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Macondray V Pinon Case Digest

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Macondray andcompany, Inc.

v Pinon

Facts:

the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants alleging that through a
letter by Ruperto K. Kangleon, then a member of the Senate, that he would guarantee
payment of his co-defendants' obligation, should they fail to pay on the due date

Because of this the plaintiff sold on credit and delivered to the defendants Perfecto
Piñon and Conrado Piring, 127 rolls of cinematographic films, for the total sum of
P6,985.
However, the principal debtors failed to pay; After extensive investigations by the
plaintiff it has found that the defendants do not have any property.

Kangleon contends that the letter was only to introduce his co-defendants;
that assuming that there was an intent on his part to guarantee payment, the
said letter was only an offer to act as guarantor of his co-defendants; to act as
guarantor for his co-defendants was not made known to him by the plaintiff,
therefore the contract of guaranty between them has not been perfected;

Issue:

Whether Kangleon is a guaranty

Ruling:

The appellant claims that the letter (Exhibit F) is mere a letter of


introduction and does not constitute an offer of guaranty. A cursory reading of
the letter (Exhibit F) belies his assertion. While in his opening sentence he
says at that "This will introduce to you the bearers, Messrs. Conrado Piring
and Perfecto Piño”… in the later part he says that "for which by their guaranty
I pledge payment." This can only mean that he undertakes to
guarantee payment of the principal debtors' obligation should they fail to pay.
That the appellant really meant to guarantee payment of the principal debtors'
obligation should they default, is patent in his answer to the appellee's letter,
he acknowledged
receipt of the appellee's letter of the 27th of the same month and informed it
that the principal
debtors were "being contacted to invite their attention to your letter." Had the
appellant meant otherwise, he would have immediately denied that he ever
guaranteed payment of the principal debtors obligation. This he did not do.

The appellant's very letter constitutes his undertaking of guaranty. "Contracts


shall be
obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for
their validity are present."

A contract of guaranty is not a formal contract and shall be valid in whatever


form it may be, provided that it complies with the statute of frauds.

The appellant insists that he should have been notified by the appellee of the
acceptance of his offer of guaranty. In the first place, his letter already
constitutes his undertaking of guaranty. In the second place, the contract
entered into by and between the appellee and the defendants in default is the
principal contract and the appellee is subsidiary to the principal contract.
Since the principal contract had already been perfected, the subsidiary
contract of guaranty became binding upon effectivity of the principal contract.
Hence no notice of acceptance by the appellee to the appellant is necessary for
its validity.

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