2S PIL Case Digests

TOPIC Extradition AUTHOR #Number_Surname

CASE TITLE Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan GR NO 148571

TICKLER Extradition of Mark Jimenez DATE September 24, 2002

DOCTRINE The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition,
supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are
intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused — or the fugitive who has illegally escaped
— back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.

FACTS Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government sent to the Philippine
Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as
Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition.

The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No.
139465. Initially, the Court dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to
file a comment and supporting evidence. Eventually, upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by SOJ, the Court
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.

Then, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC
the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition
alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges in Indictment No. 99- 00281 CR-SEITZ: (1)
1. Conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses;
2. Tax evasion;
3. Wire fraud;
4. False statements; and
5. Illegal campaign contributions.

In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate
arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioner's
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing – GRANTED. The RTC set the date for hearing. Petitioner

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manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition
case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport
and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July
4, 2001.

Petitioner appealed the Order of RTC to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S (1) Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued,
and
(2) Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending.

RULING/S
1. No, Jimenez is not entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued.

Section 6 of PD 1069 provides:

SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest, Hearing, Service of Notices. —

(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in
the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any
where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice .
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to
answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the
hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."

Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan's act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify
the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of
the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from
them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing
can no longer be considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity
but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether
a warrant of arrest should be issued.

By using the phrase "if it appears,"' the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such
early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and
actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression — a prima facie finding — sufficient
to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

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It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from the records adequate for
him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be
arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and
circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition
request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents
that "probable cause" did exist.

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing
an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after
having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.

2. No, Jimenez is not entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending.

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."

As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply
to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument
to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the
trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him, not before the extradition court.

NOTES Five Postulates of Extradition

First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the
custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other.
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and
trust, each other's legal system and judicial process. More pointedly, our duly authorized representative's
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state
to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the
accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis —
in a class by itself — they are not.

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Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative
branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national
interest.
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement
in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not
flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.

Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the
petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition,
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings
are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused — or the fugitive who has illegally
escaped — back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of
the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is
determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are
necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court's request to police authorities for the arrest of the
accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the
opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make
a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to
require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If
convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history
of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community;
and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court
in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a
special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the
context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk
involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard
and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and
the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect
for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or
excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little
step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of
international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner's simple request
to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and

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escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral
justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic
contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

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