EN BANC

[G.R. No. 38332. December 14, 1933.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. VALERIANO DUCOSIN, defendant-appellant.

Alejandra F. Antonio for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1.INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, CONSTRUED; MAXIMUM AND

MINIMUM PENALTIES. — Under section 1 of Act No. 4103 the court must,
instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two penalties, referred to in the
Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner
must serve the minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the
provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between the minimum
and maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the
conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or
in part. He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which
is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the "minimum", as these terms
are used in the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
2.ID.; ID. — The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case
punishable by the Revised Penal Code, in accordance with the rules and
provisions of said Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, had never been passed. It was not the purpose of said Act to
make inoperative any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Neither the
title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the part of the
Legislature to repeal or amend any of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.
3.ID.; MINIMUM PENALTY. — In determining the "minimum" penalty
Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of penalties the widest
discretion that the courts have ever had. The determination of the "minimum"
penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical
determination of the extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and
 second, the broad question of the factors and circumstances that should
guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the
ascertained limits. We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense" to mean the penalty
next lower to that determined by the court in the case before it as the
maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by the Revised Penal Code).
4.ID.; ID. — The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply
provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less than the minimum
imprisonment period of the penalty next lower." In other words, it is left
entirely within the discretion of the court to fix the minimum imprisonment
anywhere within the range of the next lower penalty without reference to the
degrees into which it may be subdivided.
5.ID.; ID. — Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol.
XXX I, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an
individual and, second, as a member of society. In a word, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal law to a
degree not heretofore known in these Islands. Some factors to be taken into
consideration are indicated.
6.ID.; ID. — Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the
minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum period of the degree next
lower to the maximum penalty.

DECISION

BUTTE, J :p

This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

convicting the appellant of the crime of frustrated murder was referred by the
first division to the court in banc for the proper interpretation and application
of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature approved on December 5, 1933,
commonly known as the "Indeterminate Sentence Law". As this is the first
case which has come before us involving the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it
will be convenient to set out here some of its provisions.

Section 1 of Act no. 4103 is as follows:

 "Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by acts of the Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised
Penal Code, the court shall order the accused to be imprisoned for a
minimum term, which shall not be less than the minimum term of
imprisonment provided by law for the offense, and for a maximum term
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law; and where the
offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto,
the court shall sentenced the accused to such maximum as may, in view
of attending circumstances, be properly imposed under the present rules
of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall not be less than the
minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense. Except as provided in section
two hereof, any person who shall have been so convicted and sentenced
and shall have served the minimum sentence imposed hereunder, may
be released on parole in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
Section 2 is as follows:
"This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life imprisonment; to those convicted of
treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted to
misprision of treason, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of
piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having
been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof; to those who maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor to those already sentenced
by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided
in section five hereof."
Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates a "Board of Indeterminate Sentence"
to be composed of the Secretary of Justice as chairman and four members to
be appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Senate. This section describes the qualifications of the members.
Section 4 gives the board authority to adopt rules of procedure and provides
for the compensation of the members.
Section 5 makes it the duty of the board to study the physical, mental
and moral record of the prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and
authorizes the board to determine the proper time for the release of such
prisoners. After a prisoner has served the "minimum penalty" imposed upon
on him and the board is satisfied that such prisoner is fitted by his training for
release and that there is a reasonable probability that he will not violate the
law again and that his release "will not be incompatible with the welfare of
society", the board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner
on parole. The board may also recommend the release on parole of other
prisoners may also recommend the release on parole of other prisoners
previously convicted of any offense other than those named in section 2.
Section 6 provides for the surveillance of prisoners released on parole
for a period "equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum sentence
imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence." Section 7 provides that a certified copy of the
board's order of conditional or final release shall be filed with the court and
with the Chief of Constabulary.
Section 8 provides that any prisoner who violates any of the conditions
of his parole, who violates any of the conditions of his parole, who violates
any law during the period of surveillance for which he has been convicted,
shall be subject to re-arrest and confinement and "shall serve the remaining
unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison" unless the board grants a new parole.
Section 9 provides that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
shall not be construed to impair the powers given to the Governor-General
under section 64 of the Administrative Code or the Organic Act of the
Philippine Islands.
By its terms, Act No. 4103 became law upon its approval, that is to say,
on December 5, 1933.
In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on September 30,
1932, for the crime of frustrated murder upon the following information:
"That on or about the 23d day of September, 1932, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, treacherously attack,
assault and wound one Rafael Yanguas by then and there suddenly and
without any warning, stabbing the latter with a knife, thereby inflicting
upon him several wounds in different parts of the body, some of which
are necessarily mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the death of the said Rafael Yanguas as a consequence,
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely
intervention of medical assistance.
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten
years and one day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law and to pay the costs. The penalty for the crime of murder, under article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated felony is the one next
lower in degree to that prescribed for the consummated felony, which in the
present case is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen years and
four months. The accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating
circumstance, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, fixes the
penalty within the minimum period, that is to say, from ten years and one day
to twelve years, leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to be
served within said range, i. e., not less than ten years and one day nor more
than twelve years. The penalty imposed by the trial judge being within this
range is correct and therefore is the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense which this accused has committed.

As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was enacted after
this appeal was lodged in this court, we are now required to revise the
sentence imposed upon the appellant and to bring the same into conformity
with Act No. 4103.
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court must now,
instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two penalties, referred to in the
Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner
must serve the minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the
provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between the minimum
and maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the
conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or
in part. He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which
is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the "minimum", as these terms
are used in the Indeterminate Sentence law.
This leads up to the important question: How shall the "maximum" and
the "minimum" penalty be determined?
The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable by
the Revised Penal Code, in accordance with the rules and provisions of said
Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had never
been passed. We think it is clear from a reading of Act No. 4103 that it was
not its purpose to make inoperative any of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code. Neither the title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the
part of the Legislature to repeal or amend any of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. The legislative history of the Act further shows that
attention was called to the necessity for taking care "so as not to bring the
provisions of this bill in conflict with the provisions of our penal laws,
especially with those treating with penalties." (Committee Report, House of
Representatives H-3321, Ninth Philippine Legislature, Third Session.)
The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to offenses penalized by the Revised Penal
Code:
"Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public
funds in the amount of P10,000. No mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances are present. Under this law the court may impose on him
a maximum sentence not exceeding ten years and eight months but not
less than nine years, four months and one day (see art. 217, No. 3,
Revised Penal Code), and a minimum which shall not be less than four
years, two months and one day (the minimum imprisonment period
of prision correccional in its maximum to prision mayor in its minimum.
See article 61, Revised Penal Code). The court, therefore, may sentence
the accused to be imprisoned for not less than five years nor more than
ten years or for not less than seven years nor more than ten years and
eight months, etc."
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the "maximum" is
determined in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. In
the example given reference is made to article 217, paragraph 3, of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that the defendant shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty is placed in
the medium degree because of the absence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, that is to say, anywhere between nine years, four months and
one day and ten years and eight months in the discretion of the court. In the
case on appeal here the penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper
penalty under the Revised Penal Code because of the plea of guilty, that is to
say, between ten years and one day and twelve years in the discretion of the
court. This discretion is in nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The
trial court, in conformity with the discretion conferred upon it by the Revised
Penal Code, might have assessed the penalty at, let us say, eleven years. We
wish to make it clear that Act No. 4103 does not require this court to assess
the said penalty at 12 years, which is the longest time of imprisonment within
the minimum degree.
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of imprisonment
conforms to the provisions and rules of the Revised Penal Code and is
therefore fixed and established as the maximum of the sentence which shall
be imposed upon the appellant.
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period"
referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum
which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense." We are here upon
new ground. It is in determining the "minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103
confers upon the courts in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that
the courts have ever had. The determination of the "minimum" penalty
presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the
extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad
question of the factors and circumstances that should guide the discretion of
the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.
We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense" to mean the penalty next lower to
that determined by the court in the case before it as the maximum (that is to
say the correct penalty fixed by the Revised Penal Code, see our discussion
above). In the example which the legislature had before it in the Committee
Report above mentioned, the maximum of the sentence was correctly stated
to be the medium degree of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
period. The penalty next lower is prision correccional in its maximum degree
to prision mayor in its minimum degree (article 61, paragraph 4, Revised
Penal Code), that is to say, anywhere from four years, two months and one
day to eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply
provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less than the minimum
imprisonment period of the penalty next lower." In other words, it is left
entirely within the discretion of the court to fix the minimum of the penalty
anywhere between four years, two months and one day and eight years. In
the example given by the committee they stated that the court might fix the
minimum penalty at five years or seven years.
In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty to the
maximum already determined as aforesaid, is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, that is to say, from
four years, two months and one day to ten years. As stated, it is in the
discretion of the court to fix the time of imprisonment within the said range
without reference to the technical subdivisions of maximum degree, medium
degree and minimum degree, and in this particular the courts are vested as
stated with a wider discretion than they ever had before.
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the
minimum penalty, namely, the considerations which should guide the court in
fixing the term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping
in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the
Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is
necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a
member of society. This opens up an almost limitless filed of investigation and
study which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is
humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be
standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard
to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that
should be considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme
youth or old age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his
mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct,
environment and mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his previous
education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for
usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor during trial and his attitude
with regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in
which the crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that
section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes — this should be kept
in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for analogous crimes).
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship,
first, toward his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with
him, and second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are
important factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity
of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and
other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore
known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the
courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.
It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment period under
Act No. 4103 in the case before us on this appeal. Unfortunately, as this
defendant was convicted before Act No. 4103 became effective, and as we
know nothing of his antecedents because his plea of guilty rendered it
unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined to the record before us.
He plead guilty to all of the acts which constitute the crime of murder and
only the timely intervention of medical assistance prevented the death of his
victim and the prosecution of the appellant for murder. He was given the full
benefit of the plea of guilty in the fixing of the maximum of the sentence.
With such light as we have received from the record in this case, we have
concluded that a reasonable and proper minimum period of imprisonment
should be seven years, which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
 degree to the maximum, that is to say, within the range from four years, two
months and one day to ten years of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period. We repeat that Act No. 4103
does not require the court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment in the
minimum period of the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.

The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent: that the
defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten years
and one day of prision mayor in its maximum degree, and to a minimum
imprisonment period of seven years, and as thus modified, the judgment
appeared from is affirmed. With costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull,
Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.