Amizola, Darhyl Mayte D.

8/29/17

Political Science Atty. Amon

Case Digests/Midterms

1.) ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA – G.R. NO. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of
Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate.
On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate,
approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.

Issue:

Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720
be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required?

Held:

Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the
claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable
because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB
No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does
not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House
of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

2.) HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and

HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and
TONY CALVENTO, respondents

G.R. No. 129093

Facts:

On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor
Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was
denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent
Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995;
(2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

Issue: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

Held:

As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the
national government. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in our system of government, the power of local government
units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from
Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

Section 2. Declaration of Policy.

It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and peoples organizations, and
other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions.

Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the Sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects
are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a
project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the
national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and
27 of the Local Government Code.

Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof. Section 26 reads:

Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be
the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved
in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of
animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and
other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon
the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will
be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and
programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: may cause
pollution; may bring about climatic change; may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; may
result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; may eradicate certain animal or plant species from
the face of the planet; and other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be
produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.

Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought on
their part. There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his
refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.

In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or
implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That
resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding
legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent
mayors refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate business
activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/aug2001/129093.htm

3.) G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. &
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

Facts:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City,
the reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December
7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner
Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement
Issue: Whether or not, WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

Held: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was
not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and
the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily
because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily
a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as
offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the
ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.

From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for
obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling, even if
legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place for that
matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the
people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not
despotic, manner.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jul1994/gr_111097_1994.html

4.) Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque

Facts:

The named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of
the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast milk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued
by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES

Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way
that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article
23 of the WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect
to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it
obligatory to comply with such rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_173034_2007.html

5.) REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL. G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

Facts:

On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of respondents P.J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction Corporation and against petitioner
confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfaction of a
judgment against the Phlippine Government. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor
issued an Order declaring the decision final and executory. Villasor directed the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute said decision. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served
Notices of Garnishment with several Banks, specially on Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB. The funds
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of
military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP .Petitioner, on certiorari,
filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution
against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.

Issue: Whether or not, Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

Held:

What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state
as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from
suit ,not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The
State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a
basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to
be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the
State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law

Source: http://balaod.wordpress.com/2006/07/31/republic-vs-guillermo-p-villasor-et-al/

6.) Lasco vs UNRFNRE Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural
Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations
Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary
organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government
and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the complainants for illegal
dismissal and damages .Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over
its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Held: Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states
that ³each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes
arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party.´
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a
joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in
Dinagat Island

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/feb1995/gr_109095_109107_1995.html

7.) Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083

Fact:

A cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves
and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it
is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:

1.) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

2.) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

Held: YES

Petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a
balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This right is also
the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses
may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jul1993/gr_101083_1993.html

8.) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila G.R. No. L-66598 December 19,
1986 PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, 
vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HONORABLE ARBITER
TEODORICO L. DOGELIO and RICARDO ORPIADA respondents

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications and the Corporate Executive Search Inc. (CESI) entered
into a letter agreement dated January 1976 under which (CESI) undertook to provide "Temporary
Services" to petitioner Consisting of the "temporary services" of eleven (11) messengers. The contract
period is described as "from January 1976—." The petitioner in truth undertook to pay a "daily service
rate of P18" on a per person basis.

Attached to the letter agreement was a "List of Messengers assigned at Philippine Bank of
Communications" which list included, as item No. 5 thereof, the name of private respondent Ricardo
Orpiada.

Ricardo Orpiada was thus assigned to work with the petitioner bank. As such, he rendered services to the
bank, within the premises of the bank and alongside other people also rendering services to the bank.
There was some question as to when Ricardo Orpiada commenced rendering services to the bank. As
noted above, the letter agreement was dated January 1976. However, the position paper submitted by
(CESI) to the National Labor Relations Commission stated that (CESI) hired Ricardo Orpiada on 25 June
1975 as a Tempo Service employee, and assigned him to work with the petitioner bank "as evidenced by
the appointment memo issued to him on 25 June 1975. " Be that as it may, on or about October 1976, the
petitioner requested (CESI) to withdraw Orpiada's assignment because, in the allegation of the bank,
Orpiada's services "were no longer needed."

Issue:

Whether or not, we are unable to agree with the bank and (CESI) on this score. The definition of "labor-
only" contracting in Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules must be read in conjunction with the
definition of job contracting given in Section 8 of the same Rules. The undertaking given by CESI in
favor of the bank was not the performance of a specific job for instance, the carriage and delivery of
documents and parcels to the addresses thereof. There appear to be many companies today which perform
this discrete service, companies with their own personnel who pick up documents and packages from the
offices of a client or customer, and who deliver such materials utilizing their own delivery vans or
motorcycles to the addresses. In the present case, the undertaking of (CESI) was to provide its client the
bank with a certain number of persons able to carry out the work of messengers. Such undertaking of
CESI was complied with when the requisite number of persons were assigned or seconded to the
petitioner bank. Orpiada utilized the premises and office equipment of the bank and not those of (CESI)
Messengerial work-the delivery of documents to designated persons whether within or without the bank
premises — is of course directly related to the day-to-day operations of the bank. Section 9(2) quoted
above does not require for its applicability that the petitioner must be engaged in the delivery of items as a
distinct and separate line of business.

Held:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED and the decision promulgated on 29 December
1983 of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by this Court on 11 April 1984 is hereby lifted. Costs against petitioner.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1986/dec1986/gr_66598_1986.html

9.) Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 97008-09 July 23, 1993
VIRGINIA G. NERI and JOSE CABELIN, petitioners, 
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FAR EAST BANK & TRUST
COMPANY (FEBTC) and BUILDING CARE CORPORATION, respondents. R.L. Salcedo
& Improso Law Office for petitioners. Bengzon, Zarnaga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson,
Bengzon & Jimenez for Bldg. Care Corp. Bautista, Picaso, Buyco, Tan & Fider for
respondent FEBTC.

Facts:

Respondents are sued by two employees of Building Care Corporation, which provides janitorial and
other specific services to various firms, to compel Far Bast Bank and Trust Company to recognize them
as its regular employees and be paid the same wages which its employees receive.

Building Care Corporation (BCC, for brevity), in the proceedings below, established that it had
substantial capitalization of P1 Million or a stockholder’s equity of P1.5 Million. Thus the Labor Arbiter
ruled that BCC was only job contracting and that consequently its employees were not employees of Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC, for brevity). on appeal, this factual finding was affirmed by
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity). Nevertheless, petitioners insist
before us that BCC is engaged in "labor-only" contracting hence, they conclude, they are employees of
respondent FEBTC.

Petitioners Virginia G. Neri and Jose Cabelin applied for positions with, and were hired by, respondent
BCC, a corporation engaged in providing technical, maintenance, engineering, housekeeping, security
and other specific services to its clientele. They were assigned to work in the Cagayan de Oro City
Branch of respondent FEBTC on 1 May 1979 and 1 August 1980, respectively, Neri as a radio/telex
operator and Cabelin as janitor, before being promoted to messenger on 1 April 1989.
Issue:

Whether or not, the status of BCC as an independent contractor was previously confirmed by this Court
in Associated Labor Unions-TUCP v. National Labor Relations Commission,

Held:

Indeed, the facts in Philippine Bank of Communications do not square with those of the instant case.
Therein, the Court ruled that CESI was a "labor-only" contractor because upholding the contract between
the contractor and the bank would in effect permit employers to avoid the necessity of hiring regular or
permanent employees and would enable them to keep their employees indefinitely on a temporary or
casual basis, thus denying them security of tenure in their jobs. This of course violates the Labor Code.
BCC has not committed any violation. Also, the former case was for illegal dismissal; this case, on the
other hand, is for conversion of employment status so that petitioners can receive the same salary being
given to regular employees of FEBTC. But, as herein determined, petitioners are not regular employees of
FEBTC but of BCC. At any rate, the finding of BCC in a qualified independent contractor precludes us
from applying the Philippine Bank of Communications doctrine to the instant petition.

The determination of employer-employee relationship involves factual findings. Absent any grave abuse
of discretion, and we find none in the case before us, we are bound by the findings of the Labor Arbiter as
affirmed by respondent NLRC.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jul1993/gr_97008_09_1993.html

10.)Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila (FIRST DIVISION) G.R. No.
94951 April 22, 1991 APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO, respondents.
Bernabe B. Alabastro for petitioner. Angel Fernandez for private respondent.

Facts:

Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18,
1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the
beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly
basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.

On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry,
she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate
supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she
was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa
offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit
her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to
work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.

Issue: Whether or not, The petition is devoid of merit.

Held:

Yes, Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that respondent
abandoned her work.1âwphi1 This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show that
because of an accident which took place while private respondent was performing her laundry services,
she was not able to work and was ultimately separated from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to
appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be
interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public
respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/apr1991/gr_94951_1991.html

11.) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila (FIRST DIVISION) G.R. No.
78693 January 28, 1991 ZOSIMO CIELO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HENRY LEI and/or HENRY LEI TRUCKING
respondents. Francisco D. Alas for petitioner. Mateo G. Delegencia for private respondent.

Facts:

The petitioner is a truck driver who claims he was illegally dismissed by the private respondent, the
Henry Lei Trucking Company. The Labor Arbiter found for him and ordered his reinstatement with back
wages.1 On appeal, the decision was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission, which held
that the petitioner's employment had expired under a valid contract. 2 The petitioner then came to us
on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Required to submit a Comment (not to file a motion to dismiss), the private respondent nevertheless
moved to dismiss on the ground that the petition was filed sixty-eight days after service of the challenged
decision on the petitioner, hence late. The motion was untenable, of course. Petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 may be instituted within a reasonable period, which the Court has consistently reckoned at three
months.

Issue:
Whether or not, the agreement in question had such a purpose and so was null and void ab initio.

Held:

The Court looks with stern disapproval at the contract entered into by the private respondent with the
petitioner (and who knows with how many other drivers). The agreement was a clear attempt to exploit
the unwitting employee and deprive him of the protection of the Labor Code by making it appear that the
stipulations of the parties were governed by the Civil Code as in ordinary private transactions. They were
not, to be sure. The agreement was in reality a contract of employment into which were read the
provisions of the Labor Code and the social justice policy mandated by the Constitution. It was a deceitful
agreement cloaked in the habiliments of legality to conceal the selfish desire of the employer to reap
undeserved profits at the expense of its employees. The fact that the drivers are on the whole practically
unlettered only makes the imposition more censurable and the avarice more execrable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is
SET ASIDE and that of the Labor Arbiter REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondents.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jan1991/gr_78693_1991.html

12.) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila (SECOND DIVISION) G.R. No. 78591 March 21, 1989 PURE FOODS
CORPORATION, petitioner,  vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
REMIGIO CLAVIO, ANDRES CATUBAY, VIRGILIO UMALI, ORLANDO REY and
JORGE DEL ROSARIO, respondents. Hilario, Go & De la Cruz for petitioner. The
Solicitor General for public respondent. Teofilo C. Villarico for private respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner corporation seeks, in this special civil action for certiorari, the annulment of the following:

(1) Decision 1 of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. NCR-4-1947-81,
promulgated on March 23, 1987, which modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioner to
reinstate private respondents Virgilio Umali, Jorge del Rosario, Orlando Rey and Andres Catubay to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay their backwages equivalent to three years each
without qualifications and deductions, 2 and its resolution of May 20, 1987 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration: and

(2) Decision of the labor arbiter, Raymundo R. Valenzuela, in NLRC-NCR Case No. 11-5333-83-A,
dated May 16, 1986, insofar as it ordered the reinstatement of private respondent Remigio Clavio and the
payment of his backwages of one and a half years.

The facts as stated in the Comment of the Solicitor General and which appear to be supported by the
records are as follows:
Private respondents Remigio Clavio, Andres Catubay, Virgilio Umali, Orlando Rey and Jorge del Rosario
were employees of petitioner Pure Foods Corporation.

Petitioner hired private respondents Clavio and Catubay as drivers, starting 1979 and 1976, respectively;
Umali as utility man, starting 1978; Rey as delivery man, starting 1973; and Del Rosario as checker,
starting 1978. Despite their specific appointments, there were times when respondents Umali and Del
Rosario were required by their superiors to perform the duties of a dispatcher.

Issue: Whether or not, We find merit in respondent's contentions.

Held: The foregoing considerations convince Us that the decision and resolution complained of should
not be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The decision of Labor Arbiter Raymundo R.
Valenzuela, dated May 16, 1986, insofar as it orders the reinstatement of private respondent Remigio
Clavio and the payment of his backwages of one and a half years is AFFIRMED. The decision of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission of March 23, 1987 and its resolution of May 20, 1987
are likewise AFFIRMED.

Should the reinstatement of the private respondents to their previous or substantially equivalent positions
without loss of seniority rights as herein ordered be rendered impossible by the supervention of
circumstances which prevent the same, the petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondents
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month's salary for every year of service rendered by them to
petitioner, computed at the rate of their respective salaries on March 18, 1981.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/mar1989/gr_78591_1989.html

14.) FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 162839 October 12, 2006 INNODATA PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner, vs. JOCELYN L. QUEJADA-LOPEZ and ESTELLA G. NATIVIDAD-
PASCUAL, respondents.

Facts:

The factual antecedents are narrated by the CA as follows:

"Innodata Philippines, Inc., is engaged in the encoding/data conversion business. It employs encoders,
indexers, formatters, programmers, quality/quantity staff, and others, to maintain its business and do the
job orders of its clients.

"Estrella G. Natividad and Jocelyn L. Quejada were employed as formatters by Innodata Philippines, Inc.
They [worked] from March 4, 1997, until their separation on March 3, 1998.

"Claiming that their job was necessary and desirable to the usual business of the company which is data
processing/conversion and that their employment is regular pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code,
[respondents] filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for damages as well as for attorney’s fees against
Innodata Phils., Incorporated, Innodata Processing Corporation and Todd Solomon. [Respondents] further
invoke the stare decicis doctrine in the case of Juanito Villanueva vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 127448 dated September 17, 1998 and the case of Joaquin Servidad vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 128682 dated March 18, 1999, arguing that the
Highest Court has already ruled with finality that the nature of employment at [petitioner] corporation is
regular and not on a fixed term basis, as the job in the company is necessary and desirable to the usual
business of the corporation.

"On the other hand, [petitioner] contends that [respondents’] employment contracts expired, for [these
were] only for a fixed period of one (1) year. [Petitioner] company further invoked the Brent School case
by saying that since the period expired, [respondents’] employment was likewise terminated.

"After examination of the pleadings filed, Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto rendered a judgment in favor
of complainants, the dispositive portion of which reads:

‘WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) Holding complainants Estella G. Natividad and Jocelyn Quejada to have been illegally dismissed by
[Petitioners] Innodata Philippines Incorporated and Innodata Processing Corporation and ordering said
[petitioners] to reinstate them to their former position without los[s] of seniority rights, or to a
substantially equivalent position, and to pay them jointly and severally, backwages computed from the
time they were illegally dismissed on March 3, 1998 up to the date of this decision in the amount
of P112,535.28 EACH, or in the total amount of P225,070.56 for the two of them;

(2) Further, [petitioners] are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, [respondents] attorney’s fees in the
amount equivalent to 10% of their respective awards; and

(3) All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

"Not satisfied, [petitioner] corporation interposed an appeal in the National Labor Relations Commission,
which reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision and dismissed [respondents’] complaint for lack
of merit. It declared that the contract between [respondents] and [petitioner] company was for a fixed
term and therefore, the dismissal of [respondents], at the end of their one year term agreed upon, was
valid.

"A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated July 22, 2002." 5

Issue: Petitioner raises the followings issues for the Court’s consideration:

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed serious reversible error when it did not take into
consideration that fixed-term employment contracts are valid under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence.

II
 "Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed serious reversible error when it failed to take
into consideration the nature of the business of petitioner vis-à-vis its resort to fixed-term
employment contracts.

III

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it failed to consider the fixed-term
employment contracts between petitioner and respondents as valid.

IV

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it held that regularity of employment
is always premised on the fact that it is directly related to the business of the employer.

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed serious reversible error in setting aside the
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, dated 27 November 2001 and Resolution
of 22 July 2002, respectively[,] and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 29
December 1999."7

Held:

Petitioner’s contentions deserve little consideration.

By their very nature, businesses exist and thrive depending on the continued patronage of their clients.
Thus, to some degree, they are subject to the whims of clients who may decide to discontinue patronizing
their products or services for a variety of reasons. Being inherent in any enterprise, this entrepreneurial
risk may not be used as an excuse to circumvent labor laws; otherwise, no worker could ever attain
regular employment status.

Finally, it is worth noting that after its past employment contracts had been declared void by this Court,
petitioner was expected to ensure that the subsequent contracts would already comply with the standards
set by law and by this Court. Regrettably, petitioner failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_162839_2006.html

15.) Aliviado vs. Procter and Gamble December 19, 2016 G.R. No. 160506

Facts:
Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G. They all individually signed employment contracts with
either Promm-Gem or SAPS. They were assigned at different outlets, supermarkets and stores where they
handled all the products of P&G. They received their wages from Promm-Gem or SAPS.

SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for reasons such as
habitual absenteeism, dishonesty or changing day-off without prior notice.

To enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered into contracts with
Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its products.
In December 1991, petitioners filed a complaint against P&G for regularization, service incentive leave
pay and other benefits with damages.

Issue: Whether or not P&G is the employer of petitioners.

Held:

In order to resolve the issue of whether P&G is the employer of petitioners, it is necessary to first
determine whether Promm-Gem and SAPS are labor-only contractors or legitimate job contractors.
Clearly, the law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the performance of
specific jobs, works or services. However, in order for such outsourcing to be valid, it must be made to
an independent contractor because the current labor rules expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.
To emphasize, there is labor-only contracting when the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits,
supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal and any of the following
elements are present:

i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the
job, work or service to be performed and the employees
recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are
directly related to the main business of the principal; or

ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of
the contractual

Under the circumstances, Promm-Gem cannot be considered as a labor-only contractor. We find that it is
a legitimate independent contractor. Considering that SAPS has no substantial capital or investment and
the workers it recruited are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of
P&G, we find that the former is engaged in “labor-only contracting”. Where labor-only contracting exists,
the Labor Code itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the
employees of the labor-only contractor. The statute establishes this relationship for a comprehensive
purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the
principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such
employees had been directly employed by the principal employer.

Source:https://vbdiaz.wordpress.com/2016/12/19/aliviado-vs-procter-and-gamble-digest/
 16.) G.R. No. 166295

NUWHRAIN-DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER,

Petitioner,
-versus-
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC.,
Respondents.

Facts: The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel

Nikko (Hotel), a five star service establishment owned and operated by Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. located

in Makati City. Chiyuki Fuijimoto and Esperanza V. Alvez are impleaded in their official capacities as

the Hotels General Manager and Director of Human Resources, respectively.

On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiation

proposals to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms

and conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union, onDecember 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike

on the ground of the bargaining deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),

which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01. Thereafter, conciliation hearings were conducted

which proved unsuccessful. Consequently, a Strike Vote was conducted by the Union on January 14,

2002 on which it was decided that the Union would wage a strike.

Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a general assembly at its office

located in the Hotels basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven

heads. The next day, or on January 18, 2002, more male Union members came to work sporting the same

hair style. The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the

Hotels Grooming Standards.

In view of the Hotels action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers

were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason the Hotel
experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three

restaurants.

Subsequently, on January 20, 2002, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending

them and charging them with the following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2)

illegal picket; (3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike;

and (6) commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike. The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB

a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice and violation of Article 248(a) of the

Labor Code on illegal lockout, which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-019-02. In the meantime, the

Union officers and members submitted their explanations to the charges alleged by the Hotel, while they

continued to stage a picket just inside the Hotels compound.

On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one

(61) members; and suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15

days, four (4) employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for five days. On the same day,

the Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing the premises of the

Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of

the Hotel premises.

Consequently, on January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB which was

docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-050-02, this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-

busting.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNION, THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61

MEMBERS MAY BE ADJUDGED GUILTY OF STAGING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE
ON JANUARY 18, 2002 DESPITE RESPONDENTS ADMISSION THAT THEY
PREVENTED SAID OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK
FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE HOTELS GROOMING STANDARDS

 WHETHER OR NOT THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY

VALIDLY BE DISMISSED AND MORE THAN 200 MEMBERS BE VALIDLY
 SUSPENDED ON THE BASIS OF FOUR (4) SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVITS OF
RESPONDENTS
 
 WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS IN PREVENTING UNION OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK COMMITTED AN ILLEGAL LOCK-
OUT

Ruling: The Court shall first dispose of G.R. No. 166295.

 According to the Union, there is no legal basis for allowing payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual or
physical reinstatement. As argued, Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code is clear on this point.
 
The Hotel, on the other hand, claims that the issue is now moot and any decision would be impossible to
execute in view of the Decision of the NLRC which upheld the dismissal of the Union officers and
members.
 
The Unions position is untenable. The Hotel correctly raises the argument that the issue was rendered
moot when the NLRC upheld the dismissal of the Union officers and members. In order, however, to
settle this relevant and novel issue involving the breadth of the power and jurisdiction of the Secretary in
assumption of jurisdiction cases, we now decide the issue on the merits instead of relying on mere
technicalities.

wherefore, premises considered, the CAs May 6, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 is
hereby affirmed.

In view of the possibility that the Hotel might have already hired regular replacements for the afore-listed
61 employees, the Hotel may opt to pay SEPARATION PAY computed at one (1) months pay for every
year of service in lieu of REINSTATEMENT, a fraction of six (6) months being considered one year of
service.
 
Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/november2008/163942.htm

17.) G.R. No. 74246 January 26, 1989

MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., and ANGEL T. DAZO, petitioners, 

vs.
HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Ministry of Labor and
Employment judgment, and JOAQUIN A. DEQUILA, respondents.
Facts: Private respondent Joaquin A. Dequila (or Dequilla) was hired on probation by petitioner
Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. (hereafter, Mariwasa only) as a general utility worker on January 10, 1979.
Upon the expiration of the probationary period of six months, Dequila was informed by his employer that
his work had proved unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards. To give him a chance to
improve his performance and qualify for regular employment, instead of dispensing with his service then
and there, with his written consent Mariwasa extended his probation period for another three months from
July 10 to October 9, 1979. His performance, however, did not improve and on that account Mariwasa
terminated his employment at the end of the extended period.

Dequila thereupon filed with the Ministry of Labor against Mariwasa and its Vice-President for
Administration, Angel T. Dazo, a complaint for illegal dismissal and violation of Presidential Decrees
Nos. 928 and 1389. His complaint was dismissed after hearing by Director Francisco L. Estrella, Director
of the Ministry's National Capital Region, who ruled that the termination of Dequila's employment was in
the circumstances justified and rejected his money claims for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal to the
Office of the Minister, however, said disposition was reversed. Respondent Deputy Minister Vicente
Leogardo, Jr. held that Dequila was already a regular employee at the time of his dismissal, therefore,
could not have been lawfully dismissed for failure to meet company standards as a probationary worker.
He was ordered reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority and with full back wages from
the date of his dismissal until actually reinstated. This last order appears later to have been amended so as
to direct payment of Dequila's back wages from the date of his dismissal to December 20, 1982 only. 

Mariwasa and Dazo, now petitioners, thereafter be sought this Court to review Hon. Leogardo's decision
oncertiorari and prohibition, urging its reversal for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
and/or without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: whether or not, Article 282 of the Labor Code notwithstanding, probationary employment may
validly be extended beyond the prescribed six-month period by agreement of the employer and the
employee.

Ruling: Having reached the foregoing conclusions, the Court finds it unnecessary to consider and pass
upon the additional issue raised in the Supplemental Petition 8 that the back wages adjudged in favor of
private respondent Dequila were erroneously computed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The orders of the public respondent complained of are reversed
and set aside. Private respondent's complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal and violation of
Presidential Decrees 928 and 1389 is dismissed for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to costs.

Reference: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jan1989/gr_74246_1989.html

18.) [G.R. No. 162994. September 17, 2004]

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners, vs.

GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC. respondent.

Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated May 19, 2003 and
the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62434.
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
(Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and
orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to
study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship
by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform
management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with the company, the management
and the employee will explore the possibility of a transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking
position or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. She
supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the
conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson
married Bettsy in September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of
interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would
resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because
he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsys employer, was planning to merge
with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be
offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated. At the same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from
Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In September 1999, Tecson
applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos least-
movement-possible policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales
area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance
Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to
comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued
samples of products which were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not
included in product conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter
for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half () month pay for every year
of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on
relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming
Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the
ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxos policy
prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is
a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts Decision, but the motion was denied by
the appellate court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
NCMBs finding that the Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a
competitor company is valid; and the Court of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was
constructively dismissed when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity
to attend products seminars and training sessions.
Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among
employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to
marry.
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the following circumstances: he
was transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales
area, he suffered a diminution in pay, he was excluded from attending seminars and training sessions for
medical representatives, and he was prohibited from promoting respondents products which were
competing with Astras products.
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its employees from
having a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecsons reassignment
from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur
sales area does not amount to constructive dismissal.
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a
genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict
with their responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having personal or
family interests in any competitor company which may influence their actions and decisions and
consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor
company from gaining access to its secrets, procedures and policies.
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future
relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal
protection clause. It maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on valid
grounds.
According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a real and potential conflict
of interest. Astras products were in direct competition with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence,
Glaxos enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecsons case was a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives. In any case, Tecson was given several months to remedy the situation, and was even
encouraged not to resign but to ask his wife to resign from Astra instead.
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he
signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein. In said contract,
he also agreed to resign from respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee
of a competitor company would be detrimental to the interests of Glaxo.
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecsons reassignment to another sales area and his exclusion from seminars
regarding respondents new products did not amount to constructive dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecsons refusal to resign, he was relocated from the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in
effecting the reassignment, it also considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Since Tecsons hometown
was in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from
the Bicol region to the Butuan City sales area would be favorable to him and his family as he would be
relocating to a familiar territory and minimizing his travel expenses.
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecsons exclusion from the seminar concerning the new anti-asthma drug
was due to the fact that said product was in direct competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by
Astra, and hence, would pose a potential conflict of interest for him.Lastly, the delay in Tecsons receipt of
his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales
area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area instead of Naga City because the supplier
thought he already transferred to Butuan).

Issue:  Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy against its employees marrying
employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution;
Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.

Ruling: The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tecson was constructively dismissed
when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao
City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the companys seminar on new
products which were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive
dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment
becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or
when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
[30]
 None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tecson was
demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo
properly exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/sep2004/162994.htm

19.) STAR PAPER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 164774

JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO &
SEBASTIAN CHUA,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA, AZCUNA, and -versus- GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, April 12, 2006
WILFREDA N. COMIA &
LORNA E. ESTRELLA,
Respondents.
Facts: The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N.
Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company .
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of
the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that
should they decide to get married, one of them should resign 

Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.

Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom
she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must
resign should they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners stated
that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her
services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein that they have
no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any claim or
demand of whatever nature.

Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign
voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent
Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a
married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she
severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999,
she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-
one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold
at the gate. She was denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the
staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral
conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has
not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after
submission of the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for
money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.

Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and
attorneys fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article
136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union membership.

On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not, Declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal from employment and ordering private
respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full
backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement

Whether or not,  Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the
award and the cost of this suit.

Ruling: The courts narrowly interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status as married, single,
divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader definition it would have either
chosen different language or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married
rather than to whom one is married. They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a
person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the identity, occupation, and place of
employment of one's spouse. These courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did not
violate the marital status discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.

The courts that have broadly construed the term marital status rule that it encompassed the identity,
occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike down the no-spouse employment policies based
on the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy
violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present
employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or work performance.
[27]
 These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present
any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the same workplace
might adversely affect the business. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational
qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the
other spouse in the same office.

The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got impregnated by a
married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about as immoral is incredulous. If she
really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor
would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in
voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reasons to dissociate himself from
employment.  It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment.Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was
voluntary, Estrellas dismissal is declared illegal.
 
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 dated August 3,
2004 is AFFIRMED.
 
Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.%20No.%20164774.htm

20.) CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990
A Landmark Case

FACTS:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique
situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen
(14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her
services.

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay Tung High School
in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner teacher was suspended without pay and was
terminated of his employment “for Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School
Teacher” which was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for termination.

ISSUE: Whether or not was her dismissal valid?

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the
marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and or grave misconduct?

RULING:

The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:

“Private respondent [the school] utterly failed to show that petitioner [30-year old lady teacher] took
advantage of her position to court her student [16-year old]. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the
disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has
reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal
emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their
marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social
mores.”

Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged
violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly
failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of the
circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of
contemporary social mores.

Reference: http://lawandbar.blogspot.com/2014/05/landmark-case-chua-qua-vs-clave-gr-no-l_2.html

21.) G.R. No. 113363 ASIA WORLD RECRUITMENT INC., petitioner, 

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2nd DIVISION), 
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPL

Facts: Petitioner Asia World Recruitment is a domestic corporation with authority granted by the POEA
to recruit and deploy Filipino overseas contract workers abroad. Petitioner's principal is Roan Selection
Trust International Ltd., a diamond and gold mining company in Angola, Africa, owned by one Christian
Rudolf G. Hellinger.

Private respondent Philip Medel, Jr., is a Filipino who entered into an employment contract 4 with
petitioner to work as a Security Officer in its diamond mine in Cafunfo, Angola, for a period of twelve
(12) months commencing upon his departure from the Philippines, with a salary rate of US $800.00 a
month, plus 50% of the salary by way of bonus or a total of US$1,200.00 a month. 5 The parties also
agreed that private respondent would work for six (6) hours a day, with one rest day every week and that
he would be entitled to overtime pay for work in excess of six (6) hours at the rate of $5.00 per
hour.6 Private respondent arrived in Angola sometime in December, 1988. In addition to being a Security
Officer, he was made to work as a Dispatcher and Metallurgy Inspector in the diamond mine. During his
employment, private respondent elevated the grievances of his Filipino co-workers to the
management,7 which apparently strained relations between him and management.

Issue: Whether or not, The claim of our overseas workers against their foreign employers should have not
subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that we usually apply to other complainants who have
facility in obtaining the required evidence to prove their demands.

Ruling: The need for strict enforcement of the law as well as rules and regulations governing Filipino
contract workers cannot be over-emphasized. Many hapless citizens of this country have sought
employment abroad to earn a few dollars in order to improve their lot, and provide proper education and a
decent future for their children, but have found themselves exploited by foreign employers or recruiters
who harass or abuse them. They are deprived of their jobs without cause or at the slightest pretense.
Hence, Filipino recruiting agencies must not only faithfully comply with Government-prescribed
responsibilities; they must also impose upon themselves the duty, borne out of a social conscience, to
properly help fellow citizens sent abroad to work for foreign principals. They must keep in mind that this
country is not exporting slaves but human beings, and, above all, fellow Filipinos seeking merely to
improve their lives.32, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent NLRC, the
assailed Decision dated September 13, 1993 and Resolution dated October 29, 1993 are hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that, it appearing that petitioner already partially satisfied the
NLRC judgment except for a balance of US $741.98, petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private
respondent said amount or its prevailing peso equivalent at the time of payment.The Court also finds it
proper to award private respondent moral damages, and hereby ORDERS petitioner to pay P25,000.00 as
moral damages. Costs against petitioner.

Reference: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/aug1999/gr_113363_1999.html

22.) [G.R. No. 121004. January 28, 1998]

ROMEO LAGATIC, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITYLAND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, JESUS GO, GRACE LIUSON, and
ANDREW LIUSON, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Romeo Lagatic was employed in May 1986 by Cityland, first as a probationary sales
agent, and later on as a marketing specialist. He was tasked with soliciting sales for the company, with the
corresponding duties of accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. Cold calls
refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone directory. Cityland, believing that the
same is an effective and cost-efficient method of finding clients, requires all its marketing specialists to
make cold calls. The number of cold calls depends on the sales generated by each: more sales mean less
cold calls. Likewise, in order to assess cold calls made by the sales staff, as well as to determine the
results thereof, Cityland requires the submission of daily progress reports on the same.

On October 22, 1991, Cityland issued a written reprimand to petitioner for his failure to submit cold call
reports for September 10, October 1 and 10, 1991. This notwithstanding, petitioner again failed to submit
cold call reports for September 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 28, as well as for October 6,
8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14, 1992. Petitioner was required to explain his inaction, with a warning that further
non-compliance would result in his termination from the company. In a reply dated October 18, 1992,
petitioner claimed that the same was an honest omission brought about by his concentration on other
aspects of his job. Cityland found said excuse inadequate and, on November 9, 1992, suspended him for
three days, with a similar warning.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports
for February 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12, 1993. He was verbally reminded to submit the same and was even given
up to February 17, 1993 to do so. Instead of complying with said directive, petitioner, on February 16,
1993, wrote a note, TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES? and exhibited the same to his co-
employees. To worsen matters, he left the same lying on his desk where everyone could see it.

On February 23, 1993, petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to explain why Cityland should
not make good its previous warning for his failure to submit cold call reports, as well as for issuing the
written statement aforementioned. On February 24, 1993, he sent a letter-reply alleging that his failure to
submit cold call reports should not be deemed as gross insubordination. He denied any knowledge of the
damaging statement, TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS!

Issue: 1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED;
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO SALARY DIFFERENTIALS,
BACKWAGES, SEPARATION PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY PAY, UNPAID
COMMISSIONS, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.

Ruling:  there is no law which requires employers to pay commissions, and when they do so, as stated in
the letter-opinion of the Department of Labor and Employment dated February 19, 1993, there is no law
which prescribes a method for computing commissions. The determination of the amount of commissions
is the result of collective bargaining negotiations, individual employment contracts or established
employer practice. Since the formula for the computation of commissions was presented to and accepted
by petitioner, such prescribed formula is in order. As to the allegation that said formula diminishes the
benefits being received by petitioner whenever there is a wage increase, it must be noted that his
commissions are not meant to be in a fixed amount. In fact, there was no assurance that he would receive
any commission at all. Non-diminution of benefits, as applied here, merely means that the company may
not remove the privilege of sales personnel to earn a commission, not that they are entitled to a fixed
amount thereof.
With respect to petitioners claims for overtime pay, rest day pay and holiday premiums, Cityland
maintains that Saturday and Sunday call-ins were voluntary activities on the part of sales personnel who
wanted to realize more sales and thereby earn more commissions. It is theircontention that sales personnel
were clamoring for the privilege to attend Saturday and Sunday call-ins, as well as to entertain walk-in
clients at project sites during weekends, that Cityland had to stagger the schedule of sales employees to
give everyone a chance to do so. But simultaneously, Cityland claims that the same were optional because
call-ins and walk-ins were not scheduled every weekend. If there really were a clamor on the part of sales
staff to voluntarily work on weekends, so much so that Cityland needed to schedule them, how come no
call-ins or walk-ins were scheduled on some weekends?
In addition to the above, the labor arbiter and the NLRC sanctioned respondents practice of offsetting rest
day or holiday work with equivalent time on regular workdays on the ground that the same is authorized
by Department Order 21, Series of 1990. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, said D. O. was
misapplied in this case. The D. O. involves the shortening of the workweek from six days to five days but
with prolonged hours on those five days. Under this scheme, non-payment of overtime premiums was
allowed in exchange for longer weekends for employees. In the instant case, petitioners workweek was
never compressed. Instead, he claims payment for work over and above his normal 5 days of work in a
week. Applying by analogy the principle that overtime cannot be offset by undertime, to allow off-setting
would prejudice the worker. He would be deprived of the additional pay for the rest day work he has
rendered and which is utilized to offset his equivalent time off on regular workdays. To allow Cityland to
do so would be to circumvent the law on payment of premiums for rest day and holiday work.
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, petitioner failed to show his entitlement to overtime and rest
day pay due, to the lack of sufficient evidence as to the number of days and hours when he rendered
overtime and rest day work. Entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof that said
overtime work was actually performed, before an employee may avail of said benefit. To support his
allegations, petitioner submitted in evidence minutes of meetings wherein he was assigned to work on
weekends and holidays at Citylands housing projects. Suffice it to say that said minutes do not prove that
petitioner actually worked on said dates. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his
affirmative allegations. This petitioner failed to do. He explains his failure to submit more concrete
evidence as being due to the decision rendered by the labor arbiter without resolving his motion for the
production and inspection of documents in the control of Cityland. Petitioner conveniently forgets that on
January 27, 1994, he agreed to submit the case for decision based on the records available to the labor
arbiter. This amounted to an abandonment of above-said motion, which was then pending resolution.
Lastly, with the finding that petitioners dismissal was for a just and valid cause, his claims for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, must fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolution is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jan1998/121004.htm

23.) [G.R. No. 122178. February 25, 1999]

DANILO DIMABAYAO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ISLAND

BISCUIT INC. and CHENG SUY EH, respondents.

Facts: Private respondent Island Biscuit, Inc., is engaged in the manufacture of biscuits with private
respondent Cheng Suy Eh as its General Manager. On 5 April 1983 it employed petitioner with the
specific task of operating the roller, cutting biscuits, sorting out rejects, mashing flour and feeding the
flour mass into its thinning machine.

Issue: whether or not, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the legality of
petitioner's dismissal.

Ruling: In light of our ruling in Gold City Integrated Port Services  we cannot sustain the NLRC for
upholding private respondents' dismissal of petitioner. Petitioner's act of leaving his work place to relieve
himself can hardly be characterized as abandonment, much less a willful or intentional disobedience of
company rules since he was merely answering the call of nature over which he had no
control. Restraining one's bowel movement can result in great discomfort and affect adversely the
efficiency, and even the health, of the worker. Petitioner's disobedience to his employer's orders can
easily be categorized as trivial and unimportant, and as such, does not merit a penalty as harsh as
dismissal.
Likewise, there was no gross and habitual neglect of his duties by petitioner since he merely relieved
himself which, as already adverted to, could not have constituted abandonment of work. Neither could it
have disrupted the operations of the company as to cause it irreparable damage. Witnesses testified during
the hearing before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC that petitioner was absent from his work station
only for a few minutes and that on 20 October 1992 he even took the initiative of asking his co-worker to
take over his post before proceeding to the latrine. The violation of petitioner, if at all it was, could not be
that serious as to warrant his dismissal from the service. As explained by the Labor Arbiter.

While it may be true that complainant has been leaving his work area without permission, this Arbitration
Board finds that complainant's habit of going to the toilet in the morning during production is merely a
call of nature and by force of habit he had to relieve himself. Whether or not the complainant relieved
himself is not the issue. The call of nature is a reasonable reason for him to leave his work area. Although
complainant is not entirely without fault since he has been leaving his workplace without permission from
his supervisor and his disrespect towards his superiors as borne out by the reports of his supervisor and
guards, the infraction committed by the complainant is not so grave that would warrant the ultimate
penalty of dismissal . . .

The NLRC also endeavored to justify its decision by taking into account offenses allegedly committed by
petitioner way back in 1990. These offenses as enumerated in the NLRC decision were infractions
imputed to petitioner prior to the 17 July, 30 July and 20 October 1992 incidents. As such, they should
have been outrightly ignored by the NLRC in determining and upholding the validity of petitioner's
dismissal since, as may be gleaned from the termination letter, petitioner's dismissal was based merely on
the 17 July, 30 July and 20 October 1992 alleged incidents, without reference to any infraction committed
before then. This only shows that the offenses attributed to petitioner before 17 July 1992 were mere
afterthoughts conceived in the course of the trial to further justify his dismissal.  To refer to those alleged
earlier violations as further grounds for dismissal is undoubtedly prejudicial to petitioner.Significantly, it
would also be doubly prejudicial to him to penalize him for those committed on 17 and 30 July 1992 as
he was already suspended for fifteen (15) days for those infractions. This, obviously, denied petitioner
procedural due process and deprived him of his right to be heard, to refute and present evidence to
controvert such accusations prior to his actual dismissal from employment.
As a consequence, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement. The postulate advanced by the Labor Arbiter that
there existed "strained relationship" between the parties, thus barring reinstatement of petitioner, does not
hold water. Strained relationship may be invoked only against employees whose positions demand trust
and confidence, or whose differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude
reinstatement. In the instant case, however, the relationship between petitioner, an ordinary employee,
and management was clearly on an impersonal level. Petitioner did not occupy such a sensitive position
as would require complete trust and confidence, and where personal ill will would foreclose his
reinstatement. But, interestingly, petitioner himself was praying for his reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the 15 March 1995 Decision and the 23
June 1995 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are SET ASIDE. The 21 September
1994 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED subject to the modification that petitioner DANILO
DIMABAYAO be immediately reinstated to his former or equivalent position without loss of seniority
and other rights, awarded back wages from the time of his dismissal to the time of actual reinstatement, as
well as attorney's fees of 10% of the total monetary awards.
Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/feb99/122178.htm

24.) [G.R. No. 124617. April 28, 2000]

PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTOMOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION and/or FRANCIS CHUA,

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSALINDA C. CORTEZ,
respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private
respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez was a company nurse[1] of petitioner corporation until her termination on
7 November 1994. Jlexj

On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of petitioner
corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain within forty-
eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a stapler at Plant
Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives against him on 2 August 1994; (b) for losing
the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr. Fang of the CLMC
Department on 23 August 1994; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card thus making
it appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6 September 1994 when in fact she was not. The
memorandum however was refused by private respondent although it was read to her and discussed with
her by a co-employee. She did not also submit the required explanation, so that while her case was
pending investigation the company placed her under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days effective 9
October 1994 to 7 November 1994. Lexjuris

On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was
issued by petitioner corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-
employees with the Allied Banking Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused to
receive the second memorandum although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the
memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private respondent at her last known address by
registered mail.

Issue: 1. whether or not, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding as illegal the dismissal of
private respondent.

2. Whether or not she is entitled to damages in the event that the illegality of her dismissal is sustained.
Ruling: The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an
employee, has ruled that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must
be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and, (c) must show that the
employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. The act of private respondent in
throwing a stapler and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant manager may be
considered, from a lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in order to consider it a
serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the
performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts
complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a
nurse. Her employment identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and no
other. Also, the memorandum informing her that she was being preventively suspended pending
investigation of her case was addressed to her as a nurse.

In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In moral
damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of Exemplary damages, on the other
hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or correction for the
public good" if the employer "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner."

Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager
showed an obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he
would terminate her services if she would not give in to his sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an
imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for
advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private respondent
should be adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered,
petitioners should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive
manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a forewarning to
lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy over their employees. 

All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions
committed considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or that
she inflicted serious damage to the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently
inimical to her employers interest.[25] Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was pending
investigation appears to be unjustified and uncalled for.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commssion finding the
dismissal of private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners
Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages computed
from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back wages, is AFFIRMED. However, in view of the
strained relations between the adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent,
petitioners should pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year
of service until finality of this judgment. In addition, petitioners are ordered to pay private
respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. Costs against
petitioners. Kyle

Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/124617.html

25.) FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP) v.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., PATRIA CHIONG and COURT OF APPEALS

October 2, 2009/ G.R. No. 178083

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: Cabin crew personnel were covered by the retrenchment and demotion scheme of PAL due to
financial distress which is evidenced by proof of its claimed losses in a petition for suspension of
payments, as well as the Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approving the said
petition for suspension of payments, together with proof of summary of its debts and other liabilities.
Exercising its management prerogative and sound business judgment, it decided to cut its fleet of aircraft
in order to minimize its operating losses and rescue itself from “total downfall;” which meant that a
corresponding company-wide reduction in manpower necessarily had to be made. As a result, 5,000 PAL
employees (including the herein 1,400 cabin attendants) were retrenched.

PAL, however, gave a whole different reason for retrenchment when the pilots went on strike.
Accordingly, what really brought about “the really perilous situation of closure was that on June 5, 1998,
the pilots went on strike, ninety (90%) per cent of the pilots went on strike, approximately six hundred
(600).” These pilots’ strike was so devastating. Without any pilots no plane can fly, your Honor, that is
the stark reality of the situation, and without airplanes flying, there would be no place for employment of
cabin attendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the strike, which PAL used as basis to undertake the massive retrenchment under
scrutiny, is an authorized cause.

RULING: The strike was a temporary occurrence that did not necessitate the immediate and sweeping
retrenchment of 1,400 cabin or flight attendants.

There was no reason to drastically implement a permanent retrenchment scheme in response to a

temporary strike, which could have ended at any time, or remedied promptly, if management acted with
alacrity. Juxtaposed with its failure to implement the required cost-cutting measures, the retrenchment
scheme was a knee-jerk solution to a temporary problem that beset PAL at the time.

PAL must still prove that it implemented cost-cutting measures to obviate retrenchment, which under the
law should be the last resort. By PAL’s own admission, however, the cabin personnel retrenchment
scheme was one of the first remedies it resorted to, even before it could complete the proposed
downsizing of its aircraft fleet.

The following elements under Article 283 of the Labor Code must concur or be present, to wit:

(1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already
incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are
reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;

(2) That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;

(3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or
at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;

(4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement
of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and,

(5) That the employer uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who
would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and
financial hardship for certain workers.

In the absence of one element, the retrenchment scheme becomes an irregular exercise of management
prerogative.
The retrenchment scheme under scrutiny was not triggered directly by any financial difficulty PAL was
experiencing at the time, nor borne of an actual implementation of its proposed downsizing of aircraft.

Reference: https://vbdiaz.wordpress.com/2016/12/19/fasap-vs-pal-et-al-digest/

26.) ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, G.R. No. 168081

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent

Facts: Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine

Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58) with a large body frame. The proper weight
for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds,the ideal weight being 166 pounds,
as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.

 
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended
vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently,
petitioner failed to meet the company’s weight standards, prompting another leave without pay
from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
 After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioners weight
problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
 On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with
company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally
requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several
dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do
so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of
losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his
off-duty status was retained.Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to
remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards.  Again, he was
directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER
PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

 
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE
PREDICATED ON THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ)
DEFENSE;
 
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE
WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE
EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;
 
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND]
WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC

Ruling: 1. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code.

 
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight
standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. 

2. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification

defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national
origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In
the United States, there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception
allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the
action is based on a BFOQ 

3.  Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
 Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against
him.We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that [t]he element of
discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to
escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance
position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable
standard and the private respondents failure to comply. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must
prove his affirmative allegation.

4. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.

 
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been
mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, from the time he was illegally dismissed
up to the time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA

Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/168081.htm

27.) [G.R. No. 125028. February 9, 1998]

REYNALDO VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and

NELBUSCO, INC., respondents.

Facts: Sometime in December, 1986, petitioner was hired by private respondent as a bus driver on
commission basis, with an average earning of P6,000.00 a month. On February 28, 1993, the
airconditioning unit of the bus which petitioner was driving suffered a mechanical
breakdown. Respondent company told him to wait until the airconditioning unit was repaired. Meanwhile,
no other bus was assigned to petitioner to keep him gainfully employed.
Thereafter, petitioner continued reporting to his employers office for work, only to find out each time
that the airconditioning unit had not been repaired. Several months elapsed but he was never called by
respondent company to report for work. Later, petitioner found out that the bus formerly driven by him
was plying an assigned route as an ordinary bus, with a newly-hired driver.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent for illegal dismissal, with
money claims for labor standard benefits, and for reimbursement of his bond and tire deposit.  He claimed
that the reason why respondent company did not allow him to drive again was due to his refusal to sign an
undated company-prepared resignation letter and a blank affidavit of quitclaim and release.
 Private respondent, on the other hand, admitted that it told petitioner to wait until the airconditioning
unit of the bus was repaired. However, private respondent alleged that after the bus driven by the
petitioner broke down due to his fault and negligence, the latter did not report for work.  He supposedly
informed the management later that he was voluntarily resigning from his employment in order to
supervise the construction of his house. Consequent to his resignation, petitioner demanded the return of
his cash bond and tire deposit. Respondent company required him to secure the necessary management
clearance and other pertinent papers relative to his resignation. Instead of complying with those
requirements, petitioner filed the instant complaint.

Issue: 1. whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed,

2. whether or not petitioner is entitled to back wages and separation pay starting from the time he was laid
off.

Ruling: Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, an employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Thus, it being clearly established that herein petitioner was constructively dismissed, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter awarding him back wages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, plus the refund of
his cash bond and tire deposit, is definitely in order.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 15, 1994 is hereby REINSTATED.
Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/125028.htm

28.) [G.R. No. 125887. March 11, 1998]

SOMERVILLE STAINLESS STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION AND JERRY MACANDOG, REYNALDO MIRANDA, ROBERTO
TAGALA, ET AL., respondents.

Facts: The present controversy was triggered by the inability of the respondent company to pay its
workers certain benefits stipulated in their collective bargaining agreement starting 16 March 1993. The
CBA benefits that were withheld by management are rice subsidy, incentive leave pay, hospitalization, t-
shirts and safety shoes and incentive bonus.

Complainants allege that on 09 April 1993 their union, represented by their president and vice-president,
communicated with respondents for a renegotiation of their CBA but the same was rejected by the
latter. They aver that on 19 April 1993 their union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor
and Employment for unfair labor practice. Complainants claim that on the pay day of 31 May 1994 Jerry
Macandog, Antonio de Castro, Jr., Ma. Rosita Paradero, Reynaldo Nevado, Roberto Tagala, Johnny
Miranda, Domingo Sumigaya, Nonalito Nicolas, Mario Clet, Johnny Mosquera, Renato Yape, among
others, were surprised to receive a notice of retrenchment which was inserted in their pay
envelopes. Complainants contend that most of the retrenched employees were union officers. They
explain that only the union secretary was not terminated. Complainants stress that their dismissal was
without just cause and in utter disregard of their right to due process. They assert that the true intention of
management was to bust their union which was very insistent on the renegotiation and renewal of their
CBA with the respondent company. Complainants explain further that while the notice of their
retrenchment specifically states that its effectivity is 30 June 1993, the retrenched employees were no
longer allowed to enter the company premises starting 16 June 1993, thus forcing the retrenched
employees to stage a picket in front of the company premises.

Stressing further their charges of unfair labor practice, complainants state that the respondents, led by
Messrs. Prigg and Dante Reyes, caused the removal of company equipments, files and other movable
properties and transferred them to another site.

Complainants likewise claim that management never discussed with their union their retrenchment and
that there was no retrenchment program presented to them. Moreover, they allege that they were never
advised of the basis or criteria as to who were to be retrenched.

Respondents reiterated their contention in their motion to dismiss in that individual respondents Leigh
Anthony Prigg and Dante Reyes are not parties in interest and therefore the complaint should be
dismissed insofar as they are concerned.

The foregoing contention is partly correct. There is no clear showing that respondent Prigg is the
president of respondent company. It does not also appear that he had a hand in the termination or
retrenchment of complainants. With regard to respondent Dante Reyes, it is admitted that he was
designated officer-in-charge of the respondent company. Among the powers given him is the power to
administer the affairs of the respondent company. Contrary to the pretensions of respondents, the power
of respondent Dante Reyes is not limited but very broad. In any case, the complaint against him can not
likewise be given to do [sic] with the retrenchment of complainants. It was former general of the
company William Doland, Jr. who retrenched the complainants.

Issue: A. Whether the retrenchment undertaken is valid.

B. Whether the retrenchment is attended with good faith.

C. Whether the finding of facts is contrary to the evidence in record.

D. Whether private respondent Roberto Goce should be included in the award judgment.

Ruling: Petitioner points to other cases, i.e., NLRC Case Nos. 00-09-05985-93, 00-06-04513-94, and 00-
09-06029-93, which involved the same factual backdrop as that of the present case, and which were
decided in favor of the employers. The petitioner is clutching at straws. The only material consideration
in this appeal is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering its assailed
decision. Based on the foregoing discussion, it is ineludible that, in this case, Public Respondent NLRCs
decision was not arbitrarily or despotically rendered, but was based on the extant evidence. In so
deciding, it did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and its factual findings are perforce accorded
deference and finality by this Court. We reiterate that the NLRCs evaluation of the evidence, specially
that involving the factual issue of whether petitioner sufficiently proved the essential requisites of
retrenchment in the case before us, is beyond the scope of our review under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Finally, both parties concur that the name of Private Respondent Roberto Goce does not appear on the list
of employees and, thus, is not entitled to an award. However, the solicitor general points out that, as in
Goces case, the names of Private Respondents Renato Yape and Almer Arboleda were not included in the
computation of claims filed by counsel for the complainants, but that petitioner admitted that the two
were its employees and, as such, included in the said list of its employees.  The solicitor general further
finds the following to be insufficient for determining the employment of Goce with petitioner: Goces
complaint against the petitioner, his claim to be the latters messenger, his eventual inclusion in the
computation made by the Research and Information Office of the Arbitration Branch and the grant to him
of the fourth highest award. Hence, the solicitor general recommends that Goces case be remanded to the
labor arbiter for the purpose of determining this question. We agree. Justice demands that this factual
question be finally threshed out in a remand of the case to the labor arbiter to finally give petitioner and
Private Respondent Roberto Goce their due.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that Roberto Goces name be deleted from the award and that his complaint be
remanded to the labor arbiter. Costs against petitioner.
Reference: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/mar1998/125887.htm

29.) G.R. No. L-12582 January 28, 1961

LVN PICTURES, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE MUSICIANS Guild (FFW) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents-
appellees.

Facts: Petitioners herein, LVN Pictures, Inc. and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. seek a review by certiorari of
an order of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 306-MC thereof, certifying the Philippine
Musicians Guild (FFW), petitioner therein and respondent herein, as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agency of all musicians working with said companies, as well as with the Premiere Productions, Inc.,
which has not appealed. The appeal of LVN Pictures, Inc., has been docketed as G.R. No. L-12582,
whereas G.R. No. L-12598 is the appeal of Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. Involving as they do the same order,
the two cases have been jointly heard in this Court, and will similarly be disposed of.

In its petition in the lower court, the Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW), hereafter referred to as the Guild,
averred that it is a duly registered legitimate labor organization; that LVN Pictures, Inc., Sampaguita
Pictures, Inc., and Premiere Productions, Inc. are corporations, duly organized under the Philippine laws,
engaged in the making of motion pictures and in the processing and distribution thereof; that said
companies employ musicians for the purpose of making music recordings for title music, background
music, musical numbers, finale music and other incidental music, without which a motion picture is
incomplete; that ninety-five (95%) percent of all the musicians playing for the musical recordings of said
companies are members of the Guild; and that the same has no knowledge of the existence of any other
legitimate labor organization representing musicians in said companies. Premised upon these allegations,
the Guild prayed that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for all musicians working
in the aforementioned companies. In their respective answers, the latter denied that they have any
musicians as employees, and alleged that the musical numbers in the filing of the companies are furnished
by independent contractors. The lower court, however, rejected this pretense and sustained the theory of
the Guild, with the result already adverted to. A reconsideration of the order complained of having been
denied by the Court en banc, LVN Pictures, inc., and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., filed these petitions for
review forcertiorari.

Apart from impugning the conclusion of the lower court on the status of the Guild members as alleged
employees of the film companies, the LVN Pictures, Inc., maintains that a petition for certification cannot
be entertained when the existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties is contested.
However, this claim is neither borne out by any legal provision nor supported by any authority. So long
as, after due hearing, the parties are found to bear said relationship, as in the case at bar, it is proper to
pass upon the merits of the petition for certification.

Issue: Whether or not, the petition does not allege and no evidence was presented that the alleged
musicians-employees of the respondents constitute a proper bargaining unit.

Ruling: It is well settled that "an employer-employee relationship exists . . .where the person for whom
the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to
be used in reaching such end . . . ." (Alabama Highway Express Co., Express Co., v. Local 612, 108S. 2d.
350.) The decisive nature of said control over the "means to be used", is illustrated in the case of Gilchrist
Timber Co., et al., Local No. 2530 (73 NLRB No. 210, pp. 1197, 1199-1201), in which, by reason of said
control, the employer-employee relationship was held to exist between the management and the workers,
notwithstanding the intervention of an alleged independent contractor, who had, and exercise, the power
to hire and fire said workers. The aforementioned control over the means to be used" in reading the
desired end is possessed and exercised by the film companies over the musicians in the cases before us.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners herein. It is so
ordered.

Reference:http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jan1961/gr_l-12582_1961.html

30.) G.R. No. L-32245DY KEH BENG, petitioner, vs.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR and MARINE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.

Facts: A charge of unfair labor practice was filed against Dy Keh Beng, proprietor of a basket factory, for
discriminatory acts within the meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraph (1) and (4). Republic Act No.
875, 3 by dismissing on September 28 and 29, 1960, respectively, Carlos N. Solano and Ricardo Tudla for
their union activities. After preliminary investigation was conducted, a case was filed in the Court of
Industrial Relations for in behalf of the International Labor and Marine Union of the Philippines and two
of its members, Solano and Tudla In his answer, Dy Keh Beng contended that he did not know Tudla and
that Solano was not his employee because the latter came to the establishment only when there was work
which he did on pakiaw basis, each piece of work being done under a separate contract. Moreover, Dy
Keh Beng countered with a special defense of simple extortion committed by the head of the labor union,
Bienvenido Onayan.

After trial, the Hearing Examiner prepared a report which was subsequently adopted in toto by the Court
of Industrial Relations. An employee-employer relationship was found to have existed between Dy Keh
Beng and complainants Tudla and Solano, although Solano was admitted to have worked on piece
basis.4 The issue therefore centered on whether there existed an employee employer relation between
petitioner Dy Keh Beng and the respondents Solano and Tudla .

According to the Hearing Examiner, the evidence for the complainant Union tended to show that Solano
and Tudla became employees of Dy Keh Beng from May 2, 1953 and July 15, 1955, 5 respectively, and
that except in the event of illness, their work with the establishment was continuous although their
services were compensated on piece basis. Evidence likewise showed that at times the establishment had
eight (8) workers and never less than five (5); including the complainants, and that complainants used to
receive ?5.00 a day. sometimes less. 
Issue: Whether or not, there is an understanding between the parties that one is to render personal
services to or for the benefit of the other and recognition by them of the right of one to order and control
the other in the performance of the work and to direct the manner and method of its performance.

Ruling: the award of backwages granted by the Court of Industrial Relations is herein modified to an
award of backwages for three years without qualification and deduction at the respective rates of
compensation the employees concerned were receiving at the time of dismissal. The execution of this
award is entrusted to the National Labor Relations Commission. Costs against petitioner.