4. Herald Black Dacasin vs.

Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin

FACTS:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter,
Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the
Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement 4 ) for
the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to
adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the
Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial
court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement,
respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because
of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.
RULING:
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial
court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as
petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
actions.[ Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by
the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid
if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes
sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of
(2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take
care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents
cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children
below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed,
immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will
have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to precludethe
application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery
filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino
spouse because he no longer qualified as “offended spouse” entitled to file the complaints under
Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries
as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the
alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

12. Ma. Socorro Camaco-Reyes vs. Ramon Reyes

FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. The casual
acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s
good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not
even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology
from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just
continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and
respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and
employed at the Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s
parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially,
respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first
child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed
expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent
stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered
enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to
slow advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game plan was to venture into
trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat
Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days on
end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation
will change. To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that
they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further
financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of
the household, respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a
fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner
sporadically. Compounding the family’s financial woes and further straining the parties’
relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took
him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to
remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with
petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties
became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just
financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At
that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the
petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while
playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations. Although
without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family
business. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their
family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their
family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her
mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled
counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties’
relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to
“determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning.” As with all other attempts to help
him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to
undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s
siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to
petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did
respondent’s relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr.
Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC
granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of
their psychological incapacity. The CA reversed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
2. Whether the marriage should be declared null and void under Art. 36.
RULING:
1. Yes, the respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity
in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of
behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra.
Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the
Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity
termed “psychological incapacity” which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively
function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential
duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and
support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to
entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent
is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic
duties to the marriage.
This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim
of his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is
weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did
not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was
wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In
fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original
family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of
his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have
been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly
submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent
finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the
respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the
parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.
2. Yes, the marriage should be declared void under Art. 36.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of
a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not
necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we
find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
20. Marieta C. Azcueta vs. Republic of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009

FACTS:
Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job
and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was
Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental.
Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came from
Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his
parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta never
enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be
enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta asked
Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and
see if he would follow her. He did not.
Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s
testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given by his
mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who examined
Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused, responsible, had a
direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same
psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by
loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency
on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross-
identification with Rodolfo’s mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that
Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. She added that the problem began
during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage. She stated that
the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse,
and incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his
personality. She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital duties and responsibilities.
Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City
Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by Marietta,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was based
solely on the information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged
psychological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent
and incurable.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision. Marietta, thus, brought the
case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his marriage
to Marrieta is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:
Yes, Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his
Dependent Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. As
held in Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is
whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close relative,
and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is
no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by her expert
witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40
years experience in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly explained
in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009), “(b)y the
very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of
the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual
reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality
Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and
a by-product of his upbringing and family life.
Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render him
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’ opinion that
Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to
embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting
a child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High
Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed
with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his
mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was
almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause for
Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder.
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his importantdecisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make
decisions regarding even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot
contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is
automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The
court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of
disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years.

28. Sps. Lita De Leon and Felix V. Tarrosa vs. Anita B. De Leon, Danilo B. De Leon, and
Vilma B. Ce Leon
G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009

FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment
of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968,
Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa,
Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma.
Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, on June
22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single."
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband
Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12,
1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita.
Thereafter, or on May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding at
St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan, Manila.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled.
They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon City Register
of Deeds.
Getting wind of the cancellation of their father’s title and the issuance of TCT No. N-173911,
Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City to protect their rights over the subject property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo,
and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. In their complaint, Anita
and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of
Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel
of land. In support of their case, they presented, inter alia, the following documents:
a. A Real Estate Mortgage execution by Bonifacio in favor of spouses Cesar Diankinay and
Filomena Almero on July 22, 1977.
b. A Civil Complaint filed by Bonifacio against spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena Almero
on November 27, 1979 for nullification of the Real Estate Mortgage.
c. The Decision issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, promulgated on July
30, 1982, nullifying the Real Estate Mortgage.4
The Tarrosas, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio
sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from
PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and
Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
After several scheduled hearings, both parties, assisted by their respective counsels, submitted a
Joint Stipulation of Facts with Motion, to wit:
1. The parties have agreed to admit the following facts:
a. Bonifacio O. De Leon, while still single x x x, purchased from the [PHHC] through a
Conditional Contract to Sell on July 20, 1965 a parcel of land with an area of 191.30 square
meters situated in Fairview, Quezon City for P841.72;
b. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio O. De Leon married plaintiff Anita B. De Leon before the
Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. Both parties stipulate that said marriage is valid and
binding under the laws of the Philippines;
c. On June 22, 1970, Bonifacio O. De Leon paid [PHHC] the total amount of P1,023.74 x x x.
The right of ownership over the subject parcel of land was transferred to the late Bonifacio O. De
Leon on June 22, 1970, upon the full payment of the total [price] of P1,023.74 and upon
execution of the Final Deed of Sale;
d. After full payment, Bonifacio O. De Leon was issued [TCT] No. 173677 on February 24,
1972;
e. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio O. De Leon executed a Deed of Sale in favor of defendants-
spouses Felix Rio Tarrosa and Lita O. De Leon disposing the parcel of land under TCT No.
173677 for valuable consideration amount of P19,000.00 and subscribed before Atty. Salvador
R. Aguinaldo who was commissioned to [notarize] documents on said date. The parties stipulate
that the Deed of Sale is valid and genuine. However, plaintiff Anita De Leon was not a signatory
to the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974;
f. That plaintiff Anita B. De Leon and the late Bonifacio O. De Leon were married in church
rites on May 23, 1977 x x x;
g. The late Bonifacio O. De Leon died on February 29, 1996 at the UST Hospital, España,
Manila;
h. The said "Deed of Sale" executed on January 12, 1974 was registered on May 8, 1996 before
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and [TCT] No. N-173911 was issued to Lita
O. De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage
although some installments were paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal
property.

RULING:
Yes, the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage although some
installments were paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal property.
The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell
was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was
only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full
payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect,
the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.

36. Simeon Cabang, Virginia Cabang, and Venancio Cabang vs. Mr. and Mrs. Guillermo
Basay
G.R. No. 1805867 March 20, 2009
FACTS:

Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur. Said lot was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2,768 pursuant to
Decree No. N-64 and issued on March 9, 1966. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never
occupied nor took possession of the lot.

On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real property from the heirs of Felix Odong
for P8,000.00. Consequently, OCT No. 0-2,768 was cancelled and in its stead, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-22,048 was issued on August 6, 1987 in the name of plaintiff-
appellants. The latter also did not occupy the said property.

Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse
possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. They were the awardees in
the cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-222. During the said
cadastral proceedings, defendant-appellees claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they
were actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out, however, when the Municipality of
Molave relocated the townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a big portion of Lot No. 7778 was used
by the government as a public road and as there were many discrepancies in the areas occupied,
it was then discovered that defendant-appellees were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.

On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property against
defendant-appellees. The trial court rendered its decision, holding that the rights of the plaintiffs
to recover the land registered in their names, have been effectively barred by laches; and

Aggrieved, plaintiff-appellants filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals assailing the above-
decision. The Court of Appeals, through the then Second Division, rendered a Decision reversing
the assailed decision.

Defendant-appellees thereafter filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court before the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 139601. On October 18, 1999, the
Supreme Court issued a Resolution denying the petition for late filing and lack of appropriate
service. Subsequently, or on February 15, 2000, the Supreme Court Resolution had become final
and executory.

Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo and the latter commissioned the
Municipal Assessor of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to determine the value of the improvements
introduced by the defendant-appellees. During the hearing on May 10, 2002, plaintiff-appellants’
offer to pay P21,000.00 for the improvement of the lot in question was rejected by defendant-
appellees. The court a quo disclosed its difficulty in resolving whether or not the houses may be
subject of an order of execution it being a family home.

On June 18, 2002, plaintiff-appellants filed their Manifestation and Motion for Execution
alleging therein that defendant-appellees refused to accept payment of the improvements as
determined by the court appointed Commissioner, thus, they should now be ordered to remove
said improvements at their expense or if they refused, an Order of Demolition be issued. The
court a quo issued the herein assailed Order denying the motion for execution.

Respondents thereafter elevated their cause to the appellate court which reversed the trial court in
its May 31, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76755.
ISSUE:
Whether the property is a duly constituted family home which is not subject to execution.
RULING:
No, the property is not a duly constituted family home.

It bears stressing that the purpose for which the records of the case were remanded to the court of
origin was for the enforcement of the appellate court’s final and executory judgment, which,
among others, declared herein respondents entitled to the possession of Lot No. 7777 of the
Molave Townsite subject to the provisions of Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.
Indeed, the decision explicitly decreed that the remand of the records of the case was for the
court of origin “[t]o determine the rights of the defendants-appellees under the aforesaid
article[s] of the New Civil Code, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with the evidence
and this decision.”

A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. Well-settled is the rule that there
can be no execution until and unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e. the period
of appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been taken, or, having been taken, the appeal has
been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which
event, execution shall issue as a matter of right. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the
winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court’s
ministerial duty.

Even squarely addressing the issue of whether or not the improvements introduced by petitioners
on the subject land are family homes will not extricate them from their predicament.

The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From
the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount
of P300,000.00 in urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas. Under the afore-quoted provision,
a family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.

There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it was
duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on
property owned by the persons constituting it.

Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary,
the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is
owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality
of the appellate court’s judgment. Thus, petitioners’ continued stay on the subject land is only by
mere tolerance of respondents.

All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue. Without doubt, the instant case
where the family home issue has been vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy
meant to forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and executory decision. The execution of
a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party whose implementation is
mandatory and ministerial on the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.

44. Republic of the Philippines vs. Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo

G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2007

Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr.
and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth
shows.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22,
2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a
certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique “does
not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic
records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname “Coseteng,” and the
birth certificate of his child where “Coseteng” appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and
2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using
the name “JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.”

By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the
Civil Registrar of Makati City to correct the entry “MAGPAYO” in the space for the Last Name
of the [respondent] to “COSETENG”; to delete the entry “COSETENG” in the space for Middle
Name of the [respondent]; and to Delete the entry “Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr.” in the space
for FATHER of the [respondent]…

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the trial court. Hence, it, through the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court
on pure question of law.

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of
respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the entries in
respondent’s birth certificate, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in
accord with respondent’s prayer reading:

Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites
the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil
Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four
public places at least ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no
oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent filed the proper petition.

RULING:

No, the respondent did not file the proper petition.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.17 Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then
would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that “changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .”

Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule
108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the
civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the
present case, and “all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby”
should be made parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth
certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition
filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and
mother were made parties thereto.

Republic v. Belmonte illuminates: The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name
and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are
separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of
expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court
allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. . .

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory
remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as
reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and
all affected parties as respondents in the case. Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to
different “potential oppositors.” The first notice is that given to the “persons named in the
petition” and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as
creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by
the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types
of “potential oppositors”) within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last
date of publication).
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated.