VOL.

283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 31

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.
*
G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997.

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON.
JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and
Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine
Ports Authority, petitioners,  vs.  UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance—procedural due process “refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”— Section 1 of the
Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the Constitution, viz.: SECTION 1.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x.” In order to fall
within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and
that

_______________

* EN BANC.

32

32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of

the Phils.

such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process
of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In
essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,” while
substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would
be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.” PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this
distinction.

Same; Same; As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence
of due process.—Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-
92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and the pilots
themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the
enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed
in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that “(a)s long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of
law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional
mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.”

Same;  Same;  Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the performance of
its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need
not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.—Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves
were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing.

Same;  Same;  Ships and Shipping;  Pilotage;  Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a
property right.—There is no

33

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 33

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of

the Phils.

dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner
Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of one’s
profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with,
property rights without due process.” He merely expressed the opinion that “(i)n the limited context of
this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but
merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.” As will be presently demonstrated,
such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only
unreasonable but also superfluous.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Pilotage, Defined.—Pilotage is the act of conducting a vessel

from the high seas into a port. Usually, pilotage is conducted within a two-mile area offshore to an
assigned berthing area and vice versa.

Same; Same; Same; Same; “License” and “Licensure,” Defined.—Pilotage, just like other professions,

may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is “the granting of license especially to
practice a profession.” It is also “the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in
accordance with established standards.” A license is a right or permission granted by some competent
authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.

Same; Same; Same; The license granted to harbor pilots in the form of an appointment which allows
them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of 70 years is a vested right.—Their license is
granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the
age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, “(a)ll existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain
valid up to 31 December 1992 only,” and “(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage
districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”

34
 34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of

the Phils.

Same; Same; Same; An administrative order that provides for pre-evaluation cancellation of a license

is unreasonable and constitutionally infirm—in a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.—It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots
to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they
would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for
mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation
of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso
facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of
performance” which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the
term “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Manuel E. Valenzuela and Jesus P. Amparo for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents’ right to exercise their profession and
their right to due process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On
December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA’s charter.
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of
35

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 35

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.
1 2
pilots and the pilotage profession,  the PPA promulgated PPA-AO 03-85  on March 21, 1985,
which embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots
and Pilotage Fees in Philippine 3Ports.” These rules mandate,  inter alia, that aspiring pilots
must be holders of pilot licenses  and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three
months and in the Port4 of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved
satisfactory
5
performance  that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA
itself   to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70,  unless
6
sooner removed by
reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager.  Harbor pilots in every
harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot associations which would
make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services.
In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and office
equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of
a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before
being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the
amount it paid to his predecessor. 7
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92   on
July 15, 1992, whose

_______________
1 Pilotage is the act of conducting a vessel from the high seas into a port. Usually, pilotage is conducted within a
two-mile area offshore to an assigned berthing area and vice versa.
2 Rollo, p. 87.
3  The pilot licensing function itself which used to be exercised by the Philippine Coast Guard pursuant to the

Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974 (P.D. No. 601) has been transferred to the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)
by virtue of Executive Order No. 125, which took effect on January 30, 1987.
4 Determined by an Evaluation Committee.
5 Upon the recommendation of the PPA General Manager.
6 Article IV, Section 20.
7 Rollo, p. 41.

36

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.

avowed policy was to “instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port
users through the improvement of pilotage services.” This was implemented by providing
therein that “all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the
Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and that “all
appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a
term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the
Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots
Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the
Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that “the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s
administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body.”
8
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued a Memorandum Order No. 08-92   which
laid down the criteria
9
or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.: (1)
Qualifying Factors:
10
  safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria
for Evaluation:   promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines,
number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot,
awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO
No. 04-92, but Secretary Gar-

_______________
8 Ibid., p. 42.
9  Qualifying factors are requirements which must be met before a pilot’s application for reappointment is even
evaluated by the PPA.
10 These criteria are used for evaluation by the PPA after a pilot has complied with all the requirements to qualify

for evaluation. Each criterion is assigned a certain number of points.

37
 VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 37
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.

cia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of
Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP),
reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992 the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said
administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision
over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along
with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve
the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Renato 11C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued
earlier.  He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents
and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing
Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it “to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and
conduct of pilots in any port district.”
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
“The exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of,
or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92
does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of the property rights of
those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by
limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a
rigid evaluation of the appointee’s performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in
PPA’s jurisdictional area.” (Emphasis supplied)

_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 36-40.

38

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.

Finally, as regards the alleged “absence of ample prior consultation” before the issuance of the
administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires
the PPA to consult with “relevant Government agencies.” Since the PPA Board of Directors is
composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the
Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well
as the Director-General of the National Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of
the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to
his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that
the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative
order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as  Civil12 Case No. 93-65673. On
September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment:
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:

1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA
Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null
and void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92
and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.”

_______________
12 Ibid., pp. 29-35.

39

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 39

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.

The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized
pilotage as a profession
13
and, therefore, a property right under  Callanta v. Carnation
Philippines, Inc.  Thus, abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised
would be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any
“withdrawal or alteration” of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with the
constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA
when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92;
respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From this
decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the
Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition
must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the
Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x.”

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that
there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due
process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between
matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process “refers to
the method or manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires
that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be

_______________
13 145 SCRA 268 (1986).

40
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.
14
enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”  PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this
distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and the
pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural
aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear15position in this regard,
a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that
“(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot
be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.”
In 16the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four
times  before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score,
however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard,
“which issues
17
the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots’ examinations,” was not
consulted,   the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the
Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus,
petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved 18
in the
issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need to be consulted.

_______________
14 De Leon, Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, 1991, p. 81.
15  G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997, citing  Legarda v. Court of Appeals,  G.R. No. 94457, October 16, 1997,
and Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, 322 Phil. 573.
16 Questioned twice before the DOTC, appealed to the OP, before finding affirmative relief with the RTC of Manila.
17 Rollo, p. 55.
18 Ibid., p. 163.

41

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 41

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.

Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the
validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations,
19
an administrative body need not comply with
the requirements of notice and hearing.
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of
harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested
and can only be “withdrawn or shortened” by observing the constitutional mandate of due
process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is
here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision
that “(t)he exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against
20
 20
wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process.”   He
merely expressed the opinion that “(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not
constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property
rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates,
the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.” As will be presently demonstrated, such
supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not
only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals.
Licensure is “the granting of

_______________
19 Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989), citing 73 C.J.S. 452-453.
20 Rollo, p. 38.

42

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.

license especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the system of

21
granting licenses (as for
professional practice) in accordance with established standards.”   A license is a right or
permission granted by some competent 22
authority to carry on a business or do an act which,
without such license, would be illegal.
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to
pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but  fiveexaminations, each
followed by actual training and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
“Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, that
here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government
professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice
on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and
practice for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at
least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at least
two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots.”

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage
until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No.
04-92, “(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of
Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only,” and

_______________
21 Webster’s Third World International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 1304.
22 53 C.J.S. 445, citing 37 C.J. 168. In Tan v. Director of Forestry, 210 Phil. 244 (1983), the Court defined a license
as merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. It is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted. Neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation.

43

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 43

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.
“(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only
for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the
Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to
enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure
of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job
training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner
revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to
contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent
depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike
are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of performance” which is
conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term
“renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property
without due process of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-AO No. 08-92 are already covered by
PPA-MO No. 03-85, which is still operational.
23
Respondents are correct in pointing out that
PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a “surplusage”  and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO No.
03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage
Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” It provides, inter alia,
for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor
pilots—matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memorandum order.

_______________
23 Rollo, p. 65.

44

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils.

Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Finally, respondents’ insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible
for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all,
power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations. The trial court’s
finding of animosity between him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of
truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court between private respondents and Dayan,
including cases which have reached this Court, cannot certainly be considered the primordial
reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan
should be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives.
In any event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative
authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the
court  a quodated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa  (C.J.),  Regalado,  Davide,

Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
      Martinez, J., No part.

Petition dismissed; Assailed decision affirmed.

Notes.—The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due
process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was
initially concerned with fair procedure. (Azul vs. Castro, 133 SCRA 271 [1984])
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare
45

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 45

National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed,
before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 [1996])

——o0o——