Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 1

JOHANNES
BRONKHORST



Satkāryavāda
and
asatkāryavāda

(published
in:
Categorisation and Interpretation: Indological and comparative studies from an
international Indological meeting at the Department of Comparative Philology, Göteborg University.
A volume dedicated to the memory of Gösta Liebert.
Ed.
Folke
Josephson.
Göteborg:
Meijerbergs

institut
för
svensk
etymologisk
forskning,
Göteborgs
universitet.
1999.
(Meijerbergs
arkiv
för

svensk
ordforskning,
24.)
Pp.
43-55)





Point
of
departure
of
this
lecture
will
be
the
correspondence
principle,
i.e.
the

principle
that
the
words
of
a
sentence
correspond,
one
by
one,
to
the
elements
that

constitute
the
situation
described
by
that
sentence.
A
full
discussion
of
the
historical

background
of
this
principle
is
not
possible
at
this
moment.
For
our
present

purposes
it
must
suffice
to
state
that
the
correspondence
principle
appears
to
have

occupied
the
minds
of
all
the
best
Indian
thinkers
for
a
number
of
centuries
during

the
first
millennium
of
the
common
era.


 What
is
the
problem
with
the
correspondence
principle?
A
simple
example

may
explain
this.
In
the
case
of
a
sentence
like
"John
reads
a
book"
it
makes
sense

to
assume
that
the
situation
described
by
this
sentence
contains
someone
called

‘John’,
a
book,
and
the
activity
of
reading.
The
words
of
the
sentence
correspond,

therefore,
one
by
one
to
the
elements
that
constitute
the
situation
described.
Put

differently,
the
correspondence
principle
is
valid
here.
It
is
not,
and
cannot
be,
valid

in
the
sentence
"John
writes
a
book".
The
situation
described
by
this
last
sentence,

too,
contains
John
and
the
activity
of
writing,
but
it
does
not
contain
the
book.
For

the
book
is
not
yet
finished.
The
same
is
true
of
sentences
like
"he
makes
a
jar",
or

even
"the
jar
comes
into
being".
The
situations
described
by
these
last
two

sentences
do
not
contain
the
jar
that
is
being
made,
or
that
comes
into
being.
If
it

did,
there
would
be
no
need
to
make
the
jar,
or
the
jar
would
not
have
to
come
into

being.


 The
correspondence
principle
clearly
raises
questions
which
it
is
not
easy
to

answer
as
long
as
one
holds
on
to
it.
Yet
most
[44]
thinkers
of
the
period
under

consideration
appear
to
have
accepted
the
principle.
And
many
of
them
tried
to
deal

with
the
problem
of
origination,
which
is
the
most
obvious
problem
it
evokes.

Famous
among
them
is
the
Buddhist
thinker
Nāgārjuna,
who
did
not
hesitate
to

conclude
from
the
dilemma
that
nothing
can
come
into
being.
Some
followed
him

in
this
respect,
even
from
among
those
who
were
not
Buddhists.
The
ajātivāda
of

Gauḍapāda
is
a
famous
example.
Gauḍapāda
is
considered—
at
least
by
the
later

tradition;
many
questions
surround
the
historical
person
or
persons
who
composed

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 2

the
works
attibuted
to
him
—
an
early
Vedānta
author,
the
teacher
of
the
teacher
of

Śaṅkara.


 Yet
most
thinkers
were
not
all
that
keen
to
deny
the
possibility
that
things

can
come
into
being.
They
had
to
find
other
solutions.
They
all
had
to
find

something
in
the
situation
described
by
the
sentence
"the
jar
comes
into
being"
/

"he
makes
a
jar",
to
which
the
word
‘jar’
could
refer.
Many
chose
the
universal,

sometimes
along
with
other
things,
such
as
the
individual.
The
universal
‘jar-ness’

being
eternal,
it
is
already
there
when
the
jar
comes
into
being,
or
is
made.
Others

maintained
that
the
jar
is
present
in
its
causes,
and
therefore
already
there
in
a
way

while
it
is
being
made.
This
second
position
is
known
by
the
term
satkāryavāda

"the
position
according
to
which
the
effect
exists
[in
its
causes]".
I
do
not
think
that

the
satkāryavāda
was
created,
or
invented,
in
order
to
solve
the
difficulties

connected
with
the
correspondence
principle,
but
its
appeal
grew
inevitably
once

these
difficulties
attracted
general
attention.


 But
not
everyone
accepted
the
satkāryavāda.
Some
emphatically
resisted
it,

preferring
the
asatkāryavāda
"the
position
according
to
which
the
effect
does
not

exist
[in
its
causes]".
The
Vaiśeṣika
school
of
philosophy
accepts
this
position.


 How
did
Vaiśeṣika
deal
with
the
difficulties
connected
with
the

correspondence
principle?
After
what
I
have
said
so
far,
its
reaction
is
almost

predictable.
Vaiśeṣika
does
not
accept
that
the
jar
is
already
there
before
it
comes

into
being;
that
solution
to
the
problem
is
consequently
not
open
to
it.
Its
ontology,

on
the
other
hand,
does
allow
for
universals.
One
would
therefore
expect
a
solution

of
the
kind
that
the
word
‘jar’
denotes
—
perhaps
along
[45]
with
other
things
—

the
universal.
The
word
‘jar’
in
"he
makes
a
jar"
will
have
something
to
refer
to,

and
the
problem
would
be
solved.


 It
is
true
that
from
a
certain
date
onward
Vaiśeṣika
authors
opt
for
this

solution.
The
Padārthadharmasaṅgraha,
or
Praśastapādabhāṣya,
does
not
however

touch
this
problem,
and
nor
does
the
Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra.
Since
we
have
practically
no

other
texts
for
the
early
period,
one
might
be
tempted
to
conclude
that
Vaiśeṣika

authors
have
chosen
this
solution
right
from
the
time
they
became
aware
of
the

problem
of
origination.
This
position
will
however
have
to
be
modified
in
the
light

of
some
of
the
Vaiśeṣika
points
of
view
that
have
been
preserved
for
us
in
the

works
of
non-Vaiśeṣika
authors,
which
inform
us
about
the
period
before
the

Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 3


 Consider
to
begin
with
a
passage
from
the
Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti,
a

commentary
on
the
Abhidharmadīpa,
a
text
of
the
Buddhist
Sarvāstivāda
school.
It

attributes
the
following
position
to
the
Vaiśeṣikas:1



The
Vaiśeṣika
thinks
[as
follows]:
The
substance
‘jar’,
which
is
not
present

in
the
potsherds
[out
of
which
it
will
be
constituted],
and
the
substance

‘cloth’,
which
is
not
present
in
the
threads
[out
of
which
it
will
be

constituted],
come
into
being
as
a
result
of
the
contact
between
the
potsherds

and
that
of
the
threads
[respectively].
And
through
secondary
thought

(gauṇyā kalpanayā)
one
speaks
of
the
existence
of
the
agent
of
coming
into

being,
[existence]
which
has
as
object
a
state
[of
the
jar]
which
is
opposite

[to
the
present].

[46]

Mysterious
as
this
passage
is,
it
states
quite
clearly
that
the
jar
exists
prior
to
its

coming
into
being,
thanks
to
a
secondary
thought.
No
further
details
are
provided.


 If
this
passage
has
whetted
our
appetite,
a
discussion
in
the

Dvādaśāranayacakra
of
Mallavādin,
and
in
its
commentary
the
Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī

of
Siṃhasūri
will
give
us
further
material
to
think
about.
We
learn
here
that
in

Vaiśeṣika
things
that
have
come
into
being
are
called
‘existing’
because
of
a

connection
with
the
universal
‘existence’
(sattāsambandha).
This
connection
with

the
universal
‘existence’
takes
place
at
the
moment
of,
or
immediately
after,
their

coming
into
being;
it
is
the
reason
of
the
denomination
and
of
the
idea
of
the
things

concerned.2



 Here
the
following
question
arises:
Are
objects
completely
non-existent

before
this
connection
with
existence
take
place?
According
to
Mallavādin,
the

Vaiśeṣikas
give
a
negative
answer
to
this
question.
Things
do
exist
in
a
certain
way

before
they
come
into
being.
True,
they
have
no
connection
with
existence
at
that

moment,
but
they
have
some
kind
of
essence
(astitva,
svabhāva,
svabhāvasattā),

which
allows
them
to
come
into
being.
This
means
that
even
without
connection

with
existence,
a
substance
(or,
for
that
matter,
a
quality
or
a
movement)
has
an

identity.
The
Vaiśeṣika,
according
to
Mallavādin,
goes
to
the
extent
of

reinterpreting
the
expression
asat,
which
normally
means
‘non-existent’.
The

Vaiśeṣika
takes
it
as
a
bahuvrīhi
compound,
and
interprets
it
to
mean
"that
which

does
not
have
existence".
The
expression
asatkāryavāda,
seen
this
way,
does
not


1

Abhidh-d
ad
kārikā
310,
p.
274
l.
5-7:
vaiśeṣiko manyate: kapāleṣv avidyamānaṃ
ghaṭadravyaṃ tantuṣu cāvidyamānaṃ paṭadravyaṃ kapālatantusaṃyogād utpadyate/
gauṇyā ca kalpanayā viprakṛtāvasthāviṣayā janikartṛsattā vyapadiśyata iti/.
The
word

viprakṛta
is
obscur.
The
editor,
Padmanabh
S.
Jaini,
suggests
an
emendation
into
viprakṛṣṭa

‘distant’,
but
this
does
not
improve
much.
Apte's
dictionary
gives
viprakṛta,
among
other

meanings,
the
sens
‘opposed’
which
seems
to
fit
more
or
less
both
here
and
two
lines

further
down
where
the
word
is
used
a
second
time.

2

DNC
vol.
2,
p.
459
l.
8-9:
...
sattāsambandho 'bhidhānapratyayahetuḥ.

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 4

say
that
the
effect
is
not
there
before
it
comes
into
being;
it
only
says
that
is
has
no

connection
with
the
universal
‘existence’
as
yet.3

[47]


 The
main
discussion
takes
place
in
the
seventh
chapter
(lit.
spoke,
ara)
of

the
Dvādaśāranayacakra.
The
asatkāryavāda
of
Vaiśeṣika
is
attacked
right
from
the

very
first
line:4
"If
the
effect
is
not
present
[in
its
causes],
it
would
not
come
into

being,
for
there
would
be
no
agent
of
the
operation
[of
coming
into
being]
at
hand,

just
as
[in
the
case
of]
a
sky-flower.
Or
[alternatively,]
also
a
sky-flower
would

come
into
being,
because
there
would
be
no
agent
of
the
operation
[of
coming
into

being]
at
hand,
just
as
[in
the
case
of]
an
effect."


 This
is,
of
course,
the
familiar
problem,
which
is
based
on
the

correspondence
principle.
The
Vaiśeṣika
recognizes
the
problem,
and
maintains

that
the
effect
does
not
exist
before
it
comes
into
being.
However,
there
are
two

kinds
of
existence.
The
effect
has
no
connection
with
the
universal
‘existence’

(sattā)
before
it
comes
into
being;
but
it
is
there,
in
a
certain
way
—
it
has
astitva.

This
is
why
the
Vaiśeṣika
answers:5
"Unlike
the
sky-flower,
the
effect,
having
come

into
being
through
its
own
astitva,
becomes,
even
without
the
relationship
of

inherence
with
[the
universal
‘existence’],
a
support
[for
that
universal]."


 The
opponent
of
the
Vaiśeṣika
then
raises
the
question
whether
existence

(sattā)
makes
existent
that
which
exists,
or
that
which
does
not
exist,
or
that
which

exists
and
does
not
exist.6
It
is
here
that
the
Vaiśeṣika
observes
that
one
can
deny

that
substances
etc.
have
a
connection
with
existence,
but
not
their
existence
[48]

through
their
own
form;
the
universal
‘existence’
does
not,
therefore
make

inexistent
things
existent.7


 I
will
not
bother
you
with
all
the
passage
in
this
long
discussion
that
concern

the
state
of
a
thing
before
it
is
connected
with
existence.
I
must
however
cite
the

following
sentence,
which
Mallavādin
ascribes
to
the
Vaiśeṣika:8
"And
the
[object


3

DNC
vol.
2,
p.
462
l.
3-5:
nanu asat ity atra naña uttarapadābhidheyanivāraṇārthatvāt
satpratiṣedhārthatvāt katham asya sātmakatvam? na, anekāntāt, aputrabrāhmaṇavad
aguṇaguṇavat/ yathā nāsya putro 'stīty aputro brāhmaṇaḥ nāsya guṇo 'stīty aguṇo guṇaḥ
tathehāpi nāsya sad ity asat/;
cp.
Siṃhasūri,
DNC
p.
460
l.
10-11.

4

DNC
vol.
2,
p.
455
l.
1-2:
yady asat kāryaṃ notpadyeta asannihitabhavitṛkatvāt
khapuṣpavat/ khapuṣpam api votpadyeta asannihitabhavitṛkatvāt kāryavat/

5

DNC
vol.
2,
p.
456
l.
1-2:
...
āśrayisamavāyād ṛte 'pi kāryaṃ svenaivāstitvenotpannam
āśrayo bhavati khapuṣpavaidharmyeṇa
...

6

DNC
vol.
2,
p.
459
l.
1-2:
iha prāk sattāsambandhāt satāṃ vā asatāṃ vā sadasatāṃ vā
dravyādīnāṃ satkarī sattā?.
Similar
criticism
in
the
Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā
and

Tarkajvālā
of
Bhāvaviveka;
see
Tachikawa,
1994:
898.

7

DNC
vol.
2,
p.
460
l.
1-2:
...
dravyādīnāṃ sattāsambandhaḥ pratiṣidhyate na tu
svarūpasadbhāva iti sattā naivāsatāṃ satkarī.

8

DNC
vol.
2,
p.
462
l.
6-7:
na ca tad api nirātmakaṃ śaśaviṣāṇavat, sattāsambandhād ṛte
'pi yathā parapakṣe pradhānādīnāṃ sātmakatvaṃ tathehāpi syāt.

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 5

which
is
asat]
is
not[,
for
that
matter,]
without
identity,
like
a
hare's
horn.
Even

without
connection
with
sattā,
it
is
in
our
system
like
in
another
one,
where

pradhāna
etc.
have
an
identity."
Elsewhere
in
the
discussion
the
Vaiśeṣika
recalls

that
sāmānya,
viśeṣa
and
samavāya
—
all
Vaiśeṣika
categories
—
exist
without

having
connection
with
sattā.
But
the
comparison
with
the
pradhāna
of
Sāṃkhya

—
for
there
can
be
no
doubt
that
a
comparison
with
the
Sāṃkhya
system
of

philosophy
is
made
here
—
is
stunning.
For
Sāṃkhya
adheres
to
the
satkāryavāda,

and
is
therefore
in
many
ways
the
exact
opposite
of
Vaiśeṣika
with
its

asatkāryavāda.
The
comparison
shows
that
the
Vaiśeṣikas
to
whose
writings

Mallavādin
had
access
came
dangerously
close
to
the
position
of
the
Sāṃkhyas

where
they
tried
to
solve
the
problem
of
origination.




 A
very
important
question
remains
to
be
discussed.
If
the
Vaiśeṣikas

maintained
that
things
exist
in
a
certain
way
before
they
come
into
being,
can
one

determine
the
beginning
of
this
half-existence?
Are
they
there
from
beginningless

time,
as
the
Sāṃkhyas
believed?
To
my
knowledge
Mallavādin
and
Siṃhasūri's

discussions
offer
no
answer
to
this
question.
We
may
find
the
answer
in
another

early
text,
the
Yuktidīpikā,
which
comments
upon
the
Sāṃkhyakārikā.
Around

kārikā
9
this
text
contains
a
discussion
with
a
Vaiśeṣika
on
the
satkāryavāda.

Where
it
presents
the
argument
that
one
cannot
make
something
[49]
that
is
not

there
—
an
argument
which
we
are
familiar
with
—
it
puts
the
following
words
in

the
mouth
of
the
Vaiśeṣika:9
"But
the
effect
is
made
by
the
agent
etc.
in
the

intermediate
time.
Which
is
this
intermediate
time?
The
answer
is
(follows
a
verse):

They
call
‘intermediate
time’
the
time
during
which
the
causes
have
started
to
do

the
work,
until
the
production
of
the
effect."


 I
conclude,
be
it
with
much
caution,
that
the
preexistence
of
something
that

is
going
to
come
into
being
is
not
without
beginning.
This
passage
from
the

Yuktidīpikā
suggests
rather
that
this
preexistence
starts
when
the
different
factors

that
contribute
to
produce
the
effect,
i.e.,
to
make
the
jar,
start
fulfilling
their

various
functions.
The
intermediate
time
is
neither
without
beginning,
nor

momentary.




9

YD
p.
52
l.
16-21:
āha, nanu ca madhyame kāle kartrādibhiḥ kāryaṃ kriyate/ kaḥ punar
asau madhyamaḥ kāla iti? āha:
ārambhāya prasṛtā yasmin kāle bhavanti kartāraḥ/
kāryasyāniṣpādāt taṃ madhyamaṃ kālam icchanti// iti
yadā hetavaḥ pravṛttārambhā bhavanty uddiśya kāryaṃ na ca tāvan
naimittikasyātmalābhaḥ saṃvartate sa madhyamaḥ kālaḥ/ tasmin kriyate kārakaiḥ kāryam
iti/.
Cp.
Motegi,
1994:
815
sq.;
Motegi
draws
attention
to
the
fact
that
the
reading

kāryasyāniṣpādāt
in
the
verse
is
an
emendation
which
deviates
from
the
manuscripts.

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 6

Two
questions
remain
to
be
asked
in
connection
with
the
preceding
observations.

First
of
all,
what
is
in
general
the
relationship
between
words
and
things
in

Vaiśeṣika?
Since
the
correspondence
principle
presupposes
a
close
link
between
the

words
of
a
sentence
and
the
elements
that
constitute
the
situation
it
describes,
this

question
is
of
some
importance.
The
second
question
to
be
asked
concerns
the

literature
of
Vaiśeṣika
in
which
the
positions
just
described
were
originally

expressed.


 First
the
relationship
between
words
and
things.
In
a
recent
article
I
have

argued
that
Vaiśeṣika
is
to
a
large
extent
based
on
four
axioms.10
Two
of
these

axioms
are
of
special
interest
in
the
present
context.
In
Vaiśeṣika
composite
objects

are
looked
upon
as
real,
as
real
as
their
constituents,
and
as
existing
alongside

them.
The
vase
is
different
from
the
two
halves
that
it
is
composed
[50]
of;
together

they
constitute
three
entities.
The
Vaiśeṣikas,
moreover,
present
a
list
of
categories

which
constitutes,
in
their
opinion,
a
list
of
all
there
is.
The
question
is:
how
could

the
Vaiśeṣikas
find
out
what
filled
their
world?


 Their
answer
is
directly
relevant
to
the
theme
of
this
lecture.
It
is:
the

Sanskrit
language.
The
Sanskrit
language
allowed
them
to
find
out
what
exists.

Words
are
for
them
the
key
that
gives
access
to
reality.
This
they
explain
by

pointing
out
that
names
were
given
by
seers
who
could
perceive
everything.11
This

10

Bronkhorst,
1992.

11

Vaiśeṣika Sūtra
(ed.
Jambuvijaya)
2.1.18-19:
saṃjñākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam/
pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ/.
See
also
Wezler,
1985.
The
theme
of
seers
who

have
given
names
to
things
is
already
present
in
the
Ùgveda
and
other
early
texts,
as
we

have
seen.
Other
texts
take
over
the
same
theme.
The
Yuktidīpikā
(ed.
Pandeya,
p.
5
l.
9
f.)

ascribes
the
original
function
of
naming
things
to
the
supreme
seer
(paramarṣi),
who
is,
of

course,
Kapila.
The
Mahābhārata
(12.262.8),
probably
inspired
by
the
Nirukta
passage

cited
earlier,
states
that
the
seer
Kapila
had
an
an
insight
into
the
nature
of
things

(pratyakṣadharma);
the
Mahābhāṣya
(ed.
Kielhorn
vol.
I
p.
11
l.
11
f.)
uses
the
same

expression
(here
pratyakṣadharman)
in
connection
with
seers
known
as
yarvāṇas tarvāṇas

(so
Cardona,
1990:
7
and
16
n.
24).
The
Nyāya Bhāṣya
use
the
same
expression
as
the

Nirukta
(sākṣātkṛtadharman)
with
reference
to
"reliable
persons"
(āpta);
see
Franco,
1994:

241.
See
further
Ruegg,
1994,
1994a;
also
Bhartṛhari's
Vākyapadīya
1.37-38;
3.1.46;

Houben,
forthcoming
b.
Isaacson,
1993,
has
drawn
attention
to
the
fact
that
yogic

perception
has
played
a
role
in
Vaiśeṣika
from
an
early
date
onward.
The
idea
that
poets

have
a
special
insight
into
the
nature
of
things
was
to
have
a
long
life
in
India.
Rājaśekhara,

the
author
of
the
treatise
on
poetry
called
Kāvyamīmāṃsā
(9th
or
10th
century
C.E.),

observes
in
chapter
12
(p.
62,
l.
17
-
p.
63,
l.
1;
tr.
Granoff,
1995:
364):
"The
true
poetic

eye,
gained
from
propitiation
of
the
goddess
Sarasvatī,
without
need
of
external
aids

reveals
things
that
have
been
directly
experienced
by
the
poet
and
things
that
the
poet
has

never
even
experienced
before,
in
a
process
that
is
beyond
the
range
of
human
conception

and
cannot
be
described
in
words.
For
it
is
said
that
the
goddess
Sarasvatī
reveals
even
to

the
sleeping
poet
both
the
theme
of
his
poem
and
the
language
in
which
to
express
it.
But

others
though
awake
are
as
if
blind.
For
this
reason
it
is
said
that
really
great
poets
are

blind
to
things
that
have
already
been
seen
by
others,
but
possess
a
kind
of
divine
sight
that

enables
them
to
perceive
that
which
no
one
before
them
has
ever
seen.
Even
the
Three-
eyed
God
Śiva
or
Indra
with
his
thousand
eyes
cannot
see
that
which
mortal
poets
see
with

their
ordinary
eyes.
In
the
mirror
that
is
the
mind
of
poets
the
whole
universe
is
reflected.

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 7

in
its
turn
[51]
explains
why
the
Vaiśeṣika
texts
frequently
emphasise
that
this
or

that
ontological
situation
justifies
this
or
that
current
expression.
The
quality

pṛthaktva
(separateness),
for
example,
explains
that
people
speak
of
distinction.

Sometimes
the
reasoning
works
in
the
opposite
direction:
the
fact
that
the
personal

pronoun
"I"
cannot
be
used
in
apposition
with
some
such
term
as
"earth",
proves

that
the
soul
is
different
from
the
body.
Many
further
examples
could
be
adduced
to

illustrate
the
parallelism
between
words
and
things
from
the
Vaiśeṣika
point
of

view,
but
they
tend
to
be
rather
technical;
I
will
not,
therefore,
harass
you
with

more
of
them.12
But
I
would
like
to
add
one
more
observation:
even
though
the

texts
are
not
explicit
about
this,
the
conscious
belief
in
the
intimate
connection

between
words
and
things
may
explain
why
the
three
most
important
(and
perhaps

oldest)
categories
of
Vaiśeṣika
—
substance
(dravya),
quality
(guṇa)
and

movement
(karman)
—
correspond
to
the
three
main
types
of
words:
nouns,

adjectives
and
verbs.


 These
considerations
show
that
Vaiśeṣika
takes
a
close
connection
between

words
and
things
for
granted.
This
makes
it
all
the
more
understandable
that
the

principle
of
correspondence
exerted
a
strong
attraction
on
them.


 We
now
turn
to
the
other
remaining
question.
Which
were
the
Vaiśeṣika

texts
in
which
the
positions
outlined
above
found
expression?


 The
oldest
clearly
understandable
and
unitary
Vaiśeṣika
text
which
we

possess
is
the
Padārthadharmasaṅgraha
of
Praśastapāda,
which
I
mentioned
earlier.

I
am
tempted
to
believe
that
this
text
belongs
to
the
sixth
century
of
the
common

era,
and
I
have
the
impression
that
most
researchers
would
more
or
less
agree
with

this
date.
Besides
the
Padārthadharmasaṅgraha
we
have
a
short
text,
that
has
only

survived
in
Chinese
translation,
and
which
may
have
been
called
Daśapadārthī;
it
is

unfortunately
too
short
to
derive
much
information
from
it.
And
then
there
is,
of

course,
the
Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra.
The
Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra
is
the
oldest
[52]
Vaiśeṣika
text

we
possess,
and
I
am
tempted
to
think
that
it
is
the
earliest
Vaiśeṣika
text
that
ever

existed.
It,
or
rather
its
earliest
version,
must
date
back
to
the
early
centuries
of
the

common
era,
for
Vaiśeṣika
is
already
referred
to
in
the
Buddhist
Vibhāṣā.13

Unfortunately
the
Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra
which
is
known
to
us
is
not
identical
with
its

earliest
version.
Five
versions
have
been
preserved,14
all
of
which
share
features


Words
and
what
they
express
vie
with
each
other
in
their
rush
to
be
present
to
great

minded
poets.
Poets
explore
with
their
words
that
which
yogins
see
through
the
power
of

their
religious
accomplishments.
And
so
the
words
of
great
poets
are
potentially
infinite."

12

See
Bronkhorst,
1992:
99
f.,
for
these
and
other
examples.

13

Ui,
1917:
38
f.

14

Three
versions
were
known,
accompanied
by
the
commentaries
of
Candrānanda,
Bhaṭṭa

Vadīndra
and
Śaṅkara
Miśra
respectively;
two
more
have
been
brought
to
light
in

Harunaga
Isaacson's
recent
doctoral
dissertation
(1995).

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 8

that
belong
to
a
time
well
after
the
beginning
of
the
system.
Sūtras
have
been
added

and
removed,
and
even
the
order
of
the
sūtras
appears
to
have
occasionally
been

changed
so
as
to
allow
of
a
different
interpretation.15


 It
is
not
clear
until
what
date
modifications
were
still
introduced
into
the

Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra.
Certain
is
that
a
long
time
separates
the
earliest
version
of
this
text

from
the
Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.
And
it
is
also
becoming
more
and
more
clear

that
during
this
period
much
happened
to
the
system.
The
sūtra
that
enumerates

qualities,
for
example,
has
just
seventeen
of
them.
The
Padārthadharmasaṅgraha,
on

the
other
hand,
enumerates
twenty-four
qualities.
Among
the
added
qualities
we

find
sound,
and
there
is
indeed
evidence
that
early
Vaiśeṣika
looked
upon
sound,

not
as
a
quality,
but
as
a
substance,
a
form
of
wind.16
Another
example
concerns
the

creator
god:
the
Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra
contains
no
trace
of
a
creator
god,
in
the

Padārthasaṅgraha
he
has
assumed
his
position.
We
even
have
the
evidence
from
the

Yuktidīpikā
and
from
the
Vedāntin
philosopher
Śaṅkara
to
the
extent
that
early

Vaiśeṣika
did
not
accept
a
creator
god,
whereas
later
thinkers
of
the
school
did.


 Most
of
these
changes
were
not
introduced
into
the
system
by
Praśastapāda.

The
idea
of
a
creator
god
may
be
an
exception;
here
there
is
some
reason
to
assume

that
Praśastapāda
himself
[53]
may
have
played
a
crucial
role.17
Most
of
the
other

developments
must
have
found
their
earliest
expression
in
a
number
of
texts
that

have
existed
during
the
long
time
that
separates
the
original
Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra
from

the
Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.
Of
most
of
these
texts
even
the
names
will
probably

forever
remain
unknown
to
us.
About
a
few
of
them,
however,
we
have
some
little

information.
One
is
a
commentary
written
by
Praśastapāda,
the
author
of
the

Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.
The
other
is
the
one
on
which
he
wrote
a
commentary,

and
which
appeared
to
have
been
well-known
in
its
time.
By
collecting
the
various

testimonies
in
the
texts
of
other
schools,
I
have
come
to
think
that
this
text
was

called
Kaṭandī,
and
that
its
author
was
known
by
the
name
Rāvaṇa.
The
Kaṭandī

was
itself
a
commentary,
on
the
Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra,
and
it
was
written
in
the
so-called

vārttika-style,
which
explains
that
we
sometimes
find
references
to
vākyas
and

bhāṣyas;
the
vārttika-style
is
characterised
by
the
presence
of
short
nominal
vākyas

followed
by
somewhat
more
elaborate
explanations
called
bhāṣyas.18


 This
Kaṭandī
(or
whatever
may
have
been
its
name)
appears
to
have
been
an

authoritative
text
for
quite
some
time.
It
is
indeed
the
text
to
which
Mallavādin

constantly
refers
while
describing
and
criticizing
the
Vaiśeṣika
position.
It
seems


15

See
Bronkhorst,
1995.

16

Bronkhorst,
1993a.

17

Bronkhorst,
1996.

18

Bronkhorst,
1993.

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 9

likely
that
also
the
other
texts
we
have
referred
to
—
the
Buddhist

Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti
and
the
Sāṃkhya
Yuktidīpikā
—
based
their
information

concerning
Vaiśeṣika
on
this
text.
However
this
may
be,
it
seems
probable
that
the

problem
of
origination
did
not
play
much
of
a
role,
if
any,
during
the
time
of

composition
of
the
original
Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra,
and
that
it
came
up
at
a
later
time,

perhaps
for
the
first
time
in
the
Kaṭandī,
or
already
before
this
text.


 I
have
already
pointed
out
to
you
that
later
Vaiśeṣika
came
to
adopt
a

solution
to
the
problem
of
origination
that
was
quite
different
from
the
one
offered

(if
I
am
right)
in
the
Kaṭandī.
Later
Vaiśeṣikas
joined
the
Naiyāyikas
in
thinking

that
the
fact
that
words
refer
to
universals
solved
that
problem.
Once
this
solution

accepted,
the
complicated
distinction
between
two
forms
of
[54]
existence,
and
the

attempt
to
use
it
to
answer
the
question
of
how
something
can
come
into
being,

became
superfluous,
and
the
weaknesses
of
the
earlier
solution,
such
as
its

vagueness
(when
exactly
does
the
pre-existence
of
a
jar
begin?),
could
not
but

contribute
to
its
decline.
The
earlier
solution
was
not
just
refuted,
worse,
it
was

forgotten,
and
no
one
talked
about
it
any
more.
I
do
not
exclude
that
this
change
of

position
of
the
Vaiśeṣika
thinkers
is
responsible
for
the
fact
that
the
Kaṭandī
and
its

commentary
by
Praśastapāda,
once
the
main
works
of
the
school,
soon
stopped
to

be
handed
down.
Praśastapāda's
Padārthadharmasaṅgraha,
on
the
other
hand,
does

not
touch
the
question
of
origination;
is
this
the
reason
that
it
continued
to
be

handed
down
in
a
fairly
large
number
of
manuscript
copies
until
today?
It
is
hard
to

prove
these
suspicions,
but
I
would
like
to
suggest,
in
conclusion,
that
the
loss
of

philosophical
texts
may
in
certain
cases
have
been
occasioned
by
the
fact
that

points
of
view
changed.





References:



Bronkhorst,
Johannes
(1992):
"Quelques
axiomes
du
Vaiśeṣika."
Les Cahiers de
Philosophie
14
("L'orient
de
la
pensée:
philosophies
en
Inde"),
95-110.

Bronkhorst,
Johannes
(1993):
"The
Vaiśeṣika
vākya
and
bhāṣya."
Annals
of
the

Bhandarkar
Oriental
Research
Institute
72-73
(1991-1992),
145-169.

Bronkhorst,
Johannes
(1993a):
"Studies
on
Bhartṛhari,
5:
Bhartṛhari
and

Vaiśeṣika."
AS
47(1),
75-94.

Bronkhorst,
Johannes
(1995):
"Once
again
Vaiśeṣika
sūtra
3.1.13."
AS
48(2),
1994

[1995],
665-681.

Bronkhorst,
Johannes
(1996):
"God's
arrival
in
the
Vaiśeṣika
system."
Journal of
Indian Philosophy
24(3),
281-294.

Cardona,
George
(1990):
"On
attitudes
towards
language
in
ancient
India."
Sino-
Platonic Papers
15
(Department
of
Oriental
Studies,
University
of

Pennsylvania),
1-19.

Franco,
Eli
(1994):
"Yet
another
look
at
the
framework
of
the
Pramāṇasiddhi

chapter
of
Pramāṇavārttika."
Indo-Iranian Journal
37,
233-252.

Satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda 10

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Abbreviations:



Abhidh-d
 Abhidharmadīpa
with
Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti,
ed.
P.
S.
Jaini,

Patna
1959
(TSWS
4)

DNC
 Dvādaśāraṃ
Nayacakram
of
Mallavādin,
with
the
commentary

Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī
of
Siṃhasūri,
3
parts,
ed.
Muni

Jambuvijaya,
Bhavnagar:
Sri
Jain
Atmanand
Sabha
(Śrī

Ótmānanda
Jaina
Granthamālā
no.
92,
94,
95),
1966,
1976,

1988.