People v. Buan

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25366. March 29, 1968.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE

BUAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; QUASI

OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION FOR THE
SAME ACT. — Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. As the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense remains one and the same. It cannot be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.
2. ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL FROM THE CHARGE OF SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE A BAR TO SUBSEQUENT
PROSECUTION FOR SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. — The exoneration of appellant by the
Municipal Court of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
as both charges are derived from the consequence of one and the same
vehicular accident. The second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J : p
Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First

Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal Case No. 5243 (for serious physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence), overruling a
motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
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Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company
on July 23, 1962, along the MacArthur Highway in the municipality of
Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence and recklessness,
the vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of
Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and causing it to turn turtle, and
injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered slight physical injuries
requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days; three other riders came out
with serious bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days;
while the jeep was damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on December 16,
1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in
the Court of First Instance the information in the case now before us, for
serious physical injuries, and damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway
collision.
When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his
counsel moved to quash the charges on the ground that he had already
been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court. The
prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion to quash.
Unable to secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.
Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed the
appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by the
previous acquittal.
We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not
dismissing the information for "serious physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence," in view of the appellant's previous
acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the
same imprudence.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme
Court, and is also that of this Court in its most recent decisions on the
matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as a result
of the same vehicular accident one man died, two persons were seriously
injured while another three suffered only slight physical injuries, we ruled
that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless
imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that
the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a
second information of Damage to Property Through Reckless Imprudence
based on the same negligent act of the accused. In People vs. Belga, 100
Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was declared
to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries arising from
the same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et
al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court
regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same
occurrence were triable in Courts of differing category, or that the
complainants were not the same individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal
(12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this to say:
"Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males
diversos, como el hecho culposo es uno solo, existe un solo delito de
imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal Supremo.
De acuerdo con esta doctrina el automovilista imprudente que
atropella y causa lesiones a dos personas y además daños, no
respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno de daños por imprudencia,
sino de un solo delito culposo."
The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain (footnotes 2 and 3):
"8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927."
"Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona

y además se ocasionan daños, existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno
solo fué el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos en orden a la
responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931; si a consecuencia de un solo
acto imprudente se produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de
daños, como todos son consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe
penarlos por separado, 2 abril 1932."
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of
grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and
rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. Diaz, supra:
". . . The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was
the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the
lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is
not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court."
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of

this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
'Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan is directed to quash and dismiss the charge in its
Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., did not take part.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-25366. March 29, 1968.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

1. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; QUASI

Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First

"Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona

In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of

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