Cases:

Articles 1-10

1. Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 446

Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they we to become effective and immediately upon their approval.

The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not, that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith the Official Gazette.

Issue:

Whether or not the Presidential decrees are covered by the provisions of Article 2 of the New Civil Code,
on the necessity of publication for its effectivity.

Held:

The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. The term “laws” should refer to
all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws related to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be

2. De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988-

FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross
negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. It
correctly applied the rule laid down in HabulayasvsJapzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that
the said case should not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before
theyan be binding.

RULING: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals

3. People vs., Que Po Lay 94 Phil 640-FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US
money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as
required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on
Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to
become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:
It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations
of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people
to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
costs de oficio.

4. NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, 26 March 2010-FACT:

The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75
unconstitutional, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as
the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to
participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for being violative of
substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for
restraining competitive free trade and commerce.

ISSUE(S):               

Whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 -

(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and

(b) restrained free trade and competition.

RULING:

The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.

Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a
reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the
integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like
Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the
light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction..

5. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643 March
25,2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and
an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.

ISSUE:

Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military
and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

6. Pimentel v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, GR No. 187714, March 8, 2011-FACTS: On

8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate
Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny
Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate
President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its
representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate
adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the
Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics
Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the
Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of
such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to
the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed
amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUES: [1] Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, an indispensable
party in this petition?

[2] Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior
resort?

[3] Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection?

[4] Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution?

[5] Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their
effectivity?

HELD: [1] An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest. In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before
the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the
author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on
the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator
Madrigal's interest.

[2] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here
do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution.
On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence
and jurisdiction of the Court.

[3] While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical
conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it
from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics
Committee. The referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an
extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the
members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to equal protection.

[4] The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
does not violate Senator Villar's right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to
promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court in
Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings."
[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate.
Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House
or Senate, such rules need not be published,unless such rules expressly provide for their
publication before the rules can take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the
Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution,
publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules
expressly mandate their publication. PARTIALLY GRANTED.

7. Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, 22 February 2008-FACTS:

On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for
ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after
which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was
later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.

The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a
search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied
him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a
gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a
Memorandum Receipt.

Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally
possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary
license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid

HELD/DECISION:

Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was
arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the
accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the officers and to make
sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by
the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the
person or within the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner,
the petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the gun was
found; therefore the room where the gun was found could not be “in his immediate control.”
Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted to seize any weapon
that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view doctrine.” However,
the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore not incidental.
Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used against
him.

8. PNB v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528, 18 January 1996-

FACTS:Private respondents are buyers on installment of subdivision. However, the subdivision

developer mortgaged the lands in favor of the petitioner even though the sale of land was
already executed. Unaware of the foregoing facts, the private respondents continued to comply
with their obligation as buyers. The subdivision developer later on defaulted and PNB foreclosed
on the mortgage and became the owner of the lots. A decision by the HLURB and OAALA ruled
that PNB may collect from private respondents only the remaining amortization payment and
cannot compel them to pay again for the lots they had already bought from the subdivision
developer. The Office of the President affirmed this decision by declaring Presidential Decree
957*.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Presidential Decree 957 applies to sale of land prior to its enactment

HELD/DECISION:

Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the
contrary is provided. PD 957, though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages
executed prior to its enactment and therefore must take effect to protect the innocent
purchasers from swindling and fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision
developers. The court ascertained that they will not follow the letter of the statue if it will not
reflect the intent and purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the
protection of human rights. It would also be illogical if PD 957 which seeks to oust the
fraudulent practices would not be applied to existing mortgage contract due to some a
technicality.

*Section 18: Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or
developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted
unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of
the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure
such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined
and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at
his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the
payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit
being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly
after full payment thereto;

9. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., G.R. No.
168129,

FACTS:

On 1987, CIR issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that Philhealth, as a provider of medical
services, is exempt from the VAT coverage.    When RA 8424 or the new Tax Code was
implemented it adopted the provisions of VAT and E-VAT. On 1999, the BIR sent Philhealth an
assessment notice for deficiency VAT and documentary stamp taxes for taxable years 1996 and
1997. After CIR did not act on it, Philhealth filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA
withdrew the VAT assessment. The CIR then filed an appeal with the CA which was denied.

ISSUES:

Whether Philhealth is subject to VAT.

Whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting Philhealth from payment of VAT has retroactive
application.

RULING:

YES. Section 103 of the NIRC exempts taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental,
hospital, and veterinary services from VAT. But, in Philhealth's letter requesting of its VAT-
exempt status, it was held that it showed Philhealth provides medical service only between
their members and their accredited hospitals, that it only provides for the provision of pre-need
health care services, it contracts the services of medical practitioners and establishments for
their members in the delivery of health services.   

Thus, Philhealth does not fall under the exemptions provided in Section 103, but merely
arranges for such, making Philhealth not VAT-exempt. YES. Generally, the NIRC has no
retroactive application except when:

where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any
document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially
different from the facts on which the ruling is based, or
where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

The Court held that Philhealth acted in good faith. The term health maintenance organization
was first recorded in the Philippine statute books in 1995.    It is apparent that when VAT Ruling
No. 231-88 was issued in Philhealth's favor, the term health maintenance organization was
unknown and had no significance for taxation purposes. Philhealth, therefore, believed in good
faith that it was VAT exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT Ruling No.
231-88.    The rule is that the BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal
would result to the prejudice of the taxpayer.

24 April 2007

10. D.M. Consunji vs. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

FACTS:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji,
Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose
Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.

Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,

11. Cui vs. Arellano University 2 SCRA 205

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University.    He then enrolled in its
College of Law from the first year until the first semester of his 4th year.    During these years, he
was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87.    He
then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University.      To
secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University.   
The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant
which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all
heads of private schools, colleges, and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to
another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
school”.

ISSUE:

Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of
his scholarship in cash, is valid or not.

RULING:

Not valid. Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools provides that “When
students are given a full or partial scholarship, it is understood that such scholarship is merited
and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should
not be subsequently charged to recipient students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution.” Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep
students in a school.

Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The defendant
uses the scholarship as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an
educational institution. Thus, conceived, it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also,
good morals. The practice of awarding the scholarship to attract students and keep them in
school is not a good custom nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation
except in some private institution as in Arellano University. Any contract entered into between
parties which is against the law, morals, good custom, public policy, or public order is void.

12. Mecano v. COA, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992-

FACTS:

Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on
Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the    Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order
No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by
Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand,
strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or
supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:

NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

RATIO:

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals
an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the
part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The
intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later
act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will
continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.

13. People v. Licera G.R. No. L-39990, July 2, 1975

PEOPLE V. LICERA [65 S 270 (1975)] - F: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret
agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The
SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was
applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later
People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable.

HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
them¬selves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment
of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect
those favored by the old rule.

14. Chu Jan vs. Bernas, 34 Phil 631 (1916)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match, defendant
Lucio    Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight.
Justice of peace court decided that bout was a draw. Defendant appealed toCourt of First
Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and comply with rules and
regulations governing cockfights ,to pay P160 and return the other amount which s in
safekeeping of Cockpit owner Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to
dismiss cost against plaintiff. Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special
findings. On plaintiff's motion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal
Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu Jan. Proceedings was
forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions

ISSUE:

Did Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds for dismissal
pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has always dismissed cases of this
nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and duties of referees; that he
does not know where to find the law and that he knows of no law that governs the right to
plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.

Held:

Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him
for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings
by dismissing them without deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because
foreseeing that a case may arise to which no law would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2nd
paragraph of Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shal l be observed and in absence
thereof, the general principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and order appealed from are
reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to court from when they came for
due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to cost.

15. People vs. Purisima, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66, L-46229-32, L-46313-16, L-46997, 20
November1978

FACTS OF THE CASE:

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing
the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for
short) No. 9?

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.

The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside
of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.

HELD:

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS
MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequenceArticles 11-
18

16. Martinez vs. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil 79 (1910)

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of
the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was
attached came along the street in the opposite direction at great speed.    The horses ran into
the carromata and wounded Martinez servely. The defendant presented evidence that the
cochero was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so
he tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the
wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose
driver cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses and which made it
ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable to stop the
horses. The horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It
has been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to
leave horses in the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in
all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

17. Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. 55960, November 24, 1988

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00
more or less.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition
alleging among others that:

a) They are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;

b) To their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate;

c) They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him;
and

d) They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratriz of the intestate estate of
the deceased.

The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged
that:

a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat who he married on January 19, 1931 in China;

b) The other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased Yao Kee; and

c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become
the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she
does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the bethrotal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into an agreement with the parents of her husband; that she and her
husband have been living in Fookien, China before he went to the Philippines; that in China, the
custom is that there is a go-between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties
who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son-in-
law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on the wedding day, the document
would be signed by the parents of both parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in
the Philippines; that the parties do not sign the document themselves; and that she and Sy Kiat
were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that
document can still be found now.

The testimony of Gan Ching, the younger brother of Yao Kee, that he attended the marriage of
his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a
document signed by the parents and elders of the parties being sufficient. Statements were
made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified that a) Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee according to
a Chinese custom.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China is valid.

Held:
The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A
local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom
is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact.

Article 71 of the Civil Code states that: “All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous or incestuous marriages
as determined by Philippine law.

The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or
custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly,
there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. The marriage of
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact.

As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of
China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only of acknowledged
natural children.

18. CIR vs. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of
income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund
because they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc.
However, despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May
13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents
to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it
to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed
beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec
229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13
of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000
was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return.
Hence, beyond the reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision
of CTA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be
12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of
1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled
for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

19. Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139

Facts: The petitioner is a Filipino citizen while respondent Romillo is an American citizen. They
married in Hong Kong in 1972 and after their marriage, established a residence in the
Philippines. The parties were divorced in Nevada in 1982 and now, petitioner is married to
Theodore Van Dorn. Respondent Romillo, Jr. Filed a suit against petitioner in RTC Pasay stating
that petitioner’s business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties and that the
petitioner ordered to render an accounting of that business and that the private respondent be
declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the case of the action is barred of the judgment in the divorce proceeding in
the Nevada Court wherein the respondent had acknowledged that he and the petitioner had no
“common property” as of June 11, 1982.

Issue:

                                Whether there is an effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.

Held:

                                It is not necessary to determine the property relations between petitioner and

private respondent after their marriage, whether absolute or relative community property,
complete separation of property or any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is that the
Nevada divorce of the parties that the Nevada    Court obtained jurisdiction over the petitioner
and private respondent.

20. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653

acts:

Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They
lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila
on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter
had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.

Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings.
Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already
issued.

Held:

The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

21. San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, February 6, 2007

Facts:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two
motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

Held:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as
his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It
was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.