VOL.

437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 565

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

*
G.R. No. 151149. September 7, 2004.

GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA,

JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and
JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Settled

is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction.—Settled is the doctrine that
the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence,
more so when no determination of the merits has yet been made
by the trial court, as in this case.
Same; Same; Motions; Dismissal; Motu Proprio; In four
excepted circumstances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the
claim or action.— Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res
judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the
evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall
motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin we
explained thus: “x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was
traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not
appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules
or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any
motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of
the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding
Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of
Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought
about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio dismiss a claim

_______________
 * THIRD DIVISION.

566

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it

has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another
cause of action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations. x x x.”
Courts; Jurisdiction; Residual Jurisdiction; The trial court
still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the
appeal.—The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a
stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the
appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by
the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but
prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
Public Lands; Nullification of Title; Allegations; In an action
for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint
must contain the following allegations.—In an action for
nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint
must contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land
was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the
assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2) that the
defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in
obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by
the plaintiff. In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or
deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land
Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence,
the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
Same; Reversion; Section 101 of the Public Land Act
categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer
in his stead may institute such an action.—Neither can
petitioner’s case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public
Land Act categorically declares that only the solicitor general or
the officer in his stead may institute such an action. A private
person may not bring an action for reversion or any other action
that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its
derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered
would again form part of the public domain.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the decision of the Court.

567

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 567

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

     Manuel Abrogar III for petitioner.

     Roland E. Pay for respondent Agustin.
          Zoilo C. Cruzat for respondents Palanca, Jr.,
Gapilango and Fresnillo.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a

cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with
the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio
by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated
for review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of
such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.

The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the2
Rules of Court, assailing the December 38, 2000 Decision
and the November 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

“Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the

exclusive right in applying for the patent over the land in
question, it appears that his action is already barred by laches
because he slept on his alleged right for almost 23 years from the
time the original certificate of title has been issued to respondent
Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was
certified as agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the
annulment of patents or titles acquired through fraud is the
State; thus, the petitioner’s action is deemed misplaced as he
really does not have any right to assert or protect. What he had
during the time he requested for the re-classification of the land
was the privilege of applying for the patent over the same upon
the land’s conversion from forest to agricultural.

_______________

1Rollo, pp. 8-18.

2Id., pp. 19-26. Twelfth Division. Penned by Justice Eliezer R. de Los Santos
and concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (Division chairman) and Eloy R.
Bello, Jr. (member).
3 Rollo, pp. 27-31. Special Former Twelfth Division. Penned by Justice de Los
Santos, and concurred in by Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rebecca de
Guia-Salvador. Justices Labitoria and Bello dissented.

568

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

“WHEREFORE, the petition

4
is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to cost.”

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the

Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed
the RTC’s dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No.
3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but
because of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.

The Antecedent Facts

The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:

“On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a

request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of
real property known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait,
Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of approximately 18 hectares.
Said property is within Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C
of Aborlan, Palawan, per BF Map LC No. 1582.
“Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, ordered the inspection, investigation and
survey of the land subject of the petitioner’s request for eventual
conversion or reclassification from forest to agricultural land, and
thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead patent.
“Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification
Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection and survey
of the area in the presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo
Katon (deceased) and his cousin, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca,
Jr. During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the
island but there were some coconut trees claimed to have been
planted by petitioner and [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr.
(alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to the island from time
to time to undertake development work, like planting of
additional coconut trees.
“The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island
was favorably endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto
Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The
names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus
Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement
as co-applicants of the petitioner.
“In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of
Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila,
that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest
purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

_______________

4CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 25

569

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 569

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

“Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero

Island had been classified from forest land to agricultural land
and certified available for disposition upon his request and at his
instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then [l]and investigator of
the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably
endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and
Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey on November 15, 1965.
On November 22, a second endorsement was issued by Palawan
District Officer Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to
survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island for the respondents
consisting of five (5) hectares each. On December 10, 1965, Survey
Authority No. R III-342-65 was issued authorizing Deputy Public
Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador to survey ten (10) hectares of
Sombrero Island for the respondents. On December 23, 1990,
[R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin filed a homestead patent
application for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area
of 4.3 hectares.
“Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan
Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the
island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that
[R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on
June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued
Homestead
5
Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3,
1977 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
“Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and
original certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero
Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same
were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the
reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
“On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims
that he himself requested for the reclassification of the island in
dispute and that on or about the time of such request,
[R]espondents Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already occupied
their respective areas and introduced numerous improvements. In
addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead
application for the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel
Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey of the island.
“According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the
respondents insist that they already had their respective
occupancy and improvements on the island. Palanca denies that
he is a mere overseer of the petitioner because he said he was
acting for himself in developing his own area and not as anybody’s
caretaker.
“Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful
possessors of their respective portions and have declared said
portions for taxation

_______________

5 The date on the Certificate of Title is February 21, 1977. See CA Rollo, p. 28.

570

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon
for twenty years.
“Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity
to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action for
reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere
homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by
laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an
unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
“In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead
patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the
respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as
well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The
petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an
application for homestead patent over the whole island since it
was he who requested
6
for its conversion from forest land to
agricultural land.”

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or

Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On
June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial
court’s Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus
effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased,
Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted
by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29,
1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution
dated December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited
motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA,
petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his
first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of

discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while
petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero
Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for
a homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he
never acquired title to that land.
The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a
homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the
State were matters between the latter and the homestead
grantee. Unless and

_______________

6CA Decision, pp. 1-5; Rollo, pp. 19-23.

571

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 571

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

until the government takes steps to annul the grant, the

home-steader’s right thereto stands.
Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the
exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question,
he was already barred by laches for having slept on his
right for almost 23 years from the time Respondent
Palanca’s title had been issued.
In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it
had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed
with petitioner that the trial court had acted without
jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10,
1999 Motion for Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground
that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was
actually only his first motion.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio
by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of
five members—with two justices dissenting—pursuant to
its “residual prerogative” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court.
From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate
court opined that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek
reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held
title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It
reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation of
the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion
of the land to the public domain.
Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the
action for reconveyance. First, petitioner’s action was
brought 24 years after the issuance of Palanca’s homestead
patent. Under the Public Land Act, such action should have
been taken within ten years from the issuance of the
homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from the
submission (Annex “F” of the Complaint) of petitioner
himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been
occupying six hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years
before he took legal steps to assert his right to the property.
His action was filed beyond the 30-year prescriptive period
under Articles 1141 and7 1137 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition.

_______________

7The Petition was deemed submitted for decision on March 12, 2003,
upon the Court’s receipt of the Memorandum of Respondents Palanca,
Gapilango and Fresnillo signed by Atty. Zoilo C. Cruzat. Respondent
Agustin’s 3-page Memorandum, received on February 10, 2002, was
signed

572

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.
Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

“1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for

Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the
case) in the Petition?
“2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged
‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving
8
the Petition on an
issue not raised in the Petition?”

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits

This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue
with the propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He
raised it with the appellate court when he moved for
reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA
even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution,
as follows:

“Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may
indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety,
complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues
involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges,
five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting,
often confusing, 9submissions bearing on incidental matters. We
stand corrected.”

That explanation should have been enough to settle the

issue. The CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered
petitioner’s issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it
further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed
acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case
when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact,
raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed
by the trial court in denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office
of a writ

_______________
 by Atty. Roland E. Pay. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty.
Manuel Abrogar III, was received on February 14, 2003.
8Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; Rollo, p. 160.
9CA Resolution, p. 2; Rollo, p. 28.

573

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 573

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction.

10
Such
writ does not include a review of the evidence, more so
when no determination of the merits has yet been made by
the trial court, as in this case.

Second Issue:
Dismissal for Prescription
and Lack of Jurisdiction

Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked

its “residual prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition
for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him,
residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court,
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly
exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that
such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its
“residual prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court with the “residual jurisdiction” of trial
courts over cases appealed to the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3)
res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the
pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted
instances, the court shall motu
11
proprio dismiss the claim or
action. In Gumabon v. Larin we explained thus:

“x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally

limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any
order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio
dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff
to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule
9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court,

_______________

10 Oro v. Diaz, 413 Phil. 416, 427; 361 SCRA 108, 117-118, July 11, 2001;
Negros Oriental Electric Cooperative 1 v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 357
SCRA 668, 673, May 9, 2001; Spouses Ampeloquio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 389
Phil. 13, 18-19; 333 SCRA 465, June 15, 2000.
11 422 Phil. 222, 230; 370 SCRA 638, 643-644, November 27, 2001.

574

574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no

radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio
dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on
record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when
there is another cause of action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or where the action 12is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.” (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, “residual jurisdiction” is embodied in

Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

“SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.—A party’s appeal by

notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of
the notice of appeal in due time.
“A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to
him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval
of the record on appeal filed in due time.
“In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over
the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and
the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
“In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties.
“In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or
the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection
and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal.” (Italics supplied)
The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a
stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in
the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records
on appeal, but prior to the transmittal
13
of the original
records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the
trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of

_______________

12Ibid., per Vitug, J.

13 Zacate v. Commission on Elections, 353 SCRA 441, 448, March 1,
2001. See also Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I (seventh rev.
ed.), pp. 509-510.

575

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 575

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and

allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s
Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on
residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order
of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation
of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the
case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual
prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts
to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds
mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the 14
Rules of Court and
under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind
when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio “on more
fundamental grounds 15
directly bearing on the lower court’s
lack of jurisdiction” and for prescription of the action.
Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
16
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations 17
in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought. In his Complaint for
“Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original
Certificate
18
of Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of
Title,” petitioner averred:
 “2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of
[petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioner’s]
cousin, in connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo
Agustin, x x x fraudulently and in bad faith:

2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a

prerequisite to the filing of an application for homestead
patent in his name and that of his Co-[Respondent]
Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that [Petitioner]
KATON had previously applied or requested for re-
classification and certification of the same land from forest

_______________

14 The said section provides that “[t]hese rules shall apply in all courts, except
as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.”
15 CA Resolution, p. 2; Rollo, p. 28.
16 Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 279, 285, March 19, 1990.
17 Alemar’s (Sibal & Sons), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 333, 339,
January 26, 2001; Gochan v. Young, 354 SCRA 207, 211 & 216, March 12, 2001;
Saura v. Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA 465, 472, September 1, 1999.
18 This is the case caption.

576

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

land to agricultural land which request was favorably acted

upon and approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic
fraud and misrepresentation;
x x x      x x x      x x x

2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he

was applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero
Island where there was none, the same constituted
another clear case of fraud and misrepresentation;

“3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and

OCT No. G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel
Palanca Jr. and the filing of Homestead Patent
Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo
Agustin, Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having
been done fraudulently and in bad faith,
19
are ipso facto null
and void and of no effect whatsoever.”

x x x     x x x     x x x
“x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending
the effects with natural necessity arise knowing from such act or
omission, [Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation,
first degree cousins, trust, interdependence
20
and intimacy is guilty
of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x.”

Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a

judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent applications
of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as
Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the
name of Respondent Palanca; and (2) ordering the director
of the Land Management21
Bureau to reconvey the Sombrero
Island to petitioner.
The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an
action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and
certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or
did it plead merely for reversion?
The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any
of such actions, over which the trial court could have
exercised jurisdiction.
In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its
nullity, the complaint must contain the following
allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned
by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed
certificate of title to the defendant; and 2) that the
defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in

_______________

19Complaint, p. 5; Rollo, p. 39. Citations omitted.

20Id., pp. 4 & 38.
21Id., pp. 8 & 42.

577

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 577

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

obtaining a document 22of title over the parcel of land

claimed by the plaintiff. In these cases, the nullity arises
not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director
of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to
bestow title; hence,
23
the issued patent or certificate of title
was void ab initio.
In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate
of title is also respected as incontrovertible, but the
transfer of the property or title thereto is sought to be
nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully 24
or
erroneously registered in the defendant’s name. As with
an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts
that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title
to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of
the land, and (2) that the defendant
25
illegally dispossessed
the plaintiff of the property. Therefore, the defendant who
acquired the property through mistake or fraud is bound to
hold and 26
reconvey to the plaintiff the property or the title
thereto.
In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did
petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the
land in question. On the contrary, he27 acknowledged that
the disputed island was public land, that it had never
been privately titled in his name, and that he had not
applied for28 a homestead under the provisions of the Public
Land Act. This Court has held that a complaint by a
private party who alleges that a homestead patent was
obtained by fraudulent means, and who consequently prays
for its annulment, does not state a29 cause of action; hence,
such complaint must be dismissed.

_______________

22 Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, 428 Phil. 249, 260; 378 SCRA
206, 214, February 27, 2002.
23Ibid.

24Id., p. 262.
25Ibid.

26Id., p. 263.
27Complaint, par. 7, p. 3; Rollo, p. 37.
28 On page 4 of his Complaint, petitioner averred that he “could not
have filed an application for homestead because [Respondent] Manuel
Palanca Jr., as an overseer of Sombrero Island for [petitioner] did not
advise [him] of the receipt of the letter dated September 23, 1965 x x x”;
Rollo, p. 38.
29 Spouses Tankiko v. Cezar, 362 Phil. 184, 194-195; 302 SCRA 559,
569, February 2, 1999 (citing Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1157-1158,
September 23, 1957).

578

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

Neither can petitioner’s case be one for reversion. Section

101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only
the solicitor general
30
or the officer in his stead may institute
such an action. A private person may not bring an action
for reversion or any other action that would have the effect
of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the
result that the land thereby
31
covered would again form part
of the public domain.
Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that
the disputed land will revert to the public domain even if
the title is canceled or amended, the action is for reversion;
and the proper party who may bring action 32
is the
government, to which the property will revert. A mere
homestead applicant, not being the real party in33 interest,
has no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance. As it is,
vested rights over the land applied for under a homestead
may be validly claimed only by the applicant, after
approval by the director of the Land Management 34
Bureau
of the former’s final proof of homestead patent.
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper
not only because of lack of jurisdiction,35
but also because of
the utter absence of a cause of36 action, a defense raised by
respondents in37 their Answer. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court ordains that every

_______________

30 Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, supra; Spouses Tankiko v. Cezar,

Id., pp. 193 & 195; Peltan Development Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil.
824, 836; 270 SCRA 82, March 19, 1997.
31 Lucas v. Durian, supra; Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First
Instance, 96 Phil. 946, 953, April 30, 1955.
32 Gabila v. Barriga, 148-B Phil. 615, 618; 41 SCRA 131, September 30,
1971 (cited in Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, supra).
33 Quinsay v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 268, 277, March
18, 1991; Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio, 104 Phil. 126, 129-130, June 30,
1958.
34 Quinsay v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.
35§1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
36 Pp. 3-4 thereof; Rollo, pp. 46-47. This affirmative defense was also
raised by Respondent Agustin in his “Answer with Affirmative Defense”
on p. 4 thereof; Rollo, p. 53.
37§2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:

“SEC. 2. Parties in interest—A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise

579

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 579

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest, who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right
or interest to protect has no cause of action by which38 to
invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to
bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, 39
the case should still be dismissed for being time-barred. It
is not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original
Certificate
40
of Title was issued to Palanca on February 21,
1977, while the Complaint was filed only on October 6,
1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years
from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the
prescriptive period for41 reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property.
It must likewise be stressed that Palanca’s title—which
attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the
issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in
February 1977—is no longer open to review on the ground 42
of actual fraud. Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court
ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an
administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent,
is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration
proceeding one year from its issuance; provided, however,
that the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in
this case.

_______________

authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or

defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
38 Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224; 323 SCRA 248, 256,
January 25, 2000.
39 Respondents raised this defense on p. 4 of their Answer; Rollo, p. 47.
40CA Rollo, p. 28. The title was issued pursuant to Section 122 of Act
No. 496 (now Section 103 of PD 1529), which mandates the registration of
patents like other deeds and conveyances.
41 Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743, 751, March
6, 1991 (citing Caro v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 407, December 20,
1989). See also Article 1144 in relation to Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
42 194 SCRA 743, 748-749, March 6, 1991.

580

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

43
 43
In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the
plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the action has
prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the
defense of prescription has 44 not been invoked by the
defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato, we also explained thus:

“x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an

action on the ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings
or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred;
(Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97;
Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14,
1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v.
Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a
motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer
which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule
16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits,
as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705);
or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no
statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100
SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766;
Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant
has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What
is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse
of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the
plaintiff's45 complaint, or otherwise established by the
evidence.” (Italics supplied)

Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present

case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts
must endeavor to settle entire
46
controversies before them to
prevent future litigations.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the
assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the
grounds of lack of jurisdic-

_______________

43 Dino v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 594, 604; 359 SCRA 91, 100, June
20, 2001 (citing Aldovino v. Alunan III, 230 SCRA 825, 834, March 9,
1994).
44 157 SCRA 140, January 20, 1988 (cited in Dino v. Court of Appeals,
supra).
45 Ibid., pp. 145-146, per Narvasa, J. (later C.J.) See also Garcia v.
Mathis, 100 SCRA 250, 252, September 30, 1980.
46 Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 270; 271 SCRA 546, 554,
April 18, 1997.
 581

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 8, 2004 581

Tan vs. Rosete

tion, failure to state a cause of action and prescription.

Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

     Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.

     Carpio-Morales, J., On Official Leave.

Petition denied, resolution affirmed. Dismissal of

complaint in Civil Case No. 3231 sustained.

Note.—In cases of appeals by notice of appeal, the court

loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of other parties. (Marawi Marantao General
Hospital, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 321 [2001])

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