The Social Impact of Globalization in The Developing Countries
The Social Impact of Globalization in The Developing Countries
The Social Impact of Globalization in The Developing Countries
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The social impact of globalization in the developing
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Suggested Citation: Lee, Eddy; Vivarelli, Marco (2006) : The social impact of globalization in the
developing countries, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 1925, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA),
Bonn
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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
Eddy Lee
Marco Vivarelli
January 2006
Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
The Social Impact of Globalization
in the Developing Countries
Eddy Lee
ILO, Geneva
Marco Vivarelli
Catholic University of Piacenza,
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena,
CSGR, University of Warwick and IZA Bonn
IZA
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IZA Discussion Paper No. 1925
January 2006
ABSTRACT
The Social Impact of Globalization in the Developing Countries
In this paper an ex-post measurable definition of globalization has been used, namely
increasing trade openness and FDI. A general result is that the optimistic Heckscher-
Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson predictions do not apply, that is neither employment creation nor
the decrease in within-country inequality are automatically assured by increasing trade and
FDI. The other main findings of the paper are that: 1) the employment effect can be very
diverse in different areas of the world, giving raise to concentration and marginalisation
phenomena; 2) increasing trade and FDI do not emerge as the main culprits of increasing
within-country income inequality in DCs, although some evidence emerges that import of
capital goods may imply an increase in inequality via skill-biased technological change;
3)increasing trade seems to foster economic growth and absolute poverty alleviation,
although some important counter-examples emerge.
Corresponding author:
Marco Vivarelli
Facoltà di Economia
Università Cattolica
Via Emilia Parmense 84
I-29100 Piacenza
Italy
Email: marco.vivarelli@unicatt.it
1. Introduction
This paper is one of the outcomes of a four-years economic research programme (2001-
2005), funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) of the UK and
developed at the International Labour Office (International Policy Group). The general
aim of the project is to fill a gap in understanding - both theoretical and empirical – the
impact of globalization.
Since the ‘80s, the world economy has become increasingly “connected” and
“integrated”; on the one hand the decreasing transportation costs and the diffusion of
Information and Communication Technologies have implied a fast downgrading of the
concept of “distance”, while – on the other hand – gross trade, Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), capital flows and technology transfers have risen significantly. In
most countries, the current wave of “globalization” has been accompanied by increasing
concern about its impact in terms of employment and income distribution.
Whatever definitions and indicators are chosen (see next section), the current debate is
characterized by an acrimonious dispute between advocates and critics of globalization.
While this is true even as regards the employment and income distribution effects
within the developed world, positions diverge even more sharply over the impact on
Developing Countries (DCs). For instance, the optimists underline the link between
increasing trade and economic growth and then they conclude that trade is good for
growth and growth is good for the poor (both in terms of job creation and poverty
alleviation). In contrast, the pessimists show that globalization is quite uneven in its
impact and gives rise to negative counter-effects on the previously protected sectors, the
marginalisation of entire regions of the world economy and possible increases in within-
country income inequality (WCII). Another example of this kind of diversity of
opinions is the debate about poverty indicators: supporters of globalization underline the
fact that worldwide absolute poverty has decreased over the last two decades, while
critics of globalization show that this result is almost entirely due to statistical artefacts
and to the fast growth of China, while absolute poverty has increased in many DCs and
relative poverty has increased in the majority of countries.
2
The following sections will try to go deeper into these topics and provide some
theoretical and empirical answers to the question of whether globalization is good for
employment, poverty alleviation and income redistribution within the DCs. In more
detail, the rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 some definitions and
methodological choices will be presented; in the next three sections recent theoretical
and empirical results will be critically discussed and compared with regard respectively
to the impact of globalization on employment, WCII and poverty in DCs, while the
concluding Section 6 will summarize the main findings and suggest some policy
implications.
3
theories and applied approaches which have really contributed to the understanding of
the social impact of globalization in developing countries (DCs). With this purpose in
mind, it is therefore important to clarify the limitations of the discussion put forward in
the following sections.
Definition.
An ex-post measurable and objective definition of globalization has been used,
namely increasing trade openness and FDI. The purpose is to discuss whether the
actual increase in trade and FDI inflows is favouring or damaging DCs engaging in
globalization. In this context, we will not address liberalization policies; these are
ex-ante proposals which may be announced and not implemented or implemented
but not effective. When evaluating the effect of globalization, what is really
important is not the impact of (often ineffective) policies but the consequences of
the actual increase in measurable globalization indexes such as trade openness and
FDI. An important limitation of the subsequent analysis is that some aspects of
globalization will not be treated (see for instance migration) or only marginally
discussed (see for instance financial and portfolio flows).
Countries and period.
We will only discuss the consequences of globalization (as defined above ) on DCs
over the last two decades. Although there is much wider economic literature
available on the impact of globalization in developed countries, here we will only
focus on DCs .
Methodology.
While this subject may also be fruitfully studied from a historical, sociological,
demographical or political viewpoint, here the adopted methodology will be only
economic, with particular attention devoted to the applied approaches.
Scope.
Only some particular aspects of the social consequences of globalization in DCs will
be treated, namely the impact of increasing trade and FDI upon domestic
employment, within-country income inequality (WCII) and poverty reduction.
4
Given this general framework, further and more detailed purposes of this paper are as
follows:
2) to address the relevant research questions emerging from the existing literature,
namely: a) What is likely to happen to local employment and income
distribution when a DC chooses to open (or becomes exposed) to globalization?
b) Which are the channels through which trade and FDI affect employment,
within-country income distribution and poverty reduction? c) What is the role of
the level of development and of the institutional framework of a given DC?
According to the theory of the relative comparative advantages, both trade and FDI
should take advantage of the abundance of labour in DCs and so trigger a trend of
specialization in domestic labour-intensive activities and so involve an expansion in
local employment.
However, contrary to this Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) prediction, the analysis of the recent
literature supports the conclusion that the employment impact of increasing trade is not
necessarily positive for a developing country. In particular, a relaxation of the
hypothesis of homogeneous production functions across different countries allows for
either the possibility of multiple equilibria (Grossman and Helpman, 1991), or for quite
differentiated employment trends in the evolutionary “catching-up” models (Fagerberg,
5
1988 and 1994; Dosi et al., 1990; Cimoli and Dosi, 1995; Verspagen and Wakelin,
1997; Targetti and Foti, 1997; Montobbio and Rampa, 2005). In fact, when “total factor
productivity” increases in the DCs as a consequence of globalization, the employment
enhancing competitive effect has to be compared with the direct labour-saving effect of
the imported technologies (see Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Coe et al., 1997; Aitken and
Harrison, 1999; Kathuria, 2001). In other words, in a developing country, the final
employment impact of increasing trade depends on the interaction between productivity
growth and output growth both in traded goods sectors and in non-traded sectors. The
final outcome cannot be assessed a priori for different reasons. On the one hand, export
may involve a demand-led economic and employment growth, but - on the other hand –
import may displace previously protected domestic firms, inducing labour redundancy.
Moreover, in the presence of supply constraints (lack of infrastructures, scarcity of
skilled labour, under investment, inefficient labour market), even in the exporting
sectors productivity growth may exceed output growth, to the detriment of job creation.
Finally, domestic sheltered sectors (such as agriculture, public administration,
construction, non-traded service) may act as labour sinks, often implying hidden
unemployment and underemployment in the informal labour market (see Fosu, 2004
and Reddy, 2004).
Shifting our focus from trade to FDI inflows, when a developing country opens its
borders to foreign capital, FDIs generate positive employment impacts both directly and
indirectly through job creation within suppliers and retailers and also a tertiary
employment effect through generating additional incomes and so increasing aggregate
demand (see Lall, 2004). Yet, all these positive employment effects of “greenfield” FDI
have to be compared with the possible crowding-out of non-competitive and previously
sheltered domestic firms (implying bankruptcies and job losses); with the possible
labour-saving effects of the new technologies brought about by multinational firms; and
with the possible reduction in employment associated with FDI operating through
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A).
In fact, both imports and inward FDI may imply a “crowding out” of domestic
production (especially formerly protected nascent industries; think, for instance, to the
6
case of large urban state-owned firms in China, see Rawski, 2002; see also Aitken and
Harrison,1999).
This job displacement effect can be further amplified when FDI inflows are
accompanied by financial liberalization and consequent increases in the interest rate, in
turn leading to shrinking domestic investments (see Berg and Taylor, 2001).
Since the overall employment impact of trade and FDI is uncertain from a theoretical
point of view, it is important to collect data on these relationships and to empirically
investigate the direct and indirect effects of globalization on the domestic employment
of a globalizing DC.
Matusz and Tarr (1999) survey the studies carried out before 1995 on the impact of
globalization on employment in DCs. Comparing the level of employment before and
after trade liberalization the authors conclude that trade and FDI liberalization has been
beneficial for labour except in the transition countries of Eastern Europe. Ghose (2000
and 2003) analyses the relationship between trade liberalization and manufacturing
employment. He highlights that - although increasing trade and FDI have been relevant
only in a small bunch of newly industrialized countries - for those countries the growth
of trade in manufactured products has implied a large positive effect on manufacturing
employment. More evidence has been collected at the national level mostly for the
manufacturing sector. It draws a contrasted picture of the effect of globalization. In
successfully integrating DCs, the employment effects of trade liberalization has been
mixed (mostly negative) in Latin America (see Rama, 1994; Revenga, 1997; Levinsohn,
1999; ILO, 2002; Cimoli and Katz, 2003) whereas they seem globally positive in Asian
countries (see Lee, 1996; Orbeta, 2002).
Indeed, the theoretical issues and the empirical evidence discussed in Lee and Vivarelli
(2004) lead to the conclusion that the employment impact of trade and FDI is country
and sector specific and that the HO theorem is actually rejected in most cases.
For instance, Lall (2004) observes that – while there is a clear evidence that several DCs
have exhibited export and employment growth as a consequence of opening to trade and
FDI (see also UNIDO, 2002) – doubts can be cast about the belief that globalization
should always benefit employment growth within a DC; indeed, different “national
7
absorptive capacities” (or “social capabilities”, see Abramovitz, 1986 and 1989) - in
terms of institutional setting, labour skills, technological capabilities and
competitiveness of domestic firms – can amplify the positive employment impact of
globalization, while institutional mismatches between the market, the organisations and
the government (see Perez, 1983; Shafaeddin, 2005) and lack of local capabilities can
severely jeopardize the potential for economic and employment growth (see also Basu
and Weil, 1998).
In this framework, Gros (2004) notes that opening to trade implies both an increase in
value added and in labour productivity and so that the employment impact cannot be
predicted a priori; empirically, the best results in terms of employment growth happen
to be within the “non globalizing” DCs (basically because of a lack of any improvement
in labour productivity) and in the “slowly globalizing” DCs which are characterised by
a labour friendly balance between output and productivity trends.
Finally, Spiezia (2004) studies the employment impact of trade on the manufacturing
sector. By comparing labour intensities of exported, imported and non-trade goods the
author concludes that in 21 out of 39 sampled DCs an increase in the volume of trade
resulted in an increase in employment; however, in the second group of 18 countries,
increased integration produced a reduction in employment (in contrast with the HO
theorem). As far as FDI is concerned, the author finds out that the impact of FDI on
employment is increasing with per-capita income, resulting not significant for low-
income DCs.
On the one hand, the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem predicts that both trade and FDI
should take advantage of the abundance of low-skilled labour in DCs and so imply an
increasing demand for domestic low skilled labour and hence decreasing within-country
wage dispersion and income inequality (see Stolper and Samuelson, 1941; for a recent
8
reappraisal of the possible equalizing effect of trade in newly industrialized countries,
see Wood, 1994 and 1997; for a critical view, see Milanovic, 2002a).
Some important theoretical critiques can be addressed to the SS theorem .
First, is the theorem valid in a global sense or in relation to the so-called “cones of
diversification” (see Davis, 1996, a cone of diversification being a group of countries
characterised by similar endowment proportions, very similar production functions and
supplying the same range of goods)? If SS theorem is valid not in relation to the world
economy but in relation to a specific cone of diversification, it could be the case that
countries abundant in unskilled labour in a global context are abundant in capital and
skilled labour in comparison with some other country in the same cone; if such is the
case, the SS theorem might have very different distributional consequences from those
one would anticipate on the basis of a simplistic North-South interpretation of the
theorem (for instance, in Mexico the equalizing effect of trade and FDI with the USA
may be more than compensated by the dis-equalizing effect of competition by China
and other newly industrialized Asian countries; see also Wood, 1997 and Wood and
Ridao-Cano, 1999).
Second, Feenstra-Hanson’s (1996 and 1997) model points out that what is unskill-
intensive in a developed country may be skill-intensive in terms of the labour market of
the recipient DC; accordingly, shifting production from developed towards developing
countries (both through FDI and import/export trade relationships) may imply
increasing inequality both in the former and in the latter. For instance, outsourcing of
production through FDI from the U.S. to Mexico implies that plants which were
relatively intensive in unskilled labour in the U.S. would be relatively skill-intensive in
Mexico (with a higher ratio of skilled/unskilled labour than domestic plants), thus
raising relative wages and income inequality in both countries (see also Zhu and Trefler,
2001).
Third, the latter increasing inequality effect may be amplified by a possible “skill-
biased” nature of technologies embodied both in FDIs (see Findlay, 1978; Wang and
Blomstrom, 1992) and in importation of capital goods. Indeed, capital equipment and
intermediate goods constitute the majority of increasing imports by DCs following
9
liberalisation (see Acemoglu, 1998; O’Connor and Lunati, 1999). For sake of clarity,
we can look separately at FDI and importation.
If we think about FDI as a vehicle of new technologies, in addition to the direct effect,
there are different channels through which skilled-biased innovation spill over from
foreign to local firms: the demonstration effect (local firms adopt new technologies
through imitation and reverse engineering, see Piva, 2003); the vertical spillovers
(backward and forward linkages lead to intra and inter-industry technology upgrading:
see Saggi, 1999); labour turnover and spin-offs (workers trained in foreign owned firms
may transfer important know-how to local firms by switching employers or by starting-
up their own business, see Kinoshita, 2000); and the competition effect (technology
upgrading in local firms becomes necessary because of competitive pressures from
foreign firms, see Bayoumi et al., 1999).
More than other imports, imports of capital goods, - embodying technological
innovations - are important both because of the role they play in contributing to capital
upgrading and more generally to economic growth of DCs (Xu and Wang, 2000; Eaton
and Kortum, 2001; Mazumdar, 2001), and because they originate the so-called “skill-
enhancing trade”, (see Robbins, 1996 and 2002; Barba Navaretti et al., 1998; Berman
and Machin, 2000 and 2004; Vivarelli, 2004). In fact, even without necessarily
assuming that developed countries transfer their “best” technologies to the DCs, it is
quite reasonable to expect that transferred technologies are relatively skill-intensive, i.e.
more skill-intensive than those in use domestically before trade and FDI liberalization.
If such is the case, openness – via technology – should imply a counter-effect to the SS
theorem prediction, namely an increase in the demand for skilled labour, an increase in
wage dispersion and so an increase in income inequality.
Finally, globalization is often coupled with market-oriented policy reforms within the
globalizing DCs (such as the liberalization of the domestic labour market or the
privatisation of previously state-owned firms; see Lee, 2000; Easterly, 2001; Stiglitz,
2002) which often imply possible increases in WCII (Rodrik, 2000; Milanovic, 2003).
Hence, on the theoretical side, relaxing the HO hypothesis of technological
homogeneity, and allowing for capital deepening and skill-biased technological change
10
(SBTC), opens the way to an important possible counter-effect in terms of the
distributional impact of globalization, and so the theoretical prediction ceases to be
univocal and becomes open to different outcomes depending on the relative importance
of the determinants discussed so far.
On the empirical side and starting from simple correlation analyses, both Bowles (2001)
and Dollar and Kraay (2001b) do not find any significant correlation between changes
in openness and changes in inequality. Turning the attention to more sophisticated
econometric analyses, Edwards (1997) does not find any evidence linking trade
liberalization to increases in inequality; Higgins and Williamson (1999) – using a
framework based on the unconditional Kuznets’ curve - fail to find any significant
relationship between economic openness and inequality; Spilimbergo et al. (1999) find
that trade openness has a positive impact on income inequality in skill-abundant
countries, but when they limit the analysis to DCs, they fail to find any significant
relationship between trade and inequality; Ravallion (2001) finds no significant effect of
exports as a share of GDP on Gini index changes across 50 countries (both developed
and developing countries).
However, Birchenall (2001) concludes that, in the case of Colombia, liberalization
interpreted as a skill-biased technological change induced wage inequality, polarization
and higher labour mobility. Pavcnik et al. (2003) show that trade reform in Brazil has
contributed to the growing skill-premium through SBTC instigated by increased foreign
competition (even though the overall effect on wage differentials is relatively small).
Finally, Vivarelli (2004) does not find any significant distributional effect of trade
openness and FDI inflows; however, in his study some evidence emerges that, in the
early stages of openness to trade, importation may imply an increase in WCII (possibly
via SBTC).
The main common conclusion of these empirical studies is that the popular idea that
greater economic integration across countries is associated with an increase in
inequality within DCs is not necessarily in contrast with theoretical considerations, but
it cannot be significantly supported by available recent empirical evidence. As stated by
Cornia (2004) globalization in se’ does not emerge as the main culprit of the current
11
increase of WCII in DCs. Yet, recent evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the
diffusion of SBTC from richer to developing countries may imply – at least temporarily
- an increase in within-country inequality.
As far as poverty reduction is concerned, trade and FDI are supposed to be beneficial to
a DC’s economic growth (see Collier and Dollar, 2002; for a much more critical point
of view, see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999) and so – given the expected overall neutrality
in terms of their impact on income distribution (see Section 4) – globalization should be
a way to achieve poverty reduction.
Indeed, most DCs experienced a significant reduction in the proportion of their
population living below the poverty line, including fast globalizing countries like China,
India, Vietnam. Conversely, many slow globalizers in the Sub-Saharan Africa registered
an opposite trend.
While the apologists of globalization support the view that current trends clearly
indicate a decreasing global inequality (Sala-i-Martin, 2002), the critics show that this
result mainly depend on the exceptional growth of China, while absolute poverty has
increased in SSA and relative poverty (inequality) has increased in the majority of
countries (Milanovic 2002b; Reddy and Pogge, 2002).
On the theoretical side, economic growth is not the only vehicle through which
globalization can affect poverty levels, as broadly discussed by Winters et al. (2004). In
fact, globalization deeply influences labour productivity (and this may imply higher
wages on the one hand but job losses on the other hand); the demand for skills (with a
possible redundancy of low skilled people concentrated below the poverty line, see also
previous Section 4); the need for macroeconomic stability (since stability implies low
inflation, trade should affect the poor positively because the poor tend to be hardest hit
by increasing inflation, see Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002; however, liberalization may
12
also involve cautious and restrictive macroeconomic policies with an opposite effect,
see Langmore, 2004); relative prices (with possible adverse or positive effects in terms
of purchasing power of poor households depending on the basket of tariffs reductions
and on the changes in the terms of trade); relative competitiveness of domestic firms
(possibly crowded-out by more efficient multinationals), government revenues and
expenditures, etc. On the whole, it is true that globalization aids economic growth and
that economic growth aids poverty reduction, but not unconditionally: the final outcome
in terms of poverty reduction can be actually either amplified or diminished (even
cancelled) by the complementary economic factors and policies which are part of the
game.
To better understand the issue, it is also important to distinguish between trade and FDI
on the one hand and financial liberalization on the other hand. While increasing trade
and FDIs seem to be associated with increasing economic growth and absolute poverty
alleviation (although conditional on the occurrence of many complementary events),
poverty can rise rapidly in the wake of increased vulnerability, occurrence of
generalised economic crises and contagion of “innocent victims” which can all be
related to fast financial liberalization (see Lee, 1998; Cornia, 2004; Taylor, 2004).
Hence, the liberalization of capital accounts may counterbalance the poverty alleviation
effect of trade and FDI and surely be correlated with possible increases in income
inequality (see Taylor, 2004; Santarelli and Figini, 2004; for an opposite view
underlining the long-run welfare gains associated with financial liberalization, see
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003).
To conclude, nothing can assure that the relationship between globalization and poverty
alleviation has a 1 to 1 nature as implied - for instance, - by the optimistic slogan by
Dollar and Kray (2001a and 2001b) when they state that “trade is good for growth,
growth is good for the poor and so trade is good for the poor”.
Focusing on the empirical studies, the above mentioned Dollar and Kraay (2001a and
2001b) classify countries into globalizers and non-globalizers according to their
performance in raising their trade openness (export + import over GDP) and show that
the former group has experienced higher growth rates during the period 1977-97. Then
13
they show that the incomes of the poor rise proportionally with average incomes and
that globalization does not have any systematic effect on domestic income distribution.
They therefore conclude that growth is good for the poor. A summary of the most
pertinent criticisms of these papers can be found in Rodrik (2000): the author does not
agree with Dollar and Kraay's exogenous definition of globalizers and challenges Dollar
and Kraay's arbitrary exclusion of some countries and their use of different base years
moving from one country to another. Replicating their empirical exercise, Rodrik finds
no support for the hypothesis that globalizers do significantly better in terms of
economic growth.
Much more cautious conclusions have been derived by Ravallion (2001) who points out
that microeconomic and country-specific researches are needed to understand why
some poor people are able to take up the opportunities offered by a globalizing
developing economy while others not.
Finally, UNCTAD (2002) report on low-income developing countries stresses that the
current conventional wisdom that persistent poverty in LDCs is mainly due to their low
level of trade integration is too simplistic; indeed the characteristics of trade integration
are more important than its intensity. In particular, it is underlined that completely
different paths in poverty are exhibited by non-oil primary commodity exporters (in
which poverty has increased) and by manufacturer exporters, which generally display a
trend towards poverty alleviation.
Thus, the overall conclusion by Winters (2000) sounds particularly wise: while trade
liberalization is generally found to increase economic opportunities and potentialities
for DCs, it is absurd to think that globalization never pushes anyone into poverty, if any
because the poor are so heterogeneous within a country and because poor countries
differ so much among themselves.
Using data from 120 DCs, Santarelli and Figini (2004 and 2005) have been able to
show that:
1) trade openness helps reducing absolute poverty, measured as people living below the
poverty lines;
14
2) FDI flows and especially financial liberalization seems to be detrimental for poverty
alleviation, although the relationship is only barely significant;
3) there is no significant relationship between trade or FDI and relative poverty,
measured as people below the 50% of the mean income (this result is consistent with
what discussed in the previous Section 4).
In Section 2, we posed some general questions to which the following discussion aimed
to give analytical and empirical answers.
15
different results in terms of job creation can emerge. Very similar arguments apply to
the employment effects of FDI inflows.
As far as income distribution is concerned, while SS’s theorem definitely does not
apply, it is also true that increasing trade and FDI do not emerge as the main culprits of
increasing within-country income inequality in DCs. However, some evidence emerges
that, in the early stages of openness to trade, import of capital goods may imply an
increase in within-country inequality via SBTC.
Finally, increasing trade seems to foster growth and absolute poverty alleviation,
although some important counter-examples emerge, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
While FDIs seem to be neutral in terms of their impact on income distribution and
poverty, financial liberalization seems to have adverse effects on relative poverty.
2) Which are the channels through which trade and FDI affect employment, within-
country income distribution and poverty reduction?
The positive outcome of increasing trade on poverty reduction is mediated by increasing
economic growth. Since overall trade (import+export) is neutral in terms of income
distribution and fosters economic growth, the final outcome is an overall reduction in
poverty.
As far as employment and income distribution are concerned, a clear message emerging
from many studies is that technology matters. If trade (especially through importation of
machinery) and FDI are characterized by labour-saving and skilled-biased technologies,
globalization implies consequences which are opposite to the HO/SS predictions, i.e.
decreasing employment and increasing within-country income inequality. In this
context, the preliminary theoretical and empirical results discussed in Section 4 –
concerning the spreading of SBTC from developed to middle income DCs – open the
way to a very promising avenue of further research.
Another important mediating channel of the social consequences of increasing trade and
FDI is the institutional organization of the labour market (including the informal sector).
The presence of labour market flexibility and extensive use of informal labour may
increase the positive employment impact, in quantitative terms, of globalization.
16
However, possible counter-effects are quite serious and negative, and they entail
increasing income-inequality and social dumping (a sort of “race to the bottom” and
“beggar thy neighbour” race induced by globalization). In the end, this regressive race
may imply a substantial reduction in the socio-economic capabilities of a given DC,
finally affecting the “absorptive capacity” of that country in terms of political
institutions, social cohesion and technological opportunities.
3) What is the role of the level of development and of the institutional framework of a
given DC?
On the whole, the level of economic and human development does matter in shaping the
direction and the impact of the current wave of globalization. For instance, the role of
the physical and human infrastructures within a DC is crucial in maximizing the
positive employment and distributional effects of increasing trade and FDI. Conversely,
bottlenecks in the supply of educated and skilled labour and in public and private
investments (including R&D) may condemn a country to marginalisation, exploitation
and high levels of domestic unemployment and income inequality.
Examples and policy implications are quite straightforward and concern: the role of
education and training; the institutions regulating the labour and the capital markets; the
modes of “governance” at the local, regional and national levels (including tax reforms
and eradicating of corruption); industrial and innovation policies targeting new and fast
growing sectors and products; the construction of a welfare system able to create safety
nets for possible victims of the globalization process.
4) Given the results from the previous points, what policy suggestions can be made to a
globalizing DC?
Needless to say, here we cannot go into a deep analysis of possible national and
international policy options; however, we can briefly highlight from the previous
discussion four main avenues for policies devoted to amplifying the positive impacts of
globalization in terms of a DC’s domestic employment and within-country income
distribution.
17
a) Market failures and disparities in the initial levels of economic and human
development, technological “absorptive capacity” and “social capabilities” call for
“controlled liberalization” as the best way to foster globalization. Indeed cautious
globalizers seem to be characterised by the best employment performances, while faster
globalization may imply a wider income inequality trough increasing import. Together
with some form of policy controls on trade and FDI, financial liberalization should be
even more restrained in particular historical circumstances. In fact, a sudden financial
liberalization can be accompanied by increasing vulnerability and increasing poverty.
b) Given the crucial role of the specific institutional, structural and technological
characteristics and the uneven distribution of the positive employment effects of
globalization (both in terms of countries and in terms of economic sectors), a possible
new role emerges for regional, industrial and innovation policies at the national level.
18
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