Tactical Planning B2B2367 / B2B2487 Student Handout

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
THE BASIC SCHOOL

MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND
CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
TACTICAL PLANNING
B2B2367 / B2B2487
STUDENT HANDOUT
Basic Officer Course

B2B2367 / B2B2487 Tactical Planning Process
Tactical Planning
Introduction and Success in combat is reflective of a leader’s ability to make

Importance tactically sound decisions in a time constrained and ever-
changing environment. Success in this time compressed
environment is based on the ability for our leaders to
conduct detailed analysis (analytical decision making) of the
complex information prior to entering that environment.
Only with the application of that analysis as a foundation,
will the leader be able to apply the continuous analysis
(recognitional decision making) necessary to make
tactically sound decisions in the time compressed
environment. As a leader, you must be familiar with the
Troop-Leading Steps and the associated analysis that
occurs to facilitate orders creation. The analysis is critical
to overall mission accomplishment. It shapes the
development of a tactically sound plan, communicated in
the combat orders format, and shapes your decision-
making process during mission execution. The process
taught at The Basic School is lock-step only in sequence;
the depth and detail by which the analysis is conducted is
based on time and available information. Leaders must
understand the application of the analysis to the Marine
Corps planning in order to successfully modify the process
without adversely affecting mission success.
Prerequisites MCDP 1 Warfighting, introduced you to the nature of war

which is inherently violent and chaotic, which we mitigate
through clear communication of intent and simple plans. It
discussed maneuver warfare, the theory of which is to strike
the enemy’s critical vulnerability (the decisive time and
place) with massed fires to bend the enemy to our will.
In Tactical Fundamentals, you learned in depth the Nine

Principles of War and the Six Tactical Tenets; evaluative
concepts that operate congruently to your tactical planning.
In Decision Making, you learned the importance of

decisiveness in a time compressed environment, and how
that relates to maneuver warfare. This was illustrated by
the Boyd Cycle (OODA Loop) in which maneuver in time is
achieved through an increased tempo of action. You also
learned that as a leader and a Warfighter, you must be
comfortable with making reasonable assumptions,
supported by fact, to drive your operations. The ability to
do this was defined by the “70% Solution.” You learned the
difference between analytical decision making and
recognitional decision making. In this lesson we focus on
analytical decision making.
2 Basic Officer Course

Tactical Planning (Continued)
In This Lesson We will discuss the six Troop-Leading Steps (BAMCIS), the
Tactical Planning Process, and its relation to your mission
planning.
Student Requirements For Tac Planning I Class: Read part one of this handout.
Tac Planning II Class: Read part two of this handout.
This lesson covers the following topics:
Topic Page
Part One
Six Troop-Leading Steps (BAMCIS) 5
Tactical Thought Process 7
Part Two
Review of Part One 11
Begin Planning: METT-TC 12
Begin Planning: EMLCOA 19
Begin Planning: EXP 20
Begin Planning: SOM, FSP, Tasks 21
Arrange for Reconnaissance, Make Reconn. 22
Complete the Plan 22
Issue the Order 23
Supervise 23
Summary 23
References 23
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 24
Notes 24
Appndx A: Tact Thought Process & Order 26
Learning Objectives Terminal Learning Objective
MCCS-LDR-2101. Given a mission and commander’s

intent, apply the troop leading steps to accomplish the
mission.
Enabling Learning Objectives
MCCS-LDR-2101a. Without the aid of references, describe

the troop leading steps without omission.
MCCS-OFF-2102l. Given a mission and commander’s

intent, develop a mental estimate of the situation using
METT-TC to accomplish the mission.

0300-PAT-2002b. Given an order from higher and a mental

estimate of the situation, determine the enemy's most likely
course of action (EMLCOA), to develop a scheme of
maneuver.
0300-PAT-2002e. Given an order from higher and a mental

estimate of the situation, determine the friendly situation to
develop a scheme of maneuver.
0300-PAT-2002f. Given an order from higher and a mental

estimate of the situation, develop a mission statement to
accomplish the mission.
0300-PAT-2002g. Given an order from higher and a mental

estimate of the situation, develop a commander's intent to
0300-PAT-2002h. Given an order from higher and a mental

estimate of the situation, develop a scheme of maneuver to

B2B2367 - TACTICAL PLANNING - PART ONE
Six Troop Leading Steps (BAMCIS)
In layman’s terms, planning is easy to conceptualize. In the civilian world when given a
task to do by your boss, provided the time was available, you would in general terms:
1. Determine what needs to get done to complete the task and what information you need to
complete the task. During this time you may develop questions, pertaining to completing
the task, for which you do not have the answer. To continue planning how to complete
your task, some of those questions will be deliberately answered by assumptions you
make. For others that do not impede your planning, you will seek to answer later when
you gain more information. You will emerge with an initial plan to complete the task.
2. To validate your initial plan, you would identify where to find additional information that
will aid in you completing your task. You may identify the internet, library, or subject
matter experts as sources of information that will either answer the questions you still
have after your initial plan, and/or prove your assumptions made during your planning.
You would then build a research plan to execute.
3. To execute your research, you would focus on the source of information that would
provide you the most effective answers to your questions. Once you have answered the
questions raised during your initial plan, you would compile the information and look to
finalize your plan.
4. In finalizing your plan, you would revisit your initial plan, armed now with the answers to
the questions you identified earlier. This would allow you to build an operable plan to
execute the task.
5. To start acting on your plan, you brief those who work for you on what needs to get
done, how the job will get done, and who will do what to complete that job.
6. Finally, you would watch your workers in the execution of their part of the task to ensure
that the job is done correctly.
The process is the same when we discuss planning at the tactical level in the Marine
Corps, we have simply standardized that process with the Six Troop Leading Steps.
(Begin Planning, Arrange for Reconnaissance, Make Reconnaissance, Complete the
Plan, Issue the Order, and Supervise [BAMCIS]) BAMCIS is a sequence of events
which tactical unit leaders use to plan most tactical operations. The troop-leading steps
are a tool meant to aid leaders in making tactically sound decisions, formulate plans,
coherently communicate those plans, and turn those decisions into action. BAMCIS
would be employed when you receive a job (aka. mission) from your boss (aka. higher
command).

Six Troop Leading Steps (BAMCIS) (Continued)
Begin Planning The receipt of a mission triggers the BAMCIS cycle. To

make effective use of available time, the leader issues a
Warning Order (an abbreviated set of instructions to inform
of an impending action) to his subordinates; this allows his
subordinates to execute the Warning Order while the leader
conducts a detailed analysis, which we call the Tactical
Thought Process (described below). Here, unit leaders will
develop questions and therefore will have to make
assumptions about the enemy to continue planning. The
level of risk the leader will have to assume is directly related
to the depth of analysis they perform during the Tactical
Thought Process. At the end of this step, you will emerge
with an initial plan that you expect to execute, pending the
answers to your questions, and the validation of the
assumptions you made about the enemy. To begin
answering these questions you will move to Arrange for
Reconnaissance.
Arrange for Based on the detailed analysis (Tactical Thought Process)

Reconnaissance performed during Begin the Planning, the leader must ask,
“What information am I lacking in order to achieve
success?” To get this information to further mitigate risk
assumed during the Tactical Thought Process, the leader
must arrange for a reconnaissance of the enemy and
terrain. First, the commander must determine the most
effective means of available reconnaissance. Frequently,
this is a physical reconnaissance in which the commander
visits the ground on which he will fight. Second, the
commander must determine his priority of reconnaissance,
or what order he will try to fulfill the information gaps. The
first priority must be the gaps regarding the enemy;
focusing on confirming or denying any assumptions made
about his location, orientation, or current tactical activity.
The second priority is to identify elements of the friendly
SOM such as the route, assault position, or defensive
positions. Finally, the leader must determine which
subordinate leaders will accompany them during the
collection of information. The personnel will vary according
to the tactical situation, but the leader should take only as
many subordinate leaders as necessary, while others
remain behind to supervise mission preparation.

Six Troop Leading Steps (BAMCIS) (Continued)
Make Reconnaissance The commander now acts to answer his questions and
validate any assumptions based on his priorities of
reconnaissance and the time available. Every effort must
be made to conduct a physical reconnaissance of the
enemy. This means “eyes on the enemy” must be the
focus. In addition to a physical recon, the commander
should also look to use other assets (imagery, air
reconnaissance, etc) available to help fill information gaps.
The reconnaissance is only successful if it answers those
questions needed to successfully accomplish the mission.
Complete the Plan The unit leader must now take the information gained
during the reconnaissance and validate his initial plan made
during Begin the Planning. This is done by conducting the
Tactical Thought Process again, now armed with the
answers to our questions. This analysis must be conducted
again to ensure necessary changes are ultimately reflected
in our plan to our subordinates. A common problem occurs
when leaders receive updated information that conflicts with
their previous analysis or established plan, but fail to update
their METT-TC or amend their scheme of maneuver. Do
not fall in love with your plan. At the conclusion of your
second conduct of the Tactical Thought Process, you will
write an order (Five Paragraph Order) to communicate to
your subordinates.
Issue the order Here, leaders verbally communicate their analysis and
scheme of maneuver using proper order-issuing
techniques. Without coherent communication, the leader’s
decisions will never successfully be turned into action.
Supervise The leader ensures compliance with the details of his plan
until the mission is accomplished. This includes the
timeline the commander set forth (non-negotiable), the
mission rehearsals defined (as combat realistic as
possible), the inspections (PCCs and PCIs) of personnel
prior to execution, and the complete execution of the
mission. Delegation to subordinate unit leaders is utilized,
however check, do not assume, that your plan is being
executed by subordinates to your standards.

Tactical Thought Process
The Tactical Thought Process, through its sequence, applies analysis to the
development of a tactically sound plan that ultimately counters the enemy’s course of
action. The process begins with a detailed analysis of the situation, or Estimate of the
Situation (METT-TC). Using the details of that estimate, the leader determines the
Enemy’s Most Likely Course Of Action (EMLCOA). Related to the EMLCOA, the
commander identifies: the key strength of the enemy; the enemy’s key weakness or
gap associated with the identified key strength; and the best way to strike this weakness
known as the Exploitation Plan (EXP). The Exploitation Plan determines the
development of the Scheme Of Maneuver (SOM), a Fire Support Plan (FSP) that
supports the SOM, and Tasks given to subordinates to execute the SOM. The below
flow chart that reflects the Tactical Planning Process. Its relation to the orders process
is graphically displayed in Appendix A of this handout.
METT-TC Æ EMLCOA Æ EXPÆ SOM Æ FSP Æ Tasks
Estimate of the The key is for the leader to conduct a detailed analysis to
Situation (METT-TC) mitigate risk, and drive decisions that allow him to develop
the most tactically sound plan. First, the leader must
understand the specified and implied tasks of the mission
Mission Analysis issued to him by higher (Mission Analysis). A specified task
Enemy Analysis is a task explicitly given to the commander from higher. An
Troops and Fire Support implied task is a task not explicitly given, but is a task that
Available must be done to complete the mission. (For example, your
Terrain Analysis mission is: At 2100 brush your teeth in order to prevent
Time Analysis cavities. The specified task is to brush your teeth at 2100.
Civilian Considerations A related implied task would be put toothpaste on your
toothbrush.) Second, he must look at the enemy’s combat
power and the conditions under which he can employ those
assets to achieve a desired endstate (Enemy Analysis).
Third, he looks at the effects of Observation, Cover and
Concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain, Avenues of
approach, and Weather (OCOKA-W) on possible friendly
and enemy SOMs (Terrain and Weather Analysis). Fourth,
he must understand the combat power he brings to the fight
within his own unit, and how adjacent and supporting units
will support or impede mission success (Troops and Fire
Support Available). Fifth, the leader must identify the time
available for each phase of the mission, time constraints
and restraints from higher, time/space considerations for
enemy and friendly movement, logistics required, as well as
gaps (Time/Space/Logistics Analysis). [“C” stands for
Civilian considerations. For simplicity at this time, we will
skip or “grey out” this step until later in your officer
development.

Tactical Thought Process (Continued)
EMLCOA Based on your understanding of the situation through the

detailed analysis (METT-TC), turn the map around and ask
yourself, “What would I do if I were the enemy?” What is
his mission? What are the effects of your analysis (terrain,
weather, time, etc) on the enemy? The sum of this analysis
is your prediction of the Enemy’s Most Likely Course Of
Action (EMLCOA) or enemy SOM. The detail required for
an EMLCOA is based on the tactical situation. However,
there are two things that must be considered when
developing the EMLCOA. First, is the enemy’s current
tactical activity, which includes patrolling, location and
orientation of crew-served weapons, composition and
orientation of his engagement area, LP/Ops, etc. Second,
are the enemy’s actions on contact; how he will react when
we impose our combat power on him.

EXP As learned in MCDP-1 Warfighting, we aim to gain an

advantage over the enemy through exploitation of
vulnerability. Commanders seek to avoid surfaces
(strengths) and exploit gaps (weaknesses) to gain an unfair
advantage during combat operations. The careful
consideration of enemy key strengths and weaknesses is a
critical aspect of scheme of maneuver development.
The enemy’s key strength is that element or capability

which allows the enemy to execute his mission or scheme
of maneuver successfully. The enemy typically has many
strengths, so at the platoon level we must focus our
planning on one. The key strength is critical to the enemy
successfully executing his EMLCOA.
Next, consideration must be given to a key enemy

weakness or vulnerability which can be exploited. Ideally, a
key weakness is one against which combat power can be
applied to avoid the enemy’s key strength or even render it
ineffectual. Again, the enemy likely has many identifiable
weaknesses, so we must focus our intent on the one key
weakness that will render the key strength ineffective.
The key strength and weakness analysis is critical to the

development of a plan that directly counters the EMLCOA.
If the weakness is not targetable at the leader’s level, or the
strength is not directly tied to the EMLCOA, his plan will not
successfully counter the enemy.
The commander must now decide what method he plans to

use to directly target the enemy’s key weakness. The
Exploitation Plan (EXP) may be a Form of Maneuver or a
method of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
employment. For instance, if the Enemy’s weakness is his
fixed unprotected flank, then a likely exploitation plan may
be to conduct a flanking attack. If his weakness is his
inability to integrate fires within his engagement area, then
a likely exploitation plan may be the employment of
combined arms. Whatever the method of targeting, it will
drive the rest of the commander’s planning process, as
every element of his SOM will be combined and
coordinated in order to achieve the exploitation plan.

SOM Development Keeping in mind the nine Principles of War and the six
Tactical Tenets, the commander now develops a plan for
their combat power to achieving the Exploitation Plan. This
is known as the Scheme Of Maneuver (SOM). In this way,
the Exploitation Plan is used to achieve unity of effort when
developing the SOM. For instance, a commander may
decide the Exploitation Plan is to conduct a flanking attack
while maintaining surprise with the direction of assault. The
detailed execution might be to offset the support-by-fire
position 90 degrees from the direction of assault, making
the enemy think they are being attacked from a completely
different direction. The commander’s SOM must focus on
integrating all subordinate (organic and attached) elements
within their respective capabilities to achieve the
Exploitation Plan.
FSP Development Based on the leader’s analysis of his supporting assets in

the METT-TC, he must now identify how to integrate those
assets into his plan. The Fire Support Plan (FSP) must be
developed following SOM development because the fire
support assets must be integrated to directly support the
SOM.
Task Development The leader must succinctly and effectively communicate the
task that his subordinate elements MUST accomplish to
allow the mission to be a success. They are developed to
execute the SOM. The commander must utilize
standard language to ensure that the correct action is
taken. This standardized language is known as a
Tactical Task.
This concludes Part One of Tactical Planning. The intent is that you have an
introduction to how tactical commanders in the Marine Corps think when developing
their plan. You now have a basic knowledge of BAMCIS and the Tactical Thought
Process that will allow you to better understand your upcoming instruction on Combat
Orders.
Before continuing on to Part Two of this handout, read your Combat Orders
student handout.

B2B2487 - TACTICAL PLANNING - PART TWO
Introduction
To summarize what was covered in Tactical Planning – Part One, planning at the
tactical level is diagramed below:
We also defined the Tactical Thought Process as:
METT-TC > EMLCOA > EXP > SOM > FSP > Tasks
In Tactical Planning – Part Two, we will look at the process in detail, now that you have
an understanding of the Combat Order.

Begin Planning: Tactical Thought Process: METT-TC
METT-TC is a tool helpful to a decision-maker, as its elements are a reminder of the

factors that need to be considered in order for the tactical planning process to be
successful, and ultimately counter the enemy’s actions. While much of the information
can be derived from higher’s order, the process is an analysis of that information, not
simply regurgitation. An estimate of the situation is conducted in as much detail as time
allows prior to the mission, but the process is executed as often as the situation
changes throughout execution. Detailed analysis in the initial tactical thought process
will increase the speed and accuracy of decisions as the situation changes at the point
of friction.
Mission Analysis The first step in the estimate is mission analysis. It is

the means for the unit leader to gain an understanding
of the mission. The information used in this analysis is
taken directly from: higher’s tasking statement to you,
higher’s mission and intent, higher’s scheme of
maneuver, and higher’s Coordinating Instructions.
During your analysis, it is important to think two-levels
higher, meaning if you are a platoon commander, your
analysis must take into consideration how your mission
integrates with the company, and how the company’s
mission integrates with the battalion.
• Task Analysis: Each mission statement contains

specified tasks. The unit leader must understand
not only those explicitly stated tasks, but the
implications of those tasks required for the success
of the mission. The commander must analyze his
unit’s specified tasks, the purpose of the mission,
and higher’s coordinating instructions to identify all
the implied tasks
• Purpose Analysis: An understanding of ‘why’ a
commander is conducting the mission will have a
direct impact on the development of implied tasks.
These implied tasks may drive or restrict friendly
action. For instance, they may drive fire support
control measures, elements of a timeline, signal
plan, or other coordinating instructions.
Understanding the purpose will ultimately allow the
commander to make adjustments to his plan as the
situation changes while still accomplishing the
mission.

Begin Planning: Tactical Thought Process: METT-TC (Continued)

Enemy Forces The objective of an analysis of the enemy situation is to
understand how the enemy will use each element of his
combat power. Its development comes from many
sources including enemy doctrine, current enemy
activities indicated in higher’s order, adjacent units who
have previously operated in the area, or the intelligence
section. The commander must know what information
is valid from each of these sources regarding their
specific enemy and the relationship they have with a
higher or adjacent enemy. The information used to
analyze the enemy situation includes the following:
• Composition, Disposition, Strengths: Typically

this is identified in the most general terms by
Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, and
Equipment (SALUTE). In raw terms, these are
generally facts that we know about the enemy.
They are usually identified by higher. In
conducting this part of the enemy analysis, we
need to make sure we focus primarily on the
enemy we are tasked with encountering. We
must not however ignore how our piece of the
enemy relates to the greater enemy threat two-
levels higher. Finally, make sure you are
analyzing the facts. For example, simply stating
“the enemy has AK-47s and RPG’s” lacks
analysis. However stating “the enemy has AK-
47s capable of accurate fires at 400 meters, and
RPG-7’s capable of accurate fires at 300 meters”
is far more meaningful during your analysis.
• Capabilities and Limitations. Answers the
question, “Under what conditions can the
enemy…?” The information and initial analysis
conducted during Composition, Disposition, and
Strength is further examined to determine the
enemy’s ability to conduct operations against our
unit. The enemy’s force is analyzed concerning
its ability to or inability to conduct various
operations against your unit. Commonly we
determine under what specific conditions does
the enemy have the ability or inability to Defend,
Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, or Delay (DRAW-
D)? Here is where we begin to make our first
assumptions about the enemy based on the
facts at hand.

Enemy Forces The acronym DRAW-D serves only as a reminder

(Continued) of the minimum factors to be considered. For
example, maybe the enemy is only capable of
attacking at night, or attacking units of like size or
smaller. Examples of some questions asked
during the capabilities and limitations analysis
are: How does the composition and disposition of
say, the enemy defense, affect his ability to
defend? Under what conditions will he call for or
be reinforced? How long will it take? How large
will the reinforcing element be? What conditions
will limit the reinforcement? Can it be done during
the day or only at night? Is it a vehicular
transported reinforcement force or will it be
traveling on foot? Where and how will the enemy
withdraw? Remember, the initial assumptions
you are making about the enemy now will be
supported by the rest of the METT-TC
components and will be the basis of your
prediction of the enemy’s action, or EMLCOA.
Terrain and Weather The analysis of terrain and weather must always be
Analysis (OCOKA-W) conducted from the friendly and enemy perspectives.
The enemy perspective is arguably the more important
of the two because you will use this info in conjunction
with your enemy analysis to support your estimate of
the EMLCOA. This is not simply a regurgitation of
existing terrain and current weather conditions but
rather an analysis of the effects of the five military
aspects of terrain and weather. Certain situations may
elevate one element of OCOKA-W (Observation, Cover
and Concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain, Avenues of
approach, and Weather) to a level of importance above
that of one or more of the remaining elements. The
information to be analyzed may come from among the
following: higher’s orientation, the commander’s map
reconnaissance, physical reconnaissance, or
intelligence section. While this analysis will affect
almost every aspect of the commander’s mission, the
resulting product will be briefed in the orientation
paragraph of the operations order.

Terrain and Weather • Observation and fields of fire. Observation is

Analysis (Continued) the influence of terrain on visual recon and target
acquisition. What can be seen or not seen from
where? Fields of fire are the influence of terrain on
the effects of weapons systems. Both are important
in determining how the enemy can identify and
engage you and vice versa.
• Cover and concealment. Cover is protection
from the effects of fires. Concealment is protection
from observation or target acquisition. The analysis
of cover and concealment is often related to the
consideration of observation and fields of fire.
Again, both enemy and friendly aspects must be
considered.
• Obstacles. Obstacles are any natural or man-
made obstructions that canalize, delay, restrict, or
divert the maneuver or movement of a force. It is
important not just to identify the obstacles, but to
understand what effect they will have on the friendly
and enemy SOM.
• Key terrain. Key terrain is any area whose
seizure, retention, or control affords a marked
tactical advantage to either combatant. Key terrain
does not need to be occupied to be controlled, but it
must have the potential to affect mission success for
either combatant.
• Avenues of approach are movement routes to
an objective. A viable avenue of approach usually
offers mobility corridors. These are areas within the
avenue of approach that permit movement and
maneuver. They permit friendly and enemy forces to
advance or withdraw and to capitalize on the
principles of mass, momentum, shock, and speed.
When friendly forces are attacking, friendly avenues
of approach to the objective must be identified.
Enemy avenues of approach that could affect
friendly movement — i.e., counterattack avenues —
must be identified.


(Continued)
Terrain and Weather • Weather. Weather is analyzed using the five
Analysis (Continued) military aspects of weather: temperature/humidity,
precipitation, wind, clouds, and visibility (day and
night). How will these elements influence the
operations of each combatant? To determine its
cumulative effect on the operation, weather must be
considered in conjunction with the associated
terrain. Weather affects equipment (including
electronic and optical), terrain (traffic-ability), and
visibility. Inclement weather affects visibility, rates of
movement, routes of movement, unit efficiency and
morale, and makes command and control more
difficult. Poor weather conditions can be as much of
an advantage as a disadvantage to a unit,
depending upon the unit’s capabilities, equipment,
and training.


(Continued)
Troops and Fire In the same way we analyze what the enemy brings to
Support Available the fight and how he has the capability to use it, a unit
leader must also understand the Marines and assets and
their capabilities that are brought to the fight. The unit
leader must also consider the mental and physical
condition of the Marines, their level of training, the status
of their equipment, and fire support assets. Some of this
information can be found in higher’s friendly situation
and tasking statements.
• Organic. Identify the capabilities and limitations of

the assets your organic unit will bring to bear on the
enemy during the conduct of the mission. Organic
to your unit means it is part of your de facto task
organization.
• Attachments and Detachments. Identify what
units/assets have been attached to your unit, and
what assets you will detach from your unit. How will
they affect your ability to achieve mission success?
• Fire Support Available. Identify locations, azimuths
of fire, contact information, employment, and any
priority of fires of indirect fire support agencies.
What are the effects of the supporting units location
on your ability to employ its’ assets? What are the
effects of their priority of fires on the same? Identify
any available air assets. What weapons will they
bring to the fight? What are the capabilities of their
fires? When and how long are they on station?
• Higher and Adjacent Units. Identify higher and
adjacent units’ SOM and what influence they will
have on your SOM. Consider effects on geometries
of fire, reinforcement, and contingency plans.


(Continued)
Time/Space/Logistics The ability to appreciate the aspects and effects of time
and space is one of the most important qualities in a
leader. A leader must also be able to identify resource
short-falls and have a plan to rectify them.
• Time. A solid understanding of time required versus

time available is vital to all operations; it drives
planning and execution. The unit leader must first
identify constraints and restraints which are often
given by higher. Reverse planning is the method by
which leaders should identify realistic timelines to
complete each task that is required for mission
success. Together with the time constraints, an
accurate timeline can be developed and supervised
that will uphold and drive the assigned mission.
Critical times can include planning time, LD time,
movement time, realistic times to fill logistic
shortfalls, defend-no-later-than time, time available
to prepare and rehearse the attack or defense, and
time available for reconnaissance. Whenever
possible, unit leaders should use the One-Thirds,
Two-Thirds Rule when building the time-line. This
is the idea that the leader devotes 1/3 of the
available time to those tasks he must directly
supervise, leaving 2/3 of the time to his subordinate
leaders to accomplish tasks of which he does not
need to have direct supervision.
• Space. A leader must know and understand his
Area of Operation (AO). Identify Tactical Control
Measures (TCM), Fire Support Coordination
Measures (FSCM), and Airspace Control Measures
(ACM) within your AO as applicable. Develop a
plan to deconflict converging forces and geometry
of fires.
• Logistics. Logistics sustains operations. Without
appropriate logistical planning, units will reach their
culminating point before ever reaching a decisive
point. A leader must be able to identify the required
resources in order to accomplish the mission from
crossing the LD through consolidation; then identify
shortfalls. A realistic plan to fulfill those shortfalls
must be formulated, prioritized, and built into the
timeline before departure.

Begin the Planning: Tactical Thought Process: EMLCOA

Now that we have completed our Estimate of the Situation (METT-TC), we analyze all
aspects of our estimate to develop our comprehensive assumption of the enemy, the
Enemy’s Most Likely Course Of Action (EMLCOA). As stated above, taking all we know
and estimate about the situation, in the EMLCOA we predict what the enemy’s scheme
of maneuver will be. There are two components to the EMLCOA: what the enemy is
doing now, and what the enemy will do on contact.
What the enemy is doing now is best summarized within our tactical tasks (they are
listed in your Platoon Commander Notebook). For example, if the enemy is in a
defensive position, what is the enemy attempting to accomplish? Block? Delay?
Disrupt? While the focus needs to be on the enemy at your level, in determining the
enemy’s mission, ensure you are thinking about your enemy’s relation to the enemy
two-levels up. For example if you are a platoon commander, how does the enemy you
are facing integrate with the enemy the company and the battalion are facing.
Meaningful detail in this regard is key as the EMLCOA is the key factor that will
determine your scheme of maneuver. Meaningful detail assumes that the detail
added is of impact to the mission at hand. Do not add useless or faulty assumptions
as they will have negative effects on your scheme of maneuver development.
Once we engage the enemy, the enemy’s action will change, hence we must define
what the enemy will do on contact. This will influence our scheme of maneuver in
two ways. First, when we analyze the enemy’s key weakness and determine our
exploitation plan, we will seek to build a scheme of maneuver that counters both what
the enemy is doing now and what they will do on contact. For example, we assume the
enemy is in a defensive blocking position. We also determine that the enemy’s western
and northern flanks are exposed. Finally we assume that on contact, the enemy will
withdraw north. Therefore we may opt to flank the enemy from the northwest to not only
defeat what the enemy is doing now, but to also defeat what the enemy will do on
contact.
Remember, all aspects of METT-TC influence the EMLCOA. The enemy’s composition,
disposition, strengths, capabilities, and limitations, the terrain and weather, and their
knowledge of your troops and fire support available will influence what they are doing
now. Add your mission, your troops and fire support, the time, space, and logistics, and
the terrain and weather to your analysis and you will determine what the enemy will do
on contact.

Begin the Planning: Tactical Thought Process: EXP

Having determined what we believe the EMLCOA (aka. Enemy SOM), we can now
analyze the enemy’s key strength, key weakness, and our Exploitation Plan (EXP) of
the enemy’s weakness.
As Marines, we fight maneuver warfare, and therefore we avoid striking surfaces and
conducting attrition-type warfare. The enemy has several surfaces, but we must commit
our focus to one key strength. When we look at the enemy’s strength, we must do it
within the confines of the EMLCOA. For example, we estimate the EMLCOA is a
defense to block south where they can mass effective fires in an area where they
expect us to approach from. The key strength in this case may be the enemy’s ability to
mass fires to the south along a particular avenue of approach. In this regard we are
“nesting” our enemy’s key strength with the EMLCOA. A poor example would be a
strength of the enemy’s ability to rapidly withdraw north and reinforce an adjacent force.
Note how this surface has no linkage to our original EMLCOA. If the enemy is in a
defense to block, then rapid withdrawal and reinforcement would be a “last resort”
action and has no bearing on the enemy’s ability to block. Remember, the key
strength is the element or capability that allows the enemy to accomplish your
prediction of their SOM (EMLCOA).
The enemy’s key strength will have a corresponding weakness. When struck, the key
weakness renders the enemy’s key strength ineffective, without having to strike the
strength directly. The enemy’s key strength and weakness must be “nested” or linked
with the EMLCOA we have determined. Continuing the above example, the enemy’s
strength might be his ability to mass fires south; the enemy’s weakness might be his
poorly defended left flank open to attack. Note the weakness is nested within the
strength and the EMLCOA. A poor example would be the enemy’s lack of indirect fire.
In this case, the weakness directly contradicts the strength of ability to mass fires south.
Another poor example might be the enemy’s lack of rest. While the enemy may very
well be lacking sleep, unless you can infiltrate up to his position undetected, this
weakness is difficult to exploit and would not necessarily render the key strength
ineffective.
At this point, you must define not only the key strength, but also what it allows the
enemy to do. For example, “well dug-in positions” is incomplete and lacks analysis. A
key strength of “well dug-in positions allowing the enemy to mass fires from cover and
concealment” is far more pertinent. Similarly a weakness of “small size” is also
incomplete. A key weakness of “as a result of the enemy’s small size, they lack the
manpower to protect their left flank” is far more informative.
Finally, your exploitation plan is your succinct and overarching plan to exploit the key
weakness of the enemy. For example, if the enemy’s strength is their dug in positions
allowing them to mass fires to the south along the high speed avenue of approach, and
the weakness is as a result of their small size, the enemy lacks the manpower to protect
their left flank, then a reasonable and nested exploitation plan might be a flanking attack
on the enemy’s left flank with supporting direct and indirect fires fixing the enemy’s
position.

Begin the Planning: Tactical Thought Process: EXP

(Continued)
Once you have completed your EXP analysis, go backwards through the Tactical
Thought Process. So: METT-TC > EMLCOA > EXP made sense as you did the
analysis, but if you went EXP > EMLCOA > METT-TC does your analysis still make
sense? If so, you can be assured that so far, your analysis is logical and most likely
realistic.
Begin the Planning: Tactical Thought Process: Scheme of

Maneuver
In Combat Orders you learn what the essential elements of the Scheme Of Maneuver
(SOM) are, and in general terms its relationship with the rest of the order. We will not
revisit these learning points. With regards to tactical planning, it is imperative that your
SOM is linked to the rest of the Tactical Thought Process. Your SOM is the detailed
plan you have developed to conduct your exploitation plan. Remember, we are still in
the “B” in BAMCIS, so this is your initial SOM. Once you have arranged for and made
reconnaissance, you will seek to validate your assumptions about the enemy, and
therefore your SOM.
Begin the Planning: Tactical Thought Process: Fire Support

Plan (FSP)
To support your initial SOM, you build an initial Fire Support Plan (FSP) which outlines
the supporting fires that will aid in your execution of the SOM. It is, like the rest of the
Tactical Thought Process, dependent on the analysis conducted earlier.
Begin the Planning: Tactical Thought Process: Tasks

At the conclusion of the Tactical Thought Process, we develop our tasks to our
subordinates that provide them the mission they must accomplish to allow our SOM to
be successful. In Combat Orders you learn the components of the Tasking Statements,
so we will not revisit them in this handout. A key point however is the appropriate
tactical task and purpose. The purpose is the most important part of the statement as it
allows for decentralized execution within your intent.
At the conclusion of Begin the Planning, first check the logic in your analysis by going
backwards through your Tactical Thought Process. Does your analysis make sense:
Tasks > FSP > SOM > EXP > EMLCOA > METT-TC.
Second, compile the questions you have, and the assumptions you have made, which
you will answer or validate through reconnaissance.

Arrange for Reconnaissance

At this stage in BAMCIS, you must:
1. Identify what questions you need answered and in what priority. Validating
enemy position, orientation, and activity is always the top priority.
2. Identify assets available to conduct reconnaissance.
3. Determine the most effective available means of reconnaissance. (If available, a
physical reconnaissance patrol is generally the most effective means of “getting
eyes on the enemy.”)
4. In the case of a physical reconnaissance patrol, identify the leadership you will
bring with you and build and brief a plan for the reconnaissance.
Remember, the key in this stage is to focus your reconnaissance planning on answering
your assumptions made and questions remaining concerning the enemy and ground.
Make Reconnaissance
Details concerning the conduct of arranging and conducting a reconnaissance patrol will
be instructed during your patrolling package, so we will not cover them here. The point
to be made here is, in order for reconnaissance to be effective, YOU MUST GET EYES
ON THE ENEMY; ANSWER REMAINING QUESTIONS; VALIDATE YOUR
ASSUMPTIONS.
Complete the Plan

After completing your reconnaissance, you should now have validated the assumptions
you made about the enemy and answered any questions you had at the end of your
initial plan. You can now revisit the Tactical Thought Process utilizing the new
information you have gained. Do not fall in love with your plan. If your SOM must be
changed because your EMLCOA and resulting EXP were incorrect, then change the
plan. At the conclusion you will build your five paragraph order. If done properly, the
preponderance of your order has been written through your execution of the Tactical
Thought Process. Orientation relates directly to your terrain analysis and friendly
analysis (METT-TC). Enemy situation contains your enemy Composition, Disposition,
and Strength analysis, enemy Capabilities and Limitations analysis (METT-TC), and
EMLCOA analysis. Friendly situation contains much of your Troops and Fire Support
available analysis, and higher’s mission and intent analysis (METT-TC). Your mission
contains the specified tasks identified during your mission analysis (METT-TC). Your
commander’s intent is composed of your EXP analysis, and the resulting SOM, FSP,
and Tasks have been identified. In writing your order, ensure you are providing the
meaningful detail needed for both execution of and confidence in your plan. To check
your detail, ask yourself or your senior subordinate: If I were to brief only from
orientation to my exploitation plan, would my Marines be able to predict my SOM? If the
answer is yes, you probably have the meaningful detail necessary. Finally, do not
forget the Nine Principles of War which are a useful tool to evaluate the strength of your

plan, lends rigor and focus to the purely creative aspects of tactics, and provides a
crucial link between pure theory and actual application of the Tactical Tenets.
Issue the Order

Order issuance is covered during the Combat Orders and Utilizing Terrain Models class,
so we will not revisit the concept here. The primary focus is confident, succinct, clear
communication of your plan over a terrain model that will help you paint the picture to
your subordinates. The terrain model should have not only terrain, but all the
information appropriate to show the enemy and friendly SOMs. In evaluating your
terrain model, ask yourself: If someone with a basic military knowledge approached this
terrain model, would they understand what the enemy is doing and what we are doing.
In other words, can they predict the meat of your order after looking only at the terrain
model?
Supervise
As stated previously, supervision is not limited to just the preparation for your mission.
It is supervision throughout the conduct of the operation, and the consolidation at the
end of the operation. DO NOT assume that your subordinates are executing in a
fashion that meets your standards. Failure to supervise frequently results in
mission failure.
Summary
During this lesson, we discussed the importance of leaders being able to make sound
and timely decisions based upon an accurate assessment of conditions present on an
ever-changing battlefield. We focused upon the Six Troop-Leading Steps and the role
they play in creating a streamlined process from receipt of the order to execution of the
mission. We looked at the Tactical thought Process as an analytical process that
identifies and analyzes all the elements of the situation and lends understanding to how
the situation effects the commander’s development of the Enemy’s Most Likely Course
of Action, a key strength and weakness of the enemy directly tied to the EMLCOA, and
the creation of a scheme of maneuver that directly targets the enemy’s course of action,
using the exploitation plan to achieve unity of effort focused on the enemy’s key
weakness.
References
Reference Number or Reference Title

Author
MCDP 1 Warfighting
MCDP 2 Intelligence
MCRP 3-11.1A Commander’s Tactical Handbook
MCWP 3-11.1 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon

MCRP 3-11.1B Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Weather and Terrain

MCWP 3-11.2 Marine Rifle Squad
MCRP 3-11.2A Marine Troop Leader’s Guide
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
Term or Acronym Definition or Identification

ACM Airspace Coordination Measures
ASCOPE Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and
Events
BAMCIS Begin planning, Arrange for reconnaissance, Make
reconnaissance, Complete the plan, Issue the order, and
Supervise
COA Course of Action
DRAW-D Defend, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, and Delay
EMLCOA Enemy’s most likely course of action
FSP Fire Support Plan
METT-TC Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support
available, Time/space/logistics, Civil considerations
OCOKA-W Observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key
terrain, avenues of approach, weather
PCC/PCI Pre-Combat Checks/Pre-Combat Inspections
SALUTE Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment
SOM Scheme of Maneuver
TCM Tactical Control Measures
Notes

8282367 I 8282487 Tactical Planning Process

Appendix A: Tactical Thought Process and the Combat Order
Higher’s Order Tactical Thought Process Your Order

• Orientation • Orientation
• Situation • Situation
A. Enemy METT-TC A. Enemy
B. Friendly Mission B. Friendly
1. Higher Enemy 1. Higher
a. Mission Troops & Fire Support Available a. Mission
b. Intent Terrain Weather b. Intent
2. Adjacent Time 2. Adjacent
3. Supporting Civilian Considerations 3. Supporting
C. Attach / Detach C. Attach / Detach
• Mission • Mission
• Execution • Execution
A. CI EMLCOA A. CI
B. Con Ops B. Con Ops
C. Tasks C. Tasks
D. Coord Ins EXP SOM D. Coord Ins
• Ad / Log • Ad / Log
• Comm / Sig • Comm / Sig
FSP
Tasks
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

THE BASIC SCHOOL

Basic Officer Course

Introduction and Success in combat is reflective of a leader’s ability to make

Prerequisites MCDP 1 Warfighting, introduced you to the nature of war

In Tactical Fundamentals, you learned in depth the Nine

In Decision Making, you learned the importance of

2 Basic Officer Course

Tactical Planning (Continued)

This lesson covers the following topics:

MCCS-LDR-2101. Given a mission and commander’s

Enabling Learning Objectives

MCCS-LDR-2101a. Without the aid of references, describe

MCCS-OFF-2102l. Given a mission and commander’s

3 Basic Officer Course

0300-PAT-2002b. Given an order from higher and a mental

0300-PAT-2002e. Given an order from higher and a mental

0300-PAT-2002f. Given an order from higher and a mental

0300-PAT-2002g. Given an order from higher and a mental

0300-PAT-2002h. Given an order from higher and a mental

4 Basic Officer Course

B2B2367 - TACTICAL PLANNING - PART ONE

Six Troop Leading Steps (BAMCIS)

5 Basic Officer Course

Six Troop Leading Steps (BAMCIS) (Continued)

Begin Planning The receipt of a mission triggers the BAMCIS cycle. To

Arrange for Based on the detailed analysis (Tactical Thought Process)

6 Basic Officer Course

Six Troop Leading Steps (BAMCIS) (Continued)

7 Basic Officer Course

Tactical Thought Process

METT-TC Æ EMLCOA Æ EXPÆ SOM Æ FSP Æ Tasks

8 Basic Officer Course

Tactical Thought Process (Continued)

EMLCOA Based on your understanding of the situation through the

9 Basic Officer Course

Tactical Thought Process (Continued)

EXP As learned in MCDP-1 Warfighting, we aim to gain an

The enemy’s key strength is that element or capability

Next, consideration must be given to a key enemy

The key strength and weakness analysis is critical to the

The commander must now decide what method he plans to

10 Basic Officer Course

Tactical Thought Process (Continued)

FSP Development Based on the leader’s analysis of his supporting assets in

11 Basic Officer Course

B2B2487 - TACTICAL PLANNING - PART TWO

We also defined the Tactical Thought Process as:

12 Basic Officer Course

Begin Planning: Tactical Thought Process: METT-TC

METT-TC is a tool helpful to a decision-maker, as its elements are a reminder of the

Mission Analysis The first step in the estimate is mission analysis. It is

• Task Analysis: Each mission statement contains

13 Basic Officer Course

Begin Planning: Tactical Thought Process: METT-TC (Continued)

• Composition, Disposition, Strengths: Typically

14 Basic Officer Course

Begin Planning: Tactical Thought Process: METT-TC (Continued)

Enemy Forces The acronym DRAW-D serves only as a reminder