7.87-9 (LS 63C) and Stob. 2,75,11–76,23 = Ar. Did. 6a (part LS 63B). The latter is
reprinted with a translation and notes in Pomeroy (1999).
4 See Stob. 2,75,11-12 (SVF 1.179, LS 63B).
5 See for example Xenophon, Oec. 1.11 and, using homologoumenôs in a different sense, Plato, Symp. 186b.
6 It is worth noting that the word katêgorêma was a technical term in Stoicism; see for example Diog.
Laert. 7.64, with discussion in Gaskin (1997).
7 For further discussion, which also opts for “consistency”, see Rist (1977). The claim that later Stoics
were ultimately engaged in glossing and expanding the foundational ideas of Zeno is explored in
Sedley (1989).
8 On some problems with the text of Arius, see Brennan (2014).
9 See the doxographical account in Diog. Laert. 7.101-5 and the discussion in Cicero, Fin. 3.16-24. For
further discussion see Inwood (1985), Schofield (2003), Jedan (2009), and Sellars (2018c: 103–8).
10 For definitions of the four principal virtues, see Stob. 2,59,4-11 (SVF 3.262, LS 61H). I trans-
late sôphrosunê as “moderation”. It is also often translated as “temperance” or “self-control”. In the
context of early Stoic ethics, Long and Sedley (1987: 490) translate it as “moderation”; Pomeroy
(1999: 157) translates it as “self-restraint”. In Tusc. 3.16, Cicero translates it as temperantia (hence
“temperance” in English), but also suggests moderatio, modestia, and frugalitas, signalling that in some
respects he prefers the last of these options.
11 As well as 3.6, 7.63, 8.1, and 5.12 and 12.15 quoted below, note also 2.5, 4.18, 9.1, 11.1, and 12.27.
12 Hadot (1998: 234) notes that this substitution in the traditional list of virtues has precedence in
Plato’s Republic, 487a. One might add that at 7.35 Marcus quotes a passage from the Republic just a
few lines earlier, 486a, which adds weight to the thought that Marcus may well have picked this up
from Plato.
13 For Aristo see Plutarch, De virt. mor. 440f (SVF 1.375, LS 61B). Although Aristo is often presented
as heterodox, Plutarch notes that his position did not differ much from Zeno’s. See the same passage
(441a, SVF 3.255) for Chrysippus as well. For further discussion see Schofield (1984).
14 See Hadot (1998: 232–6), with comment in Gourinat (2012b: 429), who endorses Hadot’s inter-
pretation. This is but one expression of Hadot’s wider claim that “the Meditations as a whole are
thus organized in accordance with a threefold structure […] developed, and perhaps invented, by
Epictetus” (1998: 232).
15 The passage in Epictetus as it continues relates the three topoi to managing emotions, duties, and
attaining certainty. It states (Diss. 3.2.5) that the third is only for those already making progress.
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This suggests that the three topoi might be taken as three stages in a philosophical education: first
learn to manage emotions, then understand ethical duties, and finally gain certainty in judgements.
Epictetus goes on to criticize philosophers who skip the first and second and go straight to the third
(Diss. 3.2.6), again suggesting that they ought to be understood as a progressive series of stages in an
education.
16 For examples of Marcus mentioning justice (dikaiosunê) see 3.5, 3.16, 8.7, 8.23, 9.23, 10.6, 10.11,
11.10, 11.21, 12.3, 12.24.
17 See Hadot (1998: 233), with Plato, Resp. 427d-441e. Hadot suggests that the three other virtues
straightforwardly correspond to the three parts of the soul and city, although Plato (e.g. 432a) gives
a more complex account of moderation (sôphrosunê).
18 See 6.14, with discussion in Chapter 6 above.
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9
THE COSMIC CITY
Marcus’s focus on the virtue of justice and on actions intended to benefit others highlights the
social aspect of his thought.1 Although his ethical project might be described as one primarily
concerned with self-cultivation, the “self ” that is being cultivated is that of a social animal who
is a member of a series of wider communities.
Circles of concern
This idea was standard Stoic doctrine and most famously outlined by a late Stoic writer who
may have been contemporary with Marcus: Hierocles.2 We have fragments for two works by
Hierocles, Elements of Ethics (Êthikê stoicheiôsis) and On Appropriate Acts (Peri tôn kathêkontôn),
which may have been parts of a single larger work.3 In Elements of Ethics, Hierocles outlines the
Stoic theory of oikeiôsis, which posits a natural instinct for self-care and self-preservation in all
animals, including humans.4 This is, he says, the starting point for ethics, and other accounts of
Stoic ethics also place it at the beginning.5 He describes it thus:
An animal, when it has received the first perception of itself, immediately becomes its
own and familiar to itself and to its constitution […] in accord with its own ability, each
animal does what contributes to its own preservation, avoiding every attack even from
afar and contriving to remain unharmed by dangers, while it leaps toward whatever
brings safety and provides for itself from far and wide whatever tends towards its survival.
El. Eth. 6.51-9
In the same work he also stresses the social nature of humans: “we are an animal, but a soci-
able one and in need of others […] there is no human being who is not part of a city (polis)”
(El. Eth. 11.15-17). These two ideas are combined and developed further in On Appropriate
Acts, where he presents an image of a series of concentric circles of care or concern, starting
with the individual in the centre, expanding to include immediate family, local community,
wider nation, and ultimately all humankind.6 Thus, humans are born with a natural instinct for
self-care, but that instinct can –and indeed should –expand to include others as an individual
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develops into a rational adult. In fact, Hierocles does not use the imagery of expansion but
instead contraction: the task is to bring people from the outer circles closer into the centre,
treating strangers as extended relatives and extended relatives as siblings. He is fully conscious
of the limits of this procedure, however, commenting that “a greater distance in respect to
blood will subtract something of goodwill, but, nevertheless, we must make an effort about
assimilating them” (Stob. 4,672,16-18).
Stoic cosmopolitanism
The widest circle of care mentioned by Hierocles embraces all humankind. This is often
connected with the idea of cosmopolitanism, and Marcus, along with the other Roman Stoics,
is usually taken to be a proponent of cosmopolitanism.7 The idea itself was by his time already
well established. A number of ancient sources attribute cosmopolitan ideas to Socrates,8
although some commentators have sceptically suggested that this might be a later projection
back onto him. It is most closely associated with Diogenes of Sinope, who is the first person
reported to have described himself as a kosmopolitês, a citizen of the cosmos (Diog. Laert. 6.63).
Diogenes and the early Cynics were an important influence on the early Stoics (see Goulet-
Cazé 2003) and Diogenes would later become an idealized role model for Epictetus (see esp.
Diss. 3.22, 4.1). For Diogenes, his citizenship of the cosmos went hand in hand with a rejection
of citizenship of any actual city.
When we turn to the Roman Stoics we find a slightly different, more moderate, account.
The most famous expression is in Seneca:
Let us take hold of the fact that there are two communities (duas res publicas) –the one,
which is great and truly common (magnam et vere publicam), embracing gods and men,
in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our
citizenship by the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the acci-
dent of our birth.
De otio 4.1, LS 67K9
Note how this differs from Diogenes’ Cynic cosmopolitanism. Seneca is not rejecting his
citizenship of his actual city; he is affirming two allegiances. In this way, Seneca affirms his
commitment to the Stoic ideal of a single cosmopolitan community of all humankind without
rejecting his status as a Roman citizen and his position within Roman politics.
Marcus’s cosmic city
With these preliminaries in place, we can now turn to see what Marcus has to say. To begin,
we should note that Marcus does not use the word kosmopolitês, but he does refer to “the
great city of the cosmos (polis tou kosmou)” (10.15) and to being “a citizen of this great city”
(12.36). He also follows Seneca’s image of there being two cities of which he is a citizen: “As
Antoninus, my city and fatherland is Rome; as a human being, it is the cosmos, so what brings
benefits to these is the sole good for me” (6.44). At 3.11, he refers to human beings as “citizens
of that highest of cities of which all other cities are, as it were, mere households”. At 2.16, he
says that the goal (telos) for all rational creatures is “to conform to the reason and law of the
most venerable of cities and constitutions”, i.e. the cosmos. So, qua Roman he is a citizen of
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The cosmic city 119
Rome, but qua rational being, he is a citizen of the cosmos. Marcus’s comments also suggest a
clear hierarchy between these two cities of which he is a citizen. If his commitments were to
come into conflict, his first loyalty would be to the natural law of Nature, not the manmade
laws of Rome.
His few comments about traditional politics are somewhat dismissive. In 9.29, he counsels
himself not to hope for Plato’s ideal republic, to do what he can but without expecting to
change the minds of others, and not to be impressed by leaders like Alexander the Great, who
were not governed by reason.10 Despite his own pre-eminent role in Roman politics, Marcus’s
attitude in the Meditations pays far more attention to the philosophical ideal of a community
of all humankind than it does to the politics of the local community of which he was part.
Central to this prioritization of the cosmic city over the political state was the Stoic claim
that Nature is governed by a rational law. Zeno of Citium had written a Republic, in which he
outlined an ideal image of all humans living together under a single common law (nomos).11
A century and a half later, Diogenes of Babylon is reported to have argued that Rome was not
a real city, because it was not governed by a common rational law (see Cicero, Acad. 2.137).
He is reported to have said, “among the foolish there exists no city nor any law”,12 and one
might note that this view continues the attitude of his namesake from Sinope rather than pre-
empting the later, more moderate view of Seneca and Marcus. Drawing on this Stoic natural
law tradition, Marcus puts it like this:
If mind is common to us all, then also the reason, whereby we are reasoning beings, is
common. If this be so, then also the reason which enjoins what is to be done or left
undone is common. If this be so, law also is common; if this be so, we are citizens; if this
be so, we are partakers in one constitution; if this be so, the cosmos is a kind of state
(polis).
4.4
This cosmic city is a shared fellowship among the wise wherever they may be geographically.
As he puts it elsewhere, “Among rational creatures, political communities could be found […]
among beings which are higher still, there existed a sort of union in separation” (9.9). The
ideal sage, then, will recognize other sages as fellow citizens of the cosmic city, no matter how
near or far they may be in physical space, simply by virtue of the fact that they live according
to a shared law, the law of Nature. While Marcus hints at this idea, it is worth stressing that
the vast majority of his comments regarding the cosmic city do not point towards an exclu-
sive community of a handful of sages; on the contrary, his principal motivation is to see all
humans –no matter what their level of rational and ethical progress –as his fellow citizens
and members of a single community. In so doing, he is following the theory of oikeiôsis that
extends care to others regardless of whether they are wise or foolish and, indeed, acknow-
ledges that the foolish will also extend care to others in this way, presumably because such
actions arise out of a natural instinct and so are independent of rational knowledge.13
Putting whole before part

Marcus’s image of all humans as equal citizens in a single cosmic city draws, as we have seen, on
earlier Stoic thinking. However, he develops his own thoughts on this topic further, insisting
on an even stronger connection between individuals and between each individual and the
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whole. One might say that the problem with cosmopolitanism as it is usually conceived is that
it continues to see individuals as distinct, isolated agents. There may be a single, universal city,
but there remains a plurality of citizens within it, each with their own needs and concerns.
Marcus’s aim is move beyond this individualistic model and replace it with something more
integrated and organic. In this section and the next, we shall see how he attempts to do this.
The first way in which Marcus tries to move to a more integrated model is to insist that
one ought to put the interests of the community before those of the individual.The first stage
in the process is to align one’s own interests with the interests of the cosmic city. At 5.22, he
writes “what is not injurious to the city does not injure the citizens either”. This statement is
made as part of a consolatory argument aimed at reducing the impact of perceived injuries.
He continues: “On the occasion of every impression that you have been injured apply this
canon: ‘if the city is not injured by this neither am I injured’ ”.
This thought is developed at greater length in 10.6, where he states that “I am part of the
whole (to holon)”. As we saw in a previous chapter, this is a technical term in Stoic physics
used to describe the totality of Nature.14 To this he adds that “I am allied (oikeiôs) in some
way to parts that are of the same kind with me”, which is to say other rational human agents.
His use of oikeiôs here alludes to the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis mentioned earlier. If he can
remember these two things, he writes, then “I shall, in so far as I am a part (meros), not be dis-
affected to anything assigned to the whole”. Nothing that benefits the whole, he continues,
injures the part. But everything that happens within the whole benefits it in some way, and
nothing external can damage the whole because, by definition, there is nothing external to
it.15 Thus, Marcus concludes, if he can hold on to the thought that he is part of the whole,
fully aligning his own interests with the interests of the whole, then no event will ever feel
like an injury.
This is his conclusion drawn from the first of his two opening statements. He also draws
a conclusion from his second statement: by remembering that he is allied to other parts
of the whole that share a similar nature, he will, he writes, “do no unsocial (akoinônêtos)
act”. Instead, he will focus on what is the common benefit for all humankind and direct
his energies towards that goal rather than his own interests, narrowly conceived. It seems
clear that Marcus is drawing a parallel between the two cases, the first concerned with his
place in Nature, the second concerned with his place within the community of human-
kind. He seems to take the first to be the more self-evident –that we are parts of Nature
and dependent on it –and wants carry that thought over to the case of community, where
thinking of individuals as isolated and autonomous agents is perhaps more firmly engrained,
at least in his own case. Marcus concludes by making explicit that the goal behind this is to
achieve a smooth flow of life, one of Zeno’s formulations of the goal of Stoic philosophy
(Diog. Laert. 7.88). A citizen’s life will be smooth, Marcus writes, if they act for the benefit
of their fellow citizens and welcome whatever the city decrees. It is worth stressing, though,
that this is not a political leader arguing for obedience and quietism. The city he has in
mind here, as the immediate context makes clear, is the cosmic city, governed by the reason
permeating Nature.
The same theme appears again in 10.33. Here Marcus connects it with a reflection on
human nature. It is, he says in a number of places, the nature of a social animal to act sociably
and to benefit others.16 Any human being that acts in a manner inappropriate to their consti-
tution will inevitably suffer distress, he writes. All entities act according to their own nature,
121
and so should humans too. Among the examples he picks –fire moves upwards, stones fall
downwards –most striking is the cylinder that naturally rolls down a slope. It is tempting to
take this as an allusion to Chrysippus’s famous cylinder analogy, still current in philosophical
discussions and recounted by Marcus’s rough contemporary Aulus Gellius.17 Although that is
usually associated with debates about compatibilism, it involves drawing an analogy between
the cylinder acting according to its internal nature and humans doing the same, just as Marcus
does here. Marcus concludes his thought by making explicit the claim that humans are by
nature social animals, describing them as natural citizens (politês phusei).This is part of a reflec-
tion on the relationship between the citizen of the cosmos and the cosmic city. As in 10.6, this
is presented as something that must be remembered:
Remember that nothing harms the natural citizen which does not harm the city and
nothing harms the city which does not harm the law. Now none of what are called
strokes of bad luck harms the law: wherefore, not harming the law, it harms neither city
nor citizen.
10.33[8]‌
Here Marcus gives an explicit argument for the consolatory claim he is making. The citizen
is only harmed if the city is harmed; the city is only harmed if the law is harmed; but the
law –the divine reason permeating Nature –can never be harmed; therefore, neither the city
nor the citizen can be harmed. This loosely parallels the argument we saw earlier in 10.6,
where similarly the structure of the argument was that the part is only harmed if the whole is
harmed; but the whole is never harmed (either by itself or something external to it); therefore,
the part is never harmed.18 As we saw there, the aim seemed to be to transfer that argument
over to the context of human communities; here we see him do it explicitly.
In these three passages –5.22, 10.6, 10.33 –there are a number of things happening at once.
At first glance they are primarily concerned with offering consolation for perceived injuries.
The way in which that consolation is offered is by aligning the interests of the individual with
a larger entity, the cosmic city and the whole. In the present context these are more or less the
same thing. Although in the first of these passages, 5.22, Marcus seems to admit the possibility
that the city might be injured (“if the city is injured you must not be angry”), by the time
he gets to Book 10 he argues more forcibly that the cosmic city simply cannot be harmed in
any way. Here he can be seen to follow earlier Stoic advice, such as Epictetus’s suggestion that
one ought to align one’s will with the will of Nature (Ench. 8), and Marcus further echoes
that advice elsewhere (e.g. 4.23). For Marcus’s arguments in the passages here really to work,
though, he must convince himself that his own interests are completely aligned with the
interests of the larger whole. To see how he tries to do that we need to consider some further
passages.
Parts versus limbs
Marcus uses a variety of images to characterize the person who fails to act for the benefit
of the community of humankind and, indeed, for the benefit of Nature as a whole. The soul
of such a person, he writes in 2.16, does violence to itself, becoming an abscess (apostêma)
or tumour (phuma) on the cosmos. This happens whenever someone turns away from other
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human beings or acts antisocially towards them. This presentation of antisocial or vicious
behaviour as unnatural or in some way diseased was already well established.19 The goal of any
rational animal (logikon zôion), he continues, is to follow the law of the greatest city and state
(polis kai politeia), namely Nature. Acting with regard to the wellbeing of others is a central
feature of his conception of a life in harmony with Nature.
We find similar imagery in 4.29. The way to avoid becoming a foreigner (xenos) in the
cosmic city is to comprehend properly what it is and how it operates, which is to say to
understand the reason (logos) that governs this cosmic community (politeia). The person who
fails to do this, who remains a foreigner, is an abscess (apostêma) on the cosmos, an unnatural
growth separated off from the larger whole. Although the central point concerns the relation-
ship between the individual and Nature as a whole, once again Marcus concludes his thought
by stressing the social aspect involved. The person cut off from the whole is cut off from the
cosmic city (polis) and from other rational souls, his fellow citizens.
This is one type of imagery Marcus uses to describe the antisocial person: an unnatural
growth or abscess on the face of Nature. Elsewhere, he characterizes such a person in different
terms. The antisocial person is a part of Nature that has become broken off or severed from
the whole. In 11.8, he draws an analogy with a branch broken off from its tree. The antisocial
person is similarly broken off from society as a whole. The difference though, Marcus insists,
is that while a branch is only ever broken off by some external force, the antisocial person
cuts themselves off in an act that is ultimately a self-inflicted wound. Any antisocial act against
another person is not only an act against that particular person; it is also an act that servers
oneself from the whole community (politeuma). Like the branch, however, Marcus wants to
insist that it is possible to graft a dismembered part back onto the whole, although inevitably
the more often this is done, the weaker the bond will be.
If a broken branch is not striking enough to grab one’s attention, at 8.34, Marcus opts for
a more visceral image:
If you have ever seen a dismembered hand or foot or a head cut off, lying somewhere
apart from the rest of the trunk, you have an image of what a man makes of himself […
when he] cuts himself off or when he does some unneighbourly act.
8.34[1]‌
As naturally social animals, Marcus insists that we all come into the world as parts of a commu-
nity, so any act that separates us off from other people is quite unnatural. Although the image
of a severed foot or head might seem to count against the possibility of being grafted back on
to the body, Marcus in fact explicitly states that, in the case of humans cut off from society, it
is indeed possible to re-join the whole, “to come back again once more and to grow together
and to recover his portion as a part (meros)” (8.34[5]‌).20
In these passages, then, Marcus strikes a more positive tone about the possibility of the anti-
social person being able to re-join the community of humankind. But what both the abscess
and the dismembered part passages share is that they describe unnatural states. The antisocial
person is deeply unnatural, Marcus insists, and antisocial behaviour is out of the question for
anyone attempting to live up to the Stoic idea of a life in harmony with Nature.
In many of the passages just considered Marcus refers to a part (meros) separated from the
whole (to holon), the community (politeia), or the cosmos (kosmos). In one of the most interesting
passages where he addresses this issue, 7.13, he reflects on whether this is in fact the best term
123
to use. Continuing with the imagery of the dismembered foot, Marcus wonders whether we
ought to think of individuals not as a part (meros) of something larger but instead as a limb
(melos).21 It is a much stronger claim, he says, to say that someone is a limb, rather than a mere
part, and involves only the change of a single letter. The person who sees themselves as a part
may act for the benefit of the whole, all the while retaining their own identity as an individual,
a part of, but still distinct from, society as a whole. By contrast, if someone sees themselves as a
limb of society, as an integrated part of a larger organism, then they will act for the good of the
whole knowing that it is also for the good of themselves. While a part might still experience
a conflict between its interests and the interests of the whole, a limb will experience no such
thing, for its wellbeing depends on the wellbeing of the whole. A mere part (meros), Marcus
writes, may act sociably out of sense of duty, but someone who sees themselves as an integrated
limb (melos) will do so in full knowledge that they are benefitting themselves.
This, then, is how Marcus develops his thought that one ought to align one’s interests with
those of the whole. It is not mere alignment that he is proposing; instead, it is a thoroughgoing
identification based on conceiving oneself as a fully integrated limb of a larger organism. As
a limb, one has no narrow self-interests, for one only ever benefits or suffers along with the
organism as a whole. The foot will only ever flourish if the body as a whole is in good health.
The same applies with people, Marcus suggests; the individual’s wellbeing depends upon the
wellbeing of the community of which they are a part, and Marcus primarily has the cosmic
city embracing all humankind in mind.
This way of conceiving a social community is a striking feature of the Meditations, but what
Marcus says is not without precedent.The analogy with limbs of the body can also be found in
Epictetus (Diss. 2.5.24), who argued that while it might be in the nature of a foot considered
in isolation to remain clean, when considered as a limb of a larger organism it will often be
appropriate for it to get muddy from time to time. Indeed, on some occasions it may be neces-
sary for the foot to be amputated for the sake of the organism. The foot, if it were conscious,
might protest at such a move, but only because it failed to comprehend that if the organism
were to die, it would die too anyway. Epictetus is quite explicit about the analogy:
If you regard yourself as a thing detached, it is natural for you to live to old age, to be
rich, to enjoy health. But if you regard yourself as a man and as part of some whole, on
account of that whole it is fitting for you now to be sick, and now to make a voyage and
run risks, and now to be in want, and on occasion to die before your time.
Diss. 2.5.25
Just as a foot, understood properly as an organ with a particular function, would no longer
be a foot if separated from the body, so too a human is no longer a proper human, conceived
as a social animal, when separated from other people. It is worth noting that here Epictetus
refers to both the cosmic city embracing gods and humans, and local political communities,
as Seneca had done before him (compare De otio 4.1 with Diss. 2.5.26). The well-functioning
limb will be a proper-functioning member of both the cosmic city and their local community,
Epictetus seems to suggest.
Epictetus was not obviously innovating here either.The image of the foot willingly embra-
cing mud because it understands it role as a limb of the body had already been articulated
by Chrysippus. Indeed, Epictetus quotes Chrysippus on this topic in the next chapter of the
Discourses:
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124 Ethics
As long as the consequences are not clear to me, I cleave ever to what is better adapted
to secure those things that are in accordance with Nature; for God himself has created
me with the faculty of choosing things. But if I really knew that it was ordained for me
to be ill at this present moment, I would even seek illness; for the foot also, if it had a
mind, would seek to be covered with mud.
Chrysippus, in Diss. 2.6.9-10, SVF 2.191
This passage is interesting for the hint it gives about how it is that people fall into antisocial
behaviour, according to the Stoics. Humans are born as naturally social animals but all too often
lose sight of this and have to undertake significant philosophical work to reconceive them-
selves as part of a larger community. It is, Chrysippus suggests, a lack of proper understanding
that leads people to focus on their own interests. That impulse to self-interest is an inevitable
consequence of our natural instinct for self-preservation, the Stoics would claim, but it can
expand out of control. As people develop, they will hopefully attain a fuller understanding and
so grow out of that selfish way of thinking. But it is worth noting that on their account: (i)
the instinct for self-preservation is perfectly natural, as is (ii) a period of limited understanding
before one achieves fully developed rationality.This offers the beginnings of an explanation for
why antisocial behaviour arises among animals that are by nature social.
In the light of this, we can see that Marcus’s reflections on parts and limbs had good pre-
cedent within the Stoic tradition, and he could have encountered it in his reading of either
Epictetus or Chrysippus. What looks like a colourful analogy chosen for rhetorical effect in
fact has a firm foundation in Stoic thinking about the place of humans in Nature.22
Summary
These reflections on the cosmic city bring together many of the themes we have seen in the
Meditations. This city is co-extensive with Nature, governed by divine reason. Acting for the
benefit of this city involves acting consistently with both human nature and Nature as a whole.
If we do, we shall automatically benefit ourselves, in so far as we are integrated parts of the
whole. To live in a way that is cut off from this global community of humankind is against
Nature, for we are by nature social beings. Our primitive sociability connects us with people
closest to us, but a more developed sociability –acknowledging what we share in common
with all others –involves embracing the idea of a single global community of all humankind.
Notes
1 The most relevant passages where he engages with ideas connected to politics are 2.16, 3.11, 4.4, 4.23,
4.29, 5.22, 6.44, 9.9, 9.29, 10.6, 10.15, 10.33, 11.8, 12.36.
2 Hierocles’ precise dates are unknown. The only evidence is a remark in Aulus Gellius, NA 9.5.8, that
refers to Gellius’s teacher Calvenus Taurus quoting him.Taurus was active in the middle of the second
century AD (fl. 145), so Hierocles must have been active before or around the same time (see further
Holford-Strevens 2003: 90–7; DPhA VI, 713–22). Bastianini and Long (1992: 281) date him to the
middle of the second century AD, while Ramelli (2009: xxvi) pushes him slightly earlier to the first
half of the second century AD. Either way, it is conceivable that he was alive and active around the
time Marcus first encountered Stoicism in his youth. It is equally conceivable that he could have read
works by Hierocles, but there is no evidence for this, and if he had been an important influence one
might have expected Marcus to name him.
125
3 Hierocles’ Elements of Ethics survives incomplete on papyrus (PBerol 9780) and was first published in
von Arnim (1906), later re-edited in Bastianini and Long (1992), and printed with a facing English
translation in Ramelli (2009). The fragments of On Appropriate Acts are preserved by Stobaeus and
are gathered together and translated in Ramelli (2009). On the relationship between the two works,
there has been some debate: see Ramelli (2009: xxvii–xxx) for discussion and further references;
at xlix, she notes that while they are likely to be two distinct works, “there is a clear thematic con-
tinuity” between them. Note also DPhA III, 686–8.
4 On the theory of oikeiôsis, see the texts in SVF 3.178-89, with extended discussion in Engberg
Pedersen (1990).
5 See El. Eth. 1.35-7 and compare with Diog. Laert. 7.85 (SVF 3.178) and Cicero, Fin. 3.16 (SVF
3.182). Diogenes Laertius (ibid.) cites from Chrysippus, confirming that the theory goes back
to the early Stoa; see also Plutarch, St. rep. 1038b (SVF 3.179); Aulus Gellius, NA 12.5.7 (SVF
3.181). For some doubts as to whether this really was the foundation for Stoic ethics, see Schofield
(2003: 237–8).
6 The key passage, which I shall not quote at length, is in Stob. 4,671,3–673,18, reprinted and translated
in Ramelli (2009: 90–1), and also printed as LS 57G.
7 On cosmopolitanism in Marcus, and the Roman Stoics more widely, see for example Stanton (1968),
Gill (2000), Gueye (2006), Laurand (2012), Reydams-Schils (2012a), and Gueye (2013).
8 See for example Epictetus, Diss. 1.9.1, Musonius Rufus 9 (Hense 1905: 42,1-2), Cicero, Tusc. 5.108,
Plutarch, De exil. 600f.
9 See also Helv. 9.7, Ep. 28.4. Note also Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.26 where, echoing Seneca, he mentions
the cosmic city (polis) embracing gods and men and smaller cities on earth that are copies of the
cosmic city.
10 See further Reydams-Schils (2005: 86–9 and 2012a: 439–42).
11 See Plutarch, De Alex. fort. 329a-b (LS 67A), with discussion in Schofield (1991), Sellars (2007), and
Vogt (2008).
12 Obbink (1999: 193); see also Obbink and Vander Waerdt (1991: 376).
13 See Cicero, Fin. 3.59, with Ramelli (2009: xlix).
15 Compare with Cicero, Nat. D. 2.35, recounting the Stoic view: “there can be nothing that can frus-
trate nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself all modes of being” (LCL
trans.).
16 See for example 4.24, 7.55, 9.1, 9.42.
17 See Aulus Gellius, NA 7.2.11 (SVF 2.1000); see also Cicero, Fat. 43 (SVF 2.974). It is worth noting
that Gellius refers to Cicero’s De fato a little later at 7.2.15, and so Cicero may have been his
source here.
18 The structure is: if p then q; not q; therefore not p (i.e. modus tollens). This is the second of the Stoic
indemonstrable syllogisms (see Diog. Laert. 7.80).
19 See further Gill (2013: 101).
20 It is worth noting that this passage, 8.34, comes before 11.8 in which he uses the analogy with a
branch broken off its tree. In both passages he makes the point about humans being able to be re-
joined; perhaps the shift from dismembered limb in 8.34 to broken branch in 11.8 was because the
latter enabled him more effectively to make the point about the possibility of being grafted back on
to the whole.
21 On the distinction between parts and limbs see Aristotle, Hist. an. 1.1, 486a5-14, although it seems
unlikely that Marcus had this in mind. A mere part, Aristotle says, can be divided into further parts
that resemble the original (flesh can be divided into two pieces of flesh), whereas a limb is a part that
cannot be so divided (a foot cannot be divided into two feet) and contains other undividable parts
within it (such as toes). Farquharson (1944: II, 725) notes that, despite his comment in 7.13, Marcus
generally falls back into talking about parts, not limbs. But, following Aristotle, one might respond by
saying that a limb is a type of part rather than a distinct category, so there is no error in falling back
into the admittedly less precise language of parts.
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126 Ethics
22 Note also Cicero, Fin. 3.64 where he reports that the Stoics see the universe as “a city or state of
which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is
a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own”.The same thought
is developed in Off. 3.21-2, where Cicero characterizes people as limbs (membra) of human society,
and 3.32, where he refers to the body (corpore) of humanity and the dangers posed by sick limbs to
the whole.
127
CONCLUSION
I have tried to defend Marcus’s status as a philosopher, and in particular a Stoic philosopher, in
a number of different ways. The first way was biographical, looking at his education in Stoic
philosophy and the predominance of Stoics among his teachers. The second way was literary,
looking at the sort of text the Meditations is and the way in which that sort of text might have
a specific function within a conception of philosophy as an art of living. The third way was
philosophical, examining the ideas in the Meditations and the way in which they engage with
Stoic doctrines in both the early Stoa and his Roman Stoic predecessors. As we have seen,
Marcus engages with topics in all three parts of Stoic philosophy –logic, physics, and ethics –
and we have also seen Marcus deploy explicit arguments, making use of standard Stoic syllo-
gistic forms. I have tried to show that the claims that have often been made that Marcus was a
confused eclectic, merely interested in moral exhortation, or not a serious philosopher because
he resorted to rhetoric rather than argument, do not stand up to close scrutiny.
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APPENDIX
Editions of the Meditations
There are two complete sources for the text of the Meditations. The first is a manuscript in
the Vatican Library (Vaticanus Graecus 1950), dated to the fourteenth century, containing not
just the Meditations but a number of other ancient philosophical texts, including Xenophon’s
Memorabilia of Socrates, the Paraphrasis Christiana of Epictetus’s Enchridion, and a collection of
quotations from Epicurus now known as the Vatican Sayings.1 This was acquired by the Vatican
Library in 1683. The second is the first printed edition of the Meditations, based on a now lost
manuscript once in the Palatine Library, in Heidelberg. This edition was initiated by Conrad
Gesner and was accompanied by a translation into Latin by Wilhelm Xylander and published
either towards the end of 1558 or early in 1559. It was reprinted in 1568 and 1590. A number
of other manuscripts exist that preserve extracts from the Meditations,2 but the Vatican manu-
script and the editio princeps are the only two complete witnesses for the text.
A new edition prepared by Amadeus Sally in 1626 is noteworthy for being the first to
number individual sections within each book. It was reprinted in 1635 and followed not
long after by two important editions, by Meric Casaubon (1634) and Thomas Gataker (1652).
Both contained important notes on the text and Gataker’s constitute one of the most detailed
commentaries ever produced. These two editions also number sections within books, div-
iding them up in slightly different ways. It was, however, Gataker’s that proved to be the most
popular and is the basis for the subdivisions used today. Indeed, the reason for this is easy to
see: while Casaubon’s edition was never reprinted, Gataker’s was reprinted in 1697 and 1707,
and was the basis for subsequent editions in 1704, 1728, and 1744.
The century or so from the mid-1700s to the mid-1800s saw a variety of new editions,
none especially noteworthy. De Joly’s, 1774, attempted to re-organize the text, grouping
sections under thematic headings, an experiment that did not catch on. Other editions were
prepared by Morus (1775), Schultz (1802), and Koraes (1816), among others.
The late nineteenth century saw a Teubner edition by Stich, 1882 (reprinted 1903), and
in the same year a text, translation, and detailed commentary on Book 4 only, by Hastings
Crossley. In an introductory note, he reported that he was working on a complete translation
and commentary, but only this portion made it into print. The early twentieth century saw
editions in newly formed series of ancient texts such as Leopold for the Oxford Classical Texts
129
Appendix 129
(1908), Schenkl for Teubner (1913), Haines for the Loeb Classical Library (1916), and Trannoy
for Budé (1925). The last two of these have been reprinted often.
In 1944, A. S. L. Farquharson’s major edition was published posthumously, containing text,
translation, and two separate commentaries on the text. While a number of other editions
have be published since, often with facing translations into vernaculars, such as Theiler (1951),
Cortassa (1984), R. Nickel (1990), the most significant recent edition is Dalfen’s critical
edition for Teubner, first published in 1979, with a second edition in 1987. Although this has
been criticized for bracketing many passages as interpolations,3 it has become the standard
modern edition of the Meditations.
Since Dalfen, there has also appeared the first volume of a new edition by Hadot and Luna,
containing just Book 1, prefaced by an extensive introduction. Although Hadot’s work on the
rest of the text was cut short by his death, further volumes are expected to complete this new
Budé edition.
Fuller accounts of the history of the text can be found in Schenkl (1913: vi–xvi, xxvii–
xxxi), Farquharson (1944: xxii–lv), Dalfen (1987: vi–xxvii), and Hadot and Luna (1998: cxci–
cciv). For a bibliography of editions and translations printed up to 1908, see Wickham Legg
(1910).
Notes
1 For a full description of Vaticanus Graecus 1950 and its contents, see Canart (1970–73: I, 762–6).
The contents are also listed in Schenkl (1913: xi) and Farquharson (1944: I, xxix–xxx). See also Boter
(1999: 14–15) (also 204), who notes that the version of the Enchiridion contained therein is a hybrid,
part the original Enchiridion and part the Paraphrasis Christiana. On the Epicurean Sententiae Vaticanae,
first noticed and printed in 1888, see Bailey (1926: 375).
2 See the descriptions in Farquharson (1944: I, xxx–xxxii) and Dalfen (1987: viii–xix).
3 See for example the review in Sandbach (1981).
130
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138
INDEX OF PASSAGES
Abbreviations generally follow those in the Oxford Classical Dictionary; for Galen see the list in Singer
(2013), which includes translations of Aff. Pecc. Dig., Ind., Mor., and QAM.Where specific editions of texts
have been used, these are noted. For Marcus Aurelius, passages mentioned in the text are listed, but those
that appear in long lists of further examples in the notes are not included here.
Aetius (Diels 1879) 6a: 108, 115n3

1.3.25: 61 10: 53n24, 88n26
1.7.33: 61, 103n32 10b: 88n32
1.28.4: 68 11m: 53n24
1.28.5: 78n3 Augustine
2.1.7: 66n12 Conf.
4.12.1-5: 41 11.26.33: 103n26
4.21.1-4: 88n12 De civ. D.
4.21.2: 88n15 5.8: 68–9
Alexander of Aphrodisias Aulus Gellius
in Top. Noctes Atticae (NA)
1,8-14: 41 7.2.3: 68
Mixt. 7.2.11: 125n17
225,1-2: 61 7.2.12: 35n39
Apuleius 7.2.15: 125n17
Apol. 9.5.8: 124n2
19: 9, 17n12 12.5.7: 125n5
38: 9 19.1.1-21: 53n28
85: 9 19.1.14: 18n45
Arethas of Caesarea
Scholia in Lucianum (Rabe 1906) Calcidius
207, 6-7: 34n9 in Tim.
Aristotle 144: 68
Hist. an. 220: 88n15
486a5-14: 125n21 Carm. Aur. (Thom 1995)
[Mund.] 9: 35n37
391b9-12: 79n22 14: 35n37
Phys. 35: 35n37
222a10-19: 103n29 40-44: 30
Arius Didymus (Pomeroy 1999) 54: 35n39
6: 113 55-6: 35n39
139
Cicero 7.49-51: 48
Acad. 7.49: 41, 49, 51, 52n20
1.40: 48 7.64: 115n6
2.23: 35n18 7.80: 52n19, 125n18
2.137: 119 7.81: 79n27
Div. 7.82: 51n5
1.125-6: 68 7.85: 125n5
Fat. 7.87-9: 66n4, 115n3
43: 125n17 7.87: 58, 108
Fin. 7.88: 108, 115n1, 120
1.42: 35n18 7.89: 108, 110
1.72: 35n18 7.92: 110
3.4: 35n18 7.101-5: 103n40, 115n9
3.16-24: 115n9 7.103-4: 79n13
3.16: 125n5 7.110-11: 34n12
3.22: 103n42 7.116: 88n27
3.59: 125n13 7.134: 66n8
3.64: 126n22 7.135: 61, 103n32
4.19: 35n18 7.138: 61
5.16: 35n18 7.139: 59
5.18: 35n18 7.141: 102n11
Off. 7.148-9: 78n3
3.21-2: 126n22 7.157: 88n11, 103n30
3.32: 126n22 7.159: 52n21
Nat. D 7.160: 11
2.21-2: 66n5 7.161: 17n32
2.35: 125n15 7.163: 17n32
2.40-1: 18n39 7.166-7: 30
Tusc. 7.168: 12
2.12: 35n18 7.174: 18n40, 66n23
3.1-21: 26 7.178: 66n24
3.16: 115n10 7.187: 51n5
3.24-5: 34n12, 88n26 7.201: 53n24
3.29: 36n44
3.52: 31, 36n44 Epictetus
4.14: 34n12 Diss.
5.108: 125n8 Praef. 2: 13
Cleanthes 1.2.33: 84, 88n5
Hymn to Zeus (Thom 2005) 1.6.13: 52n14
23-5: 35n39 1.7.1: 40
Clement of Alexandria 1.7.32: 40
Strom. 1.9.1: 125n8
5.105.2: 66n19 1.11.33: 53n22
1.15.1-5: 88n31
Dio Cassius 1.15.2: 22, 25
69.21.2: 8 1.17.1-12: 40
71.1.2: 8 1.17.13-18: 17n27
72.35.1: 16n9 1.20.7: 21
Diogenes Laertius 1.20.10: 21
6.63: 118 1.20.15: 52n14
6.70: 35n34 1.22.10: 103n41
7.39: 51n3 1.26.18: 53n29
7.41: 40, 51n3 1.27: 35n33
7.43: 40 1.27.1: 46
7.43-4: 40 1.27.21: 46
7.46-7: 40 1.28: 46
7.46: 52n17 1.28.11-12: 52n14
140
140 Index of passages
1.29.1-3: 48–9 Fronto (Hout 1988)

1.30: 35n33 Ad M. Caes.
2.5.24: 123 2.3: 9
2.5.25: 123 4.13: 11
2.5.26: 123, 125n9 51: 8
2.6.9-10: 124 De eloqu.
2.17.34-40: 17n27 1.3: 17n25
2.17.34: 40, 51n5 2.11: 10, 11
2.18.23-5: 46 2.13: 10, 39
2.18.24: 50 2.14: 10
2.19: 36n53 De orat.
2.19.20-5: 26 3: 12
2.23.44: 40 Fer. Als.
3.2.1-2: 18n50, 34n2, 111 3.6: 10
3.2.5: 115n15
3.2.6: 116n15 Galen (Kühn 1821–33)
3.8.5: 43, 49 Aff. Pecc. Dig. (De Boer 1937)
3.12.15: 50 1.1.4: 14
3.16.15: 21 1.3.10: 14
3.21: 36n53 1.4.4: 14
3.21.1-4: 27 1.5.1: 14, 28
3.22: 35n34, 118 1.5.6: 14
3.22.104: 21 1.6.10: 14
3.22.105: 82 1.8.3: 13
3.26.23: 12 1.8.8: 19n58
4.1: 118 1.9.20: 15
4.12: 21–3 De moribus (Mor.)
4.12.1: 22 31 Kr.: 28
4.12.4: 21 Foet. Form. (Nickel 2001)
4.12.5: 22 6.31: 14
4.12.6: 22 Ind. (Boudon–Millot et al. 2010)
4.12.7-8: 22 46: 15
4.12.11-12: 23 49-50: 13
4.12.13: 22 54: 15
4.12.14: 22 56: 15
4.12.15: 22 65: 15
4.12.16: 23 Introductio sive medicus (Petit 2009)
4.12.19: 23 8 (15,16-23): 52n8
Ench. Lib. Prop. (Boudon–Millot 2007)
1.1: 47, 78, 103n41 3.1: 18n52
1.5: 45 14.21: 18n56
5: 47, 63 18.1-2: 18n56
8: 121 Opt. Doct. (Barigazzi 1991)
9: 88n5 1.2: 18n56
17: 97 PHP (De Lacy 1978–84)
46: 27 2.5.16: 88n25
52: 52n12 3.1.25: 88n14
53.1: 18n37, 69 3.5.28: 88n25
Epicurus 5.2.22-3: 26
Ep. Men. Praen. (Nutton 1979)
124: 98 9.5-8: 13
125: 98 11.1-8: 13
Rat. Sent. Quod animi mores (QAM)
19: 98 3: 14
Eusebius
Praep. evang. Hierocles
15.20.2: 18n40 El. Eth. (Ramelli 2009)
15.20.6: 103n30 1.31-3: 52–3n21
141
1.35-7: 125n5 3.7: 98

6.51-9: 117 3.9: 51
11.15-17: 117 3.10: 100
Hippolytus 3.11: 33, 49, 51, 58, 118
Haer. 3.13: 23
1.21: 69 3.14: 34n9
Historia Augusta (HA) 3.16: 83, 88n30
1.16.10: 7 4.2: 24
3.10.4: 16n7 4.3: 20–21, 23, 34nn10–11, 48, 50, 53n30,
4.1.1: 7 74, 77, 86, 94
4.2.1: 7 4.4: 40, 119
4.2.4: 9 4.7: 50
4.2.6: 7 4.14: 97
4.2.7: 8 4.19: 100
4.3.1-2: 8 4.21: 60, 96, 97
4.3.2: 8 4.22: 47
4.3.3: 8 4.23: 121
4.3.4: 8 4.24: 112
4.27: 74, 77, 79n27
Iamblichus 4.29: 122
Vita Pythagorae 4.36: 14
196: 36n44 4.37: 101
4.39: 84
Lucan 4.40: 14, 49, 63, 64
De bello civile 4.41: 12
2.7-15: 79n18 4.42: 63
Lucian 4.43: 62, 63, 66n17
Demon. 4.44: 63
31: 16n7 4.45: 64
Ind. 4.46: 12, 14, 63, 64, 66n27
13: 13 4.48: 14
Lucretius 5.1: 24, 31
De rerum natura 5.2: 44
1.174-9: 67n31 5.6: 113
5.8: 11, 70, 71, 72, 77, 78, 78n6
Marcus Aurelius 5.12: 110, 111
1.7: 8, 12 5.13: 60, 61
1.8: 8 5.16: 27–8, 42
1.9: 8, 107 5.22: 120, 121
1.13: 9 5.24: 81
1.15: 9 5.26: 50, 83, 85
1.17: 9, 39, 40 6.3: 75
2.1: 31 6.4: 74–5
2.2: 83, 88n17 6.5: 75
2.3: 72, 73, 77, 78n11 6.8: 66n13, 84
2.7: 23, 47 6.10: 75, 77
2.8: 26 6.13: 32–3, 42, 45, 51, 58
2.10: 86, 89n33 6.14: 87, 89n38, 116n18
2.11: 72, 75, 77, 86 6.15: 62, 91
2.12: 86 6.16: 24, 47, 85
2.13: 86 6.24: 75
2.14: 94, 98 6.25: 75
2.15: 48 6.28: 96
2.16: 118, 121 6.35: 24
2.17: 62, 63, 90, 101–2 6.36: 32, 91
3.3: 66n9 6.42: 10, 12, 63, 66n27
3.4: 21, 27, 45, 107 6.44: 118
3.6: 47, 70, 110, 111 6.47: 12, 36n52, 63
142
6.49: 98 10.7: 76–7, 97

7.9: 59 10.9: 57
7.11: 107 10.11: 57, 99, 100, 101
7.13: 122–3, 125n21 10.13: 31
7.17: 44 10.15: 58, 107, 118
7.19: 10, 36n52, 65 10.17-19: 103n22
7.23: 97 10.17: 46, 95
7.28: 86, 112 10.18: 65, 95
7.29: 60, 100 10.19: 95
7.32: 96 10.24: 84, 85
7.33: 97, 103n35 10.28: 69
7.35: 115n12 10.31: 94
7.46: 78n5 10.33: 120, 121
7.47-8: 32, 46 11.1: 66n9, 66n12
7.55: 112 11.5: 24
7.56: 101, 107 11.8: 122, 125n20
7.63: 110, 111 11.10: 112
7.64: 23, 97, 103n35 11.16: 11
7.67: 24, 39, 41 11.18: 85
7.68: 24 11.19: 85
7.69: 101 11.20: 85
7.73: 114 11.36: 82
7.74: 110, 112 11.37-9: 12
7.75: 75, 77 12.1: 57, 58, 66n13, 73, 77, 107
8.1: 39, 40, 110, 111 12.3: 83, 100
8.3: 12, 36n52, 61, 63, 12.5: 73, 77
66n7 12.8: 48, 51
8.7: 47 12.13: 57
8.11: 60 12.14: 71, 72, 76, 77, 78n5
8.13: 39, 43, 49, 57, 60 12.15: 110, 111
8.26: 113 12.18: 60
8.29: 43 12.19: 88n30
8.34: 122, 125n20 12.21: 65
8.35: 70 12.22: 50, 51
8.36: 44, 96, 100 12.23: 11, 65
8.40: 43 12.24: 32, 73, 77
8.47: 47 12.25: 51
8.48: 86 12.26: 48
8.49: 42–3, 49 12.29: 60
8.50: 57 12.30: 62, 67n28
8.52: 57 12.33: 84
8.58: 98–9 12.34: 99
9.1: 72, 77, 111, 112 12.36: 97, 118
9.2: 96 Musonius Rufus (Hense 1905)
9.3: 11, 96 1 (4,5-5,2): 18n37
9.7: 47 6 (22,6-27,15): 28–9, 35nn26–32
9.9: 119 9 (42,1-2): 125n8
9.11: 77 9 (47,7-9): 66n25
9.25: 60 18a (96,8-10): 66n25
9.28: 75, 77, 78n5 44 (128,7-11): 40
9.29: 119
9.30: 36n46 Origen
9.35: 65 C. Cels.
9.39: 76 6.2: 13
9.41: 98, 103n35
9.42: 112, 114 Philo
10.5: 71, 77, 78 Aet. mundi
10.6: 76, 77, 120, 121 76-7: 66n9
143
Leg. alleg. 6.21.2: 115

2.22-3: 88n9 7.1.3-4: 30
Philostratus 7.2.1: 30
Vitas Sophistarum (VS) De otio
2.11.1: 8 4.1: 118, 123
Photius Ep.
Bibl. 2.2-4: 27
cod. 58 (17b11-20): 18n45 2.5: 99
Plato 8.8: 99
Apology (Ap.) 12.7: 66n25
25a-b: 24 16.4-6: 79n17, 79n25
28e: 25 28.4: 125n9
38a: 25, 53n29 33.4: 16
39c: 25 36.3: 17n30
Cratylus 44.3: 12
402a: 66n18 58.23: 66n25
Euthydemus 65.2: 61
278e-281e: 103n40 71.13-14: 102n3
Gorgias (Grg.) 71.15: 90
463a-466a: 25 71.31: 35n20
512d-e: 78n5 78.29: 36n45
514e: 26 91.3-4: 36n45
527d: 26 94.1-18: 17n30
Republic (Resp.) 95.7-9: 35n18
427d-441e: 116n17 107.11: 18n37, 69
432a: 116n17 115.8: 17n30
433b: 112 Helv.
486a: 115n12 9.7: 125n9
487a: 115n12 Ira
Symposium (Symp.) 2.10.5: 66n25
186b: 115n5 3.36.1-3: 29–30
Plotinus Nat. Quaest.
Enn. 2.45.2: 69
3.7.1: 102n8 Tranq.
3.7.11: 103n26 15.2: 66n25
Plutarch Vit. Beat.
Comm. not. 26.1: 36n45
1081c-1082a: 102n13 Sextus Empiricus
1081e: 102n14 Math.
1082a: 93 8.224: 52n19
De Alex. fort. 9.71-4: 103n30
329a-b: 125n11 9.104: 59
De exil. 9.110: 59
600f: 125n8 9.332: 66n12
De virt. mor. Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes
440f: 115n13 3.25: 26
441a: 115n13 Simplicius
Quaest. Plat. in Cael.
1007d-e: 67n33 294,4-7: 66n21
St. rep. in Ench. (Hadot 1996)
1038b: 125n5 Praef. 18-20: 35n33
1055f: 53n24 6,15-20: 46
in Phys.
Seneca 23,33-24,11: 66n20
Ben. 480,27-30: 66n21
1.6.1: 114 Stobaeus (Wachsmuth and Hense
2.6.2: 115 1884–1912)
2.17.7: 115 1,25,3-27,4: 78n4
144
1,105,17-106,4: 102n14 2,88,8-89,3: 53n24, 88n26

1,106,5-23: 102n12 2,90,19-91,1: 88n32
1,171,2: 66n9 2,111,18-113,11: 53n24
2,13,5-7: 73 3,648-51: 35n26
2,59,4-11: 115n10 4,671,3-673,18: 125n6
2,63,8-11: 111 4,672,16-18: 118
2,75,7-10: 113
2,75,11-76,23: 66n4, 115n3 Themistius
2,75,11-12: 115n4 Orationes (Or.)
2,76,1-8: 108 6.81c: 34n9
2,76,2-3: 108
2,76,9-15: 103n42 Xenophon
2,76,18-19: 109 Oeconomicus (Oec.)
2,88,6: 88n29 1.11: 115n5
145
SUBJECT INDEX
Academy, sceptical 46, 48, 53n27 Cooper, Anthony Ashley 1

Alexander of Aphrodisias 41 Cornutus 17n28, 73
Alexander the Great 119 cosmic city 74, 76, 117–24, 125n9, 126n22
Antipater 101, 103n42 cosmopolitanism 118, 125n7
Antoninus Pius 7, 16n7
Apollonius of Chalcedon 8, 16n7 death, reflections on 72, 75, 77, 95, 96–100, 101–2
Archedemus 102n14, 108 Demetrius the Cynic 30
archery, analogy with 101 development, stages of philosophical 65, 70, 71
Aristo of Chios 11, 17nn32–5, 18n36, digestion, analogy with 27–8
111, 115n13 Diocles of Magnesia 41
Aristotle 103n29, 125n21 Diogenes of Babylon 108, 119
Arius Didymus 25, 108–9, 115n8 Diogenes of Sinope 29, 61, 63, 118
Arrian 12–13, 18n46 dyeing the soul 21, 27–8, 42
art of living 22, 24–7
assent 48, 49, 84 emotions 31, 34n12, 85–6, 88nn27–9, 96
atomism 72, 73–7, 96–7, 98 Epictetus 10, 11, 12–13, 21–4, 26, 27, 40, 73,
attention 21–3 79n19, 97, 101, 121, 123, 128, 129n1; his three
Augustine 68–9, 103n26 topoi 18n50, 34n2, 111, 115n15; on impressions
46, 50; on judgements 47, 48–9; on prohairesis
Bergson, Henri 95, 103n27 81–2, 88n5; on things ‘up to us’ (ep’ hêmin) 45,
47–8, 78, 82, 83, 86, 100
Casaubon, Meric 16n2, 20, 34nn4–5, 36n48, Epicurus, Epicureanism 73, 74, 76, 78, 103n34,
67n27, 79n24, 103n22, 128 128, 129n1; on death 97–9
Cato the Younger 90–1, 102n2 epistemology, Stoic 48–9, 53n27
Catulus, Cinna 8, 9 eternity (aiôn) 91, 93, 94–5, 102n6, 103n20
change 62–65, 76–7, 90–1, 99, 100, 101–2
Chrysippus 10–11, 13, 17n26, 25, 26, 30, 31, 40, fate (heimarmenê) 68–72, 78n1, 78n5
79n21, 101, 103n30, 111, 123–4; his cylinder Favorinus 18n56
analogy 121; on impressions 41, 43, 44; on fire, primordial 61, 62, 76
emotions 85; on fate 68–9; on location of freedom 22
hêgemonikon 82; on time 91–3; on the Stoic Fronto, Cornelius 9–10, 11, 12, 17n15, 18nn42–3
telos 108–9
Cicero 25, 26, 31, 53n27 Galen 13–15, 18nn51–57, 19nn58–62, 26, 28
Cleanthes 11–12, 18nn37, 39, 30, 63, 66n23, Gataker, Thomas 36n48, 65n1, 67n29, 79n24,
66n25; on fate 69; on the Stoic telos 108–9 80n30, 103n22, 128
conflagration (ekpurôsis), periodic 61, 62, 66n9 Goldschmidt,Victor 91–2, 93, 94–5, 95–6
146
146 Subject index
Hadot, Pierre 28, 34n2, 79n28, 95–6, 111, present moment, focus on 22, 60, 73, 95–6, 98,
115n12, 115n14, 116n17 99, 100–1
Hadrian 7–8, 16n6 principles (archai), two Stoic 59–62, 66n8
Hecato 108 prohairesis (choice, will) 13, 48, 81–2, 84,
hêgemonikon (ruling part of the soul) 21, 45, 47, 87n3, 88n4
51, 52n21, 75, 82–5, 86–7 providence (pronoia) 68–70, 72–3, 77, 78n1,
Heraclitus 12, 61, 62–4, 66nn18–27, 67n30, 72 78n10; providence versus atoms 73–7
Hierocles 117–18, 124n2, 125n3 Pythagoras, Pythagoreanism 12, 14, 30, 33,
Hutcheson, Francis 1 36n44, 36n52, 63
Pythagorean Golden Verses 30
Ignatius of Loyola 28
impressions (phantasiai) 21, 40, 41–7, 48, 52n17, ready to hand (procheiros) 21–3, 29–30, 32, 34n11,
58, 84; first impressions 42–3, 49, 50, 52n20 35n33, 48
impulse (hormê) 47, 83–4 repetition 14, 28, 31
indifferents (adiaphora) 11, 18n36, 50, 51, 65, 72, retreat inwards 21, 81, 86–7
79n13, 100, 101, 110 rhetoric 9–10, 11, 40
intention in ethical action 114–15 Rusticus, Junius 8, 12, 16n9, 18n46
Rutherford, R. B. 10
Jackson, John 34n6
judgement (hupolêpsis) 21, 43–4, 45, 47–51, scale of Nature, Stoic 62, 66n16, 82, 83–4, 87
53n22; value judgement 48–9, 50, 53n22, Seneca 12, 18nn42–3, 25, 27, 29–30, 63, 66n25,
58, 63, 85 69, 70–1, 73, 90–1, 98, 99, 102n2; on cause
Julius Capitolinus 16n5 and matter 61–2; on cosmopolitanism 118; on
justice, virtue of 110, 111–13, 116n16 ethical action 114–15
Severus, Claudius 8, 9, 17n14
Lipsius, Justus 78n8 Sextius, Quintus 29–30
logic 39–41 Sextus Empiricus 25, 26
Lucan 73 Sextus of Chaeronea 8, 107
Shaftesbury, Third Earl of 1
Mai, Angelo 9, 17n16 Simplicius 46
Maximus, Claudius 8, 8–9, 17n12 social animals, humans as 72, 79n19, 87, 112, 114,
medicine, analogy with 25–6 117, 122, 124
Mill, John Stuart 1 Socrates 24, 25–6, 34n13, 50, 61, 63, 118
Moor, James 1 soul 81–5
More, Henry 1 spermatikos logos 96–7, 103n32
Musonius Rufus 28–9, 40, 63, 66n25 Sphaerus 63
spiritual exercises 28–33
Nature 59–65, 68, 74, 76–7, 81, 90 spontaneous ethical action 113–15
Nature, living consistently with 11, 58, 66n4, syllogisms 39, 40, 79n21; in the Meditations 42,
79n19, 107–10, 112–13, 115n7, 119 52n19, 75–6, 79n27, 125n18
oikieôsis, theory of 117–18, 119, 120, 125n4 Theophrastus 66n20, 86, 89n33

time, Stoic theory of 91–3
Palatine manuscript 34n8, 128 training (askêsis) 14–15, 19n61, 28–29, 30
parts and limbs 121–4, 125nn20–1
Persius 17n28 Vaticanus Graecus 1950 16n3, 65n1, 128,
Philodemus 98 129n1
Philopator 18n55 view from above 32, 46
physical description 33, 45–6, 51, 58, 60, 64 virtues, the Stoic 110–11, 115n10
physics 57–9, 64
Plato 13, 25–6, 109, 112, 115n12, 116n17, 119 Xenophon 109, 128
Platonism 64, 78n11, 83 Xylander, Wilhelm 16nn2–3, 34n8, 36n48, 65n1,
Plotinus 91, 102n8, 103n26 67n29, 79n24, 80n30, 128
Plutarch 8, 16n11, 92–3
pneuma (breath) 61, 82, 83 Zeno of Citium 12, 17n25, 19n65, 48, 60, 63, 69,
Posidonius 25, 78n3, 102n14, 108 102n15, 120; his Republic 119; on the Stoic telos
posthumous reputation 90, 100 108–9

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i

John Sellars is Lecturer in Philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London, a Visiting

PHILOSOPHY IN THE ROMAN WORLD

1 Marcus the Stoic philosopher 7

2 The Meditations, a philosophical text 20

3 Impressions and judgements 39

4 Nature and change 57

5 Fate and providence 68

6 Soul and emotion 81

7 Time and death 90

8 Virtue and justice 107

9 The cosmic city 117

REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

DK H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols

x References and abbreviations

LCL Loeb Classical Library

Marcus and his Meditations

Marcus the philosopher

8 Marcus and his Meditations

Marcus’s philosophy teachers

Marcus the Stoic philosopher 9

10 Marcus and his Meditations

Marcus and the early Stoics

Marcus the Stoic philosopher 11

12 Marcus and his Meditations

Marcus and Epictetus

Marcus the Stoic philosopher 13

14 Marcus and his Meditations

Marcus the Stoic philosopher 15

16 Marcus and his Meditations

Marcus the Stoic philosopher 17

18 Marcus and his Meditations

Marcus the Stoic philosopher 19

The Meditations, a philosophical text 21

22 Marcus and his Meditations

The Meditations, a philosophical text 23

He also takes up the analogy with craftsmen:

24 Marcus and his Meditations

The Meditations, a philosophical text 25

26 Marcus and his Meditations

The Meditations, a philosophical text 27

Assimilation and digestion

28 Marcus and his Meditations

The Meditations, a philosophical text 29

30 Marcus and his Meditations

Do not welcome sleep upon your soft eyes

The Meditations, a philosophical text 31

Spiritual exercises in the Meditations

32 Marcus and his Meditations

The Meditations, a philosophical text 33

34 Marcus and his Meditations

The Meditations, a philosophical text 35

15 Cf. Farquharson (1944: II, 860).

36 Marcus and his Meditations

Continually and, if possible, on the occasion of every impression (phantasia), test it by

Impressions and judgements 41

Reliable impressions and first impressions

Impressions and judgements 43

Continually and, if possible, on the occasion of every impression, test it by natural

PHILOSOPHY IN THE ROMAN WORLD

Marcus and the early Stoics

Do not welcome sleep upon your soft eyes

15 Cf. Farquharson (1944: II, 860).

also matters); instead it is an interrogation in search of value-judgements that might generate

The unity of Nature

In another passage in which he lists to himself a series of fundamental exhortations –wipe

Expanding the scale of nature

Our place in nature

Early Stoic accounts of time

Why think about death?

Living in the present moment

Time and death 101

Dealing with time and death

Time and death 103

Living consistently with Nature

The pre-eminence of justice

So what is a benefit? It is a well-intentioned action that confers joy and in so doing

The cosmic city 119

Putting whole before part

The cosmic city 121

The cosmic city 123

The cosmic city 125