1. People v. Gonzales, 73 Phil.

549
FACTS
Gonzalez was charged with estafa through falsification of a public document. He forged
and falsified reimbursement expense receipts and presented them to the disbursing officer,
after receiving payment, the accused misappropriated the amount for his own personal
use. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty.
The offense charged and admitted by the appellant constitutes the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of a public document. Pursuant to Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty
for the more serious offense should be applied in its maximum period, in this case prision
mayor. But since the appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty, the penalty next lower, which is prision correccional should be
imposed in accordance to Article 64.

ISSUE
Using Indeterminate Sentence Law, what should be the penalty to imposed?

RULING
For purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower should be
determined without regard as to whether the basic penalty provided by the Code should be
applied in its maximum or minimum period as circumstances modifying liability may
require. When, however — and this may be the only exception to the rule - the number of
mitigating circumstances is such as to entitle the accused to the penalty next lower in
degree, this penalty, in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, should be taken
as the starting point for the determination of the penalty next lower. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to the accused, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
upon him shall be the maximum period of prision correccional that is, from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Prision
correccional is the penalty provided by law for the offense and the penalty next lower is
arresto mayor which may be applied in any of its periods in the discretion of the court.
The basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law 'to uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty
and economic usefulness' . . . it is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual
and, second, as a member of society.

1
2. Basan v. People, 61 SCRA 275
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), if the offense is
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the minimum penalty should be within any of
the periods of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law, and the maximum
thereof should be within the proper period of the penalty that may be imposed were the
sentence a straight penalty.

FACTS
Petitioner Francisco Basan y Gobot was charged with two (2) homicides in Criminal Cases
Nos. 704 and 705 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Upon arraignment the
petitioner pleaded guilty in each case but invoked the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty which the prosecution did not contest. He was
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P15,000.00, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE
Is the Penalty proper.

RULING
No.
The court held that under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), if
the offense is punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the minimum penalty should be
within any of the periods of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law, and
the maximum thereof should be within the proper period of the penalty that may be
imposed were the sentence a straight penalty.
Here, the court held that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence that should have been
imposed upon the petitioner for each of the two offenses should be within the range of
from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6), years, and the maximum should have been
within the range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, the medium
period of prision mayor, which should be the proper penalty, considering that the two
mitigating circumstances have already been taken into account in reducing the penalty by
one degree lower.

2
3. People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Under section 1 of Act No. 4103 the court must, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine
two penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and
"minimum". The prisoner must' serve the minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole
under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between the minimum and
maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in
said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part. He must be sentenced,
therefore, to imprisonment for a period which is not more than the "maximum" nor less
than the "minimum", as these terms are used in the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

FACTS
This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the
appellant of the crime of frustrated murder was referred by the first division to the court in
banc for the proper interpretation and application of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine
Legislature approved on December 5, 1933, commonly known as the "Indeterminate
Sentence Law". As this is the first case which has come before us involving the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will be convenient to set out here some of its provisions.

ISSUE
What is the proper interpretation of the "minimum" penalty in the indeterminate sentence
law?

RULING
The court held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply provides that the
"minimum" shall "not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next
lower." In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the court to fix the
minimum imprisonment anywhere within the range of the next lower penalty without
reference to the degrees into which it may be subdivided. Act No. 4103 does not require the
court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum period of the degree next
lower to the maximum penalty. Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of "personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the
GovernorGeneral, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to
consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. In a word,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal
law to a degree not heretofore known in these Islands. Some factors to be taken into
consideration are indicated.
It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment period under Act No. 4103 in the
case before us on this appeal. Unfortunately, as this defendant was convicted before Act
No. 4103 became effective, and as we know nothing of his antecedents because his plea of
guilty rendered it unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined to the record before
us. He plead guilty to all of the acts which constitute the crime of murder and only the
timely intervention of medical assistance prevented the death of his victim and the
3
prosecution of the appellant for murder. He was given the f ull benefit of the plea of guilty
in the fixing of the maximum of the sentence. With such light as we have received from the
record in this case, we have concluded that a reasonable and proper minimum period of
imprisonment should be seven years, which is within the "range of the penalty next lower
in degree to the maximum, that is to say, within the range from four years, two months and
one day to ten years of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its
medium period. We repeat that Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum
term of imprisonment in the minimum period of the degree next lower to the maximum
penalty.

4
4. People v. De Joya, 98 Phil. 238
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
The determination of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence within the range
provided by law is left entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and this discretion
should not be interfered with except in case of abuse.

FACTS
On November 5, 1951, Gaudencio de Joya, Nicanor Reyes, Julian Sumaway, Cesar
Manipola, and Ricardo Hornales were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with
the crime of theft.
Appellant admits that the maximum term of his sentence is correct. He likewise admits that
its minimum term (4 months of arresto mayor) is within the range prescribed by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in this case, which is arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, or f rom 2 months and 1 day to 4 months. His only argument in support
of the appeal is that (1) the properties stolen having been recovered, (2) this being his first
offense, and (3) he having pleaded guilty to the charge, which shows repentance for his act
and lack of perversity in defying the law, the lower Court should have imposed upon him
as the minimum of his indeterminate sentence, the lowest range of arresto mayor, which is
2 months and 1 day.

ISSUE
Is the fact that the properties stolen were recovered exempts on the determination of his
penalty?
Is his plea of guilt is required to be considered (by way of mitigation) the imposition of the
minimum term of his sentence?

RULING
No in all issues.
The court held that the determination of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
within the range provided by law is left entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and
this discretion should not be interfered with except in case of abuse.
Here, the court held that the appellant’s arguments fail to show any such abuse. The fact
that the properties stolen were recovered merely exempts appellant from civil liability, but
has no bearing on the determination of his penalty; while his plea of guilt is required to be
considered (by way of mitigation) only in the imposition of the maximum term of his
sentence, and in this case, it has already been taken into account as offsetting the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, so that appellant was given only the medium
period of the proper penalty as the maximum term of his sentence. As to the fact that the
present offense is the first committed by this appellant, suffice it to say that the penalty
fixed by the Code is usually for first offenses; for otherwise, the aggravating circumstances
of recidivism or of reiteración (Article 14, Nos. 9 and 10, RPC) would come into play and
operate to increase the penalty.

5
5. People v. Fulgencio, 92 Phil. 1069
(di ko talaga makita, kahit sa escra wala)

6. People v. Cesar, 22 SCRA 1024

TOPIC/DOCTRINE
In a complex crime, the penalty for the more serious crime should be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period. The proper method is to start from the penalty imposed
by the Revised Penal Code then apply the privileged mitigating circumstance and
determine the penalty immediately inferior in degree, and finally apply the same in its
maximum degree but within the minimum range thereof if there is an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. If for instance prision mayor is the maximum of the indeterminate sentence,
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty is the penalty next lower to it as prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision correccional.

FACTS
Charged of direct assault with murder in the Municipal Court of Carmen, Bohol, accused
waived his right to preliminary investigation and moved that his case be remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Bohol at Tagbilaran. This was granted and the accused was
charged with the same complex crime in the latter court.
Upon arraignment on April 12, 1966, the accused pleaded not guilty. However, on the date
set for trial on the merits, he manifested thru counsel his intention to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of direct assault with homicide and to pay damages. With the Fiscal's
conformity and upon petition of accused, the latter was allowed to withdraw his former
plea of not guilty, the information was amended accordingly, and the accused pleaded
guilty to the charge of direct assault with homicide. With leave of court, and in order to
mitigate his liability, accused proved that he was born in the Municipal ity of Carmen,
province of Bohol, on May 27, 1948 (Exhibits 1 and 1-A), and therefore on the date of the
commission of the crime, he was only 17 years, 9 months, and 12 days old. The trial court
convicted the accused of direct assault upon a person in authority with homicide in its
decision dated April 30, 1966.

ISSUE
In this appeal, the accused raises as sole issue the correct penalty under the circumstances.

RULING
The court held that Accused-appellant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the crime of
direct assault upon a person in authority with homicide. This being a complex crime, the
penalty for the more serious crime should be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.4 The more serious crime is homicide punishable by reclusión temporal.
Accused has to his credit two mitigating circumstances: the special or privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority5 and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.6
Therefore, under Art. 64, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable is the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law. Under Art. 71, Revised Penal Code, the
penalty next lower to reclusión temporal is prisión mayor. Because of the complex nature of
6
the crime committed by accused-appellant, the penalty of prisión mayor is to be applied in
its maximum period. However, having in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty without any offsetting aggravating circumstance, applying Art. 64, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión mayor maximum should be imposed in its
minimum range.
All told, and applying now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than six (6) years of prisión correccional,
to not more than ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prisión mayor.

7
7. People v. Ong Ta, 70 Phil. 553
FACTS
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1937, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound with a knife or sharp
instrument one Chan Suy Hua inflicting upon him several wounds on the stomach and
other parts of his body, which wounds directly caused the death of the said Chan Suy.

ISSUE
The question involved in this appeal refers to the application of the proper penalty.

RULING
The court held that the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.) Appellant having committed the crime while a
minor, over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law, shall be imposed in the proper period; that is, prision mayor in its
maximum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Considering the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty, which is not offset by any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its minimum period or from ten years and one day to twelve
years of prision mayor. In the present case, paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code should be applied and in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which the
trial court failed to apply, the appellant should be, and is hereby, sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five years of prision correccional to ten years and one day of
prision mayor.

8
8. People v. Jaurigue, 76 Phil. 174
FACTS
Avelina Jaurigue was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of
murder, of which defendant was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal. Defendant
Avelina stabbed the victim Amado Capina due to the latter’s previous mischievous and
inappropriate sexual advances towards the former. The stabbing incident happened inside
the barrio church during a novena being celebrated at that time. Immediately after the
incident, the defendant surrendered the knife used in the stabbing and followed the
instructions of the barrio lieutenant to secure themselves in their home until called upon by
authorities. Appellant appealed the lower court’s decision arguing that: 1. appellant had
acted in the legitimate defense of her honor; 2. existence of mitigating circumstances that
(a) she did not have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed,
and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities; 3. absence of
aggravating circumstance based on the holding that the offense was committed in a sacred
place.

ISSUE
1. WON the mitigating circumstances raised should be considered in defendant’s favor.
(YES)

2. WON there is an aggravating circumstance in the committed offense. (NO)

RULING
1. The defendant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered after the
incident. Defendant acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and
obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control. Defendant had not intended to
kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown
by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound;

2. The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious
worship, cannot be legally sustained as there is no evidence to show that the defendant had
murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Further, defendant only
committed the alleged offense under the greatest provocation. From the foregoing, the
Court ruled that the defendant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating
circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified
character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of article 69
of the Revised Penal Code, defendant is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the
penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the
defendant should be accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law.

9
9. People v. De Lara, 98 Phil. 584
FACTS
- A surveillance operation in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana,
Manila was conducted due to reports received that the said it is a rampant drug-
pushing area
- After confirmation, a buy-bust team operation was made and the team was
accompanied by their informant
- One of the members of the team acted as the poseur-buyer and dealt with the
appellant
- After he received the marked money as payment, he went back to the house and
retrieved two (2) foils wrapped in onion paper
- As he was handing the items, he sensed that the buyer is a police operative so he tried
to take it back
- The operative was able to prevent it so the appellant ran back to the house where he
was subdued
- There, he admitted that he kept illegal drugs in his house and showed the arresting
officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs
- Appellant denied having sold marijuana to anyone especially the arresting officers
- He testified that after coming home from work and fetching his son who was in the
neighborhood, he returned to his house and there he was arrested by the police
- The police proceeded to search his house without a warrant
- He was also forced to be interrogated even when he demanded for his lawyer and
also made to sign on the photocopy of the marked money
- The trial court rendered its decision against the appellant
- Hence, the appeal

ISSUE
Whether or not the search and arrest made against the appellant was illegal

RULING
The arrest made by the operatives are within the bounds of law
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures dealing with warrantless
arrests provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
x x x           x x x          x x x
In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of
marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of
law, appellant's arrest was lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest. "Having
caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were
10
not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even
without a warrant of arrest" (People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644 [1991];  People vs. De Los
Santos, 200 SCRA 431 [1991]).

The seizure of the items are also valid

The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant's
arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of
the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made (People v. Castiller, 188
SCRA 376 [1990]).
We find to be meritorious appellant's claim that he was not assisted by counsel during the
custodial investigation, specifically when he was forced to sign the photocopy of the
marked twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E"), Receipt of Property Seized (Exh. "F"), and the Booking
and Information Sheet (Exh. "H").

11
10. People v. Colman, 103 Phil. 6
(di ko makita digest, syllabi na lang)
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; CONSPIRACY, HOW PROVED. — Conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved
by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the
purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be
inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved.

2. ID.; ID.; PREMEDITATION WHEN NOT DELIBERATE, CANNOT BE APPRECIATED

AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. — Where no sufficient time has elapsed to give the
offenders an opportunity for reflection that the conscience might have conquered the
determination of the will, the premeditation is not deliberate, and cannot be appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance.

12
11. People v. Cempron, 187 SCRA 248
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
In crimes punishable with death or life imprisonment provided the resulting penalty after
considering the attendant circumstances, is reclusion temporal or less, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies.

FACTS
This is an appeal interposed by accused Alfredo Cempron who was convicted of the crime
of Murder by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,1 Branch 3, for stabbing to death one
Gregorio Gudelusao on November 1, 1982. Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Prosecution witness Agripino Lofranco, a
barangay official in the place of the stabbing incident, positively testified that in the same
evening of said incident appellant purposely went to him and sought his help in
surrendering to the police authorities and he actually turned over appellant to them.

ISSUE
Does the ISLAW apply?

RULING
No.
The trial court failed to consider one (1) mitigating circumstance, that is, voluntary
surrender. The court ruled that the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal maximum to
death. Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the imposible
penalty would be the minimum period of the penalty provided for by law which has a
range of 17 years 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. In crimes punishable with death or life
imprisonment provided the resulting penalty, after considering the attending
circumstances, is reclusion temporal or less, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies.
Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum range of the
indeterminate sentence is 10 years 1 day to 17 years 4 months and the maximum range is 17
years 4 months 1 day to 20 years.

13
12. People v. Lee, Jr., 132 SCRA 66
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law mandatory where imprisonment would
exceed one year.

FACTS
This case is about the correctness of the sentence rendered by Judge German G. Lee, Jr.,
who imposed on Roman Amil, 57, a straight penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor for homicide. He applied the rule in People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515, involving a
conviction for illegal possession of firearms which is punished by imprisonment for not
less than five years and not more than ten years.

ISSUE
Is the penalty correct?

RULING
No.
The court held that the instant case is not a prosecution under a special law. It is a homicide
case. The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory if the imprisonment
would exceed one year. Judge Lee found that the homicide was attended by the two
generic mitigating circumstances provocation and voluntary surrender to the authorities.
There was no aggravating circumstance. Hence, the penalty of reclusion temporal must be
lowered by one degree or to prision mayor. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence
should be taken from prision mayor minimum. By applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty has to be reduced by one degree or to prision correccional from which the
minimum sentence has to be taken.

14
13. People v. Moises, 66 SCRA 151
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to persons convicted of capital offenses but not
sentenced to death.

FACTS
The three brothers, Florentino Moises y Sanidad, Eusebio Moises y Sanidad, and Baltazar
Moises y Sanidad, were charged with Murder before the CFI of Pangasinan.
The three accused brothers pleaded “not guilty” to the charge and went to trial assisted by
their attorneys, after which the court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, as charged, and there being present the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength without any mitigating circumstance
to offset the same. the court imposed upon florentino and eusebio the penalty of death and
upon the accused baltazar moises the indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months, and twenty-one (21)
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of
the victim jose soloria.
Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting the three accused of Murder.

RULING
No, the court a quo did not err in convicting the three accused of Murder.

The commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, with no mitigating circumstances to offset
them, thereby justifying the imposition of the maximum penalty of death upon the
accused. The penalty of death against Florentino and Eusebio is hereby affirmed.
The portion thereof which imposes upon the accused, Baltazar Moises Y Sanidad, an
indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for
being a minor when the crime was committed and hence entitled to a penalty one degree
lower (article 68, paragraph 2, of the revised penal code), or from prision mayor, maximum,
to reclusion temporal, medium, is hereby modified and Baltazar Moises Y Sanidad is
condemned to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than ten (10) years of prision
mayor and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal.
In imposing an indeterminate sentence upon Baltazar Moises y Sanidad, the Court overrule
the contrary doctrine in People vs. Colman, et al., 103 Phil. 6, Resolution of March 26, 1958,
pp. 19-20, holding that the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended by Act
No. 4225) is not applicable to a case similar to that of accused Baltazar Moises y Sanidad.
The penalty actually imposed upon this accused not being death, he is entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In all other respects, the appealed judgment is affirmed.
15
1. Palo v. Militante, 184 SCRA 395
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused applied for probation.

FACTS
As observed by respondent judge who filed his memorandum in propria persona, “(u)pon
arraignment, the petitioner understood the allegations in the information and he knew
very well the import of his plea. He was a third year college student so that it cannot be
said that he did not understand the information read to him. He admitted he had in his
possession three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes without any authority nor license to
possess them.”
Asked by the Court why he had in his possession these three sticks of marijuana cigarettes,
the accused answered that he wanted to try smoking them. He was further asked whether
he realized that by his plea of guilty he would be sentenced accordingly by this Court and
again the accused answered in the affirmative.”

ISSUE
Whether he is entitled to an appeal.

RULING
No.
The court held that Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit
that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for
probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise
known as the Probation Law of 1976, as amended, which in part provides that the filing of
an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. In other words, the
judgment ipso facto attains finality, although it is not yet executory pending resolution of
the application for probation. Thus, the judgment in the lower court having become final,
the respondent judge is not vested with any discretion to allow the alleged improvident
plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.
It is clear that what the law requires is that the application for probation must be filed
within the period for perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within such period was
intended to encourage offenders, who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, to avail
of probation at the first opportunity. Such provision, was never intended to suspend the
period for the perfection of an appeal.

16
2. Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Section 4 in its present form expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation if
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The period for
perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court is fifteen (15)
days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from.

FACTS
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together
with Jacinto N Pascual, Sr., President of the same corporation, Llamado was prosecuted for
violation of BP 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653 in RTC-Manila, Branch 49. The 2 co-
signed a postdated check payable to private respondent Leon Gaw worth Php186,500. The
check was dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds.
In 1987, the RTC sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year of prision correccional and to pay a
fine of Php200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He also had to
reimburse Gaw Php186,500 plus cost of the suit. On Mar. 20, Llamado orally manifested
that he was taking an appeal. The records of the case were then forwarded to the CA. He
asked for extensions to appeal, with the last being on Nov. 18. On Nov. 30, however,
Llamado filed in the RTC a Petition for Probation invoking PD No. 968, as amended.
Llamado then filed with the CA a Petition for Probation dated Nov. 16. In 1988, Llamado
withdrew his appeal. The CA also denied his petition.

ISSUE
Is Llamado’s application for probation barred under PD No. 968, as amended.

RULING
Yes.
The court held that Section 4 in its present form expressly prohibits the grant of an
application for probation if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction. The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional
Trial Court is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed
from.
However, Llamado already orally manifested his appeal on Mar. 20, 1987; the oral
manifestation is considered equal to a written notice of appeal by the RTC. From that date,
he already lost his right to apply for probation when he perfected his appeal from a
judgment of conviction. Thus, Llamado’s petition for probation is denied..

17
3. Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should
be judged on its own merits—on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the
probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to
stipulate instead unrealistic terms.

FACTS
Petitioner, Florentina L. Baclayon was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation
for having quarreled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words against Remedios
Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central School.
The CA/IAC affirmed her conviction and increased the penalty imposed by respondent
judge and sentenced her to 1 year 8 months 21 days of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional in its minimum period. The sentence
was promulgated on September 9, 1981, and on the same date Baclayon applied for
probation with respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation Officer. The
Post-sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the granting of petitioner’s
probation for a period of 3 years.
On Dec 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order granting Baclayon’s probation by
modified the Probation Officer’s recommendation by increasing the period of probation to
5 years and imposed some condition. One of the condition was, “to refrain from continuing
her teaching profession,” to which Baclayon contends; alleging grave abut of discretion in
the imposition of the said condition. She submits that said condition is not only detrimental
and prejudicial to her rights but is also not in accordance with the purposes, objective and
benefits of the probation law and prays that said condition be deleted from the order
granting her probation.

ISSUE
Did the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in giving the assailed
condition?

RULING
Yes.
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be classified into
general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The mandatory conditions, enumerated
in Section 10 of the Probation Law, require that the probationer should (a) present himself
to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may be
specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and (b) report to the
probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer.
Special or discretionary conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the same
Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison. The enumeration,
however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to
designate practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer’s constitutional rights
18
are not jeopardized. There are innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the
rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific individual context. It should,
however, be borne in mind that the special or discretionary conditions of probation should
be realistic, purposive and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and
self-respecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their
application and each case should be judged on its own merits—on the basis of the
problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation
should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.
Here, the court held that Court may not impose as a condition for grant of probation that
probationer should not continue her teaching profession. While it is true that probation is a
mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is to
be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused. Equal regard to the demands of justice and public interest must be
observed. In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and profession of
petitioner. The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation
during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching would practically prevent
her from complying with the terms of the probation.

19
4. Amandy v. People, 161 SCRA 436
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Grant or denial of application for probation does not rest solely on the offender’s
potentiality to reform but also on the absence of demands of justice and public interest.

FACTS
On or about April 3, 1983, at Brgy, Burgos, Municipality of Padre Burgos, Quezon Province,
Juanita Amanda aka Diana wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession 1.6
grams of dried leaves of Indian Hemp or marijuana, a prohibited drug and 60 pieces of
cigarette wrappers, violating Sec. 8 of RA6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Petitioner Amandy initially entered a plea of not guilty but subsequently withdrew his
former plea and substituted it with a plea of guilty, subject, however, to the reservation of
proving the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness which was not habitual, in addition to
the attenuating circumstance of his voluntary plea of guilty. The RTC found Amandy guilty
of the crime charged with a penalty of 6 yrs and 1 day and to pay a fine of P6,000, with the
accessories of the law and to pay the costs. . Subsequently, he filed an application for
probation with a petition for release on recognizance, alleging that he is entitled to the
suspended sentence under P.D. 968. However, the RTC denied because P.D. 1990 removed
from the purview of the exceptions to the Probation Law those ‘sentenced to serve a
maximum of imprisonment of more than 6 years.
On October 8,1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the lower court
denied the motion in a resolution dated October 9, 1986 on the ground that it is the
intention of the law to extend the beneficial effects of the Probation Law only to
correctional penalties which have six (6) years as their ceiling and that penalties afflictive in
scope and nature have to be excluded.

ISSUE
Did the RTC committed reversible error in disallowing the petitioner’s application for
probation notwithstanding the favourable recommendation of the Probation Officer?

RULING
No.
The court held that the grant or denial of the application for probation does not rest solely
on the offender’s potentiality to reform but also on the observance of demands of justice
and public interest (Tolentino v. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92). These are expressed in statutes
enacted by the lawmaker.
Here, the court held thata denial of the probation application in this particular case is
further justified by the gravity of the drug menace and by the increase of the penalty for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act which bring it outside the range of probation able
offenses. Again, the punishment of drug pushers and drug users is a matter of legislative
policy. Judicial deference to this legislative policy is expressed in Tolentino v. Alconcel (121
SCRA 92).

20
5. Salgado v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 304
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
(T)he extinction or survival of civil liability are governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of
the Revised Penal Code where under Article 113 thereof provides that: ‘x x x, the offender
shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed
by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation
of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty,
pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason.’”

FACTS
Petitioner was found guilty with the crime of serious physical injuries before the RTC after
trial. Said accused was sentenced of imprisonment for a period of four (4) months and
twenty (20) days, with the accessories provided for by law, and to indemnify the victim,
Francisco Lukban, Jr., in the sum of P126,633.50 as actual or compensatory damages, and
the sum of P50,000.00 as for damages.
Subsequently, the accused filed an application for probation with the trial court.  The
application was granted in an Order which contained the condition to indemnify the victim
FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a monthly installment of P2,000.00 every month during the
entire period of his probation. From May to October, petitioner complied.
Private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution for the enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in his favor in the criminal case
and it was granted. It was referred to the Court of Appeals which they affirmed.
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review and argued that the CA erred in
holding the order as far as the civil aspect is concerned and in holding that the condition in
the probation order modifying or altering the civil liability of the offender is unauthorized
and not sanction by law.

ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition of probation the manner in which
a probationer may settle his civil liability against the offended party during the period of
probation.

RULING
Yes.
The court held that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of
probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished.
This can be inferred from a reading of the text of the Apalisok case where the issue that was
involved therein was whether a grant of probation carries with it the extinction of the civil
liability of the offender. The reason for ruling that the grant of probation does not
extinguish the civil liability of the offender is clear,” (T)he extinction or survival of civil
liability are governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the Revised Penal Code where under
Article 113 thereof provides that: ‘x x x, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy
the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that
he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not
21
been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or
any other reason.’”
Here, the court held that the issue is not the survival or extinction of the civil liability of a
probationer but, whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition of probation the
manner in which a probationer may settle his civil liability against the offended party
during the period of probation.

22
6. Bala v. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Expiration of probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation, a final
order of discharge from the court is required. An order revoking probation or modifying
the terms thereof is unappealable. Probationer’s change of residence did not divest the RTC
of Manila of jurisdiction over the probation case.

FACTS
Bala has been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Diazen which
had been attached to her USA passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a
genuine public or official document. The RTC adjudged Bala guilty of the crime of
falsification of a public document. Bala appealed the said conviction but the CA affirmed in
toto the judgment of the trial court.
Bala then applied for and was granted probation by Judge Martinez. He was placed in
probation under a period of 1 year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein.
By its terms, it should have expired on August 10, 1983. However, on December 8, 1983,
People of the Philippines through Assistant City Fiscal Cajucom filed a motion to revoke
the probation as Bala had violated its terms and conditions. Bala now contends that the
motion to revoke probation was filed after the lapse of 1 year, which means that he should
have been discharged from the same.

ISSUE
Does the expiration of the probation period terminate Probation?

RULING
No.
The court held that expiration of probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation, a final order of discharge from the court is required. An order revoking
probation or modifying the terms thereof is unappealable.
Here, the court held that there must first be issued by the court of an order of final
discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only from
such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated. Precisely he was
granted probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him
hope___hope for self-respect and a better life. n the instant case, a review of the records
compels a revocation of the probation without the need of further proceedings in the trial
court which, after all, would only be an exercise in futility. If we render justice now, why
should we allow the petitioner to further delay it. Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite
with responsible society. Precisely he was granted probation in order to give him a chance
to return to the main stream, to give him hope___hope for self-respect and a better life.
Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his
chance. He has not reformed.

23
7. Budlong v. Apalisok, 122 SCRA 935
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
The probation law clearly provides only for the suspension of sentence imposed on the
accused by virtue of his application for probation. It has absolutely no bearing on civil
liability.

FACTS
The petitioner filed information before the respondent court charging private respondent
Camilo Galagar with the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
During the scheduled arraignment, on February 4, 1982, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Immediately after the plea, the respondent Judge rendered judgment
and sentence the accused to suffer 30 days imprisonment and to pay the costs. No civil
liability was imposed. The accused manifested his intention to avail of the provisions
P.D.No.968, the probation law. The respondent court gave the counsel of the accused 5 days
within which to file the petition for probation. Petitioner filed an ex parte motion to prove
the civil liability of accused but it was denied by respondent court stating that prosecution
should have asked leave to prove the civil liability of the defendant right before its
rendered judgment not after for by doing so, would in effect nullify the order of suspension
of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of Probation Law.

ISSUE
Whether or not the probation law has bearing on civil liability.

RULING
No.
The court held that the general rule is that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil liability or reserves right to institute it separately. The probation law clearly
provides only for the suspension of sentence imposed on the accused by virtue of his
application for probation. It has absolutely no bearing on civil liability.
Here, the court held that there is no legal basis for the respondent court’s conclusion that a
hearing to prove the civil liability of the accused under the circumstances of the case would
in effect nullify the order of the suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very
purpose of probation law. The respondent court is hereby ordered to set hearings on the
civil liability of the accused.

24
8. People v. Disimban, 88 Phil. 120
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Robbery With Homicide; Penalty to be imposed where the accused is a Mohammedan
inhabitant of Mindanao.

FACTS
An information for robbery with homicide was filed against Disimban, his other
companions being still at large. He was tried, found guilty and sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment (reclusión perpetua), to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P2,000 and to pay the costs. The defendant has appealed.

ISSUE
What Penalty should be imposed.

RULING
The court held that where the accused-appellant is a Mohammedan, inhabitant of
Mindanao, the penalty to be imposed upon him, regardless of the attending circumstances,
lies in the discretion of the trial court pursuant to section 106 of the Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu.

25
9. People v. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
By his plea, the accused is deemed to have admitted not only the commission of the
offenses charged, but the circumstances surrounding their commission, such as evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, alevosia, and dwelling.

FACTS
A complaint for multiple murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder was filed
against the accused before the Justice of the Peace court of Roxas, Palawan. Having waived
his right to preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the Fiscal filed an information for the same crime against him.
On October 24, 1956, a physical and mental examination of the accused was conducted by
the Chief of the Puerto Princesa Hospital and he was found to be normal and sane. He even
narrated how he killed his common-law wife and his other victims. Two local lawyers were
appointed counsel de oficio to defend him. Upon arraignment, interpreted in the local
dialect, he pleaded guilty. This notwithstanding, considering the gravity of the offenses
charged, the Court asked him to take the witness stand and narrate the circumstances
surrounding their commission, but he refused stating that he had already made a
confession. Thereupon, the Court asked the prosecution to present its evidence, and the
Fiscal presented among his exhibits the murder weapon, the confession of the accused, the
sketches of the scene of the crime, the sixteen certificates of death, the affidavits of some
witnesses, and the ante mortem declaration of Manuel Adion.

ISSUE
What is the result of the defendant’s plea of guilty?

RULING
The court held that a plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to
sustain conviction of the offense charged without the introduction of further evidence,
upon the theory that the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof by his plea of
guilty. ut in this case, despite the accused's plea of guilty, the prosecution offered evidence
considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding the commission of the acts charged.
And the evidence presented substantially supports the material allegations of the
information. In other words, by his plea, the accused is deemed to have admitted not only
the commission of the offenses charged, but the circumstances surrounding their
commission, such as evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength,
alevosia, and dwelling.

26
1. People v. Yang, February 16, 2004
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Payment of consideration is immaterial in the distribution of illicit drugs. Neither law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money used in a “buy-bust.”

FACTS
The Information charges appellant not only of selling but also of dispensing, delivering,
transporting or distributing a regulated drug, namely methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Appellant states that the alleged sale was not consummated as the poseur-buyer was still
examining the alleged drugs when the suspects ran away and no money had been
delivered to the seller. He adds that the prosecution did not present the money used in the
“buy-bust” operation. Hence, according to him, there is nothing to show that a “buy-bust”
operation indeed took place with appellant as target. As there was no consummated sale to
speak of, he contends that he could not be convicted of selling, distributing, or dispensing a
regulated drug without lawful authority.

ISSUE
Whether presentation of money is essential in the consummation of sale of illegal drugs.

RULING
No.
The court held thata under Article I, Sec. 2 (f) of the Dangerous Drugs Act, to deliver “refers
to a person’s act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.”
Here, the court held that appellant delivered the “shabu” to the poseur-buyer at the
hospital parking area after seeing the “buy-bust” money in the hands of the poseur-buyer.
The absence of actual or completed payment is irrelevant, for the law itself penalizes the
very act of delivery of a dangerous drug, regardless of any consideration. Payment of
consideration is likewise immaterial in the distribution of illicit drugs.

27
2. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Phil. Drug Enforcement Agency,
November 3, 2008
FACTS
This is a consolidated case regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g);
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 as follows:
In Pimentel v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 16158, that the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 2004 elections illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator.
In SJS v. DDM & PDEA, G.R. 157870, that paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA
9165 are constitutionally infirm for one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing.  For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable.  And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches
is also breached by said provisions.
In Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA, G.R. 158633, that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be
struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and
for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

ISSUE/RULING
1.      Whether for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection
with the May 2004 elections is constitutional.
No.
The court held that the right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.
Here, the court held that in the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec.
36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such
additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of
a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Social Justice
Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410, G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

2.    Whether or not the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicion
less drug testing of students are constitutional.
Yes.
The court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicion less drug testing of students are constitutional.
Here, it held that it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
28
policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary
schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted
and protected.

3.      Whether the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable.
Yes.
The court held that like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of
ethics in the public service.
Here, the court held that if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

4.      Whether or not the mandatory drug testing on the accused would violate a persons’
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Yes.
The court held that in the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less; To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in
this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.

29
3. People v. Ros, April 15, 2015
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
For a successful prosecution of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, all of the
following elements must be satisfied: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment.
What matters is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence.

FACTS
In the case at bar, the appellants did not present any evidence to substantiate their
allegation that the integrity and evidentiary value of the marijuana presented as evidence
at the trial had been compromised at some point. What the records show is that there had
been substantial compliance with the prescribed procedure, preserving in effect the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized marijuana. The prosecution had submitted
evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt the crucial links in the chain of custody of the
marijuana, starting from its seizure and confiscation from the appellants until its
presentation as proof of the corpus delicti before the RTC.

ISSUE
Did the court of appeals gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime
charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove the chain of custody of the alleged seized
marijuana, in violation of sections 21 and 86 of R.A. no. 9165.

RULING
No.
Here, the Court believes and so holds that all the requisites for the illegal sale of marijuana
were met. As demonstrated by the testimonies of witnesses for the prosecution, the identity
of the buyers, the sellers, the prohibited drugs, and the buy-bust money, has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Likewise, the chain of custody did not suffer from serious flaws
as appellants argue. Noncompliance with Section 21 does not automatically render illegal
the arrest of an accused or inadmissible the items seized/confiscated. As the law mandates,
what is vital is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized/
confiscated illegal drugs since they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. that the appellants have the burden of proof to overcome the presumption that the
police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly performed
their official duties. Hence for failure of appellants to demonstrate with clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust operation team were motivated
illicitly, or had failed to properly perform their official functions, the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses as to the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized illegal drugs deserve full faith and credit.

30
4. People v. Havana, January 11, 2016
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of
custody as “duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.”
“The chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in reality it is not, ‘as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.’” As such, what is of utmost
importance “is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.”

FACTS
A civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City and
reported to the duty officer SPO1 Espenido that the appellant was actively engaged in the
illegal drug trade. Espenido immediately assembled a buy-bust team, with him as the team
leader, the civilian asset and with PO2 Enriquez, SPO1 Cañete, and SPO1 Nuñez. The
police team designated the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided
him with a P100.00 marked money bill.
The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation report to the
PDEA after the buy-bust operation violates RA 9165; and that the non-presentation of the
unnamed "civilian informant" who allegedly brokered the transaction with him casts
serious doubts on the factuality of the buy-bust operation. The alleged apprehending team
after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug, and after immediately seizing and
confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever
photograph the same in the presence of the appellant from whom the alleged item was
confiscated.

ISSUE
Whether the prosecution failed to establish a continuous and unbroken chain of custody of
the seized illegal drug leading to a lack of integrity of the evidence in view of the police
officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.

RULING
Yes.
The court held that “the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in
reality it is not, ‘as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.’” As such,
what is of utmost importance “is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
Here, the Court finds it exceedingly difficult to believe that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the drug have been properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The
inexplicable failure of the police officers to testify as to what they did with the alleged drug
while in their respective possession resulted in a breach or break in the chain of custody of
the drug. In some cases, the Court declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the
31
testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of the
shabu plus the irregular manner which plagued the handling of the evidence before the
same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the government to obtain a
successful prosecution in a drug-related case.

32
5. Dela Cruz v. People, July 23, 2014
FACTS
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas.

The NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido that Ariel, the
live-in partner of Corazon and Charito was picked up by unknown male persons believed
to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the
complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed
to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police
office, they met "James" who demanded from them P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in
exchange for the release of Ariel. The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the
text messages received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement
an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen.
Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for
drug testing.

It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) . The version of the
defense stated otherwise, petitioner claims that when he is in the NBI Office, he was
required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be
done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His
request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to
the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.

Ruling of the RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision4 dated 6 June 2007,
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A.
9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of
not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug
Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.

Ruling of the CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE
WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is illegal and does it violate the
petitioner right against self-incrimination

RULING
Yes.
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We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by
the CA, erroneous on three counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. To make the
provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under
Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here
was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The constitutional
right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination
is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act.

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation." The drug test was a violation of
petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that
petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a
lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts
proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under
those circumstances. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22
June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012
issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED. SO ORDERED.

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6. People v. Morilla, February 5, 2014
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since
it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks
containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive
or knowledge.

FACTS
Mayor Ronnie Mitra (Panukulan, Quezon) and Javier Morilla were caught in flagrante
delicto while transporting shabu on board a Starex van (driven by Mayor) and an
ambulance (driven by Morilla). On a checkpoint at Real, Infanta Quezon, the Starex van
was able to pass; however, police officers ordered the ambulance to stop. Policemen then
ordered Morilla to open the rear door of the car for inspection of several sacks which
according to Morilla are narra wooden tiles. The contents turned to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride and this discovery prompted police officers to chase the Starex van. They
were able to stop Mayor Mitra and asked him of his knowledge of Morilla driving the
ambulance loaded with shabu. On plain view, operatives noticed that his van was also
loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Taken together, they carry a total
of approximately 503.68 kilos of shabu.
On trial, both accused argued that they have no knowledge of the contents of the vehicle.
Morilla further alleged that he only acted based on the instructions of the Mayor and
hence, cannot be imputed to be a member of the alleged organized/ syndicated group as
the Information alleged him to be. Trial court found conspiracy between Morilla and Mitra
holding that they have the common intent to transport illegal drugs.

ISSUE
Is there a conspiracy to commit the offense charged?

RULING
Yes.
The court held that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Article 8, RPC). To
determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.
Here, the court held that the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that
Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs.
If indeed he was not involved in a conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told
the police officers that he was with the mayor.   The very act of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense
under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs
need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

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7. People v. Laylo, July 6, 2011
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Where the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves as cops and
immediately arrested the accused and his live-in partner, the sale was not consummated
but merely attempted.

FACTS
From the testimonies given, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-
buyers in the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance
contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic
sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court.
Even the consideration of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to
the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced
themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal.
Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged
with attempted sale of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Decision of RTC in
convicting appellant of attempted sale of dangerous drugs.

RULING
Yes.
Here, the court held that where the sale was interrupted when the police officers
introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested the accused and his live-in
partner, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted.

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8. People v. Batoon, November 24, 2010
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must
be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to
exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared
with another.

FACTS
Drugs seized from appellants were properly identified before the trial court. As correctly
appreciated by the trial and appellate courts, a legitimate buy-bust operation led to the
arrest of accused-appellants. During the police operation, PO2 Vicente received from
Melchor a sachet containing the drugs. On the other hand, PO1 Cabotaje seized from Teddy
three sachets, also containing drugs. PO2 Vicente and PO1 Cabotaje marked and separately
prepared the certification of the seized items. Thereafter, they personally turned over the
items to the crime laboratory for examination. The police chemist, P/Insp. Laya II, tested
the marked sachets, which turned out positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Finally, during trial, the same marked sachets were identified by PO2 Vicente and PO1
Cabotaje.
In this case, although the three sachets containing shabu were found solely in the
possession of Teddy, it was evident that Melchor had knowledge of its existence. Moreover,
as correctly found by the CA, Melchor had easy access to the shabu, because they conspired
to engage in the illegal business of drugs.

ISSUE
Is Exclusive possession or control necessary in illegal possession of dangerous drugs?

RULING
No.
The court held that for conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the
following elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an
object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the
drug. Possession under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession
or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug
is under dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is
not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and
dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another. Thus,
conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-
exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be
37
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the
drug.
Here, the court held that since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of
the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same
way may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over
which the accused has control or dominion or within such premises in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation.”

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9. People v. Barba, July 23, 2009
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.

FACTS
The illegal drugs were seized from Barba, PO2 Rabina marked the plastic sachets with his
initials. PO1 Almacen marked the tooter in the same manner. The seized aluminum foil was
marked “AA,” presumably after PO2 Arnulfo Aguillon but there is no testimony on this.
Once at the police station, the drugs and paraphernalia were then made the subject of a
Request for Examination issued by Inspector Bauto. The specimens were then turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office where Forensic Chemist Jabonillo made his conclusion
that the sachets and the aluminum foil contained shabu. During trial, he testified that the
specimen he examined was the same one he brought to the court. Exhibit “G” or Chemistry
Report No. D-086-2003 was also presented as evidence to show that the seized items were
positive for dangerous drugs.

ISSUE
Is the chain of custody presented by the prosecution complete?

RULING
No.
The court held that e prohibited drug is an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of
possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug; proof of its identity, existence, and
presentation in court are crucial. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent
doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established
with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are
present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of
certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
Here, the court held that the chain of custody presented by the prosecution in this case
suffers from incompleteness. Pieced together, the prosecution’s evidence, however, does
not supply all the links needed in the chain of custody rule. The records do not tell us what
happened after the seized items were brought to the police station and after these were
tested at the forensic laboratory. Doubt is now formed as to the integrity of the evidence.

39