PEOPLE v. SALVADOR TULAGAN, GR No.

227363, 2019-03-12
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August
17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, which affirmed the Joint Decision[2]
dated February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City in
Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211, finding accused-appellant Salvador
Tulagan (Tulagan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of sexual assault
and statutory rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and
1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in relation to Article 266-B. In
Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows: That sometime in
the month of September 2011, at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and
with abuse of superior strength forcibly laid complainant AAA,[3] a 9-year-old
minor in a cemented pavement, and did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will and
consent. Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
R.A. 7610. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, Tulagan was charged as follows: That
on or about October 8, 2011 at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse
of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor against her will and
consent to the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against her will and consent.
Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A.
7610.

Upon arraignment, Tulagan pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged

For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted
that he lived barely five (5) meters away from AAA's grandmother's house where
she lived. He added that the whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to
1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00
p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the banana leaves he gathered at the back
of their kitchen. He said that he never went to AAA's house and that he had not
seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011. Tulagan, likewise, claimed
that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding with
AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he raped her
granddaughter.

After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden
of proof in two offenses of rape against AAA. It held that all the elements of sexual
assault and statutory rape was duly established. The trial court relied on the
credible and positive declaration of the victim as against the alibi and denial of
Tulagan. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the
crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in
relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount
of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00) pesos; moral damages in the amount of fifty
thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of the suit. Likewise, this
Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No.
SCC-6210 for the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
paragraph 2 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of thirty thousand
(Php30,000.00) pesos; and moral damages in the amount of twenty thousand
(Php20,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.[4]

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual

assault and statutory rape.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: ACCORDINGLY, the Decision

dated February 10, 2014 is AFFIRMED, subject to the following
MODIFICATIONS: 1. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault),
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award
of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, are likewise granted. 2. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 (Statutory
Rape), the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are increased to
P100,000.00 each. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, too, are
granted. 3. All damages awarded are subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% [per
annum] from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Here, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, both the RTC and the CA
found AAA's testimony to be credible, straightforward and unwavering when she
testified that Tulagan forcibly inserted his finger in her vagina. In Criminal Case
No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, both the RTC and the CA also found that the
elements thereof were present, to wit: (1) accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim, and (2) said act was accomplished when the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age. Indubitably, the courts a quo found that the prosecution was able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt Tulagan's guilt for the crime of rape. We find no
reason to deviate from said findings and conclusions of the courts a quo.

Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or

discrepancies does not, by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such
testimony. In fact, the variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering
instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility
of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness'
consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and
categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same.[8] As
correctly held by the CA, the fact that some of the details testified to by AAA did
not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not mean that the sexual assault did
not happen. AAA was still able to narrate all the details of the sexual assault she
suffered in Tulagan's hands. AAA's account of her ordeal being straightforward
and candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician,
as well as her positive identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the crime, are,
thus, sufficient to support a conviction of rape. As for Tulagan's imputation of ill
motive on the part of AAA's grandmother, absent any concrete supporting
evidence, said allegation will not convince us that the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the victim and her supporting witness was tainted with arbitrariness
or blindness to a fact of consequence. We reiterate the principle that no young girl,
such as AAA, would concoct a sordid tale, on her own or through the influence of
her grandmother as per Tulagan's intimation, undergo an invasive medical
examination then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial,
if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice.

We also reject Tulagan's defense of denial. Being a negative defense, the defense
of denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in the instant
case, deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than
the testimony of credible witnesses, like AAA, who testified on affirmative
matters. Since AAA testified in a categorical and consistent manner without any ill
motive, her positive identification of Tulagan as the sexual offender must prevail
over his defenses of denial and alibi. Here, the courts a quo did not give credence
to Tulagan's alibi considering that his house was only 50 meters away from AAA's
house, thus, he failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis when the rape incidents took place. "Physical impossibility"
refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. There must be a
demonstration that they were so far away and could not have been physically
present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed. In this regard, Tulagan failed to prove that there was physical
impossibility for him to be at the crime scene when the rape was committed.[11]
Thus, his alibi must fail.

Further, although the rape incidents in the instant case were not immediately
reported to the police, such delay does not affect the truthfulness of the charge in
the absence of other circumstances that show the same to be mere concoction or
impelled by some ill motive.

For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, We take this opportunity to reconcile
the provisions on Acts of Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual Assault under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 vis-a-vis
Sexual Intercourse and Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
to fortify the earlier decisions of the Court and doctrines laid down on similar
issues, and to clarify the nomenclature and the imposable penalties of said crimes,
and damages in line with existing jurisprudence.[13] Prior to the effectivity of R.A.
No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 on October 22, 1997, acts constituting
sexual assault under paragraph 2,[14] Article 266-A of the RPC, were punished as
acts of lasciviousness under Article No. 336[15] of the RPC or Act No. 3815
which took effect on December 8, 1930. For an accused to be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness, the confluence of the following essential elements must be proven:
(1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it
is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age.[

Issues:

Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special
type of protection for children from all types of abuse. Hence, it can be rightly
inferred that the title used in Article III, Section 5, "Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse" does not mean that it is only applicable to children used as
prostitutes as the main offense and the other sexual abuses as additional offenses,
the absence of the former rendering inapplicable the imposition of the penalty
provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses committed by the
offenders on the children concerned. Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is clear - it only punishes those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak of that which
requires statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the
law.

Ruling:

The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of

the crime, the penalty imposed, and the damages awarded in Criminal Case No.
SCC-6210 for sexual assault, and a reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal
Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, are in order. Factual findings of the trial
court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to
observe the witnesses when placed on the stand. Consequently, appellate courts
will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.

Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special
type of protection for children from all types of abuse. Hence, it can be rightly
inferred that the title used in Article III, Section 5, "Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse" does not mean that it is only applicable to children used as
prostitutes as the main offense and the other sexual abuses as additional offenses,
the absence of the former rendering inapplicable the imposition of the penalty
provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses committed by the
offenders on the children concerned. Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is clear - it only punishes those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak of that which
requires statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the
law.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that Tulagan was aptly prosecuted
for sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in Criminal Case.
No. SCC-6210 because it was alleged and proven that AAA was nine (9) years old
at the time he inserted his finger into her vagina. Instead of applying the penalty
under Article 266-B of the RPC, which is prision mayor, the proper penalty should
be that provided in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period. This is because AAA was below twelve (12) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the act of inserting his
finger in AAA's private part undeniably amounted to "lascivious conduct."[129]
Hence, the proper nomenclature of the offense should be Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is
fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On
the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, Tulagan
should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months
and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In
Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, We affirm that Tulagan should
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with paragraph 1(d), Article
266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint

Decision dated February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case
Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals Decision
dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. We find accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan: 1. Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, in
Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) month... and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. 2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory
Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with modification as to the award of damages. Appellant is
ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages... ation as to
the award of damages. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on
all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019

FACTS:

The RTC and CA convicted Salvador Tulagan for the crime of statutory rape (Art.
266-A of the RPC). During the trial, BBB, aunt of the victim AAA, testified that
around 10:30 a.m. of October 17, 2011, she noticed a man looking at AAA outside
their house. When AAA asked her permission to go to the bathroom located
outside their house, the man suddenly went near AAA. Out of suspicion, BBB
walked to approach AAA. As BBB came close to AAA, the man left suddenly.
After AAA returned from the bathroom, BBB asked what the man was doing to
her. AAA did not reply. She then told AAA to get inside the house. She asked
AAA to move her panties down, and examined her genitalia. She noticed that her
genitalia was swollen. AAA then confessed to her about the wrong done to her by
appellant whom AAA referred to as Badong or Salvador Tulagan. AAA cried hard
and embraced BBB tightly. AAA asked BBB for her help and even told her that
she wanted Badong to be put in jail. AAA, nine (9) years old, testified that
sometime in September 2011 while she was peeling corn with her cousin who lived
adjacent to her grandmother's house, Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and
inserted his finger into her private part. She said that it was painful, but Tulagan
just pretended as if he was just looking for something and went home. AAA,
likewise, testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8, 2011, while she was
playing with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house, he brought her to his house
and told her to keep quiet. He told her to lie down on the floor, and removed her
short pants and panties. He also undressed himself, kissed AAA's cheeks, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She claimed that it was painful and that she cried
because Tulagan held her hands and pinned them with his. She did not tell anyone
about the incident, until her aunt examined her private part. Upon genital
examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder on AAA, she found a healed laceration at 6
o'clock position in AAA's hymen, and a dilated or enlarged vaginal opening. She
said that it is not normal for a 9-year-old child to have a dilated vaginal opening
and laceration in the hymen. For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not
know AAA well, but admitted that he lived barely five (5) meters away from
AAA's grandmother's house where she lived. He added that the whole month of
September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried banana
leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut
the banana leaves he gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never
went to AAA's house and that he had not seen AAA during the entire month of
September 2011. Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents
occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding with AAA's grandmother, who later
on started spreading rumors that he raped her granddaughter.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC

HELD:

No. Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of
credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts
carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn
the said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed
decision or affect the result of the case. In this case, both the RTC and the CA
found AAA's testimony to be credible, straightforward and unwavering when she
testified that Tulagan forcibly inserted his finger in her vagina. Jurisprudence tells
us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or discrepancies does not,
by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance
in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness'
credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead,
what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal
elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused
as the perpetrator of the same. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste
design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by
overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted
as lewd or lascivious.