PERSONS CASE DIGEST

TANADA v TUVERA, G.R. No. L-63915

Facts:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Issue:

1. Do the petitioners have the legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition?
2. Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

Held:

1. When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws.
2. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.

Meanwhile, Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. Even though the law provides for an effective date different from the fifteen days
requirement set forth in Art 2 of the Civil Code, this does not exempt the law from the
requirement that it must be published in the Official Gazette in order to be effective. The
phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” only refers to the date they are to take effect.
PASEI v SECRETARY OF LABOR, G.R. No. 101279

Facts:

PASEI is the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino
land-based workers. DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991
temporarily suspending the recruitment of PASEI of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong.
Hence, PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the said order and prohibit its implementation.

Issues:

Whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.

Held:

Although the respondents acted within their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in restricting and regulating recruitment, the orders and circulars issued are invalid and
unenforceable. This is because of lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Registrar as required in Administrative Code.
CUSTOMS V HYPERMIX, G.R. No. 179579

Facts:

Commissioner of Customs issued CMO No. 27-2003. Under such memorandum order, wheat was
classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge.5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity
descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as
food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.

CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification
Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the
subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential

Hypermix filed a petition for declaratory relief as the CMO was ssued without following the mandate
of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. Furthermore, Hypermix also claimed
that it was summarily adjudged to be a feed grade supplier without benefit of prior assessment,
despite having food grade wheat. Therefore, it would be subjected to 7% tariff or 133% more than
was proper.

Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated
when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.

Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in
nature.

Issue:

Should Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 be declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT?

Held:

Yes. The administrative rule in question was not only interpretative in nature, but actually imposed
additional burden of those governed. Therefore, the agency should accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given
the force and effect of law. The agency did not comply with the requirements enumerated by the
Revised Administrative Code, thus, assailed regulation must be struck down.

The said memorandum order was also found to be unconstitutional as it violated the equal
protection clause. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class. CMO did not meet these
requirements because the court could not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports
it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.

The commissioner of customs also went beyond his powers by limiting the powers of the customs
officer to examine and assess imported articles.
ACAAC v AZCUNA, G.R. No. 187378

Facts:

(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is

engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within
Misamis Occidental. In line with its objectives, PETAL built some structures on Capayas Island which
it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries.

Mayor Azcuna then issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to
apply for a building permit. Furthermore, the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted
Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others:
(a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; and (b)
the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized
by the local government. After Azcuna’s approval, the ordinance was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP). Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas,
including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and
egress thereto.

A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was then sent to PETAL. Among the reasons cited was its violation
of the subject ordinance. As a result, petitioners filed an action for the issuance of temporary
restraining order, injunction and damages, claiming that they have prior vested rights to occupy
Capayas Island. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following
grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No.7160,16 otherwise known as "The
Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its
implementation should be enjoined.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners.

Held:

Yes. The subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid
within30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. Moreover, as according
to Mayor Azcuna’s testimony, the subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous places
in their municipality, and in the bulletin board. There were also public consultations conducted prior
to the passing of the subject ordinance. And finally, the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with
the authority to pass and adopt such ordinance relating to sanctuaries. With that being said, the
subject ordinance was found to be valid and enforceable against the petitioners.
Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 PHIL 217

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of
land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The
parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years., and in
such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would
execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on the
land. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a verbal
agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the condition that they
would not collect the interest of the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would
benefit by the fruits of the land, & would introduce improvement thereof.

These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract
clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis,
being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he was
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated

RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside
from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good
faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable
ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because
he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-
grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In
taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis
and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to
the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable
and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
ELEGADO v CA, GR L-68385

Facts:

In March 1976, Warren Graham, an American national and a former resident of the Philippines, died
in Oregon, USA. As certain shares of stock are left in the Philippines, his son Ward Graham filed an
estate tax return. On the basis of such return, the Commission of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed
the descendant’s estate in the amount of P96,509.35. The assessment was protested by the law firm
of Bump, Yang, and Walker on behalf of the estate which was denied by the CIR.

Meanwhile, Ildefonso Elegado was the appointed administrator for the properties left by Graham in
the Philippines. Pending the resolution by the CIR on the protest filed by the American law firm, he
filed a second estate tax return which was provisionally assessed by the CIR the amount of
P72,948.87.

Meanwhile still, in the probate proceedings filed in the Philippines for the properties of Warren
Graham, the CIR filed a motion for the allowance of the original estate tax assessed at P96,509.35.
The CIR said that this liability had not yet been paid although the assessment had long become final
and executory. Elegado contends that the first assessment is not binding on him because it was
based on a return filed for by foreign lawyers who do not have knowledge of our tax laws.

Issue:

Whether or not Elegado is correct.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that Elegado’s contention is flimsy. Elegado cannot be serious when he
argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on
which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Our lawyers and taxpayers
cannot avoid paying tax assessments by simply saying that they do not know our tax laws. If our own
lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim similar preferences, it follows that foreigners cannot be any less
bound by laws in our country.
SIMON v CHAN, GR 157547

Facts:

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon with a violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP Blg 22), docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.

More than three years later, on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in
Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. It alleges the dishonor of Land Bank Check No.
0007280 dated December 26, 1996 upon presentment for payment with drawee bank. The check, in
the amount of ₱336,000 was issued to Chan by Simon who is the accused in the above-mentioned
criminal case.

The MeTC dismissed the case on the ground of litis pendentia which was affirmed by the RTC. On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision and ordered the continuance of the civil case.

Issue:

Whether or not the institution of a separate civil action based on BP Blg 22 is proper.

Held:

No. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an
unfunded check prohibited and punished under BP Blg 22. Section 1 (b) Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court provides that the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
FRANCISCO v CA, GR 102330

Facts:

Petitioner is private respondent Eusebio Francisco’s legal wife by his 2 nd marriage. The other private
respondents are his children by his 1st marriage.

Allegedly, the Francisco’s have acquired several properties since their marriage in February 1962.
Eusebio administered these realties until he was invalidated by various diseases, rendering him unfit
to administer them. Petitioner averred that his children convinced their father to sign a general
power of attorney which authorized one of his children, Conchita, to administer the house and lot as
well as the apartments. Consequently, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said
General Power Attorney and thus, enjoining its enforcement. She also sought to be declared as the
administratrix of all the properties.

Issue:

Should the provisions of the Civil Code be applied to the determination of exclusivity or conjugality
of the property in question?

Held:

The party who invokes the presumption provided by A.160, NCC must first prove that the property in
question was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party
who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. The presumption refers only to the
property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when
the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Further, this presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to adduce ample
evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her
marriage to Eusebio.
PESCA v PESCA, G. R. No. 136921

FACTS:

The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends
that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital
obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends
daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop
or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he
chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children.
The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.

Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as
they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to give him a
chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22
March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children.
She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.

Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null and
void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn reversed
the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina should be
taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

HELD:

(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence
showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the
case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The
latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal life by the
Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural guidelines to assist the
courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of law.
Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.
DAVID v AGBAY, G.R. No. 199113

Facts:

In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot
where they constructed a residential house, a part of which is a public land. Renato David filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Agreement (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR and CENRO. In the said
application, David indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Editha Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that David, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint
for falsification of public documents against David. Meanwhile, David reacquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time
he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he hadbeen
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in disregarding the fact that petitioner is anatural-born Filipino
citizen, and that by reacquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 hewas by legal fiction “deemed
not to have lost” it.

Ruling:

No. The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of
Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and
“retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention. In fine, for those
who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship which was lost pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares,
R.A. 9225 amends C.A. No. 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries
and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining
Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took
the oath of allegiance under the new law.
NERWIN v PNOC, GR 167057

Facts:

In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to

bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of wood
poles and 20,000 of cross-arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders The contract was awarded to him
being the lowest bidder. However, NEA’s board of directors passed a resolution reducing by 50% the
material requirements for IPB 80 to which Nerwin protested. A losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific
Synergy filed a complaint alleging the documents Nerwin submitted during the pre-qualification bid
were falsified. Finding a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of Gov’t Corporate Counsel
who upheld the eligibility of Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for IPB 80
contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of injunction which was grabted by RTC
Manila. PNOC – Energy Dev’t Corp issued an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for O-ILAW project.
Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it was an attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to
another bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin respondents to the proposed bidding. Respondents
averred that this is in violation of a rule that government infrastructure are not subject to TROs. RTC
granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

W/N CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits issuance of TRO except SC
to gov’t projects

Held:

Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary injunctions,
and preliminary mandatory injunctions against gov’t.
DM CONSUNJI v CA, GR 137873

Facts:

Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower,
Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the
pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but
without a safety lock.Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the
State Insurance Fund. The employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that
the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the
remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception
is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue
for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after
he opted for the first remedy.

Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance
of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

Issue:

Whether the private respondent is already barred from claiming damages under the Civil Code
pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code.

Held:

No. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced
from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse
his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of
remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held
against her.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator
crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the
form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed.
AUJERO v PHILCOMSAT, G.R. No. 193484

Facts:

It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) as an accountant in the latter’s Finance Department. On August
15, 2001 or after 34 years of service, the petitioner applied for early retirement. His application for
retirement was approved, effective September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive retirement benefits
at a rate equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the
petitioner was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of P274,805.00.

On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s
favor, following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of P9,439,327.91.

Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits,
claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is P14,015,055.00 and the P9,439,327.91 he
received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more
than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void. According to the petitioner, he had no
choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof and was all set to return to his
hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as no single centavo
would be released to him if he did not execute a release and waiver in Philcomsat’s favor.

The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount of his retirement benefits, which is
equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service, is provided under the
Retirement Plan that Philcomsat created on January 1, 1977 for the benefit of its employees.

Issue:

Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby foreclosing
his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat.

Held:

While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or
pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities,
a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer’s claims should be respected by
the courts as the law between the parties. Considering the petitioner’s claim of fraud and bad faith
against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate
waiver.

While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the release and
waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the
same. That no portion of his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need for funds does
not constitute the pressure or coercion contemplated by law.
DONA ADELA v TIDCORP, GR 201931

Facts:

Petitioner Dona Adela filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the RTC. After finding the
petition sufficient in form and substance, RTC declared petitioner herein as insolvent and stayed all
civil proceedings against it. Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as a receiver and
proceeded to make the necessary report, to engage appraisers and require the creditors to submit
proof of their respective claims. Atty. Gonzales then filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into
Compromise Agreement incorporating therein her proposed terms of compromise. Then, TIDCORP
and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement which was approved. Petitioner filed a
motion for partial reconsideration claiming that TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement imposes upon it
several obligations such as payment of expenses and taxes and waiver of confidentiality of bank
deposits when it is not a party and signatory to the said agreement. RTC denied the motion.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement to waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405.

Ruling:

NO.

R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may be disclosed. These are under
any of the following instances: (a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of
impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation,
and (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Council
may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court.

In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only. There
was no written consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner
is waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality
of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted in the agreement. It is clear therefore that
petitioner is not bound by the said provision since it was without the express consent of petitioner
who was not a party and signatory to the said agreement.

Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement lacks the required written consent of petitioner and conformity of the receiver.
We, thus, hold that petitioner is not bound by the said provision.