Aviation Security Manual

CHAPTER I
1.1 OVERVIEW
1
2 This revised edition of Aviation Security (AVSEC) Operations Manual is
3prepared to implement the National Civil Aviation Security Program (NCASP). It sets
4forth comprehensively the various aviation security concepts, doctrines and
5measures as implemented by the Philippine National Police - Aviation Security
6Group (PNP - ASG) and specifies the various security doctrines, concepts and
7principles to be observed and enforced in our airports. This AVSEC Manual further
8contains the specific responsibilities of each key PNP-ASG officers and the duties
9and responsibilities of every security personnel from normal to extreme airport
10security operational conditions.
11
12 This manual further provides a handy reference to all PNP ASG uniformed
13and Civil Aviation Security Bureau, Office for Transportation Security (CASB,
14OTS) personnel especially those stationed in outlaying airports and contains, as
15well, definition of terms to ensure uniform understanding by all users.
16
17 The main purpose of this program is to enhance the security, reliability and
18efficiency of civil aviation in the Philippines by developing, providing and
19implementing regulations, standards and guidelines, the necessary safeguards
20against acts of unlawful interference. It aims to uphold the security and safety of the
21airport users, facilities and equipment within the airport complex.
22
23 The Airport Security System in the country consists of physical and electronics
24measures, to prevent the entry of explosives, weapons and other dangerous
25devices into the aircraft, passenger terminals and cargo warehouses. In order to
26achieve this, the PNP-ASG is conducting mandatory inspection and screening of
27passengers and their baggage and cargoes prior entry into the airport terminal
28and aircraft.
29
301.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
31
32 The aircraft was originally conceived and developed by the Wright brothers
33(Wilbur and Orville) on December 17, 1909 to harness the concept of time and space
34in order to benefit humanity. Since then, the aircraft utility, capacity and configuration
35evolved from its early limited operational capability and upgraded to its present non-
36stop trans-oceanic operational capability and lift to move men, goods and services.
37
38 The first recorded aircraft hijacking transpired in Lima, Peru on February 21,
391931. It was not motivated by an ill intention because the hijacker was plainly a
40disgruntled family man. To assure the healthy development of the then infant
41international civil aviation industry, the UN created the International Civil Aviation
42Organization (ICAO) to ensure its growth and the safety of every flight during its first
43convention in Chicago, USA on December 7, 1944. The Chicago Convention
1 1
1established the ICAO and officially came into existence on April 04, 1947, thus
2becoming the permanent body under the UN Charter. The convention
3established 18 Annexes, wherein Annex 17 pertains to Standards and
4Recommended Practices (SARPs) which contains an obligation for States to
5comply and incorporate the SARPs set forth in the 18 Annexes in their National
6Legislation. There are three (3) more Conventions and two (2) Protocols
7relating to unlawful acts against civil aviation. The Tokyo Convention dubbed
8as the Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
9signed at Tokyo, Japan on September 14, 1963. Said convention gave birth to
10organized aviation security in the Philippines on November 26, 1965 and came
11into force on December 4, 1969. However, in the immediate past, misguided
12individuals and groups saw in the aircraft an advantage they could utilize to extort
13money, advance their political causes and force governments to perform acts against
14its wills or negotiate over the bargaining table.
15
16 The next instrument is the Hague Convention known as the Convention
17for the Suppression on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed in Hague,
18Netherlands on December 16, 1970 and was ratified by the Philippine
19government on March 26, 1973. Its vital features are: the definition of unlawful
20seizures as a separate offense and obligation of States to extradite or punish
21offenders severely.
22
23 This was followed by the Montreal Convention of 1971, known as the
24Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
25Aviation signed at Montreal, Canada on September 23, 1971 and was ratified by
26the Philippine government on March 26, 1973 and came into force on April 25,
271973. Its key feature is the creation of the same obligations as under the Hague
28Convention (extradition or severe punishment of offenders) for sabotage and armed
29attacks against international civil aviation facilities.
30
31 Its vital convention features were further strengthened by the Montreal
32Protocol known as The Protocol of Suppression for Unlawful Acts of Violence
33at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, which is supplementary to
34Montreal Convention of 1971 done at Montreal, Canada on February 24, 1988.
35
36 This was followed by the Convention on the Marking of Plastic
37Explosives for the purpose of detection, done at Montreal, Canada on March
3801, 1991. This was entered into force on June 21, 1998 by the Philippine
39government, that called for the interpretation of both the Convention and Protocol as
40a single instrument. Its key feature is the amendment in the definition of the offense
41to include person who unlawfully and intentionally performs an act of violence at an
42international airport which causes or may cause injury or death and an offense that
43destroys or damages any facility of an international airport or an aircraft not in
44service. All other general principles of international law pertaining to safety and
45security of civil aviation and transportation laws are likewise deem
46incorporated within this programme.
1 2
1 The first recorded organized aircraft hijacking was committed against Israel’s
2El Al Airliner in 1968 by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It was followed by a
3series of other successful hijackings that caused untold losses of properties and lives
4that reached its peak in the 70s and tapered off somehow due to the effective early
5aviation security counter measures developed then. Intermittent attempts on
6hijackings were thwarted, but some well planned undertakings succeeded.
7Specifically, the successive seizures of four (4) aircrafts of TWA, Swiss Air, BOAC
8and Pan Am and their simultaneous wanton destruction before horrified television
9audiences world-wide in September 1970 in Jordan and Egypt airports awakened
10aviation security specialists on the vulnerabilities of the adopted security measures.
11
12 An unnamed American airline passenger on a domestic flight from Portland to
13Seattle in November 1971 perpetrated a successful hijacking for $200,000 and
14parachuted to safety by lowering the tailgate door of the aircraft. This was followed
15by three (3) more equally successful undertakings, but was stopped when the
16particular aircraft model was taken out of service of the American aviation industry.
17
18 The event that cause the control and minimized the unlawful interference in
19international civil aviation transpired when the Bonn Declaration was signed on July
2017, 1978 among the seven (7) developed countries, Canada, the Federal Republic
21of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
22Northern Ireland and the United States of America obligating themselves to
23immediately terminate their respective air services to and from any country that
24refuses to comply with the Hague Convention.
25
26 Today, aviation security is an avowed national concern of democratic
27government primarily because of international terrorist acts sponsored by
28terrorist network organizations such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and the
29Abu Sayyaf Group.
30
311.3 EVOLUTION OF PNP-AVIATION SECURITY GROUP
32
33 In compliance with the Montreal Convention of 1971 and the Supplementary
34Protocol to the said convention, the Philippine government issued Presidential Letter
35of Instruction (LOI) Number 399 on April 28, 1976 creating the National Action
36Committee on Anti Hijacking (NACAH) with the Secretary of National Defense as
37Chairman and the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Public Works,
38Transportation and Communications, Public Information, Administrator of Civil
39Aviation Administration (now Air Transportation Office) and Director-General,
40NISA as members. Its implementing arm, the Aviation Security Command
41(AVSECOM) was organized on June 1, 1976 with the primary mission of
42ensuring the continued and uninterrupted operations of civil aviation industry
43in the country. AVSECOM was later renamed by virtue of GHQ AFP GO Number
4437 as Philippine Air Force Security Command (PAFSECOM) on March I, 1986.
45With the enactment of Republic Act 6975, otherwise known as the Act Establishing
46the PNP under a Reorganized DILG and for Other Purposes, the Chairmanship of
1 3
1NACAH was transferred to the DILG and the mission and functions of the defunct
2PAFSECOM was transferred to the PNP. Executive Order (EO) Number 452
3issued on April 5, 1991 provides amendment to the composition of NACAH with
4the DILG Secretary as Chairman and the DND Secretary as Vice-Chairman. EO
5246 reconstituted NACAH into National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking
6and Anti-Terrorism (NACAHT) which took effect in May 1995, is geared towards
7implementing effective monitoring activities of suspected terrorist and develop
8capabilities of Local Law Enforcement Agencies to contain the threat of
9terrorism. However, on July 2, 1991, the PNP, through its Police Aviation Security
10Command (PASCOM) which was later renamed as PNP-Aviation Security Group
11(PNP-ASG) by virtue of Memo Circular Number 96-01 dated September 12, 1996
12assumed the responsibility of ensuring the uninterrupted security operations of the
13civil aviation in the country.
14
15 EO 336 was issued on January 5, 2000, reconstituted the NACAHT as the
16National Council for Civil Aviation Security (NCCAS). EO 277 issued on January
1730, 2004 approving and reconstituting the National Civil Aviation Security
18Program (NCASP) creating the Office for Transportation Security (OTS) within
19the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). EO 311 issued
20on April 26, 2004 designated OTS as the single authority for all modes of
21Transportation Security in the Philippines.
22
231.4 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
24
25 In the country, the first hijacking was made by two (2) young Filipino-Chinese
26students on December 30, 1952 while on board the PAL aircraft from Laoag en
27route to Aparri. The hijackers demanded to be flown to mainland China,
28however, it was intercepted by Taiwanese jets and was brought to Taipei.
29Thinking that it was already mainland China, the hijackers surrendered
30peacefully. As a result, the pilot and the flight steward were killed.
31
32 After which, eight (8) more hijacking incidents transpired that were
33staged in the provinces to include one (1) incident at MIA (now NAIA) that
34interfered with our civil aviation. Out of the nine (9) hijacking cases, five (5)
35were terminated through skillful negotiations while four (4) incidents were
36successful in attaining their demands despite dilatory tactics employed by the
37authority.
38
39 The bloodiest hijacking occurred on May 26, 1976 on board a PAL BAC 1-
4011 on a scheduled flight from Davao City to Manila that was diverted to
41Zamboanga City. Ten (10) civilian passengers and three (3) hijackers were
42killed when the negotiation failed and the aircraft exploded during the assault.
43
44 A mid-air explosion happened on December 11, 1994 on PAL flight 434
45when a 747 aircraft was on the last leg of its journey from Manila Domestic
46Airport to Narita, Japan via Cebu City. Apparently, the first generation anti-
1 4
1hijacking equipment was functional at the airport initial and final security gates
2at the time, but was not enough to detect the knocked-down parts of an
3Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that was surreptitiously smuggled inside
4the aircraft by a departing passenger.
5
6 Investigation revealed that the five (5) critical miniaturized parts of the
7knocked-down IED were carried by a mid-eastern looking passenger through
8the security checkpoints. Later on, the attending stewardess when shown the
9terrorist’s latest photograph identified to be that of the infamous Mahmoud
10Yousef, Pakistani chemical engineer, explosive genius and architect, who also
11bombed the World Trade Center in New York, USA, in 1993. Said passenger
12occupied seat 32-K and transferred to seat 22-K when the aircraft was airborne
13and disembarked in Mactan-Cebu International Airport. An hour before
14landing, the bomb claimed its lone passenger fatality a Japanese passenger
15seating on 22-K, however, the pilot was able to land the aircraft safely in
16Okinawa, Japan.
17
18 The latest incident happened on May 28, 2000 involving a PAL airbus
19from Davao to Manila, Initial report state that Augusto Lakandula later on
20identified as Trance Chua who managed to sneak in a home-made cal .22
21magnum revolver at the Security Screening Checkpoint. After holding the crew
22and passengers at bay and collecting their cash and valuables, Chua
23parachuted using an improvised parachute that caused his death.
24
25 All of these cases transpired when the present state-of-the-art anti-
26hijacking equipment was not yet in place and the competency of our security
27personnel left so much to be professionalized. Airport complexes are vital
28security installations crucial to our continued growth and development as a nation.
29They play important roles in our national endeavor to enhance our quality of life
30through the unhampered movement of men, goods and services within and beyond
31the country.
32
33 CHAPTER II
34
352.1 TOTAL AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM
36
37 Airport complexes are vital security installations crucial to our continued
38growth and development as a nation. They play important roles in our national
39endeavor to enhance our quality of life through the unhampered movements of
40men good and services within and beyond the country. To ensure at all times the
41adequate protection of our airports from any form of unlawful interference, the Total
42Aviation Security System or simply TASS is adopted and enforced. The Police
43Center for Aviation Security (PCAS), being the primary operating unit of PNP-ASG, is
44responsible for its effective implementation in each airport complex by observing the
45total team approach.
46
1 5
1 Use of various security measures is a recognized concept in aviation security
2to plug whatever vulnerable points that may be created due to the daily hustle and
3bustle in the airport. Likewise, this is to attain the primary operational objective to
4harden our airports with adequate interconnected aviation security measures. These
5active security measures shall be undertaken by the dedicated PNP-ASG units
6for maximum effectiveness. Each airport station/terminal shall have a
7Station/Terminal Action Officer (SAO/TAO) who will be responsible for the
8overall supervision of PNP personnel and other security personnel of the
9airport. Aviation terrorism and acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation have its
10rightful antecedents that brought about the development of aviation security in the
11country.
12
13 The security system encompasses three (3) major sub-systems that are
14interrelated and mutually reinforcing to blanket our airports with continuing shields of
15concentric and tiered levels of protection.
16
172.2 PROACTIVE / DETERRENT SECURITY MEASURES
18
19 Complementation among the various security measures is a recognized
20concept in aviation security to plug whatever vulnerable points / pores that
21may be created due to the daily hustle and bustle in the airport. Likewise, this
22is to attain the primary operational objective to envelop our airports with
23adequate interconnected aviation security measures. The various passive
24security measures discussed earlier will be supplemented by active security
25measures to overlap and strengthen existing security net. These different
26active security measures will independently be undertaken by separate and
27dedicated ASG units for optimum effectiveness. This security component
28represents the second layer of security systems to prevent any unauthorized
29individuals from gaining access into the airside or preclude anyone from
30breaching any established security sub-system.
31
32 The outer security layer represents the Proactive / Deterrent measures that
33interlock and supplement each other such as Intelligence, Investigation,
34Landside Patrol, Access Control, Vehicle Inspection, Security Survey, Audit &
35Inspection, Guard and Guard System, Lighting System and Signage.
36
37 2.2.1 INTELLIGENCE
38
39 The ability to foretell the plans, actions and intentions of individuals and
40groups inimical to aviation security and initiate criminal prosecution and
41administrative proceeding.
42
43 The known nature of organized international aviation terrorism consisting of
44support and hit groups behooves government to undertake preemptive steps. This
45is in order to prevent attempts to case our airports for its undiscovered weak points
46that can be exploited in tandem with local cohorts or independently by its own
1 6
1support group. To aggressively ferret out/discourage these probing efforts in order to
2undermine security operations.
3
4 The following are the duties and responsibilities of an Intelligence Offices:
5
6 a. Coordinate and collaborate with other aviation security-related agencies for
7 information exchange;
8
9 b. Coordinate with PNP/AFP intelligence community;
10
11 c. Conduct counter intelligence operations to prevent unwitting and witting
12 activities of airport personnel prejudicial to airport security;
13
14 d. Launch case operations against identified airport security threat
15 groups/personalities and initiate criminal prosecution and
16 administrative proceeding as warranted;
17
18 e. Monitor through matrix system the interceptions of prohibited/ dangerous
19 objects/substances per airport and submits recommendations on patterns
20 observed;
21
22 f. Conduct Airport Security Inspection and Survey and submit report with
23 recommendations specially on international airports;
24
25 g. Prepare appropriate Aviation Security Advisory and Current Threat
26 Assessment in collaboration with the Assistant Director for Operations;
27
28 h. Comply with all information requirements from the Directorate for
29 Intelligence, NHQ PNP;
30
31 i. Conduct continuing Security Education and Awareness Program among
32 PNP-ASG personnel particularly on document, physical and
33 communications security;
34
35 j. Submit Daily/Weekly/Monthly Intelligence Briefs/Summaries to the Director,
36 PNP-ASG;
37
38 k. Maintain Rogue Gallery of identified local and international terrorist
39 personalities;
40
41 l. Develop Watch / Target List and conduct background investigation of
42 airport users/ personnel identified to be security risks; and
43
44 m. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as required.
45
46 2.2.2 INVESTIGATION
1 7
1
2 Judicial action is an effective deterrence to any wrongdoing. Specifically, the
3possibility of losing one’s liberty prevents any insidious idea/misguided individuals to
4unlawfully interfere with the civil aviation or commit common crimes in the airport. All
5interceptions in the airport premises falling under Revised Penal Code and special
6laws will be investigated, followed up and followed through until appropriate cases
7are filed with our judicial authorities and pursued to finality. Personnel for this
8purpose are dedicated in each level of this Group.
9
10 The following are the duties and responsibilities of an Investigation Offices:
11
12 a. Investigate all reported violations of law and prepare all pertinent legal
13 documents necessary for the filing of appropriate case/s in court;
14
15 b. Inform immediately the Director, PNP-ASG (Attn: ADII) about each
16 interception/apprehension made in AOR together with its current
17 disposition;
18
19 c. Interview or interrogate separately and individually each witness and
20 suspect;
21
22 d. Conduct follow-up investigations against identified cohorts of arrested
23 individuals;
24
25 e. Establish the positive identifications of each suspect/arrested persons, take
26 their photographs, fingerprints and inventory of their
27 belongings/confiscated materials;
28
29 f. Ensure the integrity of all pertinent legal documents and gathered pieces of
30 evidences;
31
32 g. Attend all scheduled judicial hearings of each case filed in court; and
33
34 h. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
35
36 2.2.3 LANDSIDE PATROL
37
38 This is conducted regularly to preempt any activities prejudicial to
39airport operations. Special emphasis will be given to the security gates, airline
40offices and other vital installation within the airport complex damaged to which
41hampers airport operations.
42
43 The following are the duties and responsibilities of a Landside patrol
44personnel:
45
46 a. Conduct daily systematic visibility patrols within vital airport facilities;
1 8
1
2 b. Be unobtrusive in conduct and project the impression of alertness, agility
3 and competence;
4
5 c. Challenge any airport-user and vehicle within any restricted area with or
6 without appropriate access authority and turn him over for investigation as
7 warranted;
8
9 d. Verify and act as first responder on unattended baggage;
10
11 e. Report and take remedial action of any security breach during his
12 tour of duty; and
13
14 f. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
15
16 2.2.4 ACCESS CONTROL
17
18 The airport authority/management, based on its Airport Security
19Program (ASP), is responsible for the issuance of personnel access passes.
20Authority for access into any restricted area of an airport complex is prescribed. The
21prescribed access pass should be worn appropriately and conspicuously (above the
22waistline) while its user is within the airport complex. However, this access pass can
23never be used as basis for exemption from required security screening. All security
24personnel are duty-bound to challenge and report anyone observed without the
25appropriate access pass within a restricted area in accordance with the established
26coded-access system of the airport. Prevention of passengers mix shall always be
27observed.
28
29 2.2.5 VEHICLE INSPECTION
30
31 The Airport management shall be the authorized body for the issuance of
32restricted area permits, which shall incorporate measures for the production,
33administration and control of permits for the authorized access of vehicles to
34restricted areas.
35
36 The number of vehicle permits, as far as is practicable, shall be kept to a
37minimum so as to avoid proliferation of vehicles in Aircraft Movement Areas
38(AMA):
39
40 a. Contained in each vehicle permit are the following;
41
42  Registration number of the vehicle;
43  Owner/operator logo of the vehicle;
44  Validity period;
45  Security restricted areas for which the permit is valid; and
1 9
1  Access gates which the vehicle is allowed to use.
2
3 b. Drivers of vehicles issued with restricted area vehicle permits should
4 be qualified to drive the appropriate class of vehicle and have been
5 given instruction in all safety requirements for the operation of a
6 vehicle in the airside.
7
8 c. The following guidelines should be observed in the movement of
9 authorized vehicles in the AMA:
10
11  Drivers of authorized vehicles must have undergone
12 familiarization seminar on AMA layout and on rules and
13 regulations relating to the use thereof;
14
15  During upgraded security conditions, the only vehicles
16 authorized to gain access to the AMA are vehicles used in
17 the airports ground operations, as all gates leading to the
18 AMA shall be closed. All others shall have to use the public
19 thoroughfares and park at designated parking area;
20
21  Those vehicles allowed movement in the AMA shall obtain
22 clearance from the control tower or ramp control;
23
24  Airline operators’ service vehicles/equipment intended to be
25 used on the appropriate route shall be properly marked with
26 the company stickers logo etc.;
27
28  Service vehicles shall display a checkered black and yellow
29 flag measuring 10 inches by 12 inches;
30
31  A rotating/alternating beacon light shall be placed on top of
32 the vehicle while operating on the aircraft movement areas;
33
34  The aircraft always have the traffic priority. Likewise, during
35 emergencies, responding police/rescue vehicles shall have
36 priority over all vehicles in the area; and
37
38  All entry and exit gates of the airport complex shall be
39 secured on a 24-hour basis.
40
41 2.2.6 SECURITY SURVEY, AUDIT and INSPECTION
42
43 To ensure the readiness and compliance to various security requirements in
44each airport complex provided in the NCASP, personnel trained on civil aviation
45security survey, audit and inspection should be designated. All PCAS are
1 10
1required to conduct in-house regular security survey, audit and inspection,
2Reports using the appropriate forms should be made to HQ ASG.
3
4 Security survey is conducted to determine the adequacy,
5appropriateness of the security measures implemented under the TASS
6concept. Security audit is conducted to determine whether the security
7measures are sufficient or needs for improvement. Security inspection should
8be conducted daily. It is a daily routine activity to ensure the minimum security
9requirement is met. Special attention should know the given on the serious
10security violations and deficiencies noted after the conduct of security survey,
11audit and inspection, The security personnel should know the results of the
12security survey, audit and inspection to institute appropriate corrective
13measures.
14
15 The Terminal Facility Security Inspection (TFSI) and the aerodrome
16inspection shall be conducted twice daily; three (3) hours before and
17immediately after airport operation to sanitize and clear the airport complex in
18coordination with the airport management.
19
20 The following are the recommended Security Audit procedures:
21
22 a. Coordinate with airport management and other aviation
23 security stakeholders;
24
25 b. Brief the Audit Team on the emphases of the security audit;
26
27 c. Security Audit Proper; and
28
29 d. Exit briefing and preparation of report for submission to PNP-
30 ASG, Headquarters;
31
32 2.2.7 GUARD and GUARD SYSTEM
33
34 All facilities within the airport complex are deemed restricted areas.
35Only authorized individuals, personnel and vehicle are allowed access. Guards
36are posted at various perimeter posts and gates strategically established
37within the complex and terminal buildings. At least one (1) security personnel
38shall be posted to implement the access procedure.
39
40 The Guard System is composed of the following:
41
42 a. Perimeter Guards. Specific duties and responsibilities:
43
44  To inspect all perimeter fence with physical security devices;
45
1 11
1  Challenge all person/vehicle access that passes his area of
2 jurisdiction;
3
4  Always be alert and report all unauthorized and untoward
5 incident; and
6
7  Perform other duties and responsibilities as directed.
8
9 b. Gate Guards. Specific duties and responsibilities:
10
11  Check the access pass and enforce the Aircraft Movement Area
12 (AMA) requirements for vehicles such as; AMA DRIVER’S
13 PERMIT, AMA STICKER, BEACON LIGHT as provided for the
14 airport security program;
15
16  In conducting vehicle search use extended mirror for under
17 chassis inspection and visual inspection of vehicle back seats,
18 gloves and trunk compartments for prohibited/unauthorized items
19 and verify their company tally in/out receipts/documents;
20
21  Direct authorized airport-users on foot to use the pedestrian gate
22 provided for their access;
23
24  Record the ENTRY and EXIT of all authorized person and
25 vehicles;
26
27  Inform immediately the supervisor in case of any untoward incident
28 in his area of jurisdiction; and
29
30  Perform other duties and responsibilities as directed.
31
32 2.2.8 LIGHTING SYSTEM
33
34 Time is essential for airport-related agencies especially to the airline with turn
35around flights, aircraft to repair and on Rest Overnight (RON). All airport facilities
36should be well illuminated during the day and night.
37
38 The terminal building should be properly lighted during the day to prevent
39luggage mishandling, intrusions of unauthorized airport-users into restricted areas
40and proper conduct of security screening in each station. Cones of appropriate light
41intensity should illuminate the perimeter fence, gate and ramp areas.
42
43 Immediate replacements of busted bulbs should be immediately reported to
44appropriate airport authority. Likewise, back-up lighting system should be
1 12
1provided and protected from sabotage / theft. Ramp lightings should be
2sufficiently high in order not to obstruct aircraft movement and prevent accident.
3 There are various Types of security lighting to meet particular
4applications:
5
6 a. Perimeter lighting - is designed to cast a strong light on the
7 perimeter. This may be provided by overhead lamps or by low
8 mounted lamps that will create effect to dazzle and alter intruders.
9
10 b. Area lighting - is intended to illuminate areas inside the perimeter
11 through which intruders must cross in order to reach their objectives.
12
13 c. Local lighting – should illuminate those areas inadequately covered
14 by area lighting and which may concealed intruders. All dark spots
15 like roof, fire escapes and emergency exits should be illuminated by
16 mechanical lighting.
17
18Flood lighting – should be used to illuminate surface (ex. buildings and fences)
19which intruders must pass in-front to reach their objectives.
20
21 2.2.9 SIGNAGE
22
23 To prevent any unauthorized access by anyone into a restricted area,
24appropriate signage shall be installed strategically and conspicuously within
25the airport complex, to guide the airport users on the right direction.
26
27 For uniformity all types of signages indoor and outdoor shall be in
28accordance with the standard materials, letter size, color and background as
29approved by the proper authority.
30
312.3 PROTECTIVE / DEFENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES
32
33 The aircraft is the safest and most efficient mode of moving men, goods and
34services. It is also the most important single component in an airport. To assure its
35unhampered operations in our airports, different passive measures that interlock with
36each other are institutionalized to prevent intrusion and segregate authorized from
37the unauthorized airport-users and identify prohibited/dangerous objects/substances.
38
39 The middle security layer consists of Protective / Defensive security
40measures that are equally complementing each other like the Passenger and
41Baggage Screening Operation, Cargo Screening Operation, Airside Patrol &
42Surveillance, Ramp/Aircraft Guard, Profiling, Terminal Facility Security
43Inspection and Paneling.
44
45 2.3.1 PASSENGER and BAGGAGE SCREENING OPERATION
46
1 13
1 The aircraft in our air transportation system cannot be over emphasized.
2To ensure its protection, all persons and luggage to include airline crew and
3departing passengers without exemption should be properly screened before
4boarding. Total Team approach is the guiding principle in the security
5operations.
6
7 The concept for this security operation is primarily to ferret out
8prohibited/dangerous items from the persons and belongings of airport-users
9through electronic and physical means. The security screening operation
10consist of two (2) stages:
11
12 a. Initial security screening of all baggage thru x-ray machines
13 and walk-thru metal detector for the passengers and airport users at
14 the terminal departure lobby.
15
16 b. Final security screening of all hand carried/cabin baggage thru
17 x-ray machine and walk-thru metal detector and the conduct of 100%
18 body frisk to all passengers and airport users, immediately after
19 immigration or terminal fee counter.
20
21 Conduct of manual search of all passengers and their baggage when
22security screening equipment is not available, non-operational or when
23security screening equipment alarms to identify the items. As necessary,
24dedicated security screening checkpoint may be established in coordination
25with the airport authority. In addition, EOD / K-9 elements should be randomly
26deployed as part of the security screening procedure.
27
28 To meet the international standards the following security equipment
29such as x-ray machines, walk-thru metal detectors (WTMD) and handheld metal
30detectors (HHMD)/scanner are used in each security screening checkpoint.
31
32 Composition of the Security Screening Checkpoint:
33
34 a. Passenger Controller - must be stationed one (1) meter in front of the
35 screening checkpoint to regulate and control the orderly flow of the
36 airport-users one at a time prior to passengers/baggage screening.
37
38 Duties and responsibilities:
39
40  Directs the passenger to place their baggage and hand carried
41 item large enough to conceal a weapon, explosive device or other
42 restricted article unto the x-ray conveyor belt for x-ray inspection
43 and/or submit the item for hand inspection.
44
45  Directs passenger to divest any metal objects in pockets or that
46 can be removed from their person or clothing.
1 14
1
2  Advises the concerned to pass through the WTMD in normal/regular
3 pace and gait; and
4
5  Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
6
7 b. Baggage Feeder – is the front liner in a security screening checkpoint if
8 there is no passenger controller and positions himself/herself before
9 the x-ray machine metal rollers. Responsible for the orderly
10 processing, placement and distancing of each luggage and object to
11 enable the electronic sensor to scan their contents properly.
12
14
15  Advises airport users to place each luggage flat on the metal roller and
16 direct them to divests metal object and other personal items in their
17 possession and place them in the divest container provided for the
18 purpose;
19
20  Places the divest container in a location where the airport user can
21 see it while passing through the WTMD.
22
23  Ensures that spaces of each luggage is at least one foot apart and
24 acceptable through the x-ray tunnel;
25
26  Directs airport-user to pass thru the WTMD one at a time; and
27
29
30 c. X-ray Machine Operator - is the one who identifies, interprets images
31 and color codes as reflected in the x-ray monitor regarding security
32 prohibited items (SPI) like; drugs, weapons, explosives and its components
33 like 24-gauge wire, clock, fuse, detonator and batteries; bladed/pointed
34 objects and corrosive substances.
35
37
38  Checks the operational status of the machine before assuming duty;
39
40  Focuses on the job and be guided with the following three (3) threat
41 signs on the monitor screen: Obvious threats are clear images/color
42 codes of SPI like firearms, explosives and pointed/bladed weapons or
43 any of these components that calls for the assistance of the Armed
44 Supervisor. Possible threats are suspicious unidentifiable images/color
45 codes denoting SPI or parts thereof, that needs physical inspection of
1 15
1 the suspected baggage. No threat means the luggage is clear of any
2 SPI and therefore acceptable for loading into the aircraft;
3
4  Stops the conveyor belt and inform immediately the Armed Supervisor
5 in case of any Obvious Threat and the Baggage Inspector in case of
6 Possible Threat in a particular luggage and its exact location;
7
8  Observes at least 20 minutes rotation and accomplish the X-ray
9 Operator Log Sheet;
10
12
13 d. Baggage Inspector - conducts the systematic physical inspection of
14 suspected luggage for SPI in the presence of the owner under the
15 supervision of the armed supervisor witnessed by an airline staff or
16 any airport authority until the suspected item is found, verified and
17 identified.
18
20
21  Establishes the identity of the rightful owner of a suspected luggage
22 through his/her valid airline ticket and other documents prior to the
23 conduct of baggage inspection either random or Possible Threat;
24
25  Coordinates with the X-ray Machine Operator the exact location of the
26 suspected item/s inside the luggage;
27
28  Informs the Armed Supervisor about the need for physical inspection;
29
30  Requests the rightful owner of the suspected luggage to open for
31 manual inspection in the presence of the Armed Supervisor
32 witnessed by the airline staff or any airport authority. In case of
33 electronic gadgets, requires the owner to personally operate the
34 same before removing all its batteries;
35
36  Prevents the rightful owner to have physical contact with the
37 content of his luggage during the conduct of systematic physical
38 inspection;
39
40  Turns over to the Armed Supervisor all SPI found during the
41 inspection for proper disposition; and
42
44
1 16
1 e. Body Frisker – conducts body frisking of all airport-users every time
2 the Walk-Thru Metal Detector (WTMD) alarms and resolve by the use
3 of Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD) on both Initial and Final Security
4 Screening Checkpoint (SSCP). In addition, conduct 100% body pat-
5 down at the final SSCP.
6
8
9  At the Initial SSCP, when the airport user passed thru the WTMD
10 and there is no alarm, the body frisker will allow them to proceed
11 to the check-in counter, however, if the WTMD alarms the body
12 frisker shall use the HHMD to resolve the caused of alarm;
13
14  At the Final SSCP, when the airport user passed thru the WTMD
15 and there is no alarm, the body frisker will allow them to proceed
16 at the 100% pat down area. If the WTMD alarms the body frisker
17 shall direct the airport user to remove the shoes and to divest all
18 metal objects and placed them on the divest container for x-ray
19 examination and require the airport user to pass thru the WTMD
20 and if it alarms for the 2nd time, HHMD shall be used to resolve the
21 caused of alarm and allow the airport user to proceed at the 100%
22 pat down area;
23
24  Turn-over to the Armed Supervisor any SPI found from the airport
25 user during the search for proper disposition; and
26
28
29 f. SSCP Armed Supervisor - oversees the Uniformed and Non-uniformed
30 personnel for the consistent performance of their duties and
31 responsibilities at each SSCP.
32
34
35  Ensures that all anti-hijacking equipments are operational and
36 passed the mandatory operational testing and properly recorded
37 in the equipment logbook;
38
39  Inform the Terminal Action Officer (TAO) and coordinate for the
40 immediate repair/maintenance of defective anti-hijacking
41 equipment with the concerned authority;
42
43  Supervises the performance of each member of the SSCP;
44
1 17
1  Acts as witness and prevent the passenger to hold any item inside
2 his luggage during the conduct of manual inspection;
3
4  Resolves any misunderstanding between any member of the SSCP
5 and/or airport-user;
6
7  Assumes control over the confiscated/surrendered SPI and
8 deposits in a box provided for the purpose;
9
10  Coordinates with the appropriate airline and government agency
11 for the off-loading passenger and his luggage as warranted;
12
13  Reports any breach of security to the Station Action Officer for
14 corrective measures and/or proper disposition; and
15
17
18 Other security personnel that support the security screening checkpoint;
19
20 a. Terminal Action Officer (TAO) - is primarily responsible for the
21 supervision and management of all security screening checkpoint teams
22 in the terminal/airport station.
23
25
26  Conduct accounting and dissemination of security issuances and
27 directives from Hqs, PNP-ASG and Airport Authority to all
28 incoming duty security screening personnel prior to deployment
29 to their respective SSCP;
30
31  Ensures the proper conduct, efficiency, adequate manning and the
32 presence of the Armed Supervisors in every SSCP in the
33 terminal/airport station at any time of each shift;
34
35  Inform and submit report to the Chief, PCAS/station of any untoward
36 incident or significant development in his area of responsibility;
37
38  Monitor and provide security assistance to any VIPs and members
39 of the diplomatic corps; and
40
41  Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed;
42
43 b. Protocol Officer/Firearm Facilitator – assist the SSCP armed
44 supervisor in monitoring the individual performance of uniformed and
1 18
1 non-uniformed personnel at each SSCP and acts primarily as fire armed
2 facilitator and /or protocol officer who provides VIP facilitation.
3
5
6  Supervises the safe unloading of the turned-in firearm using the
7 designated clearing box and ensures that policies and rules in
8 firearms handling are strictly observed;
9
10  Verifies the authenticity of each document presented by the
11 firearm holder like license, memorandum receipt, permit to carry
12 and/or authority to transport;
13
14  Records all pertinent data in the log book provided for the
15 purpose;
16
17  Properly transfers the turned-in firearms to be contained in a
18 sturdy bag to the concerned airlines and ensures proper receipt
19 thereof. No passenger should be allowed to turn over his/her
20 firearm directly to the airline; and
21
23
24
25 2.3.2 CARGO SCREENING OPERATION
26
27 The PNP-ASG shall ensure the proper implementation of security
28measures relative to screening and administrative procedures to all outgoing
29cargo. Coordination should be made to Airlines, freight forwarders, postal authorities
30and courier companies to establish accountability for the security of all consigned
31cargo.
32
33 Cargo Security procedures at the acceptance, storage/staging and
34aircraft loading area should be developed and updated per Airport Security
35Program (ASP) to ensure that no prohibited and dangerous items shall be
36loaded on board the aircraft. EOD/K-9 teams should be randomly deployed as
37part of the cargo screening operation.
38
39 Composition of Cargo Security Screening Operation:
40
41 a. PNP Cargo Screening In-Charge – responsible for the supervision of
42 the cargo security screening of all cargo before loading on board the
43 aircraft.
44
1 19
1
2  Supervise the X-ray operator of the airline or cargo operator in the
3 performance of their duties and responsibilities;
4
5  Monitor all activities within his areas of responsibilities;
6
7  Coordinate with the airline/cargo security supervisor for the list of
8 authorized personnel involved in x-ray security screening
9 procedures;
10
11  Inform the cargo security team leader and/or PCAS/Station Hqs of
12 any prohibited/contraband items detected by the cargo x-ray
13 operator who will in turn dispatched investigator for proper
14 disposition ;
15
16  Ensures that all cargo found with possible or obvious threat image are
17 properly inspected in the presence of a cargo representative and a
18 Bureau of Customs (BoC) Examiner
19
20  Effect the arrest of any person for violations of the revised penal
21 code and other special laws and turn over to the investigation
22 section for filing of appropriate charges;
23
25
26 b. PNP Cargo Staging Area Security In-Charge – responsible for the cargo
27 security at the staging/storage area.
28
30
31  To prevent pilferage/tampering or switching of screened cargo at
32 staging/storage areas of the airline/cargo operator prior to heir
33 transport to the aircraft;
34
35  Counter check access pass and courteously challenge all persons
36 loitering within the cargo staging/storage area;
37
38  Coordinate with the customs, airline and cargo security supervisor
39 for the list of authorized personnel involved in cargo handling
40 operations at the staging/storage areas;
41
42  Inform the cargo security team leader of all incident and any
43 unusual observation in the area thru any means of fastest
44 communications;
45
1 20
4
6
7 c. PNP Cargo Security Escort – Screened Cargo from the
8 staging/storage areas to the aircraft.
9
11
12  Prevent pilferage and tampering of the screened cargo while on
13 transit from the airline/cargo staging/storage to the aircraft;
14
15  Coordinate with the customs and airlines cargo security
16 supervisor for the list of authorized personnel involved in cargo
17 handling operations from the cargo warehouse to the aircraft;
18
19  Inform the cargo security team leader of all incident and any
20 unusual observation in the area thru any means of fastest
21 communications;
22
26
28
29 2.3.3 AIRSIDE PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE
30
31 Aside from the checkpoint and visibility patrols conducted on the landside,
32preventive foot and motorized patrol within the airside shall also be conducted
33regularly to preempt any activity prejudicial to airport operations. Special emphasis
34will be given to the AMA, ramp, cargo/baggage hold areas, power generators,
35terminal, radar, control tower and other identified vulnerable facilities.
36
37 The airside of the airport should be kept under surveillance with the use of
38CCTV if possible. This is to ensure that any untoward development can be easily
39monitored and immediately attended to by the patrol teams.
40
41 a. Foot and Motorized Patrol Teams - are joint by law enforcement and
42 security teams led by PCAS/Station personnel organized to conduct
43 patrol at the airside of the airport.
44
1 21
1
2  Conduct routine foot and motorized patrols within the airside of the
3 airport;
4
5  Act as first responder on reported or discovered unattended baggage;
6
7  Exercise operational supervision to all security complement detailed in
8 the airside of the airport;
9
10  Ensure that the runway and taxiway are swept for debris and
11 obstructions and looks out for any security breach in the perimeter
12 fence;
13
14  Effect the arrest of any airport-user and vehicle operator within
15 any restricted area without appropriate access authority for
16 violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and
17 turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate
18 charges;
19
20  Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
21
22 2.3.4 RAMP/AIRCRAFT GUARD
23
24 The most important element of the middle security layer who controls the
25authorized access of service, maintenance, catering and airline flight crews
26around the aircraft.
27
29
30  Ensures that he positions himself/herself near the aircraft parking bay
31 ten (10) minutes before arrival and departure of the aircraft;
32
33  Supervise the airline security in the conduct of physical
34 inspections of the tool box/bags and cleaning equipment of airline
35 flight crew and maintenance personnel and check their access before
36 they will be allowed to enter the aircraft;
37
38  Effect the arrest of any airport-user and vehicle operator within
39 any restricted area without appropriate access authority for
40 violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and
41 turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate
42 charges;
43
44  Inhibits anybody from using the aircraft belly as standby point;
45
1 22
1  Inform the Terminal Action Officer of all incident and any unusual
2 observation in the area thru any means of fastest
3 communications;
4
6
7 2.3.5 PROFILING
8
9 This is another effective preemptive security measures that can ferret out or
10deter would-be terrorists to attempt any form of unlawful interference to civil aviation.
11It is primarily based on the careful evaluation of gathered intelligence and operational
12information regarding impending threats of terrorism or peak hour airport operations
13that may be taken advantage of by misguided individuals/groups.
14
15 Profiling, however, should be properly planned, organized and executed in a
16judicious and courteous manner at the landside security checkpoint, curbside,
17lobby prior to initial and final security checkpoints and other restricted areas to
18prevent unfounded accusations of harassment from departing passengers.
19
20 Guidelines to be followed by the profiler
21
22  Observe and record behavior of the selectee, nationality,
23 description, age and number of baggage.
24  Record the number of companion/s, nationality, description and
25 age who accompanied the selectee.
26  Record the type of vehicle, color, make, model, plate number and
27 other distinguishing markers/logos.
28  Coordinate with the security personnel at the passenger entrance
29 gate to check and verify the ticket and travel documents of the
30 selectee.
31  Coordinate with the SSCP armed supervisor for the conduct of
32 rigid security inspection on the selectee and his baggage.
33  Selectee and his baggage shall be subjected to additional security
34 screening with the use of drugs and explosives trace device. (if
35 available)
36
37 a. The following are sample questions that might be asked during profiling:
38
39  Who packed your luggage?
40  Do you know the content of your luggage?
41  Where was the luggage kept after it was packed?
42  For how long and where did it transpire?
43  Who has access to it?
44  Does the luggage contain packages from friends?
1 23
1  Do you know or personally seen the contents of the package?
2  Who knows that you were scheduled to depart today?
3
4 b. The following are to be observed by the profiler but not limited to:
5
6 o Eye movement
7 o Eye contact
8 o Nervousness with no apparent
9 reasons
10 o Inappropriate clothing/attire
11 o Sweating in the area with controlled
12 air environment
13 o Unnecessary movement
14
15 2.3.6 TERMINAL FACILITY SECURITY INSPECTION (TFSI)
16
17 TFSI is conducted three (3) hours before the start of terminal operation and
18one (1) hour after to ensure that the airport is sterile and secured from sabotage,
19infiltration and other acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation. The security
20inspection is normally done by a composite team of PNP-ASG, airport authority and
21airline security personnel, such as:
22
23  briefing/debriefing of security personnel
24  activation/deactivation of Anti Hijacking Equipment (AHE)
25  paneling of the airport terminal/facilities
26
27 a. Team Composition of TFSI:
28
29  PNP-ASG Terminal Action Officer – Team Leader
30  PNP-ASG K-9 and EOD Teams
31  Airport Duty Manager/Action Officer or representative from the airport
32 authority
33  Airline Security Representative
34 Airport Police/Contracted Security Agencies/Airport Civil Security Force
35
36 b. Procedures to be followed in the conduct of TFSI;
37
38  TFSI shall be conducted three (3) hours before and one (1) hour after the
39 flight operations.
40  Terminal Action Officer to coordinate with Airport Authority with the
41 conduct of TFSI.
42  The Airport Duty Manager or Representative from the Airport Authority
43 will notify representatives from the Airline, Airport Police/Airport Civil
44 Security Force/Contracted Security Agency for the conduct of TFSI.
1 24
1  Operational testing of AHE simultaneously with the inspection by the
2 TFSI team.
3  TFSI team will conduct paneling by levels to ensure full coverage of the
4 areas.
5  Passenger terminal shall be closed and no movement of personnel or
6 passenger shall be allowed during the inspection. Announcement will
7 be made thru the Public Address System.
8  After TFSI report shall be submitted by the TAO for the information of
9 GOC and the Director, ASG.
1 25
1 2.3.7 PANELING
2
3 Paneling is being conducted by EOD and K-9 personnel to determine the
4presence of any explosive substance, incendiary material or IED component in all
5facilities, baggage, vehicles and aircraft.
6
8
9  Conduct regular or routine paneling of vital airport facilities particularly
10 on the security screening gates, AMA, ramp, cargo/baggage hold
11 areas, power generators, fuel depot, lobby and airline offices;
12
13  Conduct random K-9 searches on luggage of departing passengers;
14
15  Inform the TAO of any untoward or significant incident as soon as it
16 arises;
17
18  Respond to report on the presence of Unattended Baggage (UB); and
19
21
22
232.4 REACTIVE SECURITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT MEASURES
24
25 The inner security layer depicts the Reactive / Crisis Management
26measures that are mutually exclusive with each other developed to respond to
27and to manage contingencies. It includes procedures on Incident Management,
28Explosive Disposal and Clearing & Armed Intervention.
29
30 Murphy’s Law states that “If anything happens, it will, at the worst moment”
31is a recognized phenomenon despite efforts to envelop our airport complexes with
32adequate concentric layers of protective and preventive security operations. The
33threat to civil aviation is like Sword of Damocles hanging overhead and should not be
34treated lightly.
35
36 In the event of the occurrence of a crisis situation, the established security
37operational plans intended specifically to respond, manage and mitigate
38security/emergencies that may transpire in our airport complexes, e.g. bomb threat,
39hijacking and airport emergencies. Each incident should preferably be nipped in the
40bud during its incipient stage to ensure its early resolution and prevent protracted and
41costly and embarrassing crisis incident situations.
1 26
1 2.4.1 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
2
3 In cases of acts of unlawful interference to Civil Aviation, appropriate pro
4active security operations is undertaken by the PNP-ASG in coordination with the
5airport authority/management through its Airport Crisis Management
6Group/Committee based on the provisions of the NCASP/ASP to resolve the
7situation and without unduly jeopardizing other on-going unaffected airport security
8operations. This is because adequate protection of lives and properties in the airport
9at any time is the avowed mission of the PNP-ASG.
10
11 A crisis has four (4 known stages that must be recognized and appropriately
12handled in order to avoid escalation. Each stage has its characteristics and
13defining traits. It is akin to a fluid, unstable and dynamic; its progress should be
14controlled. Remember, a brewing crisis cannot be seen, touched, heard, tasted or
15felt.
16
17 a) The First Phase is the Prodromal or the Warning Stage characterized by
18existence of perceptible or imperceptible signs. An example is an accumulation
19over time of ignored and neglected minor and seemingly harmless security violations
20and deficiencies that may collectively trigger a proverbial spark as occurred in an
21spontaneous explosion that would result in a conflagration; as exemplified by
22mounting indifference and complacency to the required standard security
23procedures or by a well-planned event of terrorist.
24
25 b) The Second Phase is the Acute Stage known as the turning point for the
26worst. Ideally, a crisis should be resolved in its incipient stage. However, once an
27incident is allowed to progress to this stage, only damage control techniques could
28only be instituted to prevent or delay/control the turn of events for the worst. In the
29aviation security front, this is likened to an access and control by the hijackers of an
30aircraft.
31
32 c) The Third Phase is the Chronic Stage characterized by the aggravation of
33the unfolding events marked as the point of no return. In such situation, the hijackers
34begin to harm or kill their hostages and press hard for the immediate granting of
35their demands.
36
37 d) The Final Phase is the Crisis Stage wherein the reaction unit is ordered
38and dispatched to terminate the impasse and has initiated the launching of
39surgical operations.
40
41 The overall command of an incident at the national level is exercised by the
42Office of Transportation Security (OTS). However, the initial reaction to a crisis
43situation outside Metro Manila is the responsibility of the PNP Regional Director
44under whose area of jurisdiction the affected airport is located. When the Director,
45PNP-ASG arrives at the area, he takes over the command and control of the
46crisis resolution actions from the Regional Director.
1 27
1
2 In the event of crisis, the C, PCAS with jurisdiction over the concerned airport
3is the On-site Commander and will take order from the Director, PNP-ASG upon
4the arrival of the latter.
5
6 a. On-Site Commander duties and functions:
7
8  Inform the Director, PNP-ASG by fastest means of communication;
9
10  Activates the On-site coordinating committee by coordinating with
11 the airport authority for the convening of the airport crisis committee;
12
13  Coordinate with the airport authority and airline security for the
14 transfer of the aircraft to a designated Isolation Parking Area IPA;
15
16  Establish tighter security at the IPA, outer and inner perimeter of the
17 airport complex;
18
19  Gather initial information about hijackers, passengers and involved
20 aircraft and relay them to HQ ASG (Attn: GOC). Specifically, required
21 data is the number, organization/affiliation, armaments and demands of
22 the hijackers and their identities and nationality, the passengers, the
23 aircraft, its registry, model, and destination;
24
25  Establish the Advance Command Post (ACP) and coordinate with the
26 airport authority for the staging area of the SOU or Police/ Military
27 Reaction Unit;
28
29  Designate a media coordinator and press briefing area to control the
30 movement of members of the media; and
31
32  Request for technical and medical support personnel from the nearest
33 PNP/AFP unit with jurisdiction over the area;
34
35  Designate an official negotiator and assistant;
36
37  Perform all other duties and responsibilities as directed;
38
39 b. Incident Management Staff
40
41 The HQ PNP-ASG Staffs shall automatically be converted into an
42 Incident Management Staff (IMS) to assist the Director, PNP-ASG in
43 effectively managing and resolving the instant Aviation Security Crisis
44 Situation.
45
1 28
1
2 Responsibilities of the IMS:
3
4  Establishment of the Command Post;
5
6  Planning of negotiation tactics and strategies;
7
8  Appointment of trained negotiation;
9
10  Initiate coordination with airline airport authority, concern affair for
11 technical assistance;
12
13  Deploy it of SOU personnel when necessary;
14
15  Perform other tasked as directed.]
16
17 The following are tasking of each PNP-ASG Staff Officer
18
19 1. Director, ASG (DASG) Incident Commander
20
21  Appoint member of the negotiating team and guide the conduct of
22 negotiator;
23
24  Prepare timely report about the incident for the information of
25 CASS, OTS and C, PNP;
26
27  Gave the order for the final option for armed intervention;
28
29  Perform other tasked as directed by the CMC.
30
31 Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) will act as the alternate
32 IMS commander in case the Director, ASG is not available and perform
33 other tasked as maybe directed.
34
35 2. Deputy Director for Operations (DDO)
36
37  Prepare the plan releases to be issued by ADPCR/PIO;
38
39  Assist the incident commander in the negotiation process; and
40
41  Perform other task as directed.
42
43 3. Assistant Director for Personnel and Records Management (ADPRM)
44
1 29
1  Coordinate with concerned PCAS Chief for the required personnel
2 support;
3
4  Provide a comprehensive personnel disposition plan and estimate
5 of the of the situation to the incident commander;
6
7  Initiate generation of additional personnel through General Service
8 Office;
9
10  Provide administrative support to the IMS;
11
12  Issue orders of personnel to be dispatched; and
13
14  Perform other tasked as directed.
15
16 4. Assistant Director for Intelligence and Investigation (ADII)
17
18  Gather information and updates about the hijackers, their identities,
19 organization, cohorts, weapons, the passengers and the affected
20 aircraft to support the negotiating and assault than intelligence
21 update;
22
23  Dispatch intelligence operatives to the site with their monitoring
24 equipment;
25
26  Prepare intelligence estimate of the situation for the incident
27 ________ debriefs the released passengers;
28
29  Organize a penetration decoys and follow-up team for dispatch;
30
31  Secure the Passenger Number Manifest (PNM); General Declaration
32 and relevant flight documents;
33
34  Update and validate watch list on major threat groups and finish
35 the tasked units;
36
37  Conducts appropriate investigation of arrested hijackers and prepare
38 required legal documents for filing of appropriate charges in court; and
39
40  Performs other tasked as directed.
41
42 5. Assistant Director for Operations (ADO)
43
1 30
1  Overseas the implementation of appropriate operations plans and
2 progress of the operations of the tasked units;
3
4  Coordinates with affected airline and alerts ACTF for deployment;
5 Periodically briefs Director, PNP-ASG and submits reports to NHQ PNP
6 and OTS;
7
8  Designates qualified negotiators to back up those already at the site
9 and arranges for their transport; and
10
12
13 6. Assistant Director for Logistics (ADL)
14
15  Provides necessary supply support to meet operational
16 requirements to be dispatched to the site without delay;
17
18  Arrange for transportation support to ferry required support
19 personnel to the holding area in coordination with the ADO;
20
21  Arrange for the communication equipment needed at the IMS,
22 commo link with the hijacker and on site coordination committee
23 coordination with ADTS; and
24
26
27 7. Assistant Director for Technical Service (ADTS)
28
29  Coordinate with concern agency for the installation of
30 communications link between the hijackers, On-Site Crisis Committee
31 and IMS; and
32
34
35 8. Assistant Director for Police Community Relations/Public Information
36 Officer (ADPCR/PIO)
37
38  Coordinates with ADL for the release of required medical supplies
39 and the ADI for the names, addresses/telephone numbers and
40 nationalities of the passengers contained in the PNM;
41
42  Insures the proper conduct of Passenger Assistance effort to inform
43 their nearest of kin and the extension of necessary medical services to
44 the injured or those in safe of shock; and
1 31
1
3
4 9. Assistant Director for Human Resource and Doctrine Development
5
6  Assists in the conceptualization of appropriate crisis management
7 strategy to be implemented;
8
9  Culls operational data as basis for programming training courses
10 and for enhancing aviation security doctrines; and
11
13
14 10. Assistant Director for Comptrollership
15
16  Coordinates with CASS, OTS for the required financial support; and
17
19
20 11. Group Legal Officer
21
22  Renders necessary legal assistance required; and
23
25
26 12. Public Information Officer
27
28  Establishes a Media Coordinating Center and the procedures to be
29 followed by members of the media;
30
31  Conducts periodic press briefing as appropriate;
32
33  Accredits members of the media and their equipment;
34
35  Controls the movements of members of the media during the incident;
36 and
37
39
40 13. Non-Aviation Security Related Airport Emergencies
41
42 Airport emergencies such as aircraft crashes, terminal and other airport
43emergencies like facility fire, earthquake, inundation, typhoons and power failure due
44to sabotage of power generator and navigational aids will be dealt with appropriately
1 32
1due to its threat to security. This is because the airside is the exclusive jurisdiction of
2PNP-ASG and public safety is one of the major concerns of the PNP. These
3unintended or intended incidents may have been deliberately initiated to divert our
4attention in order to penetrate the airport premises via the backdoor.
5
6 The following are the responsibilities of concerned PCAS Chief:
7
8  Immediately determines the exact location and cause of the
9 emergency;
10
11  Conducts quick inventory of available personnel and dispatches them
12 to the site in coordination with the airport authority;
13  Establishes control over the site and protect its integrity;
14
15  Coordinates for the required emergency assistance like firefighting,
16 medical, evacuation and recovery of equipment;
17
18  Insures protection of lives and damage to properties;
19
20  Submits report of action taken to Director, ASG (Attn: ADO); and
21
23
24 2.3.2 EXPLOSIVE DISPOSAL AND CLEARING
25
26 a. Bomb Threat Response
27
28 The mode of conveying the threat information specifically intended to disrupt
29airline operations should dictate the appropriate actions to undertake which fall on
30the following manner: by phone, written and personal delivery. Any threat
31information should be treated seriously. Some individuals motivated by greed,
32revenge and hatred or political agenda might attempt to delay, disrupt and jeopardize
33airline/airport operations to the inconvenience of departing passengers and causing
34unnecessary airline expenses.
35
36 The centrality of pinpointing the exact location and time of supposed explosion
37of the alleged bomb can greatly assist in the initiation of appropriate remedial bomb
38recovery procedures.
39
40 Positive Target Identification (PTI) System should be implemented if feasible
41by the Chief PCAS/DSAO. In this case, certified bomb threat assessors are
42designated by the airport authority/management to evaluate the threat whether it
43lacks credibility and therefore does not justify extra precautions or is credible that
44merits intermediate or complete countermeasures. Otherwise, the assessment
1 33
1should be done in coordination with the airport authority/management; Chairman,
2Airline Operators’ Council (if feasible); and airline concerned.
3
4 In all of the situations mentioned below, the DSAO; PCAS Chief; ASC;
5Director, PNP-ASG; and the affected airline should immediately be informed as soon
6as the threat arises. They should then be informed of the result of the paneling and
7render safe procedure as soon as it is completed as basis for clearing the aircraft.
8Furthermore, necessary coordination should be made with medical, fire and airport
9authority/management in all cases of bomb threat.
10
11 b. By telephone
12
13 Primarily, the telephone provides a cloak of anonymity and is a preferred
14method to relay bomb threat. To thwart this malicious intention, the following action
15should be observed by PCAS and other subordinate offices:
16
17  Bomb Threat Checklist should be provided and made accessible and
18 conspicuous in each telephone set in the airport; (Appendix MM – Bomb
19 Threat Checklist)
20
21  Words uttered by the caller over the telephone should be recorded and
22 analyzed while he is encouraged to divulge the exact location and specific
23 time of explosion of the alleged bomb;
24
25  Dilatory tactics by referring him to a supervisor should likewise be
26 attempted to determine the aforementioned information;
27
28  Regional accent and any background noise picked up by telephone
29 receiver should be monitored while accomplishing the checklist;
30
31  HQ ASG (Attn: ADO) should be notified in case of a bomb threat without
32 delay;
33
34  Monthly Bomb Threat Report together with the accomplished Checklist for
35 each incident should be submitted to HQ ASG
36
37 c. By Written Communication
38
39 The written communication bearing the threat information should
40 immediately be evaluated and handled properly before competent authorities
41 are able to examine it for tale-tell evidences in it like fingerprints, handwriting
42 styles and minute traces of sticky substances invisible to the naked eye. The
43 accompanying envelop particularly its postmarks can provide the location and
44 date it was sent.
45
1 34
1 d. Personal Delivery
2
3 When the threat information is conveyed through the use of a courier,
4 the person should be held to determine relevant information on his physical
5 attributes, occupations and motive, etc. When the courier leaves, efforts
6 should be exerted to identify the mode of transportation, direction he took and
7 his companions.
8
9 e. Procedural Response on Bomb Threat
10
11 If per chance, the exact location of the bomb in the airport complex is
12 elicited and the bomb is within the airport building or facility, the orderly
13 evacuation of the affected building or facility, if necessary, should be ensured.
14 In other cases, the following actions depending on the specific situation should
15 be undertaken:
16
17 f. Baggage Already Loaded in Aircraft that is on the Ground Before
18 Boarding
19
20  The aircraft should be boarded by a designated uniformed security
21 personnel, towed to the designated Isolation Parking Area (IPA) and
22 provided with adequate perimeter security thereat;
23
24  Baggage should be unloaded from the aircraft and systematically
25 lined up at a safe distance away from the aircraft and other airport
26 facilities;
27
28  Paneling shall be conducted by K-9/EOD personnel to isolate the
29 suspected baggage. It shall then be brought by the EOD personnel
30 to the designated isolation area and render safe procedure
31 undertaken;
32
33  Paneling of other areas of the aircraft should be done by K-9/EOD
34 personnel; and
35
36  Positive passenger-baggage match-up shall be undertaken prior to
37 reloading of baggage into the aircraft.
38
39 g. Baggage Not Yet Loaded in the Aircraft
40
41  When the baggage is reported to be in the baggage build up area,
42 EOD/K-9 personnel should conduct paneling thereat to locate and
43 isolate the particular baggage. The suspected baggage should be
44 brought by the EOD personnel at a safe distance away from the
1 35
1 terminal or at the designated isolation area and render safe
2 procedure undertaken;
3
4  When the baggage is already in the container van or in the baggage
5 cart, the van or the cart should be brought to the designated
6 isolation area and the baggage lined up. Paneling should be
7 conducted by K-9/EOD personnel to locate the suspected baggage
8 and render safe procedure undertaken.
9
10 h. Baggage Loaded and Passengers aboard in the Aircraft
11
12  If the aircraft is not yet ready for take-off, all passengers and crew
13 with their hand carried luggage should be required to disembark
14 immediately;
15
16  If the aircraft is ready for take-off, it should be towed or directed to
17 proceed to the designated IPA. The crew and passengers should
18 then be directed to disembark from the aircraft with their hand-
19 carried luggage and brought back by shuttle bus (if available) to the
20 pre-departure area inside the terminal;
21
22  Passengers and their luggage should be isolated while inside
23 terminal to prevent passenger/luggage mix. Movement of the
24 passengers while thereat should be closely monitored by security
25 personnel;
26
27  Baggage should then be at the same time unloaded from the
28 baggage hold of the aircraft and systematically lined up for paneling
29 by K-9/EOD personnel. The suspected baggage should then be
30 isolated and brought by the EOD personnel at a safe distance away
31 from the aircraft or to the designated isolation area and render safe
32 procedure undertaken;
33
34  Other areas of the aircraft should also be paneled by K-9/EOD
35 personnel;
36
37  When the aircraft and baggage is cleared, security re-screening of
38 crew, passengers and their hand-carried luggage should be
39 undertaken at the terminal;
40
41  Prior to boarding and loading of baggage, positive passenger–
42 baggage match-up shall be done; and
43
44  Unclaimed and/or unidentified baggage should be isolated and
45 secured and turned over to affected airline for proper disposition.
1 36
1
2 i. Aircraft In-Flight
3
4  The control tower should be informed about the threat and be
5 required to direct the Pilot-In-Command of the aircraft for the
6 immediate landing and parking of the aircraft in the designated IPA
7 to initiate the implementation of the airline emergency plan;
8
9  When the aircraft is already in the IPA, procedures in para 4.3.2.3.
10 should be implemented.
11 2.3.3 ARMED INTERVENTION
12
13 The Aviation Counter Terrorism Force (ACTF) is the special unit of the Group
14tasked to conduct counter-terrorism measures to prevent and resolved any
15unlawful interference to civil aviation especially when there is a need for armed
16intervention and bomb threat clearing operations. In case of hijacking incident,
17ACTF will deploy SOU personnel to secure the affected area while the negotiation is
18ongoing and to conduct aircraft assault in case the negotiation fails. The following are
19the duties and responsibilities of concerned unit commanders:
20
21 a. Commander, ACTF
22
23  Alerts and deploys SOU and K-9 personnel;
24
25  Organizes reserved elements for further deployment;
26
27  Monitors developing situation;
28
29  Advises Director, PNP-ASG on courses of action that can be taken;
30 and
31
33
34 b. Chief, SOU
35
36  Immediately places his personnel on standby alert status;
37
38  Practices aircraft assault with the aircraft model similar with the
39 affected aircraft;
40
41  Establishes staging areas for assault teams;
42
43  Deploys snipers and spotters at the designated areas as
44 appropriate;
45
1 37
1  Performs counter hijacking assault operations upon direction
2 of the Director, ASG?
3
4  Ensures the proper identification/segregation of hijackers and
5 passengers after the incident; and
6
7  Employs EOD personnel for a bomb clearing operation when
8 necessary.
9
11 Chief, K-9 Unit
12
13 a. Places his personnel on standby alert status;
14
15 b. Conducts paneling of affected areas as directed;
16
17 c. Coordinates with the SOU for deployment; and
18
19 d. Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
20
21
22 CHAPTER III
23
24 EXCEPTIONAL SECURITY SCREENING
25
261. VIPs and Diplomats
27
28 a. The President, Vice President and visiting Heads of States are exempted
29 from security screening. However, their luggage may be screened
30 electronically, if requested.
31
32 b. Sealed diplomatic pouches in the courier’s possession are not subject to
33 manual search. However, personal luggage of the courier should be
34 processed in the normal manner.
35
36 c. Exemption from screening may be extended to Head of Diplomatic
37 Missions and their personal effects if advance coordination are made.
38
392. Passenger under Escort
40
41 a. Certain dignitaries, VIPs, witness under
42 protective custody or prisoners in-transit will be escorted by armed law
43 enforcement officers (LEO) from PNP-ASG upon request in coordination
44 with other airport authorities. Armed LEO escorts which are not organic at
45 the airport shall deposit their firearms at the initial screening checkpoint
46 consigned by proper receipt.
1 38
1
2 b. Dignitaries with appropriate/advance
3 coordination with the airport authorities will be notified into private or
4 special screening process.
5
6 c. Security personnel accompanying foreign
7 dignitaries must have advance coordination with the airport authorities.
8 Only designated Air Marshals on duty with MOU with the Philippine
9 Government will be allowed to board the aircraft with authorized firearms.
10
113. Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)
12
13 At the airport, on duty uniformed officers with proper credentials, serving as
14 law enforcement officers such as PNP-ASG in prescribed uniform, may pass
15 through the checkpoint without full screening.
16
174. Classified Materials and Diplomatic Pouches
18
19 a. Passengers with diplomatic pouches must
20 make prior arrangements with airport authorities and airline concerned for
21 these items to be exempted from screening.
22
23 b. Upon presentation of the appropriate
24 identification and documentation describing the materials to be exempted
25 form screening to the checkpoint Supervisor, the material designated in the
26 documentation may pass through the checkpoint without being x-ray or
27 searched.
28
29 c. The person carrying the materials must be
30 screened in the same manner as other passengers. It is the classified
31 materials or so called “diplomatic documents” placed in a sealed diplomatic
32 pouch that are exempted from normal screening but not the person or
33 other baggage.
34
355. Extra-ordinary Items
36
37 a. Some religious articles, medical lifesaving and scientific items, legal
38 evidences and crematory containers (burial urns) may be exempted from
39 x-ray inspection and/or manual inspection if they cannot be opened without
40 damaging it or its content. However, proper documentation and chain of
41 custody will be scrutinized. Prior arrangements must be made with airport
42 authorities and airline concerned where the passenger is traveling.
43
44 b. The passenger must have documentations to verify the contents of the item
45 to be exempted and personal identification. The passenger should undergo
46 the standard screening procedures.
1 39
1
26. Infants and Small Children
3
4 a. Passengers traveling with infants or children shall be asked to remove child
5 from child carrier device and should carry the child carrier device shall be
6 passed through the x-ray machine.
7
8 e. Be sure that the child carriers are not placed on the x-ray machine
9 conveyor belt until the child has been removed.
10
11 f. If the passenger does want to remove the infant from the carrier, the infant
12 in the carrier must pass through the walk-thru metal detector. When the
13 metal detector alarms, both must be cleared by the hand held metal
14 detector for alarm resolution.
15
16 g. Children in strollers should be removed from the stroller and be required to
17 pass through the metal detector. If the child cannot walk, the child should
18 be carried and passed through the walk-thru metal detector by the person
19 accompanying the child. When the metal detector alarms, both must be
20 cleared by the handheld metal detector. Enough alarm between the person
21 coming the baby and the baby for alarm resolution.
22
23 h. The stroller should be cleared through the x-ray. Nevertheless, special
24 scrutiny should be taken to ensure that pockets or container on the stroller
25 and the under side are all inspected.
26
277. Physically Impaired Persons
28
29 a. Physically impaired persons, e.g. incapacitated / stretcher-
30 borne passengers (or their escorts) should be interviewed for the cause of
31 the ailment and medical certificate or proof of their condition should be
32 inquired.
33
34 b. With the gathered information, security screeners shall
35 conduct the Pat Down Search using the handheld metal detector to subject
36 passenger and be sensitive to his condition. They shall pay particular
37 attention to the blanket, clothes/carriage pockets, linings and covers.
38
39 c. Wheel chairs and hand carried baggage to be brought into
40 the aircraft should be screened electronically.
41
42 d. Unauthorized access to airport of wheel chairs should be
43 prevented to prevent substitution and insertion of prohibited/dangerous
44 objects.
45
1 40
1 e. All crutches, walking aids and baby carriages should likewise
2 be screened electronically. Scratches and other recent disturbances in the
3 metal surfaces of screws and joints should be looked into since they are
4 indicative of effort to insert prohibitive substance in the frame/tubing and
5 canvas/leather double linings/ pockets of carriage, wheel chairs, and
6 crutches.
7
88. Intransient Passengers
9
10 a. In-transit and transfer passenger and their cabin baggage may be
11 subjected to security check before continuing the flight. However,
12 measures must be established to control these passengers and their cabin
13 baggage in order to prevent unauthorized articles form being taken aboard
14 the aircraft.
15
16 b. Special precautions taken to control transfer and transit passengers
17 and baggage should include surveillance of transit areas (arrival/departure
18 halls) and baggage storage and sorting areas. Where a transit or transfer
19 passenger has had access to checked baggage or baggage collection
20 areas, the passenger needs to be re-screened before re-boarding or
21 having any contact with other screened passengers.
22
23 c. In-transit passengers should be permitted to remain on board the
24 aircraft, if they so wish, unless required to disembark for a technical reason
25 or unless the aircraft needs to be searched for security reasons.
26
27 d. Flight under an increased threat situation, all passengers and their
28 cabin baggage must be offloaded during the transit stop and to conduct an
29 inspection of the interior of the aircraft where passengers have had access
30 during the flight to ensure that no items have been left aboard, should a
31 passenger attempt to disembark as mentioned in.
32
339. Person-In-Custody
34
35 The following guidelines and procedures shall be strictly followed:
36
37 a. The airport management/authority and the PNP-ASG
38 and the responsible representative of the operator must be properly
39 notified before the date s proposed to transport a prisoner, or soon as
40 practicable in an emergency, of the identity of the person being escorted,
41 the flight on which transportation has been arranged, and whether or not
42 the escorted person is considered dangerous.
43
44 b. An operator should not accept a prisoner and escort
45 (s) as passengers unless concurrence has been obtained in advance from
46 the States and other operators that may be involved en route and at the
1 41
1 intended final destination. In such cases sufficient advance notification
2 must be given the operator so that prior agreements can be obtained.
3
4 c. Escorting officers should ensure that a prisoner does
5 not carry contraband, weapons, matches or other potentially dangerous
6 items.
7
8 d. Escort should be equipped with adequate restraining
9 devices to be used in the event they determine that restraint is necessary.
10 Under normal circumstances a prisoner should not be shackled to any part
11 of the aircraft, including seats, tables, etc.
12
13 e. Escorts should not be carry mace, tear-gas or similar
14 incapacitating gas generating devices on board an aircraft.
15
16 f. Escort should adequately identify themselves to
17 security personnel, policing authority officers on duty and flight attendants,
18 requesting that their presence on board and seat assignment be
19 transmitted to the pilot-in-command, who should acknowledge receipt of
20 this information.
21
22 g. Escorted persons should be boarded before all other
23 passengers and disembarked after all other passengers have left the
24 aircraft.
25
26 h. They should be seated as far to the rear of the
27 passenger cabin as is possible but not in a lounge area or next to/directly
28 across from an exit.
29
30 i. They should only be seated in a roe of two or more
31 seats and at one escort should sit between the escorted person and any
32 aisle.
33
34 j. Not intoxicating beverage should be served escorts
35 or prisoners while on board the aircraft.
36
37 k. Prisoners may be served food at the discretion of
38 escorts but should not be provided with metal utensils or a knife.
39
4010. Screening Procedure in Other Cases
41
42 a. Religious, medical, scientific and life-saving objects, legal pieces of
43 evidences and crematory containers which are difficult to manually inspect
44 may be exempted from screening if authentic documents are presented
45 attesting to their true nature/state.
46
1 42
1 b. The x-ray machines installed at the airports are film safe/friendly,
2 loaded still and video cameras should be screened electronically.
3
4 c. Infant on a carriage/stroller should be removed from it and carried
5 by an adult through the walk thru metal detector while the carriage/stroller
6 itself should be screened electronically. (Appendix X)
7
8 d. Cigarette packs, infant/liquid formulas, canned goods, writing
9 implements (ball/fountain pens), books, newspapers, magazines and
10 electronic devices carried by the airport-user should be screened
11 electronically and manually.
12
13 e. During x-ray machine downtime caused by brown out or mechanical
14 defects, all of these items and similar objects should be either visually
15 scrutinized, folded and inspected for carved-out portions that may carry
16 weapon that can be used to interfere with civil aviation.
1 43
111. Visually Impaired Passengers
2
3 If a visually impaired passenger is traveling without a companion,
4 he/she must be escorted by the airline staff and should be required to pass
5 through the normal screening procedures. They must divest themselves of
6 metal canes or other guide devices before walking (or being assisted) through
7 the walk thru metal detector.
8
912. Hearing Impaired Passengers and Passengers with Luggage Barriers
10
11 They should be processed using the standard screening procedures.
12 Face the passengers and speak clearly and slowly, pointing or pantomiming the
13 necessary actions and/or movements which maybe useful to help communicate
14 with the passenger.
15
1613. Passengers with Pacemakers or Other Implantable Medical Devices
17
18 Passengers should be searched by hand winding the body areas away
19 from the device. A pat down search can clear the area where the device is
20 implanted. The passenger will be subjected to a whole body pat down search.
21
2214. Wheel Chaired Passengers
23
24 a. They should be asked if it is possible for them to pass the
25 walk thru metal detector or stand far enough away from the metal
26 wheelchair to allow a handheld metal detector search. If this option is
27 impractical, the passenger should be processed using the appropriate
28 method.
29
30 b. If this is not possible, request the passenger for a whole
31 body pat down search. Always search the wheelchair to make sure that
32 there re no weapons or explosive devices concealed in any part of the
33 chair. Hand-carried items should pass through x-ray screening.
34
35 c. Wheelchairs should be searched systematically from the
36 backrest leather canvass, the external pockets, going to the arm rest, down
37 to the seat cover from front and back. Inspect properly the wheel of the
38 chair and the adjusting gear for any signs of tampering to ensure or parts
39 of an explosive are hidden thereat.
40
41 d. Direct the handler of the wheelchair to pass through the
42 walk thru metal detector for normal screening process and the hand carried
43 luggage to pass through the x-ray machine.
44
1 44
1 e. Advise the handler to standby and wait until the inspection
2 of the handicapped passenger and wheelchair are completed before
3 reconciliation.
4
5 f. Nitroglycerine in its original liquid form is a highly volatile
6 detonating explosive. It is highly unstable and toxic which render its
7 transport unsafe and very risky. To secure its safe transport, this explosive
8 must be stabilized with the use of absorbent materials like pulp woods.
9 macerated dried leaves, fowl’s feather, cloth, tissue, foam or cotton.
10 Nitroglycerine is any form has a PUNGENCY odor.
11
12 g. Require owners of bottled liquid to open the same and
13 sample a gulp in your presence.
14
15 h. Stuffed toys, pillows, blankets, hallowed-out transformer
16 toys, dolls, figurines and electronic devices loaded with PUNGENT
17 SMELLING pulp woods, macerated dried leaves, cloth, foam, feather,
18 tissue, cotton and other absorbent materials should be considered suspect
19 and its owner held for complete pat down and further investigation.
20
21 i. Traveling/ladies bags and luggage should be probed for
22 the presence of false bottom by comparing its actual physical depth with
23 that of its probable true depth. Presence of disturbances in the lining and
24 seams should arouse suspicions. The pockets, sidings and linings should
25 be checked for any bulge or wet, pungent portions
26
27 j. Contact lens container, ointments and balms should be
28 opened and smelled for PUNGENCY. Cotton/pulp stabilizers should be
29 inspected. The bottom of infant formulas should be probed for its true
30 content and sampled by its owner.
31
3215. Shipment of Firearms and Ammunitions Aboard Aircraft
33
34 a. Pertinent papers, such as authority/license to carry,
35 memorandum receipt (MR) and Mission/Letter Orders (MO/LO) stating the
36 area covered and the duration of the mission of the passenger carrying his
37 personal or issued government firearms and ammunition shall be checked
38 by ASG duty personnel. The duty personnel shall then record such firearm
39 or ammunition check in a logbook provided for the purpose.
40
41 b. Passenger/s, whether members of the PNP/AFP or not, found
42 carrying firearms and/or ammunition without necessary supporting papers
43 shall be immediately apprehended for proper investigation/disposition in
44 violation of PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
45
1 45
1 c. Any passenger with valid firearm documents but refuses to
2 surrender his firearm/ammunition shall be denied boarding the aircraft.
3
4 d. Firearms/ammunition found in hand carried/checked-in baggage
5 with or without pertinent documents shall be likewise seized.
6
7 e. Passenger with firearms and ammunitions, covered with
8 pertinent papers, shall be required to unload his firearm/s of bullet/s and
9 clear same in the firearm clearing box provided before the initial security
10 screening checkpoint, duly supervised by the PNP-ASG Firearm Facilitator.
11
1216. Safety Procedures in the Clearing of Firearms by the Owner
13
14 Unloading a Pistol
15
16 a. The owner shall be required to grasp the gun using his/her strong arm
17 with trigger finger out of the trigger guard while the gun muzzle is pointed
18 towards the Firearms Clearing Box. The weak arm of a right-handed
19 person is his/her left arm while his/her right arm is his/her strong arm and
20 vice versa;
21
22 b. He shall then press the magazine release latch to release the magazine
23 with ammo and give it to the Firearm Facilitator;
24
25 c. He shall disengage the safety lock and pull back the slide using the
26 weak arm;
27
28 d. If the chamber load does not eject, he shall repeat previous step, open
29 bolt and visually ensure that there is no live ammo inside the chamber;
30
31 e. He shall then turn-over the pistol to the Firearm Facilitator;
32
33 Unloading a Revolver
34
35 a. The owner shall likewise grasp the revolver using his strong arms
36 and point the muzzle towards the box. He shall then press the chamber
37 latch to swing out the chamber and press the chamber rod out downward
38 to eject the bullets;
39
40 b. The owner shall then turn-over the ejected bullets and revolver to
41 the Firearm Facilitator;
42
43 c. The Firearm Facilitator shall ensure that the chambers of the
44 revolver are cleared.
45
1 46
117. Handling and Shipment of Firearms Replica, Toy Firearms and Toy
2 Explosive:
3
4 a. Firearms and explosives replica are prohibited either as a
5 carry-on item or inside the checked-in baggage. During the screening and
6 the firearm or explosive replicas are found, the items shall be automatically
7 confiscated.
8 b. Toy firearms and toy explosives are not prohibited, however
9 they shall not be allowed as carry-on items. Toy firearms and toy
10 explosives shall be placed inside the checked-in baggage or shall be
11 endorsed to the airline for proper handling and safe keeping during the
12 flight.
13
14 c. Lighter gun is not considered a prohibited item, however,
15 when it resembles with the characteristics of the gun replica, the item must
16 be confiscated. If the lighter gun is dissimilar from that of a gun replica, it
17 shall be treated as an ordinary lighter.
18
1918. Policies and Rules in Carrying of Firearms in airport restricted areas
20
21 a. Only uniformed security personnel in complete uniform of PNP-ASG and
22 Airport Police Department (APD) are allowed to bring their issued firearms
23 within the airport restricted areas. However, private security guards under
24 employ of the airport authority/management maybe allowed to do so under
25 certain circumstances based on their ASP. When in uniform, the gun
26 should be holstered and secured by a snap;
27
28 b. Other law enforcement personnel with official business to transact within
29 the airport premises shall be required to deposit their issued firearms at the
30 initial screening checkpoint with the Firearms Facilitator who shall issue a
31 corresponding receipt thereof;
32
33 c. Incoming firearms arranged by licensed firearms importers, shooting
34 sports enthusiasts and firearms collectors aficionados shall be deposited
35 with the BOC until claimed / released in the presence of Firearms and
36 Explosives Division (FED) representative;
37
38 d. Competition firearms of local shootfest participants shall be handled
39 accordingly.
40
4119. Anti-Hijacking Equipment Preventive Maintenance
42
43 1. X-ray Machine
44
45 a. An efficient security machine that bombards the
46 passenger luggage and objects by gamma rays through a sensor and
1 47
1 projects the shades, shadows, shapes and colors of its metal, organic and
2 non-organic contents. The following must be observed in its maintenance
3 and operations:
4
5 b. Inspection of the inter-connections of all
6 switches and plugs per unit before operation/warm-up together with the
7 tunnel conveyor belt for any obstruction;
8
9 c. The conveyor belt must be moved according to
10 personal preference of operator without unduly causing unnecessary delay
11 in the screening of luggage;
12
13 d. Anybody should be inhibited to place bottled
14 liquid or cream that may be spilt in its inner parts and jeopardized its
15 operations;
16
17 e. The x-ray machine must be able to detect the
18 presence of 24 gauge wire, organic/non organic materials and the outline
19 of ferrous objects in each luggage;
20
21 f. The x-ray machine must be warmed-up until
22 “SIGNAL SYSTEM READY” appeared on the monitor and must be turned
23 off after each use;
24
25 g. It should be tested periodically as to its
26 capability with the findings recorded properly and HQS ASG informed
27 immediately;
28
29 h. It must be inspected annually by qualified
30 technicians who maintain individual repair history of each unit per airport;
31
32 i. Luggage size and weight should conform to the tunnel and weight
33 capability of the conveyor belt; and
34
35 j. The conveyor belt/tunnel should not be used as storage special for
36 liquid/bottled items.
37
38 2. Walk Thru Metal Detector (WTMD)
39
40 It is an efficient security machine used to detect the presence of ferrous
41 materials in the person of an airport-user as he walks through its sensor. The
42 following must be observed in its maintenance and operations:
43
44 a. Any airport-user must be inhibited from bumping the detector
45 wood/plastic frame during its operations that may damage its mechanism;
46
1 48
1 b. It must be inspected half-hour before and turned off after each
2 use;
3
4 c. It must be inspected annually by qualified technicians who
5 maintain individual repair history of each unit per airport;
6
7 d. It must be tested periodically as to is capability. Findings and
8 observations should be recorded in appropriate form and reported to HQS
9 ASG immediately.
10 3. Handheld Metal Detector (HHMD)
11
12 It is a handy security instrument that determines the exact location of
13 ferrous materials in the person of airport-users by sound. The following must
14 be observed during its use:
15
16 a. It must be turned off when not in use and handled properly. It
17 must be laid gingerly over hard surfaces when not in use;
18
19 b. It must be tested periodically and its batteries replaced when
20 weak;
21
22 c. Appropriate maintenance ledger should be maintained about its
23 operational condition;
24
25 4. Handheld Radio
26
27 a. A handy two-way communication device that enables a security
28 personnel to coordinate with their office while in the field. The following
29 must be observed in its use;
30
31 b. It must be protected from the elements when not in actual use;
32
33 c. Its battery must be recharged immediately after each tour of
34 duty.
35
36 5. Exceptional Security Articles/Items
37
38 Screeners must be aware that there are restrictions that apply to certain
39 “prohibited items” as well as articles or substances classified as “dangerous
40 goods” which passengers may attempt to carry in their baggage. Dangerous
41 goods are items that can pose a significant risk to health, safety or property
42 when transported by air.
43
44 Passengers must not be allowed to take the following types or articles
45 onto an aircraft:
46
1 49
1 a. those made or intended for offensive or defensive use such as
2 firearms and pointed, sharp-edged or blunt weapons such as
3 truncheons, axes and loaded or spiked sticks;
4
5 b. all ordinary articles capable of being used as offensive or defensive
6 weapons such as ice-axes, metal-tipped walking sticks, open razors,
7 long-pointed scissors, knives, professional tools, aerosol containers;
8
9 c. imitations of any of the articles described above; and
10
11 d. other articles which give rise to reasonable suspicion.
12
13 Examples of forbidden dangerous goods are as follows:
14
15 a. Explosives
16 b. Gases
17 c. Flammable liquids
18 d. Flammable solids and reactive substances
19 e. Oxidizers/organic peroxides
20 f. Toxic/infectious substances
21 g. Radioactive material
22 h. Corrosives
23 i. Miscellaneous
24 j. Grenades, fireworks, flares
25 k. Propane, butane
26 l. Gasoline, methanol
27 m. Magnesium, firelighters
28 n. Bleach, car body repair kits
29 o. Rat poison, infected blood
30 p. Medicinal or commercial isotopes
31 q. Mercury, vehicle batteries
32 r. Vehicle fuel system components which have contained fuel
33
34
1 50
1 7. Complete Pat Down Search
2
3 This is a mandatory search conducted by security personnel of the same
4gender to ensure that no prohibited/ dangerous/ security risk items other than metal
5objects will be carried by any person on board an aircraft. The security personnel
6must concentrate on this job and should not be distracted by any noise meant to
7divert his attention. He/she should not be deceived by the innocence of a child or be
8cowed by the elegance of worn jewelry or his stern looks. In the conduct of this pat
9down search, the security personnel shall do the following mandatory procedures:
10
11 a. Slips forefingers through the hair
12 at the nape area for any attached
13 hidden objects
14 b. Faces the passenger with both
15 hands raised parallel to the
16 ground; slips both right and left
17 forefingers to the back collar; and
18 clip it with both thumbs and index
19 fingers. Feels the entire collar by
20 sweepingly moving both thumb
21 and index fingers separately
22 toward the front in circular
23 motion.
24
25 c. Tap the right and left shoulder
26 blade with open left and right
27 palms and sweepingly spread
28 them out separately towards the
29 wrist/cuff. Bring both open palms
30 to the lower wrist and sweepingly
31 spread them inward separately
32 toward the armpit .
33
34 d. Slips both open palms to the
35 edge of the back shoulder and
36 sweepingly spreads them
37 separately downward to the
38 waistline following the body
39 contour.
1 51
1 e. Clips the back waistband with
2 both thumbs and index fingers and
3 sweepingly spreads them
4 separately to the front in circular
5 motion;
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 f. Passes through right and left
14 forefingers to the solar plexus
15 or bust cleavage for ladies and
16 runs left and right open palms
17 to the breast base for any
18 foreign objects.
19
20
21
22
23
24 g. With both open palms on each
25 side of the pelvic bone,
26 sweepingly slides them
27 separately towards the front;
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36 h. With the right hand on the right
37 buttock and the left hand on the
38 thigh of the concerned,
39 sweepingly slides both hands
40 downward along the thigh
41 towards the ankle. Does the
42 same procedures on the other
43 leg. The crotch area should be
44 felt by the inner forearm in the
45 process for foreign objects;
46
1 52
1
2 i. Cuffs each ankle together with
3 the trouser/skirt seams by each
4 hand;
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15 j. Requires the passenger to walk a five-meter line and watches for evidence
16 of any unusual gait;
17
18
19 k. Inspects manually the divested items and shoes by paying particular
20 attention to the shoes’ inner soles and heels; and
21
22 l. Requests for the assistance of a medical doctor before conducting rectal or
23 anal inspection with the use of a flashlight;
1 53
1 CHAPTER 4
2
3 GENERAL AVIATION
4
5 Pre-flight security inspections should be conducted on all aircrafts, whether
6locally or foreign registered, using the general aviation facilities of airports. All
7passengers, baggage and cargo should be subjected to electronic and/or manual
8security screening for prohibited/dangerous/security risk items like drugs, weapons,
9explosives and its components like 24-gauge wire, clock, fuse, detonator and
10batteries; bladed/pointed objects and corrosive substances. K-9 teams, if available,
11should be deployed for security screening of cargo. Profiling of aircraft crew and
12passengers should be done.
13
14 Visual inspection inside the aircraft and counterchecking of documents for
15positive ID of aircraft crew and passengers cited in the flight manifest should be
16conducted prior to departure. This inspection should be made in coordination with
17the customs, quarantine, immigration and airport authority/management personnel,
18when necessary, particularly in flights destined for other countries.
19
20 Aircraft exit clearance for each flight should be issued by PCAS prior to
21departure. An aircraft security inspection report should likewise be prepared by
22PCAS and submitted to HQ ASG (Attn: ADO).
23
24 There should be duly designated uniformed personnel to conduct such
25inspections and their duties and responsibilities are as follow:
26
27 General Aviation Officer-In-Charge
28
29 a. Primarily responsible on the conduct of all pre-flight inspections;
30
31 b. Assigns the right number of personnel to conduct the pre-flight inspection
32 by issuing the appropriate order;
33
34 c. Conducts specific seminar on the proper conduct of pre-flight inspection
35 among his personnel;
36
37 d. Coordinates the deployment of K-9 team as necessary; and
38
39 e. Performs such other duties and functions as directed.
40
41 General Aviation Supervisor
42
43 a. Acts as liaison between the assigned security inspectors and owners of the
44 aircraft;
45
1 54
1 b. Supervises the security inspectors in their conduct of the required pre-flight
2 inspections for each aircraft;
3
4 c. Conducts daily briefings of incoming security inspectors;
5
6 d. Apportions the workload among his/her personnel; and
7
8 e. Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
9
10 General Aviation Security Inspector
11
12 a. Conducts pre-flight security inspection;
13
14 b. Conducts pat-down search or with the use of HHMD to screen passengers
15 and crew;
16
17 c. Conducts electronic or manual luggage, baggage and cargo inspection;
18
19 d. Confiscates prohibited/dangerous items found during the screening and
20 subsequently apprehends the concerned passenger or aircraft crew and
21 makes appropriate report to the GA Officer In-Charge; (Appendix T –
22 Affidavit of Arrest) and
23
24 e. Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.
25
1 55
1 CHAPTER 5
2
3 SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS
4
5 The successive hijacking of four (4) aircrafts in the US that ended in the
6massive destruction of World Trade Center and Pentagon last 11 September 2001 by
7utilizing the aircraft as weapons of mass destruction is unprecedented in the annals
8of aviation history. It was a gloomy reminder of the ignominy of man that begs for
9appropriate security counter measures.
10
11 To enhance basic aviation security measures, additional procedures are
12issued from time to time based on the prevailing threat situation and on OTS policies,
13airport authority/management directives and ICAO SARPs.
14
15 Contraption of Deadly Weapons Out of Soft Drinks Canisters
16
17 Discouragement of airlines from serving any beer, juices, soft drinks, or any
18food item contained in aluminum tin foil/ canister can to all airport users during
19original and turn-around flights from any airport (domestic and international) and by
20airside terminal concessionaires.
21
22 Passenger Security Screening Operations
23
24 Confiscation at the Initial Security checkpoint of the terminal of any bladed,
25cutting and edged instrument, disposable lighter, nail cutter, tweezers, safety razor
26(including disposable), stick made of hardwood and plastic and syringe that is
27considered as Security Removed Items (SRI);
28
29 The following are the pertinent procedures of the security advisory:
30
31 a. Confiscated items shall be turned-over to concerned airline representative
32 under receipt;
33
34 b. Passenger controllers shall require all passengers with jacket and
35 overcoats to place the same on the plastic container for x-ray examination;
36
37 c. All airport users who passes thru the WTMD must be frisked;
38
39 d. Manually inspect all luggage containing unidentifiable/ questionable item in
40 it as projected in the monitor.
41
42 e. Use of HHMD to any passenger who refuses to be manually frisked at the
43 screening checkpoint is allowed. This is allowed not as a general rule but
44 rather as an exception;
45
1 56
1 f. Personal accessories like belt buckles, clutch bags, umbrella and crutches
2 shall be x-rayed;
3
4 g. Coins in any denomination and type should be allowed to be carried on
5 board after inspection/examination. They should be placed in a tray also for x-
6 ray examination;
7
8 h. Confiscated prohibited/regulated objects relative to filed cases should be
9 turned over to the SAO;
10
11 i. Clogs/elevator shoes and the like must be inspected closely;
12
13 j. Airline crews, cockpit crews, attendants, ground mechanics and all
14 personnel entering the ramp area (airside), should pass thru all the screening
15 checkpoints. However, they should be given priority in queuing;
16
17 k. Disabled/elderly passenger must be given priority in queuing but must pass
18 thru the WTMD. Wheel chairs and other carriers and crutches used must be
19 thoroughly inspected both visually and electronically;
20
21 Guidelines re Shipment of Authorized Hazardous Materials
22
23 The following are the pertinent guidelines of this memo:
24
25 a. A thorough background investigation of contractors and other airport
26 personnel involved in the air shipment of authorized hazardous materials
27 should be conducted in coordination with the local law enforcement and
28 intelligence agencies to facilitate record check; and
29
30 b. This background investigation should commence when these contractors
31 and other airport personnel start doing business at the airport complex and
32 every six months thereafter.
33
34 Enhancement of Aircraft Security
35
36 The following are the pertinent provisions of this directive:
37
38 a. Any violation of ID access control should be duly acted upon and reported;
39
40 b. Remained-Over-Night (RON) aircraft should be closely monitored and
41 parking area should be properly illuminated.
42
43 c. Ground servicing personnel, such as aircraft cleaners, maintenance
44 personnel, catering personnel, ground staff and all other persons gaining
45 access to the aircraft should be subjected to a pat down search and their
46 carry-on items carried inside the aircraft should be manually inspected to deter
1 57
1 any introduction of items that may be used in the commission of unlawful
2 interference to civil aviation.
3
4 Security Bulletin (Memo to all RASOs dtd 17 September 2001)
5
6 a. Cigarette lighter with concealed knife: A commonly manufactured cigarette
7 lighter which contained a concealed knife blade was recovered by the FBI at
8 the United States Flight 93 crash scene (Stoney Creek Township, PA). The
9 recovered item was badly damaged. Preliminary FBI Laboratory forensic
10 examination of the item revealed the cigarette lighter was approximately 2¾ in
11 length with knife blade approximately 2 ½ in length. Due to the damaged
12 condition of the item, the actual original length, diameter, appearance and
13 shape of the lighter cannot be positively identified.
14
15 b. Concealed Knife/Cigarette Lighter: Similarly, commercially available
16 models have spring-loaded blades which extend directly out of the top of the
17 lighter. FBI Laboratory research indicates that a number of similar knives are
18 commercially available concealed in other common objects, such as pens,
19 keys, belt, belt buckles and lipstick containers.
20
21 Enhancement of Security Measures
22
23 The following are the pertinent provisions of this directive:
24
25 a. Exercise of closer operational control and supervision over the private
26 security guards employed by the air carriers particularly during flight
27 operations period pursuant to Section 35.b (7) of RA 6975;
28
29 b. Observance of positive identification of passengers and prevention of
30 passengers mix;
31
32 c. Conduct of regular police visibility patrols in vulnerable areas of the airport
33 i.e. unfenced terminal buildings and runways;
34
35 d. Intensification of access control measures for persons and vehicles
36 entering restricted areas;
37
38 e. Coordination with the air carrier for measures to ensure the security of the
39 aircraft to include personnel security investigation of personnel such as aircraft
40 cleaners, aircraft maintenance, catering service personnel and other
41 authorized persons;
42
43 f. Institutionalization of stricter security measures to sanitize, isolate and
44 protect cargo, parcels prior to loading and transport by air.
45
1 58
1 g. Coordination with the airport authorities in respective stations to inform the
2 Airport Security Committee on the intensified security measures and the
3 infrastructure weaknesses.
4
5 Screening of Crews, Airline Staffs, Passengers and Airport Employees
6
7 a. No person shall be exempted from the security checkpoint standard
8 operating procedures in both the initial and final security screening
9 checkpoints except as provided in existing laws, rules and regulations;
10
11 b. Airline crew/staff, VIPs, airport employees and authorized visitors shall be
12 provided a separate lane for security screening if circumstances so warrant;
13
14 c. All persons shall be made to place their baggage thru the x-ray machine
15 and to divest themselves of all metal objects from their persons or clothing to
16 be placed on the plastic trays provided for and to be passed through the x-ray
17 machine for screening;
18
19 d. All persons shall be made to pass thru the WTMD one at a time. If the
20 alarm is triggered, the concerned individual shall be asked to further divest
21 himself/herself of any possible metal objects and to remove his/her shoes for
22 x-ray inspection, and required to pass again thru the WTMD for the second
23 time.
24
25 e. If the WTMD still triggered another alarm, the screeners shall make use of
26 the HHMD (if available) to determine further the cause of the alarm or conduct
27 pat-down search until the issue is resolved. However, all persons are
28 subjected to mandatory pat-down search at final SSCP.
29
30 Testing and Calibration of Anti-Hijacking Equipment (HQ PNP-ASG SOP
31Nr 2004-03 dated 19 March 2004)
32
33 Testing for x-ray machine shall be done as follows:
34
35 a. Once daily before the start of actual operations or once in every 24 hours
36 in case of continuous operations;
37
38 b. Every time the machine is turned-off and re-started for an actual
39 operations;
40
41 c. Testing should be conducted by using the standard operational test object
42 (STEP WEDGE)
43
44 d. Results of the test shall be recorded in the operational test log (logbook
45 ICAO standard form) and the screening check properly signed by duty area
46 supervisor.
1 59
1
2 e. Only authorized technician/shall conduct calibration and repair.
3
4 Testing for the WTMD shall be done as follows:
5
6 a. At least once before start of actual operation or once every 24 hours in
7 case of continuous operations.
8
9 b. Every time the WTMD is turned off and to be re-started for actual
10 operation.
11
12 c. Using an encapsulated weapon or operational test piece (OTP) which shall
13 be carried by a person in three different critical positions (head, waist, feet)
14 and the person to pass thru the WTMD in normal walking speed three times in
15 each position.
16
17 d. The person conducting the testing shall divest himself/herself of all
18 extraneous metals prior to commencing the test.
19
20 e. Result of the operational test shall be recorded in the ICAO standard form
21 (operational test log) to be signed by the area supervisor and shall be retained
22 at the screening checkpoint.
23
24 f. Authorized technicians shall conduct appropriate calibration/repair and
25 adjustment if necessary.
26
27
28 Establishment and Conduct of Controlled Landside Checkpoints (HQ
29PNP-ASG SOP Nr 2005-01 dated 01 March 2006)
30
31 a. Checkpoints shall be established at least 50 meters away from the airport
32 terminal.
33
34 b. Checkpoints shall be under the responsibility of PNP-ASG uniformed
35 personnel. Elements from AFP, other PNP units, ATO and contracted airport
36 security guards detailed at the checkpoints shall be under the operational
37 control and supervision of PNP-ASG.
38
39 c. Personnel manning the checkpoint must observe buddy system at all
40 times. Additional personnel detailed to serve as back-up security must be
41 equipped with long firearms and shall be at a vantage position while other
42 members are conducting the inspection.
43
44 d. Plain-view doctrine shall be applied in the conduct of search/ inspection of
45 people and vehicles. An extensive search is allowed pursuant to NCASP
46 provisions, if the officers conducting the search have probable cause to
1 60
1 believe that they would find evidences pertaining to the commission of the
2 crime in the vehicle to be searched and there is no sufficient time to secure
3 valid warrant.
4
5 Carrying of Liquid or Gel into the Aircraft (HQ PNP-ASG Memo re Strict
6Implementation of Enhanced Security Measures dated 11 August 2006)
7
8 a. All airline passengers are prohibited from carrying liquid or gel of any
9 quantity and size such as beverages, suntan lotion, perfumes, shampoo,
10 toothpaste and the like inside hand carried luggage at all airports. However,
11 baby formula, breast milk or juice shall be properly scrutinized and only be
12 permitted if a baby or small child is traveling. Likewise, prescription medicine
13 with name that matches the passenger’s ticket like insulin and other essential
14 non-prescription medicine should be allowed after consultation with the airport
15 physician.
16
17 b. Above mentioned prohibited items of same nature found at the final SSCP
18 shall be automatically confiscated.
19
20 c. Coordination with all the airlines shall be made to advise their respective
21 passengers that before checking-in, they have to place the above mentioned
22 items inside their checked-in baggage.
23
24 Mandatory Removal and X-ray Screening of Shoes and Other Items (HQ
25PNP-ASG SOP # 2006-01 dated 05 September 2006)
26
27 a. Mandatory removal and x-ray screening of shoes, belts cigarette cases,
28 eyeglass cases and all items either metallic or non-metallic that are capable of
29 concealing prohibited articles or substances shall be done at the final SSCP.
30
31 b. In the absence of an x-ray machine, all electronic gadgets shall be
32 operationally tested and physically inspected thoroughly.
33
1 61
1 Glossary
2
3 The following terms and concepts used in this Manual are defined herein to
4insure commonality of understanding and prevent confusions:
5
6 Acts of Unlawful Interference to Civil Aviation – An act of:
7
8 Violence or threat of violence against a person on board an aircraft while still
9 on the ground or on flight, if that act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft;
10
11 Destroying an aircraft in service or causing damage to such an aircraft which
12 renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight;
13
14 Placing or causing to be placed an aircraft in service, by any means
15 whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or
16 causing damage to it which renders it incapable of flight or causing damage to it
17 which is likely to endanger its safety in flight;
18
19 Destroying or damaging air navigation facilities or interfering with their
20 operations, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft;
21
22 Communicating information which is known to be false thereby endangering
23 the safety of the aircraft; or
24
25 Unlawfully and intentionally using any device, substance or weapon:
26
27 Performing an act of violence against a person at an airport which
28 cause or is likely to cause serious injury or death;
29
30 Destroying or seriously damaging the facilities of an airport or aircraft
31 not in service located thereon or disrupting the services of the airport, if any
32 such act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport.
33
34 Access Authority – Identification card and other documentation issued to
35authorized airport-users and to those individuals and vehicles with official business to
36transact in order to facilitate passage into airport restricted areas. It is limited by the
37use of color code on various restricted areas within an airport complex.
38
39 Aircraft – A heavier than air device / contraption designed to carry weights
40while navigating in the atmosphere through the dynamic action of air against its
41surface (aerodrome).
42
43 Aircraft Security Check –
44
45 Airport – A land’s physical facility wherein aircraft embarked and disembarked
46passengers and cargoes, make repairs and replenish fuel.
1 62
1 Airport Authority – A Government Owned or Controlled Corporation (GOCC)
2engaged in the efficient and orderly operations of an international airport like NAIA
3and MCIA.
4
5 Aircraft Movement Area – The area dedicated exclusively for the purpose of
6landing, takeoff, taxi, maneuver and parking of aircraft.
7
8 Airside – The movement area on an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or
9portion thereof, access to which is controlled.
10
11 Air Transportation – The mode of travel or conveyance of people and goods
12through the medium of aircraft movement.
13
14 Anti-Hijacking Equipment – The pre-boarding security screening equipment
15like x-ray, metal detector and scanners installed at the initial and final security
16checkpoints of airport terminals to inspect the passengers, airline crew and their
17luggage for dangerous / prohibited goods / items.
18
19 Airline – Business organization or company engaged in scheduled transport
20and movement of passengers, goods and services by means of aircraft.
21
22 Airport Emergency – Any unscheduled incident / event that may transpire in
23any airport facility that may disrupt / impede / hamper its smooth operations.
24
25 Airport-User – A generic term that includes authorized individuals like airline
26crew, airport-related agency personnel, passengers and well-wishers to gain access
27to the various airport facilities on a need basis during its operations.
28
29 Alternate International Airport – An airport rated for international air travel
30but due to passenger volume deficiency, the same is not used for said purpose.
31
32 Airport Security Fee (ASF) – The amount collected from departing
33international and domestic airline passengers other than those paid for ticket,
34immigration and other requirements originally authorized by PLOI 141-A.
35
36 Apron – The designated area devoted for the maneuvering and parking of
37aircraft in order to disembark and embark passengers and cargoes.
38
39 Background Check – A check of a person’s identity and previous experience,
40including any criminal history, where appropriate, a part of the assessment of an
41individual’s suitability for unescorted access to a security restricted area.
42
43 Baggage – Personal properties of passengers and crew carried into an
44aircraft by agreement stipulated in the ticket with airline operator.
45
1 63
1 Baggage Container – A receptacle in which baggage is loaded for
2conveyance in aircraft.
3
4 Baggage Sorting Area – Space in which departure baggage is sorted into
5flight loads.
6
7 Baggage Storage Area – The designated space where checked-in / held /
8mishandled bags are stored pending their transport into the aircraft forwarded to its
9destination or claimed by its owner.
10
11 Bomb – An explosive devise that generates and releases its energy very
12rapidly as an explosion and as a violent, destructive shockwave.
13
14 Bomb Alert – A status of alert, put in place by competent authorities to
15activate an intervention plan intended to counter the possible consequences arising
16from a communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, or arising from the discovery
17of a suspect device or other suspect item on an aircraft, at an airport or in any civil
18aviation facilities.
19
20 Bomb Threat – A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, that
21alludes, suggests or infers rightly or falsely that the safety of an aircraft in flight or on
22the ground or an airport facility or an individual or object may be jeopardized.
23
24 Cabin Baggage – Space above the passenger’s seat where hand carried
25baggage inside the aircraft are put.
26
27 Cargo – Property loaded into an aircraft other than mail, stores and
28accompanied or mishandled baggage.
29
30 Cargo Area – The space designated where inspected cargoes are held
31pending transfer into the aircraft.
32
33 Cargo Building – The designated place where cargoes are accepted and
34inspected.
35
36 Check-in – The act of manifesting one’s intention to an airline operator
37representative for his acceptance in a specific scheduled flight.
38
39 Clear Zone – The outer area immediately adjacent the perimeter fence that
40facilitate visual access of any approaching intruder.
41
42 Crew Member – An individual appointed by an operator to perform a particular
43duty on an aircraft during its flight.
44
1 64
1 Dangerous Goods – Articles or substances carried in the person and luggage
2of passengers that are capable of posing significant risk to health, safety or property
3when transported by air.
4
5 Effectiveness – A measure of the quality of an output. It is determining hoe
6the output achieved the desired outcome. When one measures efficiency, he knows
7how much it is costing him to achieve a specified output. When he measures
8effectiveness, he knows whether his investment is worthwhile. Efficiency is doing the
9job right which underlies cost while effectiveness is doing the right job. It underlies
10results.
11
12 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) – The systematic disarming of bombs
13and improvised explosive device in order to render them harmless conducted ny
14highly trained personnel.
15
16 Firearm Facilitator – The ASG security uniformed designated to be
17responsible for the safe processing and transfer of passenger authorized turned-in
18firearms to the concerned airline for transport.
19
20 Frisking / Pat Down – The systematic conduct of physical / bodily search of
21airport-users for the purpose of finding prohibited / dangerous objects / substances.
22
23 General Aviation - All civil aviation operations other than scheduled air
24services and non-scheduled air transport operations for a fee.
25
26 Hijacking – The unlawful seizures of a civilian aircraft for whatever purpose
27while in flight or on the ground. It includes any act aimed to compel a change in its
28course or destination or to seize or usurp its control.
29
30 Human Resources – Refers to the CASS, OTS or PNP uniformed and non-
31uniformed personnel on the employ of ASG for is administrative and operational
32requirements.
33
34 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – A UN created
35organization that regulates safety and security in civil aviation through its various
36Annexes.
37
38 International Airport – An airport designated for the entry and departure for
39international travel where formalities on customs, immigration, quarantine and similar
40procedures are carried out.
41
42 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) – Those devices placed or fabricated in
43an improvised manner incorporating explosive or destructive, lethal, noxious,
44pyrotechnics or incendiary chemicals to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass.
45
1 65
1 Jetway Bridge / Panel – The retractable mechanized panel attached to the
2outer paneling of an airport sterile area wall for the convenient embarkation and
3disembarkation of passengers.
4
5 K-9 Unit – A highly specialized PNP-ASG unit under the Aviation Counter
6Terrorism Force (ACT Force) that utilizes trained canine elements dedicated for the
7efficient search for explosives in the persons, luggage and airport facilities.
8
9 Manifest – The airline maintained list of authorized passengers who reserved
10for an accommodation in one of its scheduled flights.
11
12 Landside – That area in an airport to which the non traveling public has free
13access.
14
15 Paneling – The conduct of systematic search for explosives by EOD and K-9
16elements.
17
18 Passenger Numbered Manifest – An airline generated and maintained list of
19persons and offices, telephone numbers and addresses which have made
20reservations for each passenger.
21
22 Physical Resources – The set of anti-hijacking equipment installed at the
23initial and final security screening gates consisting of x-ray machine, metal detector
24and hand scanner.
25
26 Proactive / Deterrent Security Component – The first layer of TASS
27representing the various overlapping passive security measures laid out around the
28airport complex for its protection 24 hours daily.
29
30 Profiling – The informal interview of pre-defined type of passengers
31conducted for the purpose of determining the manner each luggage is packed, its
32content and the persons who had access to them prior to check-in.
33
34 Prohibited Items – Articles and substances found in the persons and luggage
35of passengers during the security process like guns, explosives, pointed / bladed
36objects and drugs punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other special laws.
37
38 Protective / Defensive Security Component – The second layer of TASS
39representing the various overlapping active security measures laid out around the
41
42 Ramp Area – The place adjacent to the terminal building designated for the
43maneuvering and parking of aircraft for maintenance, embarkation and
44disembarkation of passengers and cargoes.
45
1 66
1 Reactive / Crisis Management Security Component – The third layer of
2TASS representing the various mutually-exclusive contingency / security operations
3established to manage / control the escalation of known airport emergencies in an
5
6 Regulated Agent – An agent, freight forwarders or any other entity who
7conducts business with an operator and provides security controls that are
8accepted or required by the appropriate authority inrespect of cargo, courier
9and express parcels or mail.
10
11 Restricted Area – Pre-designated areas within the airport complex where
12access id controlled or limited to those authorized only.
13
14 Retractable Stairway – A motor mounted stairway for the convenient
15embarkation and disembarkation of passengers that is detached from an aircraft
16when not in use while its door is closed.
17
18 Screening – the application of technical or other means which are intended to
19detect weapons, explosives and other dangerous devices tat may be used to commit
20acts of unlawful interference or terrorism.
21
22 Security Inspection – The systematic physical examinations of the persons,
23luggage and accoutrements of departing passengers and other airport-users.
24
25 Security Screening Checkpoint – The security choke points found at the
26initial and final security screening area of each airport where the persons and
27luggage of departing passengers and other airport-users into the sterile area and/or
28board an aircraft are processed electronically or manually to preempt carriage of
29prohibited / dangerous goods / items / substances.
30
31 Signage – Explicit directional or instructional signs installed strategically within
32an airport complex for the safe and expeditious passage / screening of all airport-
33users.
34
35 Special Operations Unit (SOU) – The PNP-ASG crisis intervention unit under
36the Aviation Counter Terrorism Force (ACT Force) primarily tasked to resolve any
37aviation security crisis situation.
38
39 Sterile Area – The area between passenger inspection / screening station and
40aircraft into which access is strictly controlled.
41
42 Technology – The application of science or systematic knowledge of
43industrial or technical arts and craftsmanship that insure cost-effectiveness of an
44operation.
45
1 67
1 Terrorism – The unlawful interference or disruption of any scheduled activity
2of an airline / airport operations for social, religious and political purposes. It includes
3usurpation of control of the aircraft, bomb explosion and indiscriminate firing while on
4the ground and in flight. It may be undertaken by individuals, cause-driven or state or
5individually-sponsored groups and individuals.
6
7 Total Aviation Security System (TASS) – The overall aviation security
8concept adopted to enable PNP ASG Unit Chiefs to ensure the 24 hours protection of
9the airport complexes by blanketing them with layers of security measures.
10
11 Total Team Approach – A team building scheme that maximizes the
12collaborations among airport-based personnel and employees in providing adequate
13security in our airport complexes.
14
15 Tourism – The activity or practice of travel or journey for recreation, pleasure
16and cultural enhancement.
17
18 Visibility Patrol – An aggressive, systematic and sustained patrol of key
19airport facilities conducted by PNP-ASG personnel to ferret out and discourage
20disruption of airport operations.
21
22 Vulnerable Areas – Any airport facility or activity with inherent structural,
23operational and design deficiencies that may jeopardize airport security e\when
24damaged or subverted.
25
26 Vehicle Under Chassis Inspection – The systematic physical examination of
27an authorized vehicle under chassis interior compartment (glove, trunk and back
28seat) for explosives before access is allowed by the use of an extended mirror.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
1 68
1 ANNEX A: SOURCES OF LEGAL REGULATION
2
31. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
4
5 a. The Chicago Convention
6
7 This convention which was participated in by 52 nations in November 1944 at
8Chicago, USA, has paved the way for the information of the International Civil
9Aviation Organization (ICAO), purposely to ensure the safe and orderly growth of
10international civil aviation throughout the world.
11
12 The ICAO officially came into existence on 04 April 1947 and thus became the
13permanent body under the United Nations charged with the administration of the
14principles and objectives of the convention.
15
16 b. The Tokyo Convention
17
18 Also known as the Convention of Offenses and certain other acts committed
19on board an aircraft, signed at Tokyo, Japan on 14 September 1963 and came into
20force on 04 December 1969. This was ratified by a total of 124 states including the
21Philippines.
22
23 The convention has defined all acts, which, whether or not offenses may
24jeopardize the safety of the aircraft, persons on board or property therein, and such
25other cats which may, jeopardize good order and discipline on board. It has also
26enumerated and explained the powers of the aircraft commander in an international
27flight, as well as, the competence of signatory states to exercise jurisdiction over
28offenses committed on board.
29
30 c. The Hague Convention
31
32 Also known as the Convention for the Suppression of unlawful; seizure of
33aircraft. Signed at the Hague, Netherlands on 16 December 1970 and came into
34force on 14 December 1971. This was ratified by a total of 129 states including the
35Philippines.
36
37 Signatory states agreed to make hijacking punishable by severe penalties,
38and to include it in the list of extraditable crimes. Hijackers may be tried in the
39country where the aircraft is registered.
40
41 d. The Montreal Convention
42 Also known as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
43the safety of civil aviation. Signed at Montreal, Canada on 23 September 1971 and
44came into force on 26 January 1973. This was ratified by all member states including
45the Philippines.
46
1 69
1 Signatory states are obligated to enact laws covering all acts of unlawful
2interference to civil aviation and to provide severe penalties for their violence.
3
42. NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS
5
6 a. The Civil Aeronautics Act or Republic Act 776 enacted on 20 June 1952 as
7 amended by Presidential Decrees 844, 1278, 1462 and Executive Order
8 546 (E.O. 546). R.A. 776 as amended established the country’s agency
9 responsible recognizes the need for regulating economic and technical
10 aspects of civil aeronautics with the creations of the Civil Aeronautics
11 Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
12
13 The Civil Aeronautics Board exercises and performs its powers and duties
14 under this Act consistent with any obligation assumed by the Republic of
15 the Philippines in any treaty, convention or agreement on civil aviation
16 matters.
17
18
19 b. Republic Act 6235 enacted in 19 June 1971 enacting the Hague
20 Convention. This law makes it “unlawful” for any person to compel a
21 change in the course or destination of aircraft of Philippine registry;
22 likewise it shall be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign
23 registry to land in Philippine territory or to seize or usurp the control thereof
24 while it is within the said territory.
25
26 c. Letter of Instruction 399 (LOI 399) issued on 28 April 1976 is the
27 presidential issuance, which has the effect of law that puts into legal effects
28 the Philippines commitment to Montreal Convention of 1971 and the
29 Supplementary Protocol to the said Convention. LOI 399 created The
30 National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) Executive Order No.
31 393 which took effect 24 January 1990 provided for the constitution of the
32 committee.
33
34 d. Execution Order No. 452 – issued on 5 April 1991 provided amendment to
35 the composition of NACAH with the DILG Secretary as Chairman and the
36 DND Secretary as Vice-Chairman.
37
38 e. The Executive No. 246 – The Executive Order reconstituted the NACAH
39 into the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Anti-terrorism
40 (NACAHT). and took effect on 18 May 1995. The NACAHT shal (a)
41 formulate plans to direct, control, supervise and integrate all measures
42 aimed at preventing and suppressing hijacking, other threats to civil
43 aviation, and all other forms of terrorism with bthe end view of protecting
44 national interests, and (b) adopt measures geared towards the
45 implementation of the following main objectives: (1) to effectively monitor
1 70
1 the activities of suspected terrorists, and (2) to develop the capability of
2 local law enforcement agencies to contain the threat of terrorism.
3
4 f. Executive Order No. 336 – Issued on 05 January 2000, reconstituted the
5 NACAHT as the National Council for Civil Aviation Security (NCCAS).
6
7 g. Executive Order No. 277 – Issued on 30 January 2004 approving and
8 reconstituting the NCASP, creating the Office for Transportation Security
9 (OTS) within the Department of Transportation and Communications and
10 reconstituting the NCCAS as the NCASC.
11
12 h. Executive Order No. 311 – Issued on April 26, 2004 designated OTS as the
13 single authority for all modes of transportation security in the Philippines,
14 which upgrading the OTS powers and functions.
15
16 The President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in by law,
17ordered the composition of the Committee as follows:
18
19 Secretary of National Defense - - Chairman
20 Secretary of Foreign Affairs - - Member
21 Secretary of Finance - - -do-
22 Secretary of Justice - - -do-
23 Secretary of Transportation and Commission - -do-
24 Press Secretary - - -do-
25 National Security Director - - -do-
26 Director-General, National
27 Intelligence Coordinating Agency - - -do-
1 71
1 ANNEX B – NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM
2
1 72
1 APPENDIX “B” RECOMMNEDATION FOR CHANGES
2
3
Identification of Change/or Date Entered By whom entered
Correction and Reg. (signature, rank, grade or
No. (if any) rate; name of command)
1 73
1 PHILIPPINE AIRPPORT SECURITY SYSTEM
23
PNP- Aviation Security Group 5
Units Geographical Deployment
3rd PCAS 5th PCAS
Subic Bay Daet
IA 1st PCAS 4th PCAS Naga
Macapagal Terminal 1 Basco Batanes Virac
IA
nd Terminal 2 Northwing Laoag, Ilocos Sur Legasp
2Plaridel
PCAS Tuguegarao iI
Terminal 2 Cauayan, Isabela Masba
Southwing San Fernando, La te
th
Domestic Union 6 PCAS
General Aviation Baguio Caticlan
Pinamalayan, Kalibo
Romblon Roxas
Marinduque Iloilo
Mamburao, Bacolod
Romblon Antique
Tablas, Romblon
San Jose, Antique 7th PCAS
Busuanga, Catarma
th
10 PCAS
Palawan n
Cuyo Island, Calbayog
Surigao City
Palawan Tacloban
Butuan Princesa,
Puerto City
Ormoc
Cagayan de Oro
Palawan Mactan
Iligan City
Tagbilara
Ozamis City
thn
8 Dumague
PCAS
9th PCAS
te
Tandag
Dipolog Bislig
Pagadian Davao City
Siocon General
Ipil Santos
Zamboanga Mati
City Malabang
Jolo Cotabato
Sanga-Sanga
1 74
1 APPENDIX “E” ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE TO CIVIL AVIATION IN
2 THE PHILIPPINES
3
DTG ACFT ROUTE NR OF ID OF ARMS/ REMARKS
PAX & HJKRS WPNS
CREW
1. Morning DC-3 (PAL) Laoag 10 Ang Tio Chuk a 2-.45 Cal Pistol a. Hijacker shot of &
Dec 1952 RP-C 86 Aparri Chinese youth and killed the 1952 pilot
Lucia Lea CAPT PEDRO
PERLAS & Flight
Steward Eduardo
Tiago.
b. Acft was intercepted

by the Nationalist
Chinese Airforce &
made land in Taiwan
where hijackers
surrendered thinking
he was in.
c. He was surrendered
to the Phil Gov’t by
the ROC Gov’t & was
tried & sentenced to
life imprisonment.
d. He was pardoned in
1960, was rearrested
& re-committed to
the New Bilibid
Prison & still there up
to now.
2. 30 Mar PAL BAC- Manila- 50 a. Daniel Lobinatana, 3-revolver The Hijacking was
1971 111 PIC- Davao 23 yrs old 1-pocket-knife successful, the six (6)
1121 were brought to Canton
& no news has been
heard about them
today.
b. Glenn Michael A pair of

Rosauro, 20 yrs scissors
Old
c. Eructuoso J Chua,
23 yrs old
d. Edgardo Maosisa,
19 yrs old
e. Domingo
Baskinas, 18 yrs
Old
f. Edgardo Tigulo, 20
yrs old
2. 11 Oct PAL BAC- Davao- 56 a. Roger Rica, 21 yrs 1-Cal Pistol The hijackers
1973 111 Bacolod old 3-platik surrendered after
1 75
revolvers negotiations.
1-hand grenade
1-bladed
weapon
3. 25 Feb PAL DC-3 Pagadian 31 a. Emilio 1-.38 Cal The hijackers
1975 RPC 941 Zambo Abarca Jr, revolver (paltik) surrendered & are
34 yrs old 2-hand- presently in the Youth
granades Rehabilitation Center.
1-AR-15 riflr
b. Cesar Palang, 29 taken fm the Air
yrs old Marshal
4. 7 Oct PAL BAC- Davao- 71 A2C Camilo Morales, 1-45 Cal Pistol Hijacker surrendered
1975 RCP 1182 Manila 25 yrs old of the 1-grenade after negotiation.
(0930) Japan Mindanao Regional
Air Command
5. 5 Jan Japan Manila- 225 a. Prudencio R 1-.22 Cal Pistol Hijackers surrendered
1976 Airlines Osaka, Dono, 24 yrs old (Berreta) after negotiations
(JAL) DC-6 Japan
Jet b. Renato R Dono, 1-.22 Cal
19 yrs old Revolver
(paltik)
Improvised
home made
bomb
6. 7 Apr PAL BAC Cagayan 78 a. Ex-PC Sgt Jose 2-Pistols, a .45 The hijackers
1970 -111 RPC- de Oro- Nurr Madula cal and .38 succeeded in getting to
1187 Davao (possibly 3) Libya using a substitute
Manila DC-8 jet are presently
b. Comdr Zobair 2-hand- there at this time.
Khing grenades
(possibly 3 or
c. Cmdr Vengy more)
7. 21 May PAL BAC- Davao- 103 pax a. Pendatun 2-.45 cal pistol PAL BAC-111 Flt 166
1976 111 RPC Manila 6 crews Domianga aka 1-.22 cal pistol fm Davao was hijacked
1161 Flt diverted Cmdr Zapata 3-hand- six (6) alleged
116 to Zambo Head of Reg’l grenades members of MNLF. The
Airport Comd plane was diverted to
Zamboanga airport
b. Nike Randa were negotiations took
Ibrahim aka Cmdr placed. Negotiations
Cobra failed & the hijackers
shoot it out with the
military
1
2
1 76
c. Macalindog
Tawarac aka Tuan
El Senawe
Quartermaster,
Supply & Log O.
d. Naser Omar aka

Tuan Senkula
Commo
e. Lumentana
Dimatonsing aka
Zaragosa Dist
Comdr
f. Liling Radia aka

9. 21 May PAL BAC Bacolod- 107 & 6 Juan Cleano, a 1-hand-grenade The hijacker was
1982 111 RPC- Manila crews farmer & resident of subdued by CG,
(0755) 1186 Bacon Negros AVSECOM during a
Oriental face to face negotiation
at Mactan International
Airport.
10. 28 May PAL Air Bus Davao- 320 & 8 Trance Chua aka Home-made Chua parachuted using
2000 300 Manila crews Augusto Lakandula cal.22 magnum an improvised
revolver parachute that caused
his death.
1 77
1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PASSENGER AND LUGGAGE SCREENING
2
3 CURBSIDE
4
5
6 TERMINAL GATE
7 POSITIVE ID OF PAX, CREWS
8 AND AIRPORT USER AND
OTHER AUTHORIZED
9 PERSONNEL
10
PAX and
11 their
OPERATIONAL SECURITY
EQUIPMENT
12 CHECKED-
13 IN/CABIN SECURITY SCREENING INITIAL
LUGGAGE PERSONNEL STAFFING
14 SECURITY
CHECKPOINT
15 PERSONNEL COMPETENCE
16
17
18
19
20
CUSTOM
21
22
23 QUARANTINE
24
25
SECURITY AIRLINE COUNTER
26
SCREENING FOR HOLD BAGGAGE
27
PROHIBITED HOLD SECURITY
/DANGEROUS
28
ITEMS, HAZMAT,
BAGGAGE CHECKPOINT
AIRPORT TERMINAL
SRI 29 FEE
30
31
32
33
34
FINAL
SECURITY
35 OPERATIONAL
SECURITY EQUIPMENT
CHECK FOR36 PAX and
PROHIBITED37 their CABIN SECURITY SCREENING FINAL SECURITY
/DANGEROUS PERSONNEL STAFFING CHECKPOINT
38
ITEMS, HAZMAT,
LUGGAGE
SRI 39 PERSONNEL
COMPETENCE
40
41 SANITIZED
42 PRE—DEPARTURE AREA
43
4544 JETWAY DOOR
1 78
1 APPENDIX “H” – SAMPLE OF AFFIDAVIT OF X-RAY OPERATOR
2
3Republic of the Philippines )
st
41 Police Center for Aviation Security )
5Pasay City )
6
7 AFFIDAVIT
8
9 I, QUIRINA M. DELOS SANTOS, married, resident of 141 Vito Cruz, Manila,
10of legal age and an appointed CASS, OTS security personnel and after having been
11duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby state and depose the following:
12
13 1. That I was the duty x-ray operator last March 4, 2006;
1514
2. That about eight in the morning of the same day, I observed an obvious
16threat in the x-ray monitor that resembled a firearm;
1817 3. That thereafter, I required the duty baggage inspector, PACITA T. DELA
19ROSA, to inspect the said obvious threat in a luggage which later was determined to
20belong to ABDUL J. CAKOL, a departing passenger for Dubai on PAL X44 flight with
21valid plane ticket number 2345;
2322 4. That PACITA T. DELA ROSA, after physically inspecting the said suspect
24luggage belonging to the aforementioned departing passenger, informed me that the
25luggage yielded a Colt Caliber .32 pistol, Serial Number 6789 with seven (7) live
26ammunitions;
2827
29 AFFIANTH FURTHER SAYETH NONE:
30
31 In truth thereof, I am affixing my signature to attest to the veracity of the
32foregoing facts this 4th day of March 2006 in the office of the 1st PCAS, ASG-PNP,
33Pasay City.
34
35 Quirina Delos Santos
36 Affiant
37
38 SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of March 2006 in
39 the office of the 1st PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
40
41
42 PEDRO T CHAVEZ
43 Police Senior Inspector
44 Administering Officer
45
46
47
1 79
1 APPENDIX “I” – SAMPLE AFFIDAVIT OF BAGGAGE INSPECTOR
2
41st Police Center for Aviation Security )
5Pasay City )
6
7 AFFIDAVIT
8
9 I, PACITA DELOS SANTOS, married, resident of 141 Vito Cruz, Manila, of
10legal age and an appointed CASS, OTS security personnel and after having been
11duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby state and depose the following:
12
13 1. That I was the duty baggage inspector last March 4, 2006;
14
15 2. That about eight in the morning of the same day, the duty x-ray operator,
16Quirina M. delos Santos, summoned me to inspect a luggage whose image indicated
17an obvious threat in the x-ray monitor that resembled a firearm;
18
19 3. That thereafter, I established the ownership of the said suspect luggage

20and found out that it belonged to a certain Mr. ABDUL J. Cakol, a departing
21passenger for Dubai on PAL X44 flight based on his valid plane ticket;
22
23 4. That thereafter, I conducted a physical inspection of the suspect luggage

24particularly on its right lower quadrant in the presence of its owner and that was
25witnessed by SPO3 Juan Dela Cruz, the duty Armed Supervisor;
26
27 5. That my inspection of the suspect luggage yielded a Colt Caliber .32
28pistol, Serial Number 6789 with seven (7) live ammunitions which I turned over to
29SPO3 Juan Dela Cruz;
30
31 6. when SPO3 Juan Dela Cruz confronted and inquired from the said
32departing passenger about the required documents for the said firearm, Mr. CAKOL
33was unable to produce them that caused his apprehension.
34
35 AFFIATH FURTHER SAYETH NONE:
36
39Pasay City.
40
41 PACITA DELA ROSA
42 Affiant
43
44 SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4 th day of March 2006 in the
45office of the 1st PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
46
47 PEDRO CHAVEZ
1 80
1 APPENDIX “I” – SAMPLE AFFIDAVIT OF ARMED SUPERVISOR
2
5Pasay City )
6
7 AFFIDAVIT
8
9 I, SPO3 Juan Dela Cruz, married, resident of Pildera II, Pasay City, of legal
10age and assigned with 1st PCAS, PNP-ASG and after having been duly sworn to in
11accordance with the law, do hereby state and depose the following:
12
13 1. That I was the duty Armed Supervisor last March 4, 2006;
14
15 2. That about eight in the morning of the same day, the duty baggage
16 inspector, Pacita Dela Rosa, summoned me to witness the inspection of
17 a luggage whose image indicated an obvious threat in the x-ray monitor
18 that resembled a firearm;
19
20 3. That thereafter, the inspection of the suspect luggage was conducted
21 by Pacita Dela Rosa in my presence and that of the owner identified as
22 Abdul Cakol, a departing passenger for Dubai on PAL X44 flight;
23
24 4. That the inspection of the suspect luggage yielded a Colt Caliber .32
25 pistol, Serial Number 6789 with seven (7) live ammunitions which were
26 turned over to me by Pacita Dela Rosa;
27
28 5. After confronting and inquiring from the said departing passenger about
29 the required documents for the said firearm, I found out that Mr. CAKOL
30 had no such documents and I subsequently put him under arrest and
31 read to him the pertinent provisions of RA 7438.
32
34
37Pasay City.
38
39 PACITA DELA ROSA
40 Affiant
41
42 SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4 th day of March 2006 in the
43office of the 1st PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
44
45 PEDRO CHAVEZ
1 81
1 APPENDIX “J” – SAMPLE AFFIDAVIT OF BODY FRISKER
2
3
6Pasay City )
7
8 AFFIDAVIT
9
10 I, ELLEN O TOLENTINO, married, resident of 141 Vito Cruz, Manila, of legal age and an appointed
11CASS, OTS security personnel and after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby state
12and depose the following:
13
14 1. That I was the duty body frisker last March 4, 2006;
15
16 2. That about nine in the morning of the same day, as part of security standard operating
17procedure inside airport terminal, I required a certain departing passenger to divest her person of all metal
18objects and to place them on the divest container and while said passenger was passing through the Walk Thru
19Metal Detector (WTMD), the WTMD sounded alarm;
20
21 3. That thereafter, I required the said passenger who later turned out to be EVANGELINE PASCUAL,
22a departing passenger for Riyadh on PAL X33 flight with valid plane ticket number 9898, to examine her person
23for remaining metal objects in her body and to divest the same and to place them on the divest container and
24while the said passenger was passing again thru the WTMD, the WTMD again sounded an alarm;
25
26 4. That I, then. required the said passenger to mount the inspection platform to conduct alarm
27resolution with the aid of a Handheld Metal Detector(HHMD);
28
29 5. That when I proceeded to conduct body search, the HHMD sounded off at the right waistband of the
30subject passenger;
31
32 6. When the HHMD sounded off, I conducted the necessary body frisking for which I felt a hard object
33inside the waistband which turned out to be a five-inch double blade fan knife;
34
35 7. That I immediately took control of the said fan knife and called the attention of the duty Armed
36Supervisor.
37
38 8. In the presence of the owner and the duty Armed Supervisor, I placed said fan knife inside a
39transparent plastic and marked the same with “EXHIBIT” “A” and correspondingly affixed my signature therein;
40
41 9. Thereafter, in the presence of the owner, I turned over to the duty armed supervisor said fan knife.
42
43 In truth thereof, I am affixing my signature to attest to the veracity of the foregoing facts this 4th
44day of March 2006 in the office of the 1st PCAS, ASG-PNP, Pasay City.
45
46 ELLEN TOLENTINO
47 Affiant
48 SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of March 2006 in the office of the 1st
49PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
50
51 PEDRO CHAVEZ
1 82
1 APPENDIX “K” SAMPLE AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST
2
5Pasay City )
6
7 AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST
8
9 I, PANTALEON M. DE LUNA, married, resident of 141 Vito Cruz, Manila, of legal age and an appointed
10NCCAS security personnel and after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby state and
11depose the following:
12
13 1. That I was the duty SPOIC last March 4, 2003;
14
15 2. That about eight in the morning of the same day, I required a certain departing passenger to
16divest her person of all metal objects and place them on the plastic container and while said passenger was
17passing through the said machine, I heard the metal detector beeped;
18
19 3. That thereafter, I required the said passenger who turned out to be EVANGELINE PASCUAL, a
20departing passenger for Riyadh on PAL X33 flight with valid plane ticket number 9898, to amount the inspection
21platform;44 flight with valid plane ticket number 2345;
22
23 4. That when I proceed to conduct the body frisk to the said departing
24passenger with the aid of a hand scanner, I heard the scanner sound off at the right waistband of the subject
25passenger;
26
27 5. That on the process of frisking, I felt a hard object inside the waistband which turned out to be a
28five-inch double blade fan knife;
29
30 6. That I immediately took control of the said fan knife and informed the duty SPOIC who
31eventually placed the aforementioned departing passenger under arrest.
32
34
35 In truth thereof, I am affixing my signature to attest to the veracity of the foregoing facts this 4 th
36day of March 2003 in the office of the 1st PCAS, ASG-PNP, Pasay City.
37
38 ELLEN TOLENTINO
39 Affiant
40
41 SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4 th day of March 2003 in the office of the 1 st
42PCAS, ASG, PNP, Pasay City.
43
44
45 PEDRO CHAVEZ
1 83
1 APPENDIX “ ” RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGES
2
3
4 __________________________
5 __________________________
6 __________________________
7 (Originating Agency)
8
9 _________________
10 Date
12TO : The Director for Human Resource and Doctrine Development
13 National Headquarters, PNP
14 Camp Crame, Quezon City
15
16SUBJECT : Recommendation for Charges
17
18 The following recommendations are submitted for improvement of
19
20 _________________________________________________________________
21 (short title)
22
23
24____________________________________________ _________________
25 (long title) (page)
26
27
28____________________________________________ _________________
29 Article Paragraph Number Line Sentence
30
31_________________________________
32 Figure Number
33
34Comment:
35
36 ______________________
37 (Signature of Office Chief)
38
39Copy for:
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8
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1 86
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1 87
1GLIMPS OF SAGSB
2
3 The 9/11 incident triggers the security world of much wary and fear for the
4safety and security of the people and establishments alike. So much so to the
5window of one’s country the Airport. In effect, PNP-ASG harness and enhance the
6Aviation Security knowledge of private security guards deployed in MIAA Complex as
7force multipliers. Soon enough, PNP-SAGSD issued Memorandum 58-02 dated 02
8December 2002 regarding Security in International and Domestic Airports. However,
9to assure fully the security and safety in the airport the NHQ, PNP issued
10Memorandum Circular Nr 2005-003 dated 14 February 2005 directing PNP-ASG
11Supervision over Private Security Agencies and Security personnel performing
12Aviation Security and Aviation Security related Training at International and Domestic
13Airports. This is when SAGSB came into existence pursuant to PNP-ASG, OADPRM
14G.O.# 2005-214 dated May 12, 2005 though it was officially delegated by SAGSD on
1517 May 2005 through a simple turn-over ceremony. This is in furtherance of the 2003
16Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 5487, as amended,
17otherwise known as “ An Act Governing the Organization and Management of Private
18Security Agencies, Company Guard Forces and Government Security Forces”.
19
20MISSION:
21
22 To provide administrative services and operational control and supervision
23over the management and operations of all organize security detective/watchmen
24guard agencies, units operating at international and domestic airports throughout the
25country.
26FUNCTIONS:
27
28 To implement the laws, rules and regulations governing the administration and
29general supervision over organization, operations, business and other related
30activities of all licensed private detective , watchmen, security guard agencies and
31company/government guard forces throughout the country.
32 To disseminate policies, rules and regulations promulgated by the Chief, PNP
33or his authorized representative pertaining to security guards and their agencies
34 To endorse to the chief, SAGSD the issuance of license for security agencies
35and company guard forces.
36 To conduct inspection of posted guards security agencies, company guards
37forces and government guard units.
1 88
1 To investigate valid complaints against security agencies, company guard
2forces and government guard units
3 To supervise the training and re-training of security guard being conducted by
4PNP offices and other accredited security guards training schools.
5 To maintain and update nationwide records of security consultants, security
6officers, private detective, watchman, security guard, security agencies, company
7guard forces and government guard units.
8
1 89
1 Republic of the Philippines
2 Department of Interior and Local Government
3 National Police Commission
4 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
5 HEADQUARTERS, AVIATION SECURITY GROUP
6 SECURITY AGENCIES AND GUARDS SUPERVISION
7 Pildera II, Pasay City
8
9 *ANNEXES*
10
11OADO May 17, 2005
12
13
14STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
15NUMBER 2005-01
16
17
18 PROCEDURE IN THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION
19 Of private Security Agencies, Company guard Forces, Government Guard Forces and
20 their Security Personnel Performing Aviation Security, and Training Schools Engaged in
21 Aviation Security Related Training for Personnel deployed at
22 International and Domestic Airports
23
24
25I. REFERENCES :
26
27 1. Memorandum Circular Number 2005-003 dtd 14 February 2005.
28 2. Republic Act 5487 as amended, and its IRR
29 3. ICAO Annex 17, Standards and Recommended Practices
30 4. PNP CSG SOP NO. 04-02 dtd 2 December 2002
31
32
33II. POLICY:
34
35 A.) Periodic and non-periodic inspections shall be conducted on all
36Security agencies (Private Security/Detective Agency, Company Guard Force, and
37Government Security Force), Security Training Schools (Private Security Training
38Institutions) and Security and/or Training personnel engaged in civil aviation security.
39
40 B.) Inspection shall be connected based on the following:
41
42 1) Pre-Licensing Inspection- Periodic inspections conducted to
43determine compliance with the provisions of R.A. 5487 prior to issuance of License to
44Operated (LTO) a Security Agency and/or Accreditation to operate a Security Training
45School that deploys security personnel t the International/domestic Airports, General
1 90
1Aviation Areas and immediate vicinity of the airport complexes directly affecting
2Aviation Security
3
4 2) Post – Licensing Inspection – Periodic and/or non-periodic
5inspections conducted during the operation of Security Agencies and/or Aviation
6Security Training Schools to ascertain whether the provisions of R.A. 5487 and its IRR
7are complied with, to ensure correction of defects/violations noted, and to recommend to
8the operators appropriate measures to improve their operations.
9
10
11III. AUTHORITY:
12
13 1. The Chief, Security Agencies and Guards Supervision
14Branch (C, SAGSB), PNP ASG and his personnel shall conduct the inspections.
15
16 2. The Director, PNP-ASG may authorized and PNP-ASG
17officers and personnel to conduct the inspections.
18
19IV. DEFINITION OF TERMS:
20
21 1. Post to Post Inspections – Conducted on detailed/posted security
22guards to determine proper compliance of regulations related to uniforms, general
23physical appearance, documentation and other requirements in the actual service of
24duty.
25
26 2. Administrative Inspections (Office, Files and Records Inspections)
27– Conducted to determine compliance with records, files and other administrative
28requirements for operating a security agency and/or exercising security profession. In
29case of Security Training Schools, their inspection will determine compliance with
30provisions of the 2003 Revised IRR to RA 5487.
31
32
33V. PROCEDURES:
34
35 A.) Organization for the inspection
36
37 1. The inspection team shall be composed of at least three (3)
38 personnel led by a Police Commissioned Officer.
39
40 2. The designation, functions and responsibilities of the inspecting
41 team shall be organized as follows;
42
43 One (1) PCO – Team Leader
44 One (1) Senior PNCO – Asst Team Leader/inspector – recorder
45 One (1) PNCO – Driver /inspector – Evidence Custodian
46
1 91
1 3. Members of the inspection team shall be in complete uniform with
2proper identification and preferably using a marked uniform vehicle for easy
3identification, except howler during covert operation/inspection.
4
5 B.) Authority to Conduct Inspection
6
7 1. The inspection team shall be covered with the appropriate
8letter order duly signed by the Director, PNP ASG. The LO shall indicate the specific
9purpose, destination and period of inspection.
10
11 C.) Conduct of Inspection
12
13 1. Administrative Inspection
14
15 a) The inspection team shall introduce themselves to the
16operator or to his representative available during the inspection, state the purpose of the
17inspection and present appropriate Letter Order (LO).
18
19 b) The inspection will be conducted by using the
20Inspection Checklist (PNP SAGSD form # 9 and /or PNP SAGSD Training Inspection
21Checklist) as guide and may demand other pertinent documents related to the purpose
22of the inspection.
23
24 c) Administrative defects/violations observed or noted,
25shall be reflected on comments/finding portion of the inspection checklist. Separate
26inspection report maybe rendered if deemed necessary.
27
28 d) Appropriate recommendations shall be likewise
29indicated at the portion provided in the checklist.
30
31 e) The inspection team shall conduct exit briefing to
32ascertain acknowledgement of defects by the operator and to recommend to the operator
33to institute appropriate corrective measures.
34
35 f) If the inspection is a pre-licensing administrative
36inspection conducted within the vicinity of the airport, a transmittal/endorsement shall
37be forwarded to C, SAGSD together with the application folder and the inspection
38checklist .
39
40 g) In the event that the result of inspection may serve as
41grounds for disapproval of application or cancellation of LTO/ Accreditation, a formal
42investigation shall be conducted by C, SAGSD upon recommendation by D, ASG. If
43inspection is initiated at the PCAS level, the Chief, PCAS concerned shall forward the
44result of inspection to C, SAGSB prior to endorsement to C, SAGSD
45
46 2. Post to Post Inspection
1 92
1
2 a) Upon arrival at the post subject of inspection, the
3inspection team shall introduce themselves to the duty guards or detachment
4commander, state the purpose of the inspection, and present the appropriate Letter
5Order.
6
7 b) The conduct of inspection shall be within the purview
8of existing rules and regulations.
9
10 c) Violations noted be reflected on the Violation Ticket
11Report (SAGSD form 13-94) prepared in four (4) copies and distributed as follows:
12Original and one copy for PNP SAGSD, one (1) copy for security personnel being
13inspected and one (1) copy for the agency.
14
15 d) If the violation warrants confiscation of firearms,
16justification for its confiscation is under Rule VII, IRR of RA 5487. The serial number,
17make and caliber of firearms shall be indicated at the left side portion of Violation
18Ticket Report.
19
20 e) Issuance of Violation Ticket Report shall be per
21guard violation basis.
22
23 f) The inspection team shall conduct exit briefing to the
24security personnel concerned to ascertain acknowledgement and correction of defects
25noted and to recommend appropriate measures to improve their services.
26
27 g) Confiscation of License to Exercise Security
28Profession may be effected particularly those considered as falsified/faked.
29
30 h) Procedures in Section 6, Rule XV (Disposition of
31Violations) below shall apply when violations and defects are penalized pursuant to the
32IRR to RA 5487 as amended.
33
34 D.) Disposition of Confiscated Licenses, Documents and/or Firearms
35
36 1. Confiscations (particularly firearms) shall be effected only after
37properly informing the concerned (licensee, holder, owner, and /or client) and after their
38acknowledgement.
39
40 2. All confiscations shall be appropriately documented (i.e.
41Inventoried and receipted) and stored by the official office/unit custodian.
42
43 3. Likewise, disposition of all items, whether released or confiscated
44in favor of the government, shall be appropriately documented.
45
1 93
1 4. Confiscated items shall be released upon presentation of proof of or
2upon confirmation of legality of such document (in case of documents or licenses), or of
3proof of validity of firearm license, SG license of DDO (in case of firearms), or upon
4payment/settling of fines/penalties, as the case may be.
5
6 E. Coordinations
7
8
9 1. AS a general rule or whenever feasible prior to the conduct of
10inspection, the inspection team shall coordinate with the C, PCAS the inspection to be
11conducted by presenting the issued Letter Order , and iff necessary to make
12arrangements for appropriate assistance.
13
14 2. A corresponding exit/after inspection call should be made to the C,
15PCAS.
16
17VI. REPORTS:
18
19 A.) After Inspection Reports shall be prepared and submitted upon
20completion of the inspection or within one (1) day after the period covering the
21inspection.
22
23 B) In event that the violation/s committed entail the imposition of
24corresponding fines and penalties, the report (VTR) shall be submitted to Chief,
25SAGSB, PNP ASG which shall forward same to the C, SAGSD fro approval,
26disapproval and/or enforcement.
27
28 C) Accomplished inspection checklists of Administrative Inspections
29and recommendations thereof, should form part of the application for LTO or
30Accreditation.
31
32 D) All reports submitted to the C, SAGSB either requiring actions or
33for information shall be forwarded to the Director, ASG for subsequent endorsement to
34C, SAGSD.
35
36
37VII. DISPOSITION OF VIOLATIONS:
38
39 A.) Administrative Inspection- related violations.
40
41 1. In compliance to procedural due process, Private Security
42Agencies with pending violations shall be officially notified by C, SAGSD thru registered
43mail or personal notice.
44
1 94
1 2. The notice of appearance within seven (7) days as indicated
2in the acknowledged Violation Ticket Report issued by the inspecting team shall serve as
3first formal notice to the agency.
4
5 a) Acknowledging respondent.
6
7 (1) If respondent acknowledges violations/defects and
8 penalties/fines resulting form the inspection, appropriate payment orders shall be
9 issued by SAGSD. Thereafter, PSA shall furnish the SAGSB a copy of proof of
10 payments to serve as proof of settlement of penalty/fine.
11
12 (2) Copy of proofs of settlements shall form part of the
13respondent’s application for LTO/Accreditation.
14
15 (3) Summary Report/Consolidated Report of settlement with
16reference to the prior After Inspection Report shall be submitted to C, SAGSB for
17notation and/or information.
18
19 (b) No- response respondent.
20
21 (1) In the event that the PSA concerned shall not comply
22with first notice of appearance, the Inspection Section, SAGSD shall send a second
23notice of appearance and direct the owner or his representatives of said agency to
24appear within seven(7) days upon receipt of the notice.
25
26 (2) If the PSA concerned failed to comply with the
27second notice of appearance, the C, SAGSD shall order the conduct of formal
28investigation based on the Inspection Report including all the pieces of evidence
29(violation report, confiscated firearms, affidavit executed by the inspecting team
30members and other pertinent documents).
31
32 (3) At the onset of the investigation at SAGSD, a third
33and final notice shall be sent to PSA concerned, with directive to appear within seven (7)
34days upon receipt.
35
36 (4) Thereafter, Rule XVI and Memorandum SOP on the
37Conduct of Investigation shall ensue and be applied.
38
39 (c) Contesting Respondent
40
41 (1) In the event that a respondent questions the
42violations, penalty or fines imposed, and/or any of the circumstances giving rise to such,
43and/or refuses to submit under the sanction being imposed, the report shall be submitted
44for investigation.
45
1 95
1 (2) Thereafter, Rule XVI (Investigation of Cases) and
2Memorandum SOP ON THE Conduct of Investigation shall be applied.
3
4
5 B.) Post-to-post Inspection – related violations
6
7 1. Be it a Security agency, Security Training
8School, Security or Training Personnel, the procedures set forth in paragraph VII (a)
9above shall apply.
10
11
12VIII. MISCELLANEOUS:
13
14
15 The foregoing procedure/process is without prejudice to the filing of appropriate
16case when violation committed is penalized under Republic Act 5487, the Revised Penal
17Code and other existing laws.
18
19IX. EFFECTIVITY:
20
21 This SOP shall take effect immediately.
22
23
24
25
26 ANDRES G CARO II
27 Police Chief Superintendent
28 Director
1 96
2 Department of the Interior and Local Government
7
8OADO December 28, 2004
9
10STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
11NUMBER 2004-17
12
13 OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
14 OF ELEMENTS OF SOU AND K-9 UNIT
15
16I. OBJECTIVE:
17
18 This SOP sets forth the guidelines in the operational control and supervision of
19elements of SOU and K-9 Unit detailed at the staging areas of NAIA T-1 and T-2 and
20Manila Domestic Airport Terminal (MDAT) to ensure efficient coordination and
21immediate/quick response when need arises.
22
23II. SCOPE:
24
25 This SOP applies to personnel of 1st and 2nd PCAS, SOU and K-9 Unit.
26
27 III. PROCEDURES:
28
29 1. Elements of SOU and K-9 Unit on duty/detailed at the staging areas of
30NAIA T-1 and T-2 and MDAT shall be attached operationally to the respective Duty
31Officers of 1st and 2nd PCAS.
32
33 2. Designated Team Leaders of all incoming SOU and K-9 elements shall
34report to the Duty Officer for instruction. In case of T-2, report to duty Officer of
35Northwing and Southwing, respectively.
36
37 3. Duty officers shall establish contact/communication with the Duty SOU and
38K-9 Teams by means of any available communication equipment such as: hand held
39radio, telephone and/or cellphone of the Team Leader or any of the Team Members.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
1 97
1
2
3
4
5 4. Team leaders shall notify their respective Duty Officer of any activity or
6change of location being undertaken by the team within the duration of their duty.
7
8 5. Outgoing duty SOU and K-9 teams shall leave their respective AOR only
9when properly relived by the in-coming teams.
10
11
12IV. RESPONSIBILITY:
13
14 Chiefs, 1st PCAS, 2ND PCAS, SOU and K-9 Unit shall be held responsible for
15the strict implementation of this SOP.
16
17V. EFFECTIVITY:
18
19 This SOP takes effect upon publication.
20
21
22
23
24 ANDRES G CARO II
26 Director
27
28
29
30
31Comp 1\mydoc\
32SOP\OPNL CNTRL & SPRVSN OF SOU AND K-9
1 98
7
8OADO 26 May 2004
9
11NUMBER 2004-07
12
13 AIRSHIPMENT OF EXPLOSIVES, FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION
14
15I. REFERENCE: Philippine National Civil aviation Security Program
16
17II. PURPOSE: To establish and set guidelines for PNP-ASG personnel in
18the transport of firearms and ammunition by air carriers.
19
20III. PROCEDURES:
21
22 The safe transport of firearm and ammunition by duly authorized
23passengers is a primordial concern in the passive measure of aviation
24security carrier. Coordination between the air carrier and security status
25provides an efficient system of checking and transporting the firearm. The
26following tasks are given to the security staff:
27
28 A) Duties of PNP-ASG Police Center for Aviation Security
29Chiefs, PCOICs and PNCOICs:
30
31 a. Request from the passengers carrying
32firearms/ammunition their authorities to carry said firearms/ammunition
33together with their mission orders for personnel authorized to have the
34same. (i.e., Police, Military) PTCFOR for other persons.
35
36 b. Let the concerned passenger check the firearm
37and account for the ammunition prior to surrendering said
38firearm/ammunition for safekeeping at check-in counter. The firearm
39should be checked in the designated clearing box.
40
41 c. See to it that passenger has the claim tag as his
42receipt.
43
44 d. See to it that firearms and/or ammunition are
45properly manifested by the airline for the flight and are loaded to V-Cargo
1 99
1with padlocks. The keys of the padlock must be handled only by the
2responsible persons at the point of loading and unloading.
3
4 e. Detailed ASG personnel are required to escort the
5authorized airline carrier with the firearm and/or ammunition from the
6check-in counter up to the loading of the V-Cargo boxes to the aircraft.
7This procedure shall also hold thru upon unloading of said firearm.
8
9 f. In case of international flights, all firearms/deadly
10weapons will be checked-in as belly cargo.
11
12 g. Upon arrival at the destination, airline staff shall
13turn over the V-Cargo box/Security box to the detailed PNP-ASG firearms
14coordinator who shall be responsible in releasing the firearms in a
15designated area, located at the non-restricted area of the airport terminal.
16
17 h. Firearms shall be released only after the passenger
18have retrieved his/her baggages. Let the passenger check again the
19firearm and account for the ammunition before finally accepting it.
20
21 B) At no instance shall a firearm or ammo be given to a
22passenger while on board the aircraft.
23
24 C. Any passenger refusing to surrender any firearm or other
25deadly weapon shall be denied to board the aircraft.
26
27 D. Passengers who posses firearms and/or ammunition but
28cannot produce any authority or mission orders to carry said firearms shall
29be investigated for proper disposition.
30
31 E. Grenades, bombs, pyrotechniques and other explosive
32devices are not authorized to be loaded in any passenger commercial
33aircraft unless otherwise chartered for this purpose.
34
354. RESPONSIBILITIES:
36
37 It is the responsibility of all Chiefs, PCOICs and PNCOICs of PNP ASG
38Police Center for Aviation Security and Airport Stations to follow strictly
39these guidelines.
40
415. EFFECTIVITY:
42
43 This SOP takes effect upon publication.
44
456. RESCESSION:
1 100
1
2 This SOP rescinds SOP Nr 99-01 dated 07 May 1999 and all other
3publications in conflict hereof.
4
5
6
7 ANDRES G CARO II
10 Director
1 101
7
8OADO 15 June 2005
9
11NUMBER 2005-05
12
13AIRPORT SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

14
15 I. PURPOSE:
16
17 To establish management procedures/guidance for the level of preparedness of
18all unit at certain “risk or the condition”.
19
20 II. SCOPE:
21
22 This SOP applies to the Command Headquarters and other PNP ASG units
23throughout the country.
24
25 III. DEFINITION:
26
27 1. SECCO – a security condition which represents a level of preparedness to
28respond to specific threats.
29
30 2. AOR – the area of responsibility of an operating units.
31
32 IV. PROCEDURES:
33
34 The primary determinants of a security condition are:
35
36 - The unit’s perceptions of what security measures is necessary.
37
38 - The unit’s capability
39
40 - The warning status in effect
41
42 - The Commander’s assessment of the situation.
43
44 1. The following are the measures to be undertaken/implemented
45during the different security condition.
1 102
1
2 a) SECCO – Normal
3
4 - Vital facilities and other resources are to be protected
5and secured through normal aviation and airport duration.
6
7 b) SECCO 1
8
9 - All intelligence data collection effort must be fully
10utilized.
11
12 - All available data will be reviewed and reassessed in
13the light of new information.
14
15 - Security measures will remain normal and
16guards/sentinel will be inspected more often.
17
18 - All personnel will be service firearms .
19
20 c) SECCO II:
21
22 - (Increased Security Measures) – Units level take steps
23more than the normal security measures against possible hostile action and will provide
24increased level of intelligence watch.
25
26 - Implement appropriate area security plan.
27
28 - Additional outposts will be designated secured.
29Guards at critical posts will be augmented.
30
31 - Special strike force will be equipped ready for
32deployment.
33 - Gate guards will conduct rigid check personnel ID,
34vehicle passes and packages entering into the area.
35
36 - Maximum utilization of individual and organizational
37equipment including government resources of the NAIA.
38
39 - Emphasis on Public Info and Police Relations
40Operations.
41 - Command Incident Management Staff is organized
42and GOC is secured.
43
44
45
46
1 103
1 d) SECCO III:
2
3 - (Maximum Deployment) – a security posture for
4maximum readiness normality taken in anticipation of an impending or imminent hostile
5action. It means, full preparedness to secure vital facilities and persons in the area. i.e.
6passengers, airport employee.
7 - Intelligence activities will be concentrated on data
8collection by field teams for new information.
9 - Number of guards sentinel will be doubled and roving
10patrol will be organized.
11 - All entry points to MIAA Complex/any airport
12complex are totally closed/barricaded.
13 - Implementation of area security and contingency plan
14is continuing.
15 - All personnel are ready to secure and defend the AOR.
16 - Mobile strike force and tactical units/teams ready for
17deployment.
18
19 V. RESPONSIBILITY:
20
21 1. The Regional Chief are held responsible for the determination of security
22conditions in their respective area. Immediate reports must be submitted to Headquarters,
23ASC for increased security threat condition.
24
25 2. The Group Operations Center, ASG will disseminate information on
26increased security conditions to all concerned units/offices.
27
28 VI. EFFECTIVITY:
29
30 This SOP effect upon publication.
31
32 BY ORDER OF POLICE CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT CARO II:
33
34
35
36OFFICIAL: EFREN D UBANA
37 Police Senior Superintendent
38 Chief, Directorial Staff
39
40 ELIAS A ABAD JR
41 Police Superintendent
42 Asst Director for Operations
43
44My doc\sop, airport security mgment
45Comptr1
1 104
7
8OADO 15 June 2005
9
11NUMBER 2005-04
12
13BOMB THREATS
14
15 I. PURPOSE:
16
17 To establish security guidelines and procedures for bomb threat response
18within the area of responsibility of ASG.
19
20 II. REFERENCES:
21
22 1. Security and Fraud Prevention Manual, International Air Transportation
23Association (IATA).
24
25 2. Security Manual for the Prevention of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation
26(DOC 8973/2) International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
27
28 3. Philippine National Civil Aviation Security Program.
29
30 III. SCOPE:
31
32 This SOP applies to all ASG operating units throughout the country to include
33the Group Operation Center.
34
35 IV. DEFINITION:
36
37 Bomb Threat is an information or warning claiming knowledge that a
38dangerous device, such as a bomb or similar type of explosive has been or will be placed in an
39aircraft or airline/airport facilities.
40
41 V. PROCEDURES:
42
43 General:
44
1 105
1 a. Each threat received through any means of communication should be
2treated as real and must be thoroughly evaluated to safeguard life and property. The following
3procedures apply to recipients of the threat:
4
5 1. Telephone Calls:
6
7 a) A checklist of guidelines should be readily accessible.
8(Annex “A”)
9 b) In case of telephone call, repeat the message to the caller
10whenever possible and ask for confirmation. The receiving party should remain calm and
11courteous. He should listen carefully and write down accurately the information the caller
12provides. (Accomplish the checklist if possible)
13 c) If possible, refer the caller to a ranking officer/supervisor to
14extract more information.
15 d) Apply delaying tactics and engage the caller in prolonged
16conversation by:
17 1) Pretending to have difficulty in hearing;
18 2) Give the caller reason to believe that the flight
19information quoted is incorrect and erroneous.
20
21 2. Other means:
22
23 a) Hand-written or typed notes:
24
25 1) Documents and other materials received should be
26carefully handled to preserve marks, fingerprints etc., for examination by competent
27authorities. Unnecessary handling or other careless acts will only make the task of tracing the
28origin more difficult, if not impossible.
29 2) These items should be forwarded immediately to the
30supervisor for analysis and evaluation.
31
32 b) Person-to-person or direct:
33
34 1) Notify your supervisor immediately.
35 2) Keep the person making the threat or indicating
36knowledge of a threat under surveillance until relieved by your supervisor.
37 3) Take not of the age, height, weight, sex, color of
38eyes/hair/skin, clothing, unusual characteristics such as lameness, twitching or any
39peculiarities of the person under surveillance. Observe other personal contact, if any.
40 4) If the person leaves the scene, take note of the
41transportation used, such as bus, taxi or car; note the make, model, color
42
43 b. Pinpointing the exact location of the bomb should be a primary concern.
44The following procedures apply when specific information about the bomb is known.
45
46 1. Aircraft on the ground before boarding:
1 106
1
2 a) Recipient of the threat shall inform immediately the
3supervisor or officer.
4 b) The supervisor or duty officer informs the Operations
5Branch/ Section of affected PCAS/Airport Stations, which in turn coordinates the information
6with all agencies concerned.
7 c) Notify Director, ASG and GOC, ASG by radio or phone.
8 d) Tow aircraft to the designated clearing area. Each airport
9should have a designated site (End of TWY 06 for 1PCAS) for the purpose. The site should
10be 100 meters or 320 feet away from any aircraft parking position, taxiway, runway,
11buildings, public areas, fuel farm, storage tank storage area for explosives or incendiary
12materials and far from gas pipelines, refueling hydrant and electric power cables. For small
13airports, the site should be as practical as possible.
14 e) K-9 team conducts bomb detection operations in
15coordination with EOD teams.
16 f) Rigid inspection of passengers, baggage and positive
17baggage ID matching during the check-in process.
18
19 2. Baggage and cargo not yet loaded in the aircraft:
20
21 a) Recipient of the threat shall inform immediately the
22supervisor or duty officer.
23 b) The supervisor or officer inform the Operations Section of
24affected PCAS/Airport Stations which in turn coordinates the information to all agencies
25concerned.
26 c) Notify Director, ASG and GOC, ASG.
27 d) Tow the aircraft and the container vans containing the
28checked-in baggage and cargoes to the designated site (end of TWY 06 for 1PCAS) for the
29purpose. The site should be 100 meters 0r 320 feet away from any aircraft parking position,
30taxiway, runway, buildings, public areas, fuel farm/storage tank, storage area for explosives or
31incendiary materials and far from gas pipelines, refueling hydrant and electric power cables.
32For small airports, the site should be as practical as possible.
33 e) Baggage and cargo should be cordoned and secured from
34unauthorized persons.
35 f) EOD personnel and K-9 teams will conduct bomb detection
36procedures on the aircraft, baggage and cargo.
37 g) Passengers and crew will identify their baggage before
38loading into the aircraft.
39 h) If a bomb is found, or if a baggage is suspected to contain a
40bomb, EOD personnel shall immediately employ Render Safe Procedure Techniques (RSPT).
41The findings will be relayed to GOC, ASG and the affected unit, which in turn will inform the
42airline station manager or his representative.
43 i) In any case, whether the threat turns out to be positive or
44negative, the team leader of the EOD shall inform the GOC, ASG and all other agencies
45concerned about the status of the threat.
46
1 107
1 3. Aircraft on the ground with passengers and baggage.
2
3 a) Recipient of the threat shall immediately inform the
4supervisor or duty officer.
5 b) The Supervisor or duty officer inform the Operations
6Branch/Station of the affected PCAS/Airport Station, which is turn coordinates the
7information with all agencies concerned.
8 c) Notify Director, ASG and GOC, ASG by radio or phone.
9 d) Disembark passengers and crew with their hand carried
10baggage in coordination with the airline concern.
11 e) Tow aircraft to the designated clearing area. Each airport
12should have a designated site (End of TWY 06 for 1PCAS) for the purpose. The site should
13be 100 meters or 320 feet away from any aircraft parking position, taxiway, runway,
14buildings, public areas, fuel farm/ storage tank, storage area for explosives or incendiary
15materials and far from gas pipelines, refueling hydrant and electric power cables. For small
16airports, the site should be as practical as possible.
17 f) At the designated isolation area, baggage and cargoes are
18off-loaded, arranged systematically (for ease in paneling) while the aircraft is being
19searched/inspected.
20 g) Passengers shall identify their baggage.
21 h) If a bomb is found, only EOD personnel shall render bomb
22disposal procedures.
23 i) If no bomb or explosive is found, OIC of EOD team shall
24inform concerned unit, which in turn advises the Airline Station Manager or his representative
25that the flight is cleared.
26 j) Passengers and crew, together with their hand-carried
27baggage, will undergo redundancy security inspection before reboarding.
28 k) Unclaimed baggage will be isolated to undergo rigid
29examination/inspection, in coordination with the concerned airline before turning it over to
30them for final disposition.
31 l) Chief, PCAS will render post operations report regarding the
32bomb threat to Director, ASG.
33
34 4. Aircraft ready for take-off:
35
36 a) Recipient of the threat shall inform immediate supervisor or
37duty officer.
38 b) The officer or supervisor informs the Operations Section of
39affected PCAS/Airport Stations which in turn informs the Control tower and other agencies
40concerned.
41 c) The Control tower advises the pilot-in-command of the
42aircraft under threat, and directs the same to park at the designated area if the aircraft is no
43longer attached to the tube as in the IPT, NAIA or if the aircraft is already taxiing or being
44towed away from the terminal.
45
1 108
1 d) The Pilot-In-Command submits the aircraft for bomb search
2operations upon arrival at the designated area.
3 e) All passengers and crew shall disembark with their hand-
4carried baggage.
5 f) At the designated area, baggage and cargoes are off-loaded
6and arranged systematically (for ease in paneling) while the aircraft is being
8 g) Passengers shall identify their baggage.
9 h) If a bomb is found, only EOD personnel shall render bomb
10disposal procedures.
11 i) If no bomb or explosive is found, OIC of EOD team shall
12inform concerned unit, which in turn advises the Airline Station Manager or his representative
13that the flight is cleared.
14 j) Passengers and crew, together with their hand-carried
16 k) Unclaimed baggage will be isolated to undergo rigid
19 l) Chief, PCAS will render post operations report regarding the
21
22 5. Aircraft on Flight:
23
24 a) Recipient of the threat shall notify the immediate supervisor
25or officer, who shall inform the Operations Section of affected PCAS/Airport Stations which
26in turn coordinates the information to the Control Tower, and all concerned agencies.
27 b) The Control Tower advises the pilot-in-command regarding
28the bomb threat. Upon landing, pilot-in-command shall be directed to park the aircraft at the
29designated isolation area.
30 c) All passengers and crew shall disembark with their hand-
31carried baggage and are conveyed to the passenger holding area.
32 d) At the designated isolation area, baggage and cargoes are
33off-loaded, then arranged systematically (for ease in paneling) while the aircraft is being
35 e) Passengers shall identify their baggage. Only identified
36baggage are reloaded.
37 f) If no bomb is found, OIC of EOD Team informs the
38concerned unit, which in turn advises the Airline Station Manager or his representative that
39the aircraft is cleared.
40 g) If a bomb is found, EOD personnel render bomb disposal
41procedures.
42 h) Passengers and crew, together with their hand-carried
44
1 109
1 i) Unclaimed baggage will be isolated to undergo rigid
4 j) Chief, PCAS will render post operation report regarding the
6
7 6. Airport facilities and other buildings within ASG area of
8responsibility:
9
10 a) Recipient of the threat shall notify the immediate supervisor
11or officer who shall inform the Operations Section of affected PCAS/Airport Stations, which
12in turn will disseminate the information to all concerned agencies.
13 b) Heads of offices/occupying the affected building shall effect
14an evacuation plan.
15 c) K-9 and EOD teams will conduct appropriate bomb clearing
16operations to sanitize the building/facility.
17 d) If no bomb is found, OIC of EOD informs concerned
18agencies, which in turn advises the Head of Office or representative that the building is
19cleared.
20
21 6. Clearance for Bomb Threats will be declared by OIC, EOD or his
22authorized representative.
23
24 VI. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
25
26 a. For NAIA Complex, the Airport Security Center (ASC) is the central
27emergency control authority to where all bomb threat information shall be relayed. (ANNEX
28“B”)
29 b. The PCAS Operations Branch or Airport Station Operations Section is the
30emergency control authority where all bomb threat information in a specific area will be
31referred to. The Operations Center/Station will be the office/center responsible for relaying
32all information to all concerned agencies at the airport and the Group Operation Center, ASG.
33 c. Chiefs, PCAS/Airport Stations shall initially take the following actions:
34
35 1) Request availability of EOD and K-9 personnel from territorial
36PNP/AFP units, enter into an agreement and maintain coordination for the purpose.
37
38 2) In case of bomb threat situation, notify the following immediately:
39
40 a) Director, ASG (by any fastest possible means of
41communication).
42 b) GOC, ASG (by any fastest possible means of
43communication).
44 c) Airport Manager
45 d) Airline/ owner of concerned aircraft.
46
1 110
1 e) EOD and K-9 personnel from territorial PNP/AFP units
2coordinated in advance for immediate dispatch.
3
4 3) Duty Officers/Supervisors will take immediate control of the
5activities and will act as Ground Incident Commander in coordination with the affected
6airline.
7
8 d. GOC, ASG upon receipt of information shall immediately notify the
9following:
10
11 1. Director, ASG
12 2. Chief, Directorial Staff, ASG
13 3. AD for Operations, ASG
14 4. AD for Intelligence, ASG
15 5. Chief, SOU
16 6. Chief, K-9 Unit
17
18 e. AD for Operations/GDO ASG, upon receipt of information, shall:
19
20 1. Alert SOU, (EOD and K-9 Teams) and dispatch the same on orders.
21 2. Coordinate movement and transportation of teams to the affected
22area.
23 3. Monitor the coordination with airline/owner of the aircraft for other
24requirements.
25 4. Monitor all activities at the affected site and relay the same to
26Director, ASG.
27 5. Prepare formal report to the Chairman, NCCAS and Chief, PNP for
28their information and reference. Included in the report are pertinent information about the
29incident such as:
30
31 a) Source of information.
32 b) Time threat was received/time of paneling by K-9/EOD.
33 c) Names of personnel involved in threat response.
34
35 f. AD for Intel shall:
36
37 1. Advise operatives/agents in the area to intensify the conduct of
38surveillance in their AOR for any unusual activity.
39 2. Keep continuous watch on the concerned target and report all
40information to Director, ASG.
41
42 g. AD for Logistics – shall provide logistical support for any movement of
43EOD, K-9 and other personnel responding/on dispatch to the threat.
44
45 h. Chiefs, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 PCAS and Station Chiefs shall:
46
1 111
1 1. Coordinate with the airline manager for support requirements such
2as tow trucks, firefighting and illumination facilities and other emergency response services.
3 2. Shall provide an Officer/Senior PNCO/Supervisor to position
4himself at the Cockpit of the Aircraft as escort and guide in towing the aircraft in the
5designated isolation area.
6 3. Provide security cordon to the aircraft under bomb threat.
7 4. Publish an Operating Instruction on the mechanics for
8implementation of this SOP.
9 5. Perform other tasks as maybe directed.
10
11 i. Special Operations Unit shall:
12
13 1. Maintain a 24-hour alert of EOD team for immediate deployment
14upon orders.
15 2. Organize qualified personnel to conduct search procedures as
16necessary.
17 3. OIC/Team Leader of the responding team will report to the PCAS
18Duty Officer/Supervisor for briefing prior to accepting responsibility for the clearing
19operations of the aircraft, baggages and cargoes.
20 4. Publish an Operating Instruction on the mechanics of EOD
21operations.
22
23 j. Chief, K-9 Unit shall:
24
25 1. Maintain a 24-hour alert of K-9 team for immediate deployment on
26orders.
27 2. Organize the search/inspection, in coordination with EOD team.
28 3 OIC/Team Leader of responding team will report to PCAS Duty
29Officer/Supervisor for briefing prior to accepting clearing operation.
30 4. Publish an Operating Instruction on the mechanics of K-9 bomb
31detection.
32
33 VII. POLICIES:
34
35 1. There is no simple way to differentiate between hoax threat and one which
36may cause disaster. Specific recommendations cannot be laid down but the following
37guidelines have been developed in the hope that it may assist in reducing the treat.
38
39 a) The greatest safeguard against the effect of bomb threat is to prevent
40entry of unauthorized persons into the area of responsibility, whenever possible. Restricted
41entry and positive identification of staff and visitors can be a significant factor in assessing the
42seriousness of any given threat.
43 b) Taking into consideration that most bomb threats are hoaxes and
44made only to gain publicity, it is of utmost importance that bomb threats of any kind are
45handled with as much confidentiality as possible and coverage by the press should be avoided.
46
1 112
1 c) Any foreign object found during the search should not be touched,
2but should be made as the subject of an immediate report to the EOD teams. Only qualified
3EOD personnel shall deal with the situation.
4 d) Bomb Threat whether hoax or not shall always be treated as real.
5
6 VIII. RESPONSIBILITY:
7
8 The AD for Operations shall be responsible for the proper and strict
9implementation of this SOP.
10
11 IX. RESCISSION:
12
13 This SOP rescinds SOP Nr 2004-06A dated 22 July 2004 and all other
14publications in conflict with this SOP.
15
16
17
18
19 ANDRES G CARO II
21 Director
22My doc\SOP. BOMB THREATS
23Computer 1
1 113
1 BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST
2
3
4Date/Time/Called
5Name of Caller (If possible)
6Address of Caller:
7Origin of Call: Local ( ) Long Distance ( )
8Caller’s identity:
9
10Voice Characteristics: Loud ( ) Soft ( ) High pitch ( )
11 Deep ( ) Pleasant ( ) Others
12
13Accent: Local ( ) Foreign ( ) Others
14
15Manner: Calm ( ) Angry ( ) Emotional ( )
16 Laughing ( ) Joking ( ) Threatening ( )
17 Hurried ( ) Natural ( ) Coherent ( )
18 Incoherent ( ) Others
19
20Background noises:
21
22 Office Machines ( ) Factory noises ( ) Party ( )
23 Voices ( ) Quiet ( ) Airplanes ( )
24 Street Traffic ( ) Animals ( ) Others
25
26Attempt to obtain following information from caller:
27
28Where is it (Flight No. / building involved: ___________________________________________________
29When will it explode: __________________________________________________________________
30Type of device and Lime of explosion: _________________________________________________________
31
32Timed ( ) Explosives ( ) Incendiary ( ) BOOBY Trapped ( )
33
34 Is the caller familiar with the:
35
36 Aircraft or Building: _______________________________________________________________
37 Flight Number: __________________________________________________________________
38 Origin and destination of flight: ______________________________________________________
39 Flight Schedule: __________________________________________________________________
40 Names of pilots/crew and passengers: _________________________________________________
41 Reasons why he is doing the bomb threat: ______________________________________________
42 ________________________________________________________________________________
43
44Quote threat is its entirety as received: ________________________________________________________
45________________________________________________________________________________________
46__________________________________________________________________________________________________
47
48
49Receiver of BOMB THREAT: Name : __________________________________________________________
50 Date/time called: ____________________________________________
51 Locations: _________________________________________________
52
53THREAT CLASSIFICATION: ( ) Specific
54 ( ) Non-Specific
55
56
57
58
59
1 114
1
2
3 THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM ORGANIZATION
4
5
6
78
CHIEF, PCAS
INTEL OPNS OPNS OPNS GM REP/AIRLINE

REP/ATO REP
9
10
11
12
13
1 115
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
CHIEF, SAGSB
DEPUTY
Chief
Clerk
OPERATIONS/ENFORCEMENT
PRIVATE SECURITY TRAINING
MANAGEMENT SECTION
MANAGEMENT SECTON
(PSTMS)
Operations, Policies
Authorization &
Complaint
Doctrines&
Intelligence &
Supervision
Inspection
PSTMS
OEMSFUNCTIONS:
FUNCTIONS:
1. To assist the C, SAGSB in the
supervision
To assist the & implementation
C, SAGSB in the of
formulation
SAGSB of policiesoperational
pertaining to&
training,
enforcement
developmentfunctions
& research.
in all
2. airports.
To conduct inspections to all
PSTC/S conducting AVSEC & related
trainings/
2. To seminars.
supervise the conduct of
3. administrative
To implement & post–to-post
rules and
regulations
inspectionspertaining
& act on to the
conduct
complaintof filed
AVSEC before
& SAGSB
related
trainings/seminars
against PSAs & Security
of security
Guards
guards.
at the airports.
To administer the General
KnowledgeToExamination
conduct intelligence/
(GKE) for
private
surveillance
securityto PSAs
personnel
& security
to
evaluate
personnelthe quality for of AVSECmore
related
comprehensive
training. security
supervision/monitoring
To conduct intelligence/ of
surveillance
operations, to as
PSTC/S
directed/required
conducting
AVSEC
in coordination
& other
with otherrelated
PSAs
trainings/seminars
and authorized authority.
as directed/
required in coordination with other
PSAs4. andToauthorized
perform authority.
other task as
6. To
maybe
perform
directed
other task as maybe
directed.
1 116

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CHAPTER I

b. Acft was intercepted

b. Glenn Michael A pair of

d. Naser Omar aka

f. Liling Radia aka

19 3. That thereafter, I established the ownership of the said suspect luggage

23 4. That thereafter, I conducted a physical inspection of the suspect luggage

13AIRPORT SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

INTEL OPNS OPNS OPNS GM REP/AIRLINE

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