T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E

PEERING IN T O T HE CRYS TAL B AL L

Holistically Assessing
the Future of Warfare

W
here will the next war occur? Who will fight in it? Why will it
occur? How will it be fought? This brief summarizes a series
of reports that sought to answer these questions—looking out
from now until 2030. The reports took the approach of examining these
questions through the lenses of several trends—geopolitical, economic,
environmental, legal, informational, and military—that will shape the
contours of conflict.

PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: HOLISTICALLY ASSESSING THE FU T URE OF WARFARE 1
Military history is and media coverage can
littered with mistaken constrain how states use
predictions about the force and, thus, how wars
future of warfare that are fought.
have left forecasters More often
militarily unprepared— than not, poor Although successfully
sometimes disastrously predicting the future of
predictions warfare  is notoriously
so—for the conflicts
ahead. The United States
stem from difficult, the U.S. mili-
has suffered its own failing to think tary, for better or worse,
share of bad predictions. holistically is deeply invested in the
forecasting business. All
Why do predictions
about the the armed services want
about the future of factors to understand what the
warfare usually fall that drive future of conflict holds for
flat? More often than changes in the them because, given how
not, poor predictions long it takes to develop
stem from failing to environment capabilities, they must
think holistically about and the gamble today on what
the factors that drive implications kinds of technology and
changes in the environ- people they will need to
of those
ment and the implica- win tomorrow’s wars.
tions of those factors factors for
for warfare. Such warfare. “ When it comes to
considerations go well
predicting the nature and
beyond understanding
location of our next military engage-
the operational implications of
ments, since Vietnam, our record has
technology and include geopolit-
been perfect. We have never gotten it
ical, environmental, and economic
right, from the Mayagüez to Grenada,
changes. Furthermore, such factors
Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti,
as international laws, public opinion,
Kuwait, Iraq, and more—we had no

2 PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: HOLISTICALLY ASSESSING THE FU T URE OF WARFARE
idea a year before any of first place. The brief
those missions that we concludes by describing
would be so engaged.”— U.S. the implications of this
Secretary of Defense work for the U.S. Air
Robert Gates in a speech All the armed Force (USAF) and the
at the U.S. Military services want joint force.
Academy, West Point, N.Y.,
to understand In determining trends,
February 25, 2011
what the future RAND researchers re-
This brief summarizes a
of conflict holds viewed scholarly work,
for them because, analyzed different data
comprehensive exam-
sets and topics of inter-
ination of the factors given how long it est, conducted exten-
that shape conflict and takes to develop sive field research, and
how these variables
interact with one another. capabilities, they relied on profession-
must gamble today al judgment. All told, the
It starts by identifying
RAND team interviewed
the key three dozen or on what kinds more than 120 different
so geopolitical; military;
of technology government, military,
space, nuclear, and cyber;
restraint; economic; and and people they academic, and policy
experts from more than
environmental trends will need to win
50 different institutions
that will shape the future tomorrow’s wars. in Belgium, China, Ger-
of warfare from now
many, Israel, Japan, Jor-
until 2030. This brief then
dan, Poland, the United
aggregates these trends to paint a
Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom
holistic picture of the future of warfare—
(UK) for their perspectives on region-
the potential U.S. allies and enemies,
al and global trends that might shape
where conflicts will occur, what they
the future of conflict between now
might look like, how the United States
and 2030.
will wage them, and when and why the
United States might go to war in the

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Geopolitical Trends
U.S. polarization and China’s rise. Increasing Asia’s reassessment. As China
retrenchment. The American questions about U.S. leadership rises, other states—particularly
public is becoming increasingly on the international stage in Asia—are reacting to
polarized on many issues— would not be as serious if their larger, more powerful
including foreign and defense it were not for the other neighbor’s growing ambitions
policy—which is producing five trends in this category. by rethinking whether to get
political gridlock in the United China’s president, Xi Jinping, on the bandwagon with China
States. This gridlock will limit recently waived term limits or balance against China’s rise.
the nation’s ability to do the and promised “the great
tasks needed to act effectively rejuvenation of China”—a
as a global superpower, from commitment to restoring
resourcing the defense budget China to what it perceives as
to responding to international its rightful place on the world
crises in a coherent and stage and reversing its “century
unified way. Just as troubling, of humiliation.”
politicians might increasingly
look for military solutions
because the military is
one of the few government
institutions that Americans
trust. These political ills show
no sign of abating and could
even increase in years to come.

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A revanchist Russia. Although Upheaval in Europe. The Turmoil in the Islamic world.
Russia is arguably a declining European Union is becoming Even after a decades-long
power, it is growing more more fractured, less interested international counterterrorism
aggressive, intervening in in expeditionary operations, campaign, the Middle East
Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria and increasingly inward- remains afflicted with Islamic
and reaffirming its position as a looking, facing an immigration jihadist terrorism, systemic
great power. crisis, the growth of right-wing poor governance, economic
populism, and the lingering issues, and growing tensions
effects of the euro crisis. between Iran and Saudi
Arabia and between Iran and
Israel that are already shaping
conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and
beyond.

None of these problems appear likely to be resolved anytime soon and will likely shape the
contours of conflict in the years to come.

PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: HOLISTICALLY ASSESSING THE FU T URE OF WARFARE 5
Military Trends
Decreasing U.S. conventional Increasing near-peer conven- Selectively capable second-
force size. U.S. conventional tional modernization and tier powers—such as Iran and
overmatch is declining. Despite professionalism. The Chinese North Korea—cannot mili-
the “reemergence of long-term, and (to a lesser extent) Russian tarily match the United States
strategic competition” noted militaries are becoming and instead are increasingly
in the 2018 National Defense increasingly capable, as both turning to asymmetric
Strategy, the U.S. military will continue to modernize and capabilities—such as cyber
likely remain a fraction of the professionalize. In China’s operations, missiles, and
size it was during the Cold War, case, especially, these mili- weapons of mass destruction—
which was the last period of tary improvements likely will to counter conventional U.S.
long-term, strategic competition, continue, closing the qualita- superiority. If such strategies
and it will lack the technological tive gap between the People’s ultimately lead to war, U.S.
superiority it enjoyed during Liberation Army and the U.S. forces will need to find ways
the immediate aftermath of the military. to neutralize these asym-
Persian Gulf War. metric capabilities and destroy
substantial portions of those
adversaries’ large but less-so-
phisticated forces.

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Adversary use of gray-zone Weakening of the state Artificial intelligence (AI) as a
tactics. Almost as important monopoly on violence. Part of class of disruptive technolo-
as the changes in their military the success of gray-zone tactics gies. Developments in military
capabilities are the changes in stems from this trend. Thanks applications of AI might help
tactics that U.S. adversaries to changes in military and U.S. forces achieve objectives in
are using to operate in the communications technology, both conventional and uncon-
gray zone—employing incre- nonstate actors—or, in the case ventional operations, thereby
mental aggression, information of gray-zone conflicts, proxy mitigating some of these trends.
warfare, proxy forces, and forces—can destabilize states But these capabilities come
covert special operations forces with increasing ease. with serious risks that will need
to obtain regional objectives to be managed, and the United
while staying below the U.S. States will not have a monopoly
threshold of conventional on access to AI. U.S. leaders
response. will need to find ways to maxi-
mize the benefits that AI offers
while mitigating the inevitable
risks.

Taken together, these trends point to the fact that, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy
argues, “competitive military advantage has been eroding” and, if unaddressed, will allow U.S.
adversaries to exploit these weaknesses to their own advantages.

PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: HOLISTICALLY ASSESSING THE FU T URE OF WARFARE 7
Space, Nuclear, and Cyber Trends
Being able to use space-based assets for intelligence, communication, and navigation has
long been one of the cornerstones of the U.S. military’s advantage, but future U.S. domi-
nance in space could be subject to two countervailing trends. Nuclear trends present a
cleaner, if less rosy, picture of the future.

Space is becoming an increas- Proliferation of commer- Resumption of nuclear prolif-

ingly contested environment. cial space capabilities. The eration. Several second-tier
Both China and Russia are commercial exploitation of states—most notably Iran and
improving their abilities to space has exploded in recent North Korea—have pushed to
disable and destroy satellites. years and the trend is likely develop nuclear weapons. And
to continue through 2030. As despite concerted international
greater numbers of commercial diplomatic efforts to prevent
entities launch microsatellites nuclear proliferation (in the
for imagery and communi- former’s case) or roll it back (in
cations purposes, the overall the latter’s), it remains unclear
U.S. space infrastructure could whether either effort will be
grow more resilient—provided successful. Should these efforts
that the United States can fail, Iranian and North Korean
leverage these commercial nuclear proliferation might
investments. spur further regional nuclear
proliferation, preventative mili-
tary strikes, and possibly even
limited nuclear war.

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Erosion of norms and treaties Information control. Control Cyber espionage. As more data
constraining tactical nuclear of the cyber domain will are digitized and held in the
weapons use. At the same become increasingly central cloud, the cyber domain will
time, nuclear arms control to domestic stability. The most become the primary target of
regimes appear to be eroding, extreme example is China, espionage efforts.
increasing the chances that which tightly monitors the
Cyber sabotage. In 2007, the
Russia—and, to a lesser extent, content its citizens can access
U.S. intelligence community
China—might use tactical and uses cybersurveillance for
assessed that only a handful
nuclear weapons in the future. behavior control, but all states
of countries had offensive
are concerned about preventing
cyber capabilities; in 2017, the
the cyber domain from
number had grown to more
becoming a tool for foreign
than 30. At the same time,
subversion.
a great deal of critical U.S.
infrastructure lies outside
the direct control of the U.S.
Department of Defense—and
of the U.S. government—and
thus poses a comparatively easy
target for adversaries to attack.

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Restraint Trends
All military capabilities matter only to the extent that actors decide to use them. A host
of factors—such as international law, public opinion, media coverage, technological capa-
bilities, partner preferences, and operational imperatives—shape the amount of restraint
that combatants exercise in conflict, and many of these factors will increasingly weigh on
how the United States—and its mostly liberal democratic allies and partners—will fight
wars in the future.

Widespread distribution of Increasing public concern for The spread of lawfare.

imagery of military operations. civilian casualties. Domestic U.S. adversaries are also
As smartphones and social opinion in liberal democracies becoming increasingly adept
media saturate the developing is increasingly sensitive to at “lawfare”—manipulating
world, militaries will find civilian casualties, especially in asymmetric concern for
themselves harder pressed to perceived wars of choice—and international law to capitalize
control both what images the this is particularly relevant on U.S. and allied and partner
public sees and the narrative because of the aforementioned restraint. Adversaries such as
surrounding operations. trend regarding the spread of Hamas in Gaza, China in the
imagery. By contrast, mostly South China Sea, and Russia
authoritarian U.S. adver- in Ukraine have relied on this
saries might not feel similarly strategy to confound U.S. and
constrained by their publics, allied and partner responses
by international opinion, or by and will likely do so increas-
international law. ingly in the future.

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Increasing power of false As a result of these influences, the United States might
accusations. At the same time,
media outlets in the United confront a widening “restraint gap” between how it and
States have likely become more its allies and partners will use force in conflicts and
susceptible to disinformation
how its adversaries will—particularly in wars waged on
because of the growing role
of social media, an increasing the lower ends of the conflict spectrum.
distribution of opinions over
facts in traditional media
outlets, declining levels of trust
in the government, and the
rising influence of explicitly
partisan news sources. These
developments will give
adversaries more opportunities
to spread disinformation and
to potentially undermine
public support for U.S. or allied
military action.

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Global Economic Trends
Among the global economic trends, the first three increase the chances of future conflict,
whereas the last three will shape how wars are fought. Notably, these effects are small
and signal the need to increase watchfulness rather than raise alarm.

Increasing pressure on the The rise of China. China’s The search for new resources.
global trading system. Protec- economic ambitions are The future global economy
tionism is on the rise, although expanding. Its Belt and Road will require scarce resources—
trade remains far freer today Initiative extends across such as energy and a variety
than it has been throughout Eurasia to increase connec- of minerals—for new tech-
most of the era since World tions with traditional U.S. nologies and industries, and
War II. Even before the recent allies (such as the UK, France, restraints on trade of new
rounds of trade tariffs between and Germany). As Chinese sources for these items could
the United States and China, economic interests grow, so increase the chances of conflict.
governments had carried out will Chinese security interests.
more than 15,000 trade-
related interventions between
November 2008 and early 2018,
most of them restraints.

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Relatively declining U.S. and The shrinking defense industrial Decreasing power of sanctions.
allied economic might. As base. The United States and its The power to use economic
China rises, the United States allies will face fewer choices in sanctions might decline if other
and its allies will rise more 2030 for major weapon systems major economies develop alter-
slowly and thus make up a and a diminished capacity native systems of international
smaller share of global gross to ramp up produc­tion that payments in reaction to sanc-
domestic product. Although might be needed for a major tions overuse, if coordination
the United States and its conflict. Causes include fewer among allies becomes more
partners will still account for prime contractors, less resil- difficult, and if China makes its
a larger share of the global iency and redundancy among financial sector far more open
economy than their potential “warm” production lines and than it is now. If that happens,
adversaries by 2030, the United types of aircraft and other the United States might need to
States will be less able to rely major equipment in production, resort to more-kinetic forms of
on the overwhelming economic rising technological complexity coercion.
dominance it has enjoyed of weapons systems, and less
in the latter half of the 20th high-skill engineering and
century to give it a quantitative technological expertise in the
or even qualitative military industrial manufacturing labor
advantage. market.

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Environmental Trends
The future of warfare also will be shaped by several environmental trends.

Rising temperatures. Although Water scarcity. Hotter Opening of the Arctic. Melting
the impact of climate change temperatures can also cause a polar ice will make the Arctic
will be felt mostly in the far series of equally problematic more navigable and likely
future of 2050 and beyond, second-order effects. One effect increase the chances of spill-
global air surface temperatures would be exacerbated potable over conflict in the area among
will likely be 1 degree Fahr- water shortages, including in rival great powers—the United
enheit warmer in 2030 than places already prone to insta- States, Russia, and China.
they were in the latter decades bility and substate violence—
of the 20th century; this will particularly in the Middle East,
affect health, reduce economic sub-Saharan Africa, and parts
productivity, and contribute to of Asia.
a host of operational problems
for basing aircraft in already
hot parts of the globe, such as
the Persian Gulf.

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Sea level rise. At the same Extreme weather events will Urbanization and megacities.
time, rising sea levels will cause not only increase the demand Geography will shape conflict
humanitarian challenges and for disaster relief missions in other ways. The global
shift the geography in geopo- but also affect low-lying U.S. population is becoming more
litically sensitive regions, such military bases, including those urbanized. For the first time,
as the South China Sea, thus in strategic locations that are in 2008, more than half of
affecting Chinese sovereignty already at risk of flooding, such the world’s population lived
claims. as the Marshall Islands, Guam, in cities, and the number is
and Diego Garcia. growing. By 2030, the number
of megacities—those with
10 million or more inhabi-
tants—will expand from 31
to 41. As populations become
more urbanized, particularly
in the developing world, states
will be harder pressed to main-
tain law and order; militaries
in general—and airpower in
particular—will face a more-
difficult challenge of discrim-
inating between military and
civilian targets.

PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: HOLISTICALLY ASSESSING THE FU T URE OF WARFARE 15
Predicting the Future of Warfare
Based on the trend analysis described in the study, and assuming that the United States
will try to maintain its position as the world’s preeminent global military superpower,
the United States will face a series of deepening strategic dilemmas when confronting The locations where
warfare from now through 2030. U.S. adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, the United States
and terrorist groups—likely will remain constant, but U.S. allies are liable to change as
Europe becomes increasingly fragmented and inward-looking and as Asia reacts to the is most likely to
rise of China (see the “Allies in Flux” table). The locations where the United States is most fight will not match
likely to fight will not match where conflicts could be most dangerous to U.S. interests.
The joint force will face at least four diverse types of conflict, each requiring a somewhat
where conflicts
different suite of capabilities; at the same time, it will confront diminishing quantitative could be most
and qualitative military advantages (see the “Four Types of Conflict” and the “Declining
Qualitative and Quantitative Advantage” tables). Above all, the United States of 2030
dangerous to U.S.
could progressively lose the capacity to dictate strategic outcomes and to shape when and interests.
why the wars of the future occur.

ALLIES IN FLUX

Category Trend Who Will Fight Implications

Rising China China versus its immediate Potential for new alliances
neighbors in Asia
Growing tensions in Japan, India, Taiwan, Vietnam, Potential for new alliances
Asia and the Philippines (to a lesser in Asia
extent) versus China
Geopolitical A revanchist Russia Potentially, countries in Russia’s Continuity in NATO allies that
near abroad feel threatened by Russia
Turmoil in Europe Varies based on country and type Potentially less contribution
of crisis, with Eastern Europe from traditional Western
often showing the most will to European allies
oppose Russia
Increasing near-peer China and/or Russia versus Potential for new alliances
conventional modern- United States and select allies or in Asia among strong states
Military ization and profession- partners that feel threatened by China;
alism continuity in NATO allies that
feel threatened by Russia
Increasing public Greater deterrence of liberal and Potentially less contribution
concern for civilian democratic states; autocracies from traditional Western
casualties often less affected European allies

Potentially lower participation by

Restraint
U.S. partners
Spread of lawfare Emboldened nonstate actors and Potentially less contribution
autocracies; liberal-democratic from traditional Western allies
states more deterred

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FOUR TYPES OF CONFLICT

Asymmetric
Gray- Conflict with High-End
Counter- Zone Second-Tier Conflict with
Category Trend terrorism Fight Competitor Near Peer
Terrorism, weak states, and proxy wars in Islamic
Geopolitical X
world
Increasing near-peer conventional modernization
X
and professionalism
Selectively capable second-tier powers X
Military
Adversary use of gray-zone tactics X
Weakening of state’s monopoly on violence X
AI as a class of disruptive technologies X
Space an increasingly contested environment X
Space/ Resumption of nuclear proliferation X
nuclear
Erosion of norms and treaties constraining tacti-
X
cal nuclear weapons use
Increasing cyber espionage X X X
Cyber
Increasing cyber sabotage X X X
Widespread distribution of imagery of military
X X
operations

Restraint Increasing public concern for civilian casualties X X

Spread of lawfare X X
Increasing power of false accusation X X

PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: HOLISTICALLY ASSESSING THE FU T URE OF WARFARE 17
DECLINING QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGE

Effect on Effect on
U.S. Military U.S. Military
Qualitative Quantitative
Category Trend Superiority Superiority
Geopolitical U.S. polarization and gridlock Negative Negative On top of all this
Decreasing U.S. conventional force size Negative
Increasing near-peer conventional mod- Negative
is the necessity
Military ernization and professionalism of making a finite
Selectively capable second-tier powers Possibly negative Possibly positive
AI as a class of disruptive technologies Negative
amount of resources
Space an increasingly contested Negative go farther in a
environment
Proliferation of commercial space Positive
future with ever
Space/
nuclear
capabilities fewer strategic
Resumption of nuclear proliferation Negative
Erosion of norms and treaties constrain-
certainties.
Negative
ing tactical nuclear weapons use
Increasing cyber espionage Negative
Cyber
Increasing cyber sabotage Negative
Relatively declining U.S. and allied Negative Negative
Global economic economic might
Shrinking defense industrial base Negative Negative

The deepening strategic dilemmas that the United States will face include preparing for
the low and high ends of the spectrum of conflict, planning for the wars that the United
States most likely will fight and the ones it most hopes to avoid, and maintaining current
U.S. allies and cultivating new ones. On top of all this is the necessity of making a finite
amount of resources go farther in a future with ever fewer strategic certainties.

Ultimately, as the future of warfare places more demands on U.S. forces and pulls limited
U.S. resources in opposite directions, the United States will face a grand strategic choice:
Break with the past and become dramatically more selective about where, when, and why
it commits forces, or maintain or even double down on its commitments, knowing full well
that doing so will come with significantly greater cost—in treasure and, perhaps, in blood.

18 PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: HOLISTICALLY ASSESSING THE FU T URE OF WARFARE
Implications for USAF and the Joint Force
Assuming that the United States opts to maintain or double down on its current commitments, the accompanying
table explores how the military might shape the force in a general sense in terms of capability, capacity, posture,
strategy, and overall policy.

SHAPING THE FORCE

Shaping Area Trends That Drive Implications Implications for USAF and the Joint Force
Capability (four types)
China is becoming more militarily formidable and geopo- USAF will need to be able to operate at range—over vast
litically assertive; second-tier adversaries are investing in expanses, outside missile ranges, and at bases from afar.
Range anti-access, area denial capabilities; excessive heat, rising
sea levels, and extreme weather make it harder to operate in
certain areas of the world.

Restraints and geography trends, the increasing salience of USAF and the joint force will need to invest in increasing
lawfare, the wider distribution of imagery of military opera- precision to avoid the legal and political backlash that
Precision
tions, and the growing urbanization of the global population comes with civilian casualties.
all could affect warfare by 2030.

Increases in cyber and gray-zone conflict are likely. USAF and the joint force will need to enhance information
Information
warfare capabilities.

Greater use of AI comes with serious risks that will need to USAF and the joint force will need to invest in automation.
Automation
be managed.

The United States might need the ability to face at least Given that USAF and the joint force are now a fraction of the
five credible adversaries—including two near peers—in size they were during the Cold War, forces will probably need
four different types of conflict spread through at least three to be larger than they are today.
Capacity
different geographical regions of the world, along with the
need to consider the growing role of air, space, and cyber
operations.

Despite the intention to focus elsewhere and on interstate Given USAF’s increasingly central role in counterterrorism
competition and not terrorism, the Middle East remains missions, it will be unlikely to shift many assets out of the
the most likely—although not the most dangerous—place Middle East to support seemingly higher-priority missions in
Posture where the United States will need to fight wars in the future; the Indo-Pacific and in Europe.
this is exacerbated by U.S. restraints on the use of force and
the continued public aversion to using ground forces in the
region.

U.S. quantitative and qualitative military advantages are USAF and the joint force will have a growing need for agility
Strategy diminishing, and the United States will have increasing at all levels—a necessary cornerstone for the force of 2030.
difficulty controlling strategic outcomes.

There is the possibility that the liberal economic order tradi- There is a need to maintain the economic wherewithal
tionally upheld by the United States will erode, and internal and the political will to sustain and prevail in future wars,
Policy polarization and gridlock in government will grow. especially wars against rival great powers, something that
remains only partially in USAF or even U.S. Department of
Defense control.

PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: HOLISTICALLY ASSESSING THE FU T URE OF WARFARE 19
 The deepening strategic
dilemmas that the United
States will face include
preparing for the low and
high ends of the spectrum of
conflict, planning for the wars
that the United States most
likely will fight and the ones
it most hopes to avoid, and
maintaining current U.S. allies
and cultivating new ones.

T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E
THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

The Future of Geopolitical Trends Military Trends Global Economic Environment, Restraint
Warfare in 2030 and the Future of and the Future of Trends and the Geography, and the and the Future
The Future of Warfare in 2030

Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare

Military Trends and the Future of Warfare

Global Economic Trends and the Future of Warfare

Environment, Geography and the Future of Warfare

Restraint and the Future of Warfare

Project Overview and Conclusions

RAPHAEL S. COHEN, NATHAN CHANDLER, SHIRA EFRON, BRYAN FREDERICK,

EUGENIU HAN, KURT KLEIN, FORREST E. MORGAN, ASHLEY L. RHOADES,
Warfare Warfare Future of Warfare Future of Warfare of Warfare
HOWARD J. SHATZ, AND YULIYA SHOKH The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force

RAPHAEL S. COHEN, EUGENIU HAN, AND ASHLEY L. RHOADES FORREST E. MORGAN AND RAPHAEL S. COHEN HOWARD J. SHATZ AND NATHAN CHANDLER SHIRA EFRON, KURT KLEIN, AND RAPHAEL S. COHEN BRYAN FREDERICK AND NATHAN CHANDLER

Frederick and Chandler

Shatz and Chandler
Morgan and Cohen
Cohen et al.
Cohen et al.

Efron et al.
R

C O R P O R AT I O N C O R P O R AT I O N C O R P O R AT I O N C O R P O R AT I O N
C O R P O R AT I O N C O R P O R AT I O N

This brief describes work done in RAND Project AIR FORCE and summarized in The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Overview and Conclusions by Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan
Chandler, Shira Efron, Bryan Frederick, Eugeniu Han, Kurt Klein, Forrest E. Morgan, Ashley L. Rhoades, Howard J. Shatz, and Yuliya Shokh, RR-2849/1-AF, 2020 (available at www.rand.
org/future-of-warfare). The summary document draws from five other documents: Raphael S. Cohen, Eugeniu Han, and Ashley L. Rhoades, Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare:
The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/2-AF, 2020); Forrest E. Morgan and Raphael S. Cohen, Military Trends and the Future of Warfare:
The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/3-AF, 2020); Howard J. Shatz and Nathan Chandler, Global Economic Trends and the Future of
Warfare: The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/4-AF, 2020); Shira Efron, Kurt Klein, and Raphael S. Cohen, Environment, Geography, and
the Future of Warfare: The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/5-AF, 2020); Bryan Frederick and Nathan Chandler, Restraint and the Future
of Warfare: The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/6-AF, 2020).
To view this brief online, visit www.rand.org/t/RB10073. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities
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IMAGES: cover, Getty Images from combo1982, StudioM1, and matejmo; p.2 StudioM1 (background), wikipedia creative commons (inset); p.3, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) photo by Marvin Lynchard; p.4, derrrek/Getty Images (map), DoD
photo by Army Sgt. Amber I. Smith (China); p.5, wikipedia creative commons from Voice of America; p.6 Dori Walker/RAND Photography (game), Dmitry Terekhov/Flickr (helicopter); p.7, Sunson Guo/ Flickr Creative Commons (jet); p.8, United Launch
Alliance photo/Ben Cooper; p.9, slavemotion/Getty Images (satellite); kosamtu/Getty Images (computer), Chenography/Flickr (China); p.10, Digital Globe 2016 (satellite photo), U.S. Army photo (soldier inset), Dominic Chavez/World Bank (refugee
camp); p.11, ipopba/Getty Images; p.12, kalpis/Flickr (shipping), Maxiphoto (map), ronniechua/Getty Images (oil well), Joan Campderrós-i-Canas/Flickr (signpost); p.13, metamorworks/AdobeStock; p.14, Feed the Children/Amos Gumulira (child),
Danielle Brigida/USFWS (Arctic); p.15, U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Marco A. Gomez (top), U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Brittain Crolley (bottom); back cover, U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Taryn Butler

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