Bloch
Bloch
Emmanuel Bloch*
According to an oft quoted talmudic passage (b. Ber. 24a), a woman’s skin,
thigh, hair and voice are all considered nakedness (‘ervah). Our article will
use this brief sugya as a springboard for an in-depth analysis of the halakhic
prohibition to recite holy words in the presence of nakedness, as understood
in talmudic and rabbinic times.
Our investigation will be divided into two parts. The first part will
consist of a diachronic analysis showing that the same prohibition has been
conceptualized in two distinct ways (“paradigms”), as well as two slightly
less important subvariants, in the relevant sources. Identifying correctly the
paradigm employed in a specific passage dealing with prayer and human
nudity is essential in order to accurately comprehend the significance of
the text.
Philological tools, inasmuch as they shed useful light on the topic,
will be employed in this part of the investigation, but the first and foremost
focus will be conceptual: our contention is that each paradigm embodies a
fundamentally different vision of the offense generated by being naked in
the presence of the sacred, as reflected by the halakhic norms applicable in
each situation.
The objective of the second part of the article will be to frame the un-
folding evolution of the interdiction within two ongoing, important scholarly
discussions on rabbinic thought. While these two discussions intersect in
* I am most grateful to Profs. Benjamin Brown, Suzanne Last Stone, and Barry
Wimpfheimer, as well as to the anonymous reviewer, for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article. Naturally, I remain responsible for any mistakes
still present.
Part 1:
Diachronic Analysis of the Prohibition
1 Since the relevant passage is relatively short, I quote it here in full. The English
translation is generally taken from the 1961 edition of the Soncino Babylonian
Talmud, with a few minor emendations wherever I felt that a more literal ren-
dition was necessary. Since I am primarily interested in the macro-level, I have
only footnoted the variants, as found in the Soncino Printing (1484) and in MSS
Munich 95, Oxford Opp. Add. Fol. 23, Florence II-I-7, and Paris 671 (from the
Henkind Talmud Text Databank), when I found them to be particularly relevant.
For a synoptic table of the variants, see Aaron Amit, “The Origin, Meaning, and
Development of the Ervah Sugya in Bavli Berakhot 24a,” Okimta 3 (2015): 11–25
(19–20) (Hebrew). Also relevant is Amit’s classification of the extant manuscripts
on tractate Berakhot into two major families: according to him, the witnesses of
the “Florence/Print branch” have better preserved the original order of the
amoraic statements than those of the “Paris/Munich branch” (p. 20; and see
references to his previous publications on 20 n. 27 as well as on 12 n. 5).
143* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
ב) גלי שוק עברי נהרות, באשה ערוה שנאמר (ישעיהו מז12 שוק11אמר רב חסדא
אמר שמואל קול באשה13 ג) תגל ערותך וגם תראה חרפתך,וכתיב (ישעיהו מז
יד) כי קולך ערב ומראך נאוה אמר רב ששת שער,ערוה שנא' (שיר השירים ב
. א) שערך כעדר העזים,באשה ערוה שנא' (שיר השירים ד
14 There are other talmudic passages which deal with qol be-ishah but from a different
standpoint: if the scriptural link in b. Ber. 24a suggests a woman singing, in b.
Qidd. 70a the reference seems to be a woman speaking to a man; see also b. Soṭah
48a (mixed choral singing) and y. Ḥal. 2:1 (woman speaking). According to Aaron
Amit, “Give My Regards to Yalta: Is Kol Ishah (A Woman’s Voice) Mentioned
in Kiddushin 70a–b,” Sidra 30 (2015): 121–31 (Hebrew), the concept appeared
initially in our sugya, and was only later included in tractate Qiddushin, with
the consequence of potentially prohibiting a man from listening to a woman’s
speech.
15 The two readings of the sugya can be defended, as reflected in the diverging
positions taken by the traditional medieval commentators: one school of thought
explained the entire passage in the context of the recitation of the Shema (Cf. Behag
siman 1, p. 44; Rosh Berakhot 3:37; Ra’avyah and R. Hai Gaon, both quoted in the
Mordekhai’s commentary on Berakhot 24a; R. Eliezer of Metz in Sefer Yere’im 392,
and many others), while another group distinguished between the first memra
(handbreadth of skin) and the other three (leg, voice, and hair), and suggested
that only the first amoraic teaching should be read in connection to the Shema (cf.
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hil. Issurei Bi’ah 21:2; Teshuvot ha-Ge’onim [Sha‘arei
Teshuvah], siman 29; Sefer ha-Eshkol, Hil. ‘Avodah Zarah p. 192a; with some minor
differences between them). Finally, the outlier position of the Rif must be noted:
he skipped the passage entirely, possibly because he considered it to be aggadic
and not halakhic in nature (see his Halakhot, printed at the back of the Talmud
in the standard Vilna edition, p. 15a).
145* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
just prior to the rising of the sun (according to one opinion, the ideal time for
the recitation of the Shema).16 Similarly, the talmudic discussion immediately
prior to our passage from b. Ber. 24a17 tackles the permissibility of reciting
the Shema while laying naked in bed with one’s wife or other hypothetical
bedmates.18
Thus, the general thrust of this small textual passage, as it stands
finally redacted in the Bavli, seems relatively unambiguous: a Jewish male
is forbidden to accomplish the biblical commandment of reciting the Shema
while looking at some areas of the female anatomy (her exposed skin, at the
very least) understood by the rabbis to constitute nakedness.19
Nowhere else does the Bavli rule that certain zones of the female body
are halakhically considered ‘ervah, but one parallel passage does exist in the
Yerushalmi.20 There, however, the context is the rabbinic commandment of
reciting the blessing on setting aside the ḥallah portion of the dough,21 and the
Yerushalmi only mentions Shemuel’s teaching on the female voice but omits
the other three amoraic teachings on a woman’s skin, thigh, and hair. Still,
minor differences notwithstanding, both Talmudim introduce the concept of
16 See m. Ber. 3:5. Other conditions listed in the same source include the absence
of foul water, “steeping water,” excrement, etc.
17 However, the transition from one topic to the next on b. Ber. 24a seems less
than smooth. See Amit’s rigorous philological analysis in “Origin, Meaning,
and Development of the Ervah Sugya,” which shows that our textual passage
was initially a Babylonian sugya on m. Ḥal. 2:3. Then, owing to the absence of a
commentary on tractate Ḥallah in the Bavli, a later editor inserted the reworked
passage, somewhat artificially, in the related context of the recitation of the
Shema.
18 On the widespread tendency, before the early modern age, to share one’s bed
overnight, see A. Roger Ekirch, At Day’s Close: Night in Times Past (New York:
Norton, 2005), especially 279–84.
19 As duly noted by Rachel Neis, The Sense of Sight in Rabbinic Culture: Jewish
Ways of Seeing in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013),
118–20 and Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, “The Nakedness of a Woman’s Voice, the
Pleasure in a Man’s Mouth – an Oral History of Ancient Judaism,” in Off with Her
Head! The Denial of Women’s Identity in Myth, Religion, and Culture, ed. Howard
Eilberg-Schwartz and Wendy Doniger (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1995), 167.
20 Y. Ḥal. 2:1 (58c).
21 See Neis, Sense of Sight, 118–20, as well as Amit, “Origin, Meaning, and Devel-
opment of the Ervah Sugya,” 15–16.
Emmanuel Bloch* 146*
female ‘ervah in the context of the prohibition to recite “holy words” (whether
the biblical Shema or rabbinic blessings) in the presence of a scene of nudity.
22 The recitation of the silent prayer (‘Amidah) is also part of the discussion, but
the latter is conceptually a separate case, as it is subject to even stricter rules;
on this point, see Uri Ehrlich, The Nonverbal Language of Prayer: A New Approach
to Jewish Liturgy, trans. Dena Rodan (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 221–31.
23 M. Ter. 1:6 and t. Ter. 3:1.
24 M. Demai 1:4.
25 T. Ber. 2:20.
147* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
skin, legs, hair, and voice. No similar teachings exist with respect to the male
body, and as a result a man’s legs, hair, etc., are never considered nakedness.
On the other hand, all tannaitic sources,26 without any exception, clearly
apply the prohibition in ways not especially associated with the female body.
And a similar situation exists in more recent strata of the talmudic literature:
an ‘ervah situation arises, even though no woman is present on the scene,
when one man is naked in front of another;27 or when a person is alone and
partially clothed but “his heart sees his nakedness,” i.e., there is no proper
separation between the upper and lower parts of the body;28 and so forth.
How can we explain that all other forms of ‘ervah are androgynous while
the variants discussed on b. Ber. 24a are specifically female?
Second, the scope of the prohibition seems to vary greatly. Taking a
broad interpretation, the sugya in b. Ber. 24a suggests that even very innocuous
sights, like a handbreadth of exposed skin, is enough nakedness to impede
the recitation of the Shema. But many other older teachings are far less
prudish, wherein the most minimal coverage of the genital area suffices to
permit setting aside the terumah and reciting its accompanying blessing.29 In
the most extreme case, an entirely naked woman is authorized to set aside
the ḥallah and to recite the appropriate blessing, provided she sits down
and hides her genitals.30 The contrast between the few inches of exposed
skin (forbidden) and the entirely unclothed but sitting female (permitted)
could not be starker.
26 Such tannaitic sources include m. Ter. 1:6; m. Demai 1:4; m. Ber. 3:5; t. Ber. 2:14–16,
21; m. Ḥal. 2:3; and t. Ter. 3:1. Note that m. Ḥal. 2:3 differentiates between female
nudity and male nudity since the anatomical differences between the two
sexes impact the law (female genitalia can be covered by sitting down, male
genitalia cannot), but the presence of a woman remains entirely incidental to
the application of the prohibition. To these, one should add a couple of baraitot
quoted in the Talmud: b. Ber. 24b, on the practical dilemma of a person naked
in bed who is too cold to stick his head out of his garment to recite the Shema;
b. Ber. 25b, which discusses whether one may recite the Shema when naked in
clear or sullied waters; and b. Sukkah 10b, which analyzes whether one may
stand naked in one’s house, stick one’s head outside, and recite the Shema.
27 See b. Ber. 25b.
28 B. Ber. 24b and 25b; see below for an analysis of these teachings.
29 T. Ter. 3:2 mentions straw, hay, and “anything else” (u-bekhol davar); and even
(clear!) water suffices for m. Ber. 3:5.
30 M. Ḥal. 2:3.
Emmanuel Bloch* 148*
32 For a study of the idealized female body, and the eroticization of the breasts,
in Middle Persian and rabbinic cultures, see Shai Secunda, “The Construction,
Composition, and Idealization of the Female Body in Rabbinic Literature and
Parallel Iranian Texts: Three Excurses,” Nashim 23 (2012): 60–86, esp. 70–78.
33 We will soon have more to say on the logical reasoning which legitimized the
extension of ‘ervah to the female voice, thus creating an “auditory nakedness.”
In the meantime, note that the sexual appeal of the female voice has also been
analyzed from several other perspectives. Thus, Kosman and Golan approached
this question from a Lacanian/psychoanalytic point of view and claimed that the
rejection of the woman’s voice because of its sexual quality is a formal defense
of male anxiety from the potentially threatening disintegration of law and
order (see Admiel Kosman and Ruth Golan, “‘A Woman’s Voice is ‘Erva’: The
Female’s Voice and Silence – Between the Talmudic Sages and Psychoanalysis,”
in Saints and Role Models in Judaism and Christianity, ed. Marcel Poorthuis and
Joshua Schwartz [Leiden: Brill, 2004], 357–75). Others, however, have rejected the
Freudian psychoanalytic approach as too reductionist; thus, Eilberg-Schwartz
suggested that the eroticization of the female mouth must be understood as part
of a larger cultural process that treats the male mouth as an organ of reproduction
and dissemination. When Jewish masculinity is not about the phallus but about
the mouth, which is the organ of the dissemination of God’s word, connecting
the female mouth to the vagina is a way to reinforce “phallogocentrism.” See
Eilberg-Schwartz, “Nakedness of a Woman’s Voice,” 165–84.
34 This point should not be misconstrued as positing the existence of a universal
eros in the thought of the rabbis. Indeed, it is quite possible that the amoraic
apodictic statements were originally at odds with each other. However, I do
Emmanuel Bloch* 150*
Thus understood, the passage from b. Ber. 24a does not simply extend
the reach of traditional ‘ervah, but rather reconceptualizes its very idea:
initially, the sources from the Mishnah and the Tosefta understood ‘ervah
as a purely objective, anatomical concept, limited exclusively to genitalia,
male or female. A few centuries later, b. Ber. 24a introduced an alternative
vision of ‘ervah, understood this time as a subjective, psychological concept,
and encompassing all female body parts that a typical male finds sexually
arousing.35
But the definition of ‘ervah is just the tip of the iceberg. As the distinction
between objective and subjective ‘ervah resolves our three earlier interrogations,
we must examine how this evolution affects the larger picture of the Jewish
law. To this end, we now turn to analyze two paradigms, each one based on
a different understanding of ‘ervah, of the prohibition “to say holy words in
the presence of nakedness.””
believe that each statement taken individually, and the entire list as compiled
by the redactor of the sugya, responds to the question of what must be viewed
as marginal heterosexual stimulation.
35 Some authors have noted that the term ‘ervah is not easily translatable into
English. Thus, David Brodsky hesitated whether to render ‘ervah by “vagina” or
by “nakedness” (A Bride Without a Blessing: A Study in the Redaction and Content
of Massekhet Kallah and Its Gemara [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006], 46–47 n. 47).
The realization that the definition of ‘ervah has evolved historically resolves
this issue as well. Thus, in the sources relying on the first paradigm, the best
solution is probably to translate ‘ervah by “sex organs” (since the term was used
in connection with both female and male genitalia). In the sources relying on
the second paradigm, one could arguably use the expression “sexual stimulus.”
Alternatively, and for the sake of simplicity, one may use the broader term
“nakedness” for all sources (and specify explicitly a more precise meaning
whenever the need arises). We have adopted this latter approach in this article.
151* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
the sight of an unclad woman is the most common trigger for sexual arousal,
other sensory stimuli can arguably accomplish the same result. This logic,
which does not differentiate between visual and auditory stimulations,
goes a long way to explain how Shemuel could rely on the sexual innuendo
perceived in the female voice to extend the boundaries of ‘ervah beyond
a woman’s actual physical body, thus creating, as it were, a paradoxical
construct: the disembodied nakedness.41
The Talmud remains silent on the possible solutions, but later author-
ities, picking up on the sensory nature of the offense, make a number of
corresponding suggestions: close the eyes, look the other way, or remove the
source of erotic stimulation from sight by covering it up.42 Another factor
playing a role in this logical construct is habituation: a male who is constantly
exposed to a given stimulus eventually stops being aroused, and in such a
situation the Shema may be recited.43
Third, the ratio legis: under the objective paradigm, praying in the
presence of an ‘ervah is prohibited because it is considered disrespectful to be
naked in the same physical space as the Divine.44 This idea has long roots: already
in the written Torah, the priests were prohibited from publicly displaying
their sexual organs; they were enjoined to wear linen breeches to cover their
nudity when “they approach the altar to officiate in the sanctuary,”45 i.e.,
when performing a holy activity. Similarly, Michael Satlow has documented
other tannaitic rules based on the same rationale (i.e., avoiding displays that
are disrespectful to the Divine): someone relieving himself should turn away
and avoid facing the Temple; a person with a Tetragrammaton tattooed on
his flesh should not wash nor immerse for fear of standing naked in front of
the holy Name; a priest may not function at the altar while wearing a tunic
which gives the illusion that he is naked;46 and more.47 Anthropological
research also concurs: Howard Eilberg-Schwartz has noted that even the most
anthropomorphic biblical texts do not present the Godhead as possessing
biological functions like copulation or defecation, for a simple reason: because
of their perceived animalistic nature, these actions were seen as incompatible
with the ancient Hebrew idea of the Divine.48
However, under the subjective paradigm introduced by b. Ber. 24a, the
prohibition’s ratio legis is different: the would-be reciter is forbidden to pray
when he experiences unclean thoughts because he is personally disqualified.
As a result of this new rationale of personal unworthiness, anything perceived
by itself; thus, “one who shames his fellow who is naked is not comparable to
one who shames his fellow who is clothed” (t. B. Qam. 9:12).
45 Exod 28:42–43.
46 See t. Yoma 1:22.
47 Michael L. Satlow, “Jewish Constructions of Nakedness in Late Antiquity,” JBL
116 (1997): 429–54 (432–38).
However, I must disagree with Satlow’s claim that female nakedness, unlike
male nakedness, was not seen as an offense against God (“Jewish Constructions,”
440–44). As far as I can see, the sources draw no distinction between men and
women in this respect. In fact, the only source dealing unequivocally with the
question (m. Ḥal. 2:3) certainly considers female nakedness to be offensive in
a ritual context. No source has been found that authorizes a naked woman
to perform a holy activity. Granted, this is not enough to draw a definitive
conclusion, but the picture is consistent, and the relative textual paucity can
easily be explained by pointing out, with Daniel Boyarin (Carnal Israel: Reading
Sex in Talmudic Culture [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)], 25–30),
that rabbinic literature is androcentric (it is written by and for men).
48 Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology of Israelite
Religion and Ancient Judaism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990),
217.
Emmanuel Bloch* 154*
as sexually provocative can henceforth bar the male beholder from reciting
the Shema—even something as seemingly innocuous (and ubiquitous) as a
woman’s leg, hair, voice, or unclothed skin.
To recapitulate our findings so far: the “objective paradigm” of the tannaitic
prohibition to recite holy words is consistently predicated on the traditional
definition of ‘ervah, understood anatomically as the genitals (male or female);
it necessitates only one ritual actor (female or male), and its essential concern
resides in the offensive encounter of the sacred and the naked, both present
in the same physical space. But the “subjective paradigm” introduced by b.
Ber. 24a is based on a new definition of ‘ervah, understood psychologically
as any area of the female anatomy which a male observer finds erotically
titillating; it necessitates two ritual actors (one female and one male), and
its essential concern resides in a man’s disqualifying lewd thoughts, taken
for the first time as a halakhic impediment to the recitation of the Shema.
These insights are summarized synoptically in the following table.
These two modi operandi are both internally consistent and at odds with
each other, to the point where one could arguably claim that two different
prohibitions are now grouped together, somewhat deceptively, under the
same umbrella heading.49
49 Some traditional scholars have noticed the existence of two conflicting paradigms
and sought to reconcile them; to this end, they have explored two different
approaches. One suggestion was to distinguish between a biblical ‘ervah and a
rabbinic ‘ervah—the Torah prohibition would cover only the genitals and would
155* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
not be linked to sexual thoughts while the rabbinic prohibition would extend
to non-genital but provocative parts of the body (this is a position defended
explicitly by several modern commentators: Menashe Klein, Sefer Mishneh
Halakhot [Brooklyn: Mekhon Mishneh Halakhot Gedolot, 1960], 7:13; Benzion
Lichtman, Bnei Tzion [Jerusalem, 1946], 2:75; Yehuda Henkin, Understanding
Tzniut: Modern Controversies in the Jewish Community [Jerusalem: Urim, 2008],
14–15). Alternatively, and perhaps more simply, a distinction could be made
between two different situations: the objective definition would represent the
baseline and would always be applicable, and the subjective definition would
represent additional requirements applicable only when a man stands in the
visual presence of a woman (see Rashba’s novella to b. Ber. 24a, s.v. Amar Rav
Ḥisda). Both solutions seek to harmonize tensions by applying two definitions
cumulatively: ‘ervah as a non-evolutive two-layered—objective and subjective—
legal concept. They differ, however, in their reasons for distinguishing between
these definitions: the first biblical/rabbinic approach considers the difference
to be religious/juridical, while the second solution sees it as purely casuistic/
situational. None of these solutions account for the vastly different working
mechanisms of the two prohibitions, nor for the temporal gulf separating their
appearance in the halakhic literature.
50 The midrashic text “Pitron Torah,” probably written in the late ninth century or
early tenth century, takes note of the seductive potential of women’s eyes and
faces and considers them to be nakedness ( ראיית פנים באשה ערוה,;)עין באשה ערוה
see Ephraim Elimelekh Urbach, Sefer Pitron Torah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1978),
Parashat Qedoshim, p. 72.
Emmanuel Bloch* 156*
never prevent the recitation of the Shema;51 which areas originally had the
status of ‘ervah but are now so frequently exposed that the male observer no
longer experiences disqualifying lustful thoughts and may therefore recite
the Shema in their presence;52 whether it is preferable to avert the gaze or to
close the eyes to avoid being sexually stimulated by an ‘ervah;53 etc.
Much more ink is spilled on these questions, but even this brief survey,
which does not exhaust the available material, evidences that the existence
of the subjective paradigm of the prohibition to recite holy words is a
tangible reality in the post-talmudic halakhic literature, and that its various
ramifications are systematically explored.
As can be readily seen, the medieval sources frequently employ elements
of language taken from b. Ber. 24a (most significantly the template באשה ערוה״...״
to signify female forms of nakedness); moreover, the prooftexts used in b.
Ber. 24a, like the verses from Song of Songs, are revisited to support later
Similarly, for R. Elazar of Worms (early 13th century), a male should not recite
the Shema when facing a woman’s exposed upper arms (zero‘a), which are ‘ervah
(Sefer ha-Rokeaḥ, Hil. Tefillah 324 and Hil. Berakhot 345). In the twentieth century,
R. Menashe Klein even rules that a woman’s neck, teeth, and “everything else
mentioned in Shir ha-Shirim,” are considered ‘ervah (see his Mishneh Halakhot
7:244). R. Klein has some medieval sources to bolster his claim, like Rabbi Yehuda
he-Ḥasid’s Sefer Ḥasidim 110 and Rabbenu Yonah’s Sefer ha-Yir’ah siman 73, but
these were written in a non-halakhic context. See also R. Shmuel ha-Levy Wosner,
Shevet ha-Levi 5:197 and 7:10, who does not reach a definitive conclusion.
51 See Meiri’s commentary, Beit ha-Beḥirah, Ber. 24a; Ḥiddushei ha-Rashba on Ber.
24a; Mordekhai’s commentary, ch. 3 par. 90 – all discussed above.
52 Beyond the sources quoted above, see Ben Ish Ḥai’s ruling (Halakhot, Parashat
Bo, p. 86 letter tet) that a woman’s breasts are not considered ‘ervah during
breastfeeding, since it is socially acceptable for a woman to publicly uncover
her chest for this purpose; Mishnah Berurah (75:3), on the other hand, rules
stringently on the same issue. This line of argumentation is also used, in the
nineteenth century, by the Lithuanian authority R. Yeḥiel Mikhel Epstein, who
permits reciting the Shema when facing the exposed hair of a married woman,
since hair covering was so uncommon in his day that the sight of hair would
not cause hirhur (see Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 75:7). Similar positions are
also defended by R. Ḥayyim Berlin (Shu”t Nishmat Ḥayyim [Jerusalem: Yeshivat
Volozhin, 2008], 1:78–79), R. Yosef Ḥ̣ayyim of Baghdad (Sefer Ḥ̣uqqei Nashim, ch.
17) and others; for more sources, see Mayer Schiller, “The Obligation of Married
Women to Cover Their Hair,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 30 (1995):
81–108 (106–7).
53 See Pisqei Riaz, Berakhot 3:3:6; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hil. Qeri’at Shema
3:16; Mishnah Berurah 75:1; all discussed above.
157* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
rulings; the logical underpinnings of the passage, like the sensory nature
of the offense, are explored and taken to their natural conclusions. Finally,
many of these sources are taken from commentaries on b. Ber. 24a or from its
corresponding sections in the great Codes.54 Where, then, does this subjective
paradigm originate from, if not from our passage from b. Ber. 24a?
In short: the subjective paradigm of the prohibition blossomed over
time, thanks to the creativity of medieval and modern halakhic authorities;
but its first buds were already clearly present in the Talmud.
57 B. Ber. 25b:
אסור לקרות קריאת, ערוה בעששית. מותר לקרות קריאת שמע כנגדה, צואה בעששית:אמר רבא
והא, צואה בעששית מותר לקרות קריאת שמע כנגדה דצואה בכיסוי תליא מילתא.שמע כנגדה
. ״ולא יראה בך ערות דבר״ אמר רחמנא, ערוה בעששית אסור לקרות קריאת שמע כנגדה.מיכסיא
.והא קמיתחזיא
58 M. Ber. 3:5.
59 Actually, as noted by R. Yaakov Emden in his Mor u-Qtsi‘ah (ch. 75), there is
a difference: the lantern is only partially see-through, whereas the water is
completely transparent. But this distinction actually exacerbates the divergence
between the two teachings: Rava ruled stringently in a situation less problematic
than the case in which the Mishnah ruled leniently.
159* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
60 See Halakhot Gedolot, 44; Magen Avraham on Shulḥan Arukh, introduction to Oraḥ
Ḥayyim 75; Eliyahu Rabba 75:1; R. Yaakov Emden, Mor u-Qtsi‘ah, ch. 75.
61 See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hil. Qeri’at Shema 3:16 (see the commentary of
the Kesef Mishneh, who notes that Maimonides’ ruling on the minor’s genitalia
is derived from Rava’s teaching on b. Ber. 25b); Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 75:4.
62 Cf. t. Ber. 2:16.
63 See Pisqei Riaz, Ber. 3:3:5; Rosh, Ber. 3:35; Aguddah 3:72; and Rama’s gloss on Oraḥ
Ḥayyim 75:4.
64 I have chosen to take at face value the Talmud’s citation of Deut 23:15 as the reason
for Rava’s ruling on the ‘ervah be-‘ashashit, but one could turn this relationship
on its head and argue that the verse merely serves as an asmakhta for the norm.
However, in this second reading, one must admit that the visibility criterion then
took a life of its own in the later medieval extrapolations (see-through garment,
genitalia of a minor). While the truth cannot be proven either way, the merit of
our first reading is to interpret consistently the relationship between the norm
and the visibility criterion anchored in the verse.
Emmanuel Bloch* 160*
norms, developed under the classic definition of the objective paradigm, can
be overturned as a result.
69 In fact, this principle is mentioned altogether five times in the entire Talmud Bavli,
all in b. Ber. 24–25. The first scholar to explicitly demonstrate the innovation of
libbo ro’eh in the Talmud Bavli was Saul Lieberman, Tosefta ki-feshuta (Jerusalem:
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1992), Berakhot p. 22 line 46 and p.
23, line 48, n. 16. However, as Lieberman himself pointed out, the same idea
was already implicitly hinted at in the writings of earlier thinkers; see, e.g.,
Louis Ginzberg, Perushim ve-Ḥiddushim ba-Yerushalmi (New York: Ktav, 1941–61),
2:283–84, who already refused to interpret a difficult passage in the Yerushalmi
on the basis of the principle of libbo ro’eh.
70 B. Ber. 25b: “His heel may see his nakedness, since the Torah was not given to
angels.”
71 Here, too, I must part ways with Neis, Sense of Sight, 117 and 125, who describes
libbo ro’eh as a way for the rabbis to “trouble the production of gender” and to
Emmanuel Bloch* 162*
With these observations, I have now finished mapping out the prohibition
of “holy words in the presence of nakedness” and its various incarnations in
talmudic sources. This first part has evidenced the existence of two different
paradigms (the first objective and the second subjective), to which one must
add two subvariants of the objective paradigm. This classification is exhaustive,
inasmuch as no relevant teaching has been left out, and internally consistent.
In the second part of this article, I would like to suggest an explanatory frame-
work for the changes observed in the conceptualization of the prohibition.
Part 2:
Accounting for the Evolution of the Prohibition
“ocularize” the entirety of the male body (viz., the rabbis attributed a sense of
vision to male body parts other than the eyes). In my view, libbo ro’eh is a Bab-
ylonian extension of the objective paradigm; as such, it is predicated on a logic
of bizzayon and not of hirhur: the problem resides in the concomitant proximity
of the heart and the genitalia, and such an issue could only be solved by means
of a separation or coverage. Gender plays no role in this construct, and neither
does vision, except as a rhetorical artifact.
72 Christine Hayes, Between the Babylonian and the Palestinian Talmuds: Accounting
for Halakhic Difference in Selected Sugyot from Tractate Avodah Zara (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 3–24.
73 Boyarin, Carnal Israel.
74 Michael Satlow, Tasting the Dish: Rabbinic Rhetorics of Sexuality, BJS 303 (Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1995); idem, “Jewish Constructions of Nakedness.”
75 David Biale, Eros and the Jews: From Biblical Israel to Contemporary America (New
York: BasicBooks, 1992).
76 Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert, Menstrual Purity: Rabbinic and Christian Reconstructions
163* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
Rosen-Zvi,77 Mira Balberg,78 Yishai Kiel,79 Ron Naiweld,80 Rachel Neis81 and
others,82 proposes to analyze the rabbinic perceptions of the body, gender,
sexuality, and more, as emerging from complex processes of negotiation
with the neighboring cultures’ own positions. As we seek to account for the
changes observed in the first part of this article, our goal is now to verify
whether, and to what extent, such an historical framework proves pertinent.
First, the subjective paradigm of the prohibition, predicated on sexual
distraction. The explicit connection between vision and sexual desire in
Jewish sources has been frequently noted by scholars: very aware of the
erotic potential of female nakedness, the rabbis frequently exhorted men not
to look at undressed women lest they be led into sexual misconduct.83 Neis
remarked judiciously that in this respect, the rabbis were really no different
from their neighbors:
By the time we can speak of the early rabbis, somewhere in
the first or second century CE, a panoply of cultural traditions
and practices circulated in the Near East whereby sight, desire,
and sexuality were precariously entangled. Across ancient
Another observation frequently made is that the erotic gaze was strongly
gendered: men actively looked at women, women were passively looked at;
the reverse was rarely acknowledged.89
With respect to the specifically Babylonian concept of libbo ro’eh, a
Zoroastrian context must also be considered. The study of Middle Persian
literature shows that Zoroastrians used to walk around with a shirt (sabig)
and a belt (kustig), which served to separate between the upper and the lower
halves of the body. Failure to wear these items of clothing was likened to going
about unclothed and was considered a forbidden exposure of genitalia.90 This
practice parallels exactly the requirement implied by libbo ro’eh to separate
the heart from the sex organs.
These findings indeed seem to confirm, as previous scholarship has
asserted, that the rabbinic perceptions of sexuality were situated at the
crossroads of late antique culture. The rise of the subjective paradigm of
the prohibition, as well as of the “libbo ro’eh” subvariant of the objective
paradigm, were likely informed by the neighboring cultures’ own attitudes
to similar questions. While for the rabbis these concerns became embodied
in the halakhic realm, these developments express parallel sensitivities that
ran cross-culturally.
Still, questions remain. The possible Zoroastrian context does not seem
to adequately explain why the Bavli entertained, for instance, that a failure to
separate between the heels and the genitals could lead to a legal prohibition
to recite the Shema.91 More significantly, I am unaware of any contextual
explanation that would account for the emergence of Rava’s visibility criterion
within the objective paradigm of the prohibition.
89 See Neis, Sense of Sight, 116, and Rabinowitz, Women as Subject and Object, 195.
90 See Yaakov Elman, “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation
and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal Tradition,” in The Cambridge
Companion for the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature, ed. Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert
and Martin S. Jaffee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 165–97
(181–82); Shaul Shaked, “No Talking During a Meal—Zoroastrian Themes in
the Babylonian Talmud,” in The Talmud in Its Iranian Context, ed. Carol Bakhos
and M. Rahim Shayegan (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 161–77.
91 As explained above, the Talmud eventually rejects such a notion but, to use
talmudic jargon, how do we understand the ?הוא אמינאWhat was the original
concern? If the Persian belt was worn, as local mores mandated, what conceivable
reason was there to even suppose that the exposure of the heels to the genitals
was problematic in the context of the recitation of the Shema?
Emmanuel Bloch* 166*
92 See Mireille M. Lee, Body, Dress and Identity in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2015), 186–90. Some Jewish sources attest unambiguously
of this encounter with the Greek notion of nudity, even in a semi-religious
context; see for instance m. ‘Avod. Zar. 3:4.
93 See ad. n. 48 above.
94 See Ishay Rosen-Zvi, “Bilhah the Temptress: ‘The Testament of Reuben’ and
‘The Birth of Sexuality’,” JQR 96 (2006): 65–94; idem, Demonic Desires, 62–63,
132–34; Joshua Levinson, The Twice Told Tale: A Poetics of the Exegetical Narrative
in Rabbinic Midrash (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2005), 127–33 (Hebrew); idem, “From
Narrative Practice to Cultural Poetics: Literary Anthropology and the Rabbinic
167* When the Naked Encounters the Sacred
This insight certainly looks promising for our own research: a case can
easily be made that the diachronic study of the prohibition to recite holy
words in the presence of ‘ervah provides yet another illustration of the general
trend toward more subjectivism. On a broad level, the move from the earlier
objective paradigm, predicated upon an external/anatomical vision of ‘ervah,
to the later subjective paradigm, in which nakedness is understood as an
internal/psychological reality, fits in well with the general picture drawn
by previous scholars.
However, as demonstrated by Rosen-Zvi in his study of the evil impulse
(yetser), closer scrutiny shows the reality to be more complex. Rosen-Zvi’s
textual analysis evidences that the yetser was originally conceived as a demonic
figure with reified characteristics, a quasi-physical entity viewed as almost
part of the human body, and that it is only in late strata of the Bavli that the
yetser became identified with sexual attraction. But the objective conception
of the yetser as an external demonic creature subsisted, in an attenuated
form at least, and was never entirely replaced by the internal conception
of the yetser as the “evil inclination” dwelling in a human being’s heart.
Thus, the human oscillation between sinfulness and righteousness turned
into an intricate battle between the individual and demon-like entities that
are located inside the body but are not completely a part of it, and sexual
attraction became as much a psychological phenomenon as a temptation
originating in external forces.95
Our own textual analysis complicates even further the rise of the new
“discourse of subjectivity” noted by earlier scholarship. Thus, just as in the
process of “internalization” of the evil impulse, the late antique emergence of
the subjective paradigm of the prohibition never fully displaced the objective
paradigm already evident in tannaitic sources. But there is more: where the
Sense of Self,” in Homer and the Bible in the Eyes of Ancient Interpreters, ed. Maren
Niehoff (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 345–67; Eilberg-Schwartz, Savage in Judaism, 195–234;
Reuven Kiperwasser, “Matters of the Heart – the Metamorphosis of the Monolithic
in the Bible to the Fragmented in Rabbinic Thought,” in Judaism and Emotion:
Texts, Performance, Experience, ed. Sarah Ross, Gabriel Levy, and Soham Al-Suadi
(New York: Peter Lang, 2013), 43–59; Ephraim Elimelekh Urbach, Ha-Halakhah,
Mekoroteha ve-Hitpatḥutah (Jerusalem: Yad la-Talmud, 1984), 124. For a different
approach based on the dual concepts of nominalism and realism, see Christine
E. Hayes, What’s Divine About Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2015), 195–245.
95 Rosen-Zvi, Demonic Desires, 63–64 and 132–34.
Emmanuel Bloch* 168*
external demonic vision of the yetser merely subsisted in a weaker form, the
objective paradigm of the prohibition to recite holy words retained enough
vitality to sustain two later developments, i.e., Rava’s visibility criterion and
the Babylonian variant called “libbo ro’eh.” Furthermore, another specific
element in the subjectivization of ‘ervah consists in its temporal dimensions:
while our study has identified early indications of the subjective paradigm
in a handful of amoraic apodictic statements, it has concluded that the
paradigm blossomed over time, thanks to the creativity of medieval and
modern halakhic authorities. Arguably, the process of internalization of ‘ervah
was not concluded until all the implications of the subjective paradigm were
systematically explored, centuries after the process began.
In a nutshell: the late antique rabbinic “discourse of subjectivity” serves
as a useful prism through which the trajectory of the prohibition to recite
holy words in the presence of ‘ervah can be better understood. The analysis
confirms the conclusions reached by earlier scholarship regarding the general
move from objectivism to subjectivism, but it also evidences the existence
of specific elements unique to the process of internalization of ‘ervah. In the
end, both objective and subjective orientations are present within the same
legal institution, their precise reaches negotiated in the sources, as a hybrid
and complex legal discourse emerges in the interdiction to recite holy words
in the presence of nakedness.
96 Elliott Horowitz, Reckless Rites: Purim and the Legacy of Jewish Violence (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006), 107–46.
97 Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar, Transforming Identity: The Ritual Transformation from
Gentile to Jew—Structure and Meaning (New York: Continuum, 2007), 223–51.
98 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (New York: Touchstone, 1968), 228–30.
Emmanuel Bloch* 170*
Let us recapitulate succinctly our findings. As we have seen (part 1), the
prohibition of reciting holy words in the presence of nakedness is expressed
by two different paradigms (objective and subjective); additionally, we have
identified two later subvariants of the objective paradigm: Rava’s visibility
criterion anchored in Deuteronomy 23:15 and the Babylonian principle of
“libbo ro’eh.”
The objective paradigm of the prohibition is concerned with the offensive
encounter of the naked (understood in strict anatomic terms) and the sacred
in the same physical space. The subjective paradigm, on the other hand, gives
a psychological definition for ‘ervah and insists that a male who is sexually
aroused is unworthy of reciting the Shema or other blessings.
The results of the analysis have confirmed, to a large extent, the relevance
of the theoretical models developed by other scholars in the field: the sub-
jective paradigm and the “libbo ro’eh” subvariant of the objective paradigm
were likely influenced by the neighboring cultures’ own attitudes toward
similar questions; similarly, the general evolution of the prohibition may be
seen as a good illustration, some local specificities notwithstanding, of the
late antique rise of a new rabbinic “discourse of subjectivity.”
We have suggested that the two tracks (sociocultural context and
legal hermeneutics) reflect two different but complementary aspects of the
same phenomenon, and that the internalization processes may be read as
an ingenious way for the resilient halakhic system to adjust to its shifting
surroundings. Thus, it is arguably the encounter between the widespread
rejection of visual eros, on the one hand, and the ancient regulations of nudity
in the presence of the divine, on the other hand, which generated the subjective
paradigm predicated on a legal rationale of personal unworthiness due to
sexual stimulation. Similarly, the reception of Zoroastrian notions arguably
led to the principle of “libbo ro’eh” being grafted, by means of metaphorical
language, onto preexisting regulations.
As a final perspective, let us briefly broaden the temporal horizon once
again. I believe that the conclusions of this article prove relevant to understand
Emmanuel Bloch* 172*