Official History of The Canadian Army in WWII Volume I Six Years of War 1956 Extendet

Official History of the Canadian Army
in the Second World War
Volume I
SIX YEARS OF WAR

The Army in Canada, Britain
and the Pacific
NOTE
In the writing of this volume the author has been given full
access to Relevant official documents in possession of the
department of National Defence; but the inferences drawn
and the opinions expressed are those of the author himself,
and the Department is in no way responsible for his
reading or presentation of the facts as stated.
OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN ARMY
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Volume I
SIX YEARS OF WAR

THE ARMY IN CANADA, BRITAIN
AND THE PACIFIC
By
COLONEL C. P. STACEY,
O.B.E., C.D., A.M., Ph.D., F.R.S.C.
Director, Historical Section, General Staff
Maps drawn by
CAPTAIN C. C. J. BOND
Published by Authority of the Minister of National Defence
EDMOND CLOUTIER, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., OTTAWA, 1955 QUEEN'S

PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
First published 23 December 1955
Second printing (corrected) February 1956
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE
Organization, Training and Home Defence in Canada
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE CANADIAN MILITIA ON THE EVE OF WAR
The Canadian Tradition ......................................................................................................................... ... 3
The Approach of the Crisis ..................................................................................................................... ... 5
The New Defence Programme and its Problems .................................................................................... ... 7
The New Programme Develops, 1937-1939 .......................................................................................... ... 15
The Reorganization of the Militia ........................................................................................................... ... 18
The Problem of Supply ........................................................................................................................... ... 20
The Coast-Defence Programme .............................................................................................................. ... 26
Defence Schemes and Mobilization Planning ........................................................................................ ... 29
The Last Days of Peace ........................................................................................................................... ... 33
The General State of Preparation, 1939 .................................................................................................. ... 35
II. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND THE MOBILIZATION

OF THE ACTIVE SERVICE FORCE, 1939
The Approach of War ............................................................................................................................. ... 38
"Adopt Precautionary Stage Against Germany" ..................................................................................... ... 40
War in Europe: The Mobile Force is Mobilized ..................................................................................... ... 42
Canada Goes to War ............................................................................................................................... ... 46
Mobilizing the Units of the Active Service Force ................................................................................. ... 49
The Response of the Country .................................................................................................................. ... 53
The Decision to Send Troops Overseas .................................................................................................. ... 58
The Technical Troops for Britain ........................................................................................................... ... 64
Paying for the Military Effort, 1939 ....................................................................................................... ... 68
III. THE EXPANSION OF THE ARMY, 1939-1943

The Completion of the 2nd Division ...................................................................................................... ... 72
The Summer Crisis of 1940: Formation of the
3rd and 4th Divisions ..................................................................................................................... ... 76
Canadian Troops for Iceland ................................................................................................................... ... 83
The Formation of the Canadian Corps .................................................................................................... ... 86
The Army Programme for 1941 .............................................................................................................. ... 87
The Modification and Approval of the 1941 Programme ...................................................................... ... 90
The Development of the Army Programme for 1942 ............................................................................ ... 93
First Canadian Army Comes into Existence ........................................................................................... ... 98
The Final Composition of the Field Force .............................................................................................. ... 100
The First Special Service Force .............................................................................................................. ... 104
Organization of the Canadian Army Overseas at its Peak ..................................................................... ... 108
IV. RECRUITING AND TRAINING IN CANADA

Making an Army in an Unmilitary Society ............................................................................................ ... 110
Reliance Upon Voluntary Service .......................................................................................................... ... 110
Recruiting in the Early Days, 1939-1941 ............................................................................................... ... 112
The Beginnings of Manpower Scarcity, 1941-1942 ............................................................................... ... 115
The National Resources Mobilization Act:
Compulsory Service for Home Defence .......................................................................................... ... 118
The Extension of Compulsory Service ................................................................................................... ... 120
Changes in the N.R.M.A. and its Administration, 1942-1943 ................................................................ ... 122
v
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
The Canadian Women's Army Corps ..................................................................................... 124
The Selection of Officers for the Army ................................................................................... 127
The Training Process in Canada ........................................................................................ ..... 132
The Training of Mobilized Units ............................................................................................ 132
The Organization of Training Centres ...................................................................................... 133
Training Developments in 1942-1944 ..................................................................................... 134
Special Training Establishments and Trades Training .............................................................. 136
Training the C.W.A.C ............................................................................................................. 137
The Training of Officers .......................................................................................................... 138
The Royal Canadian Army Cadets ......................................................................................... 141
The History of Private Jones ................................................................................................... 141
V. DEFENDING THE SOIL OF CANADA, 1939-1945

The Nature of the Problem ..................................................................................................... 145
Early Measures for the Defence of Canada ............................................................................ 146
The Guarding of "Vulnerable Points" .................................................................................... 149
The Development of Fixed Defences, 1939-1944 151
The Development of Anti-Aircraft Defences ......................................................................... 157
The Security of the Atlantic Coast After Dunkirk .................................................................. 160
The Security of the Pacific Coast After Pearl Harbor ............................................................ 165
Home Defence at its Peak ...................................................................................................... 174
Security Measures Against the Submarine
Menace in the Lower St. Lawrence ............................................................................... 176
The Japanese Balloon Enterprise ........................................................................................... 177
The Canadian Army in Newfoundland .................................................................................. 178
Canadian Troops in the West Indies and the Caribbean ......................................................... 181
The Role of the Reserve Army ............................................................................................... 182
Disbandment of the Home Defence Divisions, 1943-1944 .................................................... 183
PART TWO
The Army in Britain, 1939-1945
VI. THE GROWTH OF THE ARMY OVERSEAS AND
ORGANIZATION IN BRITAIN
Moving the Troops to Britain ................................................................................................. 189
Canadian Military Headquarters ............................................................................................ 194
Organization of C.M.H.Q., 1945 ............................................................................................ 198
Canadian Reinforcement Units and other
Units under C.M.H.Q. Command .................................................................................. 203
The Canadian Forestry Corps ................................................................................................. 207
The Canadian Women's Army Corps Overseas ..................................................................... 210
VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN FORCES

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Problems of Control ............................................................................................................... 212
Relationship Between C.M.H.Q. and Field Headquarters ...................................................... 212
Relationship Between N.D.H.Q. and the Army Overseas ...................................................... 215
Changes and Reorganization, 1943-1944 ............................................................................... 221
VIII. TRAINING THE ARMY OVERSEAS

The Beginning of Overseas Training ..................................................................................... 230
Training to Defeat Invasion, 1940-1941 ................................................................................ 234
Manoeuvres on the Grand Scale, 1941 ................................................................................... 238
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
CHAPTER PAGE
Improvements in Organization and Methods ......................................................................... 240
Offensive Training, 1942-1943 .............................................................................................. 243
Battle Experience in North Africa .......................................................................................... 248
Exercise "Spartan", March 1943 ............................................................................................ 249
The Final Stages, 1943-1944 .................................................................................................. 251
IX. ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS, 1940
The Role and Problems of the Canadian Army Overseas ...................................................... 254
Authority to Commit Canadian Forces to Operations ............................................................ 254
The Proposal to Send Canadian Troops to Norway ............................................................... 257
"Angel Move": The 1st Division and the Crisis
in the Low Countries, May 1940..................................................................................... 263
The Dunkirk Evacuation ........................................................................................................ 269
First Measures Against the Invasion Menace ......................................................................... 273
Forlorn Hope: The Second B.E.F., June 1940 ........................................................................ 276
The 1st Brigade in France ...................................................................................................... 279
A Reckoning of Disappointment ............................................................................................ 284
The Invasion Summer ............................................................................................................ 285
The Storm that Did Not Burst ................................................................................................ 290
The Canadian Corps ............................................................................................................... 294
X. TASKS AND OPERATIONS, 1941-1942
The Situation at the Beginning of 1941 .................................................................................. 296
The Corps Moves Into Sussex ................................................................................................ 297
Sappers at Gibraltar ................................................................................................................ 299
The Expedition to Spitsbergen ............................................................................................... 301
General McNaughton's Authority is Widened ....................................................................... 307
Raiding Projects and the Raid on Hardelot ............................................................................ 308
Allied Grand Strategy in 1942 ............................................................................................... 310
Decision in July ...................................................................................................................... 317
Major Raiding Projects, 1942 ................................................................................................ 323
The Origins of the Raid on Dieppe ........................................................................................ 325
Planning and Training for the Raid ........................................................................................ 330
Changes in the Plan ................................................................................................................ 336
The Cancellation of Operation "Rutter.. ................................................................................. 338
The Revival of the Operation ................................................................................................. 340
The Plan of Operation "Jubilee" ............................................................................................. 346
XI. THE RAID ON DIEPPE, 19 AUGUST 1942
German Defences in the West in 1942 ................................................................................... 349
The Enemy in the Dieppe Area .............................................................................................. 352
Our Information About the Enemy ........................................................................................ 357
The Collision with the German Convoy ................................................................................. 358
The Attack on the Berneval Battery ....................................................................................... 360
The Attack on the Varengeville Battery ................................................................................. 362
Disaster at Puys ...................................................................................................................... 363
The Fighting in the Pourville Area ......................................................................................... 369
The Frontal Attack on Dieppe ................................................................................................ 374
The Fortunes of the Tanks ..................................................................................................... 378
The Landing of the Reserves .................................................................................................. 381
Withdrawal from the Main Beaches ....................................................................................... 384
XII. DIEPPE: LOSSES, COMMENTS AND AFTERMATH
Allied Losses at Dieppe ......................................................................................................... 387
German Losses and German Critiques ................................................................................... 388
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
How the Public was Told ....................................................................................................... 393
The Shackling of Prisoners .................................................................................................... 396
Some Comments on the Operation ......................................................................................... 397
The Influence of Dieppe on German Thinking ...................................................................... 404
Problems of Strategic Employment, 1942-1943 ..................................................................... 408
XIII. SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

A Unique Experience ............................................................................................................. 413
The Problem of Finding Commanders and Staff Officers ...................................................... 413
The Problem of Morale .......................................................................................................... 419
Discipline and Deportment .................................................................................................... 425
Leave to Canada ..................................................................................................................... 427
Repatriating the Overseas Army ............................................................................................ 431
PART THREE
The War Against Japan, 1941-1945
XIV. THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG, DECEMBER 1941

The Army in the Pacific War, 1941-1945 .............................................................................. 437
The Situation in the Far East, 1939-1941 ............................................................................... 437
The Request for Canadian Help at Hong Kong ...................................................................... 439
The Training and Equipment of the Expeditionary Force ...................................................... 446
The Development of the Japanese War Plans ........................................................................ 450
The Defences of Hong Kong .................................................................................................. 455
The Hong Kong Defence Plan ............................................................................................... 458
The Japanese Attack Begins ................................................................................................... 461
The Loss of the Gin Drinkers Line and the
Withdrawal to the Island ................................................................................................. 465
The Attack on Hong Kong Island .......................................................................................... 471
Operations in the Eastern Sector ............................................................................................ 474
The End on Stanley Peninsula ................................................................................................ 478
The Fight for the Western Sector ........................................................................................... 480
The Fall of Hong Kong .......................................................................................................... 485
The Cost of the Defence ......................................................................................................... 488
Some Comments on the Hong Kong Campaign ..................................................................... 489
XV. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE ALEUTIANS

The War in the Pacific, January-June 1942 ............................................................................ 492
The Japanese Invade the Aleutians ........................................................................................ 493
The Counter-Offensive Against the Islands ........................................................................... 495
Fiasco at Kiska ....................................................................................................................... 500
XVI. PACIFIC PLANS AND ENTERPRISES, 1943-1945
Eyes on the Kuriles ................................................................................................................ 506
Observers in the Pacific ......................................................................................................... 507
Canadians in Australia ........................................................................................................... 510
Policy on Participation in the Pacific ..................................................................................... 510
The Canadian Army Pacific Force ......................................................................................... 512
Recruiting and Training the C.A.P.F....................................................................................... 516
The End in the Pacific ............................................................................................................ 518
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
PAGE
CHARTS AND TABLES IN TEXT
Pre-War Appropriations for the Department of National Defence ......................................................... 13

Peace Establishment, Canadian Active Militia, by Arm of Service, 1938 ............................................. 19
Strength of the Canadian Active Service Force, 30 September 1939 ..................................................... 55
Growth of the Canadian Army Overseas, 1939-1945: Arrivals in the United
Kingdom from Canada and Strength in European Zone ........................................................................ 191
Canadian Military Headquarters, London, February 1945:
Organization Chart ................................................................................................................................. 199
Channels of Communication, Canadian Army Overseas, 1942 ............................................................. 220
Dieppe Raid: Embarkation Strength, Casualties and Disembarkation
Strength, Canadian Units ....................................................................................................................... 389
APPENDICES
"A" Strength and Casualties, Canadian Army ........................................................................................ 522
"B" General Service Enlistments, 1 September 1939 - 31 August 1945 ................................................ 526
"C" Canadian Army Appropriations and Expenditures, 1939-1946 ....................................................... 527
"D" Canadian Army (Active) Training Centres and Schools in Canada,
1 July 1943 .................................................................................................................................... 528
"E" Operational Units of the Active Army in the North American
Zone, 24 April 1943 ...................................................................................................................... 536
"F" Persons Holding Principal Appointments, Canadian Army, 1939-1945 .......................................... 540
"G" Note on the Equipment of the Canadian Army Overseas, 1939-1945 ............................................ 544
"H" The Number of Men Evacuated from the Dieppe Beaches ............................................................. 547
"I" Newfoundland Army Units Overseas ............................................................................................... 548
"J" Organization Chart, National Defence Headquarters
(Army), April 1945 ......................................................................................................Facing Page 550
ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................... ... 551
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. ... 555
INDEX ............................................................................................................................................... ... 599
MAPS
(in Colour)
1. Atlantic Coast Defences ..................................................................................................................... 152
2. Pacific Coast Defences ...................................................................................................................... 158
3. Canada, Showing Commands, Military Districts etc. ......................................................................... 178
4. France and Southern England, 14 June 1940 ..................................................................................... 284
5. The Dieppe Operation, 19 August 1942 ............................................................................................. 386
6. Mainland Positions, Hong Kong ........................................................................................................ 462
7. Hong Kong, 18-25 December 1941 ................................................................................................... 490
SKETCHES
(in Black and White)
1. The British Isles ................................................................................................................................ 205
2. Spitsbergen, 1941 .............................................................................................................................. 303
3. German Dispositions, North Central France, at time of Dieppe Raid ............................................... 353
4. Hong Kong and New Territories ........................................................................................................ 472
6. North Pacific Ocean............................................................................................................................ 494
7. Pacific Ocean, 1941-1945 .................................................................................................................. 508
x TABLE OF CONTENTS
ILLUSTRATIONS
FOLLOWING PAGE
Canadian Tanks in Sussex, by Major W. A. Ogilvie (in colour) Frontispiece
Coast Defence in Canada—British Columbia ........................................................................................ 50
Vimy Barracks, Barriefield, Ontario ...................................................................................................... 50
The 1st Division Goes Overseas ............................................................................................................ 50
The Minister of National Defence in London, April 1940 ..................................................................... 50
Canadians at the Palace .......................................................................................................................... 82
Basic Training in Canada ....................................................................................................................... 82
Renault Tanks Arriving from the United States, October 1940 ............................................................. 82
Combined Operations Training in Canada ............................................................................................. 114
Flame-Throwing Demonstration, Valcartier .......................................................................................... 114
Coast Defence in Canada—Nova Scotia ................................................................................................ 114
A Gun Operations Room, Saint John Defences, New Brunswick........................................................... 114
The Canadian Forestry Corps in Britain ................................................................................................ 210
The Canadian Women's Army Corps Overseas ..................................................................................... 210
Training for the Dieppe Raid ................................................................................................................. 242
Training in Assault Landings ................................................................................................................. 242
Battle School in England ....................................................................................................................... 242
Training before D Day ........................................................................................................................... 242
The King with Canadian Troops, July 1941 .......................................................................................... 306
Canadians Preparing to Leave for Norway, April 1940 ......................................................................... 306
Canadian Engineers at Gibraltar ............................................................................................................ 306
Engineers at Spitsbergen ........................................................................................................................ 306
The Queen Inspects a Guard of Honour ................................................................................................. 338
A Very Near Miss at C.M.H.Q., London ............................................................................................... 338
Cabinet Ministers at Army Headquarters ............................................................................................... 338
Homeward Bound After Six Years ........................................................................................................ 338
The Sea-Wall at Puys ............................................................................................................................. 370
Pourville from the East .......................................................................................................................... 370
The Main Beaches at Dieppe ................................................................................................................. 370
Dieppe from the Western Headland ....................................................................................................... 370
Part of the Floating Reserve at Dieppe .................................................................................................. 402
Evidence of the Fierceness of German Fire at Dieppe ........................................................................... 402
A Disabled Tank on the Dieppe Promenade .......................................................................................... 402
Canadian Troops Arriving at Hong Kong .............................................................................................. 482
A Former Japanese Commander Surveys the Hong Kong Battlefield ................................................... 482
Wong Nei Chong Gap, Hong Kong Island ............................................................................................ 482
Landing at Kiska, August 1943 .............................................................................................................. 482
The End of the War ................................................................................................................................ 482
The "Maple Leaf" Reports the End ........................................................................................................ 482
PREFACE
T HIS is the first volume of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second
World War. The second, dealing with the campaign in Italy, will appear very shortly.
The third, dealing with the campaign in NorthWest Europe, is in preparation. A
subsequent volume will deal with Canadian military policy in the broad sense. This
history is more detailed, and based on more thorough research, than was possible in the
case of the single-volume Official Historical Summary, The Canadian Army 1939-1945,
which was published in 1948.
The present volume is concerned with a variety of subjects. It deals in outline with
military events in Canada throughout the war; in somewhat greater detail with the history
of the Army in the United Kingdom, including the raiding operations based on that
country; and with the Army's part in the war against Japan. An attempt has been made to
apportion the space allotted to the various topics in accordance with their interest and
significance. The active operations-notably those at Dieppe and Hong Kong, both of
which were important and controversial-have been given more attention than any other
matters. Questions of organization and administration at home and abroad, which are
certainly important and could well form the matter of several volumes, have been more
briefly dealt with; the author has aimed at summarizing the essentials while omitting the
detail. Throughout, he has tried to write mainly for the general reader rather than for the
soldier and the military student. He hopes that these experts will find the book useful; but
information on the more specialized subjects, including the detail of the activities of the
technical arms and the services, must be sought in technical monographs. As was stated
in the preliminary Official Historical Summary, the main object of the present history is
"to tell the Canadian citizen what his army accomplished in the last war, and to provide
him, perhaps, with the means of forming an intelligent judgement on military issues that
may confront him in the future".
It has been considered essential to document the book in detail, but since many
readers will seldom need to consult the references these have been collected at the back
and printed in small type to save space. It may be noted that many of the documents
referred to are still "classified", and the fact that they are cited does not necessarily imply
that they are available for public examination. In spite of this it has been thought best to
give the references, since a documented narrative carries more weight than an
undocumented one even when all the sources cannot be produced; and many of the
classified documents cited will presumably become available to students in due course.
xi
PREFACE
In the interest of security, certain cipher telegrams have been paraphrased without
altering the sense. It is not the practice of the United Kingdom to cite unpublished papers
in official histories. Such British documents are accordingly referred to in this study
merely by the phrase "United Kingdom records". This method is used at the request of
the United Kingdom authorities.
Officers and men are invariably designated in the text by the ranks they held at the
time of the events described. It has not been considered necessary to append decorations
to personal names in the text. In the Index all individuals are referred to by their "final"
ranks and decorations, i.e. those as of the date of compilation.
The author wishes to acknowledge the liberality with which he has been treated in
the matter of access to records. He has had unrestricted access to documents in the hands
of the Government of Canada. In this respect, he acknowledges special debts to the Privy
Council Office and the Department of External Affairs. In addition, many individuals
have generously opened private records to him. The kindness of Mrs. Mackenzie has
enabled him to make use of the papers of the late Senator Ian Mackenzie, Minister of
National Defence 1935-39. General A. G. L. McNaughton has deposited his voluminous
papers with the Historical Section for free use in connection . with this history; and
General H. D. G. Crerar has permitted the Section the fullest access to his private files.
Mr. C. G. Power has kindly lent documents from among his own papers. The literary
executors of the late Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King have been very cooperative.
It is out of the question to make full acknowledgement here to the many
organizations and individuals who have given generous assistance. In London the
Historical Branch of the Cabinet Office has accorded us constant and indispensable aid,
and we have had much help also from the Air Historical Branch of the Air Ministry and
the Historical Section of the Admiralty. We have had helpful exchanges with official
historians in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and India and Pakistan. We owe a
great debt to the Office of the Chief of Military History and to the Captured Records
Section in the United States Department of the Army. In Canada there is a special obli-
gation to the Director of War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, whose
office provided many of the Canadian Army statistics included in this volume. Finally,
the author is most grateful to the innumerable participants in the events described who
have read the volume in draft, in whole or in part, and have given him the benefit of their
comments.
It is quite impossible to thank all the personnel, past and present, of the Canadian
Army's Historical Section who have contributed directly or indirectly to the production of
this book. Lt.-Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, Deputy Director, and Lt.-Col. C. J. Lynn-Grant,
Executive Officer, have helped at
xii
PREFACE
every point. Chapters VI, VII, VIII, XIII, XV and XVI were originally drafted by other
members of the Section and subsequently revised by the writer; in this respect he is
obliged to Captain J. B. Conacher, Major J. C. Newlands and Mr. J. M. Hitsman. All
other chapters he drafted himself; and he takes full responsibility for the entire volume as
now presented. Captain Bond's maps speak for themselves. Captain L. R. Cameron has
acted as research assistant to the author and has made an invaluable contribution. Mr. A.
G. Steiger has given equally important help in connection with German documents.
Lastly, Q.M.S. (W.O.2) M. R. Lemay, a friend and colleague in the wartime Historical
Section overseas which laid the foundations for this work, has typed the numerous
successive drafts with great efficiency and cheerfulness.
Readers who discover errors or important omissions in this volume are asked to
communicate with the author.
C.P.S.
Historical Section (G.S.),

Army Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.
xiii
blank page
PART ONE
Organization, Training and Home Defence
in Canada
CHAPTER I
THE CANADIAN MILITIA ON THE EVE OF WAR

(See Maps 1, 2 and 3)
The Canadian Tradition
C ANADA is an unmilitary community. Warlike her people have often been forced to
be; military they have never been.
Repeatedly, during the French regime, Canadians took up arms in defence of their
country. Twice during Canada's early history as a British colony her people joined with
British forces in defending the soil against attack by the neighbouring nation. On many
occasions in later times there was danger of renewed war with the United States. Later
still, when a happy evolution had put an end to such apprehensions, Canada's increasing
involvement in world politics led her to take a minor part in the South African War of
1899-1902 and a much larger share in the World War of 1914-18. None of these episodes
proved sufficient to convince Canadians that there was a close connection between their
nation's welfare and the state of her military preparations. Fortunately for the country,
there were always some people in it who interested themselves in such matters and
sought to maintain a degree of active military spirit; but they were always a small
minority.
For generations, Canadian governments and parliaments, and certainly also the public
at large, appeared to be convinced that it was time enough to begin preparing for war
after war had broken out. It would be easy to demonstrate the country's traditional dislike
of peacetime armaments and unwillingness to spend money upon them, and to give
examples of how on many occasions the sudden appearance of a crisis led ministers and
legislators to take, hurriedly and belatedly, the military measures for which in more
peaceful moments they had seen no need. But it is not necessary to labour the point; nor
need we here attempt to account fully for the country's unmilitary outlook, which has
certainly been due in great part to the happy accident of a political and geographical
situation that, placed formidable barriers, in the shape of distance, ocean spaces and the
power of great friendly nations, between Canada and potential aggressors. It is enough to
say that not until the years following the Second World War did the Canadian people
3
4 SIX YEARS OF WAR
and their government show themselves ready to spend, in time of peace, money enough
to maintain national armaments commensurate in any degree with the position claimed by
Canada in the world.
It is a remarkable fact that the First World War, which affected Canadian
development so fundamentally in so many ways, had almost no long-term influence upon
the country's military policy. In that war, the most important episode in Canadian history
until its time, 628,000 Canadians served and 60,000 lost their lives.1 Canada intervened
on a large scale on European battlefields, and her troops were recognized as being among
the most formidable on the Western Front. Nevertheless, when the emergency was over
the country reverted lightly and confidently to her earlier traditions, and reduced her
armed forces to a level of insignificance almost as low as that of 1913.
There is no point in going into details here. Only a few illustrations need be given.
The report of the Department of National Defence for the year ending 31 March 1924
calculated that Canada's expenditure on defence, per head of population, was $1.46, by
comparison with $3.30 for Australia, $6.51 for the United States, $23.04 for Great Britain
and $24.66 for France. The total expenditure upon Militia services (including all land
forces) in that year was only $10,920,000.2 Seven years later it had risen scarcely at all.
The expenditures upon Naval and Air services were smaller than those for the land
service, and the grand total for the Department of National Defence for Militia, Naval,
Air and other services amounted in 1930-31 to about $23,700,000, of which just over $11
million was for the Militia. Even this small provision was severely reduced in succeeding
years as a result of the economic depression, and the total actual disbursements of the
Department for the year 1932-33 sank to $14,145,361.3 With this sum Canada, a country
of more than ten million people, was supposedly maintaining a Navy, an Army (then
called the Militia) and an Air Force. How utterly inadequate these forces were for any
practical purpose can be imagined.
A word will be said here about the Militia only. After the First World War a very
inflated paper organization for the land forces of Canada had been set up, apparently on
the recommendation of the "Otter Committee" appointed in 1919. It provided
theoretically for 11 divisions and four cavalry divisions. The Committee appears to have
postulated this organization upon a war on Canadian soil, but recognized that in a war
fought abroad the largest expeditionary force Canada could produce would be six
divisions and one cavalry division.* The peace establishments of the units actually
authorized amounted to more than 140,000 men. (To organize the whole 15
*This Committee, appointed for the special purpose of reporting on means of perpetuating the traditions of Canadian
Expeditionary Force units in the post-war Militia, was originally composed of Major-General Sir William Otter, Major-
General Sir Archibald Macdonell.Brigadier-General E. A. Cruikshank, and Brigadier-General A. G. L. McNaughton.4 In
practice, it consisted of the first and last of these plus Major-General Sir E. W. B. Morrison. The Com-
THE CANADIAN MILITIA ON THE EVE OF WAR 5
divisions, with necessary additional units, at least 300,000 all ranks would have been
required, but-wisely-no attempt was made to provide them.)6 The actual strength, under
the conditions imposed by financial limitations, bore no relationship to these figures.
Lack of funds restricted training and prevented the acquisition of new equipment. This,
combined with the widespread pacifist feeling of those days, made the Non-Permanent
Active Militia (the volunteer citizen force, roughly equivalent to the Territorial Army in
Great Britain or the National Guard in the United States) unpopular. Recruiting was
difficult; and even where a unit could recruit to full strength, it could not draw training
pay for more than a fraction of its numbers. All that could be done in these circumstances
was to seek to train a nucleus of leaders and specialists. That the N.P.A.M. continued to
exist as a basis for the land defence of Canada was due to the public spirit of its officers
and men, to many of whom membership in the force meant an actual financial loss. On
30 June 1931 its enrolled strength was 51,287 officers and other ranks as against a peace
establishment of 134,843. As for the tiny regular army, the Permanent Active Militia, its
peace establishment was 6925 all ranks, but its actual strength on 31 March 1931 was
only 3688.7
The Approach of the Crisis
Such was the state of things in Canada when, just as the world depression was at its
worst, the international situation began to go to pieces at an alarmingrate. In 1931 the
Japanese seized Manchuria from China and defied the League of Nations. In 1933 Adolf
Hitler possessed himself of supreme power in Germany and set about re-arming the
Reich and re-making the map of Europe. The impotence of the League as an instrument
for the preservation of peace became more and more patent, and the frightened
democracies showed no disposition to run risks in the interest of making the League
system effective. As the horizon steadily darkened, those charged with advising the
Canadian Government on matters of defence became increasingly apprehensive.
As we have noted, the depression had led to an economy campaign which further
reduced the already attenuated provision made for the fighting services. Expenditure upon
them in 1932-33 was the lowest since 1913. During the next three years, however, the
depression may be said to have paid a limited dividend to the Canadian forces, for under
the Unemployment Relief and Public Works Construction Acts considerable sums were
expended
mittee made no general report and apparently put on paper no full" statement of its views on the proper organization of the
5
Militia at large; but a table attached to a memorandum by Brig.-Gen. McNaughton (undated but evidently of 1919)
confirms that its calculations werefounded upon a force of 11 infantry divisions with divisional troops, and four cavalry
divisions with divisional troops, plus Corps and Army Troops.
6 SIX YEARS OF WAR
on projects of military importance, including barracks, armouries and air stations. The
project which the Chief of the General Staff (Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton)*
considered most significant was a beginning on a new Dominion Arsenal plant at
Valcartier, Quebec, where respectable progress was made during the depression years.
These measures somewhat improved the material, bricks-and-mortar basis of Canadian
defence; little, however, was done for the forces themselves.
In January, 1935 the main estimates for the militia and air forces for 1935-36 were
tabled in the House of Commons. The amounts proposed were "substantially less" than
those originally submitted to the Government and supplementary estimates were essential
if the deficiencies were to be corrected. The Chief of the General Staff (who at this time
was in Canada "also Chief of the Air Staff in fact if not in name") 8 now prepared for the
Government's information a memorandum entitled The Defence of Canada in which he
reviewed the existing position, the dangers and the needs.9 After giving the statistics of
strength and expenditures since 1919, he dealt with the question of equipment in the
following terms:
As regards reserves of equipment and ammunition, the matter is shortly disposed of. Except as
regards rifles and rifle ammunition, partial stocks of which were inherited from the Great War-there are
none.
As regards equipment, the situation is almost equally serious, and to exemplify it I select a few
items from the long lists of deficiencies on file at National Defence Headquarters:
(i) There is not a single modern anti-aircraft gun of any sort in Canada.
(ii) The stocks of field gun ammunition on hand represent 90 minutes' fire at normal rates for the
field guns inherited from the Great War and which are now obsolescent.
(iii) The coast defence armament is obsolescent and, in some cases, defective in that a number of
the major guns are not expected to be able to fire more than a dozen or so rounds. To keep
some defence value in these guns, which are situated on the Pacific coast, we have not dared
for some years to indulge in any practice firing.
(iv) About the only article of which stocks are held is harness, and this is practically useless. The
composition of a modem land force will include very little horsed transport... .
(v) There are only 25 aircraft of service type in Canada, all of which are obsolescent except for
training purposes; of these, 15 were purchased before 1931 and are practically worn out. The
remaining 10 were procured in 1934 from the Air Ministry at a nominal valuation; they are old
army cooperation machines obtained so that some training with aircraft of military type might
be carried out.
Not a single machine is of a type fit to employ in active operations.
(vi) Not one service air bomb is held in Canada.
McNaughton went on to point out that the funds provided by Parliament in past years
had been "barely sufficient to keep the mechanism of defence
*Appointed C.G.S. 1 January 1929.

in being." Apart from essential overhead, it had been possible to provide only for "the
training of a minimum cadre, composed of officers, non-commissioned officers and
specialists." Equipment had not been added to, save for a very few items; on the contrary,
reserves had been used up to satisfy current requirements. The memorandum proceeded:
Until a few years ago this parlous state of affairs was to some extent tolerable, owing to the
knowledge that in the United Kingdom preparations for defence were based on the assumption "that at
any given date there would be no major war for ten years" and that, in consequence, the Chiefs of Staff
of the Royal Navy. the Army and the Royal Air Force were relieved of responsibility for lack of
preparation in the event of a major war arising within that period.
In 1933, after a comprehensive review of the international situation, this assumption was
cancelled* and the Chiefs of Staff in the United Kingdom resumed their responsibility for advising the
Government as to the nature and extent of the defence preparations which, in the light of their
information, they considered to be necessary.
The ten-year assumption was never formally applied to Canada, but in point of fact ever since
1919, Departmental estimates have been prepared on this basis, and in those which I have submitted
annually since 1929 to provide for the Land and Air Forces, nothing beyond that which was
immediately necessary to the maintenance and training of cadre forces was contemplated.
The C.G.S. recalled that the draft estimates which he had submitted for the fiscal year
1934-35 had been based on his appreciation that "the most urgent requirements were in
respect to Air Defence"; Parliament had voted, as a result, an increase for the Air Force
of $525,000 over the previous year's provision, the estimates for the land forces showing
little change. In preparing draft estimates for 1935-36, he had followed the same policy
of "placing emphasis on the urgent need for the development of the Air Force", and had
asked, by comparison with the previous year's estimates, additional sums of $1,927,604
for the R.C.A.F. and of $1.512,634 for the Militia, which would provide for modest
increases in numbers of men trained and some small improvements in equipment,
including the provision of "one section of anti-aircraft guns for training."
Supplementary Estimates for 1935-36 were duly brought down, and provided
$1,651,000 for militia services and $1,302,900 for aviation, in addition to $145,000 for
naval services. The final total of actual expenditure for all purposes, including the three
fighting services, by the Department of National Defence for the fiscal year 1935-36 was
$27,378,541.11
The New Defence Programme and its Problems
The general election of 14 October 1935 resulted in the replacement of the

Conservative government of Mr. R. B. (later Viscount) Bennett by a
*General Lord Ismay has stated that the "Ten Years Rule" was in fact abandoned as early as March 1932.10
8 SIX YEARS OF WAR
Liberal administration headed by Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King. It fell to this new

government not only to preside over the final stage of defence planning preceding the
outbreak of the Second World War, but also to lead the nation in that war.
The new Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ian A. Mackenzie, called for accounts of
the state of the armed services. Major-General E. C. Ashton, who had become Chief of
the General Staff when General McNaughton was seconded to the presidency of the
National Research Council on 1 June 1935, submitted on 12 November a report upon the
land and air forces.12 This was based largely upon McNaughton's memorandum, to which
Ashton called attention. He pointed out that while the Supplementary Estimates had led
to some slight improvement since that report was made, the position had nevertheless
become "still more acute" in view of events abroad. War had now broken out between
Italy and Ethiopia, and the attempt of the League of Nations to check the aggressor had
brought Great Britain within measurable distance of war with Italy. Much of Ashton's
statement concerning the equipment situation derived from McNaughton's, but certain
additional details which he gave may well be quoted:
Mechanical Transport
Beyond the purchase of a few mechanical tractors for the guns of the artillery , batteries of the
Permanent Force, no provision has been made for the supply of mechanical transport for war purposes.
We possess no tanks or service armoured cars. No tractors suitable to haul heavy and field artillery are
wholly manufactured in Canada though certain companies partly manufacture a light 6-wheeled vehicle
adaptable for field artillery.
Anti-Gas Defence
A few respirators, sufficient for the supply of a limited number to the
Permanent Force, are held for training. None is available for mobilization... .
Steel Helmets
The stocks of steel helmets are sufficient only for the supply of one division.
Existing Manufacturing Facilities
At the present no facilities whatsoever exist for the production of rifles, machine guns and artillery
weapons in Canada. The existing Dominion Arsenal at Quebec is equipped only for the production of
rifle ammunition and a limited amount for field guns.
No aero engines of any kind are manufactured in Canada at the present time.
To develop an aero-engine industry to the point of production will take two years.
Between 1935 and 1939 the Government made a degree of progress in remedying the
situation thus outlined, a situation once characterized by Mr. Mackenzie in a letter to the
Prime Minister as "a most astonishing and atrocious condition".13 It approached the
problem, however, with a circumspection which doubtless reflected the difficulties
arising out of the Ethiopian War. The election campaign of 1935, during which the two
major parties both declared their intention of doing everything possible to prevent
Canada's becoming involved in this conflict, had demonstrated the extreme unwilling-
ness of the Canadian public to face the possibility of another war; and however loudly the
military situation might cry out for action-and the cry, as we have seen, could scarcely
have been louder-it was evidently feared that any programme of rearmament might be
exposed to misinterpretation and misrepresentation, at home as well as abroad.* During
its first year in office the new Government moved cautiously. The Defence Department's
total expenditure for the fiscal year 1936-37 was actually slightly less than for the
previous one, although it must be noted that there were very considerable increases in the
normal provision for the three armed services; the over-all reduction resulted from the
cessation of the Special Unemployment Relief programme. In particular, the main
estimates for the R.C.A.F. (totalling $4,130,000) were exactly one million dollars larger
than those for 1935-36.14
The Government offered the public an earnest of its intention to give serious attention
to defence problems by forming in August 1936 a Canadian Defence Committee
(subsequently referred to as the Defence Committee of the Cabinet), composed of the
Prime Minister and the Ministers of Justice, Finance and National Defence.15 The
formation of some such body, distantly analogous to the Committee of Imperial Defence
in the United Kingdom, had been suggested at intervals since 1911, and had been
recommended more than once by General Ashton.16 The Defence Committee actually
met only a few times before the outbreak of war; its chief practical function seems to
have been to bring the Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff together for the discussion of
proposed defence estimates. The Chiefs of Staff had had their own Committee (copied
from British practice) since June 1927.17 Called at first the "Joint Staff Committee", its
name was changed to "Chiefs of Staff Committee" in January 1939, after the Senior Air
Officer, who had always been a member of it, was given the title "Chief of the Air
Staff".18
Ashton also pressed for the institution under the Defence Committee of a group of
sub-committees and a secretariat (again copied from the Committee of Imperial
Defence).19 In April 1937 approval was given for this in principle, but only -on 15 March
1938 did an order in council set up interdepartmental sub-committees on Treatment of
Aliens and Alien Property; Censorship (a committee on this subject had in fact existed
since 1936, if not earlier) ;20 Treatment of Ships and Aircraft; Air Raid Precautions;
Emergency Legislation; and Defence Co-ordination. Most, though not all, of these
committees set to work at early dates, and made useful contributions to pre-war planning
and the preparation of the War Book21 (see below, page 33). As we shall see, a Navy,
Army and Air Supply Committee, with various sub-committees, had been set up in
1936.22 The central organization for the coordination of defence was thus gradually
improving.
*See the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons, 19 February 1937.
10 SIX YEARS OF WAR
During 1936 most careful consideration was given to the preparation of the estimates
for 1937-38, which represent the real beginning of the Government's modest re-armament
programme. On 26 August the Defence Committee appears to have met the military
heads of the three services in the Prime Minister's office, and the officers explained their
requirements.23 Subsequently, on 5 September, the Joint Staff Committee, composed at
this time of Commodore P. W. Nelles, Major-General Ashton, and Air Commodore G.
M. Croil,* submitted a document entitled "An Appreciation of the Defence Problems
Confronting Canada, with Recommendations for the Development of the Armed
Forces".24 This dwelt upon the increasingly precarious international situation. "The
possibility of a major world war is becoming more apparent", remarked the three officers
presciently. "Indeed, the realization is growing in many minds that the cessation of
hostilities in 1918 was but an armistice." They noted both the German situation and that
in the Far East, and observed that both concerned Canada, "no matter how reluctant that
concern may be." Of the two, they wrote, the European situation contained the more
serious implications. They considered it quite possible that circumstances might again
arise demanding the dispatch of Canadian forces overseas; they also called attention to
the possibility of Canada's being obliged to defend her neutrality in a conflict in the
Pacific. The tasks of the Canadian forces were thus defined:
"(a) The direct defence of Canada is the major responsibility of its armed forces.
"(b) The indirect defence of Canada by co-operation with other Empire forces in a war overseas is a
secondary responsibility of this country, though possibly one requiring much greater ultimate
effort."
The heads of the services proceeded to point out those extremely serious deficiencies
in the Canadian armed forces which have been noted above, and submitted their
recommendations for remedial measures. So far as the Militia was concerned, they
observed that there was a requirement for modernizing the Esquimalt defences and
improving the seaward defences of Halifax. Antiaircraft defence measures were also
essential. As for the Militia at large, they pointed out that the reorganization already
effected called for smaller forces but that these should be up-to-date. "The necessary
armament, equipment and supplies to enable one-third of this future force to mobilize
without delay, on a war footing, and concentrate in any part of Canada is considered
essential." Subsequently General Ashton gave a still more specific account of the
minimum Militia requirements for the defence of Canada: two divisions, equipped to
modern standards. "No Chief of the General Staff could be expected to undertake to
safeguard the integrity of our coasts with any smaller force."25
*Colonel H. D. G. Crerar, as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1935-38, was Secretary of the
Committee and drafted most of its memoranda.
On 8 September the Minister of National Defence sent the Joint Staff Committee's
memorandum to the Prime Minister, along with the financial calculations of the three
services and the draft estimates for the year 1937-38 which they had submitted to him.26
These calculations had been made on the basis of a five-year plan for development, the
total cost of which was estimated at $199,351,333; or roughly $40,000,000 per year. Of
this grand total the Militia's share was calculated as $98,872,075, the Navy's as
$25,815,500 and that of the Air Force $74,663,758. These figures, however, did not
include the usual standing vote for Militia Services, which would add $11 or $12 million
more per year. The total estimate for the first year, which the Joint Staff Committee
envisaged as the most expensive under this project, was the main difficulty; it would
amount to roughly $65 million. "Frankly", wrote Mr. Mackenzie, "I do not think we can
get that amount approved without difficulty. I think, however, we can justify an amount
of $50,000,000. a year for the first year; $45,000,000. for the second, and $40,000,000.
for the third year with approximately an annual vote of $40,000,000. subsequent to that
date." He called attention to the expanded defence programmes which had been adopted
by other Commonwealth countries.
On 16 November, presumably in accordance with a suggestion from Mr. King, Mr.
Mackenzie circulated the papers to his Cabinet colleagues .27 He again observed that the
really difficult problem was the immediate requirements for the first year of the five-year
plan. The estimated cost for the first year for all three services, he wrote, "amounts to the
staggering figure of $53,838,942, with an additional $12,000,000 for the ordinary Militia
estimates, or a total of $66,000,000." This was the figure which had been submitted in the
previous September, but the detailed estimates which the Chiefs of Staff had now
requested actually amounted to $69,315,005.42. These estimates were divided into
"main" and "special" categories, the former covering the normal expenditures of the
services, the latter making provision for the large capital expenditures required to
modernize them and fit them for war.
Reviewing the services' demands in detail, the Minister indicated to his colleagues
certain points where it appeared to him that reductions might be made. He suggested total
possible reductions in the R.C.A.F. special estimate (which totalled $12,649,411)
amounting to $2,400,483. The Navy's modest special estimate of $4,269,040, he felt,
could not be reduced. As for the Militia, it might be possible to eliminate from the
provision for miscellaneous supplies the sum of $1,300,000, which would have provided
clothing and accoutrements, steel helmets, and tents, blankets, and camp and barrack
equipment. He also suggested that the provision for armament might be reduced by
$810,000, including $500,000 intended to provide Bren guns. The recommendations for
Engineer Services and Works were divided into
12 SIX YEARS OF WAR
List "A", which provided for coast defences and other facilities considered necessary, and
List "B", which consisted of items of lower priority, chiefly armouries. The Minister
made the obvious suggestion that List "B" (which totalled $6,227,820) might usefully be
dispensed with. His suggestions concerning List "A" (the total of which was $5,057,150)
should perhaps be quoted:
... If it is not decided to undertake government manufacture of munitions on a large scale, but to
leave mass production to Canadian industry, which in time of emergency would undoubtedly be the
case, the item for $600,000 (Ammunition Group, Dominion Arsenal, Valcartier, or in the vicinity of
Quebec City), might be deferred. It is really impossible not to proceed with the development of our main
permanent training camps, such as, Valcartier, Barriefield, Dundurn, Shilo and Calgary.
There might also be some question as to the necessity of proceeding immediately with fortifications
on the Atlantic Coast for which the following items are included:
Halifax, N.S.
Reconstruction of emplacements$300,000
Atlantic Coast
Coast Fortifications 900,000
Halifax, N.S.
Improvements, Joint Services
Magazines 100,000
If it is not decided to proceed with the Ammunition Group and the Atlantic Coast defences, a
reduction of $1,690,000 could be made.
In closing it may be said that everything asked for is required, but I also find it very difficult to
recommend that the entire amounts requested should be submitted to Parliament during the coming
Session. Should Council fix an amount to which the Estimates of my Department should be reduced, I
would immediately have worked out by the technical advisers of the Department, some other order
of priority.
There is no record of the consideration of this matter by the Cabinet; but it is clear
that Mr. Mackenzie's colleagues shared his feeling that the figures submitted by the
services were "staggering", and were prepared to go further than he in reducing them.
Had the tentative reductions suggested by him been applied, the estimates for the
Department of National Defence for 1937-38 would have totalled $56,886,702. The
actual total of the Main Estimates as finally presented to Parliament was $34,091,873.42.
Including Supplementary Estimates, the final total for the year was $36,194,839.63, of
which $18,703,636 was for Militia Services. Many items which the Joint Staff
Committee had recommended for inclusion in the 1937-38 estimates were deferred for
years to come. Work began on a considerable scale on the West Coast defences during
1937-38, but nothing of importance was done on the Atlantic coast until 1939. Action for
the provision of Bren guns, recommended in 1936, was not taken until 1938. As is noted
below, the Ammunition Group of the Arsenal was never proceeded with. The grants
made for general stores were so limited that, as will be seen in due time, the force
mobilized in 1939 was short of the simplest necessities for a long period..
The Government decided upon a definite order of priority as between the three services
and the various tasks. Precisely when this decision was taken is not clear, but it was at
least adumbrated in Mr. Mackenzie's memorandum of November 1936 quoted above,
which suggests the desirability of dealing with the question in the order, Air Services
first, Navy second and Militia third. This may possibly have been suggested by the Prime
Minister, as it is not in Mackenzie's letter to him of 8 September. The priority finally
arrived at was stated by Mr. Mackenzie in the House of Commons on 26 April, 1939, in
the following terms:
1. Fortification of Pacific Coast prior to Atlantic Coast.

2. Development of the air force in priority to navy and, so far as possible, the navy in priority to
the militia.
3. Reorganization and re-equipping the militia as soon as our resources permit us to do so.
The relegation of the Militia to what was at least theoretically a tertiary position was
something new in Canadian defence policy. But while the land service now received a
smaller proportion than before of the total appropriations, those appropriations were
sufficiently increased to ensure that it at least received sums materially larger than those
for earlier years. As for the decision to give immediate priority to the Air Force, it will be
remembered that in 1933-35 General McNaughton had declared that the most urgent task
was to repair the deficiencies in the country's air defence (above, page 7).
The general pattern of the Government's programme, and its annual progress, may best be
traced in a simplified tabulation of the appropriations made during the six fiscal years
preceding the outbreak of war.
PRE-WAR APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF

NATIONAL DEFENCE*
(in $000's)28
Fiscal Militia Naval Air Other Total
Year Services Services Services Services
1934-35 8,882 2,222 2,262 13,356 26,724
1935-36 10 651 2 395 4 302 12 762 30 112
1936-37 12 018 4 853 6 809 6 304 29 986
1937-38 18 703 4 485 11 752 1 253 36 194
1938-39 16 727 6 639 11 686 1 292 36 345
1939-40 21,397 8,800 29,733 4,730 64,666
*Appropriations made in the last two years of the Bennett administration have been included, both for purposes of
comparison and to illustrate the upward trend noticeable in those years. "Other Services" include various non-military and
miscellaneous appropriations; also those for unemployment, relief projects (many, though not all, of which had military
significance) and (in 1939-40) provision made for retirement of capital expenditure. The figures for 1939-40 are
appropriations made before the outbreak of war.
14 SIX YEARS OF WAR
Many considerations hedged the Government in. The country's economic life had not
recovered from the depression; unemployment was still widespread and the public
accounts still showed a regular annual deficit. In these circumstances, large expenditures
for defence, traditionally unpopular in Canada, were likely to meet considerable criticism.
At the same time there were political difficulties. As we have said, pacifist feeling was
strong, the public naturally shrank from the idea of another destructive war, and there was
no general realization of the fact-now so clear in retrospect-that the best hope of avoiding
such a war lay in the democracies' being strong. There was constant public debate over
the question of the position which Canada could and should take in the event of another
world conflict, and in the light of the various attitudes which emerged there was
considerable apprehension as to the effect of such a crisis on the unity of the country.
These circumstances inevitably left their mark upon both the scale and the nature of the
Government's defence programme. In particular, they led the Government to avoid any
appearance whatever of preparing for action overseas.
In a private address to members of his party in Parliament on 20 January 1937,29 the
Prime Minister gave an indication of the considerations which controlled the ministry's
defence policy. He spoke of the destructive forces at work in Europe and the Orient, and
of the "disruptive influences" visible within Canada and the consequent paramount duty
"to be united in regard to policy and to recognize that the unity of Canada comes first and
foremost". He mentioned the importance of preserving the unity of the Commonwealth
also; and he went on to point out that Canada, though a rich country, was at the moment
"practically defenceless", with no one to guard its doors. He proceeded:
We are not concerned with aggression. We are concerned with the defence of
Canada. . The possibility of conflict with the United States is eliminated from our mind.
There is nothing here for an expeditionary force-only for the defence of Canada against
those who might wantonly assail us or violate our neutrality. The defence of our shores
and the preservation of our neutrality—these are the two cardinal principles of our policy.
You read what Meighen said in the Senate yesterday, that the amount in the estimates
was not enough, that we were concerned with the defence of the Empire as a whole; that
the first line of our defence was the Empire's boundaries. We cannot accept that. But we
can put our own house in order [so] that we shall not be a burden on anyone else-neither a
burden on the States nor a burden on England. Meighen would do so much more-at least
so he says—and Woodsworth would do nothing at all. The safe policy is the middle
course between these two views-the safe policy is a rational policy of domestic defence.
Let us therefore be not afraid. Too many are governed by fear in the days in which
we live. Let us first of all have a complete understanding of our own policy-and then
fearing neither of the extremists-let us pursue our moderate way. Let us be united on a
sane policy of defence: let us explain that policy to our people and let us above all strive
at all times to keep Canada united.
Statements along these lines were made to Parliament a few weeks later by the Prime
Minister and the Minister of National Defence.30
In May 1937 the Government's policies were further crystallized-though not publicly-
in a statement by the Minister of National Defence to the Imperial Conference then
meeting in London.31 It was a frank exposition of the ministry's views, accompanied by
an account of the divided state of Canadian public opinion on "the questions of neutrality,
foreign policy and defence". Mr. Mackenzie described the defence priorities which had
been established:
In general, may I make it very definite . . . that we attach the first importance to Air development
and to attaining our objective of 11 permanent and 12 non-permanent squadrons.
Next in order we place the increasing of our modest Naval force from four to six destroyers-with
four out of the six stationed on the Pacific. And lastly, we plan to have two out of our six divisions
completely equipped, thoroughly modernized and mechanized, and ready for service immediately in any
part of Canada.
In all our plans and preparations we are paying particular attention to the Pacific Coast…
Mr. Mackenzie ended by presenting to the Conference the following "conclusions":
"1. Canadian public opinion supports the present defence policy of the Government of Canada.
"2. Canadian public opinion will not, under present conditions, support any larger appropriations than
those voted this year by Parliament.
"3. Canadian public opinion is definitely opposed to extraneous commitments but is prepared to support
a National defence policy for the protection of our coasts and the focal areas of our trade routes...
The New Programme Develops, 1937-1939
In the light of the second of these conclusions, it is not surprising that the influence of
financial considerations, so evident at the inception of the programme, continued to be
important as it developed. As indicated by the Minister, the estimates for 1937-38 were
taken as a norm; and the service authorities were informed that "for three years the
Defence Estimates would probably not be increased over those of 1937/38". Accordingly,
plans were made for development based on a total of roughly $18,000,000 for the Militia
for each year 1938-39, 1939-40 and 1940-41.32 In September 1937, however, instructions
were received to reduce the estimates for 1938-39, which had been prepared on this basis,
"by a total sum of $2,326,889". The money thus taken from the Militia was given to the
Navy.33 Economy continued to be an important object of the Government. On 12 January
1938 the Prime Minister wrote to all his colleagues in the Cabinet34 reminding them
16 SIX YEARS OF WAR
of the recent deficits and emphasizing the importance of achieving a surplus and if
possible some reduction in taxation before the next appeal to the electorate. He begged
them if possible to cooperate in bringing the country's expenditures for 1938-39 within a
total of $500 million-necessitating "a reduction of seventy million dollars on estimates
for the ensuing year, as thus far presented". This was presumably the origin of the second
reduction in the defence estimates which is recorded as imposed this year. The main
Militia estimates now fell to $15,880,635; even with Supplementaries included, the final
total was only $16,727,000.35
The Chief of the General Staff understood that this deficiency of approximately two
million dollars (by comparison with 1937-38) would be made good the next year. On 31
May 1938 he submitted provisional Militia estimates for 1939-40 amounting to a total of
$22,779,943.36 These, along with those of the other services, were considered at a
meeting of the Defence Council* on 1 June. The total sum exceeded the amount voted for
1938-39 by $14,515,160. The Minister asked the heads of the services to reconsider the
estimates; they did so, but reported that in their opinion the programmes which had been
approved could not be implemented at less expenditure.37 On 22 July the Joint Staff
Committee submitted a new "Review of Canada's Position with Respect to Defence”,38
surveying developments since 1936. This paper noted that the European situation had
become much worse during this period, the German navy had grown powerful, and the
East Coast defences accordingly had acquired increased importance. The concluding
summary may be quoted:
15. Since we last reported collectively on the requirements of Canadian defence [5 September 1936]
some progress has been made towards the implementation of the programme then recommended. The
Naval objective of six destroyers then aimed at will shortly be attained. Despite unforeseen delays in the
procurement of essential armament for the land forces we have made headway, by using existing
equipment, in strengthening the fixed defences of the Pacific Coast. The Air Force has been
substantially increased as to personnel, and a beginning has been made in development of air bases and
the arming of units with service aircraft.
The above programme, however, has, generally speaking, and in particular with respect to the
Militia and Air Services, been undertaken very much on a "long-term" basis.
In the meantime the international situation has continued to deteriorate, and has developed in such a
way as to shift the centre of gravity of danger from the Pacific to the Atlantic Coast. We have felt it
necessary to revise our estimate of the forms and scales of attack to which Eastern coastal and inland.
centres may be subject, and to include therein bombardment by fast armourd ships
mounting heavy guns, and air attack on centres as far from the coast as Toronto.
16. In these circumstances, while we are fully aware of the difficulties in the way of obtaining larger
appropriations, we feel that we would be remiss in our
*The Defence Council was composed of the Minister of National Defence, the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the
General Staff, the Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Senior Air Officer, with the heads of Branches at Militia Headquarters
and the Judge Advocate General as associate members.
responsibilities to you if we did not state that a long-term expenditure on the gradual improvement of
our defences has, we believe, little relation to the actual problem of the security of this country. In our
view the situation strongly indicates that immediate speed, rather than present economy, requires to be
taken as the governing factor in the execution of our plans.
The Committee's specific recommendations with respect to the Militia service were as
follows:
"(i) Immediate provision of essential coast and anti-aircraft defence armament and equipment.
"(ii) Completion of the Interim Plan* on both coasts without delay.
"(iii) Further and determined action to complete the equipment of two divisions."
In September the crisis over Czechoslovakia brought the world to the brink of war
and administered a severe shock to the country. On 14 November the Cabinet Defence
Committee met the Chiefs of Staff, and the latter presented their recommendations for
expenditure during 1939-40. It is recorded that the total increase contemplated in these
recommendations, by comparison with the appropriations for the current year, was
approximately $37 million. This would have raised the total appropriation for the
Department of National Defence to roughly $73 million. The Militia estimates submitted
had risen to $26,451,783.39 Subsequently they were further increased to $28,657,795.40
Although the Government was prepared to go some distance in expanding and
improving the forces at this time, it was not ready to go so far as this, and in particular it
was not ready to spend so much on the land forces. The Militia now suffered for its low
status in the official priority. On 17 December the Militia authorities received through the
Deputy Minister of National Defence verbal instructions to make a drastic cut of
$7,882,195, which brought the Militia estimates down to $20,775,600.41 This produced a
very strong protest from the Military Members of the Defence Council (the heads of
branches at Militia Headquarters), as it involved eliminating, among other things, the
proposed beginning on East Coast defences, important purchases of armament,
ammunition and stores (including boots and clothing), a small increase (159 all ranks)
which had been proposed for the Permanent Force, and other items. The C.G.S. wrote:
"The Military Members . . . are of the opinion that the Militia, both N.P.A.M. and P.F.,
will not be able to meet requirements in a crisis unless it receives more generous
treatment in the coming estimates."42 The protest brought no increase in the main esti-
mates. It is clear that the Cabinet had fixed an arbitrary total, for the actual over-all
estimates for the Department of National Defence as submitted to Parliament amounted
to exactly $60,000,,000.42.†
*See below, page 28.

†This is apart from $3,477,175 included for the retirement of moneys borrowed for capital expenditure.
18 SIX YEARS OF WAR
The Cabinet Defence Committee again met the Chiefs of Staff on 30 January, 1939,
and although the business done is not recorded it was probably concerned with
recommendations for Supplementary Estimates. In due course, Militia Supplementaries
amounting to $622,000 were brought down, making limited provision for the first stage
of the East Coast defences—$145,000 for engineering works and $53,625 for armament-
and for boots for the Non-Permanent Active Militia. Even including these, however, the
pre-war appropriations for Militia services for the fiscal year 1939-40 were still
materially less than the sum requested in May 1938. Reference to the table on page 13
will make it clear that the R.C.A.F. was the chief beneficiary of the increased generosity
of this period.
The Reorganization of the Militia
Having surveyed the new defence programme generally, we may now cum to more
detailed consideration of the Militia aspects of it.
In matters of organization there were important changes in these years. On 19 November
1938 the Chief of the General Staff ceased to be responsible for the Royal Canadian Air
Force. The designation of the Senior Air Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force, was
subsequently changed to Chief of the Air Staff, and this officer thereafter possessed the
same independence as the Chiefs of the General and Naval Staffs, becoming "directly
responsible to the Minister of National Defence." The Canadian situation was thus largely
assimilated to that in the United Kingdom. The change was a natural consequence of the
high priority accorded the Air Force in the Government's new defence programme.43
The land forces themselves underwent an extensive and salutary reorganization. It
had long been recognized that the organization of the NonPermanent Active Militia did
not make sense. In discussions preceding the Disarmament Conference of 1932, General
McNaughton recommended that Canadian calculations for the future should be based
upon reducing the theoretical 11 divisions and four cavalry divisions to six divisions and
one cavalry division, with the necessary proportion of corps and army troops. He pointed
out that, apart from being absurdly inflated, the existing organization was unbalanced; it
contained an excess of infantry and cavalry units, but lacked any due and proper
proportion of artillery and other ancillary units and services, and these could not be
organized without a further increase of nearly 100,000 in the peace establishment.
McNaughton's recommendations were accepted as a basis for the guidance of the
Canadian delegation to the Disarmament Conference. When in 1933 it became necessary
to submit detailed calculations to the Conference, the recommendations were
reconsidered, and (with no substantial change with respect to land forces) accepted by a
special Cabinet Committee. They were accordingly transmitted to Geneva.44
Although a new basis for the Militia had thus been approved in principle, and the
Defence Associations representing the various arms of the NonPermanent Active Militia
were consulted during 1933-34 and concurred in its desirability, reorganization in
accordance with it was postponed until 1936. On 5 June of that year, following the
passing of the departmental estimates, ministerial authority was received to proceed with
it without further delay. By the end of the following December it was virtually
complete.45 The nature of the reorganization can be only broadly sketched here. The
reorganized force contained only 20 cavalry regiments as compared with 35 before;
moreover, four of the 20 were armoured car units and two others were mechanized. There
had been 135 infantry and machine-gun battalions; these now declined in number to 91.
Six of the 91, moreover, were to be tank battalions. (These were the first tank units
organized in Canada; but an Armoured Corps had not yet been set up; and, of course,
they had no tanks.) On the other hand, the Artillery was largely increased (the number of
field batteries rising from 67 to 110) and the Engineer arm was also much expanded. The
Militia now began to assume the appearance of a balanced army. 46
As a result of the reorganization, the land forces of Canada in 1938 had an authorized
peace establishment (as distinct from an actual strength) of 90,576 all rank, distributed as
shown in the following table:47
Permanent Non-Permanent
Active Militia Active Militia
Arm of Service Personnel Horses Personnel Horses
Staff and General List 71 - - -
Cavalry 444 323 8 141 4 840
Artillery Field 389 - 9 976 -
Artillery Medium 57 - 2 155 -
Artillery Heavy and Anti-Aircraft 302 4 1 924 -
Engineers 296 - 4 860 -
Signals 422 - 4 008 -
Officers' Training Corps - - 4 553 -
Infantry 997 27 42 721 -
Army Service Corps 300 - 1 535 -
Other Services* 990 - 6 435 4
Totals 4,268 354 86,308 4,844
No formations higher than brigades actually existed. In the course of this reorganization
the horse virtually disappeared from the establishment, except in the cavalry, where he
got a reprieve which proved to be very short.
*Medical; Dental (N.P.A.M. only); Ordnance; Veterinary; Pay (P.F. only); Postal (N.P.A.M. only); Corps of Military
Staff Clerks (P.F. only).
20 SIX YEARS OF WAR
The Problem of Supply
The progress of re-armament was very materially retarded by the supply difficulties
which General Ashton had indicated in 1935 (above, page 8). Canada had no armament
industry. Even during the First World War, when she produced vast quantities of shells,
she had made no weapons except Ross rifles, and her facilities had not improved since
that time. Her traditional source of supply was the United Kingdom; but both public and
private factories there were now fully occupied in producing the weapons required by
Britain's own re-armament programme, and equipment could not be had merely by
appropriating funds and placing orders. (At the same time, the continued relative
smallness of appropriations limited the orders that could be placed.) Whether ordered
from Britain, or from Canadian plants which had never made weapons before and were
sure to require years for preparation, war material in quantities was certainly not going to
be available to the Canadian forces for a long time to come. Thanks to these facts, the
progress made before September 1939 towards re-equipping the Militia was very limited.
Of the considerable amount of equipment ordered from England, Canada received
before the outbreak of war quantities so small as to afford only very slight facilities for
training, and none at all for arming troops on mobilization. Two light tanks (the Militia's
first tanks) came in from the United Kingdom in 1938; and 14 more arrived in the
summer of 1939 just before war broke out. In other categories the quantities of modern
equipment available were equally ludicrous. In the spring of 1939, five 3-inch mortars
had arrived (at this time, every infantry battalion was supposed to possess two such
mortars). When war broke out, Canada had 29 Bren guns (the units were armed with the
obsolete Lewis of 1914-18) and 23 anti-tank rifles.48 There were four modern anti-aircraft
guns in the country,* as against 116 calculated to be required.49 There were also four 2-
pounder anti-tank guns; 32 more had been ordered in 1938-39 and were expected to
arrive in 1940-41.50
The possibility of producing armaments in Canada had been extensively canvassed at
the Department of National Defence for many years, but with, on the whole, very little
result. Sir Frederick Borden, Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Minister of Militia, had recommended
to the Colonial Conference of 1907 that each Dominion establish its own gun and small
arms factories; and in 1917 the Imperial War Conference had suggested the development
of capacity for production of "naval and military material, munitions and supplies, in all
important parts of the Empire ... where the facilities do not presently exist".51 The
undesirability of relying entirely upon British sources of
*Even these were 3-inch, an already obsolescent pattern. See also Chapter V, below.
ammunitions and weapons was frequently urged in Canada. In 1930, for instance, a
General Staff memorandum52 remarked:
The factories of Great Britain barely suffice for her own peace requirements and, in consequence,
deliveries of ammunition are sometimes delayed as much as three years from date of ordering. The same
applies to guns. It is safe to say that if the Government ordered two Anti-Aircraft guns now, delivery
would not be effected for at least two years.
As noted above, this situation grew even worse when Britain began to re-arm in the
middle thirties.
In July 1929, shortly after General McNaughton became Chief of the General Staff, a
military committee was appointed to consider plans for a new Dominion Arsenal. The
existing arsenal, occupying cramped quarters at Quebec, was, as already mentioned,
equipped to produce only small arms ammunition and limited quantities of field artillery
shells. The committee's terms of reference required it to produce a plan for an arsenal
capable of manufacturing small arms ammunition to the amount of five million rounds
annually, and gun ammunition up to and including 6-inch; while in addition locations
were to be selected and reserved for a rifle-factory and a factory for manufacturing guns
and carriages up to 4-inch calibre. The idea was to use a site at Little River, near Quebec
City, which had been bought during the late war to permit of expanding the Arsenal.
Some additional adjoining property was required, and the C.G.S. pressed for it to be
purchased. In a memorandum53 addressed to the Minister of National Defence (Colonel J.
L. Ralston)* on 12 May 1930, he wrote in part as follows:
It is my considered opinion that the provision of the proper facilities for initiating the manufacture
of guns, small arms and ammunition in Canada should no longer be delayed, and I recommend that
authority be obtained to include, in the Supplementary Votes of this Department, the following item:—
Quebec Arsenal: purchase of additional land required and construction, $200,000.00.
I regard it as in the highest degree important that the policy initiated by Sir Frederick Borden in
1907, that Canada should be self contained in the provision of munitions, should now be implemented.
The sum requested was not provided, however. The depression was already coming on.
As it seemed impossible to obtain the additional land required for it, the Arsenal
Committee recommended that the Little River scheme be abandoned and the arsenal placed
at Valcartier, P.Q., where the 1st Canadian Division had been concentrated in 1914 and
ample land was available in the possession of the Department. General McNaughton now
urged that provision for beginning construction be made in the estimates for 1931-32; but
again this was not done. Not until the 1933-34 estimates was an
*Colonel Ralston was Minister of National Defence in Mr. King's second administration, 1926-1930. He held the
same portfolio during the greater part of the Second World War.
22 SIX YEARS OF WAR
appropriation made for work at Valcartier, and this was only $10,000, barely enough for
survey and planning.54 As we have already seen (above, page 6), it proved possible to
make some progress with the scheme as an Unemployment Relief project. The only unit
of the proposed establishment executed, nevertheless, was the Filling Group. This part of
the Dominion Arsenal finally moved from Cove Fields, Quebec, to Valcartier in the late
summer of 1938. No provision for the proposed Ammunition Group or gun or small arms
factories had been made. Steps had, however, been taken to increase the output of the
Quebec Arsenal; its staff was enlarged and its equipment improved, while the old
wartime branch at Lindsay, Ontario, was reopened.55 The position with respect to
ammunition production was thus somewhat bettered.
The total cost of the whole arsenal scheme as recommended by General McNaughton
was estimated at between $30,000,000 and $35,000,000, and the Minister of National
Defence said in 1938 that it was financial considerations that had prevented the
Department from proceeding with it.56 The sum was very large by pre-war standards, but
it was of course altogether dwarfed by those spent after the outbreak of war to expand
manufacturing facilities. In 1944 it was recorded that the Canadian Government had
spent about $130,000,000 in constructing plants for the production of ammunition, bombs
and mines-in addition to expenditures by private capital; while another $130,000,000 had
been invested by the Crown in the gun and small arms industry.57 Thus the first years of
war were spent in developing, slowly and at great expense, an industry whose nucleus, at
least, could have been in existence in 1939. Had Canadian governments accepted the
recommendations of their military advisers, which three successive administrations felt
themselves unable to entertain, the Canadian land forces in the Second World War could
have been armed with modern weapons from the outset. As it was, they made do for
many months with the equipment of 1918.
It should be noted that in September 1937 General Ashton reviewed the whole matter
for the information of the Minister of National Defence.58 He pointed out how very little
had yet been accomplished towards supplying the numerous equipment deficiencies
catalogued in 1935, the basic reasons being the smallness of appropriations and the
difficulty of obtaining deliveries from England. He concluded that, in the light of the
desperate international situation, it was out of the question simply to wait until Britain
could meet Canada's needs. He had no objection in principle to buying equipment from
the United States, at least equipment not used with a field army; but he pointed out that
existing U.S. neutrality legislation would automatically cut off supplies from that source
in the event of war. The only effective course of action, he suggested, was "the setting up
in this country of an armament
industry designed to diminish our dependence on external sources of supply". He

proceeded:
In considering this course… it is not for a moment suggested that it lies within the limits of
practical politics to solve the sum total of the supply difficulties with which we are confronted. It is not
suggested, for instance, that it would be reasonable to undertake the manufacture of heavy guns and
armour piercing ammunition such as are for the most part required for coastal defence. With regard to
these there does not appear to be any course open to us other than to place our orders in the United
Kingdom as early as possible and then to do everything which lies in the Government's power to
expedite delivery. On the other hand, it is considered to be within the technical ability of Canadian
industry to undertake the manufacture of a wide range of the munitions this country now purchases
abroad, including the production of the lighter guns and carriages of a calibre up to approximately 4
inches. This calibre comprises field, anti-tank and certain types of anti-aircraft artillery. The practical
limitation to the adoption of this policy is not technical. It lies rather in the high cost per unit which
would be inevitable should the industry be dependent for its contracts on the requirements of this
Department alone. The solution lies in the placing of parallel, and probably much larger, orders by the
United Kingdom.
Ashton recalled that at the Imperial Conference earlier in the year the United Kingdom
representatives had mentioned the possibility of assisting the Dominions by placing arms
orders in those countries for British requirements.
In this particular paper the C.G.S. did not come to grips with the question of whether
the manufacture which he recommended in Canada should be by government factories or
private industry. He did, however, call attention to the example of Australia, and shortly
presented a memorandum59 describing that country's policy, which was founded mainly
on the principle of government manufacture. In 1936 Ashton had recommended a similar
policy for Canada. The Deputy Minister (Major-General L. R. LaFleche) had thought this
undesirable on grounds of excessive capital cost "both in money and in time".60 Mr.
Mackenzie referred the question to the Prime Minister.61 "The Chief of the General
Staff", he wrote, "believes that our policy should be to have a Government factory both in
regard to munitions and also in regard to small arms, but to cooperate with industry as far
as possible." Mackenzie suggested that a meeting of the Defence Committee might be
called to consider the matter; but no record has been found of the Committee's dealing
with it until 14 November 1938, when Ashton strongly urged the erection of a gun
factory, estimating the cost at $2,750,000.62 At a later meeting of the Committee, on 30
January 1939, his successor, MajorGeneral T. V. Anderson,* was asked whether it might
not be possible to utilize "idle workshops, such as railway shops";63 and investigation of
this suggestion followed, indicating that it might serve to reduce the capital outlay.64 An
item of $20,000 was included in the supplementary estimates for 1939-40 for preliminary
surveys and plans for a gun factory. By this time,
*Appointed Chief of the General Staff as of 21 November 1938.

24 SIX YEARS OF WAR
however, the possibility had arisen of the War Office placing an order for 25-pounders
with a private company in Canada.65
There was never, it appears, a firm formal decision on the general point of policy.
But the Government was clearly reluctant to embark upon a programme of multiplying
publicly-owned factories. It preferred a policy of reliance upon private industry combined
with rigid limitation of profits, a point on which public opinion at this period was very
sensitive. With such limitation in view, the Government appointed in March 1937 an
"Interdepartmental Committee on Profit Control"; this action, the Minister of National
Defence believed, would be "a very popular move".66 After the Bren gun controversy the
following year, the Government introduced, and Parliament passed, legislation setting up
an independent Defence Purchasing Board and limiting profits to five per cent per
annum* of the average amount of capital employed in the performance of the contract.67
To organize production in Canada through the medium of private industry was itself
not easy. No firms were "tooled up" to produce war material and this meant, at best, a
long delay. In certain cases there was another difficulty. In accordance with the practice
accepted by a long succession of Imperial Conferences, the Canadian forces used
equipment of standard British type. The designs of some of this equipment were the
property of private British firms, and the latter were sometimes disposed to make
unacceptable. conditions. In 1936-37, for instance, it was proposed to manufacture in
Canada "light dragons" (artillery towing vehicles). The British company which owned the
design was prepared to permit production in Canada under licence, but this licence was to
be "restricted to manufacture in Canada and supply to the Canadian Government for
military purposes only".68 This ruled out any possibility of production in Canada for the
War Office or for other Commonwealth governments. As Canada's own requirements in
dragons were relatively small, it would not have been economically sound to start
production on these terms.
The possibility of private firms in Canada manufacturing military equipment for the
British Government was frequently discussed in these pre-war years, and there was talk
in this connection of the Canadian Government acting, in some degree, as an agent for
the United Kingdom. Late in 1936, the War Office suggested that consideration might be
given to a plan by which the Department of National Defence would take responsibility
for investigating the standing and facilities of Canadian manufacturers on behalf of the
United Kingdom.69 At the Imperial Conference in 1937 the Canadian Government made
it clear that while they would welcome any orders given to Canadian industry by another
government, and would be willing to afford
*This limitation proved to be the first Canadian casualty of the Second World War. It was abrogated by order in
council (P.C. 2709) on 15 September 1939.
such information as might be available on the status of firms, they were unwilling to take
any responsibility for the negotiation of contracts between Canadian firms and other
governments.70 This reluctance was presumably related to the Government's policy of
avoiding any sort of commitment to action in a future crisis. Actually, relatively few
orders were placed in Canada by the British Government before the outbreak of war, and
it is doubtful whether the volume would have been very much larger had the Canadian
authorities been prepared to play a more active part in the negotiation of contracts.* The
most significant order from the War Office was probably one for 100 25-pounder field
guns, obtained a few weeks before war began by Mr. E. Simard of Marine Industries
Limited, Sorel, P.Q. The Department of National Defence had been consulted in this
matter, but the contract was placed with Mr. Simard before a recommendation could be
offered.72
On the whole, remarkably few items of equipment were produced in Canada for the
Canadian forces before war came. An exception was antigas respirators, but even here
there were initial difficulties and for some time, apparently for reasons of secrecy,
important components had to be obtained from the United Kingdom. The annual report of
the Department of National Defence for 1938-39 noted, however, "arrangements have
been made for the development of production of the Container which hitherto has been
imported from England". Coast-defence and anti-aircraft searchlights were ordered in
1939, but none was received before the outbreak, except a few lights of commercial type
which had been hastily purchased at the time of Munich. Production of signal equipment
was in the main still in the exploratory stage, although 133 Canadian-made wireless sets
were delivered during 1937-38.73 For the production of mechanical transport Canada,
with her well-developed automobile industry, was much better situated. Military vehicles,
however, were not the same as civilian ones; and for some years various manufacturers
had been cooperating with the Department in experimentation looking to the
development of specialized types.74 The Minister of National Defence reported to
Parliament on 26 April 1939 that 122 vehicles had actually been delivered-for an army
whose immediate requirements on mobilization would amount to many thousands.
Light machine-guns of modern type were a special need; and in this instance active
steps were taken to initiate manufacture in Canada. On 31 March 1938 the Department of
National Defence signed a contract with the John Inglis Company Limited of Toronto for
the production of 7000 Bren
*In the summer of 1939 the Canadian Manufacturers Association, with government encouragement, sent a mission to
Britain to study the possibility of Canadian firms supplying British defence needs. The mission was accompanied by
General McNaughton, President of the National Research Council. It returned to Canada about the time of the outbreak of
war.71
26 SIX YEARS OF WAR
guns. In accordance with the plan mentioned by General Ashton in 1937, the firm
obtained from the British War Office a concurrent order for 5000 guns, which was
calculated to produce a saving to the Canadian Government of $1,300,000 as compared
with the cost of making Canada's 7000 guns alone. The two governments were to share
the cost of tooling the plant for production, the machinery becoming the property of the
Canadian Government. This contract was the largest and most significant single step
towards the re-armament of the Canadian land forces taken before the outbreak of war,
and represents the only important progress made towards the goal of acquiring the
armament of two divisions. It shortly became an object of criticism, and the whole
transaction was investigated by a Royal Commission.75 The affair is scarcely within the
scope of this history. The main complaint against the contract was the absence of
competitive bids by other companies. From the strictly military point of view, however,
the only serious objection that can be urged against it (once one has accepted the
principle of production by private industry) is the fact that it was made in 1938 rather
than in 1937 or 1936. The contract was duly carried out, the production of guns
beginning in March 1940, when they were very badly needed. In the autumn of that year,
when under war conditions the prospective production of guns had risen to figures never
contemplated in 1938, a new contract was made.76 During the war the plant established
on the basis of the 1938 contract actually produced for Canada and Canada's allies
186,802* Bren guns.78
Although comparatively little was done towards the actual development of
manufacturing facilities in Canada before the outbreak of war, a comprehensive attempt
was made for the first time to collect and collate information concerning the country's
industrial war potential. A Survey of Industry was undertaken during the fiscal year
1936-37, and some 1600 industrial plants had been surveyed by the spring of 1939. This
work was carried on by the Navy, Army and Air Supply Committee, formed in
September 1936 under the chairmanship of the Master General of the Ordnance.79
The Coast-Defence Programme
In the programme as a whole, during these pre-war years, much emphasis was laid
upon coast defence; and as it was considered in the beginning that the most serious
existing threat was in the Pacific, the west coast, as already noted, was given priority.
(Officers who were concerned point out that in the
*This figure would seem to refer only to .303-inch guns. The Bren was also produced in 7.92-mm. calibre, and
28,908 guns of this type had been made by 31 August 1944.77
existing sensitive state of public opinion it was much easier to get support for measures
on the Pacific than on the Atlantic.)80 There were in Canada only two important fortified
positions, the naval bases of Halifax on the east coast and Esquimalt on the west. At
Esquimalt there was particular need for major alterations in the existing defences. As it
was considered that there was no Canadian with sufficient experience in coast defence
available to advise, the War Office was asked to provide an expert, and this officer,
Major B. D. C. Treatt, R.A., arrived in Canada in October 1936. In company with
Canadian officers, Treatt visited not only Esquimalt but also Vancouver and the northern
coast of British Columbia, and subsequently the Maritime Provinces. He submitted full
reports before returning to England in December. These were reviewed by a sub-
committee of the Canadian Joint Staff Committee, the review being completed by the
autumn of 1937. Treatt's recommendations, though not followed in all respects, formed
the basis of firm plans for fortifying the two coasts.81
The broad principle on which the alterations at Halifax and Esquimalt were based
was that of increasing the main armament and pushing it farther out from the vital points
so as to lengthen the range of the defences. A general modernization of equipment was
required. At the same time, plans were made for protecting other places of importance on
both coasts. Only an outline of the plans and the action taken upon them will be given
here.
It was out of the question, of course, to fortify every small port or coastal town. To
have tied up men, armament and money in such tasks would have been to play the game
of our potential enemies. When, in the spring of 1939, representations were received that
defences should be provided at Liverpool, N.S., the Chief of the General Staff (General
Anderson) gave the sensible answer:82
... the contemplated distribution and role of our sea and air forces in war will provide a greater
degree of protection to such towns as Liverpool than would be obtained by scattering fixed defences all
along the coast, even if such a course were financially possible.
The places where fixed defences were justified were those ports (particularly potential
convoy assembly points) whose wartime functions would make them important enemy
objectives, and the bases of the naval forces which provided, along with the air force, the
long-range mobile defence of the coastal areas. Even at these points there were common-
sense limits to the amount of preparation required. "Defence Scheme No. 3" (see below,
page 30), as revised in 1938, contained careful estimates of the "forms and scales of
attack" to which, in the circumstances of that time, the various Canadian coastal ports
might be considered exposed. There is again no need to go into details; but it may be
noted that the heaviest attacks which it was considered any port had to apprehend
28 SIX YEARS OF WAR
were as follows: by sea, a bombardment raid by one capital ship; by land, attack by
raiding parties of up to 250 all ranks landed from naval vessels (it was considered that no
port was exposed to the risk of a landing in force aimed at the capture of the defended
area); by air, attack by one airship or a maximum of twelve ship-based aircraft.83 That
these estimates were not over-optimistic under the conditions of the day was amply
demonstrated by the almost total immunity of Canadian soil during the six-year war
which followed.
As soon as active planning began, it was found that action was impeded by the
supply difficulties already noted; for guns, mountings and fire-control equipment could
be obtained from the United Kingdom only after the lapse of years. No new coast-
defence guns actually arrived from England before the outbreak of war, although three
worn 9.2-inch barrels which had been sent thither for relining were received back in
October 1938. As a result of these difficulties, it was considered necessary to adopt an
Interim Plan, under which, pending delivery of new guns, the armament actually
available in Canada would be used to the best advantage to provide some measure of
immediate defence. The Interim Plan was approved by the Minister of National Defence
in December 1937, and the redistribution of armament was undertaken in the following
March. Several reserve guns in the hands of the Navy were handed over to the Militia for
coast-defence purposes. Some guns were moved from British Columbia to Nova Scotia,
and a larger number from Halifax to British Columbia; two were also moved from
Quebec to Halifax.84
By 1939 the situation on the Pacific coast had improved considerably. The most
important works carried out had been in the Esquimalt fortress area, where about
$1,000,000 had been expended, by the spring of that year, on a new battery on Albert
Head (a site recommended for a battery long before Treatt's time) and other defences
were being constructed or improved. Sites had been acquired in the Prince Rupert area,
and one battery was under construction. At Vancouver one battery for the "close defence"
of the city and harbour had been completed and another was under way; a battery was
also in readiness on Yorke Island, covering the northern approach to Vancouver through
Johnstone Strait. There was some further progress before the outbreak of war.85
On the Atlantic coast nothing of any importance had been done when the war crisis
of September 1938 alarmed the country. (The Director of Military Operations and
Intelligence, Colonel Crerar, had pointed out a year before that, failing "a change in
financial policy", there would be no votes for engineering works there before 1940-41.)86
The 1938 crisis, however, led to a sudden access of interest in this coast; the Chief of the
General Staff wrote on 9 September that it had assumed a "priority position";87 and in the
absence of an appropriation some expenditures were made under
authority of a special Governor-General's Warrant. This Warrant was cancelled when the
immediate crisis subsided, but a little progress had already been made on various
projects, including defences for Saint John, N.B., and Sydney, N.S.88
The provision for the East Coast defences included in the Supplementary Estimates
for 1939-40, passed in the spring of 1939, covered work at Saint John intended to provide
some inte im security at that important point. This came too late to have any appreciable
effect before war broke out. Militia Headquarters, however, had taken the precaution of
preparing a scheme for completing the Interim Plan of coast defence, on both coasts, on a
temporary basis in an emergency. Under this scheme those guns not yet permanently
mounted would be emplaced on concrete platforms, adjacent to the unfinished permanent
emplacements. These platforms could be completed in a matter of weeks, and the guns
were already on or near the sites. On 19 August 1939 the Minister of National Defence
was asked to approve putting this emergency plan into effect. He passed the
recommendation on to the Prime Minister. As we shall see, the Cabinet approved the
necessary emergency expenditure, and by the end of August guns were actually being
mounted on the temporary platforms.89
Defence Schemes and Mobilization Planning
During the years following the First World War, the Canadian General Staff gave
considerable attention to preparing defence schemes to provide a basis for action in the
various types of major military emergency that then seemed possible. Broadly speaking,
it may be said that these fell into two main categories: "direct defence", i.e., the actual
defence of Canadian soil against invasion, and "indirect defence", in which Canada might
require to send an expeditionary force overseas to act in conjunction with the forces of
other countries of the Commonwealth, or allied states, against a common enemy. In either
case, plans were required for the mobilization, concentration and operations of large
militia forces. As early as 1921 it had been decided to prepare three* different Defence
Schemes.90
The Canadian planners could see, in the circumstances of the early 1920s, only two
countries which could possibly present any direct menace to Canadian soil. These were the
United States and Japan. As we have already suggested, in an earlier day the defence of
Canada had meant defence
*In 1931 work began on a fourth scheme, dealing with "The Despatch of a Canadian Contingent to take part in a
Minor Empire Crisis". This scheme was circulated in draft in 1936, but seems never to have been carried further. Two
alternative forces were proposed in this draft-a Cavalry Brigade Group and an Infantry Brigade Group.91
30 SIX YEARS OF WAR
against the United States, pure and simple; but steady improvement in Anglo-American
and Canadian-American relations had relegated conflict with that country to the realm of
the highly improbable. Nevertheless, some people felt that this contingency could not be
entirely overlooked; and a plan of defence against the United States, known as "Defence
Scheme No. 1", was prepared and circulated to Military Districts under "Very Secret"
cover, beginning in April 1921. Work on it continued in a somewhat desultory fashion
until 1926. After that year no attempt was made to keep it up to date, and in fact it was
never reduced to final form.32 In 1931 General McNaughton, who had now become
C.G.S., observed, "the direct defence of Canada against invasion by the United States is a
problem which in the last ten years has become increasingly susceptible to political
solution but quite incapable of being satisfactorily answered by Empire military action".93
Defence against Japan was dealt with in "Defence Scheme No. 2". Some work was
done on this plan during the years immediately following the First World War, but it was
never developed in any great detail. It was subsequently revised, during the 1930s, in the
form of a tri-service outline plan for the maintenance of Canadian neutrality in the event
of a war between the United States and Japan. This was completed in 1938.94
The plan on which most attention ultimately centred, and the one under which action
was taken in 1939, was "Defence Scheme No. 3". This was designed in the first instance
to provide against the emergency of a major war in which the immediate threat to
Canadian territory would be limited, but circumstances would probably dictate
intervention overseas. Defence Scheme No. 3 did not receive a great deal of
consideration until 1927, but in 1931 it was circulated in draft to District Officers
Commanding, and in January 1932, after some revision, it was submitted to the Minister
of National Defence in Mr. Bennett's government (Colonel D. M. Sutherland) and by him
approved.95 No actual complete copy of this 1932 scheme, unfortunately, appears to have
survived; but we know that "the main emphasis of the Scheme was laid on the
organization of a Canadian Field Force for eventual despatch overseas".96
Defence Scheme No. 3 was revised in 1937, a period at which, in the light of
changing international conditions and governmental policies, the direct defence of
Canada was bulking increasingly large. In the revised Scheme increased attention was
given to local defence and internal security, and the body formerly envisaged as a purely
expeditionary force was redesignated "the Mobile Force". Its functions were defined in
the Scheme97 as follows:
The primary object governing the mobilizing of the Mobile Force is to employ it, in whole or in part, against enemy
landings on Canadian territory, should a situation develop whereby there will be danger that such landings cannot be
rapidly dealt with by forces locally and immediately available. The Scheme will
also serve as a means of providing a field force for employment, with other Empire forces, overseas,
should this be the decision of the Canadian Government in the light of conditions then existing.
Actually, the expeditionary role, though officially secondary to that of local defence,
was far more likely to be the one the force would play in a major emergency; and most
people concerned with the scheme doubtless knew it. It could be argued that there was
some inconsistency between the declared "primary object" of the force—defence against
invasion-and the fact that one of the scheme's appendices (above, page 28) notes that no
Canadian port is considered to be in danger of large-scale landing attack. The form of
words was immaterial; what mattered was that plans should be ready for every probable
emergency. The revised Defence Scheme provided for various general arrangements in
the event of an expeditionary force being dispatched, including movement to embarkation
ports and the establishment overseas of a Canadian intermediate base and a Canadian
headquarters.
On 15 March 1937 the Chief of the General Staff (General Ashton) sent the draft of
the revised Scheme to the Minister of National Defence, accompanied by an explanatory
memorandum tracing the Scheme's history. Two days later Mr. Mackenzie returned the
draft with the following handwritten note:98
I have carefully read the revised draft of Defence Scheme No. 3. I am glad to observe that the
dominant motif of the plan is the Defence of Canada and Internal Security; but I realize that whereas
Government policy is at the moment concerned with the defence of Canada and the protection of
Canadian neutrality it is the duty of the staff to prepare for every possible contingency. I therefore
approve the plan in principle and detail. It seems to me to have been carefully considered in scope and in
detail.
The revised Scheme was now finalized and was circulated secretly to the Military
Districts on 22 January 1938.99
The Otter Committee of 1919 (above, page 4) had apparently suggested that the
largest force that Canada might be able to maintain overseas in a future war would be six
divisions and one cavalry division, plus ancillary troops. In the event of a "minor crisis"
overseas it was considered that a force of one division, one mounted brigade and the
necessary ancillary troops would be adequate. Defence Scheme No. 3, as approved in
1932, provided for the mobilization of a field force (known as Contingent "A") to consist
of a corps headquarters, two divisions and one cavalry division, plus a quota of corps,
army and lines of communication troops, with the necessary base units in Canada and
overseas. Although no detailed plans were made for the expansion of this force, the
possibility was anticipated that it would in due course include four more divisions and
additional ancillary troops. In other words, it would become the force contemplated in
1919-a force somewhat larger than that which Canada finally placed in the field overseas
in 1939-45.
32 SIX YEARS OF WAR
The Mobile Force provided in the 1937 revision of the Defence Scheme was
Contingent "A" under another name, and it had the same basic composition. As the
international situation worsened, the Scheme continued to receive attention, and
numerous amendments were issued in the course of 1939. It is of interest that the cavalry
division was dropped from the Mobile Force only in the spring of that year, when, as a
General Staff memorandum put it, it had become reasonably certain that if the Canadian
Government decided to intervene' abroad the theatre of operations would be Europe and
the enemy Germany. In these circumstances, it was remarked, there would be little scope
for horsed cavalry; nor would such a division be necessary if the Mobile Force were
retained for the direct defence of Canada.100
The composition of the Mobile Force was drawn up in detail, units, commanders and
staff officers being designated, and was amended and revised in these details annually,
mainly on the basis of nominations from the Military Districts. The force was divided
into two sections, Force "A" and Force "B", each consisting of one infantry division plus
part of the cavalry division and a proportion of the ancillary troops. These were to
mobilize simultaneously, but in view of the shortage of accommodation and transport
only Force "A" would be concentrated in the first instance; Force "B" would begin to
concentrate only after Force "A" had moved to an area of operations in Canada, or to an
overseas base. The designations Force "A" and Force "B", and the division into these two
sections, were dropped by an amendment issued in July 1939, when the original scheme
for using only one concentration camp was abandoned in favour of using several.101
Separate provision was made for forces to man the coast defences and guard
"vulnerable points" in Canada. As in the case of the Mobile Force, units for this purpose
were nominated annually by District Officers Com- 1, manding, "List One" being the
units intended for coastal garrison duty and "List Two" those designated for the
protection of vulnerable points. Two "stages of preparation" were envisaged. In the
"Precautionary Stage", when a serious danger of war had arisen, the coast defences would
be manned ' and vulnerable points guarded, and it was anticipated that the units of Lists
One and Two would be called out for the purpose. The "War Stage" would begin upon a
decision by the Government "that measures of defence applicable to a state of war should
be put into effect", even though war might not 9, have been actually declared. The War
Stage might be initiated without the Precautionary Stage having been ordered. Both
stages would be put into effect by "short pre-arranged telegrams" to the Districts, which
were included 1 in the Defence Scheme. Since mobilization of the Mobile Force might
become necessary at any stage, a third telegram was provided for this purpose.
The situation in the summer of 1939, then, was that complete plans existed for the
mobilization of a Mobile Force of two divisions and ancillary troops, and of special
forces for local defence and internal security duties. The composition of these forces had
been determined in advance, and nothing was required to launch the mobilization of them
except the dispatch of a telegraph message.
The Defence Scheme was not the only plan put on paper in anticipation of the crisis.
Many departments of government besides National Defence would have special tasks to
perform when and if war came, and it was necessary to allot and prescribe these in
advance. On 14 March 1938, accordingly, a Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on
Defence Co-ordination was formed by order-in-council, with the Deputy Minister of
National Defence (Major-General L. R. LaFleche) as Chairman and Colonel M. A. Pope
as Secretary; fifteen Departments, and in addition the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
were represented upon it. The ultimate result of its work was a War Book, completed in
provisional form in May 1939, which defined in some detail the immediate action which
the various departments would be required to take on the outbreak of war.102
Early in 1938, moreover, a committee of officers began work on a special "Militia
Service War Book" designed to define more fully the steps to be taken by the various
branches of the Staff. This book never progressed beyond the stage of a somewhat
tentative draft, and it appears to have had no influence on the measures taken in
September 1939.103 The Government book, on the other hand, was very valuable. On 8
September 1939 Colonel Pope wrote, "It was pretty well on this Book that defence action
has been taken during the last ten days".104
The Last Days of Peace
As the situation in Europe grew worse, the tempo of Canadian preparation quickened
somewhat. This was particularly the case after the "Munich Crisis" of September 1938.
The total defence appropriations for the fiscal year 1938-39 had been $36,345,000, and
the provision for the militia services that year was nearly $2 million less than the year
before. The funds provided for the Department of National Defence, before the outbreak
of war, for the fiscal year 1939-40 amounted to $64,666,874.105 This was, as we have
already shown, considerably less than the Chiefs of Staff had asked for; but it was by far
the largest defence appropriation which had ever been passed by the Canadian Parliament
in time of peace. It came too late to have much influence before war began. Only
$13,712,000 of the appropriation had been spent by 1 September 1939.106
34 SIX YEARS OF WAR
The measures taken during the past five years had materially improved the general
condition of the Canadian land forces, but had produced no important increase in their
actual size. The Permanent Force, which we have seen less than 3700 strong in 1931, had
risen only to 4261 all ranks at 31 July 1939.107 None of its three infantry units was at
anything approaching war strength, and one of them (the Royal 22e Regiment) could
have mustered a maximum of only 184 all ranks, in March 1939, as against even a peace
establishment of 773. There was a slight further increase in the force's strength before the
actual outbreak of war, the result of last-minute authority to recruit given after the
provision of emergency funds on 24 August. The professional full-time force was of
course the most expensive element in the Militia. Only two new permanent units were
actually organized during the period of preparation: in 1936 the Canadian Tank School
(redesignated in 1938 the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicles School) and in 1937 an
anti-aircraft battery (numbered the 4th) of the Royal Canadian Artillery. Both reflected
the attempt which was being made, under adverse conditions of finance and supply, to
modernize the forces. At the same time, the units were somewhat better trained. In the
summer of 1938, for the first time in many years, the greater part of the Permanent Force
was concentrated for a short period of collective field manoeuvres, held at Camp Borden.
During the final phase of this, R.C.A.F. participation lent a note of realism and the force
taking part was enlarged by two battalions of the Non-Permanent Active Militia from
Toronto.108
The Non-Permanent Active Militia had not increased in strength to any material extent.
On 31 December 1938 the number enrolled was 51,418 all ranks-almost exactly what it had
been in 1931, and somewhat more than half the existing peace establishment. The force's
standard of training had, however, been raised as the result of increased financial provision
in recent years. The number of militiamen reported as trained for the fiscal year 1934-35
was 5120 officers and 34,055 other ranks. The equivalent figures for the fiscal year 1938-
39 were 5272 and 41,249. Although the basic general period of training for which pay
could be drawn was increased only from 10 to 11 days, there was also an increase in the
numbers permitted to train, and the period was considerably lengthened for certain units,
notably for coast artillery, who were allowed 21 days. The most striking evidence of
improvement, however, was the increase in the amount of camp training, the most realistic
and valuable form. In 1934-35 only 2062 officers and 10,721 other ranks trained in camp.
For 1938-39 these figures rose to 3479 officers and 25,624 other ranks. There was also a
large increase in attendance at schools of instruction. The Militia constituted a considerable
pool of basically trained officers and N.C.Os. The Militia Staff Course and
Advanced Militia Staff Course had allowed an important number of citizen officers to
qualify in staff duties.109
When war broke out in 1939, Canada had no troops ready for immediate action,
except for local coastal defence against very small raids. The tiny Permanent Force did
not constitute a striking force capable either of counterattack against a major raid or of
expeditionary action. The Non-Permanent Active Militia, with its limited strength,
obsolescent equipment and rudimentary training, was incapable of immediate effective
action of any sort against a formidable enemy. The two forces together constituted a
useful and indeed essential foundation upon which, over a period of months, an army
could be built. They offered, however, no means for rapid intervention in an overseas
theatre of operations.
The General State of Preparation, 1939
Enough has been said to indicate that much had been done to improve the state of the
Canadian Militia before war came, and to indicate at the same time that the preparations
were utterly inadequate by comparison with the scale of the coming emergency.
The task of commentary upon pre-war defence policies is a difficult one. Hindsight,
proverbially, is better than foresight, and the historian must eschew the unhistorical
approach which would criticize the policies of 1935-39 merely in the light of the events
of 1939-45. In particular, he must not fail to keep before him the nature of the Canadian
"climate of opinion" in the prewar years, which until a short time before the actual
outbreak was certainly hostile, in general, to large military preparations. At the same
time, if the nation is to profit by experience, it is his responsibility to consider the
influence of what was done, or left undone, in the days before the war, upon the events of
the war itself.
In mere justice to Mr. King's pre-war administration, it must be said that it did more for
Canadian security than any other peacetime ministry in the country's history before 1939.
Its approach to the problem was comprehensive and workmanlike, if unduly deliberate; and
although it disbursed money sparingly it nevertheless spent more on the nation's defences
than had been spent by any earlier administration except during the actual years of the First
World War. In September 1939, Canada was, nn balance. better prepared for war than she
had been in August 1914. Viewing the programme in terms of the experience of six years
of conflict, however, we see the inadequacy of judgement based merely upon Canadian
historical standards. These standards had no real relationship to the scale of the approaching
crisis. The preparations made by Canada before the outbreak
36 SIX YEARS OF WAR
were so small that she was unable to make any really large contribution to the sum of the
Allied military effort for years after war broke out. Because so little had been done to set
up an armament industry, the peak of Canadian war production was not reached until
1943.* Sound plans had been made, and military forces were organized, when the crisis
came, with considerable speed and efficiency; but, thanks to the inadequacy of the
existing supply arrangements, these forces were armed almost entirely with the weapons
of 1918, and many months passed before they could be fully re-armed on modern lines.
At the same time, the limited number of thoroughly trained officers and soldiers available
inevitably slowed down the process of preparing the force for battle.
The difficulties and delays were due in some degree to conditions over which the
Canadian authorities had little control. This is true, up to a point, of the supply situation.
Nevertheless, had the public and Parliament been willing to spend more money in good
time, even this difficulty could have been largely overcome. Had the Government carried
out the scheme for an expanded Dominion Arsenal capable of producing guns and small
arms, which was recommended as early as 1930, it would have paid a great national
dividend in 1939 and 1940. Even in the period immediately before the outbreak of war,
when appropriations were larger than they had been earlier, financial considerations were
a constant drag upon progress. As late as 12 June 1939, the Quartermaster-General's
Branch at Ottawa advised the District Officer Commanding Military District No. 11 that
"owing to lack of sufficient funds it has been found necessary to curtail the proposed
programme for this year's work on the Esquimalt-Victoria Coast Defences".111 And these
defences were one portion of the programme which had received relatively generous
financial treatment.
As we have noted, the Government had given the Air Force the first priority among the
services, and had placed the Militia last. Nevertheless, as the table on page 13 shows, it was
only in the spring of 1939 that R.C.A.F. appropriations first surpassed those for the Militia
in size. At that moment they made a great leap ahead; the Air Force was given far more
than twice as much money as the year before, and over $8 million more than the Militia.
During 1938 and 1939, it is made clear above, the Militia's requests for financial support
received short shrift. In the light of later events, the soldiers' demands appear decidedly
modest; but they were far from fully met. No exception can be taken to the sums given the
Air Force, but the decided discrimination against the land forces which had now appeared
was not justified by the facts of the time. These facts were not as clear in 1939, however,
*A vivid illustration of the truth of a remark of Sir Winston Churchill: “Munition production on a nation-wide plan is
a four-years' task. The first year yields nothing; the second very little; the third a lot, and the fourth a flood".110
as they are to us today. As late as March of that year, the leaders of both Government and
Opposition in the House of Commons had declared their belief that in another war there
would be no need for a large expeditionary force from Canada.112' In so far as the
prevailing attitude towards the Militia was dictated by such views, it was unrealistic. War
had no sooner come than the need for an expeditionary force began to manifest itself.
It had been difficult for Canadian citizens and legislators, accustomed for generations
to a situation in which Canada was able to make virtually no military preparations and to
pay no penalty for this neglect, to raise their mental sights to meet the new situation
which was now arising. They adjusted themselves to the needs of defence in the modern
world very slowly, too slowly for the country's safety. As late as January 1938, a good
example of this was afforded by a member of the "Interdepartmental Committee on the
Control of Profits on Government Armament Contracts" which was then considering the
proposed Bren gun contract:
It was suggested by one of the members that he thought Canada was in no immediate danger of
being destroyed through, say, six months' delay. The only country that might now attack us would be
Japan, and she is pretty busy at present, so that the sense of immediate danger is not real. The same
member asked if the speed element was so vital that we cannot consider contracts in the course of the
next few months, and contended that he would not be uncomfortable in this matter for a year.113
Had this complacent individual's views carried the day, we should have begun to get
Canadian Bren guns in 1941 instead of in 1940. Who he was, or what department he
represented, is not recorded; but it cannot be doubted that his views would have been
echoed, at that time, by a considerable proportion of the population of Canada. It was
fortunate for the country that there were some people at least, in the armed services and
the Government, who had a livelier sense of the dangers of the situation and the nature of
the measures required to meet it.
CHAPTER II
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND THE

MOBILIZATION OF THE ACTIVE SERVICE
FORCE, 1939
(See Map 3)
The Approach of War
I N March of 1939, in defiance of the agreements made in the previous autumn when he
had declared that he wanted no Czechs within his boundaries, Hitler occupied the
whole of Czechoslovakia and extinguished the Czech state. German pressure upon
Poland followed immediately. The British Government, now fully undeceived as to the
nature of Hitler's policy, proceeded, in conjunction with France, to promise full support
to Poland in the event of aggression. The Prime Minister (Mr. Neville Chamberlain)
announced on 26 April that Britain, for the first time in her history, was to have
compulsory military service in a time of peace.
In the course of the summer the German-Polish situation steadily deteriorated. The
position of Russia having become a matter of the deepest importance to the western
powers, France and Britain sent military missions to Moscow to initiate staff
conversations which might be preliminary to the conclusion of a political agreement.
These missions reached Moscow on 11 August, but the conversations led nowhere. On 21
August the announcement that Russia and Germany would shortly sign a non-aggression
pact burst on the world with stunning effect. The track was now clear for Hitler.
The United Kingdom had kept the Canadian Government fully informed of the
development of the crisis. On 22 August, after attending a. meeting at the Dominions
Office, the Canadian High Commissioner in London (Mr. Vincent Massey) reported to
Ottawa that all evidence available at the Foreign Office pointed to a very critical period
between 25 and 28 August during which a German attack upon Poland might take place.
He added that, while no general mobilization was as yet to be ordered in the United King-
dom, very wide military precautions were being taken.1 The Secretary of
38
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND MOBILIZATION, 1939 39
State for the Dominions informed the Canadian Government separately that the British
Cabinet had decided to institute certain measures prescribed in the Precautionary Stage of
the War Book, though this Stage was not yet to be formally instituted. The measures
included calling up additional naval reserves, all squadrons of the Auxiliary Air Force
and key parties of coastdefence and anti-aircraft units.2 From France came reports of
similar action.3 On 24 August the British Parliament re-assembled and Mr. Chamberlain
told the House of Commons, "We find ourselves confronted with the imminent peril of
war".
As the summer wore on and tension grew, additional measures of preparation had
quietly been taken in Canada. In particular, a survey was made of the accommodation
which would be required in the event of mobilization of the Mobile Force. All Military
Districts made some preparations to lease or expropriate buildings in accordance with
plans laid down by the Quartermaster General.4 On 24 June an instruction to District
Officers Commanding5 advised them that, whereas it had previously been intended that
the Mobile Force when called out would be concentrated in a single "Field Force
Concentration Camp", this procedure was not practicable for an early mobilization; for in
a war with Germany it was desirable to concentrate the force in Eastern Canada, and
there was no single camp there capable of accommodating the whole of it (even under
summer conditions) and at the same time affording facilities for useful training. It was
accordingly ordered that the Force would be concentrated initially "by Arms of the
Service"6 in six camps across Canada (Valcartier, P.Q.; Petawawa, Ont.; Camp Borden,
Ont.; Shilo, Man.; Dundurn, Sask.; and Barriefield, Ont.) At the same time, the period
allowed for unit mobilization prior to concentration was extended from seven to 21 days.
As time passed and it began to appear that mobilization might take place in autumn
weather, the arrangements had to be revised a second time, and a letter was sent to the
Districts on 21 August,7 informing them that if mobilization occurred late in the year the
Mobile Force would not be concentrated in camps; instead, units would be
accommodated in the same areas in which they were mobilized, under arrangements
made by the Districts. This change was necessitated by the fact that there was neither
time nor money to construct winter accommodation at the camps.
During the summer further attention was given to selecting staffs for the formations
of the Mobile Force. A circular letter sent out on 1 August8 listed tentatively the officers
of the Permanent and Non-Permanent forces to be employed in headquarters of the Field
Force; this list, replacing the previous one appended to Defence Scheme No. 3, contained
the names of 19 future general officers of the war period, of whom only three had at this
40 SIX YEARS OF WAR
time attained the rank of Brigadier. Commanders were not designated for either the Corps
or the Divisions. The Brigadier General Staff of the Corps was to be Brigadier H. D. G.
Crerar.
"Adopt Precautionary Stage Against Germany"
For some time past, estimates had been in preparation for the immediate expenditures
which would require to be authorized by special means in the event of a state of
emergency arising while Parliament was not sitting. The warnings received on and after
22 August clearly indicated that the emergency had arrived. The draft Militia estimates
were approved by the Military Members of the Defence Council on the evening of 23
August, and by the Minister of National Defence, after discussion and amendment, on the
24th. On the same day the Cabinet gave its sanction, an expenditure of $8,918,930, for
which no appropriation existed, being authorized by Governor-General's Warrant.* Of
this sum $7,500,000 was for the Air Force (for purchase of aircraft, spares and
accessories) and only $946,930 for the Militia. The Militia allotment was concerned in
great part with the completion of the Interim Plan of coast defence on an emergency
basis, and the procurement of essential stores. The two largest single items however were
$511,000 to finance increasing the strength of the Permanent Force by 77 officers and
731 other ranks (a measure which would have been more useful if taken earlier) and
$100,000 to provide forms required for "documentation" of recruits on mobilization."
On 25 August the Prime Minister, Mr. King, announced that the Government had
been engaged in formulating the policy to be presented in the event of Parliament having
to be summoned, and added that "all possible precautionary measures" were being taken
to meet "whatever eventuality may arise". One of the steps taken at this time was
cancelling the leave of the Permanent Force.11
It was now necessary to consider partial mobilization and the institution of the
Precautionary Stage. The Government was naturally reluctant to take, while there was still
hope of peace being preserved, any steps that might require Parliament to be summoned;
but it was advised that action could be taken under Section 63 of the Militia Act† without
its being necessary to call Parliament. On 25 August, accordingly, the Military Members
dis
*The order in council (P.C. 2389) is dated the following day (25 August), on which it was approved by the Governor
General. However, the Military Districts were informed on the 24th that authority had been obtained for expenditures
required to implement the Interim Plan.9
t"The Militia or any part thereof, or any officer or man thereof, may be called out for any military purpose other than
drill or training, at such times and in such manner as is prescribed." A regulation pursuant to this Section was made by
order in council (P.C. 2396 of 26 August 1939).
cussed the question of measures for immediate security, and that evening the Chief of the
General Staff (General Anderson) presented to the Minister of National Defence a request
for authority to introduce the Precautionary Stage. The Cabinet approved this action the
same night; and at 11:15 p.m. the Department of National Defence dispatched to Military
Districts warning telegrams12 calling out the units selected for the guarding of vulnerable
points:
Reference Defence Scheme Number Three. Adopt Precautionary Stage against Germany. List Two
called out under Section 63 Militia Act. Personnel comprising units of List Two will not for present be
cocppelled to respond under authority of this Section but will be called out on a voluntary basis. No
proceedings will he instituted against any officer or man failing to respond. Reference HQS 3498 FD 41
dated 29 April 1939 execute arrangements for protection of armouries.
C.G.S.
The sentences concerning the strictly voluntary nature of the service were not in the
telegram as included in the Defence Scheme. They were presumably added because
troops called out under Section 63 were not technically "on active service". Coastal
Districts received in addition instructions to call out "List One", the force required to man
the coast defences, less certain specified units.13
The action taken was promulgated in General Order No. 124, which called out "on
service" 99 units of the Non-Permanent Active Militia, in whole or in part. The number
of units affected was subsequently increased to 106. The force thus called out on a
voluntary basis amounted to roughly 10,000 men. On 26 August another authority for
emergency expenditure (amounting to $1,453,000) was obtained to cover the cost.14 The
citizen soldiers' response to the order was excellent. By 2 p.m. on 27 August all Military
Districts had reported that guards had been placed at most of the vulnerable points for
which they were responsible. These included the more important canals and railway
bridges, and R.C.A.F. hangars. At the same time, all coast defences were reported
manned in accordance with the Defence Scheme.15 There was in general no trouble in
carrying out these tasks on a voluntary basis, although a minor difficulty was reported
from Toronto, where apparently some men "were anxious to get back to more
remunerative employment".16
Under the authority given on 24 August, the Engineers were working hard to carry
out the emergency coast defence plan. To strengthen the East Coast, the 4th Anti-Aircraft
Battery (Permanent Force) R.C.A., which had already been recalled from Petawawa
Camp to its normal station at Kingston, was ordered to move to Halifax at once. It left
Kingston at midnight 26-27 August.17 This unit was equipped with the only effective anti-
aircraft guns in Canada.
The Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force were also moving units
into the Atlantic coastal area. Two of the four destroyers
42 SIX YEARS OF WAR
based on the Pacific coast sailed from Vancouver for Halifax on 31 August.18 R.C.A.F.
units had begun moving to war stations on the 26th, and within a few days three
squadrons from the interior had reached airfields on the Atlantic coast (where only one
had previously been stationed), and another had taken post at St. Hubert, near Montreal.19
So far as the strength and equipment of the Canadian forces allowed, the gates were
guarded.
War in Europe: The Mobile Force is Mobilized
Hitler did not assail Poland between 25 and 28 August as had been feared, although
we now know that the attack had actually been fixed for the 26th. He accepted a
postponement, apparently in the hope of "eliminating British intervention"; but the delay
was very short.20 In the early hours of 1 September, without the decent formality of a
declaration of war, German divisions rolled across the Polish frontier and the German air
force began bombing Polish aerodromes and communications.
This news led the Canadian Government to order mobilization. On 1 September
Council, meeting at nine o'clock in the morning, rapidly agreed upon a series of
important orders in council. One, pursuant to the provisions of the War Measures Act,
declared the existence of a state of "apprehended war" as of and from 25 August; a
second advised a proclamation summoning Parliament to meet on 7 September; and a
third provided for "the organization forthwith of a Canadian Active Service Force".21
Under this authority, steps were at once taken to embody the Mobile Force provided for
in Defence Scheme No. 3. The machine was started by a pencilled note22 from the
Minister of National Defence to his Military Secretary, received at 11:05 a.m.:
Col Scott.
You can ask C.G.S. to take immediate action under Sect. 64 for Active Service in Canada.
IAM
At 12.35 p.m. on 1 September the Adjutant General, acting in accordance with the plans
so long prepared, dispatched to all Districts the "mobilization telegram":23
Reference Defence Scheme Number Three Mobilize entire Mobile Force.*
The District Officers Commanding immediately put into effect the District mobilization
schemes which were in readiness, and notified the Commanding Officers of the militia
units concerned.
*The telegrams to coastal districts ordered also the mobilization of List One. A separate telegram advised that the
entire mobilized force (Mobile Force, Lists One and Two, District Headquarters and Permanent Force units) was being
placed on active service under Section 64 of the Militia Act. Under the statute, this action necessitated calling Parliament.
At this time, although the guns were firing on the Continent, Great Britain had not
declared war. As for Canada, not only had she not yet declared war, but her Government
had repeatedly stated that such action would not be taken without consultation with
Parliament. There can have been little real doubt in any mind about what Parliament
would do when it assembled; but even in the event of a declaration of war, the question of
the forms of Canadian participation still remained open. The Government was evidently
anxious to avoid any imputation that it had pre-judged the case, and with this in view
decided to alter the designation of the force mobilized for active service. The events of 1
September were thus described in a personal diary kept by Major E. G. Weeks, the
Assistant Director of Organization in the Adjutant-General's Branch:24
Gov. decided to place Militia on active service in Canada (Mobile Force). Although all submissions
to Council were ready and all plans made, we were horrified to hear the Cabinet decided at the last
minute to change the name of the Mobile Force from "Canadian Field Force" to "Canadian Active
Service Force". The result being many changes, torn up stencils, and $65,000 worth of Mobilization
forms almost useless. Very hectic day-but we managed to get the General Order 135/1939 issued and in
the mail to all Districts.
General Order No. 135 announced that the Governor in Council had "authorized the
organization of a Canadian Active Service Force" and had "named as Corps of the Active
Militia" and "placed on active service in Canada" certain specified units. The
accompanying schedules listed nearly 300 individual units and formation headquarters,
including the headquarters of "1st Corps C.A.S.F.", the whole of the 1st and 2nd
Divisions, C.A.S.F., and quotas of Corps, Army and Lines of Communication troops. In
addition, this Order incorporated in the C.A.S.F. the units and details of the Non-
Permanent Active Militia which had been called out under General Order No. 124 to
guard vulnerable points and man coast defences. Some additions were now made to the
original list. The N.P.A.M. soldiers on duty were attested into the C.A.S.F., except for
those not wishing to enlist, who were released in due course.
A word may be said here upon the composition of the force thus mobilized. It had
been carefully worked out in advance so as to give, as far as possible, proportional
representation on a population basis to every part of the country. Thus the three infantry
brigades of the 1st Division were arranged territorially: the 1st being composed of units
from Ontario, the 2nd of western units and the 3rd of units from Quebec and the
Maritime Provinces. In the 2nd Division, similarly, the 4th was an Ontario brigade, the
5th (as originally mobilized) was made up of units from Quebec, and the 6th was entirely
western. Subsequently, as noted below, the composition of the 5th and 6th Brigades was
somewhat altered.
44 SIX YEARS OF WAR
The position of the Permanent Force units requires some explanation. Defence
Scheme No. 3 as approved in 1937 had placed them in Force "B", i.e., the portion of the
Mobile Force which would be last to concentrate or (in the events of troops being sent) to
go overseas. It was explained that the efficient mobilization, concentration and training of
the Mobile Force would "require a maximum effort on the part of the comparatively few
professional soldiers available in Canada". In other words, Permanent Force personnel
would be so urgently required as staff officers and instructors that it would not be
practicable to use the Permanent Force units-as such in Force "A". Early in 1939,
however, a General Staff memorandum suggested that it was not inconceivable that in
case of war the Government might decide to mobilize only a portion of the Mobile Force,
"say one complete division and ancillary troops". In such an event, if the Permanent
Force units had been left in Force "B", they might not reach the theatre of war for a long
period. "It is unnecessary to enlarge", the memorandum proceeded, "on the detrimental
effect which such a contingency would have on the Permanent Force." It recommended
that the P.F. units included in the scheme for the 2nd Division (i.e., part of Force "B")
should be transferred to the 1st, and that those included as Corps Troops in Force "B"
should be transferred to the Corps Troops of Force "A". This was done, and so the 1st
Division as actually mobilized in September included one Permanent Force battalion in
each of its three infantry brigades, while the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery became one
of its artillery "brigades" (subsequently reorganized as "regiments"). The two Permanent
Force cavalry regiments were not mobilized initially.25
One other question touching the composition of the force is worthy of notice. An
intention, entertained during the planning period, of forming a complete French-speaking
infantry brigade, was never realized.
Until July of 1939, the Mobile Force planned for mobilization under Defence Scheme
No. 3 contained three French-language infantry battalions (including the Royal 22e
Regiment, a Permanent Force unit), all in the 5th Infantry Brigade. Now, however, as a
result of the decision just described, the Royal 22e was moved to the 1st Division and a
fourth French-speaking battalion was designated, being substituted for a Western Ontario
unit. The letter to the Districts announcing the revision26 remarked,
This brings the total number of French-speaking infantry units in the force up to four, of which one
is in the 1st Division and three are in the 2nd. Provided both divisions are mobilized these can be formed
into a complete French-speaking brigade.
At this time, it should be noted, the plan was that each brigade would comprise three
infantry battalions and a machine-gun battalion. The C.G.S. in June 1939 used the
proposal for a French-speaking brigade as an argument
for the mobilization of the whole Mobile Force, and not merely of one division, in case
war came:
We are particularly anxious ... that one of the infantry brigades initially mobilized should be
predominantly French speaking, with a French speaking commander and staff. This would be quite
impossible if only one division were mobilized.27
As we have seen, both divisions were actually mobilized, with the Royal 22e in the
1st Division and the other three French-speaking battalions in the 2nd-all in the 5th
Brigade, which included Le Regiment de la Chaudiere as machine-gun battalion and was
completed by an English-speaking Quebec battalion, the 1st Battalion of The Black
Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada. To create the French-speaking brigade
would thus have required merely to exchange the Royal 22e with the Black Watch.
However, this was not done-or apparently even suggested-at this time; and it may be con-
jectured that the reason was the fact that it was so soon decided that the 1st Division was
to go overseas, while the role of the 2nd remained for some time a matter of speculation.
To have removed the Royal 22e Regiment from the 1st Division would thus not merely
have condemned a Permanent Force unit to what might be an inactive role, but would
have deprived French Canada of all formal infantry representation in the division likely
to be first to see action.
If it is permissible to anticipate, we may note here the later development of this
question. When the headquarters of the 5th Brigade was organized—which was not until
May 1940-a French-speaking officer (Brigadier P. E. Leclerc) was appointed to
command it and the authorities in Ottawa held to the intention of making it a fully French
brigade with a French-speaking staff. One of its French battalions—Les Fusiliers Mont-
Royal—was, however, sent to Iceland, and when the Brigade arrived in the United
Kingdom in the summer of 1940 The Calgary Highlanders (from the 6th Brigade) were
temporarily attached to it to replace this unit. Further exploration of the scheme for a
French-speaking brigade revealed a most serious obstacle: an existing shortage of
qualified French-speaking officers for command and staff appointments. Brigadier
Leclerc now suggested that the scheme for a French brigade be abandoned, and the
existing temporary organization of the 5th Brigade made permanent. The Divisional
Commander, General Odium, urged that this be done, writing to General McNaughton
that this plan "would give French and English speaking Canadians wider contacts. Men
from the prairie would be working daily with French speaking Canadians from Quebec.
The result would be a contribution of great national value to the future life of the
Dominion.28 A General McNaughton concurred, and after further discussion and some
demur National Defence Headquarters also agreed (19 November 1940).29 The Calgary
Highlanders remained in the 5th Brigade and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal in due time
joined the 6th.
46 SIX YEARS OF WAR
Canada Goes to War
On 3 September-their final representations to Hitler having failed to check the attack

on Poland-Britain and France proceeded to honour their undertaking to that country, and
declared war on Germany. In Canada, later the same day, the Chief of the General Staff,
as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, inquired whether the Government would
now approve instituting the "War Stage", remarking, "For most effective military defence
it is highly desirable that Coast Defence Commanders should no longer be tied down.”
The matter was evidently discussed by the Cabinet, and the Minister of National Defence
thereafter gave instructions to the Chiefs of Staff concerning an altered version of the
War Telegram provided in the Defence Scheme.* As a result the following telegram was
dispatched at 12:50 p.m. on 3 September to the District Officers Commanding the
Districts concerned with coast defence:
Take all necessary defence measures which would be required in a state of war. Utmost secrecy of
contents to be observed. Contents to be divulged to minimum number of officers.31
We have already noted the Government's evident determination to meet Parliament

uncommitted, in the strictest accordance with its pledges. This continued to be apparent
after mobilization. On 29 August the Chiefs of Staff had submitted to the Minister of
National Defence a memorandum on "Canada's National Effort (Armed Forces) in the
Early Stages of a Major War".32 This document, which outlined for the guidance of the
Cabinet the forms which effort in the impending crisis "might take", pointed out that,
whatever uncertainty had existed earlier, there was now no doubt of the intention of
Britain to dispatch "a major Expeditionary Force" to the help of France. It concluded with
the following summary of proposed Canadian army effort:
The Army's contribution would take the form of the immediate raising of an Army Corps of two
divisions and ancillary troops (roughly 60,000 men) in accordance with the Militia Service plan and its
despatch abroad as soon as arrangements can be made, in co-operation with the British Government, to
transport it and to make good such deficiencies in its war equipment as cannot be supplied from
Canadian sources.
On 5 September the Cabinet Defence Committee, with the Prime Minister in the chair,
met the Chiefs of Staff and discussed this paper and the measures which had been taken.
The Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the forces being
*General Pope, then Director of Military Operations and Intelligence and Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee,
recalls that Mr. Mackenzie summoned him to the Privy Council Office to receive these instructions. "On his telling me that
we were to take all necessary defence measures which would be required in a state of war and to fire on any blinking Ger-
man that came within reach of our guns, but that we were not at war, I exclaimed, 'You are certainly trying to have it both
ways', and Ian, chuckling, replied, 'Of course we are’ “.30
mobilized and the equipment asked for were essential for the defence of Canadian
territory, and it was indicated that if the Mobile Force were in due course sent overseas
other units would have to be called out to provide for the security of Canada.
The Government at this time was thinking in terms of a "moderate" effort.
Apparently after a cabinet meeting this same day, instructions33 were sent to the Chiefs of
Staff governing the preparation of estimates for the period ending 31 January 1940:
Estimates should be held down to very moderate level.

The proposed large concentrations in training camps should be abandoned (for instance the Health
Department have advised that it would be improper to keep troops at Petawawa during the winter
months).*
Programmes for the construction of huts should, therefore, not be included in these estimates.
It has been reported to members of the government that some purchases of lumber have been made
at Edmonton and Calgary without authority and unauthorized newspaper items appeared today with
regard to purchases of large quantities of lumber for Petawawa. Attention is directed to the fact that the
Defence Purchasing Board has to be consulted.
The Minister desires that there be no stimulation to recruiting at the present time as it is probable
that more men are now available than can be conveniently handled.
The Militia estimates submitted under these instructions ultimately amounted to

$59,520,754. They were based upon a reduction of the planned strength of the Mobile
Force from 60,000 to 40,000, and the C.G.S. pointed out that the sum proposed would not
"render the troops mobile nor provide necessary accommodation in training camps".35
We may note here two basic contrasts between the procedure followed in mobilizing
the Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1914 and that used in mobilizing the Canadian
Active Service Force in 1939.
In 1914 a mobilization scheme existed for a force similar to that actually mobilized in
August of that year. This scheme, however, was not used. On the contrary, the then
Minister of Militia cancelled on 31 July 1914 the mobilization plan which had existed
since 1911, and substituted a system of improvisation, conducted by Militia Headquarters
through direct communication with the individual units and with little or no participation
by the Military District staffs.36 This was not a procedure calculated to enhance
efficiency, although thanks to the boundless energy of the Minister and the enthusiasm of
the units and the population at large it produced better results
*It seems strange that such advice should come from the Department of Pensions and National Health rather than
from the Militia medical service. It will be recalled that it had been decided in August that there would be no concentration
if mobilization took place late in the season (above, page 39). Definite orders that there would be no concentrations were
34
sent out on 6 September. In the event, one corps concentration was carried out: Signal units were collected at Barriefield.
48 SIX YEARS OF WAR
than might have been anticipated. Nevertheless, the system followed in 1939 -to abide by
plans carefully laid in advance for such a contingency-was a much better one.
Secondly, it may be noted that whereas in 1914 the Expeditionary Force was
composed in the main of new units-numbered C.E.F. battalions-raised through the agency
of Militia regiments but not possessing any direct connection with them, the units of the
Active Service Force of 1939 were units of the Canadian Militia, wearing the badges and
the titles of regiments long familiar to the public in their districts, and inheriting
traditions and esprit de corps which were a part of Canadian history. It is true that in a
strictly legal view the units of the Active Service Force were new units having no direct
connection with those bearing the same names in the Permanent or Non-Permanent
Active Militia; in law, for instance, the 48th Highlanders of Canada, C.A.S.F., was not
connected with the 48th Highlanders of Canada, N.P.A.M. But whatever the law might
say there was a close connection in every other respect, and this was recognized by the
public, the regiments and the Army at large. The units of the Active Service Force were
regarded as being what, for most practical purposes, they were: service battalions of their
militia regiments.
Before passing on to discuss the problems of mobilization as they presented

themselves to the Districts and the units, it is convenient to take note of the further
development of the situation at Ottawa and events following the meeting of Parliament.
The Houses met, in accordance with the summons, on 7 September, and the
Government let it be known that the adoption of the Address in reply from the Speech
from the Throne would be considered as approving the Government's policy of
"immediate participation in the war". On 8 September the Prime Minister told the House
of Commons in general terms what had been done already for the defence and security of
Canada, which was, he remarked, Canada's "primary task and responsibility". As to
measures to be taken in cooperation with the United Kingdom, Mr. King stated that the
Government was in consultation with that of Britain and that more information was
required before firm decisions could be made. "The question of an expeditionary force or
units for service overseas", he said, "is particularly one of wide reaching significance
which will require the fullest examination." The debate ended on the evening of 9
September, the Address being adopted without a division. Only four members had spoken
against the Government's policy of declaring war. The following day, accordingly, the
King gave his approval to a proclamation declaring that a state of war with the German
Reich existed in Canada as of and from that date. The proclamation was published in a
special issue of the Canada Gazette the
same day. Thus Canada, for the second time in a generation, went to war with Germany.
She had been formally neutral for one week after the declaration of war by Britain.
Although, in the light of all that had taken place and the measures already in effect, it
might have seemed that to send the War Telegram was now almost a work of
supererogation, it was duly dispatched by the Chief of the General Staff on 10
September:
District Officers Commanding,

All Military Districts.
G.S. 201 Reference Defence Scheme Number Three

War has broken out with Germany.37
Parliament was prorogued on 13 September, but before the short session ended the
members had made some financial provision for prosecuting the war for the remainder of
the financial year (i.e., to 31 March 1940). The War Appropriation Act which was passed
was for the modest sum of $100 million; this included $16,454,120 already authorized by
Governor-General's Warrants. The Acting Minister of Finance (Mr. J. L. Ilsley) had
explained to the Commons that "approximately $50,000,000" of the year's regular
defence appropriations remained unspent. This would be available in addition to the new
appropriation. Mr. Ilsley explained,38 "The cost of a war effort by Canada does not lend
itself to precise calculations in advance", and added, "Therefore the financial process
must take a form permitting financial decisions to be made as need arises, and not by
settling now a fixed plan which must be rigidly observed, irrespective of what the
necessities may involve."
Mobilizing the Units of the Active Service Force
The Military District staffs, knowing what units were slated for mobilization under
Defence Scheme No. 3, had made their own preparations accordingly. One consisted of
drafting mobilization orders for the units, and these were issued as soon as the
Mobilization Telegram arrived at the District Headquarters. They dealt with such matters
as the establishment* upon which the unit was to mobilize, the place of mobilization and
the accommodation to be used, procedure to be followed in recruiting (which was laid
down in a document, issued by National Defence Headquarters on 15 May 1939, entitled
"Recruiting Memorandum No. 1"), arrangements to be made for messing, etc.
Commanding Officers were referred to the pamphlet Mobilization Instructions for the
Canadian Militia, which had been printed
*An establishment is "the authorized composition of a unit" expressed in numbers and ranks of personnel and
numbers and types of weapons and transport.
50 SIX YEARS OF WAR
in 1937. Units were allotted blocks of regimental numbers to be allocated to their recruits.
On this basis the mobilizing regiments proceeded to make their arrangements.
In some cases, the first step taken was to parade the Non-Permanent Active Militia
unit, advise its members of mobilization, and call for volunteers. Thus we find one urban
infantry regiment (one of the relatively few units whose war diaries give a fairly adequate
record of this phase) setting down the fact that on 2 September it held a mobilization
parade and called for volunteers for its Active Service Force battalion. It recorded that 30
officers and 251 other ranks were on parade, and that 29 officers and 156 other ranks
declared their willingness to serve. This was probably a fairly representative as well as a
very creditable showing. It may be noted that since the battalion was mobilizing to a war
establishment, including "first reinforcements", of 26 officers and 774 other ranks, the
majority of the men obviously had to be obtained by enlistment from the general public.
This was the case very generally, for as a result of conditions in the years preceding 1939
the strength of all N.P.A.M. units was far below that required for war establishment.
Moreover, a proportion of the officers and other ranks of these units were of an age or
medical category unsuitable for active service. This particular battalion was at full
strength as early as 19 September.
In spite of the circumstances described, the actual contribution of personnel made by
the peacetime forces was very large. The fact is that almost half of the 58,337 men and
women who joined the Active Service Force in September 1939 were then serving or had
served earlier either in the Permanent Force or the Non-Permanent Active Militia-4986 in
the former and 24,089 in the latter. A total of 1252 had seen service in the forces of the
United Kingdom or foreign countries.39
The proportion of the N.P.A.M. strength which volunteered for the C.A.S.F. varied
very widely between units, and the records are incomplete. The unit recorded as
containing "the highest percentage of peacetime personnel" of any inspected by General
McNaughton in the autumn of 1939 was the 9th Field Ambulance, Royal Canadian Army
Medical Corps, in Montreal; no less than 89 per cent of its N.P.A.M. personnel had been
enlisted and found fit for service.40 But even where the numerical proportion was much
smaller the N.P.A.M. contribution was very important. The war diaries make it clear that
the Militia provided practically all the commissioned officers and (at least equally
significant) the warrant officers, for the units mobilized in 1939. Of the other ranks, only
a minority normally came directly from the Militia. Even so, the N.P.A.M. endowed each
mobilized unit with an invaluable nucleus of partially-trained non-commissioned officers
and soldiers, who were tremendously useful in getting the machinery of
mobilization going, in providing a framework for the unit and in setting up a solid
connection between the Militia regiment and the service battalion which served to
maintain the integrity of regimental spirit and traditions. The men enlisted from the
general public were thus received into an existing family and made to feel themselves
sharers in the inheritance of an honourable name.
It would be difficult, indeed, to over-estimate the debt of the wartime Army to the
Non-Permanent Active Militia. It provided the foundation upon which the great new
structure was built. It produced, to no small extent, the leaders who built and developed
that structure. And it gave the Army a group of personnel, officers and men, who
continued to play dominant parts in it even when the great majority of the Army's
members had come to be volunteers of no militia experience recruited from civil life. It is
a notable fact that, at the end of hostilities with Germany in 1945, three of Canada's five
fighting divisions were commanded by citizen soldiers who in 1939 had been captains or
majors in the Non-Permanent Active Militia. And if further evidence of the Militia's
contribution is required, one might rehearse the list of those who won the
Commonwealth's highest awards for gallantry. Of the ten Victoria Crosses won by the
Army during this Second World War, six were awarded to former members of the Active
Militia—five from the Non-Permanent Active Militia and one from the Permanent Force.
Of the three Canadian soldiers who won the George Cross, two had served in the Non-
Permanent Active Militia.* These facts suggest that the pre-war citizen force made to the
wartime service a contribution remarkable for quality even more than quantity.
A word must be said also of the little Permanent Force, which played in 1939 and
throughout the war a part out of all proportion to its size. On 31 March 1939 the "P.F." had
on its strength just 455 officers.41 The events of the next six years were to prove that the
average quality of these officers was very high-extraordinarily high, when one considers
how limited, on the whole, were the attractions of a military career in pre-war Canada.
Other things being equal, a man who has devoted his life to the study of military affairs
should be a more useful soldier than an amateur; and it was fortunate that the country had a
few professionals available in the crisis. In 1914 a British regular officer was appointed to
command the 1st Canadian Division; the Canadian Corps was not commanded by a
Canadian until 1917; and throughout the First World War the first-grade staff appointments
in the
*Victoria Cross: Lt.-Col. C. C. 1. Merritt (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, N.P.A.M.); Major P. Triquet (Royal 22e
Regiment, PT.): Major J. K. Mahony (Westminster Regiment (M.G.), N.P.A.M.); Major D. V. Currie (12th Divisional
Signals, and subsequently King's Own Rifles of Canada (M.G.), N.P.A.M.); Major F. A. Tilston (Essex Scottish,
N.P.A.M.); C.S.M. J. R. Osborn (Winnipeg Grenadiers (M.G.), N.P.A.M.).
George Cross: Lieut. J. M. S. Patton (Queen's University Contingent, C.O.T.C., N.P.A.M.) and Corporal James
Hendry (Algonquin Regiment, N.P.A.M.).
52 SIX YEARS OF WAR
Corps were, with few if any exceptions, held by officers of the British Regular Army. In
1939 Canada had her own regular soldiers for such tasks. As the war progressed and the
non-professionals gained practical experience, and particularly after the Army got into
large-scale action, the distinction between the two groups became more and more blurred
and the P.F. officer became somewhat less important; but the Army could not have done
without him in the early years, and he-and the other ranks of the Permanent Force also-
continued to make a great contribution to the end.
Two special features stand out in the exiguous unit records of the mobilization period:
the anxiety of the "old soldiers" of 1914-18 to serve once more, and the extent to which
the high medical standards in effect at this time resulted in rejections among these and
other would-be recruits. In Montreal the war diary of the Canadian Black Watch42 gives
us a glimpse of conditions during these hectic early days:
Many of the Regiment's originals unfortunately failed to pass the medical examination for various
reasons, chief amongst these being "over age". These men, mainly veterans of the Great War 1914-1918,
will be sadly missed as the accumulation of knowledge gathered over a period of years with the Regiment
would have been an invaluable asset during the Battalion's preliminary training.... Amongst the first rush
of recruits were many ex-members of the Regiment and a remarkable number of ex-Service men... .
The actual number of veterans of the Canadian Expeditionary Force of 1914-18 recorded
as attested into the Active Service Force during September 1939 was 4206; of these, 836
were officers, including five nursing sisters.43 The number would doubtless have been
much higher but for the medical standards and the age limit.
Many men, it is clear, were also rejected for possessing too many dependents. Recruiting
Memorandum No. 1 contained the following provision:
In carrying out enlistments, men without dependents are preferable; married men with four or more
dependents should not be enlisted.
This vague instruction was interpreted in some places, notably in Montreal, as a

prohibition against enlisting married men. Le Regiment de Maisonneuve, for instance,
recorded that orders had been received to take only bachelors, and that married applicants
("ils sont legions") had to be refused. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal also refused married
men, and the Canadian Black Watch recorded that, at one stage at any rate, they were
accepting "single men only of good bearing and education".44 This matter was discussed
by the Defence Council on 14 September, and the Minister ruled that dependents'
allowance should be paid in respect of a maximum of three dependents (wife and two
children), and that men enlisted with more than this number should be given the option of
accepting the restriction or being discharged.*
*At this time the rate of dependents' allowance for men below the rank of Warrant Officer Class I was $60 per month
for a wife and $12 per month for each child. It may be noted that the basic pay of a private was $1.30 per day.
This limitation, which had in fact been included in Recruiting Memorandum No. 1,
remained in effect until November 1941, when it was relaxed to permit payments for a
third and fourth child for soldiers of ranks below Warrant Officer Class I. In January
1943 it was further relaxed; all ranks could then draw dependents' allowance for up to six
dependent children, and a dependent father or mother in addition.45
The Response of the Country
It is time to turn to the statistics of enlistment as they presented themselves at

National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. On 6 September, five days after the
mobilization order went out, the strength of the Active Service Force was reported as
22,878, more than half of it accounted for by the units manning coast and anti-aircraft
defences or guarding vulnerable points. On 24 September the total had grown to 56,534,
of whom 38,986 were in the Mobile Force.* On 30 September it had risen further, being
reported as 61,497.46 Corrected statistics for the whole month of September, prepared
later, show a total of 58,337 men and women actually taken into the Active Service Force
(55,255 enlistments for general service, 3001 appointments to commissions, 81
appointments of nursing sisters).47 It was, as might be expected, by far the largest single
month for enlistments of the whole war. And when one remembers in addition the great
(but unrecorded) numbers of volunteers who came forward only to be rejected because of
age, medical unfitness or other reasons, and whose offers find no reflection in the figures
just quoted, it is apparent how strongly the spirit of service and sacrifice was moving in
the country at this moment. The mood and approach, it is true, were very different from
those of 1914, when, we are told, "The strains of `Rule Britannia' rang through Canada
from ocean to ocean".48 A message49 from Military District No. 13 (with Headquarters at
Calgary) strikes the keynote of 1939 in one of the areas where the response was readiest:
Recruiting at all stations MD 13 exceeding expectations. Best type of men offering their services in
numbers that tax capacity of medical boards. Units will have no difficulty in recruiting to strength well
within time limit. Complete absence of jingoism or war excitement. Men volunteering doing so with full
realization of their responsibility.
On 14 September the Chief of the General Staff told the Defence Council that
recruiting was proceeding satisfactorily apart from minor troubles. The strength of the
C.A.S.F. at that date was just over 39,000 men, of whom
*This includes District Depots and Internment Camp staffs, not included in the figures for 6 September. Headquarters
staffs and some detachments were not included until the end of the month.
54 SIX YEARS OF WAR
22,500 were in the Mobile Force. The Adjutant General stated that there were at this time
"more men enlisted than there had been in the same period in 1914", which was certainly
true.50 On 26 September General Anderson reported to the Chiefs of Staff Committee that
there were some 56,000 men under arms, but that the infantry "was not coming along as
well as might be desired".51
There was inevitably considerable variation between the results obtained by different
units and in different regions of the country. Some units filled their establishments very
rapidly; for example, by 12 September the 48th Highlanders of Canada (in Toronto) and
The Edmonton Regiment had both passed the 500 mark; and The Seaforth Highlanders of
Canada (Vancouver) and The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.) completed
recruiting by 22 September and 30 September respectively.52 The two medium batteries
mobilizing in Prince Edward Island were both full by 24 September, when recruiting in
such units was ordered suspended.53 Some units had more difficulty; among these were
certain Permanent Force regiments. Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was still
about 200 under establishment at the end of September, and the strength of the Royal 22e
Regiment was only 338 all ranks.54 Notes prepared by the C.G.S. for presentation to the
Defence Council on 24 October (when general recruiting had long been suspended)
review the situation at that time in the infantry units of the . two divisions:
In regard to the Brigades of the 1st Division, with the exception of the Hastings and Prince Edward
Regiment in the 1st Infantry Brigade which is 39 short, the Brigade is up to Establishment, 2 units being
each 19 in excess of Establishment.
The 2nd Infantry Brigade is practically up to Establishment, the Saskatoon Light Infantry being 13
under Establishment and the P.P.C.L.I. 24 deficient.
The situation in the 3rd Infantry Brigade is still not good. The Royal 22e Regiment is 235 under
Establishment, the West Nova Scotia Regiment 204, the Carleton and York Regiment 181 and the Royal
Montreal Regiment 21.
In respect to the 2nd Division, the 4th Infantry Brigade is up to Establishment except for a few
personnel in the case of 3 of the units.
Of the 5th Infantry Brigade, 3 units are still under Establishment, the Black Watch 41, Les Fusiliers
Mont-Royal 103 and Le Regiment de la Chaudiere 381.
In the 6th Infantry Brigade, the Calgary Highlanders have completed to Establishment but the South
Saskatchewan Regiment is deficient 360. The other two units, the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders
and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, are short 10 and 23 respectively.
General McNaughton's inspection report written at the end of October mentions that the
deficiency in both the Carleton and York and the West Nova Scotia Regiments was due
not to shortage of recruits, but to accommodation and clothing difficulties which made it
impracticable to recruit to full strength.
To afford a general view of the situation in the country, we append a table showing
the strength of the Active Service Force by Military Districts, as it was reported on 30
September.
STRENGTH OF THE CANADIAN ACTIVE SERVICE FORCE55

30 September 1939
Military Authorized Strength Actual Actual Actual
District (Mobile Force Only) Strength Strength Strength
Headquarters As of 1 (Mobile (Other Units) (Total)
M.D. 1 London,b Ont. 5,794 4,735) 267 5,002
M.D. 2 Toronto, Ont. 12.199 9.401 1,917 11,318
M.D. 3 Kingston, Ont. 5,959 4,273 1,109 5,382
M.D. 4 Montreal, P.Q. 11,000 6,019 1,784 7,803
M.D. 5 Quebec, P.Q. 3,239 1,506 908 2,414
M.D. 6 Halifax, N.S. 1,614 1,226 5,824 7,050
M.D. 7 Saint John, N.B. 1,512 1,239 2,340 3,579
M.D. 10 Winnipeg, Man. 5,084 4,027 549 4,576
M.D. 11 Victoria, B.C. 2,588 1,880 4,806 6,686
M.D. 12 Regina, Sask. 4,647 2,166 317 2,483
M.D. 13 Calgary, Alta. 4,196 4,068 418 4,486
Miscellaneous, unallotted to Districts - - -
N.D.H.Q. Ottawa, Oat. - - 718 718
Total - 60,709 40,540 20,957 61,497
NOTE: The disparity between the authorized strength of the Mobile Force on 1 September and its actual
strength on 30 September might be taken to indicate a serious deficiency in recruits. In fact, however,
recruiting had been suspended during the month in a large number of units. As some of these had taken on
considerable numbers of men before recruiting was stopped, it is not possible to give a reliable total for
authorized strength for 30 September. It also proved impossible to provide totals of authorized strength for
"Other Units"; in certain cases, no establishments are to be found. If all the units authorized on 1 September
had been recruited to full establishment, the total strength of the Active Service Force would have been ,.not
far short of 80,000 men”.56
"Other Units" include Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft troops (drawn from the coastal Districts);
District and National Defence Headquarters staffs and Corps detachments of the Permanent Force; District
Depots, and Armoury and Internment Camp guards; and guards on Vulnerable Points. Strengths of existing
Training Centres and the Royal Military College, however, are not included. Of the "Miscellaneous" total,
2566 is the authorized strength of six units (two anti-tank regiments, two anti-tank batteries and two
searchlight batteries) whose mobilization was suspended. The remaining 321 is the authorized strength of the
various formation headquarters; actual strength figures for these, so far as they existed, are not available.
The figures of actual strength are those reported to National Defence Headquarters at the time. The total
is larger by about 4200 than the adjusted enlistment figures prepared after the war. These show enlistments as
58,337 and discharges as 1096, leaving a balance of 57,241 all ranks at 30 September. The disparity may be
accounted for, in part at least, by the possible inclusion in the contemporary figures of Non-Permanent
personnel still serving in Coast Defence or Anti-Aircraft units or guarding vulnerable points.
This table indicates that there were two provinces where recruiting was sluggish at
this period. One was Saskatchewan, where Military District No. 12 had reported on 12
September, "Recruiting very slow." The other was Quebec. With respect to the French-
speaking province, however, it is well to add that the war diaries of Les Fusiliers Mont-
Royal and Le Regiment de Maisonneuve testify that in both these regiments the
personnel of the pre-war
56 SIX YEARS OF WAR
Non-Permanent Active Militia unit volunteered for service en masse or virtually so, and
the latter regiment was fully up to strength by 29 September. Military District No. 4
(Montreal) reported on 10 September that Frenchspeaking units had had more
applications for enlistment than English-speaking ones, but medical rejections had been
higher in the former. The reasons suggested for the difficulties in Saskatchewan were the
very large foreign-born population there and the effect of the harvest season in a
predominantly rural province.57
For every unit, mobilization was a time of many difficulties, of which the problem of
attracting recruits was normally one of the least. The worst were those concerning
accommodation, clothing and equipment.
Accommodation for the newly mobilized units was very difficult to find, in spite of
the measures taken before the outbreak of war. Much use was made of available public
buildings, particularly exhibition buildings; and notwithstanding the Government's initial
reluctance the construction of hutments began very soon in many places. Nevertheless,
some units simply could not house their recruits, and in certain cases in the larger cities
the latter continued to live in their own homes for many weeks, merely reporting for daily
parades. This procedure necessarily had a decidedly adverse effect upon discipline and
upon the progress of training.
The clothing situation caused serious complaints, which continued for some months.
Stocks of clothing available in militia stores were small and of obsolete pattern. Orders
for the new-pattern "battledress" were placed only after the outbreak of war, and some
weeks passed before it began to become available for issue. The story of this particular
item may be outlined here, merely as an example.
The adoption of battledress in the British Army was authorized by a "War Office
Periodical Letter" dated 31 March 1939.58 Samples of the new clothing did not reach
Canada until July, but on the 13th of that month the Dress and Clothing Committee,
Militia Service, recommended that Canada adopt it. A query by the Master General of the
Ordnance as to its suitability for summer training seems to have caused some delay, and
the M.G.O. submitted the recommendation to the Military Members of the Defence
Council only on 29 August. By this time one Canadian manufacturer had already been
asked to make a sample suit, so that any manufacturing difficulties might be discovered
at once. On 1 September the Chief of the General Staff concurred in the adoption of
battledress, and on the following day the Minister of National Defence likewise
approved.59 Stocks of cloth sufficient for some 20,000 suits were then on hand, having
been purchased under an appropriation made in the main Estimates in the spring of 1939.
By the time of Canada's declaration of war contract demands for 100,000
suits had been prepared by the Department of National Defence. These were passed to the
Defence Purchasing Board on 16 September.60 Tenders were invited by the Board on 23
September, and on 2 October orders were placed with five companies for quantities worth
$194,600. Cloth, apart from that on hand, had to be manufactured and dyed; it was made
to National Research Council specifications. Production now went forward rapidly, and
the first consignments of battledress were shipped to the Districts the last week in
October.61 Canadian battledress proved to be of excellent quality.
The situation with respect to boots was particularly difficult; the supply on hand was
relatively small,* and the recruits' civilian footwear fell to pieces rapidly. District
Officers Commanding were authorized on 21 September to make local purchases of such
boots as were to be had.63 The war diary of The Royal Regiment of Canada records that
on 25 September the Commanding Officer was constrained to accept with gratitude the
offer of a public-spirited Toronto lady to provide 130 pairs of boots and socks for his
men. Supplies of blankets, socks and underwear were similarly inadequate, and these
shortages also produced many complaints before they were remedied.
One quotation from a unit diary (that of The Carleton and York Regiment for 9
September) will serve to illustrate the problem:
By this time the shortage of blankets, beds, uniforms and boots began to assume a serious aspect. No
palliasses whatever were available; approximately half of the men had no beds or cots; blankets were
issued while they lasted at two per man, and many men who had no blankets at all were issued with two
greatcoats. Only sixty-six pairs of boots could be secured and there was a great shortage of uniforms and
caps. Many men who were reporting in with inferior footwear and light cheap clothing had to be excused
from training parades. There was a great deal of suffering from colds and sore feet.
These shortages were inevitable in the circumstances of 1939. They could have been
avoided, but only by the expenditure, during preceding years, of far larger sums of money
than those which had been provided for the Militia by Parliament.
The impossibility of providing the men who were volunteering with even the simplest
necessaries certainly helped to produce at early dates a series of decisions to suspend
recruiting in units of certain categories. As early as 2 September, indeed, District Officers
Commanding were advised of 31 miscellaneous units whose mobilization might be
deferred at their discretion. Four days later mobilization of these units was postponed "until
further notice". On the same day (6 September) consideration was given to postponing the
*There were 54,468 pairs in store early in 1939; but 10,091 pairs were issued to the Non-Permanent Active Militia in
the summer before mobilization. The first specific provision ever made for boots for the N.P.A.M. was that in the
Supplementary Estimates passed in the spring of 1939, and as a result of some argument over specifications the order did
not go to the Defence Purchasing Board until 24 August.62
58 SIX YEARS OF WAR
mobilization of 47 more units which, thanks to the abandonment of the scheme for
concentration camps, were not yet urgently required. The Minister of National Defence
decided that this should be done in units which had not yet commenced recruiting; those
which had commenced were to continue. As a result, recruiting was deferred in nine more
units; the total was now 40, involving 7362 all ranks.64 The Adjutant General would have
preferred to postpone recruiting in a still longer list, pointing out that many of the
ancillary units would be merely "a fifth wheel to the coach throughout the winter months,
unless the Mobile Force is to be used as such sooner than appears likely at present".65 The
matter was again discussed with the Minister, and on 11 September recruiting was
suspended in 30 more ancillary units, the great majority of which had begun taking on
men. By this date, then, recruiting had been stopped in 70 units, with a total
establishment of over 15,000 all ranks.66
On 22 September mobilization was further slowed down when telegrams were sent to
the coastal Military Districts suspending recruiting for rifle and machine-gun battalions
engaged on coast-defence duties. On 24 September an order went out deferring
immediately all recruiting except for infantry and machine-gun units of the 1st and 2nd
Divisions. On 11 October a further telegram put a stop to recruiting in the infantry and
machine-gun units of the 2nd Division.67 These suspensions were evidently the result, in
great part, of the equipment situation and the existing uncertainty concerning the future
employment of the force apart from the 1st Division. As noted below, however (page 70),
economy was also a motive. The suspension of recruiting was necessary if technical units
as requested by the United Kingdom were to be provided without exceeding the
expenditures which had been approved.
The Decision to Send Troops Overseas
When the mobilization orders were issued on 1 September (on which date, it may be
recalled once more, Canada was not at war) the use to be made of the Mobile Force had
of course not yet been decided, and decisions emerged only after consultation with the
British Government and consideration in Ottawa.
It is evident, that, in accordance with its policy of avoiding any measure which could be
interpreted as a commitment to any special line of action in a future emergency, the
Canadian Government had hitherto engaged in no discussions with the Government of the
United Kingdom concerning the military measures which would be desirable if war came
and Canada was involved. Now, on 3 September, the day on which the British Government
declared war, an exploratory query was dispatched to London. This telegram,68 sent on a
"Prime-Minister-to-Prime-Minister" basis, is of such importance that it should be printed
here in full:
1. As you are aware the Canadian Parliament will meet on Thursday of this week.
2. In view of the announcement which you made this morning, indicating that in spite of your
unceasing and persistent efforts for peace, the action and attitude of the German Government had resulted
in a state of war developing between the United Kingdom and Germany, the Canadian Government, in
addition to the defence and precautionary measures which it is taking under the War Measures Act and
other administrative powers, will recommend to Parliament further action. The measures to be proposed
are now under consideration.
3. As regards military activities our primary task will naturally be the defence of Canada, which under
present circumstances is a more pressing and urgent undertaking than it was in the last war. We are also
considering to what extent we could undertake as necessity required and our means permitted action in the
Western Atlantic region, particularly in Newfoundland and the West Indies. As to further military
cooperation we should be glad to receive your appreciation of the probable theatre and character of main
British and allied military operations, in order that we may consider the policy to be adopted by Canada.
4. We should also like to have your Government's present appreciation of the nature and extent of
British and allied requirements as regards supplies and particularly the relative urgency of the needs for
various commodities which Canadian producers could furnish. As regards munitions the despatch of the
British Mission now on its way and the consultations which have already taken place should make it
possible to reach prompt conclusions on detailed arrangements. Presumably the negotiations which have
been taking place in the United Kingdom for the purchase of war materials and food stuffs will be
completed and developed. The Canadian Government is considering what general measures of economic
organization and control will be required in this country.
Three days later, on 6 September, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs replied,
expressing gratitude for the message and outlining the general needs of the situation.69 He
pointed out that there would be a large requirement for Canadian dollars and that any
steps which might assist in "the financing of desired purchases" would be most helpful.
With respect to strictly military assistance, his telegram said:
As regards further military cooperation, our appreciation of the probable theatre of war and the
character of main British and Allied military operations will be communicated separately as soon as
possible.
Generally, so far as immediate steps are concerned, provision of naval vessels and facilities and of air
force personnel would be of most assistance, and in particular at present time supply of any pilots and
aircraft crews available is a capital requirement. As regards land forces, policy here is to avoid a rush of
volunteers such as occurred in the last war and to expand by means of a controlled intake. The chief
requirement is for certain technical personnel.
On the same day (6 September), the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in
Ottawa (Sir Gerald Campbell) handed to the Secretary of State for External Affairs a
memorandum70 describing the specific measures which the United Kingdom Government
had had in mind in framing the foregoing
60 SIX YEARS OF WAR
telegram. It was definite and detailed, and dealt separately with the Navy, Army and Air
Force. Only the section relating to the Army need be quoted:
15. While it was hoped that Canada would exert her full national effort as in last war, even to the extent
of the eventual despatch of an expeditionary force, it is realised that no statement of policy on these lines
is likely to be possible at the
moment. Would it be possible however, to consider as an immediate programme
(a) the despatch of a small Canadian unit which would take its place alongside the United Kingdom
troops.
(b) the provision of technical units, particularly signal, royal engineers, ordnance, medical,
transportation (particularly railway construction and operating) units for attachment to United Kingdom
formation
(c) technical personnel for enlistment in United Kingdom units, particularly fitters, electricians,
mechanics, instrument mechanics, alternatively motor transport drivers, and officers with similar
qualifications.
The British Government had thus indicated that it hoped for a large Canadian effort on
land; it asked for some sort of token force at an early date; and in addition it asked for
technical ancillary units, and technical personnel for enlistment in British units. At the
same time it had carefully refrained from urging large immediate measures and had given
some impression that the organization of considerable land forces was scarcely a matter
of urgency. On this basis the Canadian authorities proceeded to conduct their own
discussions.
On 8 September the Canadian General Staff submitted observations on the British
memorandum.71 Suggesting that this indicated serious concern on the part of the British
Government "over their ability to provide the manpower to maintain the war on land
while meeting their commitments at sea and in the air", it went on to remark that the
mobilized Mobile Force could be dispatched abroad without endangering the security of
Canada, and could leave within three months, though necessarily with limited equipment.
Equipment and training would have to be completed overseas. It mentioned that the
ancillary troops of the Mobile Force included units of all the types mentioned in the
British request for technical troops. If it was desired to send a token force, it could be
drawn from the Mobile Force and sent abroad in less than three months; but technical
units, whether sent singly or as components of an expeditionary force, could not be ready
to leave Canada until after about the same period. As for permitting technical personnel
to enlist in the United Kingdom forces, this, it was pointed out, was "difficult to reconcile
with a possible decision to despatch an appreciable number of technical units overseas".
The matter was now up to the Cabinet. During the next few days, while Ministers
discussed the matter, Ottawa buzzed with rumours, accurate and inaccurate. On 11
September the Minister of National Defence referred in the House of Commons to the
possibility of using the Mobile Force overseas; and by 16 September decisions had been
taken. On that day the three
Chiefs of Staff met a Cabinet Committee and received the Government's instructions.
There appears to be no formal record of this meeting, but the
gist of the instructions as they affected the Militia was thus summarized by the Chief of
the General Staff in a memorandum72 sent to the Minister of National Defence later the
same day:
"(a) that the despatch of a large expeditionary force as referred to in para. 15 of the despatch from the
United Kingdom Government forwarded under cover of Sir Gerald Campbell's letter of the 6th
instant, would not be considered at the present time, and
"(b) that the Canadian unit referred to in para. 15(a) which would take its place alongside the United
Kingdom troops, would be a division."
On this basis the C.G.S. made detailed recommendations.73 He suggested that Canada
"offer to send and maintain one division" (the essential decision on this point, it would
seem, had already been taken), and further recommended that she offer to send such
technical units as the British Government might ask for, "with the proviso that they shall
remain Canadian units and return to Canadian control, should they be required for a
Canadian Expeditionary Force, should it be later decided to send one". His advice was
that individuals "be not sent over to enlist into United Kingdom units".
General Anderson's long-term recommendations for the effort of Canadian land forces
ran as follows:
It is recommended that Canada should aim at having in the field ultimately a force consisting of a
Canadian Corps of not less than two divisions and ancillary troops, it being considered that only in this
way will it be possible to satisfy the demands of the numbers desiring to serve and in view of the fact that
the manpower of Canada could maintain as much as six divisions, a cavalry division and ancillary troops.
As time goes on it might be found desirable to send one or more further divisions to join the Canadian
Corps of two divisions. This, however, would depend upon developments.
... It will, of course, be necessary to maintain a continual flow of reinforcements for any units sent
abroad, entailing the establishing of training centres at home and, in order to replace casualties quickly,
reinforcement units abroad.
... It will also be necessary to maintain an effective force in Canada to meet any eventuality that may
arise. At present we are mobilizing, as such a force, a Corps of two divisions and ancillary troops. As units
are sent abroad it is considered that they should be drawn from this mobilized force and replaced in
Canada by calling out and training further Non-Permanent Active Militia units which have not yet been
ordered to mobilize. It is not considered, however, that it will be necessary to replace, at present at least,
any of the ancillary units sent abroad.
The Chief of the General Staff went on to consider the question of the training and
dispatch of the expeditionary division. Training in winter in Canada could not go beyond
an elementary stage, while for more advanced training complete equipment was essential,
and this, we have already seen, was not available there. Production of equipment in
Canada would be a long task, and immediate supplies must come from British sources.
"In view of the above wrote the C.G.S., "it is considered that the Division should
62 SIX YEARS OF WAR
proceed abroad as soon as the United Kingdom can equip it. . . . After receiving their full
equipment in England, troops will require training with it from a month to three months
before proceeding to a theatre of war." As for the technical units, since these were for
attachment to British formations they should go forward as soon after they were ready as
the War Office should require. Anderson remarked, "It would appear reasonable that
Canada limit her commitments in respect to these units so as to exclude cost of equipping
them, at least until such time as they come under Canadian Corps Command in the field".
The C.G.S.'s general comments on the equipment problem are of interest:
Speaking generally, the only equipment available at present for a unit being despatched overseas is
personal equipment and rifles. Our other equipment, including guns, is mostly obsolete or obsolescent
and would be required in this country for training purposes. All equipment required has to be obtained
from manufacturers in Canada or the United Kingdom. The United States is not a suitable source of
supply unless the equipment were specially made to War Office specifications, as otherwise difficulties
would arise in respect to maintenance in the field. The United States as a source of supply is, therefore,
not contemplated.
It is impossible to say just what equipment will be supplied from Canada. It will probably be found
desirable for Canada to concentrate on certain lines while the United Kingdom is concentrating on the
others. This is a matter for arrangement between the two countries which, it is presumed, will be looked
into by the Department of Munitions and Supply.*
It is also impossible to say at the moment just when any particular equipment will be available and,
in consequence, just when the funds to pay for it will be required. Some of the major items of
equipment, such as field guns, anti-tank guns, tanks, etc., will for some time to come have to be supplied
from the United Kingdom as the time necessary for production in Canada will probably be not less than
a year and a half.
New equipment will also be required for training in Canada, for which funds have not been
provided, amounting to $10,800,00.
On the same day Anderson dispatched a telegram to Colonel G. P. Loggie, who since
1937 had been on duty at Canada House, London, as Ordnance representative for the
Department of National Defence, advising him that consideration was being given to
sending a token force of one division, the date of departure to depend upon availability of
modern equipment in England.74 Loggie was instructed to consult the War Office
immediately and report by cable when such equipment might be expected. Before he
could reply, the Canadian Government, on 19 September, announced that it had decided
"to organize and train a division to be available as an expeditionary force, if and when
required". A second division would be "kept under arms as a further measure of
preparedness". "Pending the organization of these two divisions", further recruiting
would be deferred.75
*This Department replaced the War Supply Board, which had itself replaced the Defence Purchasing Board. Though
authorized by an Act assented to on 13 September 1939, the Department came into existence only on 9 April 1940, by
virtue of Order in Council P.C. 1435 of that date.
On 20 September the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (General Sir Edmund Ironside)
cabled General Anderson76 expressing appreciation of the Canadian offer, stating that he
would "welcome Canadian troops at an early date" and suggesting that the division
concentrate in England and complete its training there. He gave the assurance that
"Canadian units will not go into action with a lesser scale of equipment than British
Divisions" and added that a War Office committee had been formed under the Deputy
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with Colonel Loggie and Lt.-Col. E. L. M. Burns
(another Canadian officer then in England) as members, to study accommodation,
equipment and training facilities for the Canadian troops. Loggie cabled the following
day,77 mentioning that the War Office contemplated including the Canadian division in a
"contingent" to be sent overseas (i.e. to the Continent) in about six months. At the same
time he wrote by air mail78 reporting in detail the result of his conversations with the War
Office. The letter ran in part:
The proposal to send Canadian troops overseas was warmly welcomed by all concerned and we
were assured that everything possible would be done to ensure that they reach the front as early as their
state of training warranted. You are no doubt aware that the allies are faced with a serious situation in
the Western theatre and that the need for additional divisions is acute. From the strategical, political and
moral points of view, there is every reason to expedite the despatch of Canadian troops to this country
and subsequently to France. It was made clear that the reputation Canadians earned in the last war has
not been forgotten, and that, except for regulars and one or two territorial divisions, there are no troops
whom the C. in C. would rather have with him.
The decision to send a force overseas involved changing the basis on which men had
so far been enlisted into the Active Service Force. The Minister of National Defence had
explained to the House of Commons on 11 September that under the Militia Act (Section
68) no man could be required to serve in the field continuously for a longer period than
one year, unless he had volunteered to serve for a longer period or "for the war". He
suggested that if a decision were made to use part of the Active Service Force overseas
the men might be "reenlisted for overseas service". The statement issued on 19
September confirmed that this would be done, the men of both divisions being re-attested
on a basis of volunteering for service in Canada or elsewhere for the duration of the war.
Orders were shortly sent out that the whole of the Active Service Force was to be re-
attested in this way.79
Very few men took advantage of the opportunity to leave the service which the new
order afforded. The war diary of The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment for 30
September describes the order's reception in that unit. It was probably typical of many:
During the afternoon parade at Picton the terms of the "Supplementary Declaration", Form M.F.M.
2(x) were read and explained to Picton Coys., and they were told that they might have a short time in
which to discuss these terms and deliberate over them. However one strong voice called out: "I don't need
64 SIX YEARS OF' WAR
any time on mine! Bring on the declaration! I'm all set to sign!" This was the signal for quite an outburst
of enthusiasm, and there was a period of shouting and cheering. The upshot was that when the Coys.
were called upon to sign for overseas service "D" Coy. turned out to a man, but five members of "C"
Coy. refused to sign and were heartily booed as a result.
In all, only five officers* and 532 other ranks of the C.A.S.F. declined to re-attest and
were struck off the strength, "services no longer required".80
On 20 September, the Chief of the General Staff wrote to the Minister of National
Defence as follows:81
Now that it has been decided to prepare a division for despatch overseas, and with a view to maintaining
generally Provincial representation in accordance with population, I recommend that the composition of
the first Division to proceed abroad be the units called out and mobilizing as units of First Division
C.A.S.F.
This having been approved, the appointment of a commander and the organization of
divisional headquarters followed. C.A.S.F. Routine Order No. 69 (18 October 1939)
announced the appointment of Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton as "Inspector-
General of Units of the 1st Canadian Division", effective 5 October. It was not
practicable for him to exercise command over units scattered all across Canada, but it
was intended that he should be appointed General Officer Commanding before the
Division went overseas, and this was done by Routine Order No. 180 (2 December 1939)
with effect 17 October. General McNaughton, who, as already noted, had relinquished
the appointment of Chief of the General Staff in 1935 on accepting the appointment of
President of the National Research Council, thus returned to active military duty and
assumed the most significant Canadian field command. On 25 October, following a
fortnight devoted to problems of organization, he left for a rapid inspection tour of the
units, which took him from Charlottetown to Esquimalt. His reports written as a result of
this tour deal at length with the problems of accommodation and supply, which were still
a serious embarrassment, though the situation was now much better than it had been.82
The Technical Troops for Britain
The question of the technical units requested by the British Government on 6

September-had stood over until a decision was made on sending a Canadian token force.
On 24 September the Chief of the General Staff sent a memorandum to the Minister of
National Defence on this matter.83 He pointed out that the estimates recently approved
provided for a definite number of personnel and a definite expenditure, and if the
estimate was not to be exceeded any technical units offered to the United Kingdom would
*Two of these officers had never been formally on the strength of the CAST., but had been attached to C.A.S.F. units
pending qualification.
have to come from within these limits. General Anderson considered it practicable to
provide units as required without exceeding the estimates, but suggested that Canada
should attach certain conditions to any offer, namely:
"(a) the units shall remain intact as Canadian units.

"(b) that Canada will assume responsibility for the pay and allowances of the personnel,
for the cost of their subsistence, for their initial issue of clothing and for their
transportation to the United Kingdom.
"(c) that the United Kingdom will assume responsibility for equipping the units and for
maintenance of their clothing and equipment so long as the units are not under
Canadian higher command.
"(d) that if Canada should at a later stage decide to increase her forces in the field, all or
any of the units provided will be made available for return, upon request, to higher
Canadian command.
"(e) should any units be returned to higher Canadian Command as referred to in sub-
para. (d) above, Canada will assume the cost of maintenance of equipment from
that time and the assumption of the cost of equipment then in use will be subject to
mutual arrangements."
On 29 September a telegram84 was sent to the Dominions Office in London informing the
British Government that Canada was willing to send technical units "to a total of from
5000 to 6000 all ranks", to be selected from a list which was supplied. This included
Medical, Signals, Engineers, Army Service Corps and Ordnance units, all drawn from
among the ancillary units already mobilizing. The telegram specified the conditions
which Anderson had suggested. On 7 October the Dominions Office replied85 expressing
thanks and inquiring whether Canada could provide forestry companies and certain
special railway troops.
This request raised difficulties, as no such units had been mobilized and there was no
provision for them in the financial estimate ($188 million) which was supposedly to carry
the Canadian military effort until 1 September 1940.86 On 20 October, the British
Government was informed that the Canadian authorities preferred not to undertake to
raise forestry or railway troops, pending the outcome of negotiations which were in
progress in connection with the proposed British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.87
That scheme was at the moment the centre of the Canadian Government's interest, and it
was clear that it would cost a great deal of money and absorb a high proportion of the
national energies.* Five days later the British Government submitted the list of ancillary
units which it required, accepting the proposed conditions under which the United
Kingdom would be "responsible for issue
*The idea of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was broached in a message from Mr. Chamberlain to Mr.
King, called by the former "a special personal appeal", on 26 September. On the 28th the question was considered at a
meeting of the Emergency Council (a sub-committee of Council), with the Chiefs of Staff present. The same day Mr. King
cabled to the British Prime Minister, "I can say at once that our Government fully agree that Canadian cooperation in this
field would be particularly appropriate and probably the most effective in the military sphere which Canada could furnish.
We would therefore be prepared to accept the scheme in principle.” 88
66 SIX YEARS OF WAR
and maintenance of unit equipment and for maintenance of personal equipment until units
are absorbed into Canadian higher formation, when the unit equipment will be taken over
by the Canadian Government at agreed valuation". The British list slightly exceeded the
maximum of 6000 troops indicated by the Canadian Government, and in consequence the
Canadian authorities suggested some deletions.89
At this point the scheme for sending a Canadian division to the United Kingdom
introduced complications. With one division going overseas shortly, and the possibility
presenting itself that a second would go in due course and a Canadian Corps be formed,
the question arose of revising the list of technical "non-divisional" troops so that these
might fit into a Canadian higher formation. Brigadier H. D. G. Crerar, who had now
arrived in London to represent National Defence Headquarters, called this point to the
attention both of the War Office and of the Department of National Defence. Quite apart
from the question of a Canadian Corps, he suggested, it was desirable that the Canadian
non-divisional units should form a suitable component of the British Corps to which the
Canadian division might be assigned.90
On 6 November the matter was discussed in Ottawa at a meeting in the Minister's
office. General McNaughton represented the desirability of ensuring that his division
should be well supported by Canadian ancillary troops and that the Canadian force as a
whole should be "a balanced one". He suggested particularly that it was desirable to
provide artillery units.91 As a result of these suggestions, and of further consideration by
the Army Council in London "in the light of Brigadier Crerar's recommendations", the
British list was revised. The new list, as sent to Canada on 18 November, included one
regiment of medium artillery and one army field regiment.* In the meantime, there had
been further discussions with General McNaughton in Ottawa and the result was ultimate
agreement upon a list of ancillary units including one medium regiment and two army
field regiments.92
The question of the command and administration of these units had also come under
discussion, and the C.G.S. pointed out to General McNaughton that if they were
considered as under his command the financial agreement with the United Kingdom
might be so interpreted as to require Canada to assume the cost of equipping them-for
which funds had not been provided.93 McNaughton replied:94
…I must frankly say I do not concur that the units referred to do not come within the inspectional
duties which have been assigned to me. The change in composition of the ancillary troops was made at
my request so that requirements
*A regiment of field artillery normally under the control of an army headquarters but available for release to a lower
formation in accordance with the demands of operations. It was identical in establishment with a normal divisional
regiment.
for essential arms and services for the 1st Division might be available. The whole purpose of the re-
arrangement would be defeated if these units were not under the orders of the General Officer
Commanding, 1st Canadian Division.
As a result of these discussions, the Canadian Government expressed the hope that the
War Office would agree that the Canadian ancillary units would "normally" be employed
with the 1st Canadian Division; it added that while employment of these units in the field
would be a matter for the headquarters of the corps in which the 1st Canadian Division
was serving, it was felt that "channel of authority for training and for administration of
personnel including such matters as all questions relating to commissions, promotions,
appointments, transfers, exchanges, recalls and demands for officers should pass through
G.O.C. First Canadian Division to Canadian Government". The same telegram referred to
the agreement by which the War Office assumed financial responsibility for equipment,
and remarked, "In view of very heavy financial commitments already assumed and now
receiving consideration by Canada under air training scheme it remains necessary to
reiterate this condition." It was further suggested that, with Canadian factories tooling up
to make the mechanical transport required by the 1st Division, and in the light of the
advantages of all Canadian units having vehicles of uniform pattern, it might be desirable
for the War Office to order transport for the ancillary troops in Canada.95 On 6 December
Canadian Military Headquarters replied, "War Office agree Canadian ancillary units will
normally be employed same corps as division and that administrative matters as listed
should pass through G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division".96 This did not, however, imply
confirmation of the financial arrangement under the new conditions. C.M.H.Q. had
suggested to the High Commissioner that it would be appropriate that he take up this
policy question with the British authorities, and this was done. A difference of opinion
now appeared between the two govemments.97
The whole question of the ancillary troops had in fact, now been placed upon a
different basis from that originally contemplated. The list of units had been greatly
altered as the result of Canadian representations; and whereas the original assumption had
been that these units might serve apart from other Canadian troops, a definite link had
now been established between them and the 1st Canadian Division. (They sailed from
Halifax, it may be noted, only in the Third Flight, which disembarked in Britain on 8-9
February 1940; and they never served in a British corps.) It is not surprising, in these
circumstances, that the implementation of the financial arrangement concerning them
produced some controversy. Apologizing once more for anticipating later events, we may
outline this matter here.
The Canadian authorities, considering the original agreement still operative, took the
view that the United Kingdom should pay for unit equipment
68 SIX YEARS OF WAR
for these troops until such time as they came under a Canadian Corps organized as such.
This was the Canadian interpretation of the phrase "higher Canadian command", but the
War Office argued (as General Anderson had indeed anticipated) that the arrangement by
which the administration of these units was confided to General McNaughton had the
effect of placing them under such command and so of relieving the United Kingdom of
further responsibility for them. There was long and tedious discussion, and the matter
was actually not finally adjusted until the summer of 1940, when the Canadian
Government agreed to take over full financial responsibility for the Canadian non-
divisional troops, effective 1 September of that year and irrespective of the actual date on
which a Canadian Corps might be formed.98 The argument had by then used up far more
time and paper than the issue was worth. It might have been avoided by pre-war
consultation between Canada and the United Kingdom concerning the form of assistance
which would be most useful to the latter. The improvisations undertaken to meet the
unexpected British request of 6 September 1939 certainly contributed to producing an
unnecessary controversy. The affair also reflected the importance attached to financial
considerations in the days of what became known as the "phony war"-the period of
deceptive calm which followed the rapid German conquest of Poland. Under the
conditions created by the desperate strategic crisis which arose in the summer of 1940,
such matters were to, appear much less important.
Paying for the Military Effort, 1939
It will be recalled that Parliament during the brief session of September 1939
provided $100 million to cover defence expenditures up to 31 March 1940. Shortly after
the session ended, further estimates were completed covering anticipated expenditures for
the first year of hostilities, that is, until 1 September 1940. The estimate for this entire
year amounted to $314 million for the three armed services, of which $188 million was
for the Militia. This was to be provided by the unexpended balance of the defence vote
passed in the first session of 1939, plus the war appropriation made in September, plus a
further vote to be asked of Parliament at the next session. These arrangements were
outlined by the new Minister of Finance (Colonel J. L. Ralston) in a letter written to the
Minister of National Defence on 21 September.99 On 20 October the Acting Deputy
Ministers of National Defence wrote the Chiefs of Staff indicating an amendment to the
policy laid dawn in Ralston's letter.100 It had now been decided to "set aside a general
reserve to provide for unforeseen contingencies"; moreover, the expenses of
censorship and internment camps were to be found from the Militia Service allotment.
The amended division of funds was as follows:
Naval Services ............................................................................................................. $35,888,000

Militia Services, Internment Operations and Censors .................................................. 168,654,000
Air Services ................................................................................................................ 77,158,000
Departmental Administration....................................................................................... 900,000
General Reserve .......................................................................................................... 31,400,000
——————
$314,000,000
On 28 October the Chief of the General Staff advised the Deputy Ministers that the
Military Members of the Defence Council, having previously estimated the minimum
requirements of the Militia Service at $188 million, did not consider themselves able to
reduce this sum to $168,654,000. Each item in the list had now been reduced by a
percentage to produce the revised figure, but the C.G.S. wrote, "I wish to make it quite
clear, however, that we expect that at least the whole of the $188,000,000 will be
required to see the Military Service through to 31-8-40, and that therefore the
$19,346,000 now being withheld to go into the general reserve of the Department of
National Defence will have to be held available for return to the Military Service".101 In
the revised Military Service Vote, reduced as stated, which the Chief of the General Staff
now submitted, the largest items were $74,831,000 for Pay and Allowances, $17,466,000
for Clothing and Miscellaneous Stores, and $17,632,000 for Armament Stores.
The influence of financial scruples is written large in the records of this period. In the
United Kingdom, "financial limitations" had essentially ceased to affect the defence
programme by the time of the outbreak of war;102 but in Canada they were very powerful
until Dunkirk. The need for the strictest economy was repeatedly emphasized. On 18.
September the Associate Acting Deputy Ministers, K. S. Maclachlan (Naval and Air) and
H. DesRosiers (Militia) * sent to the Minister of National Defence a memorandum103
commenting upon the estimates submitted by the service chiefs in the following terms:
The recommendations of the Chiefs of Staffs have been carefully reviewed. The Estimates given in
connection with such recommendations have been prepared with all the care possible, taking into
consideration the very short time at the disposal of the Staff.
The figures clearly demonstrate the shocking expense entailed in modern warfare, and the close
relationship between the combatant and civilian efforts. The Staff personnel of all three services clearly
understand the vital importance of using whatever funds are available with the utmost economy and
efficiency.
The letter, mentioned above104 which the Minister of Finance wrote to his colleague of
National Defence on 21 September, affords further evidence of
*Appointed by P.C. 2588 of 9 September. General LaFlbche went on sick leave at this time.
70 SIX YEARS OF WAR
the power of financial considerations at this moment. After stating the sums which were
to be available, Colonel Ralston wrote (the italics have been supplied):
As I say, the above figures are given so that you can proceed rapidly and with assurance from the
financial point of view. At the same time, I know it will be kept in mind that, in Canada's war effort,
economic and financial power appears to be regarded, at the moment, by the United Kingdom as even
outranking manpower in importance, and you will realize too that, even in this first year, we shall have
to call on Canadians for very much more in the way of financial and economic burdens and sacrifice
than indicated by the imposing figures given above. Therefore, we ought, I think, to keep in mind that
these figures are the limits within which expenditures can be made, and while I am the last to be "cheese
paring" in connection with a matter of such vital importance, I am sure that you and your officers will do
their utmost to see that, even within these limits, every economy which is possible, consistent with the
appropriate celerity and effectiveness, is provided for.
Even more striking is the comment of General Anderson, in a memorandum to the

Minister dated 28 November,105 concerning the means adopted for financing Canada's
share of the cost of the ancillary troops for Britain:
You will recall that under instructions of the Committee of the Cabinet, the proposed expenditures for
the Military Service to see us through to 1st September, 1940, had to be reduced and that the amount of
funds finally authorized was based upon the despatch overseas of one bare division. Later, by
postponement of recruiting savings were effected which permitted of the Government offering, within the
funds authorized, certain technical units for service in British formations, but under an agreement that
Canada would not equip them with unit equipment or maintain their equipment....
The war, it is clear, was, at this stage, being fought on a limited budget. The
expenditures which the Government had approved were indeed "imposing" by
comparison with the pre-war appropriations. They were less imposing by the standards of
the existing emergency as seen from the vantage-point of our knowledge of later history.
Before September of 1940 arrived, these painful calculations ("the limits within which
expenditures can be made") were to be blown into thin air by tremendous events in
Europe.
The Mobile Force planned under Defence Scheme No. 3 consisted of an Army Corps
of two divisions with ancillary troops. On 29 August 1939 the Chiefs of Staff referred to
this specifically in their memorandum on Canada's national effort (above, page 46). The
Force was duly mobilized, as we have seen, but not as an Army Corps. Although the list of
units scheduled for mobilization in General Order 135 included the headquarters of "1st
Corps C.A.S.F.", no such headquarters was actually organized at this time, and indeed the
headquarters even of the 2nd Division was not set up until early in 1940. Presumably as a
result of the Government's decision notified to the Chiefs of Staff on 16 September, the
Corps element of the C.A.S.F. faded away; the force to go overseas immediately was to be
only one division plus ancillary troops, and further development was a matter for
future decision.* In the event, as we shall see, a Canadian Corps did not come into actual
existence until 25 December 1940.
About the time when the final decision was made to send the 1st Division overseas,
the Ministry was reorganized. Mr. Ian Mackenzie, who had been Minister of National
Defence during the period of preparation and the first days of mobilization, now assumed
the portfolio of Pensions and National Health (19 September). On the same date, Mr.
Norman McLeod Rogers, formerly Minister of Labour, became Minister of National
Defence. He was to preside over the affairs of the Department until his tragic death in an
aircraft accident in June 1940. For the moment one minister continued to be responsible
for the administration of all three armed services.
*"It has become necessary to abandon all idea, for the time being at least, of forming a Corps Staff' (C.G.S. to
Director of Signals, 10 Oct 39)106 When C.A.S.F. Routine Order No. 22 was drafted on 19 September 1939, it contained a
reference to the training of Corps Headquarters; this had been eliminated from the order by the time it was published on 27
September.107
CHAPTER III
THE EXPANSION OF THE ARMY, 1939-1943
T HE preceding chapters dealt at some length with planning and preparation in Canada
before 1939, and with the action taken immediately following the outbreak of war.
The first weeks of hostilities have a special interest for both the general reader and the
military planner. It seems unnecessary, however, to deal with subsequent happenings in
such detail. Accordingly, we shall try to present an authentic outline, rather than a
complete account, of the long and jerky process by which the two divisions mobilized in
September 1939 evolved into an overseas Army of two corps.
The present chapter deals primarily with policy as it developed in Canada. The
problems encountered by the Canadian Army in Britain are described later in this
volume.
The Completion of the 2nd Division
The mobilization of the units of the 1st and 2nd Divisions has already been described,
and we have noted that at an early date the decision was taken to send the 1st Division
overseas and to keep the 2nd, for the present, under arms in Canada.
Having been brought up to strength, and provided with equipment to the limited
extent which Canadian resources then permitted, the 1st Division duly moved to the
United Kingdom, sailing from Halifax in two "flights" on 10 and 22 December 1939.*
The third flight, comprising, for the most part, the ancillary units which had been the
subject of special negotiations with the British Government, sailed on 30 January 1940.
The units of the 2nd Division in Canada had plenty of troubles during this winter of
1939-40. As we have seen, all recruiting for them had been suspended in October, when
some were still short a good many men. No concentration of the Division had been
possible, and practically all the regiments remained in the home areas where they had
been mobilized. The
*On the First Flight, see below, page 189.
72
THE EXPANSION OF THE ARMY, 1939-1943 73
accommodation situation was such that it was necessary for many, for a considerable
time, to place their men "on subsistence", i.e., to pay them a cash allowance to enable
them to provide themselves with lodging and meals. This, as already noted, was
inevitably detrimental to the progress of discipline and training. At the same time, the
shortage (and indeed, in many items, the total deficiency) of modem equipment made
realistic training extremely difficult. Add to this the effect of the Canadian winter
climate, and the fact that neither divisional nor brigade headquarters had yet been
organized, and it is not surprising that the state of the 2nd Division units during these
"phony war" days was not ideal.1
This was a period of inactivity in Europe. Poland had been quickly overrun in
September 1939. On the Western Front, there had been no action of any importance; the
combatants lay in their elaborate fortifications, watching each other and awaiting events.
In France, on the Belgian border, a small British Expeditionary Force commanded by
General Lord Gort had taken its place beside the French and was gradually being built up.
No bombs had yet fallen on the United Kingdom. As one looks back upon this winter
little sense of urgency seems apparent in France, Britain or Canada.
Nevertheless, those in positions to know viewed the immediate future with deep
anxiety. On 7 November Brigadier Crerar cabled the Chief of the General Staff from
London pointing out the superiority of the German forces in the West on the ground and
in the air, and reporting apprehension at the War Office as to the result of major attacks
there next spring. "If the Allied forces, by reason of these circumstances", he wrote, "are
defeated before next summer, it matters little as to long-term Allied plans for military
superiority a year or more from now". Among these long-term schemes, the British
Commonwealth Air Training Plan had an important place; but Crerar noted, "It is very
necessary to remember that more immediate and most important object is to secure our
military position during period required to build up all forces to decisive superiority". His
cable ended, "At War Office conferences question of despatch of second Canadian
division has been raised several times".2
The first indication of the 2nd Division's future employment was given in the
Canadian House of Commons on 25 January 1940, during the one-day session in which
the dissolution of Parliament was announced. The Prime Minister then stated that a
second division would be sent overseas "as soon as may be possible". The evidence
indicates that this announcement was made primarily with a view to preventing any
question of the further dispatch of troops from becoming a political issue during the
election campaign then pending. No decisions had been taken on a long-term programme
for the Canadian Army Overseas; and accordingly no elucidation of the announcement
was sent to the Canadian authorities in England.
74 SIX YEARS OF WAR
For them, however, it raised important questions. If a second division was to arrive at
an early date, the formation of a Canadian Corps was a natural and probable
development. In the absence of further information, General McNaughton proceeded to
explore the possible implications of this in a conference with the War Office on 9
February. It had been understood that the 1st Canadian Division would in due course be
incorporated in the 4th British Corps, which was to go to France in the summer.3 Now,
however, it was suggested that to do this would merely be to dislocate that corps when
the Canadian Corps was formed; and it was agreed that instead it would be proper, in the
meantime, to employ the 1st Division and the Canadian ancillary troops together as a
self-contained formation directly under General Headquarters, B.E.F. General
McNaughton reported the results of the discussion to Ottawa, mentioning that some 8000
additional ancillary troops would be necessary to complete a two-division Corps.4
The War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet discussed the matter on 12 February.
As a result a telegram was sent to Canada House emphasizing that the Government had
not authorized the formation of a Canadian Corps and that discussions with the War
Office should proceed only on the basis of offers and commitments already expressly
made. Mr. Massey and General McNaughton were told that, barring some unforeseen
emergency, conversations concerning "any additional undertaking to War Office" should
await the election of a new Parliament, when the Canadian Government would be in a
position to have direct discussions with the British Government on a long-range
programme of cooperation in all phases of the war effort.5
The Government's concern over the apparent tendency of its generals to anticipate
events was based, in part at least, on financial considerations. On 22 February a further
telegram to Canada House, sent following a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War
Finance and Supply, called attention to the extent of Canadian war expenditures. These
already amounted to $375 million; while estimates of war expenses for the fiscal year
ending 31 March 1941 totalled some $500 million, and the undertaking to send the 2nd
Canadian Division to England, and certain other measures, meant further increases, to
roughly $560 million. The telegram remarked, "Obviously it would be nothing but a
disservice to the task we have in mind and to our Allies for us to attempt to undertake
something beyond our capacity".6 Soon afterwards McNaughton was told that the
Government did not concur in his recommendation that the 1st Division and ancillary
units should constitute a self-contained formation directly under G.H.Q., but considered it
advisable to "adhere to original proposal under which First Canadian Division would be
employed on arrival at front as part of a British Corps".7
The Canadian officers and officials in England urged that this decision be
reconsidered, Mr. Massey fully supporting General McNaughton in his argument that
many difficulties of jurisdiction and organization would be obviated by accepting the
tentative arrangement which had been made with the War Office.8 The election campaign
made it difficult for Ministers to give proper attention to the matter. On 26 March,
however, the general election took place and the Government was sustained. Thereafter,
with its position secure and its members again assembled in Ottawa, it was able to give
more adequate consideration to military policy. On 5 April, following discussion by both
the War Committee and the full Cabinet, Massey was notified that McNaughton's
proposal for organizing the Canadian forces in England as a G.H.Q. reserve had been
accepted, "provided a mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached with United
Kingdom with respect to financial implications of this proposed arrangement".9
In the meantime, recruiting for the 2nd Division had been resumed. On 18 February,
orders had gone out permitting the resumption of enlistments for tradesmen and
specialists; and on 18 March general recruiting for the Division's units was authorized.10
Its total strength rose from 13,829 all ranks on 2 March to 17,635 all ranks on 22 June.11
During the interim, it may be noted, the war establishment of an infantry (rifle) battalion
had been increased by 133 men.
Divisonal and brigade headquarters had not yet been organized, but this was now
done. The command of the Division was given to Colonel (Honorary Brigadier-General)
V. W. Odium, who though not a soldier by profession had fought in the South African
War and commanded an infantry brigade in the First World War. In 1939 he was
Honorary Colonel of the Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment). He was promoted Major
General and (following the precedent set in the case of General McNaughton) appointed
Inspector General of the units of the 2nd Division with effect from 6 April. Soon
afterwards he was gazetted as G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Division.12 The divisional
headquarters was organized in Ottawa at the end of May, and about the same time the
three brigade headquarters were set up-the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade at Camp
Borden. Ontario, the 5th at Valcartier Camp, Quebec, and the 6th at Shilo Camp.
Manitoba. Simultaneously the units moved to these camps.13 Thus at last concentrated in
brigades, they were now able to undertake really effective training for the first time. Due
to the adverse conditions already described, their progress so far had been slow; indeed,
General Odium, after a tour of inspection, wrote to the Minister of National Defence on 4
July, perhaps with some exaggeration, that they were "no further advanced than they
should have been in two months of effective training".14 They had actually been
mobilized for ten.
76 SIX YEARS OF WAR
There was considerable discussion as to when the Division should go overseas.

General McNaughton, anxious that it should reach England as soon as possible,
recommended that it arrive there about 15 April.15 The Canadian Government, however,
preferred to postpone its departure, and at the end of February the High Commissioner in
London was told that subject to agreement with the British authorities it would probably
be sent about 1 July. This would allow a month's training in camps in Canada before
embarkation. The idea was that after three months' further training in England with the
equipment which it was hoped would be available there, the Division would be able to go
"to the Front" in France about 1 November.16 Like many others, however, these forecasts
were voided by events on the Continent in May and June.
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Rogers) visited England and France from 18
April to 9 May, and one of the matters he discussed in London was the formation of a
Canadian Corps. On 26 April, in a conference with four British Ministers (the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, the Dominions Secretary, the Minister of Supply, and the Secretary of
State for War), he said that he had authority to open discussion on this question. He
added that so far as the Canadian Government was concerned "the primary factor was
one of finance", and inquired whether it might be possible for the United Kingdom to
provide, "for an interim period", the additional ancillary troops required to complete a
Corps of two divisions. The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Oliver Stanley) agreed to
this, provided that the commitment would cover only a specified period. In answer to an
inquiry from Mr. Rogers, the four British Ministers assured him that it was "definitely the
wish of the British Cabinet that a Canadian Corps should be formed"; and when he asked
further whether the British ancillary units which might be attached to a Canadian Corps
would "continue to be a British financial responsibility", some indication was given that
this would be the case, on the understanding that the troops would be required only for a
short time.17
The Summer Crisis of 1940: Formation

of the 3rd and 4th Divisions
On 9 April 1940 the calm of the "phony war" was shattered by the German attack on
Norway and Denmark; and the Norwegian campaign which followed was a severe blow to
Allied confidence. The Western Front, however, remained quiet for another month. Then,
on 10 May, the German forces were let loose upon neutral Belgium and the Netherlands.
Within a few days it was clear that the Allies were faced with another disaster, and
the events which followed in France and Flanders had an immediate and drastic effect
upon Canadian military policy.
On the afternoon of 10 May the War Committee of the Cabinet held an emergency
meeting to review the situation and consider the methods by which Canada might give
further assistance to the common cause in cooperation with the United Kingdom. Later
that day a telegram was sent to London outlining the decisions taken. Leaving aside the
naval and air measures proposed, it is enough to note that the Government now stated that
it would be prepared to arrange to dispatch the 2nd Division to England during June and
July instead of in July and August as planned. At the same time, in response to a request
just received from London, it authorized sending a Canadian infantry battalion to Jamaica
to replace a British unit which was going to Curacao. The British Government was
invited to offer suggestions for other measures.18
The emergency soon produced a decision to expand the existing Active Service Force
very considerably. On 17 May the War Committee met again. The country was now in
the atmosphere of crisis induced by Allied reverses in France and the Low Countries
during the past week. The Dutch Army had already surrendered. The Germans had
smashed through the French front at Sedan; and the British and French armies on the
Allied left, thus threatened with encirclement, were falling back from the positions in
Belgium to which they had advanced following the German invasion. The Minister of
National Defence reported to the Committee on the visit to the United Kingdom and
France from which he had just returned, describing the impression of German mechanical
superiority and Allied complacency which he had gathered in the days immediately
before the attack.
Some thought had already been given to the possible formation of a third division of
the C.A.S.F. As early as 13 September 1939 the Director of Military Operations and
Intelligence had suggested to the Chief of the General Staff a tentative composition for
such a division.19 On 2 February 1940 General Anderson had pointed out to the Minister
of National Defence the importance of "a home reserve". If the 2nd Division were sent
overseas as announced by the Prime Minister, and the ancillary troops required for a two-
division corps went too, only about 4200 mobilized ancillary troops would remain in
Canada, and the C.G.S. therefore recommended that "upon departure of the 2nd Canadian
Division overseas, a 3rd Canadian Division should be raised for duty in Canada".20
The War Committee at the meeting of 17 May considered raising this 3rd Division
and also, as an alternative, forming a Canadian Corps. With Mr. Rogers' report of his
discussions in England before it, it decided to do both. The financial scruples and
questions of "capacity" that had seemed so
78 SIX YEARS OF WAR
important a few weeks before had suddenly passed into the background; for the Allied
cause and the very existence of the Commonwealth were now hanging in the balance.*
On 20 May the Prime Minister announced the decisions in the House of Commons. A
Canadian Corps, he said, would be formed in the field, to consist of the two existing
divisions and the necessary corps troops, this involving sending several thousand more
men overseas. Mr. King added, "We shall undertake the raising of a third division, to be
available for such service as may be required in Canada or overseas."
These measures had anticipated by only a narrow margin a request from the British
Government. On 18 May Lord Caldecote, Secretary of State for the Dominions, wrote to
Mr. Massey in reply to the Canadian ministers' invitation to make suggestions.22 He
placed in the forefront the possibility of Canada's undertaking to provide and maintain a
garrison for Iceland (where British marines had landed on 10 May); and he observed that
accelerating the dispatch of the 2nd Division would be "a great help and encouragement"
and that everything would be done to find shipping to make this possible. His letter
proceeded:
The Army Council would next wish to suggest that detailed consideration should be given as soon
as practicable to the formation of a Canadian Corps. ... The provision of the necessary Corps, Army and
G.H.Q. troops would then become a matter of great urgency. . . . We should also like to suggest that the
Canadian Government would wish to consider the desirability of completing the Canadian Corps, if and
when that formation comes into existence, to the normal standard of three divisions. If so, it would no
doubt be necessary to make arrangements at once for the formation of a third Canadian division which,
it is needless to say, would prove of great military assistance and encouragement in prosecuting our
common task.
Lord Caldecote also inquired whether Canada could provide a second battalion for the
West Indies, and raised again the question of forestry and transportation units.
The decision to form the Corps and raise the 3rd Division had been taken the day
before this letter was sent. The Division's future role, however, remained unsettled. The
Department of External Affairs cabled to .Massey, "For the present it is not contemplated
that the Third Division should be included in the Canadian Corps."23 This was not of
immediate importance, for it would be months before the Division was ready for
employment of any kind. What mattered was that the organization of another fighting
formation was going forward. There was some delay before selection of the infantry units
for the 3rd Division was complete (choosing regiments in such a way as to give
appropriate representation to the various sections of the
*As noted above (page 74), in February war expenditures for 1940-41 were estimated at $560 million, a figure which
was regarded with considerable alarm. The actual ultimate total was approximately $778 million.21
country was always a ticklish matter),* but the organization of the Division was well
under way by the end of May.25 And even before the administrative arrangements for
raising it were complete, a further enlargement of the Active Service Force had been
decided upon.
On 22 May the War Committee considered Lord Caldecote's suggestions, which had
been examined by the Department of National Defence in the meantime. It decided that
an infantry brigade would be provided for duty in Iceland (the intention at this moment
being that it would be formed from among the units mobilizing for the 3rd Division); that
a second infantry battalion would be found for the West Indies and could embark at an
early date; that forestry units would be organized and dispatched at once, and that it be
agreed in principle that transportation units would be provided, inquiry being made as to
what type were most urgently required.26 The military situation in France was going
from bad to worse. On 25 May a personal message from London for the Prime Minister
concluded, "Position of B.E.F. is now one of utmost gravity".27 On the 27th the Dunkirk
evacuation began (but only about 5000 men were taken off the French shore that day).
Before the House of Commons assembled in Ottawa in the afternoon, the members of the
Government met and agreed upon additional steps that should now be taken; and the
House was told that in addition to the 3rd Division and the corps troops it was intended to
recruit other units, including all the nine rifle battalions of a fourth infantry division.28
Four days before, in response to suggestions that more use be made of veterans in
domestic security duties, it had been announced that a Veterans Home Guard (later
redesignated the Veterans Guard of Canada) was being formed. It was to consist in the
first instance of twelve companies of 250 men each.29 The intention to form reserve
companies of veterans as well was included in the announcement of the 27th.
The Canadian public had been profoundly moved by the crisis. For a time it appeared
that almost the whole of the British Expeditionary Force would be lost; indeed, on 29
May Canadian Military Headquarters cabled, undoubtedly on the strength of information
from the War Office, "In spite of their own magnificent resistance and the maximum
effort of Navy and Air Force, it must be accepted that the bulk of force now comprising
the B.E.F. will not reach shores of the United Kingdom."30 The Dunkirk deliverance -the
successful evacuation of 338,000 British and Allied soldiers-followed;
*The last regiment selected was The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, which was mobilized as a 4th Division unit; its transfer
to the 3rd Division was authorized by, the Minister on 1 August 1940.24 The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.) and
Le Regiment de la Chaudiere (Mit.), two machine-gun units mobilized in September 1939 but not required for the 1st or
2nd Divisions under the new organization which allowed only one machine-gun battalion per division, were incorporated
in the 3rd Division, Le Regiment de la Chaudiere being converted to an infantry (rifle) battalion.
80 SIX YEARS OF WAR
but the spectres of the imminent collapse of France and the probable invasion of England
by the victorious enemy arose at once. The heavens, it seemed, were falling; and in the
emergency the manhood of Canada came forward generously, eager to share the honour
and the peril of the moment with the men of the 1st Division, standing in the front line in
the United Kingdom. There was no difficulty in filling the ranks of the 3rd and 4th
Divisions. The summer months of 1940 brought a flood of recruits second only to that of
the previous September. Since the new units began recruiting in the last days of May,
enlistments for that month amounted only to 6909; but in June there were 29,319 and in
July 29,171. Including officer and nursing sister appointments, a total of 85,102 men and
women joined the Canadian Active Service Force during the four months of May, June,
July and August.31
It is convenient to mention here the completion of the 3rd Division. The formation of
the divisional headquarters and those of the infantry brigades and of the artillery,
engineers, signals and R.C.A.S.C. were authorized by a General Order dated 5 September
1940. The Division's first commander was Major-General E. W. Sansom, lately Deputy
Adjutant General at C.M.H.Q., who returned to Canada for the purpose and was
appointed as of 26 October.32 The Division was to be concentrated in the Maritime
Provinces, where a big new camp was being built at Debert, N.S. (near Truro) and the
existing camp at Sussex, N.B., was being enlarged. The units began moving into these
areas in the autumn of 1940.33 This arrangement was considered desirable for two main
reasons: it would provide a degree of concentration which would facilitate effective
training, and at the same time the Division could form the operational reserve for the
newly-formed Atlantic Command (see below, page 163).
There was considerable delay before the organization of the 4th Division was
completed. All the infantry battalions had been mobilized during the summer, but the
three infantry brigade headquarters were not formed until the following winter
(December 1940-February 1941) ;34 and the divisional headquarters was set up still later.
The recruitment of the balance of the Division was authorized by the War Committee of
the Cabinet on 9 May 1941, by which time the 3rd Division's departure for the United
Kingdom was imminent. On 10 June the 4th Division's headquarters was finally formed,
with the appointment of Major-General L. F. Page as General Officer Commanding.35
The new Divisions' units were not the only ones raised in the hectic summer of 1940.
On 15 July the Minister authorized the mobilization of eight additional infantry rifle
battalions for local security purposes.36 Another (The Royal Rifles of Canada) had been
mobilized independently late in June.37 In addition, five motorcycle regiments had been
authorized early in July-one to operate with each brigade group of the 3rd Division on the
East
Coast, one for the West Coast and one for the Niagara district. One of these regiments
was a composite unit provided by the two Permanent Force cavalry regiments, The Royal
Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians).38
The expansion of the armed forces led to new arrangements for their administration.
An amendment to the Department of National Defence Act which received the Royal
Assent on 22 May provided for the appointment of a Minister of National Defence for
Air, and Mr. C. G. Power assumed the post. Another amendment, of 12 July, provided for
a Minister of National Defence for Naval Services; Mr. Angus L. Macdonald was
appointed to this charge.39 Provision was made for an Associate Minister of National
Defence "entitled to exercise all the powers of the Minister of National Defence", and
Mr. Power combined this appointment with that of Air Minister. Although, technically,
separate departments of government were not set up to control the naval and air services,
in effect this is what took place. Following Mr. Rogers' death on 10 June, Colonel J. L.
Ralston was appointed Minister of National Defence (5 July) and administered the Army.
In matters affecting the air or naval service and another service, the powers of the
Minister of National Defence were exercisable "in consultation with" the Air or Naval
Ministers or both, as the case might be. The statute of 12 July 1940 further provided for
the powers of one service minister to be exercisable in his absence by another; thus, if the
Minister of National Defence and Associate Minister were absent, the Naval Minister
would administer the whole Department, and if he too was absent this authority passed to
the Air Minister. Thus the ministers became familiar with their colleagues' functions and
duties, with resultant advantages to the public service.40
It is evident that the powers and authority of the respective Ministers were never
clearly defined. In other circumstances this might have been awkward, but in practice the
excellent personal relations between the service ministers obviated any difficulty. Mr.
Power writes, "The three were bound together by ties of intimate friendship and on the
part of Macdonald and Power particularly had such admiration and respect for Col.
Ralston that they had no difficulty whatsoever in granting him the primacy over both, and
by consent if not by law he was looked upon by all as the senior Minister."41
Colonel Ralston, however, was not a coordinating Minister of Defence as that term was
understood in the United Kingdom, where Mr. Churchill combined this office with that of
Prime Minister. In Canada the formal coordination of the armed forces on the political level
was effected through the Defence Council, which was reorganized by an order in council of
13 September 1940 to consist of the Minister of National Defence as Chairman,
82 SIX YEARS OF WAR
the Associate Minister and the Ministers for Naval Services and Air as ViceChairmen,
and the three Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Ministers for the three services as Members.
This was an effective organ of inter-service coordination.42 High military policy, on the
other hand, was in general the province of the War Committee of the Cabinet, presided
over by the Prime Minister. The three service ministers were members of this committee,
along with other senior members of the Government.
Following the reorganization of the Defence Council, an "Army Committee", soon
redesignated "Army Council", was established by the Minister of National Defence to
advise him on Army policy and matters of administration and procedure affecting more
than one branch of the staff. This was composed of the Minister as Chairman, the Chief
of the General Staff and the heads of the other staff branches, and the Deputy Minister for
the Army.43
One other measure taken during 1940's summer crisis has yet to be noted. On 17
June-the day on which Marshal Petain asked Hitler for an armistice -the War Committee
agreed that a bill should be drafted providing for the general mobilization of human and
material resources. The measure was introduced in the House of Commons next day, and
received the Royal Assent on 21 June as the National Resources Mobilization Act.44 It
was a brief, highly-generalized statute which had the effect of authorizing the Governor
in Council to make orders or regulations "requiring persons to place themselves, their
services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in the right of Canada, as may
be deemed necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada,
the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for
maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community". It may have been
based to some extent upon the United Kingdom's Emergency Powers Act, 1940, assented
to on the previous 22 May.45 The powers which the Canadian act conferred upon
government were subject to only one reservation: they might not be exercised "for the
purpose of requiring persons to serve in the military, naval or air forces outside of Canada
and the territorial waters thereof". It thus authorized compulsory military service, but (in
accordance with the Government's pledges) limited it to home defence. The act's
administration, and its consequences in national manpower policy, are dealt with in
Chapter IV.
After Dunkirk the question of equipment for the defence of the British Isles and the
further prosecution of the war was one of desperate urgency. Although the bulk of the
British Expeditionary Force had reached England safely, it had brought back practically
nothing except "personal weapons"; heavy equipment could not be withdrawn. Vast stores
of reserve supplies and equipment which had been accumulated on the Continent had been
lost to the enemy, or destroyed to prevent them from falling into his hands. Even rifles
and small arms ammunition were very badly needed. In these circumstances, Canada was
asked to give what assistance she could from her reserves. Unfortunately, a country
which for many years had spent as little money as Canada upon its defence forces could
have little in the way of reserves to send; but such material as existed and could be spared
was shipped, only enough being kept back to meet the essential needs of training.
France as well as Britain was asking for equipment by the beginning of June, but
there was little that Canada could do. A total of 75,000 Ross .303 rifles* had by now been
dispatched to the United Kingdom.46 The War Committee was told on 3 June that 60
million rounds of small arms ammunition had been sent thither in answer to earlier
appeals. Of this total, 25 million had been shipped in the early winter of 1939-40, and
about 34,600,000 in four releases during May.47 Only one million rounds remained in
Canada's general reserve, and rifle practice had had to be curtailed. Accordingly, the
Committee, with what regret can be imagined, had to tell the governments of Britain and
France that no more rifles or ammunition could be spared. After equipping the Active
Service Force units already organized, the remaining stores were in fact inadequate to
provide training equipment for the Non-Permanent Active Militia.
Canadian Troops for Iceland
The sending of Canadian troops to Iceland, and their subsequent withdrawal thence,
occasioned much cabling and discussion, which can only be briefly summarized here.
The original British suggestion, contained in Lord Caldecote's letter of 18 May 1940
(above, page 78), was that Canada should garrison Iceland with troops other than those
required for her field force. In answer to inquiries from Ottawa, Canadian Military
Headquarters reported on 26 May that the War Office considered that the island required
for defence four battalions in all, one of which might be a machine-gun battalion. The
British authorities were anxious that the troops should arrive as soon as possible; a
particularly urgent requirement was one infantry battalion needed at once to reinforce a
British infantry brigade already in Iceland.48 This somewhat altered the picture, and led
to the abandonment of the scheme for using 3rd Division units, since these were just
being formed. The only battalions in Canada in condition for immediate dispatch were
those of the 2nd Division. It was decided accordingly to send one of these (The Royal
Regiment of Canada); and the
*To replace these, Canada in August purchased from the United States 80,000 Enfield .300 rifles with five million
rounds of ammunition.
84 SIX YEARS OF WAR
Chief of the General Staff obtained confirming authority for the assumption by Canada of
the responsibility of providing and maintaining the garrison of Iceland, and for the
dispatch of the Royal Regiment at the earliest possible moment.49 Brigadier L. F. Page
was appointed to command the Canadian force for Iceland, which became known as "Z"
Force.
The situation was now changing again. The disaster in North-West Europe led the
United Kingdom Government to the conclusion that further measures for Iceland's
security should be taken without delay, and on 6 June the Canadian High Commissioner
in London reported that they would now be most grateful if Canada would agree to take
responsibility for its defence on an increased scale. It was considered that in addition to
the brigade already in the island there would be required two rifle battalions, one
machinegun battalion, six flying boats, one heavy anti-aircraft battery, additional coast
defences and some ancillary troops; furthermore, another infantry battalion would
probably be required in the winter. The United Kingdom Government observed that, if
Canada could undertake this whole commitment, they would themselves be prepared to
provide the second battalion for the West Indies which she had agreed to send.50
Canadian planning now proceeded on this new basis, and the intention again was to
use units of the 3rd Division; but on 14 June a request was made to accelerate the
movement. This meant that the 2nd Division must be drawn upon once more.51 On 20
June the High Commissioner's office reported that the British Government had gone still
further, suggesting that the whole of the 2nd Division, less such units as would not be
required for garrison duty, should go to Iceland. This, it was indicated, would probably
release the British brigade there for the defence of the United Kingdom itself. It was
further pointed out that the arrangement need not be permanent; the 2nd Division might
in due course be relieved in Iceland by the 3rd, and could then move to England for
incorporation in a Canadian Corps.52
This request caused some anxiety in Ottawa, one reason being conditions in the
Pacific (where the Japanese were exerting pressure designed to turn Britain's European
embarrassments to their own advantage) * and Canada's undefended situation if the 2nd
Division were withdrawn at an early date. Moreover, the Division's advance parties had
already gone to England in accordance with the earlier arrangement, and its vehicles had
largely been shipped thither. The Chief of the General Staff considered that unless the
United Kingdom thought sending the 2nd Division to Iceland a matter of immediate and
paramount importance, the balance of it should stay in Canada until the 3rd and 4th
Divisions were sufficiently trained to meet, at
*On 18 July the British Government found itself obliged to agree to suspend, for the present, the transit of war
material and certain other goods to China over the Burma Road. The road was re-opened three months later.
least, any internal security problem such as might be occasioned by the large Japanese
population in British Columbia. The Canadian Government
communicated with London along these lines, remarking in passing, "we feel that
Canadian public opinion would not readily be reconciled to our forces being permanently
in garrison abroad".53
As late as 8 July, however, the High Commissioner in London was reporting
continued very earnest representations by the "United Kingdom Government" in favour
of sending the whole of the 2nd Division to Iceland.54 On the 11th the Canadian
Government replied at length, stating that it "very much" desired that the Division should
be concentrated in the United Kingdom, not sent to Iceland or broken up between the two
places. It suggested that the United Kingdom should itself relieve the Canadian battalions
which were in Iceland or on the way thither, so that the 2nd Division could shortly be
assembled in England and the Canadian Corps formed there, "while the force in Iceland
would be a homogeneous division of the United Kingdom forces".55
This proposal was immediately accepted by the United Kingdom authorities, whose
change of front was reported by the High Commissioner on 13 July.56 The reason, it is
now clear, was a sudden intervention by the British Prime Minister. On 6 July Mr.
Churchill, along with Mr. Eden (who had become Secretary of State for War) and
General Ironside (C.-in-C. Home Forces), had visited the 1st Canadian Division south of
London and seen a demonstration by the 2nd Brigade. On the 7th he sent a minute57 to
Mr. Eden:
You shared my astonishment yesterday at the statement made to us by General McNaughton that the
whole of the 2d Canadian Division was destined for Iceland. It would surely be a very great mistake to
allow these fine troops to be employed in so distant a theatre. Apparently the first three battalions have
already gone there. No one was told anything about this. We require two Canadian divisions to work as a
corps as soon as possible....
From now on, planning continued on the basis which the Canadian Government had
suggested.* Thus it turned out that Canadian units stayed in Iceland only a few months.
Brigadier Page with part of his brigade headquarters and The Royal Regiment of Canada
reached Reykjavik on 16 June 1940.59 The remainder of "Z" Force, comprising Les
Fusiliers MontRoyal, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.), an infantry brigade
signal section and details, arrived on 9 July.60 The Camerons, who had been allotted to
the 3rd Division, spent the winter on the island, but the remainder of the Force, including
Page and his headquarters, sailed for England on 31 October and rejoined the main body
of the 2nd Canadian Division at Aldershot on 4 November.61
*General McNaughton noted on 6 July that he had suggested to the Secretary of State for War during their interview
that the proper solution was "to induce U.S.A. to occupy the island" .58 American occupation was, in fact, the ultimate
solution.
86 SIX YEARS OF WAR
It may be noted here that the Divisional Headquarters, with a good part of the
Division, had arrived in the Clyde in the Sixth Flight on 1 August. The Division's last two
infantry battalions, however, did not reach the United kingdom until Christmas Day
1940, when they landed from the Eighth Flight.62
The responsibilities undertaken by Canada in Newfoundland and the West Indies in
the summer of 1940 are described in Chapter V.
The Formation of the Canadian Corps
At this point a word must be said concerning the implementation of the decision
taken on 17 May 1940 to form a Canadian Corps overseas.
It was delayed for seven months. One obvious reason was the slowness in
concentrating the 2nd Division in England, due in part to the Iceland venture and in part
to the Government's reluctance to move the whole of the Division overseas until the
training of the 3rd and 4th Divisions' units was well advanced. In accordance with this
latter policy, the 6th Brigade was kept in Canada; the War Committee was told on 9 July
that it would be held at Shilo to deal with any emergencies which might arise on the
Pacific Coast. It was two of its battalions which arrived in England only on 25 December-
the day the Corps was finally formed.
There were also certain matters of detail to be worked out before the Corps could
come into existence. As an anti-invasion measure the 1st Canadian Division and the
Canadian ancillary troops in England were incorporated in July into a new British corps,
which General McNaughton was appointed to command. The activities of this 7th Corps
belong properly to the story of the Canadians in Britain, and an account of them is given
in Chapter IX. The prospective change-over from the 7th to a Canadian Corps, however,
involved some questions of Anglo-Canadian policy, for many of the Corps Troops of the
existing formation were British, and some of them would have to stay in the Canadian
Corps until Canada could provide units of the same type. The financial basis for this
arrangement was the subject of discussions with the War Office which reflected the effect
of the long controversy over responsibility for equipping the Canadian ancillary troops
(above, page 67). The War Office would have liked Canada to consent to maintain British
units temporarily remaining with the Canadian Corps in the same manner in which the
British had maintained the Canadian non-divisional troops. The ultimate agreement,
reached in conferences in which the new Minister of National Defence (Colonel Ralston)
took part while in England late in 1940, was however founded on the general principle
that each government would take responsibility for all charges in
respect of its own units.63 This had the very great advantage of simplicity and obviated
accounting difficulties.
The advent of winter had lifted, for the moment, the threat of German invasion of
Britain against which the 7th Corps had been formed. The 7th Corps could accordingly
be dispensed with; and the administrative questions involved in organizing a Canadian
Corps having been settled, that formation could now be set up. Mr. King announced its
advent on Christmas Eve; and at one minute past midnight this successor to the famous
force of 1915-18 came into official existence, with Lieut.-General McNaughton as
General Officer Commanding.64
The Army Programme for 1941
Major-General T. V. Anderson, who had carried the heavy burden of the office of
Chief of the General Staff since November 1938, was in July 1940 appointed Inspector
General of the Military Forces in Central Canada, and Major-General H. D. G. Crerar, *
whose nine months in London had given him valuable experience of the broad problems
of the prosecution of the war, was on General McNaughton's recommendation brought
back to Ottawa and appointed C.G.S. with effect from 22 July.65
On the 26th Crerar attended a meeting of the War Committee and presented his
estimate of the existing military situation. A German attempt at invading the United
Kingdom was possible at any moment. Crerar reviewed the various developments which
might take place, emphasizing the point that Canada's chief concern, in existing
circumstances, was the British Isles; they were her best defensive line, and it was in her
interest to give every possible assistance in maintaining it against Hitler. This was
strategically sounder than building up a great apparatus of local defence within Canada.†
With reference to the desirability of sending further troops to England, he said that there
would be no object in sending more divisions overseas until the equipment situation had
improved. In his view, however, Canada ought to send additional troops to strengthen the
British Isles just as soon as there was a reasonable prospect of being able to complete
their equipment by the time their training period was over.
Crerar's first great task was to prepare a formal appreciation of the situation and a
Canadian Army Programme to meet it. In September he submitted his detailed proposals
to the Minister of National Defence.66 The best information available from the War
Office, he wrote, indicated that the
*Brigadier Crerar was promoted Major General effective 15 January 1940.

tOn Crerar's recommendations for home defence measures at this time, see below, Chapter V.
88 SIX YEARS OF WAR
British strategy in 1941 "must be one of attrition", looking forward (somewhat

optimistically, it must be said!) to passing to the offensive with all possible strength "in
all spheres and all theatres" in the spring of 1942. The enemy's most probable action
during the winter of 1940-41 was an attack on Egypt from Libya, possibly coupled with
offensives through Spain or the Balkans, or against Morocco. An attempt at invading the
British Isles was unlikely between October and April. Such were the basic strategic
conditions. Crerar summed up his Army Programme to meet them in the following terms
A Canadian Corps of three Divisions should be completed [in the United Kingdom] by the early
spring of 1941, and should be joined by an Armoured Brigade Group as soon as possible thereafter.
While the date the 4th Division will be required overseas cannot as yet be determined, we should be
prepared for its despatch in the latter part of 1941.
Subsequent additions to the Canadian Forces overseas should be armoured forces rather than
Infantry.
Provision should be made for replacing the 3rd and 4th Divisions, and the Armoured Brigade Group
by equivalent forces for home defence.
The unmobilized portion of the N.P.A.M. will become the Reserve units and formations of the
Canadian Army, with as their principal functions, the holding of partially trained personnel and the
completion of their individual
training.67
This programme's most striking feature was its emphasis upon armoured formations, a
reflection of the experience of the short campaign in France and Belgium. An enlarged
foundation for armoured development in Canada had been laid before it was formally
submitted. As we have seen (above, pages 19 and 34), a small beginning had been made
before the outbreak of war, when a few tank units were organized and an Armoured
Fighting Vehicles School was set up. Now, on 13 August 1940, the Minister of _National
Defence approved a recommendation of the C.G.S. for instituting a Canadian Armoured
Corps and organizing the country's first armoured formation-the 1st Canadian Armoured
Brigade-which might later expand into a full armoured division.68 The Brigade actually
came into existence at Camp Borden in October, Colonel F. F. Worthington, the
commander of the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Training Centre, being appointed to the
command.69
This programme was a plan for 1941, and General Crerar made no attempt to forecast
precisely what the size or shape of the Canadian Army Overseas might be when it had
reached its full development. However, he gave an indication of the direction of his
thought in a memorandum to the Minister dated 3 September.70 The great object for the
British Empire, this memorandum says, is "to raise land and air forces until our total
power is sufficient to over-balance that of Germany, which is attenuated by the necessity
of garrisoning conquered countries and diminished by the effect
of our blockade". At the moment Canada's efforts in this direction were limited by
shortages of equipment; at some future time they might perhaps be limited by the
numbers that could be raised by voluntary enlistment to serve overseas. "While it is
impossible to calculate exactly, due to the many imponderables affecting the problem, it
is estimated that on the voluntary enlistment basis, from five to seven divisions, of which
one or more should be armoured, might well be the largest force this country could
maintain overseas throughout a war of several years duration". Crerar's plan specifically
contemplated a total of four infantry divisions overseas; he also made it clear that the
armoured brigade group which he proposed to send should be built up into an armoured
division in due course; and he recommended that the units of a brigade group of a second
armoured division should be selected at once, for future mobilization. The basic
procedure was to keep the equivalent of two infantry divisions and an armoured brigade
available for home defence, replacing formations sent overseas by new ones mobilized at
home.71 He referred to the desirability of forming very shortly a fifth and subsequently a
sixth infantry division; his memorandum of 3 September suggested that both of these
might be largely filled with trainees called up for compulsory service under the National
Resources Mobilization Act, but a later one (24 September) mentioned the possibility that
one "might be completed on a purely C.A.S.F. basis". Adding the whole together, his
plan may be said to have foreshadowed an overseas army of six or seven divisions, two
of them armoured, all composed of volunteers; and two divisions for home defence,
largely composed of N.R.M.A. men.
In one of his submissions,72 the C.G.S. referred to the possibility "at present
envisioned" that an army tank brigade (of "infantry" tanks-see below, page 90) might be
raised and sent overseas during 1941. He remarked, however, that in some influential
quarters in the British Army the opinion was held that infantry tank units should be
eliminated.
One special point in the Crerar plan remains to be noticed. "The scale on which
formations are to be raised," he wrote, "and the general reorganization of the military
forces, suggests that the time has come to abandon the title `Militia'. We have a Royal
Canadian Navy and a Royal Canadian Air Force and it would seem logical, and in accord
with common speech that we should have a Canadian Army."73 No one objected, and an
order in council of 19 November74 provided, "The Military Forces of Canada shall
henceforth be designated and described as `The Canadian Army' ". Units embodied for
continuous service were to be designated "Active" and all others (i.e. those of the former
Non-Permanent Active Militia) as "Reserve". A time-honoured term thus passed out of
wartime use, and one more appropriate to the conditions of the moment took its place.
90 SIX YEARS OF WAR
The Modification and Approval of

the 1941 Programme
At the end of November 1940 Colonel Ralston and General Crerar went to England
for an extended visit. As a result of their conferences overseas the Army Programme for
1941 was somewhat modified.
On 17 December Colonel Ralston met Mr. Eden, and was told that the War Office
"would like the Canadian Government to provide an armoured division as soon as
possible, to be equipped with M.3 tanks ordered by the U.K. in the U.S.A." Some
administrative difficulties were seen in having an unattached armoured brigade arrive in
advance of the rest of the Division. The War Office considered the provision of an army
tank brigade by Canada, to be equipped from Canadian resources, "desirable, but not so
desirable as the division".75 On 2 January 1941 there was a further conference with
Captain David Margesson, who had now succeeded Eden as Secretary of State for War.
The War Office again urged that the personnel of an armoured division would be a very
important contribution. It was explained that the British authorities were faced with the
necessity of finding nine such divisions. This was evidently the result of the initiative of
Mr. Churchill, who had written to his Cabinet colleagues on 15 October, “At present we
are aiming at five armoured divisions, and armoured brigades equivalent to three more.
This is not enough. We cannot hope to compete with the enemy in numbers of men, and
must therefore rely upon an exceptional proportion of armoured fighting vehicles. Ten
armoured divisions is the target to aim for to the end of 1941...."76
Canada was being asked to provide one of the new divisions. Margesson summed up
the British desires in these terms:77
"(a) The War Office are particularly anxious that the personnel of a complete Canadian
Armoured division should be formed ready for despatch to the United Kingdom by the
early Autumn of 1941. They anticipate that equipment from British orders (either U.S.A.
or U.K.) would be available to equip the division, which would thus be completely trained
and available for employment during the first quarter of 1942.
"(b) If in addition to the above, and without slowing up its formation, a Canadian Army Tank
Brigade, for inclusion in the Canadian Corps, could also be raised, equipped with Mark
III Tanks now being made in Canada, and despatched to the United Kingdom in the
Summer of 1941, this would be most welcome to the War Office. For this purpose the
United Kingdom Government were entirely agreeable to Canada having priority on
Canadian production of Mark III tanks and to assist if necessary by provision of I tanks*
from United Kingdom production."
*Infantry tanks, heavier and slower than the cruisers with which armoured divisions were equipped. The Mark III
infantry tank was later called the Valentine.
Colonel Ralston inquired about further infantry formations; and the British
representatives made it clear that for the moment these were considered less important
than armour:78
General Macready [Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff] said that so far as can be foreseen
at present, it was not considered necessary or desirable that a 4th Canadian Infantry division should be
sent to England during 1941, but the War Office would be glad if the possibility of its despatch by the
Summer of 1942 could be borne in mind.
The minutes of this meeting conclude, "There was general agreement that if Canada
could provide three infantry divisions, with the necessary Corps troops and A.A. units, an
Armoured division and an Army Tank Brigade by the end of 1941, it would be a most
valuable and whole-hearted contribution to the Empire war effort."79
Ralston promised to place the views of the War Office before the Canadian
Government. Three days later he did so by cable,80 recommending changes in the Army
Programme along the lines of the British requests. He now suggested that Canada send
overseas successively, during 1941, the remaining Corps Troops for the existing two-
division Corps; the 3rd Division and its complement of Corps Troops; an army tank
brigade; and a complete armoured division. The dispatch of the 4th Division could be
postponed until, probably, the summer of 1942.
The Cabinet War Committee considered this telegram on 8 January 1941. In view of
the large expenditures involved, and the desirability of dealing with the programmes of
the Navy and the Air Force simultaneously, it was agreed to defer decision until the
Minister's return. Colonel Ralston arrived back in Ottawa on 24 January, and reported to
the Committee the same day. He said that an early attempt at invading the British Isles
was still regarded as the enemy's most likely move, and added that he had not realized
before visiting the United Kingdom how great was the present need for men. The British
authorities were greatly embarrassed by the necessity of providing simultaneously for the
protection of Britain, the security of the Middle East, and the war industries. Ralston
reported that it was important to provide an army tank brigade, and observed that a
Canadian Corps of three divisions, this brigade and ancillary troops would represent
useful immediate assistance for the defence of Britain during 1941.
The programme was carefully reviewed by the War Committee, and its essential
features (particularly the formation of the army tank brigade, and the organization and
dispatch overseas in due course of the armoured division) were approved on 28 January.*
General Crerar wrote to General McNaughton subsequently in a personal letter, "I must
give full
*The authority for the armoured division had been granted in principle, it appears, on 13 August 1940, although the
record is rather obscure. Ralston's cable of 5 January 1941 refers to the division as "already authorized".
92 SIX YEARS OF WAR
credit to the Minister who backed the Programme 100% and needed to use fairly strong
arguments with some of his colleagues".81
The implementation of the programme now went forward. The existing armoured
brigade was not directly converted into an army tank brigade, but two of its three
regiments (The Ontario Regiment and The Three Rivers Regiment) were turned into
army tank battalions and transferred to the new formation, and its commander, Brigadier
Worthington, was also transferred. The 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade was formally
organized in February 1941. Its third battalion (The Calgary Regiment) joined it at Camp
Borden in March. The Brigade trained there until it went overseas in the following June.82
It had been given priority over the 3rd Division, but the latter was sent to the United
Kingdom later in the summer, the greater part of it arriving at the end of July. It was
virtually complete in England early in September.83 Various units of Corps Troops, etc.,
were arriving (or being formed in Britain) throughout the period. It was possible, as we
shall see, for the whole Canadian Corps, now consisting of the three infantry divisions,
the army tank brigade and large numbers of ancillary troops, to be concentrated in Sussex
before the end of 1941.
The 1st Armoured Brigade continued to exist as a formation of the armoured division
which was now raised and which was designated, in the beginning, the 1st Canadian
Armoured Division. Divisional Headquarters was formed at Camp Borden in March.
Major-General E. W. Sansom was appointed to the command, being succeeded at the 3rd
Division by MajorGeneral C. B. Price.84 Two experienced tank officers, Lt.-Cols. E. L.
Fanshawe and J. R. Farrington, were lent by the British Army to take the appointments of
G.S.O. 1 and A.A. & Q.M.G.,* respectively, during the period of mobilization.85 The
two Permanent Force cavalry regiments were both included in the Division's original
order of battle, The Royal Canadian Dragoons as the 1st Armoured Car Regiment and
Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) as the 2nd Armoured Regiment. At this time
the organization of an armoured division comprehended two armoured brigades (each
consisting of three armoured regiments and a motor battalion of infantry) and a "support
group" including one field regiment, one light anti-aircraft regiment and one anti-tank
regiment of artillery and an infantry battalion.
To hasten the mobilization of the 1st Army Tank Brigade and the 1st Armoured
Division, the 4th Division was "robbed" of units and men. The 17th Field Regiment R.C.A.
had already been withdrawn from it for incorporation in the 1st Armoured Brigade Group,
and now became part of the Armoured Division. The 4th Division's anti-tank unit (the 4th
Anti-Tank
*The two senior staff appointments at a divisional headquarters. The General Staff Officer, First Grade, headed
the General Staff Branch (concerned with operations, intelligence and training) and coordinated the divisional staff
generally; the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General headed the administrative branches of the staff.
Regiment R.C.A.) was similarly transferred, and the Armoured Division's light anti-
aircraft regiment (the 5th) was formed by converting 4th Division field batteries.
Medical, Engineer, and Provost units of the 4th Division were transferred to the new
brigade and division, and Signals, Ordnance and Army Service Corps personnel were
moved over wholesale. The Armoured Division's infantry and armour came mainly from
units already mobilized. The armoured regiments of its 2nd Armoured Brigade were
provided by converting three of the motorcycle regiments formed during the summer of
1940.96
Utilizing 4th Division units for the Armoured Division was not merely a means of
speeding the organization of the latter; it also served as an economy measure. The size of
the proposed budget for 1941-42 had caused alarm at the Department of Finance, and on
28 January the Cabinet War Committee agreed that the service departments and the
Department of Munitions and Supply should so adjust their programmes as to reduce
their total requirements from $1500 million to $1300 million. In these circumstances
General Crerar, taking into account General Wavell's recent successes in the Middle East,
felt that it was safe both to take 4th Division men and units for the Armoured Division
and to delay reconstituting the 4th Division until later in the financial year, as well as
deleting provision which had been proposed for mobilizing a fifth infantry division and
taking preliminary steps towards mobilizing a sixth. It was only in May 1941 (after
disasters had befallen the Allied cause in Africa and Greece) that reconstitution of the 4th
Division was ordered and Crerar asked for authority to mobilize another infantry division
for home defence.87
In July 1941 the 1st Armoured Division was redesignated the "5th Canadian
(Armoured) Division".88 (This designation was never officially altered afterwards; but the
simpler form "5th Canadian Armoured Division" soon came into common use.) The
Division moved overseas, as planned, that autumn, its main flight (Convoy T.C. 15)
reaching the United Kingdom on 22 November. This convoy, which included the
divisional headquarters, was the largest single troop movement from Canada up to that
time,* totalling nearly 14,000 all ranks.90 As a result of the build-up during 1941, the
strength of the Canadian Army Overseas at the end of the calendar year was 124,472 all
ranks.91
The Development of the Army Programme for 1942
During 1941 and the early part of 1942 there was much official discussion, at home
and in England, of the further expansion of the Canadian
*The largest of the war was "A.T. 56", of July 1943;89 see below, page 190.
94 SIX YEARS OF WAR
overseas army. It was increasingly clear that the arrangements now to be made would
represent, to all intents and purposes, the final stage.
On 11 August 1941 General Crerar, writing confidentially from Ottawa to General
McNaughton,92 said that a programme was being prepared but that he proposed to submit
it to the Government as tentative only, subject to discussion with the Corps Commander
and the War Office. He anticipated that the Minister and himself would have to take
another trip to the United Kingdom in the autumn to discuss the matter. In the meantime,
he presented some thoughts for McNaughton's consideration:
To commence with, our departmental studies of man-power available do not indicate that numbers
will be a restrictive factor for some time yet in respect to an expansion of the Canadian Army. Perhaps
the A.G. has already spoken to you on this subject, but, if not, I might say that our departmental
appreciation indicates that man-power is available to maintain a Canadian Army of eight Divisions, of
which two will be in Canada, for a war period of over six years from now. An Inter-departmental
Committee on Man-Power has now been formed and is considering the calculations submitted by this and
other departments such as Labour and Munitions and Supply. It may be that the results of this
Committee's considerations will be somewhat at variance from the estimates we have separately reached.
On the other hand, our own calculations certainly do not suffer from optimism and I believe that the
numbers for the Army are there, without interfering with essential industry and other home activities,
providing the Government takes the steps required to get those numbers into the Services.
All the above leads me to the conclusion that, providing the Government are prepared to face up to
the financial and other strain, we should be able to reinforce the Corps during 1942 with not only the 4th
Division but another Armoured Division as well. This would result in too large a Corps, but have you
ever considered the pros and cons of a Canadian Army comprising 2 Corps each of 2 Divisions and an
Armoured Division? I fully admit that this is a pretty ambitious proposal because the necessary increase
in Corps, etc., troops will be fairly heavy. At the same time, I do not think that the picture is an
impossible one.
Crerar explained that these suggestions had not yet been put before the Minister "even in
a tentative way". McNaughton did not reply directly to this letter, explaining later that he
had put off doing so as the result of understanding that an official "proposition for 1942"
might be expected shortly.93
It is worth noting that Colonel Ralston had mentioned to the War Committee on 29
July the fact that the Adjutant-General's survey of manpower had suggested that there
was manpower available in Canada to permit of the mobilization of eight divisions-six
overseas and two for home defence—and their maintenance for a period of five years
from the end of December 1942. This meeting of the War Committee accepted Crerar's
proposal to mobilize a new infantry division, numbered the 6th, for home defence (see
below, page 166). It was further agreed that Canada should maintain overseas four
divisions, plus the army tank brigade, with two divisions at home. Beyond this, no
commitments were authorized for the present.
In September Crerar put his tentative plan before the Minister.94 It was important, he
wrote, that plans for the army should be "such as can be
implemented with our present system of voluntary enlistment for overseas service"; it
was also essential that Canada should provide "the maximum force overseas that it is
possible to organize and maintain". Having given thought to the various possibilities
(including a suggestion received from the Corps Commander through his chief
administrative officer, Brigadier G. R. Turner, that the best way to create Canadian
armoured formations was by the conversion of infantry units already in the United
Kingdom),95 Crerar suggested for preliminary consideration "the following Canadian
Army Programme for 1941-42":
"(a) Conversion of the 4th Canadian Division to an armoured division for service overseas.
"(b) Eventual formation overseas of a Canadian Armoured Corps of two divisions.
"(c) Creation of a Canadian Army Headquarters overseas to command and administer the Canadian
Corps of three Divisions and the Canadian Armoured Corps of two Armoured Divisions."
Final consideration of this programme would have to be postponed until after the
discussions overseas.
Ralston and Crerar arrived in the United Kingdom on 13 October 1941. This visit
gave the Minister ample opportunities for conversations with the British authorities and
General McNaughton.96 On 6 November, following his return to Ottawa, Ralston
reported to the War Committee that the Secretary of State of War (Captain Margesson)
had told him that another armoured division from Canada would be a most helpful
contribution. What was in mind, Ralston remarked, was converting the existing 4th
Division; however, no commitment to do this had been made. He mentioned that it might
be desirable to set up a new command, apart from the Corps, to include the Lines of
Communication troops, now numbering some 30,000; but he seems to have made no
specific mention of an army headquarters, and any discussions on this subject which may
have taken place overseas between him, McNaughton and Crerar appear to have gone
unrecorded. In a cable97 sent on 14 November, General McNaughton, in addition to
providing a long list of the ancillary troops which were required, mentioned that a second
army tank brigade and a second armoured division would be "most useful further
additions" to the force overseas. This cable also contained no reference to an army
headquarters.
On 18 November General Crerar submitted to the Minister a definite Army
Programme "for the balance of this year and for 1942".98 The army headquarters element
was omitted. The chief items were the organization for service overseas, first, of nineteen
Corps and Army units, with a total strength of 378 officers and 3893 other ranks, already
authorized but not yet provided; secondly, of twenty-five additional Corps and Army
units now required, with a total strength of 172 officers and 3136 other ranks; and
96 SIX YEARS OF WAR
finally, of an armoured division (to be formed by converting the 4th Division), an army
tank brigade, and the Corps and Army units required to support and serve these new
formations, amounting to thirty-nine units with a total strength of 255 officers and 6011
other ranks. The C.G.S. remarked, "Provision of these units will permit the constitution
of a Canadian Armoured Corps of two armoured divisions." He added that he saw "no
military factors in the present strategic situation" that would warrant the mobilization of
an additional division for home defence, but this might become necessary if conditions
changed for the worse.
Before this programme was finally approved, it underwent alterations which included
the reinstatement of the army headquarters mentioned in Crerar's early draft. On
Christmas Day 1941 General McNaughton had a conference on organization matters with
General Sir Bernard Paget, who had now been appointed C.-in-C. Home Forces. Crerar,
who had given up the appointment of C.G.S. and was to command the Canadian Corps in
an acting capacity while McNaughton was on leave,* was also present. To a query by
Paget on higher organization, McNaughton replied that he "would prefer an Army H.Q.
with two Corps". Next day McNaughton cabled the Minister of National Defence as
follows:99
In out discussions yesterday General Paget C.-in-C. Home Forces reiterated views previously
expressed to me by his predecessor Brooke now C.I.G.S. that on account of the size of Canadian Forces
in the United Kingdom we should now provide an Army Headquarters. It is my view that
implementation of Army Programme which I discussed with you on your visit and which is given in
some detail in my GS 2512 dated 14th November 1941 will require the formation of a second corps
headquarters and some small additions to ancillary units.
Ralston replied: "This involves a somewhat imposing expansion in overhead and did not
understand that it had been advocated by you. Understood you proposed to put forward
recommendations for increases of Corps staff to permit of more attention being paid to L.
of C. and Ancillary units. It was in Crerar's recommendation for Army Programme that
the possibility of this expansion was indicated as a possible corollary if another armoured
division was approved and if and when it was sent to the U,K." He went on to suggest
that it might be well not to discuss the matter with the War Office until it had been
explored in Ottawa during a visit which the Corps Commander was shortly to make to
Canada.100
Before McNaughton left for Canada, he had received a personal note101 from the new
Chief of the Imperial General Staff saying that he would welcome a chance of discussing
the future Canadian organization. General Brooke wrote:
The force seems to me to be growing too big to be handled by one Corps Commander.
*McNaughton had been on sick leave since 14 November. Major-General G. R. Pearkes commanded the Corps until
Crerar's arrival.
I feel that you require a Force or Army Headquarters which will take over the running of all the rear
services, workshops, base organization, etc., and thus free the Corps Commander's hands for the job of
commanding & training the fighting formations. That in itself is a full time job!
This was rather less than enthusiastic support for the formation of an operational Army
Headquarters. It was, however, full recognition of the fact that some change in higher
organization was required.
The War Committee examined the Army Programme for 1942 carefully. During this
consideration, the war situation was fundamentally altered by the sudden attack by Japan
(7 December 1941), which immediately brought the United States into the conflict. This
may have had some influence on the final decision. The Labour Supply Investigation
Committee, which appears to be the Inter-Departmental Committee referred to in General
Crerar's letter to General McNaughton of 11 August, had made its report on 16 October.
It expressed the opinion that "609,000 men between the ages of 17 and 40 years in
August, 1941, are potentially available for the armed forces"; but it added with great
emphasis, "these 609,000 men will be available only if the most drastic measures are
adopted".102 The Government's commitments against compulsory overseas service were
of course still in effect. At a meeting of the War Committee on 3 December the new
Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-General Kenneth Stuart) said in reply to questions that
in his opinion the programme could be carried out on the voluntary basis, and that he
considered that the number of reinforcements in sight would be adequate tinder
foreseeable circumstances. He also said that the programme represented the visible
ceiling of army expansion; it would make possible an excellent, well-balanced and
adequate contribution by the Canadian Army in the European theatre.
Before the programme was approved, the Canadian Government was able to obtain
the advice of Mr. Churchill, who said that armoured divisions were the highest form of
army requirement, and that another from Canada would certainly be most welcome. The
programme was in fact authorized before General McNaughton arrived in Canada. Along
with those for the Navy and the Air Force, it was approved by the full Cabinet on 6
January 1942. On 26 January, while McNaughton was on the ocean, the Prime Minister
announced in the House of Commons that "a Canadian army of two army corps" would
be created overseas during 1942.
It will be noted that during these discussions in Ottawa the current manpower
anxieties had given General Crerar's idea of a six-division overseas Army its quietus. It
was now quite clear that not more than five divisions would be authorized.
98 SIX YEARS OF WAR
First Canadian Army Comes Into Existence
The basic decisions on the Army Programme having been reached before his arrival,
General McNaughton was able to devote himself while in Ottawa to discussing broad
policies and various points of detail. On 6 March he attended a meeting of the War
Committee and spoke of the problems of the overseas army. He said that the relationship
of the Army Commander to the Department of National Defence had been settled
satisfactorily, the general principle being that the former should have direct and adequate
authority in the details of administration of the Canadian Army Overseas, subject to
control by the Government where principles were involved. The Minister of National
Defence had agreed that this degree of freedom was necessary. Canadian Military
Headquarters in the United Kingdom, McNaughton observed, had two primary sets of
responsibilities-as a forward echelon of the Department of National Defence and as an
agent of the Army Commander. He said that after the completion of the new programme
the Canadian Army Overseas would constitute a self-contained, well-balanced force,
suitable for its present role in the defence of the United Kingdom, and for future
employment on the Continent. He stated that the 1942 programme represented in his
opinion the upper limit of the force which Canada could deploy and maintain in a war of
long duration; no major, increase would or should be made beyond it.
The Army Commander emphasized the importance of the security of the British Isles.
The enemy, he said, was continuing invasion preparations, and invasion of those islands
was still the most dangerous of all contingencies. In these circumstances, the first and
most important task for the Canadian Army continued to be the defence of the United
Kingdom; its secondary role was that of eventual operations upon the Continent. At this
period, the Canadian Government, as a result of the Japanese successes in Asia, was
being pressed for increased defences in British Columbia (below, page 170).
McNaughton expressed the opinion that under existing conditions the Japanese could
attempt no serious attack upon Canada; the present probable limit of their enterprises was
nuisance raids. Canada's best general policy, he suggested, was to concentrate upon the
protection of the United Kingdom; to increase war production to the limit; and to find
some method of bringing Canadian engineering skill and methods to bear upon the design
and development of weapons.
During a visit to Washington on 8-11 March, General McNaughton had

conversations with President Roosevelt and various American military officers. In these
he expressed the same opinions which he had submitted to the Canadian Government,
emphasizing the importance of the security of
the United Kingdom and the likelihood that the war would ultimately be won by an
offensive launched from that country "across the narrow seas".103 He returned to England
late in March to carry out the programme which had been approved. Authority for the
formation of Army Headquarters and units to work in affiliation with it had been given
by the War Committee on 11 March. In consequence, Headquarters First Canadian Army
came into existence on Easter Monday, 6 April 1942, with McNaughton as G.O.C.-in.C.
Crerar retained command of the Canadian Corps, which now became the 1st Canadian
Corps.
The development of the new Army was to proceed by stages. The first phase would
be the formation of a nucleus staff and a beginning on mobilizing the several units
required to work with Army Headquarters (Army Signals, etc.) In the second phase,
Army Headquarters would be gradually completed to about half its final establishment-
this being achieved, it was anticipated, by about the middle of June 1942-and the related
ancillary units would be brought up to strength as required. The third phase was
thus outlined:104
H.Q. 2 Cdn Corps would be organized on an establishment which is to be provided for the purpose
to be completed about 1 Jul 42. On the completion of this H.Q. it would be exchanged with H.Q. 1 Cdn
Corps in an operational role and the latter brought out of the Order of Battle and reorganized also on the
lower establishment.
It proved impossible in practice to carry out this programme as planned, particularly with
respect to the new Corps Headquarters. The main difficulty here was the shortage of
trained staff officers.105 Headquarters 2nd Canadian Corps was not actually set up until
14 January 1943, some six months later than originally planned. Major-General E. W.
Sansom was promoted Lieut. General and appointed to command the Corps, being
succeeded at the 5th Canadian Armoured Division by Major-General C. R. S. Stein.106
During the early months of 1942, the complicated process of converting the 4th
Infantry Division into the 4th Armoured Division was going forward in Canada.
Brigadier Worthington became a Major-General and was appointed to the command. His
task was somewhat eased by improvements in the equipment situation; Canadian "Ram"
tanks were now coming off the production line, and thus the units were able to train in
Canada with the equipment which, in the first instance, they would use overseas. The
Division moved across the Atlantic in the late summer and early autumn of 1942, the two
main convoys reaching the Clyde on 31 August and 6 October. The last units arrived in
the Queen Elizabeth on 4 November.,107 The 2nd Army Tank Brigade was organized in
Canada in January 1942 (its headquarters being provided by redesignating that of the
11th Infantry Brigade, a 4th Division formation now no longer required) ;108 but it did not
go overseas until the summer of 1943.
100 SIX YEARS OF WAR
The Final Composition of the Field Force
During 1942, there was intense discussion of the composition of the Canadian Army
Overseas. The problem was extraordinarily complicated, and can be considered here only
in its broadest aspects.
The increasing stringency of the manpower situation was a basic factor, the more so
as the limits of Canadian capacity had not yet been defined. In June 1942 General
McNaughton asked N.D.H.Q. to fix the total establishment which might be used as a
basis for planning the field army,109 but this information could not be provided at once.
After his conferences with Ralston and Stuart in October, he recorded that it had become
apparent that there were still "difficulties in reaching a conclusion as to the proper
balance between allocations to War Industry and between the Sea, Land and Air Forces",
but that it was hoped that these things could be clarified in December.l10 Apart from
manpower, other complicating factors were the chronic shortage of shipping for moving
troops from Canada to England; certain important alterations in organization which were
in progress, or under discussion, within the British Army; and the unsettled state of
planning for future operations, which compelled the Canadian staffs to allow for the
possibility of the Army having to take part in major battles on the Continent, at some
uncertain date in 1943, before the limited shipping available could bring the whole of the
authorized force in from Canada.
The fundamental problem was that of providing the great number of ancillary units
(Army, G.H.Q. and L. of C. Troops) required for the support of a modem army in the field.
These actually represented a larger manpower commitment than the fighting formations. It
was considered that the overall strength of troops in a theatre of war could be calculated on
a rough basis of 40,000 all ranks per infantry division, 35,000 per armoured division and
5000 per army tank brigade. (The actual strengths of these formations themselves were,
respectively, approximately 18,000, 15,000 and 3500 all ranks.) On 19 January 1942 the
Director of Staff Duties, War Office (Major-General D. G. Watson) pointed out that
Canadian planning for ancillary troops so far fell considerably short of this standard.111 The
question of what ancillary troops Canada could and should provide was the main one
grappled with by the Canadian Army Planning Committee which General McNaughton set
up in the summer. By August there had emerged what was known as the "Third Proposal"
for the composition of the Canadian Army Overseas. The only formations included were
the three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two army tank brigades already
authorized, but it allowed for ancillary units which would have raised the total
establishment of the field force and units in England to 209,920 all ranks, apart from
reinforcements .112 This represented at least an approximation
to a self-contained Canadian Army, though the total suggested for the field force
(178,091 all ranks) was still short of the standard indicated by General Watson, which
would have called for 200,000.*
By the late autumn it was clear that the "Third Proposal" was beyond attainment. On
15 November the Chief of the General Staff cabled McNaughton, ". . . without waiting to
end of year we have to accept the conclusion that it is not feasible to plan for a
composition of the First Canadian Army such that it could operate wholly independently
with all Canadian Base L. of C. and Army troops which after all would seem to be
envisaging the ideal".114 At the same time the shipping situation remained bad, the
allotment being based on a monthly movement overseas of only 5000 Canadian troops.
Stuart's cable went on:
Based upon above considerations I have recommended and A.G. [Adjutant General] agrees that our
objective as to the strength of the First Canadian Army overseas should be limited first to presently
authorized formed and forming units overseas. Second to presently authorized units designated for
overseas service formed or forming in Canada. Third to personnel for establishment increases .. . Fourth to
units that we might be able to make available directly or by conversion from home defence formations.
Fifth reinforcements at proposed new battle casualty rate.
Ten days later, in answer to a request from McNaughton for specific figures on
available manpower, Stuart calculated that it should be possible, assuming that shipping
space could be found, to send 64,000 men to England during the first eight months of
1943. Thereafter it was hoped to maintain the flow at "about 5000 per month", which it
was estimated would be required for reinforcement purposes when the Army went into
action.115
On receiving the cable of 15 November, McNaughton replied accepting the situation
and remarking, "Under these circumstances I recognize . . . that it may not be possible to
operate as a Cdn Army". He proposed, he said, to place the situation before the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff "and obtain his views as to the best form our contribution can
take".116 A few days later he reported117 the result of his consultations:
Late Thursday 19 Nov 42 1 had long talks with C.I.G.S. and D.M.O.† in
respect to plans for employment Cdn Army. I want you to know that in accordance policy enunciated your
CGS 615 dated 15 Nov 42 I made it clear at the start that I was only concerned with making the best
contribution possible to winning the war and that I was prepared to recommend the abandoning of the
possibility of operating as an army if it were more advantageous to supply individual formations to
separate theatres or to break up divisions if this were the proper and best solution.
It is very definitely General Brooke's opinion that the project for a Cdn Army should be maintained
and he hoped that our 2nd Army Tk Bde would be sent over in due course ...
*General Brooke told General McNaughton on 19 November 1942 that he considered the quota of 40,000 per
infantry division and 35,000 per armoured division "altogether too generous under the conditions in which an attack on the
Continent would be contemplated" 113
†Director of Military Operations, War Office (Major-General J. N. Kennedy).
These conversations reflected the uncertain state of Allied operational planning at this
period. Apart from Operation "Tonic" _ (the occupation of the Canary Islands), the
possible enterprises envisaged were "largescale raids of limited scope and duration" upon
the German submarine bases in the Bay of Biscay in the spring of 1943, while it was
considered that by August the Canadians should be ready "to go on the continent in
strength" if circumstances warranted, playing their part in securing and holding a
permanent bridgehead of limited depth. By October they should be "ready to operate as a
Cdn Army on the continent with all essential rearward services". No other possible
operations were mentioned at this time.
On this basis McNaughton, in consultation with the C.G.S. in Ottawa and the various
branches of the War Office, proceeded to work out a programme. On 21 December he
reported118 that the War Office had undertaken to contribute "up to 9000 [men] per
Division as a permanent commitment to complete our rearward services and more if
necessary until our own quota is fully available". On 28 December he stated the priorities
in which he proposed to use the manpower available, and added that he now intended as
far as possible to organize the Army on British war establishments. (While Canadian
establishments had in general been based upon British models, they had not followed
them in detail.) This would facilitate incorporating Canadian corps or divisions in a
British force if necessary.119
At this time the organization of armoured divisions was being materially altered. The
War Office had decided to abandon that based on two armoured brigades and a support
group in favour of a single armoured brigade, an infantry brigade, and two field regiments
of artillery; and General McNaughton advised conforming to this change. This involved
disbanding one armoured brigade from each of the two Canadian armoured divisions, and
although three of the armoured regiments of these brigades were needed for other tasks in
the new organization three others were left surplus. More infantry and artillery would be
required. McNaughton desired to utilize the surplus armour to form a third army tank
brigade, and in his cable of 21 December he wrote, "As a long term objective I propose that
Cdn Army should comprise two corps with three Infantry Divs (three Inf Bdes), two Armd
Divs (one Inf and one Armd Bde) and three Army Tank Bdes."120 This objective, however,
was never attained. The Chief of the General Staff queried the suggestion of a third tank
brigade, in view of a current shortage of Armoured Corps reinforcements.121 General
McNaughton replied that completing this formation was a matter for later discussion; the
extra armoured regiments would be made available for reinforcement purposes unless and
until adequate reinforcements were in sight. 122 As it turned out, by
March 1943 it was apparent that the formation of the third tank brigade would not be
practicable, and in any case experience in Exercise "Spartan" (below, pages 249-51)
convinced the Army Commander that two such brigades would be enough.123
On 6 January 1943 General Stuart sent to the Minister his final submission124 for the
Army Programme for 1943, which was based on McNaughton's recommendations. Its
main elements, apart from the reorganization of the overseas divisions on British
establishments, were the dispatch overseas of two infantry battalions, already mobilized,
to complete the reorganization of the armoured divisions; the completion of "Basic Corps
Troops, already authorized" by sending forward units in existence in Canada; the
conversion of one of the surplus armoured regiments to a "tank delivery regiment"
(whose function was to provide armoured units with replacement tanks and crews fit for
immediate action) and the retention of two armoured car regiments as Army Troops; and
the organization of the headquarters of the third army tank brigade to administer the three
surplus armoured regiments "which are to be considered as a potential reinforcement
reserve". The programme also included:
In principle only, the provision of such units as may be required by the Army Commander, together with
their proper proportion of reinforcements, to complete the overseas programme, to a total of 18,369, being the
unencumbered balance of
the 64,000 proposed to be despatched abroad [see above, page 101] . ; the foregoing additions to include such
changes in establishments or reorganizations as may be required abroad.
The provision overseas of a pool of reinforcements based on 3 months (casualties] at the intense rates,
and the provision of one additional month's reinforcements in Canada at the same rate.
This programme had the effect of fixing for the army overseas a "manpower ceiling" of
approximately 226,000 men.125 This covered all existing establishments, including the
base units in England, plus the reinforcements calculated as required for three months'
fighting at the "intense" rate of activity. In addition, an undertaking was made, as already
forecast, to send forward 5000 men per month from Canada as replacements for
casualties subsequent to 1 September 1943.
The programme was approved by the War Committee on 6 January, the same day on
which it was submitted in its final form, subject to review if it was found to conflict with
the manpower or financial requirements of the Navy or Air Force. On 11 March,
following further discussions with General McNaughton and minor modifications, the
Committee approved a figure of 232,100 as the manpower ceiling for the Canadian Army
Overseas to 1 September 1943.
*The ceiling was subsequently raised to include the 1st Parachute Battalion and its quota of reinforcements. In August
1944 a final adjustment to cover the 1st Special Service Battalion and some minor units fixed the total at 234,500 all
ranks.126
The 2nd Army Tank Brigade arrived in the United Kingdom from Canada in June
1943. A 3rd Army Tank Brigade had been formed overseas on a temporary basis, out of
the surplus armoured regiments, in January 1943. As both brigades could not be retained,
and the units which had been overseas longest were reported as the most efficient, those
from Canada, and the brigade headquarters which had come with them, were in due
course disbanded; but since the authorized army tank brigade was designated by order in
council as the 2nd, this number was used for the formation which continued to exist and
which fought in the North-West Europe campaign.127 In June 1943 the decision was
taken to reorganize the Canadian army tank brigades as independent armoured brigades.
The reason given was the desirability of being able to "replace" them in the armoured
divisions if required128 (presumably, in the event of a return to the older establishment of
armoured divisions, on a basis of two armoured brigades, or if temporary operational
conditions called for such an arrangement). The brigades, however, remained without an
important part of the armoured brigade in an armoured division-the motor battalion of
infantry.
The addition of one special unit to the Canadian Army Overseas may be noted here.
On 1 July 1942 the Cabinet War Committee approved the organization of a Canadian
Parachute Battalion. Its purpose as explained at this time was primarily one of home
defence: to provide means for recapturing aerodromes or reinforcing remote localities. A
number of officers and other ranks were returned from overseas during the late summer
to join the battalion, which subsequently moved to the United States for four months'
parachute training at Fort Benning, Georgia.129 By the time this was completed, the
battalion no longer seemed required in Canada, and on 7 April 1943 the War Committee
authorized incorporating it in a new British airborne division being formed in the United
Kingdom. It arrived in Britain on 28 July, and shortly moved to Salisbury Plain, where it
joined the 6th Airborne Division and became a unit of the 3rd Parachute Brigade.130 A
small Canadian element was added to the Division's headquarters to look after
administrative matters for the battalion. The 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion fought
with the 6th Airborne Division through the North-West Europe campaign.
The First Special Service Force
Another special unit must be mentioned. This is the 1st Canadian Special Service
Battalion, the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force, a unique
international organization whose personnel was drawn partly from the Canadian and
partly from the United States Army.
Early in 1942 Allied strategists were considering a highly novel scheme known as
Operation "Plough" (originated apparently by an Englishman named Geoffrey Pyke)
which had caught the imagination of both Mr. Churchill and Lord Louis Mountbatten. It
envisioned operations with special vehicles, sent in by air, to be conducted during the
winter of 1942-43 in the snow-covered areas of Europe, the objectives being the
Romanian oilfields and hydro-electric plants in Northern Italy and Norway. The scheme's
realization involved raising a special force and developing special equipment; and it had
sufficient appeal to British and American leaders to lead them to put both matters in
hand.131 In Canada the Department of Munitions and Supply was asked to develop a
snowmobile, and did produce an effective vehicle, the "Penguin", which, with
modifications, has since given good service in the Army's Arctic exercises. United States
agencies on their side, with help from the National Research Council in Ottawa and from
other Allied countries, developed a vehicle which, under the name of "Weasel", later did
well in many theatres. In its amphibious form (M 29 C) it was familiar to the Canadian
Army.132
The original scheme for the raiding force contemplated a unit composed of
Canadians, Americans and Norwegians. It soon became clear that no Norwegians except
a few instructors would be available. On 26 June 1942, however, the Canadian Prime
Minister approved Canadian participation (possibly because of the extreme secrecy of the
project, it does not appear to have been put before the Cabinet War Committee at this
stage), and on 14 July the Minister of National Defence authorized the movement of 47
officers and 650 other ranks to the United States in connection with the project.133 For
security reasons, the Canadian part of the force was designated "2nd Canadian Parachute
Battalion" until May 1943, when the name was changed to "1st Canadian Special Service
Battalion". The senior Canadian officer was Lt.-Col. J. G. McQueen, who was brought
back from the army overseas to take the appointment; the junior officers were chiefly
recent graduates of the Officers Training Centre at Brockville; while the other ranks were
selected from among men in Canada volunteering for duty as paratroopers.134
The First Special Service Force consisted of a Combat Force of three small
"regiments" (two battalions each) and a Base Echelon or Service Battalion. Canada
provided no men for the latter except a paymaster and two N.C.Os. Under the original
"table of organization" the strength of the Combat Force would have been 108 officers
and 1167 other ranks, and Canada's contribution would have been half of it.135 However,
"The regiments' enlisted strength was later raised by 50 per cent",136 and since the
Canadian quota was not increased in proportion the Canadian component usually
amounted to a little more than one-third of the Combat Force and
about one-quarter of the Force as a whole.137 The American element thus predominated.
Canadians liked to think of the Force as a CanadianAmerican venture on a basis of equal
partnership. A press release issued by the U.S. Secretary of War on 6 August 1942, which
included the phrase "the first time in history that Canadian troops have served as part of a
United States Army unit",138 aroused some feeling in Ottawa but perhaps was not entirely
at variance with practical facts. The Minister of National Defence had contemplated the
Force's wearing "a uniform of its own", neither Canadian nor American;139 in practice, it
wore U.S. uniform with special badges, and the Minister, rather reluctantly, authorized
Canadians to wear U.S. badges of rank.140
The Commander of the First Special Service Force was Colonel Robert T. Frederick,
U.S.A.* Lt.-Col. McQueen acted as his executive officer until injured in a parachute
jump; Lt.-Col. D. D. Williamson then became Canadian senior officer, though he did not
succeed McQueen as executive officer. The initial arrangement was that two of the three
regiments were commanded by Americans with Canadian "executives", and the third by a
Canadian with an American "executive".141 Canadian and American soldiers of all ranks
were distributed throughout the regiments, not segregated in separate units. Thus the "1st
Canadian Special Service Battalion" was never a tactical unit; this was simply a
convenient administrative label for the Canadian part of the Force.
The First Special Service Force was organized at Fort William Henry Harrison,
Helena, Montana, in the summer of 1942. Parachute training began at once; then came
ground tactics and, as cold weather came on, winter warfare training under Norwegian
instructors. Already, however, Operation "Plough" had been cancelled, as a result of,
among other things, Norwegian doubts; the possibility of attacking the objectives in
Norway in a much simpler manner with small airborne parties; and the natural reluctance
of the R.A.F. to divert a huge number of aircraft from the bombing of Germany.142
However, the American military authorities wished to keep the Force in existence with a
view to its employment in the Mediterranean area, and requested Canadian
concurrence.143 The Cabinet War Committee agreed on 18 November.
The story of the First Special Service Force in action is outlined elsewhere in this
history.† After undergoing amphibious training, it took part in the abortive expedition to
Kiska in August 1943. Thereafter it was moved to Italy, and beginning in November was
engaged in hard mountain fighting on the approaches to Cassino. Early in 1944 it was put
into the Anzio
*Succeeded (24 June 1944) by Colonel Edwin A. Walker, U.S.A., who commanded until the Force was disbanded.
†Below page 501 and see Volume Two The Canadians in Italy
bridgehead and saw further bitter action there, being rewarded by taking part in the
liberation of Rome. In August of the same year the Force fought in a commando role in
the landings on the south coast of France, and subsequently covered the Allies' right flank
along the Franco-Italian boundary. In December it was disbanded. It had had a splendid
fighting record, the result of a magnificent regimental spirit. Canadians and Americans
had taken equal pride in their unique organization, and had served together in a
comradeship which had no place for international jealousies.
Something must be said here of the administration of the Canadian battalion and the
peculiar problems which it raised.
The division of costs between Canada and the United States was on the following
basis.144 Canada was responsible for pensions, pay and allowances of Canadian
personnel, including Canadian parachute pay of $2.00 per day for officers and 75 cents
per day for other ranks; for repayment to the United States in U.S. funds of the cost of
rations for the Canadians; and for exchange on Canadian funds to cover the men's pay.
The United States was responsible for quarters and equipment; clothing, except items
issued to Canadians by the Canadian Government; all transportation costs with the ex-
ception of the original transportation of Canadian personnel to Helena; and hospital,
medical and dental services except any rendered Canadians after return to Canada as unfit
for service. The American authorities were thus allowed to bear a considerable portion of
the cost of the Canadian part of the Force-not a very satisfactory arrangement.
The Canadian soldiers of the Force were paid at Canadian rates, which were lower
than those of the U.S. Army. The authority, obtained in October 1942, for parachute pay
for all ranks, did not entirely meet the case, as the Americans of the Force had already
been receiving parachute pay at a higher rate - $50 per month for "enlisted men". The
Canadian battalion's war diary, recording the grant of parachute pay, noted, "We now
have Canadian staff sergeants drawing less money than the American privates under
them." Calculations made at Ottawa, which allowed for the fact that the Americans paid
income tax and the Canadians did not, indicate that this was only a slight exaggeration:
on this basis a Canadian staff sergeant got $99 per month and an American private $93. A
Canadian private got $63. These rates are all for unmarried men.145 Colonel Frederick
urged that the Canadian Government pay its troops in the Force at American rates.146 The
C.G.S. had already recommended this, but the proposal had been rejected, on the ground
that it would be improper to discriminate between the men of the Special Service Force
and other Canadian soldiers.147 The inequality of pay continued throughout the existence
of the Force.
Awards for gallantry also caused difficulty after the Force got into action. The
Canadians of the Force resented the fact that, although they
were eligible for U.S. awards, no machinery existed by which they could receive
decorations from their own country. The first four British Commonwealth awards were
promulgated only in November 1944, when the unit was about to be disbanded. By that
time 43 U.S. gallantry awards had been made to Canadians in the Force.148
Special provision was of course required for the enforcement of discipline. It was
agreed in the beginning that Canadian members of the Force would be subject to
Canadian military law and would be disciplined by Canadian officers for offences under
the Army Act.149 A Canadian order in council150 gave every Canadian officer of the Force
the legal powers of a detachment commander (subject to the authority of the senior
Canadian officer). It also provided that American members of the Force should "for the
purposes of command only (but not discipline and/or punishment)" be deemed to be
members of the Canadian forces of equivalent rank-an interesting device. Serious military
offences by Canadians were dealt with by Field General Courts-Martial composed of
Canadian officers and convened by the Commanding Officer of the Canadian battalion as
provided in the Army Act.151 This system seems to have worked smoothly.
Organization of the Canadian Army Overseas at its Peak
By midsummer of 1943, when the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st
Canadian Army Tank Brigade left the United Kingdom for Sicily to engage in the first
protracted campaign in which a formation of the Army participated in this war, the
Canadian Army Overseas may be said to have reached its full development. Thereafter, it
was subject only to minor alterations resulting from those changes in war organization
which are always taking place as the result of experience, and the necessary special
adjustments resulting from the division of the force during 1943 between the United
Kingdom and the Mediterranean theatre.
The "fighting" portion of the force consisted, as has been made clear, of two
armoured divisions, three infantry divisions, and two independent armoured brigades,
plus two "army groups" of artillery. An Army Headquarters and two Corps Headquarters
existed to direct the force in the field.
In addition to the fighting formations, the Canadian Army Overseas contained, as the
reader will have gathered, a very large number of Corps, Army, G.H.Q., L. of C. and Base
units. The War Office had, we have seen, agreed to provide, for the support of the First
Canadian Army, rearward units amounting to 9000 men for each division. Nevertheless, the
number of ancillary units provided by Canada herself was very large indeed. For the sake of
simplicity and convenience, let us merely outline the situation as it
existed at the end of hostilities in Europe in May 1945, when the 1st Corps had returned
from Italy and the whole Canadian field army was reunited in North-West Europe. At this
time the "authorized" composition of the Canadian Army Overseas represented a total
personnel of 217,371 all ranks. This figure was exclusive of the holding of
reinforcements, which was included, as already noted, in the manpower ceiling. Of this
total establishment, 25,786 all ranks were in units, or "increments" to units, organized on
a "temporary" basis, and of these 9567 were in North-West Europe. Apart from this, the
total establishment of the Canadian component of the 21st Army Group in North-West
Europe amounted to 160,850 all ranks. Canada of course provided all her own Corps
Troops, which totalled at this time 7875 all ranks for each of the two Corps. First
Canadian Army Troops provided by Canada numbered 28,350 all ranks, while G.H.Q.
and L. of C. Troops and Base Units amounted to 24,287 more. In addition, various
special units in North-West Europe accounted for 644 all ranks.152
In the United Kingdom, the establishment of the various Canadian units amounted in
May 1945 to 30,735 all ranks on a permanent basis, plus a total of 16,219 all ranks
(including the staffs of schools and reinforcement units) organized on a "temporary"
basis.153 Of the total authorized establishment of the Canadian Army Overseas at this
period, only approximately 44 per cent (a total of 97,546) was accounted for by the
strength of the fighting formations-the five divisions, the two armoured brigades and the
artillery units of the two army groups R.C.A. If reinforcement holdings were added to the
establishment figures, the percentage would be still lower. Even within the formations, of
course, a considerable number of men were employed on purely administrative tasks. All
this does not mean that Canadian use of manpower was necessarily improvident; it
merely emphasizes that in war as waged by the Western Allies in 1939-45 more
manpower went to supporting and maintaining the fighting formations than was used by
those formations themselves. To maintain 100 men in contact with the enemy and
provide them with what they needed to fight and win, considerably more than 100 other
men had to work in the rear areas of the theatre of operations, and many more again were
required at the home base.
CHAPTER IV
RECRUITING AND TRAINING IN CANADA

(See Map 3)
Making an Army in an Unmilitary Society
W HEN a community accustomed, as pre-war Canada was, to maintain only the

tiniest regular military forces, is suddenly plunged into war and finds itself obliged
to raise large bodies of troops, it confronts one of the greatest problems that can face a
modern nation. It must obtain the services of great numbers of its citizens (most of whom
will have no military experience), satisfy itself that they are suitable for the business in
hand, and turn them into soldiers. This entails training long enough and thorough enough
to produce a standard of efficiency that will enable them to meet the enemy and beat him.
Volumes could be written on this process of recruiting and training, which is clearly a
subject of exceptional importance; but space limits the treatment which we can give it
here. The present chapter, accordingly, attempts to give only an outline of the process as
it developed in Canada.
Reliance Upon Voluntary Service
When Canada went to war in 1939, and for a considerable time thereafter, there was
no question of adopting a policy of conscription for military service, either at home or
abroad. The Government relied upon voluntary patriotism and public spirit to fill the
ranks of its armed forces, and in the first period of the war this reliance was not in vain.
The general question of voluntary service and compulsion will be explored in more detail
in a later section of this History, but an attempt must be made here to deal briefly with the
background of the question, as it particularly affected the Army.
The reasons for the unquestioning acceptance of the voluntary principle in 1939 (an
acceptance which might seem the more surprising in view of the fact that Great Britain
had resorted to conscription even before the war
110
RECRUITING AND TRAINING IN CANADA 111
broke out) are not far to seek. They are to be found in Canadian experience in the First
World War and particularly in the social and political consequences of the conscription
measure which was passed in 1917 to keep up the strength of the Canadian Expeditionary
Force. That measure produced a grave threat to the unity of the nation; it temporarily
isolated the Frenchspeaking Province of Quebec, whose people were in general strongly
opposed to the conscription policy, and it introduced into Canadian politics an element of
bitterness which every political leader recognized as dangerous in the extreme. This issue
more than any other, perhaps, dominated the thinking of Canadian parties as they faced
the growing threat of war in the years before 1939. The formula which, it would appear,
both major parties had reached by the spring of 1939 was that the maintenance of
national unity required participation in the war against Hitlerism which seemed
impending -but participation on the basis of repudiating conscription for overseas service.
Pledges against such conscription were made by both Government and Opposition
leaders in March 1939,1 and from that moment it was clear, if it had not been before, that
if war came any forces which Canada might send abroad would have to be raised on a
purely voluntary basis, in the first instance if not for the duration.
This seemed the more practicable in the light of theories which were popular in the
months preceding the outbreak of war. The pledges made against overseas conscription
were closely accompanied, as mentioned earlier, by declarations of belief that large
expeditionary forces were unlikely to be required in any new war. The Prime Minister
said in the House of Commons on 30 March 1939, "One strategic fact is clear: the days of
great expeditionary forces of infantry crossing the oceans are not likely to recur. Two
years ago, I expressed in this House the view that it was extremely doubtful if any of the
British Dominions would ever send another expeditionary force to Europe." On the same
day, the Leader of the Opposition, Dr. R. J. Manion, expressed similar opinions.2 As we
have seen (above, page 13), the Government's pre-war defence policy placed the air force
in first priority, the navy second and the land forces last. This may be taken as
representing its conception of the nature of Canadian effort in another war, and it was
doubtless particularly acceptable on both sides of the House of Commons in that such a
policy seemed to promise less serious pressure on manpower than one based upon "great
expeditionary forces of infantry".
These opinions had been encouraged by the policies of the United Kingdom, which in
1937-38 seem to have been dominated by the idea of a limitedliability war. A British
official document of 1937 assumed that the country's plans would be based "on what may
be termed a war of limited liability, i.e. for example, that there will be no such expansion of
the Army, and consequently of military supply, as occurred in the last war". In line with
these
theories, there had been, a United Kingdom official historian points out, "a strong
temptation to neglect the Army and to concentrate the main effort of rearmament on the
naval and air arms, particularly the latter"; and the temptation was not resisted.3 The
parallel with Canadian policy is obvious. By the spring of 1939, however, the British
Government had abandoned the limited-liability concept. In March of that year it
engaged itself to France to "prepare an army of thirty-two divisions and have it ready for
service wherever it was needed before the end of the first twelve months of war".4 Thus
the idea of an expeditionary army again assumed, belatedly, an important place in British
military planning. No similar development took place in Canada, however, before the
outbreak of war.
Another factor, probably less important in practice, made conscription seem
unnecessary in Canada in 1939. The country had not fully recovered from the depression
which had begun a decade before, and there was still a great deal of unemployment.
Estimates of the number of unemployed at the outbreak of war run as high as 600,000,
and the Federal Government at this time was still making large contributions to
unemployment relief.5 In contrast with the situation in the United Kingdom, a very small
part of the country's working force was engaged in munition production, and this
continued to be the case for months after war began. In these circumstances, it would
have been hard to convince the country that there was any immediate need for
conscription in 1939. The demand for it, and the adoption of it, came only later, when
circumstances had greatly altered.
Recruiting in the Early Days, 1939-1941
The problem of finding men had two aspects: that of filling the ranks of the
mobilizing units in the first place, and that of subsequently providing "reinforcements"
(replacements to fill the gaps that would be made by battle losses or natural wastage).
Both were provided for in the plans made before the outbreak of war, and the procedure
to be followed was broadly outlined in the pamphlet Mobilization Instructions for the
Canadian Militia, 1937.
Recruiting for mobilizing units was the responsibility of each unit's own
Commanding Officer. On getting the order to mobilize, the unit made its own
arrangements, opening its recruiting office and setting up its medical board or boards for
the examination of recruits. The composition of these boards, which were frequently
made up partly of medical officers and partly of civilian doctors, was prescribed in
advance. In examining recruits the boards were guided by another pamphlet, Physical
Standards and Instructions for the Medical Examination of Recruits for the Naval,
Military and Air Services, 1938. This gave detailed instructions for examination and
classification. Without going into details, it may be noted that Category "A"
("Fit for general service") was defined as "Men perfectly fit, mentally and physically, for
all active service conditions of actual warfare in any climate, who are able to march, can
see to shoot, and hear well". This category was required for enlistment in all units of the
Mobile Force, except that Category "B" men could be accepted for units employed on the
lines of communication, or in any unit for "sedentary work" or if they were "skilled
tradesmen employed at their trades". The minimum age for enlistment was 18 years, the
maximum 45. Chest measurement was to be at least 34 inches, although youths between
18 and 19 years of age with minimum chest measurement of 32 inches might be attested
if their general physical condition was good and there was "reasonable chance of
developing under training". The minimum height, as laid down in the 1938 pamphlet,
was five feet four inches; but for horse and field artillerymen it was five feet six, and for
"garrison, heavy and siege" gunners five feet seven inches.
The provision of reinforcements was a responsibility of the Military Districts, under
the supervision of the Adjutant-General's Branch at N.D.H.Q.; and the Mobilization
Instructions provided that a recruiting organization would be prepared to function "as
from the seventh day of mobilization" in every District. It was to consist of a District
Recruiting Officer with as many assistants as might be required. As a general rule,
Depots, those of cavalry and infantry units as well as the District Depot which was to be
set up in each Military District to serve other arms and services, were to act as recruiting
centres for their respective localities.
Detailed instructions for recruiting units on mobilization were contained in "Recruiting
Memorandum No.1", dated 15 May 1939, which was distributed to all officers
commanding Non-Permanent Active Militia units. It provided both for action during the
Precautionary Stage and that required on mobilization. It pointed out that in the latter case a
"duration-of-the-war" engagement for General Service would be required of all individuals
volunteering, as under Section 68 of the Militia Act no officer or soldier of the N.P.A.M.
could be required to serve in the field continuously for a period exceeding 18 months. To
be eligible for enlistment, in addition to being physically fit and within the age limits, men
had to be British subjects and "of good character". Apart from certain obviously
disqualified classes, persons in the following categories were not to be enlisted: graduates
of universities or colleges "in the medical, engineering or other scientific or technical
professions"; graduates or qualified ex-cadets of the Royal Military College of Canada; ex-
cadets of the Canadian Officers Training Corps in possession of certificates of
qualification; and "Bankers and chartered or other Accountants".6 The clear intention was
to ensure that men with special qualifications for service as officers or specialists should
not be wasted through uncontrolled enlistment in the ranks. This was one of the earliest
attempts to provide against unscientific use of manpower. We have already noted the vague
provisions made concerning the enlistment of men with "dependents", which were
interpreted in some areas to prevent the enlistment of married men.
Procedure for enlisting reinforcements was prescribed !in "Recruiting Memorandum
No. 2", which was likewise dated 15 May 1939. This document noted that the recruiting
organization for reinforcements required to be flexible, since it was uncertain whether the
mobilized force would or would not go to a theatre of operations outside Canada; if it did
go abroad, the wastage, and the number of reinforcements required, would naturally be
much higher than if it remained at home. Each District Officer Commanding was made
responsible for obtaining the quotas of recruits required to reinforce the units mobilized
in his District. It was assumed that reinforcements for cavalry and infantry units would be
provided by enlistment at the regimental depots and subsequent dispatch direct to the unit
as long as the latter was in Canada. In the case of technical arms, enlistment would be
through the District Depots.
The system for enlisting reinforcements prescribed in pre-war planning was not
uniformly followed in practice. Some of the mobilized cavalry and infantry units
organized proper depots; some maintained a depot organization of sorts within the Active
Service Force unit; and some organized no depots at all. In July 1940 all regimental
depots were swept away by a General Order,7 and thereafter recruiting reinforcements for
all arms was the business of the District Depots.
The general course of recruiting in September 1939 is outlined in Chapter II, where it
is noted that broadly speaking there was no difficulty in getting the men, although the
intake was much slower in some parts of the country than in others. At this early period
there was certainly no manpower shortage, and the suspension of recruiting led to some
would-be recruits being turned away during the autumn and winter months. Recruiting,
however, never did cease quite entirely, although the number of men attested sank to
2049 in December 1939, the lowest month's figure of the war.8 (See Appendix "B").
When training centres were being opened in January to train reinforcements for the units
overseas, authority was given for enlistments to fill the quotas where C.A.S.F. men were
not available in sufficient numbers.9 Attestations rose to 6412 that month.10
The long process of lowering the qualifications for enlistment began at a very early
date. The first reduction of medical standards came as early as 14 September 1939, when
a Routine Order11 introduced new categories ("AV", "BV" and "CV") to indicate defects
of vision corrected by glasses. Individuals with such defects were made eligible for
enlistment, though not in units of the Mobile Force. In June 1940 another Routine Order12
lowered the general physical requirements for recruits. Men of a minimum height of five
feet, a minimum weight of 120 pounds and a minimum chest measurement of 32 inches
were now declared acceptable. The reasons for this change
are not now available,* but it may be assumed that it was considered necessary, the light
of experience, if the large requirements in men for the new ions then being raised were to
be met. It may be noted that a change - the opposite direction had taken place in
November 1939, when the minimum age for enlistment was raised from 18 to 19 years.13
The requirement at recruits should be British subjects was abandoned on 13 December
1939, when orders were issued permitting the enlistment of aliens, other than enemy, who
had been resident in Canada on 1 September 1939.14 This residence qualification was
dropped in its turn in October 1940.15 American citizens who wanted to fight Hitler
could now enlist in the Canadian forces without perjuring themselves.
The Beginnings of Manpower Scarcity, 1941-1942
We have seen already the consequences of the European events of the spring and
summer of 1940: the raising of new divisions in Canada, and a great rush of recruits to
the colours. There was a large increase in the strength of the mobilized force (from
76,678 all ranks on 31 March 1940 to 177,810 on 29 December 1940);16 from now on,
quite apart from the requirements of new units, there was a constant demand for
reinforcements to fill the gaps caused by natural wastage.
It was in the early months of 1941 that some difficulty began to be encountered in
obtaining the men required for the enlarged Active Force. Recruits were appearing in fair
numbers (there were 5863 General Service enlistments in January)17 but not in numbers
equal to the requirements of the new Army Programme; and the Navy and Air Force were
competing actively for the available men. The combined requirements for the three
services for 1941 were estimated at as many as 130,000 recruits; and the Adjutant
General and his "opposite numbers" in the other services consulted together and
recommended co-ordinated action.18 On 8 April the Ministers for the three services made
a joint broadcast on the needs; the total now mentioned as required was 116,000-72,000
("probably 6,000 men . . . each month") for the Army, 35,000 for the Air Force, and
9,000 for the Navy.19
On 11 May Colonel Ralston opened what he called "Canada's first recruiting
campaign" † with another broadcast;20 he asked for "about 32,000 men for the Canadian
Army in the next two months", emphasizing the increase in requirements caused by the
new measures taken after the disasters in North Africa and Greece (see above, page 93).
The campaign's
*The file concerned, along with a good many others, was unfortunately destroyed as a result of a cloudburst in Ottawa
on 6 July 1947.
†It was not, of course, the first appeal. General Crerar, for instance, had made a definite call on behalf of the Minister
in a broadcast on 22 July 1940.
first results were disappointing, but it gradually gathered momentum and in the end the
objective was attained with something to spare. On 16 July Ralston announced that up to
14 July 33,500 volunteers had been "actually enlisted for service". All told, about 48,000
men had sought to join the Army, but the balance- a rather alarming proportion-had had
to be rejected for medical reasons. During the same period the R.C.A.F. had enlisted
"more than 12,000" and the R.C.N. "about 3500", "bringing the grand total up to about
60,000 who actually volunteered to serve".21
From this time onward, recruiting methods were under constant study and new
expedients were constantly being devised to encourage men to come forward. On 28 July
1941 a Directorate of Recruiting, on a civilian basis, was set up in the Adjutant-General's
Branch at National Defence Headquarters. A French-speaking Associate Director was
appointed, primarily to control activities in the Province of Quebec. Subsequently the
Directorate was reorganized on a military basis as the Directorate of Army Recruiting. It
planned and coordinated recruiting campaigns with the assistance of a "National
Campaign Committee", including representatives of the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation, the National Film Board, the Wartime Information Board, and the
advertising agencies of Canada, as well as of the Directorate of Public Relations (Army).
This Committee held its first meeting on 5 May 1941.22
This organization at Ottawa was supplemented by local organizations in the Military
Districts. Each District had its District Recruiting Officer with a staff to carry on the
actual business of recruiting. They were assisted by Civilian Recruiting Advisers and
committees, composed of public-spirited citizens, who gave much time to the work.23 In
November 1942 District Recruiting Companies were formed. Each consisted of three
elements: a Central Recruiting Station, normally functioning at the District Depot;
Recruiting Sub-Stations, which were set up in the larger centres in the District; and a
Mobile Recruiting Unit which toured the more sparsely settled areas .24
During 1942 many publicity devices were used to keep the need for recruits before
the public. One was the "Army Train", a 15-car railway train containing displays of arms,
clothing and equipment, which toured Canada from coast to coast, beginning in February,
and was "visited by more than 800,000 people".25 Another was "Army Week", first tried
during the week beginning 29 June 1942. During this week, Training Centres were
opened to public inspection, parades and demonstrations were held, and everything
possible was done to focus attention on the Army. Still another expedient was the "Army
Show", which provided entertainment for the troops while at the same time serving
recruiting purposes. It began its work
in December 1942, and reached a large audience through broadcasting as well as more
directly in its cross-country tours.26
All this activity produced satisfactory results in 1942; evidently there was still a
considerable pool of manpower in the country which could be tapped by such methods.
During 1942, in fact, more men and women were enlisted into the Canadian Army than in
any other year of the war, the total of General Service enlistments rising to 130,438,
including 7463 C.W.A.C. This does not include officer appointments, but does include
men called up for compulsory service under the National Resources Mobilization Act
who chose to "go active". At no time during 1942 was there such a rush to enlist as had
taken place in September 1939 or in June and July of 1940, but a steady high average was
maintained throughout the year and in nine of the twelve months enlistments numbered
more than 10,000.27
This could not be expected to go on indefinitely. There was certain to be a limit to the
manpower obtainable by voluntary methods, and the situation took a turn for the worse
early in 1943. Except for November 1944, the last month in which General Service
enlistments exceeded 10,000 was January of 1943, when 11,492 male soldiers were
attested. In February the figure fell to 8633, and there was a steady decline for several
months thereafter. The total male enlistments for 1943 amounted to 69,202, little more
than half of those for 1942.28 As major action by the Canadian Army started only in July
1943, it is evident that a serious decline in voluntary recruiting appeared six months
before heavy battle casualties began. The clear fact is that the manpower accessible
through voluntary methods had been largely exhausted during the long static period. The
combination of this with continuing heavy casualties and a miscalculation of probable
losses as between different arms of the service was to produce a serious crisis late in
1944.
We have referred several times to the extent of normal "wastage". Discharges were
numerous from the beginning. By 30 September 1941, when Canada had been at war for
two years and the Army had seen virtually no action, there had been 40,718 discharges,
mainly on medical grounds.29 The proportion varied between different parts of the country.
By July 1943, when the Army's first large-scale campaign began, 90,061 of the men and
women enrolled for general service had been discharged (3467 deaths, of which only 1348
had been caused by enemy action; 59,100 medically unfit; 5269 unapprehended deserters;
and 22,225 for various other reasons, e.g. release to one of the other armed services, or
misconduct or inefficiency).30 In addition to those discharged the Army had lost, up to 30
June 1943, another 3461 men who had become prisoners of war (mainly at Dieppe and
Hong Kong).31 Total wastage at that date was thus 93,355 all ranks. This
compared with a total of 531,551 all ranks attested for general service; of these, 13,445
were members of the Canadian Women's Army Corps, and 1857 were Nursing Sisters.32
Considering only the grand totals, the Army in forty-six months of war had lost more
than 17 per cent of the people it had recruited; and it had not yet been seriously in action.
The National Resources Mobilization Act:

Compulsory Service for Home Defence
When the National Resources Mobilization-Act was passed in June 1940 (above, page
82) a new element was introduced into the recruiting situation. Overseas service
remained on a purely voluntary basis, but conscription for service in Canada was now the
law of the land. This dualism was a complicating factor for the rest of the war. We must
now examine the Act's results and the manner in which it was administered.
The first measure required to make it effective was a National Registration. This was
held on 19-21 August 1940, all persons, male and female, who had reached the age of
sixteen, being required to register.33 By affording full information concerning men of
military age, it provided the basis for a system of compulsory service. The National
Registration was supervised, and the National Resources Mobilization Act administered
in the first instance, by a new department of government, that of National War Services.
The decision to set up this Department, taken by the Cabinet War Committee on 17 June
1940, was implemented by the Department of National War Services Act,34 assented to
on 12 July. The first Minister was Mr. J. G. Gardiner.
The procedure for making men available for training was defined in "National War
Service Regulations, 1940 (Recruits)".35 Under these Canada was divided into thirteen
Administrative Divisions, corresponding to the eleven Military Districts save that Prince
Edward Island, and that portion of Ontario adjacent to Manitoba and included in Military
District No. 10, were constituted as separate Divisions. For each Division a National War
Services Board of three members was set up. The chairman was a Judge of a Superior or
other Court of the Province in which the larger part of the division was situated; the other
members were representative citizens of the district. The Boards' main function was to
hear applications for postponement made by men called out for training, and decide
whether postponement orders should be granted. The decision of the majority of a board
was final.
In each Administrative Division a Divisional Registrar was appointed. These officials
had the immediate tasks of preparing, from the results of the National Registration, lists
of single men within the age-group 21 to 24. They
listed separately men engaged in seasonal occupations; those who were students of
colleges or universities; those who had some form of military qualification or experience
in the armed services; and the remainder of the group. The Government had decided to
call out in the first instance only men of the ages of 21 to 24 who were unmarried, or
widowers without children. These men were to be subjected to training for 30 days only.*
This was formally announced by a proclamation published in the Canada Gazette on 13
September 1940. On 16 September the Minister of National Defence made upon the
Minister of National War Services the first requisition, for 29,750 men required for
military training for a period of thirty days beginning on 9 October.37
The Divisional Registrars proceeded to call out the men required, selecting them, in
accordance with the Regulations, "so far as is practicable .. . from the younger men of the
age class . . . at the same time endeavouring to call out men proportionately from all parts
of the Division". There were special arrangements covering university students or men in
seasonal occupations; employers of labour were allowed to submit plans for calling out
their employes, over a twelve-month period, in the manner least likely to inconvenience
their businesses; and the National War Services Boards were authorized to grant
indefinite postponements to Mennonites and Doukhobors (who occupied special
positions under the terms of orders in council of 1873 and 1898) or to conscientious
objectors, although all such persons were declared "compellable to do non-combatant
duty".
The young men selected were required to submit themselves for medical examination
to one of the duly-appointed examining physicians in their districts, and, if found fit, to
report to an indicated training centre. Severe penalties were provided for failure to
comply. Under the "Militia (Special) Regulations, 1940",38 all men reporting for training
and passing the supplementary medical examination given at the training centres became
members of the Non-Permanent Active Militia, and each was taken on the strength of an
appropriate N.P.A.M. unit. During their training these "draftees" were paid at N.P.A.M.
rates, somewhat lower than those of the Active Service Force.
On 9 October 27,599 men reported at the thirty-nine "N.P.A.M. Training Centres"39
which had been set up across Canada to receive them. Over 2000 failed to pass the
second medical examination; the rest were given thirty days' intensive elementary
training and sent home again. A second large group reported on 22 November, and a third
on 10 January 1941. Taking the three together, 89,126 men reported, 7248 were rejected
and 81,878 were trained.40 These were the only groups dealt with under the 30-day plan.
*This decision had been reached by 30 July. General Crerar points out that the primary reason for the limited period
was the extreme shortage of modern weapons at this moment; there were simply no means of giving more than 30 days'
effective training.36
The Extension of Compulsory Service
The compulsory service programme had received critical attention in General

Crerar's project for the Army Programme for 1941, presented to the Minister of National
Defence in September 1940 (above, pages 87-89). His first memorandum41 made
proposals synopsized as follows:
Besides the C.A.S.F. overseas and the C.A.S.F. for home defence, we have a
scheme for giving all young men thirty days continuous training, and authority to
train non-permanent active militia thirty days in the year... .
The present war has shown that man-power armies cannot resist the German mechanized land and
air forces . . . our forces may be relatively small but must be highly trained.
Individual training requires 4 months; collective training a further 6 months continuously, thus the
programme contemplated under the National Resources Mobilization Scheme, and the N.P.A.M.
Training Scheme, will be inadequate. We don't need the number of men for which those schemes cater,
but we require longer and more thorough training for a smaller number of men.
We should assert the principle and put it into practice, that men may be compelled to serve for the
defence of Canada in this hemisphere. . . .
Specifically, Crerar recommended extending the N.R.M.A. training period to four

months, so that every enrolee might complete his individual training. Thereafter the
trained men might be posted to home defence formations, or placed on the rolls of reserve
units until required. In accordance with the Government's declared policy, the overseas
army would continue to be exclusively an army of volunteers; but the forces maintained
for home defence would, under this scheme, become increasingly an army of conscripts.
The War Committee, at its meeting of 31 October, approved the four-month training
plan, and following further discussion confirmed this decision on 4 December. A detailed
programme for carrying the scheme into effect was approved by the Committee on 28
January 1941 and subsequently promulgated in "Reserve Army (Special) Regulations,
1941 ".42 These provided:
Upon ... becoming a member of the Active Militia each "R. Recruit"* shall forthwith undergo
training for a period of four months, or for such other period as the Minister of Defence may from time
to time prescribe, unless in the meantime he is required for service or duty. Thereafter, so long as he
remains a member of the Active Militia he shall be liable to perform such training, service or duty, but
only within Canada and the territorial waters thereof, as the Minister of Defence may from time to time
require.43
The men called up were now to be paid at the same rates, and be eligible for the same
Dependents' Allowance, as those volunteering for general service. An "R. Recruit" who
was "employed in a key post in the armament industry" might be released, by authority
and at the discretion of the District Officer Commanding, at the end of two months'
training, on application of his employer.44
*The term adopted to describe a man called out for training under the N.R.M.A. Men enlisting for general service were
known as "A. Recruits".
It was an essential part of the new scheme that General Service recruits and
N.R.M.A. men should train together, going through the same syllabus in the same
camps.45 The training centres which had been set up to train C.A.S.F. reinforcements and
those which had been serving the N.R.M.A. programme were now combined into one
system. Every recruit would now go in the first place to a Basic Training Centre where he
would get two months' elementary "common-to-all-arms" training before passing on to an
Advanced Training Centre for two months' more "special-to-arm" training in the work of
his own arm of the service (Infantry, Artillery, Signals, etc. ) The division of training
centres into these two categories was not necessarily an ideal arrangement; it was adopted
because it was the only means of getting the four-months training scheme going quickly.
There was a temporary shortage of trained instructors in special-to-arm subjects, and
some of the "N.P.A.M. Training Centres" did not have enough ground available for
special-to-arm training.46 The new system began to function on 20 March 1941, when the
first four-month group of N.R.M.A. trainees (4840 21-yearolds) reported to the training
centres. Thereafter a group of comparable size was normally called up every month.47
The next step soon followed. General Crerar, we have seen, favoured using N.R.M.A.
trainees for home defence. In April he asked the Adjutant General to give immediate
consideration to making such use of the 21-yearolds then in training centres, at the end of
their four-month period. Point was given to this requirement by existing shortages in
active units-the same situation which helped to produce the first Army recruiting
campaign, referred to above. On 23 April Colonel Ralston sought and received from the
War Committee authority to post General Service soldiers from coast-defence units to
overseas formations and replace them with men called up under the N.R.M.A. At a press
conference on 26 April, and subsequently in the House of Commons two days later, he
announced that as the men undergoing four months' training completed their course they
would be detailed to units doing coast defence duty in Canada, "thereby enabling the men
in the coastal defence units in Canada to go overseas".48 The trainees who had finished
their training and been posted to home-defence units were known as "Members (H.D.) of
the Canadian Army". This awkward label was subsequently dropped, and N.R.M.A.
trainees and men performing compulsory duty in Canada were alike called "N.R.M.A.
soldiers".49
Another natural advance was made in July, when an order was issued authorizing
recalling to duty for the duration of the war the men called out earlier for 30 days'
training.50 Beginning that month, these men were called out in succession, in groups of
1000 or more, to complete their training and subsequently do duty in Canada.51
With the increase in the training period, and still more following the decision to
retain N.R.M.A. men on permanent duty, the question of post-
ponements or exemptions became much more urgent than when the training period was
30 days only. Special sittings of National War Services Boards were held in the
Advanced Training Centres to enable trainees of the first group undergoing four months'
training (who of course had not known when called up that they would be required for
permanent duty) to apply for postponement of that duty.52 No exemptions from service
under the N.R.M.A. were granted at any time, except in the cases of certain limited
occupational groups, e.g., judges, clergymen, police officers, members of fire brigades,
and officers of penitentiaries, asylums, etc. Postponements, however, were permitted in
many cases, the chief grounds being the importance of the individual to war industry or to
farm production. Under new arrangements introduced in July 1941, applications for
postponement were not heard until after the individual had been medically examined and,
if found fit, enrolled in the Army by the officer known as the "Representative of the
D.O.C." If granted postponement, he was given leave of absence without pay for the
period specified.53
The N.R.M.A. programme did more than provide men to fill the ranks of home-
defence units and thereby release General Service soldiers to go overseas. It also
provided, as an important by-product, large numbers of General Service recruits. Many
men, when called up for training and faced with the prospect of indefinite military service
in Canada, preferred to volunteer for general service and become available as
reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas. Such enlistments began in the spring of
1941, and in all 7868 N.R.M.A. men "went active" that year. In 1942 the figure rose to
18,273, but in 1943 there was a very marked decline, to 6561.54 This was part of the
general recruiting recession of that year.
Changes in the N.R.M.A. and its

Administration, 1942-1943
As the war had proceeded, pressure for a policy of general conscription had
gradually grown, and the demand became more insistent after the attack by Japan in
December 1941. The Government now sought release from its commitments against
compulsory overseas service. The Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament
on 22 January 1942 announced the intention of holding a plebiscite for this purpose. The
voting took place on 27 April, the question presented being, "Are you in favour of
releasing the Government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments
restricting the methods of raising men for military service?" The result was a decisive
"Yes". The overall vote, service and civilian combined, was 2,945,514 "Yes" (or about 64
per cent) as against 1,643,006 "No". The
voters of Quebec, however, maintained their traditional position on the issue, and this
was the only province where a majority (993,663 as against 376,188) voted against
release. Of the service voters in Canada, 84 per cent voted "Yes"; the overseas service
vote was 72 per cent "Yes".55
In May the Government introduced a bill to amend the National Resources
Mobilization Act by deleting the proviso limiting compulsory service to Canada and
Canadian waters. The amending act56 received the Royal Assent on 1 August. The
Government now possessed full powers to institute general conscription when and if it
thought fit to do so. In practice it held these powers in reserve until November 1944,
when drafted men were sent to Europe for the first time. In the interim, however, a
succession of orders in council gradually widened the scope of employment of N.R.M.A.
men within the North American zone. This process began even before the amending act
was passed, when an order in council of 15 May authorized sending N.R.M.A. men of
two battalions to the United States to guard prisoners of war in transit.57 On 4 September
1942, authority was given for employing draftees in three specified anti-aircraft units in
Alaska.58 Ten days later the Government authorized using them in specific units in
Newfoundland (including Labrador) ;59 and in November the dispatch of N.R.M.A.
personnel of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion to the United States for training was
approved.60 On 18 June 1943 another order, passed to cover the enterprise against Kiska,
provided for using N.R.M.A. men in "the Territory of Alaska (including the Aleutian
Islands and other United States islands adjacent thereto)". The Kiska project might have
produced very heavy fighting.61 On 11 August 1943 a generalized order62 authorized em-
ployment in any Active unit serving in Newfoundland (including Labrador), Bermuda,
the Bahamas, Jamaica, British Guiana, Alaska and the United States; on 31 August this
was extended to men not on the strength of Active units.63 Thus the way was opened for
releasing considerable numbers of General Service soldiers for service overseas. There
was no further change until November 1944, when a serious shortage in infantry
reinforcements for the overseas army led the government to authorize sending N.R.M.A.
soldiers in Europe.
In the autumn of 1942 the decision was taken to transfer the administration of the
compulsory service programme under the N.R.M.A. from the Department of National
War Services to the Department of Labour. It was felt that the control of civilian labour
and the calling -up of men for military service could be most effectively coordinated if
placed under the same department. The new arrangement was authorized by order in
council of 26 September 194264 and became effective on 1 December. Thereafter requisi-
tions for personnel to be called up for training and duty were addressed by the
Department of National Defence to the Department of Labour.
Certain topics connected with manpower administration have been left for treatment
in a subsequent volume. These include inter-service aspects of the question, and
particularly competition between the services for recruits, and the measures taken to
alleviate it. The various steps taken to ensure the most economical use of manpower,
including the institution of a personnel selection organization, are likewise left aside. In
general, the final stages of the army manpower question, when it assumed the proportions
of a crisis and became a national problem of the. most serious nature, seem most
appropriately dealt with in a volume devoted to the larger aspects of policy.
The Canadian Women's Army Corps
The year 1941 witnessed the inauguration of a women's corps of the Canadian Army.
This was a product both of the manpower stringency which was beginning to appear at
this period, and of the urgent desire of Canadian women to wear official uniform and play
a direct part in the armed services.
There was no official women's corps in the Canadian military forces during the First
World War, although women served with them in Canada and Britain in various civilian
capacities. In 1918 consideration was given to forming a "Canadian Women's Army
Auxiliary Corps", and in September 1918 the Militia Council actually approved this in
principle.65 The war was then nearly over, however, and no action was taken. The only
Canadian women who served in army uniform in 1914-18 were the nursing sisters of the
Army Medical Corps.
The organization of women's auxiliary corps for the armed services in Great Britain
began before the outbreak of war in 1939, the Auxiliary Territorial Service being
authorized in September 1938, the month of the Munich crisis. Partly perhaps as a result
of this British example, Canadian women began forming unofficial and voluntary
organizations from this time onward. These multiplied after the outbreak of war and
existed in every part of the country. Some of these "corps", all of which originated in a
public-spirited desire to aid actively in the war effort, sought official recognition and
status; but as the official_ employment of women came under more serious discussion,
the Government's view was that it was better to set up entirely new organizations, which
could not be objects of jealousy or competition among the voluntary groups.66
The formation of a women's corps of the Army was discussed at National Defence
Headquarters from the summer of 1940,67 but there was no action until the following year.
On 14 February 1941 the Adjutant General (Major-General B. W. Browne) recommended
to the Minister of National Defence the formation of a "Canadian Women's (Army)
Service". Except
for tradesmen, he wrote, there was no existing shortage of manpower, but the time was at
hand when it would be necessary to utilize the services of women to replace soldiers "to a
much greater extent than at present".68 In April the Navy, Army and Air Force discussed
the question jointly, but neither Navy nor Air Force thought employing women necessary
at the time, nor did the Army feel that it was urgent. The opinion was expressed, how-
ever, that it would be desirable for each of the three services to control entirely any
women's service which might be formed to work with it.69 There had been some
suggestion that a women's service might be formed under the Department of National
War Services, which would supply women to the armed forces, or perhaps to other
departments, as they might be required. The forces had no objection to accepting
personnel from National War Services, but wished also to be able to enlist directly any
women considered particularly suitable.
The matter became more urgent when it was suggested that the British Air Ministry
might employ members of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force in R.A.F. schools in Canada,
and the Associate Deputy Minister of National War Services, Mr. Justice T. C. Davis,
was asked to investigate. His report, rendered to the War Committee on 8 May,
recommended that the Defence Departments should create either "one Women's
Auxiliary Force" or a separate force for each service.70 On 13 May the War Committee
decided that the Department of National War Services should undertake, in collaboration
with the defence departments, the provision of "female auxiliary personnel" required by
the armed services. Subsequently, however, it was decided that the services should
organize women's corps of their own, although for a time National War Services carried
on the recruiting. Detailed planning for the Army was undertaken by the Adjutant-
General's Branch late in June.71 The Government's decision to enlist women volunteers
for the armed forces and form a Canadian Women's Army Corps was announced on 27
June, 1941,72 and on 30 July the War Committee approved Colonel Ralston's specific
proposals for the establishment of the Corps. Recruiting began in September, and 1256
women had been appointed or enlisted in the Corps by 31 December.73 Many recruits
came from the unofficial organizations.
In the first instance, the Corps was not part of the Army and not subject to military
law. Accordingly, instead of using military terms for officers' ranks, designations similar
to those of the Auxiliary Territorial Service in the United Kingdom were used; the
equivalent of "Lieutenant" was "Subaltern", and of "Lieutenant Colonel", "Chief
Commander". Badges of rank were also different from those of the Army, arrangements
of maple leaves and beavers being used instead of the familiar crowns and stars.74 In
1942, however, the status of the C.W.A.C. was materially changed. The fact that the
Corps had not been part of the Army had caused many administrative
difficulties, particularly in connection with consideration of post-discharge benefits.

Accordingly, by order in council of 13 March 194275 the Canadian Women's Army Corps
was named as a Corps of the Active Militia, and came under military law, with effect
from 1 March. C.W.A.C. officers now assumed Army ranks and badges of rank.
Throughout the war the C.W.A.C. was paid at rates lower than those of male soldiers.
The original rates, which were supposed to approximate those of the Civil Service, gave a
Volunteer (Private) 90 cents per day on enlistment as compared with $1.30 for a male
recruit, while a Chief Commander received $6.70 (the regimental pay of a Lieutenant
Colonel in the army was $10.00 per day). In 1943, however, the C.W.A.C. rates of pay
were increased to 80 per cent of those of other corps of the Army.76
The "administration" of C.W.A.C. personnel was necessarily somewhat complicated.
Although the great majority of the women of the Corps were employed in non-C.W.A.C.
units, it was desirable that their discipline and personal problems should be dealt with by
female officers. In the first instance, all C.W.A.C. personnel were kept on the strength of
C.W.A.C companies, which were responsible for them in all respects except employment.
This system proved unsatisfactory, one of the disadvantages being that women were
shown on the strength returns of both C.W.A.C. companies and employing units, thus
giving a false overall strength. Matters of discipline and promotion were complicated by
the dual authority. In August 1943, accordingly, a different policy was introduced.77 All
C.W.A.C. officers and other ranks employed with other than C.W.A.C. units were now
taken off the strengths of their C.W.A.C. companies and placed on those of the
employing units. The only women remaining on the strength of C.W.A.C. companies
were their own administrative staffs, newly-enlisted personnel, etc. It should be noted,
however, that upon being thus enrolled by their employing units, C.W.A.C. "other ranks"
were "attached back" to a C.W.A.C. company for administration, including pay and
discipline and, where applicable, quarters and rations. In urban centres where male
soldiers employed at static headquarters were usually placed "on subsistence" and
allowed to find their own quarters, C.W.A.C. personnel were normally accommodated in
barracks.
The military duties undertaken by the C.W.A.C. were various, increasingly so as the
war proceeded. Many were clerical, and large numbers of C.W.A.C. women were
ultimately employed at National Defence Headquarters, in spite of initial doubts on the
part of the Civil Service Commission.78 Other forms of employment ranged from service
in the Army Show, whose concert parties entertained our troops in Britain and the
theatres of war, to duty as junior staff officers replacing male officers at static
headquarters. There were laundry workers, cooks, drivers, switchboard operators, cipher
operators, dental assistants, postal sorters, and many other
"trades". In 1942, following some experimentation in Pacific Command, the Army

Council authorized the employment of C.W.A.C. women in gun operations rooms, etc.,
in connection with anti-aircraft defence.79 Although the vast majority of C.W.A.C.
women served only in Canada, a detachment was sent to Washington, D.C., and in
November 1942 a first C.W.A.C. draft arrived in the United Kingdom. Subsequently the
C.W.A.C. served overseas in considerable numbers,* not only in Britain but at the
Canadian administrative headquarters in the two main theatres of operations, Italy and
North-West Europe.80
All told, 21,624 women served in the Canadian Women's Army Corps during the
war. At the end of hostilities in Europe in May 1945, the Corps' strength was 636 officers
and 13,326 other ranks.81 Although its formation had been undertaken belatedly and not
without some misgivings, it had proved a triumphantly successful experiment. Without
the C.W.A.C., Canada's manpower problem would have been considerably more difficult
of solution. The C.W.A.C. in itself, however, was far from representing a complete
answer to that problem; for the Corps' strength at the time of the German surrender was
only 2.8 per cent of the total strength of the Army.
The Selection of Officers for the Army
Much could be written on the problem of finding the very large number of new
officers required by the Canadian Army during the war, and few topics are more
important. However, the policies followed can be only summarized in this place.
The Mobilization Instructions in effect in 1939 provided that mobilizing units might
find officers from their own Active Lists or Corps Reserves, or from the Reserve of
Officers. Other expedients authorized were transfer from other units; appointment of
graduates or ex-cadets of the Royal Military College, or members and former members of
the Canadian Officers Training Corps possessing certificates of qualification; and
promotion from the ranks.82 In September 1939 some C.A.S.F. units wished to have
unqualified officers posted to them. It was recommended that in such cases the candidate
should first be commissioned in the Non-Permanent Active Militia, and be posted to the
C.A.S.F. only after qualifying for commissioned rank in the N.P.A.M. or on being sent to
an Officers Wing of a Training Centre. It was admitted that exceptions might have to be
made in the case of units with inadequate or non-existent peace establishments, such as
those of the Ordnance and Provost Corps. The Chief of the General Staff accepted these
recommendations.83
*See bellow, Chap. VI.

It follows that in the first instance the Canadian Active Service Force was officered
almost entirely by men who already held commissions in 1939. In general, the active lists
of the Militia units which were ordered to mobilize provided the officers who were
needed. Beyond these, there were numerous officers on the corps or general reserves who
were willing and anxious to serve; and in spite of the instructions which had been issued
limiting the enlistment of university graduates, etc., there was much good officer material
available in the ranks of the mobilizing units, both among the peacetime personnel and
the new recruits.
We may note in passing that in 1939 Canadian units were mobilized on United
Kingdom war establishments which substituted Warrant Officers Class III ("platoon
sergeant majors") for a proportion of lieutenants—a total of eleven platoon commanders
in the case of an infantry battalion.- This scheme of making a junior warrant officer do a
commissioned officer's work proved to have nothing to commend it in practice, and both
the British and Canadian armies abandoned it in 1940.84
One source of well-qualified officers, few in number, however, was the Royal
Military College of Canada, at Kingston, which had conducted cadet training of officers
for the Canadian military forces, on a four-year-course basis, since 1876. At the outbreak
of war there were 200 cadets at the College. The policy then decided upon was that the
first class, i.e., the fourth-year men, would be offered commissions and would leave the
College immediately; the second class would remain there until the Christmas "break,"
when they too would be offered commissions. The third and fourth classes would stay at
the College until the end of the school year, and would then be considered qualified as
officers. This policy was carried out with respect to the first and second classes, but a
subsequent change resulted in only one class graduating in June 1940. The fourth class,
which had entered the College in September 1939, did not graduate until June 1941. In
addition, 100 new cadets were admitted in September 1940. These, however, were the
last to enter during the war. They graduated in the summer of 1942, and the College, as a
cadet college, was then closed for the duration of the war.85 A four-year course to produce
subaltern officers, though it paid large dividends for a peacetime regular army, was not an
economic or practical arrangement in wartime.
The decision to close R.M.C. was related to other far-reaching decisions on the
supply of officers. As we have seen, there was no shortage, but rather a surplus, of
officers in the early months of the war;* but as soon as
*The present writer's own experience may illustrate this. In 1939 he was a member of the Reserve of Officers and
living in the United States. In the first week of September he offered his services to Headquarters Military District No. 2
and was politely advised that he would be informed when he was required. Subsequent inquiries met with similar responses
until October 1940, when some hope of employment was held out. By that time, however, the writer had got into the
C.A.S.F. by another route.
the Army began to expand in earnest in the summer of 1940, the question of officer
supply became more urgent. In August, Brigadier Stuart, Deputy Chief of the General
Staff, made the suggestion that the time had come "when all commissions should be
granted only through the ranks".86 The stages by which this policy evolved thereafter are
not clear, but on 15 November 1940 Colonel Ralston announced in the House of
Commons the broad lines on which it was intended to proceed. He said that measures
were to be taken to ensure "more uniformity" and a higher "standard of officer
qualification":
Included in these measures is the decision that for the future every candidate for a commission in
the Canadian Army must first pass through the ranks….This system has been based on a study of the
experiences of the last war and on the present practice in the British Army.
Regulations for putting the new policy into effect were not approved until March
1941. It was then decided that it would apply both to the Active and Reserve Armies. The
time to be spent in the ranks was laid down as four months for Active units, and
approximately one year (or the 30-day annual training period) for Reserve units.
Exceptions were to be made in the cases of certain specialists, primarily those having
technical university degrees or other specialized training suitable for appointment to the
Engineers, JudgeAdvocate General's Branch, the Pay or Ordnance Corps or the Chaplain
Service.87 About the same time that this policy was approved, two Officers Training
Centres were set up to train the men selected under it, and the production of
reinforcement officers on a large scale began (see below, page 138).
The selection of men from the ranks for officer training was a matter requiring careful
handling. The British authorities, who probably had in proportion to the size of their army
a rather smaller pool of "potential officer material" available than Canada, gave much
attention to the problem, and their experience influenced Canadian policy. It was
necessary to set up some machinery for "screening" candidates and selecting those most
likely to succeed. In Britain, as early as the autumn of 1940, a selection committee of
senior Canadian officers was set up to interview candidates for commissions
recommended by unit and formation commanders and select those to go to the Canadian
Officer Cadet Training Unit.88 This unit had been opened at Bordon, Hants (near
Aldershot) in August.89 In Canada itself, where the problem was larger, policy
crystallized more slowly.
Certain basic principles had been laid down by the Minister of National Defence (Mr.
Rogers) in a memorandum to the C.G.S. dated 3 October 1939.90 He had decided, he said,
that the granting of commissions and promotions should be "determined by the proper
service authorities on the basis of merit alone," and he would make "no personal
recommendations" on these matters. Men in the ranks were "entitled to feel that merit will
open a clear path of promotion to commissioned rank which would not be the case if
commissions were granted on the basis of personal or political influence." Applications
for commissions were to be made,-in the first instance, to unit Commanding Officers or
District Officers Commanding, and any "use of outside influence" was to be "regarded as
an admission on the part of the applicant that the case is not good on its merits". In
directing in this memorandum that there was to be "no political or personal bias of any
kind" the Minister took, perhaps, too little account of the imperfections of humanity. It
would have been strange if, in the granting of over 40,000 commissions, there were no
cases where the "political or personal" influence of individuals played some part.
Nevertheless, it is the present writer's belief that in general the principles laid down by
Mr. Rogers were strictly followed, and that the wartime record of the Army in this
respect is a proper matter for satisfaction.
On 27 March 1940 a Routine Order laid down the procedure to be followed in
Canada in appointing officers from among men serving in the ranks. It was simple and
traditional: selection by the soldier's Commanding Officer and approval by "higher
authority", followed by the grant of a temporary commission, which would be forfeited if
the individual failed to qualify "on attendance at an appropriate training centre". The
educational standard required was that prescribed in King's Regulations and Orders for
the Canadian Militia, 1939 - to have passed a provincial matriculation examination or its
equivalent.91 With the adoption of the new policy of commissioning from the ranks,
something more seemed to be required. Nevertheless, the arrangements for selection
authorized in the summer of 1941 differed from the earlier ones in only one important
respect: units were now instructed to set up unit selection boards, headed by the
Commanding Officer, which would forward recommendations to the district or formation
commander concerned. Very careful consideration of candidates' qualities was enjoined.
It was now provided that men from the ranks going to Officers Training Centres would
no longer be commissioned at this stage, but would have the status of "Cadets".
Specialists who by virtue of professional or other qualifications were exempt from
service in the ranks would be granted commissions before going to the Centres.92
Late in 1942 there was a considerable advance in policy. An "Officers Selection,
Promotion, Reclassification and Disposal Board" was set up at N.D.H.Q. under the
chairmanship of Brigadier Howard Kennedy,93 and the whole system was reorganized
under its direction. It was now decided that any soldier might be permitted to apply for a
commission, and that a careful review should be made of men already serving with a
view to discovering "officer material".94 Moreover, two Officer Selection and Appraisal
Centres (one at Three Rivers, P.Q., for Eastern Canada, and one at Chilliwack, B.C., for
Western Canada) were set up and began functioning in the spring and
summer of 1943. At these Centres, Officer Selection and Appraisal Boards were
established (two at Three Rivers, one at Chilliwack). They were described as "impartial
Boards composed of senior officers of all Corps, together with Psychiatrists,
Psychologists and Educational Officers, presided over by Brigadiers with long experience
in selecting and training officers".95 At the Centres candidates were put through a series
of tests lasting one week, designed to show their fitness or otherwise for commissioning;
they were then interviewed by one of the Boards, with the results of the tests before it,
and a final decision made as to whether they should be sent to an Officers Training
Centre. The normal period of service in the ranks required before recommendation for
commissioning was now fixed at five months. Every recruit entering the Army was to
pass through a Reception Centre where he would be interviewed by an Army Examiner
(i.e., a Personnel Selection Officer), given a "general classification" test ("M" test) and
appraised as to his possible fitness for commissioning.* Thereafter, men considered
potential officers would be watched and reported on as their training proceeded, and
those who made good would be sent in due course to a Selection and Appraisal Centre.98
This uniform and "scientific" system of officer selection was introduced very late, at
a time when the former shortage of officers was about to be transformed into a surplus.
The result was that it functioned at full capacity for only a short time. In September 1943
the Selection and Appraisal Board and Centre at Chilliwack were closed, and the similar
facilities at Three Rivers moved to the Officers Training Centre at Brockville. There they
continued to operate, "on a greatly reduced scale", until June 1945.99
In spite of the decision taken in 1940, a considerable number of officers continued to be
"directly" commissioned throughout the war. All told, 42,613 commissions were granted in
the wartime Active Army (to the end of June 1946). Of these, 22,339 were direct, and
20,274 were from the ranks. The direct ones of course included all those Permanent Force
and Non-Permanent Active Militia officers who were appointed from the Active and
Reserve lists at the beginning of the war or later. Many of these officers had served in the
ranks at earlier stages of their careers, and the overall figures just quoted therefore require
some qualification. Between 1 April 1941 (when the policy of commissioning from the
ranks may be said to have become effective) and the end of the war, 19,322 officers were
appointed from the ranks of the Active Army and 10,929 direct commissions were
*The Directorate of Personnel Selection had been formed at Ottawa on 18 September 1941. Officers were stationed at
Basic Training Centres and District Depots thereafter to assist in ensuring that recruits were allocated to the duty for which
they were best suited.96
Receptien Centres, one per Military District, and normally located at the District Depot, were set up by an order of 3
December 1942.97 Their function was to provide uniform facilities for the medical examination of recruits and the other
formalities involved in "inducting" men into the Army.
granted.100 In other words, during this period nearly two-thirds of` the Army's officer
vacancies were filled by men who had served in the ranks. The direct commissions are
accounted for by the exceptions- for specialists permitted under the 1940 policy, and by
the fact that officers of Reserve units mobilized into the Active Force were given direct
Active commissions subject to qualification. It must be realized further that many of
these latter officers had had service in the ranks in the Reserve Army; this indeed was
itself a result of the 1940 policy, which provided that Reserve as well as Active Officers
should be appointed from the ranks. Statistics are not available for the number of Reserve
Army officers appointed to the Active Army who had served in the Reserve ranks, but it
must have been very considerable.
The Training Process in Canada
We pass on now to consider the process of training the soldier. This has become
longer and more complicated in proportion as warfare has become more scientific. A
modern army contains great numbers of specialists, some of whom may be able to make
use of skills acquired in civil life, but many of whom, on the contrary, must be taught
from the ground up. This is not limited to the technical arms. The soldier in an infantry
rifle company in 1939-45 required to understand and be able to use a wide variety of
complicated weapons and equipment, mastery of which could be acquired only by long
and careful instruction.
As in the case of recruiting, the present topic falls into two sections: the training of
the units which were mobilized as such; and the training of the individuals subsequently
enlisted as reinforcements to fill future gaps in those units' ranks.
The Training of Mobilized Units
The training of a newly-mobilized unit of the Active Army was the responsibility of
the unit's own Commanding Officer. He was assumed to be capable of supervising, under
the direction and with the assistance of higher authority, a training programme adequate
to fit a completely raw recruit for action, or to bring up to the same standard a soldier
who had already had some degree of training.
Unit commanders were not of course left entirely to their own devices and resources.
Training policy was prescribed in the first instance by National Defence Headquarters. The
earliest general instructions for the Canadian Active Service Force were issued on 27
September 1939, in a Routine Order101 which laid down in very general terms the principles
on
which training was to proceed. It provided, among other matters, that, until divisions
were concentrated as such, District Officers Commanding were responsible for the
training of units quartered in their respective Districts; and it was their particular
responsibility to arrange courses for training regimental instructors. In some cases at
least, non-commissioned officers of the Permanent Force were attached to newly-
mobilized C.A.S.F. units as instructors; and from early dates selected personnel from the
units were dispatched, as indicated above, to take specialist courses arranged by the
District or otherwise. The officers or non-commissioned officers attending these courses
were then able to return to their units as qualified instructors, passing on to the personnel
of the unit at large the knowledge they had obtained.
As already indicated, the training was conceived in two stages: individual and
collective. The first stage was designed to teach the soldier discipline and the handling of
his own weapons and equipment; in the second he learned to work as part of a team in the
business of tactical manoeuvre.
The Organization of Training Centres
The training of reinforcements was a different problem, and clearly required a special
organization. The probable need for training units or training centres had of course been
recognized before the war, and a certain amount of planning had been done. The Director
of Military Training and Staff Duties recommended in August 1939 that plans be made
for training centres for the various arms and branches of the service, and locations were
suggested.102
When war came, and the decision was made to send troops abroad, the formation of
centres to train reinforcements became a matter of urgency. Arrangements were made for
fourteen training centres across the country. Five of these were for infantry (rifle) and two
for infantry (machine-gun) units; the other arms and services had one centre each. Three
were Permanent Force establishments which had existed before the war and had already
given good wartime service: the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicles Training Centre,
Camp Borden, which had been given this new title in September 1939; the Royal Canadian
Army Service Corps Training Centre, also at Borden, which had existed since 1938, and the
Canadian Signal Training Centre, Barriefield, Ontario, which had been set up in 1936.103
The fourteen centres duly received their first quotas of reinforcements for training on 15
January 1940, except that the Engineer Training Centre at Halifax and the Royal Canadian
Army Medical Corps Training Centre at Ottawa did not open until the next month. At the
end of February, 5465 reinforcements of all ranks were being instructed in the C.A.S.F.
training
centres, whose staffs then totalled 2564 all ranks.104 In May 1940 the number of C.A.S.F.
training centres was increased with the organization of two Small Arms Training Centres,
one at Connaught Camp, Ottawa, and the other at Sarcee Camp, Alberta.105
When compulsory training began under the National Resources Mobilization Act,
"N.P.A.M. Training Centres" were set up to receive the 30-day trainees. These were
manned by staffs found in great part from Corps Reserves and the Reserve of Officers, or
from N.P.A.M. units. The staffs, although not in the first instance forming part of the
Canadian Active Service Force, were, unlike the trainees at this period, paid at C.A.S.F.
rates. Of the thirty-nine N.P.A.M. Training Centres, 21 were four-company centres, while
four were three-company and nine were two-company centres, and five had one company
only.106 As already noted, they began their work on 9 October, and it was reported that
they did it well. A visiting officer wrote, "The training carried out in the centres ... was of
a surprisingly high standard".107
After the decision to extend the compulsory training period to four months and
consolidate the training of the General Service recruits and the N.R.M.A. men (above,
page 120), the original C.A.S.F. Training Centres, together with eight of the former
N.P.A.M. Training Centres (which had lately been renamed Canadian Army (Reserve)
Training Centres), became Advanced Training Centres, with the function of giving
"special-to-arm" training to both "A" and "R" recruits. Most of the remainder of the
Reserve centres now became Basic Training Centres, in which elementary training
common to all arms was given (see above, page 121).108 By the autumn of 1941 there
were 27 Basic Training Centres and 32 Advanced Training Centres operating. The latter
included two teaching coast-defence and anti-aircraft artillery work and the two Small
Arms Training Centres, as well as two Officers Training Centres and several
establishments engaged in special or trades training.109
Training Developments in 1942-1944
The early weeks of 1942 brought increased demands for reinforcements, to complete
the First Canadian Army and the divisions being mobilized for home defence. A
considerable increase in training centre capacity was now authorized, existing
establishments being enlarged and new ones set up;110 the number of basic training centres,
which had grown to 28, was increased to 40.* (Two of the new ones were Educational
Basic Training Centres,
*For this multiplication, which appears to have been uneconomic, there was no sound military reason. Major-General
H. F. G. Letson, then Adjutant General, remarks that there was some pressure to "train the boys close to home". The Army
would have preferred the opposite policy.111
where illiterate or semi-literate recruits could be given elementary education sufficient to

enable them to be useful soldiers.) Once the immediate need had been met, however, the
new organization proved larger than the normal reinforcement stream required. At 31
May 1943 "the total capacity of basic and advanced training centres was more than
78,000 all ranks at one time".112
As early as 6 November 1942 the Army Council had agreed that the linking of basic
and advanced training centres on a corps basis would lessen the administrative burden
and increase efficiency.113 However, it proved impossible to introduce this new "Link
Training Plan" until 5 August 1943. Under it, all corps except the Infantry, the Armoured
Corps (less reconnaissance units) and the Medical Corps carried out both basic and
advanced training at Corps Training Centres. In the cases of those three corps, certain
basic training centres were linked to specific corps training centres in the same parts of
the country. All men destined as reinforcements for a single corps were sent from their
District Depot to a common training centre and remained together during the whole of
their training, both basic and advanced, with resulting advantage to esprit de corps.* A
by-product of the new scheme (and of the "completion of capital commitments for the
Army Overseas" and the decline in recruiting) was the closing of 13 basic training centres
and reductions in the size of others.115
In the autumn of 1943 correspondence with Canadian Military Headquarters,
London, underlined the need for better coordination of training between Canada and
overseas, and reflected dissatisfaction in the overseas army with the state of training of
the reinforcements arriving from Canada.116 Training syllabi were altered accordingly,
and it was felt that the introduction of the Link Training Plan would raise the standards
materially.117 A special measure taken at this period was the establishment at Debert in
October of No. 1 Training Brigade Group. This formation, composed of training units of
all the arms except the Armoured Corps and Signals (but not all the services), had the
task of giving a final four-week course to reinforcements before they were sent overseas.
This served to review and check their individual training and introduce them to
elementary collective training up to battalion or equivalent level. At the end of their time
in the Brigade Group, reinforcements went to a Transit Camp to await embarkation.118
Hereafter there were few changes in the organization of training in Canada. For the
rest of the war, "the flow of reinforcements continued to be from Reception Centres to
Basic Training Centres to Corps Training Centres to Training Brigade Group or Transit
Camp and thence overseas".119 But the infantry reinforcement crisis which began to
manifest itself in the late summer of 1944, when it became apparent that official casu
*During 1943 the arrangement in effect since 1939 by which a recruit enlisted into a specific corps was abrogated, and
all enlistments thereafter were for general service in the first instance. Recruits were then allotted to corps by the Army
Examiner at the Reception Centre.114
alty estimates had been too low for infantry and too high for other arms, necessitated
rapid adjustments of training-centre capacities. The re-mustering and re-training of
reinforcements of other corps as infantry was the great need. It was met by converting
one Medical Corps and two Armoured Corps centres into Infantry Basic Training
Centres, devoting all the facilities of one Corps Training Centre to the conversion and
refresher training of noncommissioned officers being prepared for dispatch overseas, and
utilizing the infantry portion of the Training Brigade Group for the concentration of other
ranks for the same purposes. One Army Service Corps and three Artillery training centres
were closed, certain other corps centres were reduced, and all Reconnaissance, Army
Service Corps and Medical training was concentrated at Camp Borden. In addition to
increasing infantry facilities, these measures permitted considerable manpower
economies in Canada.120
Special Training Establishments and Trades Training
The natural tendency, under modern conditions, is for specialized training

establishments to multiply, and this tendency appeared very clearly in Canada. Special
training centres and schools were very numerous. For, example, the Canadian School of
Army Administration, located successively at St. Johns, P.Q., Esterel, P.Q. and
Kemptville, Ont., provided an Administrative Staff Course (the word "Staff" was later
dropped from the designation) as well as courses for Quartermasters and Quartermaster-
Sergeants and Clerks.121 A Battle Drill School was set up at Vernon, B.C., and
subsequently became the Canadian School of Infantry.122 The Canadian School of
Artillery (later redesignated "Canadian Artillery School") was opened at Petawawa in
July 1942.123 The Canadian Driving and Maintenance School, at Woodstock, Ont., gave
courses in Advanced Driving and Maintenance for both wheeled and tracked vehicles,
and a Commanding Officers' short mechanical transport course.124 The Canadian
Chemical Warfare School was set up at Suffield, Alta.,125 and a Combined Operations
School at Courtenay, B.C.126 A complete list of training centres and establishments as
they existed in the summer of 1943 will be found in Appendix "D".
Active efforts were made, increasingly as time passed, to maintain effective liaison
with the Army Overseas in order to ensure high standards and realistic syllabi in training
establishments in Canada. With this in view, instructors from overseas were brought back
to Canada for tours of duty at training centres and schools. When in September 1943 the
Commandant of the Canadian Training School in England (Colonel T. E. D'O. Snow)
made a tour of establishments in Canada, he laid great emphasis upon such contacts,
remarking, "The only live, worthwhile liaison is personal liaison".127
Since the army of 1939-45 was, as we have already indicated, to a great extent an
army of specialists and technicians, "containing over 30 per cent tradesmen",128 trades
training was of the greatest importance from the beginning. The topic is enormous, but
space permits only a few words. As the war went on, very large measures were found
necessary to provide trained tradesmen. Trades training policy at N.D.H.Q. was handled
by a special section of the Directorate of Military Training until April 1942, when a
separate Directorate of Trades Training was set up.129 Considerable use was made of
civil facilities, including Youth Training Centres and Technical and Vocational Schools,
and many tradesmen were trained in the two latter under what was called the War
Emergency Training Plan.* The Army itself, however, was obliged to undertake trades
training on an important scale. On 10 December 1940 the Cabinet War Committee
authorized setting up the Canadian Army Trades School. This large school, originally
planned for Barriefield, Ont., but finally opened in May 1941 at Hamilton, Ont., was
designed to instruct 2000 soldiers at one time in a great variety of trades, including those
of welder, electrician, carpenter, driver mechanic, bricklayer, blacksmith, clerk,
armourer, equipment repairer, fitter, machinist, cook, coppersmith, motor mechanic and
instrument mechanic. By the end of 1944, over 15,000 soldiers (including many
C.W.A.C. personnel) had successfully completed training at the C.A.T.S.130 In the spring
of 1942, Vocational Training Schools were set up, one in each Military District. Their
original function was the administration of soldiers training in civilian schools, but
subsequently they themselves conducted trades training courses. Special arrangements
were made for enlisting youths 17 and 18 years of age for trades training; they were
enlisted in a Canadian Technical Training Corps and carried on the strength of these
Vocational Training Schools.131 Other trades schools conducted by the Army are listed in
Appendix "D".
Training the C.W.A.C.
Training the Canadian Women's Army Corps had two aspects: giving the recruits a
modicum of military training, and teaching them trades. Many, of course, had trades
training (e.g., as stenographers) before enlistment, and some had acquired some military
knowledge in the voluntary organizations. In the earliest days of the Corps, training was
organized locally under direction of District Officers Commanding;132 but in February
1942 the first C.W.A.C. training centre opened at Ste. Anne de Bellevue, P.Q. After a
preliminary course for officers and N.C.Os. it began a regular series of four
*This was developed from the youth training plan set up by the Department of Labour in the depression days before
the war.
week courses on military subjects for officers and other ranks. Two other C.W.A.C. basic
training centres were set up later in the year, and thereafter the one at Ste. Anne was
given over to advanced and officer training.133
Trades training for the C.W.A.C. passed through a similar evolution, beginning with
training under District arrangements and progressing by the autumn of 1942 to courses
organized on a national scale by N.D.H.Q. Courses for cooks, drivers and stenographers
were the greatest immediate need. Some of these were held at the C.W.A.C. training
centres, some at other establishments. As time passed, many C.W.A.C. women went as
students to the various trade schools established for the instruction of male soldiers, and,
as in the case of male soldiers, much use was made of technical and vocational schools
and other civilian facilities.134
The Training of Officers
The proper training of new officers was of fundamental importance. As already

explained, many of these reinforcement officers were found in the ranks of the Active
Army, but they could not be commissioned without passing through a process of training
to give them the special knowledge an officer requires, training which would at the same
time serve as a final "screening" process to determine their fitness for commissions.
The Canadian Army Overseas, we have seen, had its own Officer Cadet Training Unit
as early as August 1940. In Canada the training of young officers was placed upon a
centralized and systematic basis in the spring of 1941, when two Officers Training
Centres were opened, at Brockville, Ont., for Eastern Canada and at Gordon Head, near
Victoria, B.C., for Western Canada. The syllabus at these Centres included four weeks
spent on basic subjects common to all arms, six weeks devoted to elementary subjects
special to the cadet's arm, and a two-week course in platoon tactics, designed to ensure
that every officer would be able to take command of men performing duties in an area
defence scheme. Candidates qualifying in this syllabus were granted commissions as 2nd
Lieutenants and then went to Advanced Training Centres of their own arms for a further
course qualifying them as Lieutenants. In some but not all cases, the final stage of a new
officer's training was a period spent as an instructor at a Basic Training Centre and sub-
sequently at an Advanced Training Centre, after which he was posted, either overseas as
a reinforcement officer or to a unit in Canada.135
Early in 1942, a decision was taken to dissolve the Canadian O.C.T.U. in the United
Kingdom (except for the short five-weeks "basic" course) and send overseas candidates
back to Canada for training at Brockville or Gordon Head. This policy was subsequently
modified, and most overseas candidates for the technical arms continued to be trained in
England.136 During 1942
the formation of home-defence divisions created a need for more officers and the training
programme was expanded, by enlarging the Brockville and Gordon Head centres and
establishing a temporary one at Three Rivers, P.Q. This increased the total
accommodation to 2600 candidates.137 As a result, an ample and indeed over-abundant
supply of reinforcement officers was soon available.* In August 1943 the Adjutant
General (General Letson) estimated that there would be a surplus of 2000 by the end of
April 1944.138 The centre at Gordon Head was now closed; after September 1943 all
officer training was concentrated at Brockville.139
Special arrangements were made to fit French-speaking Canadians for Active Army
commissions. Early in 1942 pre-O.C.T.U. courses for specially selected French-speaking
candidates were instituted at No. 44 Basic Training Centre, St. Jerome, P.Q. Candidates
completing one of these were sent on to the Officers Training Centre at Brockville, where
a special French Wing had been organized.140 To assist in the training of French-speaking
personnel generally, a large programme of translating military manuals and pamphlets
was undertaken.141
In peacetime the contingents of the Canadian Officers Training Corps established at
various universities had provided many officers for the NonPermanent Active Militia.
The C.O.T.C. continued to serve on a large scale in wartime, and was particularly useful
in giving a measure of military training to university students who were completing their
education in subjects important to officers in the technical arms. It was desirable for such
men to complete their academic courses before joining the Active Force. The policy
which gradually took shape was that of enabling students to complete in the C.O.T.C.
courses of military training covering the same syllabus as at Basic Training Centres. This
was done during their first and second years, while students in the third and fourth years
had a syllabus designed to prepare them for entrance to an Officers Training Centre.
Some students trained at Officers Training Centres in the summer months. The net result
was to produce considerable numbers of university graduates technically fitted for
commissions in the specialized arms and having enough military training to enable them
to complete their qualification for commissions in short order.142
In the autumn of 1942 an experiment was tried at the University of Toronto when
"No. 1 Canadian Army University Course" was inaugurated. The plan was to provide a
special one-year course specializing in mathematics and engineering subjects but
including some basic military training (not given by the C.O.T.C.) Students attending, if
not already serving, were enlisted in the Army as privates. The object was to produce
potential officers for the technical corps. Those completing the course were, however,
required
*A by-product of this situation was the lending of 673 Canadian junior officers to the British Army under the
"Canloan" scheme early in 1944. Many of these officers served with distinction in British units in the North-West Europe
campaign.
to go through basic and advanced training centres in the normal way and there was no
undertaking that they would be selected for officer training. During the academic year
1943-44 a second course was held, at Toronto and eleven other universities, with a total
of 1270 students. By this time, however, the shortage of officers in the technical corps
had been overcome, and graduates of the course were allowed to appear before Officers
Selection and Appraisal Boards only on the understanding that they were prepared, if
accepted, to take commissions in the Infantry.143
The higher training of officers was largely concentrated at the Royal Military
College, Kingston. The normal work of the College, we have seen, was increasingly
suspended from the outbreak of war. The buildings were used, however, for special
instructional purposes, and a considerable variety of courses were held there.
The problem of Staff training was serious and urgent. Many pre-war Permanent
Force officers had qualified at the Staff Colleges at Camberley, England, or Quetta, India,
and many officers of the Non-Permanent Active Militia had passed the Militia Staff
Course. Nevertheless, there was a shortage of trained staff officers from the beginning,
and a serious shortage from the moment when the Army really began to expand.
Although the Canadian forces were allotted vacancies in British schools, these were quite
inadequate to the need. Accordingly, arrangements were made to conduct one Canadian
Junior War Staff Course in the United Kingdom beginning in January 1941 (see below,
page 237). All later Canadian staff courses were conducted in Canada, at Kingston, the
second Junior War Staff Course commencing there in July 1941.144
The graduation of the last class of cadets from R.M.C. in June 1942 made possible
some expansion of staff training activities there. The Junior War Staff Course was
enlarged and late in 1942 its designation was changed to "Canadian War Staff Course",
since its syllabus corresponded with that of the Intermediate Staff Course at Camberley.
Early in 1943 this Camberley course was reorganized into two wings, one to train officers
for Grade II appointments in field formations, and one to provide Grade II staff officers
for headquarters other than field formations. (A Grade II staff officer is normally of the
rank of major.) The Canadian War Staff Course was reorganized along similar lines in
the autumn of 1943. The Intermediate Wing was later termed "A" Wing. The first Junior
(later "B") Wing course, designed to provide staff officers for static headquarters in
Canada, began in October 1943.145 By 1944 the staff officer problem, like that of the
supply of junior regimental officers, had been largely solved.
Apart from the staff courses, other advanced courses for officers were held at R.M.C.
A Senior Officers' Course and a Company Commanders' Course were conducted until the
summer of 1943, when they were fused
into a Field Officers' Course. This was itself discontinued to make room for the Canadian
Civil Affairs Staff Course, inaugurated in December 1943. R.M.C. was also the scene of
various more specialized training activities, including Intelligence courses for officers
and other ranks, and courses in Field Security.146
The Royal Canadian Army Cadets
Since Victorian times the Army had been represented in the schools of Canada by
cadet corps which gave elementary military training and served to introduce the
schoolboy to the idea of serving his country as a citizen soldier. This movement
expanded and became more active during the war. His Majesty the King lent it
countenance in 1942 by granting the title Royal Canadian Army Cadets and consenting to
become Colonel-in-Chief. The Army Cadets were the responsibility of a special
directorate at National Defence Headquarters, formed in October 1942 (an earlier
"Directorate of Physical Training and Cadet Services" had been abolished in 1933). The
new Directorate superintended a training programme which included drill, army
organization, weapon training, fieldcraft, map reading, signalling, aircraft recognition,
etc. The Cadets were divided into Senior and Junior divisions. Their strength at 31
March, 1943 was 95,291; two years later it was 113,827. In the later years of the war,
over 9000 senior cadets annually attended summer camps. It was reported in 1945 that at
least 54,546 cadets and former cadets had enlisted in the three services or the merchant
marine.147
The History of Private Jones
The foregoing outline of the process of recruiting and training has been purely
impersonal. How did the system work in actual human terms? Let us trace the record of
one individual citizen-soldier who went through the army mill. For the sake of
completeness, and as a matter of interest, the story is extended overseas and down to the
moment when the soldier was finally discharged after the war. Although some material
not wholly relevant to the present chapter is thus included, it may be worth while to
record these matters as a concrete example of the system of "personnel administration"
within the Canadian Army. The account which follows is based on the service documents
of an actual soldier. We shall call him Private Jones, though that was not his name.
Mr. Jones was in civil life a resident of a town of medium size in Nova Scotia. At the
time when he decided to volunteer, in the autumn
of 1942, he had had no military training and no connection with the armed forces. He
approached the branch recruiting office of Military District No. 6 in his town, and on 11
November 1942 he was medically examined and placed in Category "A". On 16
November he signed his attestation papers, was sworn in as Private Jones of the Active
Army and was taken on the strength of No. 6 District Depot, Halifax. He remained there
until 4 December, attending clothing and equipment parades. On 5 December he was
posted to No. 60 (Basic) Training Centre at Yarmouth, where he received the usual
inoculations and began his training. He stayed there nine and a half weeks instead of the
normal eight. The probable explanation is the bad weather which hampered training that
winter.148 While at the Centre he qualified in all the elementary subjects: drill, physical
training, first aid, marching, small arms training (exclusive of bayonet fighting), gas
training, fieldcraft, map reading and "fundamental"* training. In addition, he fired the
rifle range course and was rated as an above-average shot. On completing his course he
received a good report.
On 10 February 1943, Private Jones was posted to A-14 Advanced Infantry (Rifle)
Training Centre at Aldershot, N.S., for a further step in his military education. Here he
received approximately nine weeks of advanced training, including the following
subjects: physical training, marching, "fundamental" training, bayonet fighting, judging
distance, digging and wiring, field training, and sub-machine gun. He passed as average
in drill, mapreading, anti-aircraft training, grenade and pistol, and successfully passed his
"tests of elementary training" with the rifle, light machine-gun and 2-inch mortar. There
is no record of range courses except a further one with the rifle, in which he was
classified as a second-class shot. He had a short elementary course on the 3-inch mortar
and passed as qualified. Private Jones's advanced infantry training ended on 13 April
1943.
Probably because of special aptitude, he had been selected as a signaller, and on 14
April he went to the Canadian Signal Training Centre at Barriefield, Ont., to take the
infantry signaller's course. His training there was interrupted by two periods in Kingston
Military Hospital with pneumonia. On 6 May he received an increase in pay from $1.30
to $1.40 per day effective from 16 March, the date of his completion of four months'
service, and on 16 May he was granted $1.50 per day, the current rate of pay for private
soldiers of six months' service. On 1 October he graduated from Barriefield a qualified
infantry signaller.
*The "Standard Syllabus for Basic, Training, 1942" defines the objects of this as (a) to establish in the recruit "a
fundamental knowledge of his own personal responsibilities in regard to conduct, health and personal administrative
efficiency"; (b) to broaden his "knowledge of conditions of service in the Army"; (c) to give him "a basic knowledge of
democratic Government" and of the responsibilities of a citizen; (d) to give him "a general picture of the war situation as it
develops".
So far, Private Jones appears to have had no regimental affiliation. The Canadian
Infantry Corps had been formed in September 1942, and it may be presumed that he was
a member of this Corps only, although undoubtedly earmarked as a reinforcement for a
Maritime infantry battalion. After a year of training in Canada, Jones was now ready to
move overseas. He was given 14 days' furlough, and was then posted to a "reinforcement
serial" and embarked at Halifax on 24 November. On 2 December he landed in the
United Kingdom and went to No. 1 Canadian Signals Reinforcement Unit, at Cove,
Hants, near Aldershot. This was the normal procedure for infantry signaller
reinforcements; all such men were posted to No. 1 C.S.R.U., where they received
specialist training until required by their field units.
Private Jones's stay in the United Kingdom, however, was comparatively short. On
31 January 1944 he was posted to No. 7 Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Unit (which
held reinforcements for the Maritime infantry battalions), was immediately "placed on
draft" and sailed for Italy on 19 February. The 1st Canadian Infantry Division had
suffered heavy casualties in the fighting around Ortona in December, and many
reinforcements had been required to bring it up to strength. Jones was now being sent out,
with other men, to fill the depleted pool of reinforcements held for the Division in the
theatre of operations.
Landing in Italy on 3 March 1944, he went to the 1st Battalion of No. 1 Canadian
Base Reinforcement Depot, in the Canadian base area at Avellino, not far from Naples.
Here he was listed as a reinforcement for The Carleton and York Regiment. At this
period the 1st Division's front was static, and there was no immediate demand for large
numbers of reinforcements. Private Jones accordingly remained at Avellino until 8 May,
when he was posted directly to the Carleton and York. He appears to have joined the unit
the same day; it was then at Montesarchio, only 40 or 50 miles from Avellino. He thus
finally joined a field unit approximately a year and a half after his enlistment in the
Army, and became a soldier of the 1st Division just three days before the beginning of
the Liri Valley offensive.
In the great assault on the Adolf Hitler Line on 23 May, in which his battalion tore
the first hole in the enemy defences, Private Jones seems to have suffered a minor flesh
wound, but he remained on duty and was never formally reported a casualty. He was less
fortunate during the rest period after the offensive, when like many other Canadians in
Italy he caught infectious hepatitis (jaundice). He was sent to No. 15 Canadian General
Hospital at Caserta on 10 July, and then on 24 July to No. 1 Canadian Convalescent
Depot at Mercatello, where he stayed until discharged on 16 August. In accordance with
normal procedure, he was sent back to the 1st Battalion of No. 1 Base Reinforcement
Depot at Avellino, and immediately posted thence to the 4th Battalion (then at Monsano),
whose function it was to hold a pool of reinforcements ready in the forward area. On
15 September he returned to The Carleton and York Regiment, which was then engaged
in the desperate fighting south of Rimini. With it he served through the successive bitter
actions of the autumn and winter on the Savio, Lamone and Senio rivers. On 1 December
he received trades pay as a regimental signaller for the first time; this may indicate that he
only now became a regular member of the Signals platoon. Although unscathed in action,
he again fell ill at the end of January and was admitted to No. 3 Canadian General
Hospital at Misano, with pyrexia ("short term fever"). He was later transferred to No. 1
Canadian General Hospital at lesi and discharged on 13 February. The same day he went
to the 4th Battalion, No. 1 C.B.R.D., and the next was back with his regiment.
Private Jones left Italy with the Carleton and York on 17 March 1945, landing in the
south of France on the 20th. He served through the 1st Division's short campaign in
Western Holland and was still with his unit at the end of hostilities in Europe. On the day
of the cease-fire (5 May) he went on leave to the United Kingdom; and July saw him on
the first leg of his journey homeward. A Nova Scotian serving in a New Brunswick
regiment, on 18 July he was transferred to The West Nova Scotia Regiment for return to
Canada. With this regiment he arrived on 10 September at No. 8 Canadian Repatriation
Depot in the United Kingdom. After a further period of leave in England, he embarked
with the West Novas and landed at Halifax on 1 October. He was sent to No. 6 District
Depot, where he had begun his military career, for disembarkation leave and discharge.
On 16 November 1945 he received his honourable discharge, having served in the
Canadian Army three years to a day. Throughout this period his military character was
excellent and there were no entries on his conduct sheet. He had qualified for five
campaign stars and medals-the 1939-45 Star, the Italy Star, the France and Germany Star,
the Canadian Volunteer Service Medal and Clasp, and the British War Medal. (Unlike
many Canadians who had joined the Army earlier, he did not serve in the United
Kingdom long enough to get the Defence Medal.) * He thus reverted to the status of a
civilian, doubtless with no marked reluctance, but doubtless also with considerable sense
of satisfaction in duty done. Private Jones was now Mr. Jones once more; but it is
unlikely that he will soon forget the part he played in some of Canada's hardest battles, or
the days when he wore the King's uniform in the ranks of the Carleton and York.
*The Canadian Volunteer Service Medal was instituted in 1943 and is normally awarded on the basis of eighteen
months' completed voluntary service; the clasp recognizes a period of a minimum of 60 days served outside of Canada. The
Defence Medal, instituted to commemorate certain non-operational and civil defence service, was awarded to members of
the Canadian forces who served six months in the United Kingdom (a "non-operational area .. . subject to air attack or
closely threatened"). 149
CHAPTER V
DEFENDING THE SOIL OF CANADA, 1939-1945

(See Maps 1, 2 and 3)
The Nature of the Problem
M ANY people assumed, during the years before 1939, that in the event of another
war Canada would be in greater direct danger than in 1914-18. Even after war
began, this assumption continued to be influential. As we have seen, on 3 September
1939 the Prime Minister, sending his first formal cable to Mr. Chamberlain concerning
military cooperation, remarked that the primary task for the Canadian Government would
naturally be the defence of Canada, "which under present circumstances is a more
pressing and urgent undertaking than it was in the last war".*
Nevertheless, no real menace to Canadian soil developed at any time during the war.
There was no invasion; there were no landings from the sea or bombings by aircraft, nor
is there any evidence that the Germans or Japanese ever seriously considered such
enterprises. It is true that Canada was in peril, and the peril was deadly; but it never took
the form of an imminent threat to her territory. This was due to fortunate geographical
accidents, and the possession of powerful allies, which made it possible to conduct the
war on the further side of great bodies of water; and Canada's main contributions butions
to winning it took the form of active help to those allies in distant
r theatres. Had the joint Allied effort there failed-in particular, had the Germans overrun
the United Kingdom as well as the rest of North-West Europe-the direct danger to
Canada would have become infinitely greater. As it was, Canadians, for the second time
in the century, were able to defend their interests on foreign soil and defeat their enemies
before they came to Canada. No more serious immediate threat to Canada's own shores
developed than a few shells from a Japanese submarine, some ineffective bomb-carrying
balloons, and sporadic operations by German U-boats in her coastal waters.
*This chapter deals only with the Army's share in home defence. For the work of the Navy and Air Force, readers are
referred to the histories of those services. Inter-service aspects will be dealt with in the subsequent volume dealing with
military policy, as will also the question of cooperation with the United States. On defence measures immediately before
the outbreak of war, see Chapter II, above.
145
All this, as usual, was not so clear at the time as it is in retrospect. To strike a balance
between home defence and action abroad was not entirely easy for the Canadian
Government. Not only was it impossible to forecast 1 the course the war might take, but
the Cabinet also had to consider popular fears and pressures which were not necessarily
closely related to the actual 1 facts. Thus in the months after Pearl Harbor it was
subjected, as we shall "s see, to strong demands for increased defences in British
Columbia, and to some extent was obliged to yield to them. Large numbers of men and
large 1 quantities of material were thus immobilized on the Pacific Coast. An excited
public opinion, in pressing for such exaggerated precautions against menaces which were
almost entirely imaginary, was of course simply playing Hitler's game. In so far as such
pressure resulted in keeping at home men and weapons that could have been used in the
theatres where the war was decided, it was an advantage to our enemies.
Early Measures for the Defence of Canada
The plans made before 1939 for the defence of Canadian soil are described in
Chapter I. They provided for more and stronger coast-defence batteries, and we have seen
that much progress had been made before war broke out, although the measures taken
had been largely confined to the Pacific Coast. In addition, Defence Scheme No. 3
provided for the mobilization in emergency of considerable forces to man the defences
and otherwise provide for the security of coastal areas.
On the night of 25 August 1939, as already related (above, page 41), the Government
called out on a voluntary basis the units of the Non-Perma nent Active Militia required
for the coast defences and the protection of "vulnerable points". The batteries at Victoria-
Esquimalt, Vancouver, Yorke Island and Prince Rupert were manned on the west coast,
while on the Atlantic similar action was taken at Halifax, Saint John, N.B., Sydney-
Canso, and Quebec. The job was done swiftly and efficiently so far as the limited
strength of the N.P.A.M. units permitted. Thus at Halifax the 1st (Halifax) Coast Brigade
R.C.A. paraded at 2:30 p.m. on 26 August with a strength of 202 all ranks; and its war
diary records that, with the help of the local Permanent Force gunners and the 3rd (New
Brunswick) Coast Brigade R.C.A., who were doing their annual training at Sandwich
Battery, "the forts were manned and ready for action by 1830 hrs [6:30 p.m.]". At
Esquimalt on the same day 226 all ranks of the 5th (British Columbia) Coast Brigade
R.C.A. and attached units manned the new and old batteries.1
DEFENDING THE SOIL OF CANADA, 1939-1945 147
The improved defences in British Columbia included two new "counter-

bombardment" batteries* in the Esquimalt area (at Albert Head and Mary Hill, mounting
9.2-inch and 6-inch guns respectively) which had already been armed. The guns,
however, were on old mountings permitting an elevation of only 15 degrees, and not until
1943-44 were modem mountings allowing more adequate elevation and range received
and installed. At Vancouver, the new batteries (on Point Grey; in Stanley Park; and on
the north side of the First Narrows of Burrard Inlet) were ready, or nearly ready, for
action on an emergency basis, though at Point Grey the action might not have been very
effective. (The guns there, just mounted under the emergency scheme, still had the
automatic sights originally provided for them on a much lower battery position at
Halifax, and these were useless at Point Grey; while an alternative method of laying the
guns was nullified when visibility was poor.) The Yorke Island guns were also "in
action". The Vancouver and Yorke Island defences were manned by the 15th
(Vancouver) Coast Brigade R.C.A.2 At Prince Rupert, where the 102nd (North British
Columbia) Heavy Battery R.C.A. was on duty, the two new batteries had not been armed
when the crisis came, but this was quickly done and guns of three different calibres had
been test-fired here before the end of September.3
On the east coast, Halifax of course had its old batteries, which were in serviceable
condition, although here too the mountings were low-angle. Some new anti-motor-
torpedo-boat positions were set up on an emergency basis. At Sydney and the Strait of
Canso the 16th Coast Brigade R.C.A. manned guns mounted in accordance with the
emergency plan lately authorized; there had previously been no active batteries here. At
both places guns were progressively placed in action during September.4 At Saint John,
where the 3rd (New Brunswick) Coast Brigade was doing duty, there had similarly been
no armament before the emergency, but by Canada's declaration of war on 10 September
two 6-inch guns of 1896 vintage (originally part of the armament of H.M.C.S. Niobe) had
been mounted in one battery, and other positions were armed later in the month, though
only with field guns.5 At Quebec, a position unlikely to be assailed by sea under modem
conditions, the 59th Heavy Battery R.C.A. manned the elderly weapons of Fort
Martiniere, commanding the St. Lawrence below the city, and the 94th Field Battery had
guns in position covering the examination anchorage near St. Vallier somewhat lower
down.6
*One can distinguish four roles for coast-defence batteries. Counter-bombardment batteries, the heaviest type, were
for dealing with enemy battleships or cruisers at long range. Closedefence batteries were for defending harbours at shorter
ranges. Examination batteries were for supporting the naval examination service for incoming shipping. Anti-motor-
torpedo-boat batteries were composed of light quick-firers for defending harbours against raiding M.T.Bs., and were often
mounted to cover the boom defences of harbour-mouths. Sometimes a battery had more than one role.
Such was the coast artillery picture. Had an attack materialized during the first weeks
of war, the defences' efficiency would scarcely have been high; many of the gun positions
were temporary, the equipment was outdated, the units were low in strength and
incompletely trained. Yet the guns and crews were there and ready to fire. Surveying
what had been accomplished since the Government authorized emergency action on 24
August, one must account it a not unimpressive performance.
Inadequate as the fixed gun defences were, they were in far better condition than the
anti-aircraft defences, which were very nearly non-existent. As we have seen, the only
efficient anti-aircraft guns in Canada (four 3-inch 20-cwt. pieces, already obsolescent)
were sent to Halifax during the precautionary period. The only other A.A. guns in the
country were eight 13pounders, obsolete since 1920, for which a total of 307 rounds of
ammunition was available, and two 4-inch naval guns which were useless since there was
no fire-control equipment for them. In the early stages of the war, with Japan still neutral,
the Atlantic ports naturally got priority; and it is the fact that until Pearl Harbor the
Pacific coast's anti-aircraft defences consisted of two of the ancient 13-pounders—with
no ammunition.7 Since the United Kingdom's own defences were still far from complete,
it was next to impossible to obtain equipment from there; however, in November 1939,
assisted perhaps by the fact that there had as yet been no air attacks on Britain, the
Canadian authorities in London obtained the release of four modem 3.7-inch guns. These
reached Canada early in January and were very properly allotted to Halifax, whose
importance (and vulnerability) as a convoy assembly point needed no emphasis.8 No
further A.A. guns were received for use in Canada for two years, until November and
December 1941, when two more 3.7s arrived9 and 40-millimetre Bofors guns began to
come out of Canadian factories.
In view of the almost total lack of equipment, certain anti-aircraft and searchlight
batteries were intentionally omitted from the list of units called out voluntarily on 25
August. Nevertheless, through a misunderstanding, when mobilization began on 1
September several anti-aircraft units for which there was no equipment were ordered to
mobilize. Subsequently the personnel of such units were absorbed into other C.A.S.F.
units in their respective Districts.10 For some time the men of the 2nd Anti-Aircraft
Battery, having no equipment of their own, manned the coast-defence guns at Fort
Macaulay, Esquimalt.11
The artillery were of course not the only troops on coast-defence duty. Infantry was
also required, and on each coast several battalions were called out for this purpose. Their
functions were to support the artillery garrisons of defended ports, to furnish small mobile
reserves, to guard certain "vulnerable points" and in general to provide as might be required
for internal security. In September 1939 four infantry battalions were mobilized for
such duties on the Pacific coast,* and eight in the Maritime Provinces.13 The battalions
mobilized on establishments smaller than those for the Mobile Force, and recruiting was
suspended before they reached full strength. The result was that during the winter they
had too few men for their tasks. In the early summer of 1940 the infantry battalions on
duty in British Columbia averaged only about 300 all ranks. Troops of all arms on coast-
defence and anti-aircraft duty in Canada on 1 June totalled 9100 all ranks, in addition to
1732 guarding vulnerable points.14
The Guarding of "Vulnerable Points"
A word must be said on the problem of the protection of "vulnerable points". The
question of responsibility in this matter was a difficult one. The principle laid down
before the outbreak of war was that the Dominion Government would take responsibility
for protecting the following: defence establishments; certain vital and essential spots
along the railways and canals; and some other points such as oil depots, drydocks, grain
elevators at the Head of the Lakes, cable landing-places, wireless stations, and the
Niagara hydro-electric plants. The point was made that, in general, Dominion protection
could not be provided for every establishment which might conceivably become a target
of attack or sabotage; "except where other arrangements have been specifically made, the
authority responsible for protection in time of peace must continue responsible in time of
war".15 The local police authorities, and the owners of factories, etc., were not to be
permitted to avoid responsibility.
With respect to those points which were acknowledged as Dominion charges, the
question arose of the division of function between the armed forces and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police. Before war began arrangements for this division had been made, and lists
of Department of National Defence and R.C.M.P. responsibilities had been mutually agreed
upon.16 The military forces naturally assumed wider obligations on the coasts, where
enemy landings were possible, but the Mounted Police in general carried the heaviest
responsibilities in inland districts, where the danger was limited to that from saboteurs. The
R.C.M.P. planned to enlist special constables to handle the tasks assigned to it, which could
usually be carried out by men whose age and medical category would render them unfit for
active service. It was agreed in August 1939 that the Police would not be required to take
over all the proposed responsibilities until its protective
*A fifth did guard duty on an N.P.A.M. basis until November, when it was relieved by the Mounted Police. It may be
noted that after becoming Chief of the General Staff in 1940 General Crerar sought and received authority to move units
required for duty in Canada from one part of the country to another at his discretion. One of the arguments used was the
contribution such moves would make to the education of young soldiers as Canadians. This particularly appealed to the
Prime Minister.12
organization had been completed. This was not yet the case when war broke out, and
therefore, as a temporary measure, the Department of National Defence in September
assumed the protection of all vulnerable points which were considered Federal
obligations. From the first week of October onward the transfer from the Militia to the
Police was gradually carried out.17 A certain number of C.A.S.F. personnel who had been
employed on guard duty were now no longer required, and under the provisions of a
routine order18 published on 11 October these men were given the alternatives of
discharge from the service, reversion to Non-Permanent Active Militia status or
continued service in another unit of the C.A.S.F., if they could meet the required physical
standards.
There was, as might have been expected, a good deal of correspondence with
provincial and municipal authorities and private firms and individuals concerning the
protection of vulnerable, or supposedly vulnerable, points. The Dominion Government
was pressed to widen its own responsibilities in this respect. The matter was reconsidered
during October 1939, and as a result the principle was re-affirmed that protection against
sabotage was primarily a police rather than an army function, and one in which local
authorities properly had large responsibilities.19 The Dominion Government continued to
maintain that there were definite limits to its own obligations and declined to extend them
to cover the protection of all establishments and communities against menaces which, the
result showed, had little real existence.
In spite of all these qualifications, the Army had considerable responsibilities for
guarding vulnerable points. In August 1940 the situation was as follows. There were no
commitments whatever in Military Districts Nos. 1 (Headquarters, London, Ont.), 4
(Montreal), 12 (Regina, Sask.) and 13 (Calgary, Alta.) In Military District No. 7 (Saint
John, N.B.), only 15 all ranks were employed on guard duty, and in No. 10 (Winnipeg)
only 47. There was however a large commitment in Military District No. 2 (Toronto),
where two battalions of the 13th Infantry Brigade were protecting the hydroelectric
installations in the Niagara Peninsula and the Welland Canal locks, and a considerable one
in No. 3 (Kingston, Ont.) where 237 all ranks were employed, including 152 guarding
public buildings in Ottawa. In Military District No. 5 (Quebec, P.Q.), 307 all ranks were on
duty, divided between eight different points, among which the Dominion Arsenal
establishments at Quebec and Valcartier, and the Aluminum Company of Canada plants
and power units at Arvida and Isle Maligne on the Upper Saguenay, were prominent. In
Military District No. 6 (Halifax, N.S.), there were 234 all ranks, including 100 guarding the
Joint Services Magazine at Bedford Basin and 70 at the oil depot at Imperoyal, both in the
Halifax harbour area. In Military District No. 11 (Victoria, B.C.) 516 all ranks were
employed, of whom 105 were guarding the drydock at Prince Rupert, while 74 all ranks
were allotted to each of three R.C.A.F. stations.20 This survey includes only troops
allotted to definite local tasks. There were in addition infantry battalions in an "internal
security role", i.e. available to support the civil power or act in any other manner required
by circumstances. In October there were five such battalions, stationed at Sherbrooke,
P.Q.; Ottawa; Chatham, Ont.; Fort William, Ont.; and Edmonton, Alta. Furthermore, the
13th Brigade's third battalion was considered available for the same role in the Toronto-
Hamilton area.21
Another task, which grew much larger during 1940, was guarding internment and
prisoner of war camps. From the beginning of the war, guards were required for the
camps in which enemy aliens and other persons considered dangerous were interned.
After the disaster in France in 1940, when a German attempt at invading Britain seemed
likely, the British Government asked Canada to accept custody of 4000 internees and
3000 prisoners of war, whose presence in the United Kingdom might be dangerous in the
event of invasion. On 10 June 1940 the War Committee of the Cabinet agreed.
Subsequently the numbers increased until at the peak, in October 1944, Canada was
holding for the United Kingdom 34,193 prisoners, of whom 254 were civilian internees.
Canada held 853 other prisoners on her own responsibility. A total of 5524 all ranks of
the Army were employed at this time as staff and guards. A Directorate of Prisoners of
War had been set up at the beginning of 1943 to supervise the work.22 Guarding the
camps was at first the responsibility of the Canadian Provost Corps, but in May 1941 full
responsibility for them was transferred to the Veterans Guard of Canada.23
It may be noted here that the Veterans Guard had greatly expanded since its inception
in May 1940. By March 1941 there were 29 active companies with a total strength of 206
officers and 6360 other ranks. Of these, 98 officers and 2848 other ranks were guarding
internment camps, the balance of the personnel being employed in guarding vulnerable
points and training. There were in addition 43 reserve companies with a total strength of
183 officers and 3765 other ranks.24 The Guard reached its peak of strength in June of
1943, when its Active strength was 451 officers and 9806 other ranks. This included one
company in the United Kingdom-the General Duty Company at C.M.H.Q.—and one each
in the Bahamas, British Guiana and Newfoundland, in addition to 37 companies and 17
internment camp staffs in Canada.25
The Development of Fixed Defences, 1939-1944
The emergency measures taken in August and September 1939 to strengthen the coast
defences were only the beginning. Succeeding years
witnessed a steady improvement and by 1943-44 the fortifications were in a highly

efficient state. It is convenient at this point to summarize this development.
The first aim, naturally, was to complete the Interim Plan of coast defence. We have
seen the arrangements made in August 1939 to do this on an emergency basis. It was now
necessary to substitute permanent emplacements for the temporary gun platforms then
constructed. This was done in short order. On 15 February 1940 the Chief of the General
Staff reported to the Defence Council that the Interim Plan had been "completely
implemented".26
It still remained to carry out the Ultimate Plan, drawn up, not on the basis of the
armament that was available, but that which was desirable and necessary. As modern
guns and mountings began to arrive (chiefly from the United Kingdom) it was possible to
make progress with this final stage; but because the equipment came so slowly the
progress was equally slow. The Ultimate Plan-considerably altered by this time-could not
be said to be complete until early in 1945. Long before this, as early as the autumn of
1943 in fact, the garrisons of the coast defences were being reduced as a result of Allied
victories beyond the seas.
Dealing first with the Atlantic coast, we find naturally that large and energetic
measures were required during 1939-40 to make up for the effects of the pre-war policy
which had granted such heavy priority to the Pacific. Measures which under ideal
conditions would have been carried out as a part of peacetime preparation now had to be
put into effect under the threat of attack.
The ancient fortress of Halifax continued to receive much attention. Permanent anti-
motor-torpedo-boat batteries gradually replaced the temporary ones, and in addition work
began in the summer of 1940 on a new 9.2-inch battery near Devils Island, a position
farther to seaward than any so far occupied. About the end of the year construction began
on a 6-inch battery at Chebucto Head, on the opposite side of the harbour.27 The
completion of these batteries was slowed by delays in delivery of armament from the
United Kingdom.. Canada had ordered in 1936 three high-angle mountings for heavy guns
which were intended for Esquimalt.28 After war began it was decided to divert them to
Halifax. In November 1939 the British Government found itself faced with the need for
assisting South Africa in providing a heavy battery for Cape Town (to replace a monitor,
previously stationed there, which now had to be withdrawn). Canada agreed to give up one
of her mountings for this purpose, on the understanding that it would be replaced as soon as
practicable. Subsequently the Admiralty asked that the replacement should be postponed
until after provision had been made for the defences of Freetown (Sierra Leone) and
Trinidad. Canada again agreed. Then, in July 1940, Mr. Churchill cabled
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Mr. King begging that, in view of the great importance of Freetown to the vital Cape of
Good Hope sea-route, Canada should agree to the diversion thither of the two heavy
mountings for Halifax, then nearly ready for shipping. On the advice of the Chief of the
General Staff (General Crerar), Mr. King accepted this suggestion, it being understood
that two others would be made available in November and January.29 However, there was
further delay, caused this time by bomb damage to the English factory concerned; the
first mounting was not received until the summer of 1941.30 Devils Battery was partially
in action "at restricted ranges" in January 1942,31 and its last gun was placed in action in
the following March.32 Chebucto Battery was reported ready for action with all its guns
in August 1943.33
Second only to Halifax in importance was Sydney, where no less than eight different
battery positions were armed during the war. The activity here was closely related to the
fact that Sydney shared with Halifax the heavy responsibilities of a convoy assembly
point. The batteries were progressively improved and strengthened throughout the war.
One 6-inch battery, Lingan, was reported in action in June 1941, although its role was
temporarily limited to close defence pending the installation of more adequate range-
finding equipment. A still more formidable site, Oxford Battery (9.2-inch guns), was not
completed until the war was almost over, the last gun for this position being received
from the United Kingdom only in November 1944.34 Saint John, N.B., as a major port
required respectable defences. Four different positions were armed here, the most
important, the Mispec counter-bombardment battery, being "practically completed" with
its guns mounted by 30 June 1940.35 This rapid result had been achieved as a
consequence of the availability of 7.5-inch guns for immediate delivery from the United
Kingdom. The one remaining item of the original Ultimate Plan was the two small
batteries, each armed with two 4-inch guns, covering the northern and southern entrances
of the Strait of Canso. These were gradually developed from temporary positions into
permanent ones.36
The pre-war plans had not contemplated providing defences at any East Coast points
except Halifax, Sydney, the Strait of Canso, Saint John and Quebec. However, after the
collapse of France in the summer of 1940, which had the incidental but important effect
of greatly increasing the apprehensions of the United States with respect to the Atlantic
coastal area, the programme was expanded. The Third Recommendation of the Canadian-
American Permanent Joint Board on Defence,* adopted at its Ottawa meeting
*The creation of the Board was agreed upon between Mr. King and President Roosevelt at their meeting at
Ogdensburg, N.Y., on 17-18 August 1940. The Board's work will be dealt with in a later volume. On its inception, see
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation (New York, 1952), 702 ff. Its activities are
described in the present writer's "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945" (International
Journal, Spring 1954).
of 27 August 1940, advised the "early completion" of both underwater defences and
harbour defences, not only at Halifax and Sydney, but also at Gaspe and Shelburne. The
United States helped by selling to Canada armament, heavy if not of the latest type.
Surveys were promptly undertaken, and in August 1941 it was reported that at both
Shelburne and Gaspe 10-inch U.S. counter-bombardment guns had been mounted and
manned and were "awaiting range-finding equipment and gun stores".37 At Shelburne
four different positions were armed in the course of the war to protect the harbour. At
Gaspe there were three, all placed in action in the summer of 1941. The only other new
position armed on the east coast of Canada proper (as Canada existed in 1939-45) was
Louisburg, N.S., where in 1943 two 18-pounder field guns with searchlights were
temporarily emplaced to offer some protection to the port.38
It remains, however, to note the defences provided by Canada in the territory of
Newfoundland. Guns for a battery at Bell Island in Conception Bay were made available
in the summer of 1940 (below, page 178). Newfoundland, of course, acquired increased
importance in American as well as Canadian eyes as a result of the French collapse, and
the Second Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (Ottawa, 26
August 1940) expressed the strong opinion that the island was inadequately defended and
the security of Canada and the United States "thereby endangered". One of the measures
recommended was "completing, as early as practicable, and not later than the spring of
1941, the installation of appropriate defences for the port of St. John's, Newfoundland,
for Botwood, and for other points as required". Canada took prompt action along these
lines, the United States assisting by providing equipment. However, the work could not
be finished by the spring of 1941. In August of that year it was reported that the batteries
at Botwood and St. John's, for both of which 10-inch guns were being purchased from the
United States, would be "completed during the coming fall".39 Canada built and manned
three batteries at St. John's, the 10-inch one in advance for counter-bombardment and two
covering the harbour mouth. There were two sites at Botwood, and an additional small
position at Lewisporte. The picture of Canadian coastdefence installations on
Newfoundland territory is completed by a small battery placed in action in June 1942 at
Rigolet, on the approaches to Goose Bay in Labrador.40
Coast-defence searchlights were almost as important as coast-defence guns.
Fortunately, they were relatively easy to produce in Canada. In October 1940 it was
reported that all the new searchlights required by the Ultimate Plan for Halifax, Sydney,
Canso and Saint John had been delivered and installation was far advanced. New lights
were then being delivered to the Pacific coast at the rate of four or five per week.41
It is apparent that the gun defences of the Canadian Atlantic coastal area, very limited
in 1939, were vastly improved and extended before 1945. During the war, no less than
thirteen areas on the east coast (including Newfoundland) were defended with coast
artillery in some degree; and counting certain positions which were abandoned during
hostilities, a total of 45 individual sites were armed with guns. These figures do not
include anti-aircraft sites. When the Ultimate Plan, as extended in 1940, had been
completed, the artillery defences of the Atlantic coast were on a very adequate scale.
Turning back to the Pacific coast, we find that, thanks to what had been done before
the war, rather less needed to be done here during hostilities; nevertheless, the defences
were materially extended. Apart from entirely new measures, the completion of the
Ultimate Plan as originally conceived was itself a considerable task. Cooperation with the
United States was particularly important in the area of Juan de Fuca Strait, where the
Canadian defences were coordinated with the heavy batteries on the American shore.
Information on the defences here was exchanged between the two countries as early as
January 1938.
In the war's early days the manner in which the old low-angle mountings limited the
range of the counter-bombardment armament of the EsquimaltVictoria fortress caused
some anxiety, which extended to the United States; and a meeting of Canadian and U.S.
officers at Victoria on 21-22 October 1940 discussed the desirability of making better
arrangements to cover Juan de Fuca Strait with fire.42 A meeting of the Permanent Joint
Board on Defence in January 1941 was told that the United States was prepared to lend to
Canada either four 8-inch railway guns or eight 155-millimetre guns for strengthening the
defences in this area. There was some discussion of placing armament at the west end of
the Strait, but it was decided that it was sufficient to emplace two of the 8-inch guns at
Christopher Point, at the south-eastern angle of Vancouver Island, as a temporary
measure pending the arrival of high-angle mountings for the Esquimalt guns. This was
done, and the installation of the guns on temporary concrete platforms, with crews and
ammunition available, was reported complete three days before Japan attacked Pearl
Harbor, although range-finding equipment was not yet installed. These guns effectively
controlled the Strait.43 As already noted, the change-over of the Albert Head and Mary
Hill batteries to high-angle mountings, which greatly increased their range, was carried
out during 1943-44. The final stage in these installations' development was not reached
until late in 1944. The anti-motor-torpedo-boat batteries for this area reached completion
at the same period. It was reported in August 1944 that all the guns and mountings
ordered from the United Kingdom for batteries of this type on both coasts had now been
received.44
In the Vancouver area, activity was mainly directed to completing the pre-war
Ultimate Plan. The guns on Point Grey were mounted in their permanent emplacements
in the autumn of 1940.45 The 6-inch pieces at Stanley Park were exchanged in 1942 with
the 4.7s at Yorke Island. In October 1941 an 18-pounder was mounted on Point Atkinson,
serving in what was known as a "bring-to" role, in conjunction with the Naval Exami-
nation Service. Another small and very rudimentary battery was set up in October 1939,
when two field guns were mounted near Steveston to stop unauthorized ships going up
the Fraser River to New Westminster.46 All told, and not counting Yorke Island, five sites
were occupied in the Vancouver-Fraser River sector.
The only other area on the Pacific coast which was defended with heavy coast
artillery was that of Prince Rupert. This community was important as being the only
ocean port in northern British Columbia and the terminus of a transcontinental railway
line, and it had a special significance for the United States, in relation to Alaska. Seven
battery sites were occupied here, including three which had formed part of the pre-war
Ultimate Plan. One of these, Barrett Battery, armed with 6-inch guns, although in action
from the beginning, received its final armament only in the spring of 1944.47 The others
were armed with light quick-firing guns, except that two of the four 8-inch guns lent by
the United States (see above) were placed in action here on their own railway
mountings.48
There were fewer significant ports on the west coast of Canada than on the Atlantic,
and for geographical reasons those that did exist were somewhat easier to defend with
coast artillery than was the case in the Maritime Provinces. There was, accordingly,
considerably less expansion of the gun defence programme during the war period than
was the case on the Atlantic. Only four main areas were defended with coast artillery
(Esquimalt-Victoria, Vancouver-Fraser River, Yorke Island and Prince Rupert), and in all
23 individual battery sites were armed. These figures do not allow for the light defences
installed at four advanced R.C.A.F. stations in 1942.*
As we have already seen, the Pacific coast began to receive its allotment of up-to-
date coast-defence searchlights (which totalled 34) in the autumn of 1940. Deliveries
were complete by the following February.49 Modern fire-control equipment for the gun
batteries came to hand more gradually; on both coasts it built up in efficiency and
completeness throughout the war, as the supply position improved and technical progress
continued. The National Research Council gave constant advice and assistance in this
matter. The prototype "CDX" radar set for controlling coast-defence fire was first
operationally tested in the Halifax area in March 1943, although a set intended primarily
to reveal the approach of vessels was in action there as
*In a few cases, both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, batteries were moved from one site to another. In such cases
both sites have been counted.
early as 1941. At the end of hostilities technical apparatus for the control of fire, both by
visual methods and by radar, had been provided and installed at all the principal sites.50
On neither coast of Canada did a coast-defence gun fire a single shot in anger during
the war. It should not, however, be assumed from this that the guns were useless. An
enemy usually prefers to go where defences are not, and the purpose of coast artillery was
as much to discourage attack as to defend specific targets if an attack took place.
The Development of Anti-Aircraft Defences
We have noticed the ludicrous inadequacy of Canadian anti-aircraft defences in 1939,

and the shortage of equipment which made any important improvement impossible for a
long time after war began. It remains to survey the improvements which did take place
later.
It has been made clear that early in 1941 there were in Canada still only eight
efficient anti-aircraft guns, and that all of these were doing duty in protecting the port of
Halifax and the great assembly of shipping normally found there. At this time alarm was
felt for the security of the Aluminum Company of Canada's plant at Arvida, P.Q. The
Chiefs of Staff observed on 3 March that the Commonwealth's aircraft industry was "now
about 90,70 dependent on this Plant for the supply of aluminum ingots", and that air
attack upon this "tempting bottleneck in the Empire's war effort" was a distinct
possibility. They recommended that four A.A. guns should be transferred to Arvida from
Halifax.51 It was pointed out that at the latter place there were always in harbour a
considerable number of vessels with antiaircraft armament.* The War Committee
approved the transfer on 12 March. On 21 April the Prime Minister told the Committee
that during his recent visit to the United States he had ascertained that there was no
present possibility of obtaining additional anti-aircraft guns from the United States, which
was itself very short of guns. The Americans did, however, make a useful contribution at
this time in the shape of .5-inch anti-aircraft machine-guns, of which 16 were loaned for
use in Newfoundland, while 12 more were purchased and divided equally between
Halifax, Saint John and Arvida.53 These guns were manned by artillerymen.
The four 3-inch guns were duly withdrawn from Halifax and two of them were
disposed at Isle Maligne and two at Arvida, the latter also receiving four of the .5-inch
machine guns. These dispositions were completed in
*In April the Rear Admiral Third Battle Squadron (R.N.) placed the A.A. armament of H.M.S. Forth, lying in a berth
at Halifax, under the tactical control of the Fortress Commander. Telephone communications were established between the
ship and the fortress gun operations room s2
June; the 14th Anti-Aircraft Battery R.C.A. placed its guns in action at Arvida on the
12th of that month .s' The remaining guns at Halifax were re-deployed to cover the area to
the best advantage. As equipment began to come to hand from Canadian factories, the
Arvida area was more completely protected. The plan was to provide for it a total of 12
3.7-inch guns and 16 Bofors. By the autumn of 1942 this programme had been
completed, except that the four 3-inch guns remained there in place of four of the
proposed 3.7s.55
One other inland area deserves attention. This was Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, which
owed its importance to the American and Canadian canals connecting Lake Superior and
Lake Huron, which carry far more traffic than those of Panama and Suez combined.
There was some possibility, however remote, that they might become a target for long-
range air attack, perhaps launched from ships that might penetrate into Hudson Bay; and
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence discussed the matter on 20 January 1941. The
Board's Thirteenth Recommendation, adopted that day, advised that each government
should "constitute a single authority to be responsible for the safety of navigation through
these waters", these authorities to be clothed with the necessary powers and required to
cooperate with each other. In June 1941 there were local discussions at Sault Ste. Marie
between Canadian and American officers, and it became apparent that the latter feared
sabotage by disaffected elements as well as a possible "sacrifice attack by parachute
troops ... from the North". The Americans had large plans for the military protection of
the canals. So far, the Canadian canal had been guarded by the R.C.M.P., which had 23
men on duty.56
The Permanent Joint Board on Defence further examined the matter at its meeting of
20 January 1942, at which it was agreed that precautions at Sault Ste. Marie should be
reviewed. As a result, the question of antiaircraft protection was carefully considered, and
the 26th meeting of the P.J.B.D. (25-26 February 1942) was told that the United States
intended to augment its forces in the area with an anti-aircraft regiment (less one gun
battalion), a squadron of pursuit aircraft, and barrage balloons. The Board's Twenty-fifth
Recommendation, passed at this meeting, was to the effect that the R.C.A.F. should
undertake further study of the danger to the Sault Ste. Marie area, and the Canadian Army
assign a four-gun heavy anti-aircraft battery to protect the Canadian locks. It was
recommended that the United States Army lend the necessary guns if Canada could not
provide them, and that the Canadian battery should come under the operational command
of the Commanding General of the United States Military District of Sault Ste. Marie,
Mich. The battery was formed at once and sent to Halifax for training. The Cabinet War
Committee was told on 26 March that while the Canadian Chiefs os staff felt the risk at the
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Sault was relatively slight, the concern of the U.S. Army (arising from the importance of
the locks to war industry) was appreciated.
Before the Canadian battery was ready, gunsites protecting the canals on the
Canadian side were set up and manned by United States artillery in April 1942.57 That
autumn the United States, with Canadian permission, established radar units in Northern
Ontario to cover Sault Ste. Marie; the 671st Signal Air Warning Reporting Company had
its headquarters at Kapuskasing and subordinate stations at Armstrong, Nakina, Hearst,
and Cochrane.58 The R.C.A.F. had already set up the Central Canada Aircraft Detection
Corps, which utilized the staffs of fire towers and other facilities in the area for the same
purpose. In August 1942 the 40th Anti-Aircraft Battery R.C.A. had arrived at the Sault
and took over a gunsite from American troops, manning U.S. guns in the first instance.59
Nevertheless, nearly 1000 American soldiers continued to be employed on Canadian soil
in the area.60 During 1943 the opinion seems to have gained ground that the forces here
were unnecessarily large. The Canadian battery was removed at the end of the navigation
season, and shortly afterwards the United States troops were withdrawn from Canada and
the anti-aircraft equipment guarding the canals was sent elsewhere.61
To return to the coastal areas, the problem of increasing their anti-aircraft defences
was entirely one of equipment. In 1940 it had been decided to manufacture both 3.7-inch
and 40-mm. guns in Canada, and beginning on 28 June the Department of National
Defence placed "contract demands" that summer for 200 of the former and 112 of the
latter. These orders were later increased.62 Predictors to control the fire of both types of
weapon were made in the United States.* As for radar fire-control equipment, the first
two sets, ordered from the War Office in October 1939, were delivered in Canada in
August 1940. Manufacture was then undertaken in Canada. The first sets were made by
the National Research Council laboratories, which achieved production in ten months;
thereafter manufacture was turned over to Research Enterprises Limited, a Crown
company. In January 1941, 40 "GL Mk IIIC" sets were ordered for use in Canada, and 11
more were ordered a year later.64 However, no operational set was installed on a
Canadian gunsite until November 1942, when one arrived at Arvida.65 Searchlights were
also required, but changing doctrine concerning such equipment held up action. By the
autumn of 1941 it had been decided that a total of 80 anti-aircraft lights were required in
Canada; at this time there were on hand only 37 modern and five obsolescent ones, all on
the Atlantic Coast.66
Inevitably, there was a long wait for the guns ordered in Canada. The first 3.7-inch
gun from Canadian production was not delivered until the end
*The ultimate Canadian production of complete guns for all accounts, Canadian and other, amounted to 1735 3.7-inch
and 4352 Bofors, plus much larger numbers of separate barrels.63
of March 1942, difficulties in the manufacture of the mounting being responsible for the
delay. The first three 40-mm. Bofors guns were reported received during the week ending
13 December 1941-the week of Pearl Harbor.67
The plan for the anti-aircraft defence of the Atlantic Coast, as it stood in May 1942,
provided for fourteen defended areas (including Arvida); the largest being Halifax, which
was estimated to require 28 3.7-inch guns and 16 Bofors. All told, at this period, the
estimate was that this coast needed 112 heavy guns and 114 light ones. This included
armament for six areas in Newfoundland territory, among them the airports at Gander and
at Goose Bay in Labrador. Twelve more light guns were allotted to protection of coast-
defence batteries.68 This plan was somewhat modified later. The peak of the Atlantic and
interior defences was reached in September 1943, when all guns allotted under the
amended ultimate scale of defence were reported ready for action: 108 heavy and 138
Bofors guns. There were also 36 mobile Bofors.69 This includes Sault Ste. Marie as well
as Arvida. At this time not all the batteries were fully trained, nor was fire-control
equipment quite complete.
On the Pacific Coast, to which of course priority was given after Pearl Harbor, there
was rapid development from that time onward. The ultimate scale for this coast, as the
plan stood in May 1942, called for 48 3.7s and 78 Bofors, plus 14 more Bofors for the
coast-defence batteries. At this time there were only eight 3.7s and 12 Bofors actually in
British Columbia.70 By November 1943 there were 56 3.7-inch and 142 Bofors guns
(including 36 mobile ones) on the coast. Fourteen heavy anti-aircraft sites were manned,-
six in the area centred on Vancouver, three each at Prince Rupert and Victoria-Esquimalt,
and two at the aerodrome at Patricia Bay.71
The Security of the Atlantic Coast After Dunkirk
So far we have been considering the development of static defences, which it was
convenient to treat as an independent subject. It is now time to deal with the mobile
military defences and relate them to the changing course of the war.
That there was no German activity in Canadian waters during the first two years of
the war was due to Adolf Hitler's desire to avoid trouble with the United States. In a
conference on 23 February 1940, Admiral Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the German
Navy, recommended that two submarines be sent to operate off Halifax with mines and
torpedoes. He had "cleared" the project with the Foreign Office; but Hitler refused his
consent "in view of the psychological effect on the U.S.A." The Admiral was disgusted.72
Nevertheless, Hitler's decision was a sound one from the German
point of view. Nothing could have been better calculated to excite American public
opinion than a sudden burst of submarine activity in North American waters in the midst
of the "phony war". As it was, submarines stayed away from those waters until after Pearl
Harbor, and the German surface raiders also kept their distance, although they made
several thrusts against Halifax convoys in mid-Atlantic. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
sank five ships some 500 miles east of Newfoundland in February 1941 and 16 ships in
the same general area in March.73
We have already mentioned that an early consequence of the Allied disaster in North-
West Europe in the spring of 1940 was decisions taken during May to reinforce the
Canadian troops in England and dispatch other units to the West Indies and Iceland. As
the situation overseas went from bad to worse, the Canadian Government became
increasingly anxious for the security of Canadian soil. A meeting of the Cabinet War
Committee on 29 May canvassed the extent to which contributions to the defence of
Britain had left Canada undefended (on 23 May the Committee had agreed to send
overseas four destroyers of the Royal Canadian Navy, the entire force actually available
at that moment; and the R.C.A.F.'s only effective fighter squadron was also under orders
for the United Kingdom). At this period there was talk of forming a Ministry of Home
Defence, and appointing a Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces. These particular steps
were not taken; but many emergency measures were put into effect during the summer
for the security of Canada and particularly of the Maritime Provinces.
On 14 June, the day on which Paris fell to the Germans, the War Committee discussed
the crisis at length, noting that it was necessary to consider the possibility of having to
provide bases in Canada for the British Fleet, in case things got still worse. The Chiefs of
Staff were accordingly instructed to prepare a full report on the defensive situation on the
Atlantic Coast, with special reference to the question of naval bases. The Chiefs referred
this requirement to their Joint Planning Sub-Committee, composed of senior staff officers
of the three services; and this body shortly produced a first draft of a new "Chiefs of Staff
Committee Plan for the Defence of Canada".74 This proposed, broadly speaking, the
following measures: developing the defences of the east and west coasts and of the interior
to the extent that the resources of the country permitted; organizing a large mobile force
capable of rapidly reinforcing either coast and resisting attacks from the north; steps for
maintaining internal security and providing against sabotage; and arrangements for the
cooperation of the United States. In connection with this last point, the draft emphasized
that American assistance was essential if Canada was to be defended against a first-class
power. For such cooperation to be effective, the United States forces would require
operational facilities over and above those needed by the Canadian forces, and with this in
view it was very desirable that staff conversations between the Canadian
and American services should be undertaken immediately.* On the special question of

naval bases on the Atlantic coast, to be available for British and United States forces
cooperating in the defence of Canada, the draft proposed that new bases should be set up
without delay at Gaspe and Shelburne, plus an advanced base in Newfoundland. The
Sub-Committee suggested that the Army's main role in defence, apart from developing
the static defences of the east coast, should be the provision of the Mobile Force, which
should be on as large a scale as the manpower and equipment situations permitted. A
force of two divisions, plus a considerable number of ancillary units including five
motorcycle regiments, was recommended.
This draft plan was submitted to the Minister of National Defence on 9 July,75 but
was subsequently considerably altered. General Crerar, who became Chief of the General
Staff on 22 July, offered comments on the scheme to the Minister the following day.76 He
considered that a large mobile force would be "both a wasteful and also an inadequate
answer to our problem"; what was required was adequate defences and garrisons at those
points against which the enemy might throw a raiding force, and in rear of these defences
a mobile reserve equivalent to three brigade groups available for rapid counter-attacks.
Crerar had refused to allow the threatening situation abroad to throw him into a state of
panic. "With a very considerable portion of the British fleet and possibly of the British
Air Force based on Canada", he wrote, "I maintain that there is still no probability of an
attempt by Germany to invade this country for a period of months if not indeed of years."
He discounted any possibility of Japanese or Russian attack on the west coast "under
present or prospective world conditions"; the military organization of the east coast was
"the really urgent matter" so far as home defence was concerned. As noted in an earlier
chapter, Crerar emphasized that everything else was subordinate in importance to
strengthening Canada's first line of defence-the British Isles.
The new Minister of National Defence (Colonel Ralston) was evidently impressed by
these recommendations, and immediately authorized the organization of the three brigade
groups which the C.G.S. had indicated as required for a reserve for the Maritime
Provinces.77 These would be found from the 3rd Division, whose formation had been
approved on 17 May. The draft "Chiefs of Staff Committee Plan for the Defence of
Canada" was revised in August along the lines advised by General Crerar.78 The duties of
the Mobile Reserve were defined to be to provide means of reinforcing coastal garrisons,
dealing with enemy attacks in coastal areas not at present garrisoned, and ensuring the
maintenance of internal security. The Mobile Reserve was to consist, for the present, of
the 3rd Division, which, less one
*The Americans were not less anxious for this than the Canadians, and after preliminary discussions staff
conversations took place in Washington in July. This matter will be dealt with in a later volume.
brigade group, would be concentrated in the Truro area. The remaining brigade group
would be at Sussex, N.B. As we have already seen, the units began to move into these
areas that autumn.
Crerar's memorandum to the Minister written on 23 July79 also recommended
important changes in command arrangements. Concerning the command of Army forces
in the coastal areas, as referred to in the draft plan, he wrote:
I do not concur in the proposal that operational command of these forces can remain under the
District Officer Commanding. I consider that a Command Headquarters (Operational) with adequate
staff should be established in the Maritimes with operational control over those Army forces earmarked
for the defence of the Maritime Provinces, including the Gulf of St. Lawrence area and Newfoundland,
and that following this a similar Command Headquarters (Operational) should be established in British
Columbia. The function of the several District Headquarters in the Eastern area and of the one in M.D.
11 under the conditions which Canada now faces should be restricted to administration and to the
command and training of those troops not actually allotted to Command Headquarters for operational
purposes. It should be noted, incidentally, that such organization would fit in with the Operational Zones
established by the
Royal Canadian Air Force.
This recommendation also was approved by the Minister in principle on the following
day,80 and action followed immediately. On 1 August Major-General W. H. P. Elkins,
formerly Master General of the Ordnance, was appointed G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic
Command with headquarters at Halifax. The Command thus set up comprised the whole
of Military Districts Nos. 6 and 7 (that is to say, the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island), and those portions of Military District No. 5 lying
east of "a line drawn between Cape Chidley (Hudson Strait) and the mouth of the
Saguenay River and extending southerly from the St. Lawrence along the Temiscouata
Railway from Riviere du Loup to Edmundston, New Brunswick." It also included
Newfoundland and Labrador.81 The responsibilities of the G.O.C.-in-C. were defined as
requiring him to:
"1. Represent the Army as regards all operational matters which affect all three Services in the Atlantic
Command and in the closest co-operation with the equivalent commanders of the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F.
in that area.
2. Control all mobile forces which may be placed under his command for operational purposes in the
defence of the Atlantic Area.
3. Exercise operational control through Fortress Commanders, etc., over all units comprising the
garrisons of all fortresses, defended ports and defended areas in the Atlantic Command.
4. Be responsible for internal security measures and protection of such vulnerable points in the Atlantic
Command as are defined by policy as military responsibilities.
5. Be responsible for the training of the units and formations under his command.”82
The G.O.C. Mobile Reserve (who for the moment was the G.O.C. 3rd Canadian
Division) was under the command of the G.O.C.-in-C. for all operational matters. The
District Officers Commanding Military Districts Nos. 5, 6 and 7 were responsible for the
training, administration and main-
tenance of all units, etc., in their Districts, other than those under the operational control
of the G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command; and for the maintenance of all units and
formations in their Districts, including those under such operational control. The D.O.C.
Military District No. 6 was made responsible for the administration and maintenance of
Canadian Army forces in Newfoundland.83
So far as relations between the services were concerned, it was provided that in the
coastal areas "Command of the Navy, Army and Air Force will be exercised by a joint
system of command", under which the commanders would have "a collective as well as
an individual responsibility for the success of the enterprise as a whole". A joint
operations room was to be maintained on each coast.84 Joint Service Committees,
composed of the senior officers of the three services in the area, already existed on both
coasts. Headquarters of the Eastern Air Command of the R.C.A.F. and those of the
R.C.N. for the Atlantic Coast were already established at Halifax, and coordination was
thus comparatively easily arranged.
As the spring of 1941 approached, the Cabinet War Committee was still anxious
about the east coast. In February the Chiefs of Staff made a new appreciation85 which
emphasized once more the fact that any attempt at the invasion of Canada "by actual or
potential hostile Powers" was not to be feared "so long as the defence of the British Isles
successfully continues." On the other hand, the Chiefs pointed out that it must now be
becoming clear to Hitler "that no consideration on his part can deter the United States
from pursuing a course aimed at his eventual overwhelming defeat". In these
circumstances, every day increased the chances of "tip-and-run" sea and air raids against
the east coast; and it was pointed out that, while existing Army preparations were
sufficient to provide against enemy landings, "we continue to find ourselves inadequately
furnished with Naval and Air forces, and with anti-aircraft guns and equipment, to ensure
that raids by hostile naval or air forces against ports, the shipping in them, and other
important objectives, are met with adequate resistance". The conclusion was that an
increase of naval and air forces on the east coast of Canada was necessary, and that the
only source of such forces in existing circumstances was the active cooperation of the
United States (with which, of course, Canada was now engaged in joint planning through
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence). This appreciation was discussed by the Chiefs of
Staff with the War Committee on 26 February, and the former pointed out that under
existing conditions, with Britain still inadequately armed and under the threat of invasion,
it would not be reasonable to expect reinforcements from the United Kingdom. It was
agreed, however, that the defensive position of Canada as seen by the Chiefs of Staff
should be communicated to the British Government.
Mr. King accordingly, on 2 March, sent to Mr. Churchill two cables86 giving the text
of the appreciation and making the point that since the outbreak of war the Canadian
Government, on the Chiefs' advice, had "consistently followed a policy of sending all
possible aid to the United Kingdom, desipte the fact that this has necessarily involved the
weakening of Canada's own defences". Giving details of the inadequacy of the naval and
air forces available in the Atlantic coastal area, Mr. King remarked that the situation had
been causing the War Committee "a good deal of concern". He added:
We have, from the beginning, realized the serious implications in regard to home defence of
sending you every possible assistance, naval, military and air. Our Chiefs of Staff believe the policy
followed has been wise and justified by results. At the same time we cannot be unmindful of our direct
responsibility for the defence of Canadian shores, and of the effect upon the common effort and
Canadian morale should our coast and harbours be attacked and our defences prove inadequate to an
emergency. In particular the importance of adequate protection for the convoy assembly port of Halifax
and strategic approaches thereto cannot be too strongly emphasized. We should be very glad to have
your views on the situation and to learn whether, having in mind the requirements of various theatres of
war, it will be possible to strengthen those features of our home defence position which Chiefs of Staff's
analysis has shown to be inadequate.
The nature of Mr. Churchill's reply,87 sent on 24 March, might have been anticipated.
The enemy, he wrote, was making "an extreme effort both at sea and in the air" against
British trade; more bombing of the British Isles had to be provided against; and "a large
scale attempt at invasion" was still a likely contingency. The United Kingdom authorities
thought tip-andrun raids on the Canadian eastern seaboard unlikely; enemy raiders were
more likely to attack the shipping routes in the western Atlantic. In these circumstances,
said Mr. Churchill, "The position is bluntly that we have not all the equipment that would
enable us to give complete protection on both sides of the Atlantic, and the question is
therefore how can we make best use of material we have, having regard to what the
enemy is trying to do and probabilities as to his future course of action. . . . If we were to
divert any substantial part of our forces from their present area of operations to cover
wider areas where there is admittedly some risk of enemy action, we should only imperil
the whole and play into his hands."
The Security of the Pacific Coast After Pearl Harbor
The problem which faced the Canadian Government and Chiefs of Staff in their own
sphere was similar to Mr. Churchill's. There was not enough equipment-not nearly
enough—to afford complete protection to all parts of Canada, and as long as Japan
remained neutral and the Pacific Ocean remained in some degree true to its name, it was
obviously necessary to give priority to the Atlantic coastal area. It was the easier to do so
in that the Pacific Coast, having itself received a comparable priority for some years
before the outbreak of war, was already moderately well defended. All this changed
abruptly on 7 December 1941 when the Japanese launched their tremendous attack.
During the months that followed, although the German menace to the Atlantic Coast had
not diminished-indeed, it grew more serious, as the U-boats now for the first time
appeared in North American waters-the security of British Columbia became the first
domestic concern of the national government.
The west coast had not, of course, been wholly neglected since September 1939. On
the contrary, it had received all the consideration which shortage of equipment permitted.
The Government's anxieties concerning the attitude of Japan in the summer of 1940 have
been noted, as has the retention of the 6th Brigade at Shill as a precautionary measure
(see above, page 86). As we have also seen, General Crerar in July 1940 had
recommended setting up a Pacific Command as well as one on the Atlantic. This was
done in the following October, when Major-General R. O. Alexander was appointed
G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command. His command comprised the whole of Military Districts
Nos. 11 and 13-that is, the Provinces of British Columbia and Alberta, the Yukon
Territory and the District of Mackenzie. General Alexander assumed operational
command throughout this area, but while retaining full responsibility for administrative
policy he delegated his authority in administrative matters to the District Officers
Commanding.88 (In the first instance, General Alexander was appointed to perform the
duties of D.O.C. Military District No. 11 as well as those of G.O.C.-in-C. The two
appointments were separated for a time in 1942, but after June of that year no D.O.C. was
appointed.)
Since the beginning of the war, the three main defended areas in British Columbia
had been organized as separate subordinate commands. The Victoria-Esquimalt fortress,
the Vancouver area (including Yorke Island), and the Prince Rupert area were all under
specific defence commanders. Upon taking command on the Pacific Coast, General
Alexander recommended that, with a view to providing a mobile reserve, an infantry
brigade group (less artillery) should be stationed in the Nanaimo area of Vancouver
Island.89 This arrangement was carried out in February 1941, when the headquarters of
the 10th Infantry Brigade was set up at Nanaimo.90 This brigade moved east in the
following May, and its place at Nanaimo was taken by the 13th, an independent brigade
formerly stationed in the Niagara Peninsula.91 In July 1941 the Cabinet War Committee
(as noted in Chapter III) authorized the formation of the three brigade groups of the 6th
Division for home defence purposes;* the 13th Brigade was now incorporated in this
division and remained in its position of readiness at Nanaimo. The other
*In this connection, reference was made to an understanding with the United States that Canada would maintain a
general reserve of not less than two divisions. This understanding, often mentioned,92 was apparently never reduced to the
shape of a formal agreement.
two brigades were to be concentrated in the Niagara Peninsula and at Valcartier; the 15th
Brigade, at the latter station, would be considered a potential reserve for Pacific
Command. As for the Maritimes, their security was provided for by the 4th Division,
which moved into Debert and Sussex when the 3rd went overseas.93
On 18 November 1941, when the Allied governments had begun to worry seriously
about Japanese intentions, the Chief of the General Staff (General Crerar) reported to the
Minister of National Defence that the dispositions which had been made on the west
coast were, with certain exceptions, "adequate for the purpose of meeting the anticipated
forms and scales of attack" in the event of war with Japan.94 The exceptions were the
absence of antiaircraft units, for which there was still no equipment, and the fact that four
platoons of the Veterans Guard of Canada, required for the protection of certain R.C.A.F.
stations, had not yet been provided. These platoons had however been authorized and
organization was being pushed. One other deficiency was the inadequacy of the coast
artillery defences to deal with long-range bombardment, the guns being still on low-angle
mountings.
At this time a very considerable force was already deployed on the Coast. An infantry
battalion of the Active Force was stationed in each of the three main defended areas
mentioned above: Victoria-Esquimalt, Vancouver-New Westminster, and Prince Rupert.
The Prince Rupert battalion had a company detached at the R.C.A.F. station at Alliford
Bay in the Queen Charlotte Islands. The 13th Infantry Brigade with its own three
battalions remained at Nanaimo as a general reserve for Pacific Command; and platoons
of the Veterans Guard were on duty at the R.C.A.F. stations at Ucluelet (two, to be
increased to four), Coal Harbour (two, to be increased to three), and Bella Bella (one, to
be increased to two).95
General Crerar's memorandum continued:
While the present dispositions are considered adequate to meet any situation that might arise, it
must be anticipated that on the outbreak of war strong pressure may be brought upon the Government to
increase the Active forces in British Columbia. In that event, it might become necessary to move
additional troops from Eastern Canada to the Pacific Coast.
It was to appear in due course that this was a very accurate appreciation.
On the evening of Sunday, 7 December 1941, the Chiefs of Staff met with the War
Committee to discuss the new situation created by the Japanese attack which had taken
place that day. Canada had already declared war on Japan. Crerar reported again that he
considered Army dispositions on the Pacific Coast reasonably satisfactory except for the
absence of anti-air craft artillery. Everything possible to provide against air attack was done
immediately. When the War Committee met again on 10 December it was reported that
R.C.A.F. strength on the coast was being built up and some anti-aircraft guns were being
sent to British Columbia. The
point was made that it would be playing into the enemy's hands to shift a disproportionate
amount of force from east to west; in particular, there was mention of the importance of
anti-aircraft protection at Halifax and at Newfoundland Airport. The Vice Chief of the
General Staff (Major-General Stuart) was able to report however that the guns being
dispatched were the first three Bofors coming direct from the factory, and the four A.A.
Machine-guns from Arvida. Subsequently, early in January, two 3.7-inch guns, manned
by a section of No. 1 Anti-Aircraft Battery R.C.A. from Halifax, were also sent from
eastern Canada. These appear to have been the two guns lately received from England
(see above, page 148), which had been used for training purposes. Six anti-aircraft
searchlights, previously destined for the east coast, were diverted to Esquimalt in
December.96
Within a few weeks of Pearl Harbor, everything that circumstances permitted had
been done to strengthen the anti-aircraft defences of the Pacific Coast. It was little
enough. At Esquimalt were two Bofors guns protecting the naval dockyard and the great
drydock; the third Bofors was at the R.C.A.F. station at Patricia Bay, where also were the
two 3.7s. At Patricia Bay too the machine-guns and crews from Arvida were kept until
late in February, when two more Bofors arrived there and the machine-guns were
released-two to the Sea Island air station near Vancouver, the others to Esquimalt.97 It
was an unimpressive array, and it was lucky that the enemy attempted nothing against the
Pacific Coast in these early weeks, for it offered targets worthy of his attention. On 25
February 1942 the diary of the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Battery at Esquimalt recorded that the
liner Queen Elizabeth had entered the drydock, and remarked, "$80,000,000 more in
property for us to protect with our two guns." The period of worst anxiety ended with the
arrival on the Coast, in April 1942, of the first 3.7-inch guns from Canadian production.98
From this time the situation steadily improved (see above, page 160).
While doing what it could to strengthen British Columbia's anti-aircraft defences,
National Defence Headquarters was also moving more troops into the province. On 12
December the 18th (Manitoba) Reconnaissance Battalion,* then at Camp Borden, was
ordered to Vancouver Island, and arrived there on the 19th. It was placed under
Headquarters Victoria and Esquimalt Fortress as a local mobile reserve.99 Simultaneously,
in accordance with orders issued earlier, three field batteries of artillery were moved from
stations on the Prairies to New Westminster and organized into the 21st Field Regiment
R.C.A. It moved to Nanaimo in March.100 A field company of Engineers for the 13th
Brigade was concentrated at North Vancouver early in January,101 and a field ambulance
was moved from Edmonton to Nanaimo.102 The 13th Brigade was thus provided with
artillery, engineers
*Later the 18th Armoured Car Regiment (12th Manitoba Dragoons).

and services to enable it to function as an independent brigade group. At the same time,
steps were taken to protect the advanced R.C.A.F. bases on the coast. Orders had been
issued on 3 December to prepare to move the required Veterans Guard platoons on short
notice-two to Ucluelet, one to Coal Harbour103—and this was done between 11 and 15
December, Alliford Bay being reinforced simultaneously.104 In the absence of Bofors
guns, Ucluelet, Alliford Bay, Bella Bella and subsequently Coal Harbour were
strengthened by the provision at each of a "Special Section" of two 75-mm. field guns
(one at Coal Harbour) manned by crews provided from the Artillery Training Centres at
Brandon and Shilo.105
The first days of the war with Japan were anxious ones on the Pacific Coast, and the
air buzzed with remarkable and alarming rumours (one of the best was the report,
received on 11 December from the United States Army at Seattle, that the "main Japanese
fleet" was "154 miles west of San Francisco ... headed north-east").106 Nevertheless,
General Alexander was able to report to Ottawa on 12 December, "The emergency has
caused a very noticeable uplift in the morale of the troops and the civilian population
while remaining calm have become considerably more war minded.107 The civilians,
however, became less calm as time passed; and many of them were afraid of the large
Japanese population of British Columbia. Alexander reported on 30 December that this
situation was "assuming a serious aspect". "Letters are being written continually to the
press," he wrote, "and I am being bombarded by individuals, both calm and hysterical,
demanding that something should be done." The G.O.C.-in-C. felt that there was definite
danger of "inter-racial riots and bloodshed." He had made preliminary arrangements for
the use of troops in certain areas ("for the protection of the Japanese against those who
wish to do them violence") if this proved necessary. He recommended removing the
Japanese from the coast.108 A policy of partial evacuation was announced on 14 January,
and on 26 February the evacuation was made general.109
Fanned by the agitation about the Japanese population, anxiety in British Columbia
grew steadily. The Japanese armies were sweeping forth resistlessly in Asia, one Allied
stronghold after another falling before them. Hong Kong surrendered on Christmas Day;
British forces failed to check the invader at any point in Malaya for more than a moment,
and Singapore, with a great force of troops, was lost on 15 February; in the Philippines,
General MacArthur's forces continued to fight on in Bataan, but it was clear that there
could be only one end. By February public opinion on Canada's Pacific coast was in a
state approaching panic.
British Columbia's representatives in Parliament were now bringing heavy pressure

upon the Government. On 9 February a government member speaking in the House of
Commons urged the Ministry to see that the coast
was "supplied with everything with which it is possible to supply it-with guns and tanks,
and not with a company of men, but with divisions of men."110 The Province's
representative in the Cabinet took a similar, line. The day before Singapore fell Mr. Ian
Mackenzie (Minister of Pensions and National Health, and a former Minister of National
Defence) wrote to the Prime
Minister: 111
I am receiving repeated representations from British Columbia in regard to our Pacific Coast
defences. I feel, not being a member of the War Committee, I am not exactly sufficiently conversant
with what is transpiring, although the Ministers separately have been very courteous in giving me the
necessary information....
My definite impressions are, after having information in regard to what has been done, that the
preparations on the Pacific Coast are entirely inadequate....
I feel, in regard to the military situation, that we should have at least two mobile divisions on the
Pacific Coast....
It is my considered judgment, after the events of the last few days, that we should not send any
more troops overseas until we have adequate defence for our own coast.
I feel that as the Minister from British Columbia I must share some of this responsibility in a very
definite way and that is why I am troubling you with this personal letter.
Feeling continued to mount all along the Pacific Coast of North America. On 23
February a Japanese submarine fired a score of shells "in the general direction" of an oil
refinery near Ellwood, California.112 On the 25th took place the "Battle of Los Angeles",
when the anti-aircraft defences of that area fired 1440 rounds against Japanese raiders
which appear to have existed only in the defenders' imagination.113 There were no such
actual incidents in British Columbia, but the same feverish anxiety existed there, and a
section of the press, far from trying to exercise a steadying influence, did the opposite.
From 13 to 16 March the Vancouver Sun published a series of articles entitled "The
Derelict Defense", which complained that the General Staff was devoting far too much
energy and thought to intervention in Europe, and not nearly enough to the defence of the
west coast. The writer remarked, "Our present defense is based on the assumption that we
must surrender, and might as well do it first, rather than last."*
On 16 March Premier Hart of British Columbia discussed the situation with the senior
officers of the three services in his province. General Alexander pointed out to him the
undesirability of piling up troops and weapons, in numbers exceeding those required to
meet any probable scale of attack, in areas like British Columbia which were not directly
threatened,
*This quotation is from the article of 14 March. This and other passages were deleted from later editions by the Press
Censor, who had not seen the original one. The damage done to public morale by articles such as this needed no
demonstration. Legal action was taken against the newspaper by the Crown. It pleaded guilty to a charge under Section 16,
Defence of Canada Regulations (other charges being withdrawn) and was fined $300. On 23 April the Sun published an
editorial on the fine, claiming that its criticisms, by inducing the Government to provide more defences, had "actually
damaged the enemy". This, however well meant, would seem to be difficult to justify. Accumulating men and equipment
uselessly on the B.C. coast could give the enemy nothing but satisfaction.114
and explained that the risk of minor "nuisance" attacks was one that must be accepted.
The Premier replied that he appreciated these facts, but the people of the province were
alarmed and were "obsessed with the necessity of the adequate protection of British
Columbia from any possible eventuality and until this can be assured did not appreciate
the necessity of sending weapons and equipment abroad".115 Alexander faced an
unpleasant situation. On 19 March he reported to Ottawa, "The morale of the public in
British Columbia is undoubtedly at a very low ebb", adding that "the wildest statements
and rumours" were in circulation.116
All this pressure had its due effect. It may be recalled that in November 1941 General
Crerar, in his final submission concerning the 1942 Army Programme, had noted that
while there was no factor in the existing situation warranting the mobilization of an
additional division, if conditions changed for the worse he might be obliged to
recommend the completion of the 6th Division and the mobilization of the brigade groups
of a 7th (see above, page 96). By February 1942 it had been decided that this action was
necessary,117 and on 16 March the new Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.General Stuart)
formally recommended it to the Minister.118 On 18 March this great expansion of the
Army was approved by the War Committee, which at the same time authorized a very
large increase in the Home War Establishment of the R.C.A.F., estimated to cost $206
million. (The actual strength of the R.C.A.F. in Canada increased during 1942 from 16
squadrons to 36.)119 The Committee was told that General McNaughton, in conversation
with the Prime Minister, had recognized the need of measures to allay public
apprehension and favoured a large mobile force on the West Coast. Even this action,
however, was now considered inadequate, and a project for mobilizing still another home
defence division suddenly emerged. On 20 March the C.G.S., remarking that the
Combined Chiefs of Staff had recently revised their estimate of scales of attack on the
Pacific Coast to include the possibility of a raid by an enemy force of up to two brigades,
recommended the completion of the 7th Division and formation of the brigade groups of
an 8th.120 The War Committee approved this the same evening. That the expenditure on
the armed services for the fiscal year 1942-43 was nearly double that for 1941-42 was
due in no small part to the excitement in British Columbia.
The measures we have described were not the whole story. On 7 March authority had
been given for mobilizing five unbrigaded infantry battalions to be used for airport
defences in British Columbia and as local reserves at Vancouver, Kamloops and
Terrace.121 In addition, on 17 February the Cabinet had approved the mobilization of
anti-aircraft units (four batteries, six troops and five sections) "to cover all anti-aircraft
equipment likely to be available to Pacific Command in 1942", as well as similar
provision for Atlantic Command. In April most of these units were converted into
batteries of double or treble the size originally planned, and at the same time the
formation of three additional batteries and one more troop was authorized. Again Atlantic
Command was similarly treated.122
As early as 11 March, even before the mobilization of the new divisions had been
authorized, a decision had been taken to dispose three brigade groups in Pacific
Command, against the possibility of raids on an increased scale;123 and in the course of
the spring troops moved west until at the end of May there were 13 infantry battalions in
the Command. Six more arrived in June. The original plan was to use the 6th Division on
the Atlantic Coast, where it would replace the 4th when the latter went overseas; but
almost immediately this arrangement was changed, and the 7th Division was sent to
Debert and Sussex as general reserve for the Atlantic Command. The 6th and two brigade
groups of the 8th were now to be general reserve for Pacific Command and Western
Canada. The 8th's third brigade group would go to Valcartier as mobile reserve for
Eastern Canada.124 On 17 June 1942, in the midst of a further flurry of excitement in
British Columbia resulting from the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands, the War
Committee authorized the completion of the order of battle of the 8th Division. When the
two new divisional headquarters were formed, the 6th Division (commanded by Major-
General A. E. Potts) took responsibility for Vancouver Island, with its headquarters at
Esquimalt. The northern section of British Columbia-north of a line running from Bella
Bella on the coast inland by way of Chilko Lake to Ashcroft, west of Kamloops, and on
along the main line of the Canadian National Railways to the Alberta border west of
Jasper -was the responsibility of Major-General H. N. Ganong, G.O.C. 8th Division, with
headquarters at Prince George. He was responsible for the Queen Charlotte Islands and
the U.S. aerodrome at Annette Island, but not for the R.C.A.F. aerodrome at Bella
Bella.125 (The 7th Division was commanded by Major-General P. E. Leclerc, with
headquarters at Debert.) All three divisional commanders had formerly commanded
brigades overseas.
The March excitement produced a change in command arrangements on both coasts.
The matter had been discussed by the War Committee on 18 and 20 February, the Chiefs
of Staff being present on the latter occasion. The Chiefs argued that the existing
arrangements-coordination through a Joint Service Committee on each coast—amounted
in fact to unified command and that cooperation was preferable to complete unification.
However, they produced on 10 March a new formula under which the senior member of
the Joint Service Committee on each coast would be designated Commanderin-Chief of
the defences on that coast, and would exercise, in emergency, strategic direction of the
other two services as well as tactical command of his own. This arrangement the War
Committee approved on 18 March.* Under it General Alexander became Commander-in-
Chief, West Coast Defences.126
*This matter will be dealt with in greater detail in a later volume.

The Aleutian flurry began late in May of 1942. The United States naval authorities
received information that the Japanese were planning a thrust at Midway Island combined
with a secondary operation against the Aleutians.127 This information was in General
Alexander's hands by 20 May and he passed it on to his senior commanders, pointing out
that the enemy might attempt something against Prince Rupert.128 In the last days of the
month the developing threat caused alarm in Ottawa, and on 30 May the Chief of the
General Staff, Lieut.-General Stuart, arrived on the Pacific Coast to take personal
control.129 Throughout the summer Stuart combined the appointment of C.G.S. with that
of G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command.130 General Alexander was appointed Inspector
General for Central Canada with effect from 1 July. Major-General G. R. Pearkes, V.C.
(who had commanded the 1st Division overseas since July 1940) was subsequently
brought back to become G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command, and took over on 2 September.
The Japanese occupied the two Aleutian islands of Kiska and Attu on 6 and 7 June,
and when this became known it inevitably caused further anxiety in British Columbia.
This was heightened when on 20 June enemy shells fell upon Canadian soil for the only
time in either World War. Japanese sources indicate that as part of the Midway-Aleutian
operations two submarines, 1-25 and 1-26, had been stationed off Seattle for
reconnaissance purposes but were subsequently ordered to move to the Aleutian area.
During this move they seized the opportunity of spreading alarm and despondency on the
Pacific Coast; 1-25 shelled Fort Stevens, Oregon, and 1-26 the isolated wireless station
and lighthouse at Estevan Point, Vancouver Island. The shelling at Estevan was very
ineffective, causing no casualties and virtually no damage.131
As we shall see (below, page 493), the enemy's Aleutian enterprise was not the
beginning of an offensive move against the American continent. He had no plan for an
invasion of the mainland. The situation was pretty clear at the time to the U.S. Army
Commander in Alaska, Major-General Simon B. Buckner, who said of the possibility of a
Japanese invasion of the United States by way of Alaska, "They might make it, but it
would be their grandchildren who finally got there; and by then they would all be
American citizens anyway!”132 But ordinary Americans and Canadians did not have
Buckner's professional knowledge and cool military judgement, and the new Japanese
activity produced widespread alarm.
This emergency caused efforts to accelerate the large defence measures already under
way in the Pacific, and led to a reinforcement of the Prince Rupert area. We have already
noted that orders were given at this time to complete the organization of the 8th Division.
The approach of the crisis had occasioned an extension of R.C.A.F. activities into Alaska,
which led in turn to the presence of some Canadian Army units there. Two R.C.A.F.
squadrons were stationed at the American airfield on Annette Island in the
southern tip of the Alaska panhandle, a position of great importance to the defence of
Prince Rupert; and General Stuart arranged to send Canadian anti-aircraft gunners to
protect the field. The first detachment arrived on 1 June.133 At the same time the anti-
aircraft defences of Prince Rupert were further strengthened by dispatching six Bofors
guns from the Artillery Training Centre at Petawawa; Victoria got six others, from
Debert.134 Shortly afterwards mobile defence for the line of the Canadian National
Railways along the Skeena between Terrace and Prince Rupert was provided in the form
of an armoured train. The train, mounting two 75-mm. guns, four Bofors and two
searchlights, had accommodation for artillerymen to man the guns plus an infantry
company. It made its first trip between Terrace and Prince Rupert on 29 July, and during
the rest of the summer it covered the 90 miles between the two places almost every
day.135
Another measure of local defence, authorized during the February excitement, was
the organization of the auxiliary corps subsequently named the Pacific Coast Militia
Rangers. This force soon grew to a strength of 14,000 men,* with 115 companies
organized from the Queen Charlotte Islands to the American border.137 The fundamental
idea behind it was to utilize the local knowledge of fishermen, trappers, farmers and other
residents of the coastal region, who would provide information for the regular forces and
report subversive activities or sabotage, in addition to resisting minor enemy' attacks.
Training was limited to preparations for these tasks; there was, special emphasis on rifle
practice, usually carried out on ranges constructed by the men themselves. The P.C.M.R.
wore khaki denim uniforms with a distinctive arm-band. Had there been any active
operations on the coast, this force would certainly have played a useful part.
The most northerly post occupied by the Canadian Army during the war on a long-
term basis was Whitehorse, Yukon Territory. The aerodrome here was an important link
in the Northwest Staging Route, which had been developed to provide the United States
with an airway to Alaska.138 An aerodrome defence platoon was sent to protect it in the
autumn of 1942. In the early summer of 1943 an anti-aircraft battery with Bofors guns
was sent in. Both units were withdrawn in August of the same year after the Japanese had
been driven from the Aleutians.139
Home Defence at its Peak
The numerical strength of Pacific Command reached its peak in the spring and early
summer of 1943; on 12 June, 34,316 all ranks of the Active
*Its peak strength (31 August 1943) was 14,849 all ranks.136
Army* were stationed within its boundaries.140 Headquarters Pacific Command was
located at Vancouver, having moved from Esquimalt on 30 November 1942. The
Command was organized in four main subordinate areas, as follows. The Vancouver
Island area was commanded by the G.O.C. 6th Canadian Division, who in March had
under his command the 13th Infantry Brigade at Nanaimo and the 18th Infantry Brigade
at Port Alberni, while the troops of the Victoria-Esquimalt fortress, including three
infantry battalions and a reconnaissance regiment, provided, with the fixed defences,
.rather more than the equivalent of a third brigade group. The Northern British Columbia
area was commanded by the G.O.C. 8th Division, who had the 14th Infantry Brigade at
Terrace and the 16th Infantry Brigade at Prince George, in addition to the Prince Rupert
Defences, which included two infantry battalions. The third area was Vancouver
Defences, which had two infantry battalions under command in addition to its artillery
units. The fourth subordinate command was the Command reserve, consisting of the 19th
Infantry Brigade, at Vernon. This location, well back in the interior, with good
communications both north and south, would allow the brigade to move rapidly to any
threatened point on the coast. All told, there were 21 infantry battalions in the Command.
One of these, the 3rd Battalion, Regina Rifle Regiment, became during the summer the
2nd Airfield Defence Battalion and absorbed the Aerodrome Defence Companies
protecting the various R.C.A.F. stations.141
The Atlantic Command reached its peak strength at about the same period, on 17
April 1943, when the number of troops in the Command was 24,784 all ranks.142 Its
operational strength consisted largely of the 7th Division, whose headquarters was still at
Debert. With it at that station were the 15th and 20th Infantry Brigade Groups. At Sussex,
N.B., was the 17th Infantry Brigade Group. The G.O.C. 7th Canadian Division had no
fortress or defended port garrison under his command; his formation's role was purely
that of mobile reserve. In all, there were 18 infantry battalions in Atlantic Command in
April 1943 (not including two which were being prepared for dispatch overseas) : ten
(counting a machine-gun battalion) were in the order of battle of the 7th Division, three
were included in the garrisons of fortresses or other defended areas, and five (including
one in process of relief) were in Newfoundland and Labrador.143 An Airfield Defence
Battalion was subsequently organized on this coast also.
At Valcartier, P.Q., outside the boundaries of Atlantic Command, was the 21st
Infantry Brigade Group, originally formed as part of the 8th Division. Its strength on 17th
April 1943 was 3668 all ranks .144 This brigade
*This is the highest total shown in any Army Weekly Progress Report; but Pacific Command's own Weekly Strength
Return for 27 March, obviously compiled on a different basis and including certain attached personnel, gives a total of
37,800 all ranks.
group was under the District Officer Commanding Military District No. 5, and was
available as a reserve for the Atlantic Command and for Eastern Canada generally.*
Security Measures Against the Submarine Menace

in the Lower St. Lawrence
We have already noted that there was no enemy submarine activity in Canadian
waters until after Pearl Harbor. Thereafter, however, the Germans launched an offensive
along the Atlantic Coast. The attack began in the second week of January 1942, off New
England, and in the spring it was extended to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the lower
river. The first sinkings here took place on the night of 12-13 May, and there was further
enemy activity beginning in July. During the whole shipping season of 1942, a total of 23
ships were torpedoed and 22 were sunk in the Strait of Belle Isle, the Gulf and the
river.145 Inevitably, the population of the adjacent shores was alarmed and this
occasioned certain protective measures on the part of the Army as well as the other
services.
On 16 May, on orders of Headquarters Atlantic Command, one infantry company
moved into the defended port of Gaspe to supplement the artillery garrison; this
precaution seems to have been ordered just before the first sinkings.146 After them,
General Elkins visited the Gaspe area and reported that he was satisfied with the naval
and air dispositions which had been or were being made. However, he arranged for a
small reconnaissance detachment from the 4th Division to stand by to move to Mont Joli
for patrol duty, should the situation deteriorate.147 This move actually took place after the
sinkings in July, a motor platoon from The Lake Superior Regiment being used to patrol
between Bic and Cap Chat. At the same time a platoon of the Gaspe garrison was used
for a similar motorized patrol along the more easterly section of the coast.148
What the local population would most have liked was to have large numbers of
Active Army troops deployed along the coast as protection against raids by or from
submarines. However, to have allowed a mere threat by one or two U-boats to tie up
thousands of soldiers in this manner would have been very poor policy. National Defence
Headquarters accordingly made it clear that static protection for the communities along
the lower St. Lawrence should be provided by the citizens themselves through the
medium of the Reserve Army.149 An intensive recruiting campaign for the Reserve Army
in the Gaspe Peninsula was launched in September 1942, and with the cooperation of the
clergy and other local leaders good
*Units in Canada and adjacent areas in April 1943 are listed in Appendix "E".
progress was made. By 18 November Brigadier G. P. Vanier, D.O.C. Military District

No. 5, was able to report that some 1500 recruits had been enrolled in four
supernumerary companies of the local reserve infantry unit, the 2nd (Reserve) Battalion,
the Fusiliers du St. Laurent. As a result, authority was granted to organize these four
companies into an additional reserve battalion (the 3rd) of this regiment, and 1000 rifles
and 200 Sten guns were provided for it. Special teams of Active Army instructors trained
the companies during the winter months.150
By February 1943 the strength of the 2nd Battalion of the Fusiliers du St. Laurent
was over 1000 all ranks, and that of the 3rd over 1600. By the autumn the 2nd Battalion's
strength stood at 38 officers and 1213 other ranks, and the 3rd's had risen to 49 officers
and 1877 other ranks. The 3rd Battalion was redesignated in 1944 Le Regiment de
Gaspe-Bonaventure. These battalions must have been by far the largest in the Canadian
Army. Each had 15 full-time telephonists to man telephones at detachments where there
were no civil telephone facilities. Wireless was also used. During the 1943 shipping
season and the rest of the war they made a useful contribution to the maintenance of
security and of public confidence in the lower St. Lawrence area. In particular, they
manned road-blocks on the roads adjacent to the river, and enforced the "dimout"
regulations upon motorists using these roads. Both battalions were trained for coast
watching and local defence roles.151
Needless to say, these Army measures were of secondary importance in protecting
the lower St. Lawrence against submarines. The best security was provided by the highly
mobile units of the Navy and the Air Force. Measures taken on an inter-service basis for
the protection of this region will be dealt with in a later volume. It may be noted here that
there were no enemy attacks against shipping in the river and Gulf in 1943. There was a
small revival of activity in the autumn of 1944, when three ships were torpedoed, though
only one was lost. The Reserve Army units continued their protective activities along the
Gaspe shore until after the end of hostilities in Europe.152
The Japanese Balloon Enterprise
One ingenious but ineffective Japanese project deserves brief notice: the attempt to
strike at the United States and Canada with free unmanned balloons.
This campaign began in November 1944 and ended about 20 April 1945. The
balloons were made of mulberry bark paper (in a few cases, of rubberized silk) and were
filled with hydrogen. They carried a bomb-load varying between 25 and 65 pounds,
frequently consisting of one high-explosive and
four incendiary bombs, which were released by automatic devices. They were sent off
from the Kanto district of the island of Honshu, the Japanese relying on the prevailing
winds over the Pacific to carry them to North America. Their calculations were not
entirely unsound. Of some 9300 balloons believed to have been released, approximately
300 are known to have reached North America, and 90 of these came to Canada.
Doubtless some landed in wild country and were never reported. Balloons came as far
east in Canada as Manitoba, "incidents" being reported in that province at Trout Lake,
Southern Indian Lake and Nelson House.
This strange scheme with its aim of blind random destruction did no harm whatever
in Canada. In the United States it killed a woman and five children, all in one incident
near Bly, Oregon, in May 1945, when a balloon was found and tampered with. Such were
the results of a plan on which the Japanese expended much money and energy. It had
been feared that they might use the ballons as agents of chemical or biological warfare;
but apparently no such attempts were made.153
Such counter-measures as could be taken were carefully organized. The spotting and
reporting of balloons was arranged for. Army bomb-disposal squads transported by the
R.C.A.F. had the task of dealing with unexploded bombs when found, and the Army's
Directorate of Military Operations and Planning, Ottawa, was made responsible for
coordinating anti-balloon measures as between the various police, service and research
authorities concerned.154 The Air Force was responsible for destroying balloons in flight;
and there are three authenticated instances of such destruction by R.C.A.F. aircraft.155
The Canadian Army in Newfoundland
In 1939 the island of Newfoundland was not a part of Canada, nor was it to become
such for a decade. Nevertheless, the significance of Newfoundland for Canadian security
needed no emphasis. Military cooperation between the two communities was clearly of
the first importance. It is true that there was no effective joint planning before the actual
crisis; but cooperation began even before the Canadian declaration of war and continued
throughout the conflict. In the first week of September 1939 Canada asked and received
permission for R.C.A.F. aircraft to fly over Newfoundland and use the colony's airport
facilities.156 Shortly thereafter steps were taken to provide the Newfoundland
Government with arms and equipment, some on loan, some on repayment. The items
shipped included rifles, Lewis guns and small-arms ammunition.157 In the spring of 1940
Canada agreed to provide two coast-defence guns to protect Bell Island in Conception
Bay, an
BLANK PAGE
important source of iron ore. In June a Canadian engineer officer went to Newfoundland
to supervise the construction of the Bell Island battery.158
The disasters in Europe in the early summer emphasized the importance of
Newfoundland, and on 14 June the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended
that one flight of bomber-reconnaissance aircraft be stationed at Newfoundland Airport at
Gander* (to be reinforced by one flight of fighters when suitable aircraft became
available), and that an infantry battalion with detachments of other arms be dispatched for
ground protection as soon as possible. The Newfoundland Government's consent was
sought and obtained and action taken at once.159 The 2nd Division, as already noted, was
the only source of trained troops at this moment, and the unit selected was the 1st
Battalion of The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada. It landed at
Botwood on 22 June, and assumed the task of defending Newfoundland Airport and the
Botwood seaplane base. It remained in Newfoundland, however, only until August, when
it was relieved by The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, a 3rd Division unit, and returned
to Canada for embarkation for England.160 As things turned out, the forces sent to
Newfoundland in June 1940 were but the vanguard of larger bodies, and Canadian troops
garrisoned the island throughout the war.
In August 1940 a Canadian delegation headed by the Air Minister (Mr. C. G. Power)
visited Newfoundland and made an agreement161 with its government under which
Canada took wide responsibilities for the defence of the neighbour island, and the
Newfoundland forces were placed under Canadian command. In accordance with this
agreement, Newfoundland was included within the Atlantic Command when the latter
was set up in the same month. Under the new command arrangements authorized in
March 1942 (above, page 172), Newfoundland became in effect "a sub-command of the
East Coast", organized in the same manner as the coast at large; that is to say, the senior
Canadian service officer in Newfoundland functioned as "Commanding Newfoundland
Defences" and exercised "strategic direction" over all three services under "the general
direction of the Commander-inChief, East Coast Defences".162 United States bases had
been set up in the island as part of the Anglo-American arrangement announced in
August 1940. The first U.S. troops arrived in January 1941, and the force was increased
in April. One of the responsibilities of the Canadian commanders in Newfoundland,
accordingly, was cooperation with the American forces. This will be dealt with in a later
volume.
The Canadian Government, and particularly the Prime Minister, attached the greatest
importance to Newfoundland and to the protection of Canada's
*This great establishment was built before the war by the Newfoundland Government in cooperation with the British
Air Ministry. It was in use for experimental flying as early as 1937.
permanent interests there. Accordingly, large and increasing Canadian forces were
stationed on Newfoundland territory as the war progressed and enemy activity in North
American waters increased. We have already noted the measures taken to develop the
island's coast and anti-aircraft defences. Strong forces of artillery and ancillary troops
were required for this duty, and in addition infantry was needed for security against
possible raids. The Canadian Army force in Newfoundland ("W" Force) reached its peak
of strength on 15 December 1943, when it was 5692 all ranks.* It had been a major-
general's command since 25 December 1941, when Major-General L. F. Page† took over
the command of "Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces in
Newfoundland".163
At the time of its greatest expansion "W" Force included the following major units:
two infantry battalions (with headquarters at St. John's and Botwood), plus two
companies of the 1st Airfield Defence Battalion (Le Regiment de Chateauguay) and one
of the Veterans Guard; two anti-aircraft regiments R.C.A. (with headquarters at St. John's
and Gander) and three coast batteries R.C.A. (at St. John's, Botwood and Lewisporte); a
fortress company R.C.E. and a company of Atlantic Command Signals; and the numerous
administrative and service units required to maintain the force.164 The active component
of Newfoundland's own forces was called until March 1943 the "Newfoundland Militia".
In that month Newfoundland acts were passed changing the name of the active force to
"Newfoundland Regiment" and applying the term "Newfoundland Militia" to the former
Auxiliary Militia or Home Guard.165 The Newfoundland Regiment assumed various local
protective functions and in addition manned the Bell Island battery.166 Its strength on 15
December 1943 was 26 officers and 543 other ranks.167 The activities of Newfoundland
units overseas are described in Appendix "I".
Canadian soldiers were also stationed on Newfoundland territory in Labrador. In the
autumn of 1941 work began here on a tremendous new trans-Atlantic airport at Goose
Bay. In the following summer a Canadian infantry battalion (The New Brunswick
Rangers) and other troops were sent there for protection, and the Goose Bay garrison
became a permanent Canadian responsibility. On 13 March 1943 it amounted to 1300 all
ranks, and included both coast and anti-aircraft artillerymen in considerable numbers.168
It was under the operational control of the G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command, but was
under the District Officer Commanding Military District No. 6 for administration.169
*This is from a strength return submitted by "W" Force itself. Figures for this date compiled at Ottawa are
considerably higher; they may have included certain attached personnel and troops in transit.
†Commanders in Newfoundland are listed in Appendix "F".
Canadian Troops in the West Indies

and the Caribbean
We have mentioned in Chapter III the suggestion of the British Government in May
1940 that Canadian troops should be sent to the West Indies, and the Canadian
Government's assent. As a result of these arrangements, The Winnipeg Grenadiers sailed
from Halifax in two flights on 24 May and 13 June 1940. One company of the battalion
was sent to Bermuda, where it relieved a company of the King's Shropshire Light
Infantry, while the main body went to Jamaica. The Bermuda detachment stayed there
only until 27 August, when it was relieved in its turn by British troops and embarked for
Jamaica to join the main body.170 We have also seen that the Canadian Government was
asked, and agreed, to send a second infantry battalion to the West Indies. This
arrangement, however, was not carried out; the British authorities suggested that if
Canada would undertake larger responsibilities in Iceland the United Kingdom would
find the additional troops required for the West Indies (above, page 84). It would appear
that the proposal to send a second unit was dropped at this time and not revived. One
Canadian infantry battalion, however, remained in Jamaica until the end of the war.*
Late in 1941 the British Government again asked Canada to provide a company for
Bermuda. On 7 January 1942 the Cabinet War Committee agreed to send thither a
company of the battalion in Jamaica. On further consideration, however, this was not
considered desirable. On 4 September the War Committee approved sending troops from
the mainland, and a company of The Pictou Highlanders arrived in Bermuda on 12
November.171 With appropriate reliefs, "B" Force, as it was known, remained there until
after the end of hostilities.
In April 1942 the United Kingdom asked that Canada give further assistance by
providing a company for Nassau in the Bahamas, so that a British company on duty there
might rejoin its battalion in the United Kingdom. Protection was particularly important at
this point as a member of the Royal Family, H.R.H. the Duke of Windsor, was Governor
of the Bahamas. The War Committee agreed on 9 April to provide the troops. A new
company of the Veterans Guard of Canada (No. 33) was organized for the purpose and
arrived at Nassau in June. This was "N" Force. The Veterans were relieved in the autumn
of 1943 by a company of The Pictou Highlanders. The Canadian garrison left Nassau
only in the spring of 1946, simultaneously with the relief of the troops in Jamaica and
Bermuda.172
*No attempt is made here to describe the defences of the Caribbean area generally. Large United States army and air
forces were stationed there, in great part as a result of the leasing from Britain of bases in Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica,
St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua and British Guiana.
In March 1942 there was some anxiety for the ships carrying bauxite to Canadian
aluminium plants from the mines in British Guiana; it was feared that they might be
sabotaged in the Demerara River between the mines and the sea. A local coloured guard
was provided for their security, but the British Government now inquired whether
Canada could send white N.C.Os. to stiffen this force. On 22 May the Cabinet War
Committee approved the mobilization of No. 34 Company of the Veterans Guard for this
purpose. The company (which except for its officers was entirely composed of N.C.Os.)
reached Georgetown in June. Thereafter they performed the routine of directing the
coloured detachments guarding the ships while the latter lay in the river or moved up or
down it. The ships were filthy and the weather sweltering; the duty in general was
unpleasant in the extreme. As the war situation improved, the withdrawal of the
detachment became practicable, and it returned to Canada in January 1945.173
The Role of the Reserve Army
Only a word can be said here of the part played by the Reserve Army (formerly the
Non-Permanent Active Militia) in maintaining the security of Canada.
During the first period of mobilization the N.P.A.M. made a useful contribution by
providing details to guard vulnerable points until the Mounted Police could take over.
Thereafter there was increasing emphasis upon the force's function of producing
reinforcements for the Active Army. Second (Reserve) battalions of mobilized units were
organized and it was hoped that they would provide a good many recruits for their Active
battalions. After the outbreak of war with Japan in December 1941, more attention was
directed to the Reserve Army's functions in connection wish home defence. On 31
December a directive174 was issued affecting both its composition and its role. Eight
Reserve Brigade Groups were to be organized across the country and given accelerated
training for the defence of Canada. A more detailed instruction issued in February 1942175
provided that there would be one Brigade Group in each of the eleven Military Districts.
The total number finally organized was twelve,176 as Military District No. 6 (Nova
Scotia) had two. These Reserve Brigade Groups (numbered from 31 to 42) had full-time
commanders and staffs. As the equipment situation improved, they were given weapons
and transport on an increasing scale. As for personnel, the new policy required that future
enlistments would be restricted to men not eligible for the Active Force—i.e., those
between 17 and 19 years of age or over 35; those granted or entitled to postponement of
compulsory service; those between 19 and 35 with a medical category lower than "B";
and personnel of the Canadian Officers Training Corps in all categories, until their
graduation.177
To ensure proper direction and coordination of the Reserve Army programme, the
office of Director General of the Reserve Army was instituted at this same period. Major-
General B. W. Browne, formerly Adjutant General, was the first Director General, and
was later succeeded by Major-General F. R. Phelan.178
The Reserve Army continued to produce a proportion of recruits for the Active force
by training young men of pre-enlistment age. Its function in the direct defence of Canada,
as defined in the latter part of the war, was threefold:-to support the civil authorities if
required; to constitute a trained reserve ready to support the Active forces available for
the defence of the country, if the military situation should deteriorate; and to form a basis
for expansion of the Active Army in case of need .179 We have already seen, in the case
of the Fusiliers du St. Laurent along the lower St. Lawrence, an instance of the practical
and useful contribution which the Reserve Army could and did make to the security of a
threatened area.
The Reserve Army was larger during this war than the Non-Permanent Active Militia
had ever been in peacetime. It actually reached its peak of numbers in the week ending 7
December 1940. Its strength at that date was 111,579 all ranks, not counting 13,604 30-
day N.R.M.A. men carried "supernumerary to establishment", or 28,299 others who were
undergoing training. The great strength in 1940 was certainly due in part to the patriotic
impulses of that moment. Undoubtedly, however, it also owed something to the fact that
men enrolled in the Non-Permanent Active Militia at the time of the National
Registration were exempt from the 30-day compulsory training under the National
Resources Mobilization Act unless the Department of National Defence reported that
they had not received equivalent training. Many men preferred service with a local militia
unit to thirty days in a training centre. The strength of the force decreased after December
1940 until February 1942, when it was 69,660 all ranks plus 63,299 N.R.M.A. men. It
climbed again thereafter until it reached a total of 105,000 all ranks (plus 5313 "Non-
Effectives") in June 1943. Then, as the war situation improved and the danger lessened, it
gradually fell off until at 30 April 1945 it was 82,163.180
Disbandment of the Home Defence Divisions,

1943-1944
The three home defence divisions, the 6th, 7th and 8th, were never complete in all arms
and services. They did not need to be, for they were designed to operate within the
framework of a static organization already existing. This meant that the services of the
Commands and Military Districts were available to assist them; it also meant that the
artillery of the fixed defences,
and other permanent installations, could support them in operations. Thus their
establishments were never as complete as those of field divisions. Nor were the
establishments ever quite full. On 17 April 1943, the 7th Division was deficient 97
officers and 3738 other ranks; the 6th and 8th Divisions were short approximately 1200
and 1100 all ranks respectively.181
These three divisions had been composed in great part of men called up for
compulsory home-defence service under the National Resources Mobilization Act. Thus
on 10 April 1943 the "other rank" strength of the Active Army in Canada, in its major
components, was as follows:182
Formation Total Strength N.R.M.A. Strength

6th Division.......................................................... 11,4628 8,165
7th Division.......................................................... 10,782 7,058
8th Division.......................................................... 8,069 5,401
Units on Garrison Duty ........................................ 31,989 17,342
It will be seen that, although a very high proportion of the troops on homedefence duty
were N.R.M.A. men, the formations and units thus employed also absorbed many
General Service volunteers. Nevertheless, age or medical category made a considerable
proportion of the latter ineligible for overseas service.
In the course of 1943 the threat to Canada's shores, never really very great, receded
further. The summer saw the expulsion of the Japanese from the Aleutian Islands (below,
Chapter XV; while on the other coast the submarine threat, serious in the early months of
1942, had also become considerably less important. This situation permitted, and
common sense dictated, a reduction in the number of men tied up in protective duties in
Canada. As early as 13 May the Cabinet War Committee approved a prospective
reduction in home war establishments, to take effect on 1 September, which would
involve disbanding "five or six" infantry battalions in Canada. On 30 August the Chief of
the General Staff reported that "substantial reductions" in the forces on both coasts were
now practicable, and he recommended the disbandment of the 7th and 8th Divisions, plus
reductions in coast and antiaircraft defences and other economies. The total cut in
establishment was 20,873 all ranks. It would be carried out by transferring volunteers of
suitable age and category to the "reinforcement stream"; Home Defence men of suitable
age and category for overseas service would be transferred to other units in Canada, in
order to release General Service personnel (for overseas duty) and lower category
personnel (for return to civilian occupations).183 Since operational troops in Canada were
so far below authorized establishments, the actual reduction in strength would be about
14,000. These proposals were approved by the War Committee on 31 August.
On 13 September the Minister of National Defence announced the decision,
explaining that the plan was to disband the 7th and 8th Divisions completely
and the 6th Division in part. Three brigade groups were to be retained, "each capable of
operating independently", and to be "administered and trained under a modified
Divisional Headquarters." The formation of the Training Brigade Group in Eastern
Canada (see above, page 135) was announced at the same time.184
This announcement's timing was bad, as it coincided with a setback at Salerno and
the United States Congress was debating a bill to draft fathers of children; and the press
release, though long, had not made explanations particularly desirable for American
consumption. Perhaps through fear of domestic misunderstandings, the important point
that disbanding the divisions would release men for employment abroad was not clearly
made, although the continuing need for General Service recruits was emphasized. The
result was considerable criticism in the United States, where it was made to appear that
Canada was simply taking advantage of a favourable turn in the war to disband a
considerable proportion of her army and send thousands of her soldiers home.185 A
supplementary release, issued on 14 September,186 explained that the changes meant no
modification of the Army's overseas programme, and that "every man of category
suitable for operational duties" would be retained; but it is doubtful if this undid the
damage.
Under the new arrangement the reorganized 6th Division was to consist of three
brigade groups, each of four (not three) battalions. The model was the American
organization used in the Aleutian campaign, and the 13th Infantry Brigade Group, then at
Kiska (see below, Chapter XV), was to be one of the three. Divisional headquarters
moved from Esquimalt to Prince George in October. Its primary purpose was now
defined as coordinating the training and administration of the three brigade groups, which
themselves were directly under Headquarters Pacific Command but dealt with
Headquarters 6th Division in matters of training and local administration. The new
organization was designed to permit the use of one or more of the brigade groups in
"further operations against the Japanese in the North Pacific Area" in cooperation with
United States forces;187 but these operations never came to pass (below, page 507).
There were more changes in the 6th Division in 1944. The 13th Brigade returned
from Kiska in January. In May, it was sent overseas, its units completed with General
Service men. An energetic but only partially successful effort had been made to prevail
upon N.R.M.A. personnel of the battalions to "go Active" on the basis of their units going
overseas as such. In the United Kingdom it was converted into a training brigade.188 In
August, the Division was reorganized on a basis of three infantry brigades, each of three
battalions, a new 16th Brigade being formed to replace the 13th.189
In the autumn came the "reinforcement crisis". On 16 November the Chief of the
General Staff (Lieut.-General J. C. Murchie) informed the Minister that, having reviewed
the matter in the light of the urgent need to
free fit men for overseas, he now recommended reorganizing the 6th Division as one
infantry brigade group and two infantry brigades. The divisional headquarters would be
disbanded. The Cabinet approved these proposals on 21 November, and the divisional
headquarters ceased to exist on 2 December.190 The circumstances, however, were now
changing very rapidly. The Government's decision of 22 November to send 16,000
N.R.M.A. soldiers overseas altered the whole situation. The units in which these men,
long regarded as a potential reserve for the overseas army, were serving, were now no
longer required from this point of view, and any menace to Canadian territory had ceased
to exist. Under the new policy, there was no reason why the units that had composed the
Division (less men not physically fit) should not be sent overseas as units, and this was
done. The disbanded Division and unbrigaded infantry battalions provided two brigade
headquarters, nine infantry battalions and a reconnaissance regiment from Western
Canada, and four infantry battalions from Eastern Canada, to go overseas. In the United
Kingdom they were broken up and the personnel used as reinforcements. Only eight
infantry battalions were now retained for duty in Canada, Newfoundland and the West
Indies.191
At the same time when the 7th and 8th Divisions were disbanded, very large
reductions were made in coast and anti-aircraft defences.* At the beginning of October
1943 certain coast-defence batteries were "placed in maintenance" and at others crews
were reduced so that only a proportion of the guns were manned.192 Simultaneously
various static anti-aircraft units were "relieved of their operational role", among them that
at Arvida. This was only the beginning of a long process which went forward steadily
through 1944. By the end of that year of victories the great structure of coast and anti-
aircraft defence built up in the earlier part of the war had been largely dismantled.193
Thus, for example, it was decided in the autumn that all coast artillery in Newfoundland,
and the infantry garrisons at Botwood and Lewisporte, would be withdrawn permanently
from their operational roles "on freeze-up".194
During November of 1944 authority was also given for the disbandment of
Headquarters Atlantic Command, and the Military Districts in the Maritime Provinces
resumed their normal functions, with Newfoundland retained as a separate command
similar to a District. This was carried into effect on 14-15 December.195 Headquarters
Pacific Command continued to exist somewhat longer; it was "redesignated" as
Headquarters Military District No. 11 only on 23 January 1946, when the Army's
peacetime Western Command came into existence.196
*These Canadian reductions of 1943 proceeded pari passu with similar measures in the United States.
PART TWO
The Army in Britain

1939-1945
BLANK PAGE
CHAPTER VI
THE GROWTH OF THE ARMY OVERSEAS

AND ORGANIZATION IN BRITAIN
(See Sketch 1 )
T HE gradual evolution of Canadian military policy, and the expansion of the Army
Overseas which it produced, have been dealt with in Chapter III. The present chapter
considers the actual process of getting the troops across the ocean and the organization of
the Army in the United Kingdom. It is also convenient at this point to examine the roles
of certain special corps such as the Canadian Forestry Corps and the Canadian Women's
Army Corps.
Moving the Troops to Britain
The movement of Canadian soldiers to Britain began in earnest on 10 December

1939, when convoy T.C.1, comprising the Aquitania, Duchess of Bedford, Empress of
Australia, Empress of Britain, and Monarch of Bermuda, carried 7449 officers and men
of the 1st Division out of Halifax harbour. From 4 November 1939 to 8 May 1945 some
368,000 men and women of the Canadian Army crossed the North Atlantic in more than
300 ship sailings,* all but one of which arrived safely in the United Kingdom.1 About
one hundred different ships were used in this great undertaking, from the stately Queen
Elizabeth, carrying 14,000 men in one crossing, to unknown little cargo vessels, such as
the Olaf Fostenes with her quota of eight soldier passengers. The vast majority of
Canadian troops, however, were carried in fast passenger ships, some of them old-timers
on the North Atlantic run, but others bearing exotic names from distant oceans, In all,
some sixty-five liners carried Canadian soldiers at one time or another. The Pasteur made
thirteen crossings with large Canadian drafts, the Andes eleven, the Empress
*See table, page 191. In addition, 1363 persons were appointed or enlisted in the United Kingdom. There were also
some arrivals by air (about 444 between 12 October 1941 and 8 May 1945); but most of these air travellers were only
visitors. On the other hand, there were perhaps 2000 duplications, caused by individuals returning to Canada and then
going to Britain a second time.
189
of Scotland nine, the Queen Elizabeth, the Aquitania, and the Mauretania six each, and
the Duchess of York, the Letitia, and the Batory five each.
There were no armadas of the sort familiar in the First World War when the first
Canadian contingent of over 30,000 troops was carried in a great convoy of 31
transports.2 The normal practice until the late autumn of 1942 was to send the large
troopships in small fast convoys, but thereafter they sailed singly and unescorted, relying
on their speed for protection. In the earlier period some 30 separate convoys, ranging
from two to eight ships, crossed the Atlantic with Canadian troops, while from November
1942 to the end of the war there were about 70 separate troop sailings. Besides the
regular troop sailings, escorted and unescorted, which carried the great bulk of the
Canadian troops, there were also a large number of so-called "berth sailings", small
parties sailing in merchant convoys or on liners that were not troopships. In all some
5669 soldiers were carried in 95 separate sailings of this type. Thirty-nine different ships
carried Canadian troops as berth passengers, of which the four most frequently used were
the Bayano (twelve crossings), the Duchess of Richmond (ten), the Cavina (seven), and
the Beaverhill (six).
Overall statistics are difficult to establish, since many ships were shared with the
other services and some with the United States forces (indeed in a few cases Canadian
troops formed only a very small fraction of the total personnel on board) ; but with this
reservation the accompanying table3 will give some indication of the magnitude of the
operation. The largest troop convoy was T.C. 15, consisting of eight ships carrying
14,023 all ranks, mostly of the 5th Armoured Division, which arrived in the United
Kingdom on 22 November 1941, but this figure was surpassed in July 1943, when the
Queen Elizabeth crossed with 14,313 Canadian soldiers aboard.5
The annual totals in the table suggest a regular flow of troops in conformity with
Canadian policy regarding the disposition of the country's forces. From month to month,
however, there were wide oscillations in the numbers dispatched and during the whole
period the amount of shipping space available was a paramount consideration in the
"build-up" of the Canadian Army Overseas. Priorities had to be worked out between the
three services and, beginning in 1942, with the American forces. Anticipated sailings
were, of course, made known months ahead of time, but in a war being fought across the
seven seas of the world numerous changes were inevitable. Operations in the
Mediterranean Sea and the Indian and Pacific Oceans were constantly competing for
ships with the flow of soldiers and airmen across the Atlantic to Europe.
With the beginning of the movement of American forces on a large scale and the
abolition of the troop convoy system the Canadian problem became more complicated.
National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, which had no control over shipping, was
forced to hold large numbers of troops ready
GROWTH OF THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS 1939-1945
ACTUAL STRENGTH OF CANADIAN
year ARRIVALS IN THE UNITED Officers Other R
Ships Troops Remarks Date Male N/S CWA Total Male
1939 15 15,908 Advance party CMHQ; 1st30 Nov 34 - - 34 48
T.C. I & 2. 31 Dec 692 - - 692 15,219
1940 57 42,999 2nd Division; ancillary troops;30 Jun 1,514 130 - 1,644 25,735
Convoys T.C. 3-8 and 1889 troops31 Dec 3,099 228 - 3,327 53,332
1941 72 70,416 3rd and 5th Divisions; 1st Army30 Jun 3,653 322 3,975 63,052
ancillary troops; reinforcements;31 Dec 6,837 384 - 7,221 117,25
1942 36 63,497 4th oDivision;
Con sTC ancillary troops;30 Jun 7,939 576 1
8,515 139,00
Convoys N.A. 1-16. 31 Dec 10,000 764 22 10,786 165,96
1943 43 79,564 2nd Army Tank Brigade; ancillary30 Jun 12,671 766 24 13,461 189,80
forcements; all single sailings31 Dec 15,588 1,212 52 16,852 224,82
1944 59 e
64,764 13thceptInfantry
for fi e ships
Brigade; ancillary30 Jun 18,259 1,88772 20.218 9
234,44
forcements; single sailings. 31 Dec 18,115 2,028 85 20,228 249,23
1945 18 31,115 14th and 15th Infantry Brigades31 Mar 18,654 2,03170 20,755 265,51
forcements up to 8 May; single8 May 18,277 2,041 68 20,386 259,93
sailings. Does not WE Day) 8
Total 300 368,26 I
*Figures for 1943,31944 and 1945 arrivals include 16 Hospital Ship sailings, which carried 1769 medical
troops. The total of ships includes 95 berth sailings. Although the number of troops arriving in the UK from
Iceland is included in the TROOPS column, the number of ships involved is not included in the SHIPS
column. There were ten such sailings in 1940 and eight in 1941. Except for two sailings in Oct 1940 and one
in Apr 1941 most of these ships carried only small parties of Canadian personnel proceeding on courses, for
medical treatment, etc.
†The discrepancy of three between the total of arrivals in 1939 and the strength on 31 December 1939 is due to the latter
including three officers who were already in the United Kingdom and two other ranks who were enlisted there; while two
other ranks died during 1939.
‡The peak strength of the Canadian Army Overseas was reached during March, 1945.
for draft on short notice in order to take advantage of the various "offers" that were made
via the British Army Staff in Washington. These offers were often vague as to sailing
date and subject to constant change as to amount of space available. In the case of one
ship there were at least eight changes in the few weeks between its first announcement
and its sailing, ranging from an original offer of space for 2500 air force men to the final
allocation of 140 R.C.A.F. and 130 Canadian Army personnel.6 In December 1942
Canadian troops were promised priority with monthly accommodation for 10,000, yet in
January and February of 1943 Canadian Army drafts totalled less than 30007 for the two
months. The situation greatly improved in July and August of that year, however, with
the result that by the autumn the Canadian Army's overseas programme was virtually
complete and, as already indicated, it was then able to reduce its demands to a monthly
flow of 5000 reinforcements. Shipping space was a less serious problem thereafter. Thus
the so-called period of waiting, which many Canadian troops had to endure in England,
was only just sufficient for building up the force that fought in the last two years of the
war. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington could
have found the necessary shipping if it had been considered necessary to give Canadian
Army movement a really high priority at an earlier time.
Most of the Canadian Army troop crossings were made from "an eastern Canadian
port" which the public correctly identified as Halifax; but at least two ships* sailed from
Sydney with small Army drafts on board. The 1st and 2nd Divisions came directly to
Halifax from various parts of Canada and immediately went on board ship. A Rest Camp
established in the Immigration Building, Halifax, in 1939, accommodated only 500 men.
The 3rd Division, however, and subsequently the 4th, were concentrated at Debert, N.S.,
and Sussex, N.B., where they trained prior to embarkation. As the flow of reinforcements
developed, transit camps were opened at Debert and Windsor, N.S., which held drafts in
readiness until the necessary shipping was available.9
When in the autumn of 1942 it was decided to stop sending troopships in convoy and
the great Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary were included among the unescorted troop
carriers, Canada was forced to send some of her contingents via New York. The
Canadian Government strongly protested this innovation because of the lack of Canadian
embarkation facilities at New York and the extra costs involved.10 British authorities at
first demurred to the suggestion that the Queens might sail from Halifax, both because of
doubts about facilities there and because of the docking space that would be lost to cargo
shipping; while the Admiralty felt that to call at Halifax after sailing from New York
would entail too great an increase in risk.11 In the end the Queens were not used to carry
Canadian troops to the extent
*The Beaverhill, 6 October 1944, and the Erria, 11 November 1944.8

THE GROWTH OF THE ARMY OVERSEAS 193
anticipated and in three cases they did make trips from Halifax. Nevertheless, from the
winter of 1942-43 a proportion of Canadian troop sailings were from New York.
By peacetime standards, the ships were always crowded, but some time elapsed
before the fullest possible use was made of the space available. Thus in 1939 the 1st
Division crossed in relative luxury with the Aquitania, which later took more than 7500
troops, carrying 2638, and the Andes, with a later capacity of about 5000, carrying only
1358.12 As a result, in the early crossings it was possible to keep the men occupied with
an organized programme of physical training, marches, military lectures and sports.13 As
the demands on shipping became more pressing, however, the transports were shorn of
their peacetime trappings and almost every available nook filled with sleeping
accommodation; swimming pools, most of the public lounges and even parts of the holds
were turned into giant dormitories, while staterooms designed for two or three passengers
were filled with bunks for ten or fifteen. Conditions in the holds were such that many
men preferred to bring their blankets on deck; later, however, all access to the open decks
was cut off during blackout hours. With the great increase in numbers it became
necessary to reduce the meals to two a day. The men ate in relays and waited their turn,
standing much of their time in long queues.14 Under such conditions organized activities
ceased to be a feature of the Atlantic crossing. Fortunately, in most cases the voyage was
short.
In the first three years the troop convoys normally left Halifax under the escort of
Canadian destroyers while a British battleship accompanied them across the open
Atlantic as "ocean escort". Destroyers based in the United Kingdom met them at the edge
of the danger zone around the British Isles, but on at least one occasion the rendezvous
was missed and the transports arrived in port unescorted.15 The single sailings in the later
years were unescorted by surface craft. but air cover was provided in the danger areas at
either end of the voyage. In November 1941 a precedent was created when T.C. 15,
carrying part of the 5th Division, was escorted halfway across the Atlantic by United
States warships, although the Americans were not yet in the war.16
Not a single Canadian troopship was lost in the Atlantic. One small vessel carrying a
Canadian Army draft of 105 all ranks as "berth" passengers was lost by enemy action.
The Nerissa, a vessel of 5000 tons built for the Newfoundland service, sailed from
Halifax on 21 April 1941, with less than 200 passengers including, besides the army
draft, several naval and R.A.F. men. Although her speed was only 13 to 14 knots she
sailed alone and unescorted, except for a Coastal Command aircraft which gave cover in
the daylight hours of the last two days. On the evening of 30 April, about 80 miles off the
coast of Donegal, the ship was struck by two or perhaps three torpedoes and sank within
a few minutes. Thirteen officers and 60 other
ranks of the Canadian Army were lost, 33 of whom were members of the Corps of
Military Staff Clerks.17 This was the only occasion in the Second World War on which
Canadian soldiers were lost in the Atlantic by enemy action; similar losses in the First
World War amounted to 133.18
In the first years of the war most of the troopships went into the Clyde, but as time
passed an increasing number ended their voyages at Liverpool. In all, almost two-thirds
docked on the Clyde (mostly at Greenock and Gourock, but some in Glasgow itself),
while one-third went to Liverpool; the few remaining ships were divided between
Avonmouth and Southampton. Small drafts travelling in other ships arrived at a wide
variety of ports, including London, Manchester, Cardiff, Newcastle, Leith, Belfast, Oban,
Barry (South Wales), and Methil (Firth of Forth).19
Since ship sailings and shipping routes were subject to frequent and sudden changes,
Canadian Military Headquarters, London, was often uncertain until almost the last minute
of the exact places and times of arrival. The actual movement of the troops from port to
billeting area was a British responsibility, but Movement Control, C.M.H.Q., maintained
liaison with the War Office and sent an officer to the port of entry whenever a Canadian
troopship arrived.20 Most Canadian troops arriving in Britain went first to the Aldershot
area, where the main Canadian base installations gradually developed. Over a period of
more than five years the Canadian Army built up in the south of England a large and
complicated structure, which was the basis of its operations in Europe. The overall
growth of the overseas force is shown by the table on page 191.21
It will be readily seen that the organization and control of these large numbers of
troops presented formidable problems.
Canadian Military Headquarters
Even during the planning period before 1939 it was clear that a Canadian military
headquarters in the United Kingdom, separate from the fighting formations that were
gradually concentrated there, was an essential requirement (see above, page 31). Apart
from all other aspects, it seemed vital to the maintenance of Canadian autonomy. In 1942
senior staff officers of the Canadian Army Overseas summed up the matter in these
terms:22
Experience in the last war showed the necessity for retaining control of our administration. It is
unnecessary to argue this principle, which is based on inherent characteristics strong in the minds of all
Canadians, and formally expressed as a guide to our existence in the Statute of Westminster.
Fundamentally this is a basic reason for the provision of machinery required effectively to conduct our
own military business.
Long before the Statute of Westminster, indeed, the Canadian Government had
insisted on the administrative control of its own troops when they arrived in Britain in the
First World War. From 1914 to 1916 Sir Sam Hughes,
then Minister of Militia, had used the device of a "special representative" overseas in the
person of Major-General J. W. Carson. In October 1916 the Canadian Government
appointed a Minister, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, with a headquarters in
London, which soon became "a miniature War Office" with "an ample establishment of
officers".23 Such a solution, which must have greatly reduced the reference of matters of
policy to Canada, was not attempted in the Second World War. Mr. T. A. Crerar, who as
a senior member of the Canadian Cabinet led a mission to the United Kingdom in 1939,
made this very clear in a telegram to Mr. Mackenzie King when he said, "Anything
resembling Argyll House Organization in last war should be wholly avoided".24
Presumably Mr. King's government, which throughout the war opposed setting up an
Imperial War Cabinet, did not consider that a Minister separated from the rest of the
Cabinet could have any more powers than the High Commissioner or the senior military
commander.*
Since 1937, we have seen (above, page 62), there had been a military officer (Colonel
G. P. Loggie) on the staff of the Canadian High Commissioner in London, but with the
outbreak of war the volume of military business at Canada House increased so greatly
that new arrangements had to be quickly made. On 26 September 1939 the Minister of
National Defence authorized a Canadian Military Headquarters overseas with Brigadier
H. D. G. Crerar as Brigadier General Staff, Colonel the Hon. P. J. Montague as Assistant
Adjutant and Quartermaster General, and Lt.-Col. E. L. M. Burns as General Staff
Officer First Grade (G.S.O. 1).25
The responsibilities of this new headquarters were subsequently defined as follows:26
"(a) To prepare for the arrival, quartering and general administration of Canadian Active
Service Force units or formations despatched from Canada; to arrange for the completion
of their equipment, and the provision of training facilities for them.
"(b) To requisition the War Office for equipment required by Canadian divisional and non
divisional troops, and to carry out the financial accounting in connection therewith.
"(c) To arrange for quartering, maintenance and hospitalisation of Canadian troops in U.K.
and for the financial accounting in connection therewith. "(d) To maintain close liaison
with the War Office and with the G.O.C. Canadian Forces in the theatre of operations (or
in the United Kingdom when separate command is specified).
"(e) To command and administer Canadian formations and units in the United Kingdom and
at the base in the theatre of operations, as may be specifically detailed.
"(f) To furnish the High Commissioner for Canada with information on military questions as
necessary."
*Inquiries indicate that neither the files of the Department of External Affairs nor Mr. King's private files reveal what
was behind the declaration that the Argyll House precedent should not be repeated. The decision was quite consistent with
Mr. King's ideas of cabinet government, but it may be that Mr. Crerar's message was simply based on the recommendations
of his namesake and military adviser Brigadier Crerar, who was opposed to the Argyll House plan on military grounds.
(See page 213 below.)
In addition C.M.H.Q. was to be responsible for Canadian establishments on the lines of

communication-thus relieving the Canadian G.O.C. in the field of the task of attending to
administration far in the rear-and for serving as the link between Canadian formations in
the field and the Department of National Defence at Ottawa.
Brigadier Crerar arrived in England at the end of October and went to Canada House,
where Lt.-Col. Burns, who had been in England at the outbreak of the war, was already at
work.27 Sharing one office they formed the small nucleus of a headquarters that was
destined to grow with mushroom rapidity. At the outset, however, the Canadian
Government was unwilling to approve Crerar's recommendation that the new
establishment should be redesignated "Canadian Army Staff" and modelled on the
organization of National Defence Headquarters in Canada.28
The advance party of C.M.H.Q., consisting of Colonel Montague, eight other officers
and 14 other ranks, sailed from Montreal in the Antonia on 4 November 1939. On 16
November they reported for duty at Canada House.29 In the meantime Mr. Massey and
Brigadier Crerar had arranged, with the somewhat reluctant concurrence of their
government, to rent the second floor of the substantial Sun Life Building, next door to
Canada House on Cockspur Street.30 During the course of the war, by degrees, almost the
whole of this building was taken over, as were other buildings in the vicinity. In
December 1939 arrangements were made to house the Pay, Treasury and Records
branches of the Headquarters in a large and gloomy "Government Building" on
Bromyard Avenue in Acton.31 It wan thought that this western suburb would be
relatively safe from air attack, but as events turned out this was one of the few buildings
housing Canadian offices in the London area to suffer a direct hit.*
With the decision to send larger Canadian forces to England and the acceptance of
the principle that the Canadians would be responsible for their own training, the
expansion of Canadian Military Headquarters became inevitable. Moreover, it soon
became clear that the Senior Officer should he free from the details of administration in
order that he might devote his full attention to questions of policy, liaison and general
supervision. Consequently, after much communication with Canada, a reorganization was
completed by the early summer of 1940.33
Briefly, the new organization established three separate Branches under the Senior
Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters (which office had recently been raised to a
major-general's appointment) : the General Staff Branch, the Adjutant-General's Branch,
and the Quartermaster-General's Branch.34 In accordance with normal British and
Canadian staff practice, the first
*The incident happened on the night of 20-21 February 1944. It caused only minor damage to the Canadian offices,
which were at the other end of the building from the wing that was hit.32
named was responsible for matters relating to operations, intelligence, staff duties
(mainly war organization), training and public relations; the second, for organization
(reinforcements, statistics, appointments and promotions, etc.), personal services
(ceremonial, discipline, records, C.A.S.F. Overseas Routine Orders), medical services
and pay services; and the third, for supplies and transport (accommodation, movement
control, postal matters, rations, printing and stationery), ordnance services, assembly of
Canadian vehicles in the United Kingdom, and purchasing. Simultaneously the size of the
staffs was increased. Early in July Major-General Crerar was recalled to Canada, where
he became Chief of the General Staff, and was replaced as Senior Officer at C.M.H.Q. by
Brigadier Montague, who was promoted Major General. General Montague (who was in
civil life a Justice of the Court of King's Bench in Manitoba) also held the appointment of
Deputy Judge Advocate General.
The resources of the new headquarters were soon fully extended. In particular, the
establishment of Canadian hospitals, the maintenance of Canadian motor transport, and
the general administration that would not have been required had the Canadian field force
gone to France, imposed a heavy burden upon the Quartermaster-General's branch. At the
same time, the concentration of Canadian troops in the south of England brought in its
wake an increasing number of courts martial and civilian claims for damages, which
similarly burdened the office of the D.J.A.G. Moreover the heavy air attacks on London
beginning on 7 September 1940 put what was supposed to be a base headquarters into the
front line, with resultant extra strain on the staff.35
The main lines along which Canadian Military Headquarters was to develop were
well defined by the summer of 1940, although numerous adjustments were made
thereafter. As the overseas force grew, C.M.H.Q.'s establishment grew likewise. On 31
December 1939 its staff numbered 87 persons-23 officers, 28 other ranks, and 36
civilians. A year later the strength had increased to 124 officers, 518 other ranks and 258
civilians, a total of 900, which included some personnel outside London. By the end of
1942 the total was 3215, while by 30 April 1945 the figures were 616 officers (including
24 C.W.A.C.), 2712 other ranks (including 511 C.W.A.C.), and 745 civilians, making a
total of 4073.36 This expansion, which was typical of almost all higher headquarters as
the war progressed,* caused some alarm, and in February 1944 the Chief of Staff issued
orders that the establishment was to be kept under constant review and reduced wherever
possible. In the following June he advised C.M.H.Q. and all units under its command that
except on his specific instructions no more increases in
*On 25 April 1945, 5687 persons (all ranks and civilians) were employed in the Army branches of N.D.H.Q., Ottawa.
In addition, 2226 were carried on the strength of miscellaneous units in the Ottawa area closely associated with one or
more of the branches.
establishments would be approved unless compensating decreases were made at the same
time.37
Early in 1943 a Special War Establishment Committee in recommending certain
increases in the establishment of C.M.H.Q. appeared to accept the assumption that the
work of the Headquarters increased "in direct ratio to the number of troops in the
country".38 One critic of the committee's report, however, argued that there was no
automatic relationship of the sort postulated and that in fact the headquarters'
responsibilities had increased at a faster rate because of "the enormous number of added
functions” that had been tacked on since 1940 and because of "the higher standard of
service" that was required. "Speaking generally," he observed, "the trend has been for this
Headquarters to shoulder all items of administration that can properly be taken off H.Q.
of field formations.39 The latter point will be considered in more detail below.
The amount of paper passing through the Central Registry illustrates the expansion of
the work of C.M.H.Q. The average daily number of pieces of incoming mail increased
from 165 in 1940 to 1500 in 1944, while the number of files in Central Registry increased
from 2,000 to 200,000 in the same period.40 Physically the headquarters had spread into
six main buildings, while small detachments were located at many other places both
inside and outside of London.41
Organization of C.M.H.Q., 1945
The complex organization of Canadian Military Headquarters in its final form can
best be visualized by reference to the organization chart printed herewith.42 The Senior
Officer was replaced in December 1943, we shall see, by a Chief of Staff. The latter, a
lieutenant general, was relieved of much detail by the appointment of a Major General in
Charge of Administration, who had general supervision of the "A" and "Q" branches. The
Brigadier General Staff became a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, directly responsible
to the Chief of Staff.43
In the last days of the war in Europe, the General Staff Branch, with an establishment
of 85 officers and 90 other ranks, comprised four main sections -Military Intelligence,
Staff Duties (which included Training), Historical, and Public Relations.44 After the
formation of the First Canadian Army there was no "Operations" section at C.M.H.Q and
the Intelligence Section's functions were limited to liaison with the War Office (chiefly
designed to keep N.D.H.Q. and the Chief of Staff informed on military operations) and
local security. The Historical and Public Relations sections had their own special duties.
C.M.H.Q. Signals, under General Staff
supervision, had the task of handling the heavy signals traffic that passed in and out of
the headquarters.
Thus the main functions of the General Staff at C.M.H.Q. were Staff Duties and
Training, which entailed the employment of 57 officers. In the words of an official
memorandum, "Staff Duties at CMHQ involve principally the determination, in proper
relation to First Cdn Army, of the organization, establishment, and equipment of the Cdn
Army Overseas, and the policy of mobilization of our resources to meet this
requirement..."45 This involved decisions regarding the types of units needed and their
establishments, decisions regarding the movement of troops and equipment and the
mobilization of units in the United Kingdom, the determination of what sorts of
equipment were required and on what scale, and finally "the determination of rates of
wastage and scales of reserves of personnel and equipment."46 Owing to the tremendous
technical developments of modern warfare a separate and highly specialized section
(Staff Duties-Weapons) was built up to deal with the particular problems of technical
equipment. Another part of the Staff Duties organization was responsible for sending
training information back to Canada and for the training of the many troops under the
command of C.M.H.Q. in England. It will also be noted that the functions of Staff Duties
are very closely related to those of the administrative branches. Briefly the distinction
may be made that "the General Staff is responsible for defining what is required by the
Army. and the A.G. and Q.M.G. Branches are then responsible for taking executive
action."47
The Adjutant-General's Branch. consisting of 208 officers and 415 other ranks under
a Deputy Adjutant General with the rank of brigadier, fell into two main divisions,
Organization and Personal Services, each under an Assistant Deputy Adjutant General.
Personal Services relating to officers, however, were dealt with by a separate Military
Secretary section, also under an A.D.A.G.; and towards the end of the war a Director of
Reorganization and Demobilization was appointed,* who was directly responsible to the
D.A.C. The Organization division under the A.D.A.G.(A) was itself divided into seven
main and 26 sub-sections, dealing with organizational matters proper (formation,
mobilization and disbandment of units, provision and despatch of reinforcements, etc.).
records (a very large section with eight sub-sections), requirements and statistics,
personnel selection, pay, education and inspections. The pay arrangements of the
Canadian Army Overseas were centralized in a large section under a Chief Paymaster
with the rank of brigadier, who had direct access to the Deputy Adjutant General.
Personal Services under the A.D.A.G.(B) was a much larger division. consisting of
153 officers and 289 other ranks, divided into eight main and 39 sub-sections. Matters
dealing with Army personnel generally, such as
*The appointment of Col. D. K. Tow with the acting rank of brigadier was made on 8 September 1944 by the Chief
of Staff C.M.H.Q., with the approval of the C.G.S. at N.D.H.Q.48
promotions, enlistments, discharges, prisoners of war, welfare, and Chaplain and

Auxiliary Services, were grouped together in a large section known as A.A.G. (Pers), but
a separate directorate, the Canadian Wives Bureau, had been formed to deal with the
complex problem of sending servicemen's wives and children to Canada. Four sections
dealt with legal matters: A.A.G. (Discipline) being responsible for disciplinary matters in
general, including the administration of the Provost Corps and the holding of courts of
inquiry; A.A.G. (Claims) dealing with the numerous civilian claims for damages that
inevitably resulted from the presence of a large Canadian force in a small area of south-
eastern England; an Estates section, which looked after the disposal of estates of deceased
personnel; and the Judge Advocate-General's Section, which dealt with courts martial,
legal relationships with Allied forces, and other legal matters. The last-named section was
headed by a Deputy Judge Advocate General, since General Montague remained Judge
Advocate General for the Canadian Army Overseas.* A few weeks before the end of the
war in Europe, however, the Office of the Judge Advocate General was separated from
the Adjutant-General's Branch and its head given the title of Vice Judge Advocate
General with the rank of brigadier.50
Medical and Dental services were also included in A.D.A.G.(B)'s division of the
Adjutant-General's Branch, but the Director of Medical Services, himself a major general
(Major-General R. M. Luton), had direct access to the Major General in Charge of
Administration.
The Quartermaster-General's Branch, consisting of 138 officers and 389 other ranks,
under a Deputy Quartermaster General with the rank of brigadier, was divided into two
main parts, Arms and Equipment, and Q.M.G. Services, each under an A.D.Q.M.G., also a
brigadier. The Arms and Equipment division consisted of R.C.O.C. and R.C.E.M.E.
services. The former was divided into three main sections, the Organization, Administration
and Financial Section, the Ordnance Stores Section and the Mechanical Transport Section.
The Ordnance Stores Section was in turn divided into sub-sections dealing with warlike
stores, clothing and general stores, war equipment tables, and Canadian Army
Requirements, most of which were broken down into further sub-divisions. The
R.C.E.M.E. services fell into two main sections, one dealing with organization and the
other with technical matters, each having numerous subdivisions. There was also a civilian
Director of Design, Equipment and Mechanization (originally known as Technical Adviser,
Mechancial Transport) with a civilian staff, which worked within the framework of the
*The reasons why General Montague retained this appointment until the end of the war were thus stated by the
D.J.A.G. at C.M.H.Q. in a letter to General Montague:49 " ... the large body of Cdn troops overseas warrants no less than a
Judge of the Bench of Canada as the guardian of its legal interests. . . . I think it most significant that in five years there has
been no case that I recall where a commander, a court or an accused did not accept your decision as final.... In this
connection, I venture to add that our Senior Commanders would probably not be prepared to accept as conclusive an
opinion on the law from anyone other than yourself.”
Q.M.G. branch and also served the Department of Munitions and Supply.51
While the organization of Canadian Military Headquarters outlined in the foregoing
pages remained in effect until the end of the war, it should be noted that in 1944
consideration was given to a radical reorganization on the `one-stag" principle followed
by the United States Army and most European countries. The proposal was first made by
Major-General E. L. M. Burns, then commanding the 2nd Canadian Division, in a
memorandum, dated 10 January 1944,52 which suggested a reorganization throughout the
Army but beginning with C.M.H.Q. and N.D.H.Q. He claimed that the British staff
system had never been planned logically, but that rather it was "the result of evolution
and compromise". In consequence there were anomalies and overlapping, particularly
with regard to the Staff Duties section of the General Staff. He criticized the preeminence
of the General Staff in the field of policy and recommended that the staff as a whole
should be reorganized into five branches or divisions-Intelligence, Operations, Personnel,
Maintenance and Movement, and Equipment-with necessary changes in nomenclature.
The old Staff Duties section dealing with organization would be absorbed into the new
Personnel branch (the equivalent of the old "A" Branch) and the Staff Duties-Weapons
section would become part of the new Maintenance and Movement branch (the
equivalent of the old "Q" Branch). The whole system would be coordinated by a Chief of
Staff.
These ideas found favour with some senior officers and the matter came to a head a
few months later when Major-General J. V. Young, Master General of the Ordnance,
arrived with several staff officers from N.D.H.Q. to discuss the organization of Research
and Development in the Canadian Army. General Stuart, suggesting that this might
involve a drastic reorganization of the whole staff system, became interested and directed
his staff to explore Bums' suggestion.53
General Burns' original memorandum was circulated at C.M.H.Q. and at Army
Headquarters54 and was the subject of much discussion at both. An outline plan submitted
by the D.C.G.S. at C.M.H.Q. was considered by the heads of the other branches,55 and the
whole matter was gone into with the War Office, where similar changes were being
considered. On his return to Canada General Young reported that there was general
agreement among the senior officers consulted on the need for radical staff
reorganization. He then submitted proposals for an organization along the lines proposed
by Bums, writing:56
It is the considered recommendation of C of S at CMHQ that the appended proposal be urgently

considered by higher authority in this Department, and that the reorganization so envisaged be
implemented in Canada at the earliest feasible date and without waiting until the conclusion of
hostilities. C of S at CMHQ is proposing to initiate a similar reorganization of his own staff almost
immediately, subject to the concurrence of the Minister.
In September General Stuart wrote to the Department of National Defence urging early
consideration of these proposals,57 but shortly thereafter, following the departure of
Colonel Ralston from the Government, Stuart ceased to be Chief of Staff and the matter
lapsed. Appropriately enough, the last item on the file is a memorandum of 2 December
1944 from General Burns in which he suggested that General Young's project had gone
too far. He proceeded to make other proposals for a considerably modified version of the
reorganization. No further action appears to have been taken. C.M.H.Q., like the rest of
the Army, continued to be organized on the British staff system, which throughout the
war gave service generally considered pretty satisfactory.
Canadian Reinforcement Units and Other Units

Under C.M.H.Q. Command
Canadian Military Headquarters had under its command in the United Kingdom
towards the end of hostilities with Germany numerous miscellaneous units, whose
establishments- (not including the reinforcements held in the reinforcement units, but
including temporary units or "increments") totalled 34,777 all ranks.58
The most important group were the Reinforcement Units, the organization of which
underwent six major revisions in the course of the war. Originally known as Holding
Units, they were first organized in the summer of 1940 in two groups.59 Although they
were primarily reinforcement pools it was found from the outset that they had to
undertake the task of training the drafts arriving from Canada.60 This and the great
growth of the Canadian overseas army were among the causes of the various changes; the
reorganization of the army in 1943 to conform with British war establishments was
another factor. The principle of affiliation of Infantry Holding Units with field units was
also a matter of discussion and experimentation.
They were originally organized on a territorial basis, but in 1941 this was replaced by
a divisional one; that is, each infantry division had its own Infantry Holding Unit.61 In
1943, however, the divisional principle was abandoned and the territorial one revived. 62
Thus for example all reinforcements for western Canadian infantry units of any division
would
*The organization of C.M.H.Q. may be compared with that of the Army branches at N.D.H.Q., Ottawa, a chart of
which appears as Appendix "J".
†On 30 November 1944 the actual strength in Britain was 73,006 all ranks. Of these only 25,816 covered permanent
establishment vacancies; 26,621 were reinforcements, 4568 were employed in the temporary units or "increments", while
16,001 listed as "non-effectives" (unfit personnel, personnel employed outside the United Kingdom, etc.) did not count
against unit establishments. By 30 April 1945 the strength had risen to 94,569, of whom 39,380 were reinforcements.
come from the same reinforcement unit. The term "Reinforcement Unit" had been
adopted because it was considered that the name "Holding Unit" was liable to have a bad
psychological effect on the troops concerned.63
By the spring of 1944 the Canadian Reinforcement Units were organized in six
groups64 in the Bordon-Aldershot area under a Headquarters, C.R.U.* "A" and "D"
Groups embraced five Infantry Reinforcement Units and No. 1 Canadian General
Reinforcement Unit, which served Intelligence, Medical, Dental, Provost, Educational,
and Auxiliary Service units, as well as the Chaplain Service and the Pay Corps. "B"
Group consisted of Engineer, Signals and Army Service Corps Reinforcement Units; "C"
Group, one Ordnance and two Artillery Reinforcement Units; "E" Group, three
Armoured Corps Reinforcement Units, and "F" Group miscellaneous static units. The
decision made early in 1944 to hold some 19,000 reinforcements in the two theatres of
war on the Continent had led to the elimination of "G" Group and the disbandment of one
Artillery and two Infantry Reinforcement Units.65
Each Reinforcement Unit was organized in a headquarters, an instructional wing, an
administrative wing and holding wings. The last named were subdivided into wing
headquarters and training companies, etc. The whole system in England was designed to
hold approximately 23,000 reinforcements at one time.66
Early in 1944, in order to stimulate the flow of infantry reinforcements, the policy of
sending formed units overseas from Canada was adopted and the arrival of the 13th
Infantry Brigade in the summer of that year led to another change in the organization of
the Infantry reinforcement units. "A" and "D" Groups and the 13th Infantry Brigade were
all disbanded and a new organization known as the 13th Canadian Infantry Training
Brigade was formed. This consisted of four and subsequently five training regiments,
each made up of one and subsequently two training battalions and one depot ' battalion.
The latter was responsible for all administration in connection with the reception, holding
and dispatch of drafts, while the training battalion carried out refresher and collective
training up to company level.67 In January 1945, preparatory to the arrival of the 14th
and 15th Infantry Brigades, a 14th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade was also set up,
consisting of four infantry training regiments, with the same distribution of depot and
training battalions as in the 13th Brigade.68
The training done by the reinforcement units is mentioned in another chapter, but the
operational role taken by them at one stage of the war may be mentioned here. When
England was bracing herself to face invasion in the summer of 1940 the British command
at Aldershot asked that the
*Until October 1941 it was known as Headquarters Canadian Base Units. The successive officers in command were
Brigadier L. F. Page, November 1940; Brigadier F. R. Phelan, July 1941; Major-General J. H. Roberts, April 1943; Major-
General D. C. Spry, March 1945.
Canadian troops should participate in the local defence scheme. The Canadian military
authorities naturally agreed and undertook to take the necessary legal action to place the
holding units under the command of the senior British officer in the area should an
emergency arise.69 The task assigned to the Canadians was essentially local in character
and consisted chiefly in providing mobile columns to combat parachutists, and special
patrols and platoons for the defence of various barracks.70 On two occasions subse-
quently during major exercises ("Tiger" and "Spartan") C.R.U. organized ad hoc forces to
relieve Canadian field formations from their protective duties on the south coast and so
enable them to take part.71
Apart from the reinforcement units there were a great variety of Canadian units in the
United Kingdom. It may be sufficient to describe the situation as it existed in the last
winter of the war.
Medical installations included at the end of November 1944 ten general hospitals
with a total capacity of over 7000 beds: No. 4 General Hospital at Farnborough, No. 9 at
Horsham, No. 11 at Taplow, No. 13 at Cuckfield, No. 17 at Crowthorne, No. 18 at
Colchester, No. 19 at Birmingham, No. 22 at Bramshott, No. 23 at Watford, and No. 24
at Horley. The remaining twelve Canadian General Hospitals overseas were on the
Continent at this time. There were also the Basingstoke Neurological and Plastic Surgery
Hospital, a 2000-bed convalescent depot, one convalescent hospital (though two were
authorized) and a number of miscellaneous units, the total authorized establishment being
1390 officers and 3413 other ranks.72 Canadian Dental Corps units, serving the R.C.N.
and R.C.A.F. as well as the Army, included seven Base Dental Companies and totalled
257 officers and 693 other ranks.73
The Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps establishment in the United Kingdom included
2804 personnel in static units, of whom the vast majority belonged to No. 1 Central
Ordnance Depot.74 Originally the Canadian Army Overseas had been largely dependent
on the United Kingdom's Royal Army Ordnance Corps, but on the urgent
recommendation of Generals McNaughton and Crerar the authorities in Canada agreed,
after considerable discussion, to the principle of an R.C.O.C. system of supply. The result
was the establishment early in 1942 of the Canadian Base Ordnance Depot, which was
reorganized as Central Ordnance Depot in January 1944.75
The Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, an offshoot of the
R.C.O.C., were set. up early in 1944, in imitation of British organization, to undertake
"the inspection, maintenance, and repair of electrical and mechanical equipment".
R.C.E.M.E. units in Britain had an establishment of 3547 all ranks, chiefly in No. 1 Base
Workshop (originally Base Ordnance Workshop).76 The Canadian Army Overseas had
found British repair facilities unable to cope with the amount of work to be done.
Consequently, on the recommendation of General McNaughton, and after a detailed

investigation by a representative of the Master General of the Ordnance, the Canadian
Government approved the establishment of a Canadian Base Workshop, which was
especially recruited in Canada in the winter of 1941-42. Accommodation was built at
Bordon, Hants, by the Royal Canadian Engineers and in May 1942 the unit took
possession and immediately began work on a great backlog of repairs that had been piling
up.77
Other C.M.H.Q. units in the last months of the war included three Artisan Works
Companies (R.C.E.), a Printing Detachment (R.C.A.S.C.), two Provost Companies, a
Detention Barracks, three Field Security Sections, a Postal Depot, a Tobacco Depot
(which was also part of the Canadian Postal Corps), three General Pioneer Companies,
two Kit Storage units, the Canadian Wives Bureau, six detachments of the Canadian
Army Show (actually on the Continent), two bands, and various Public Relations,
Auxiliary Services, Educational and other units.78 As already noted, at the end of
November 1944 about 4500 of the troops in the United Kingdom were on the strength of
temporary units or "increments".* These consisted mostly of increments to the Canadian
Reinforcement Units and schools and other static establishments in the United Kingdom,
and theoretically they were available for the reinforcement stream.79
The Canadian Forestry Corps
A very specialized element of the Army in the United Kingdom was the Canadian
Forestry Corps, which at its peak numbered nearly 7000 all ranks. Such a corps had
existed and done important work in the United Kingdom and on the Continent during the
First World War. In this matter history repeated itself in the Second.
We have already mentioned that the British Government proposed the provision of
Canadian forestry units as early as October 1939, and that the decision to form the new
Canadian Forestry Corps was taken in May 1940 after the recommendation had been
renewed (see above, pages 65 and 79). At this time the United Kingdom suggested that 80
companies might ultimately be provided for service in Britain and France. The situation
was soon materially altered by the French collapse, but there was still an urgent need for
foresters in the United Kingdom, for with supplies from Scandinavia and Russia cut off a
great gap existed between local supplies of lumber and essential requirements. An initial
force of twenty companies was asked for, and it was pointed out late in June that the
military
*These were set up under authority of Telegram GSD 602. See page 217 below.
situation in Britain now made it important that these companies "should have received
appropriate scale of military training before they arrive here".80
The required twenty companies, each about 200 strong, were accordingly mobilized
and trained in Canada. The Corps was first commanded by Brigadier-General J. B.
White, who had been in charge of timber operations in France in 1918.* Under a
financial agreement between the two Governments, modelled on the practice in the
previous war, Canada was to bear the cost of pay, allowances and pensions of officers
and men, all initial personal equipment, transport to and from the United Kingdom, and
some minor matters, while the British Government paid for "all other services connected
with equipment, work or maintenance" and certain others including medical services.81
Canada provided and paid medical officers for the Forestry Corps, but the British
authorities paid the cost of "hospitalization".82
An advance party arrived in Scotland in October 1940. This was followed two
months later by the Corps Headquarters and No. 5 Forestry Company, and during the
winter and spring by additional units; by May 1941 there were thirteen forestry
companies overseas, organized in five "forestry districts" each of which had a small
headquarters, and located in the counties of Inverness, Ross, Aberdeen, Nairn and Perth.
The remaining seven companies had arrived by July. Under the pattern of operation
which developed companies worked in two sections, one cutting "in the bush" and
bringing out the timber, the other sawing it into lumber in the company mill, and both
using mostly Canadian mechanical equipment. Each unit was a self-contained
community, including men capable of turning their hands to almost any task; and the
Corps performed in fact an endless variety of undertakings, from miscellaneous building
to snow clearance on the Highland roads. A regular proportion of the units' time was
devoted to military training, each company preparing for the defence of its area and
cooperation with the troops of Scottish Command in the event of invasion.83
The control of the Canadian Forestry Corps naturally presented some unusual
problems, since it was, essentially, a Canadian organization working for the British
Government under a special agreement. None of these problems proved serious, however.
The system of control may be briefly summarized as follows. Military administration was
through Canadian channels, the Corps being under the orders of Canadian Military
Headquarters, London. Timber operations were directed by the British authorities, through
the Home Grown Timber Production Department of the Ministry of Supply, which
arranged the areas where the Canadians were to work and the disposal of the product.
Control of military operations of the C.F.C. was never surrendered by the Canadian
authorities to the United Kingdom.84 General McNaughton's view of the case was thus
stated in May
*When ill-health forced General White to relinquish the command in the autumn of 1943, he was succeeded by
Colonel C. E. F. Jones.
1942: "It is agreed that the War Office is to direct the forestry operations performed by
these Coys; but military operations are reserved for control by Canadian authorities...
personnel of the Cdn Forestry Corps in the United Kingdom might, as an extreme
measure, have to be used as reinforcements for field formations and units of First Cdn
Army."85 However, special, arrangements were made to enable the Corps to act
immediately under the orders of the G.O.C.-in-C. Scottish Command in an emergency,86
although it was never formally placed "in combination" with the British troops under the
Visiting Forces Act (see below, pages 255-6).
The United Kingdom authorities estimated that the timber output of each forestry
company was "roughly equivalent to the timber carried by a ship of six thousand tons
plying regularly from Canada under war-time conditions".87 Naturally, therefore, they
were anxious to get as many Canadian foresters as they could. In July 1941, in view of
the "effect of the Battle of the Atlantic and the heavy demands for shipping for the Near
East and other theatres of war", the British Government asked for twenty more Canadian
forestry companies, to be provided if possible before the end of the year. Considering the
other present and prospective claims upon Canadian manpower, this one had to be
carefully examined; but on 9 October the War Committee of the Cabinet agreed to
provide 1000 more Forestry personnel (equivalent to five companies) and on 23 January
1942 it approved five more companies, as a final contribution. The last of the ten new
companies reached the United Kingdom in October 1942. The overseas strength of the
Corps reached its peak in February 1943, when it was 220 officers and 6771 other
ranks.88
Increasing manpower stringency produced in the spring of 1943 a proposal to
contract the C.F.C. In any case, the Scottish timber stands were being depleted. During
the summer several hundred men of the Corps suitable for other employment were posted
to other overseas units; and in October ten companies, consisting of close to 2000 all
ranks, were repatriated for forestry work in Canada.89 By May 1944 the Corps' overseas
strength was down to 4055 all ranks.90
The remaining twenty forestry companies continued to work overseas until the end of
hostilities. Ten stayed in Scotland; the other ten were ultimately employed on the
Continent, and their story will be outlined in the volume of this history dealing with the
North-West Europe campaign. Canadian forestry operations in Scotland ended only in
June 1945, and the Corps Headquarters there ceased to function on 1 September.91 The
production figures for four-and-a-half years of work in Scottish forests are impressive
evidence of the value of the Corps' work; they are headed by 394,467,161 F.B.M. of
sawn lumber, and production in other categories was in proportion.92
It should be noted that Newfoundland, like Canada, contributed foresters to work in

the Scottish Highlands. The Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit was formed in
November 1939 at the expense of the United Kingdom. It was a civilian organization
whose members signed an engagement to serve for a stated period (at first, six months;
later, the duration of the war). Its strength in December 1942 was 1497 men. Except for
its non-military nature its operations were basically similar to those of its Canadian
counterpart.93
The Canadian Women's Army Corps Overseas
The organization of the Canadian Women's Army Corps has been described in
Chapter IV, where it is mentioned that detachments of the Corps served overseas.
Although these detachments were not large, their work merits brief separate notice here.
All told, 1984 all ranks of the C.W.A.C. served overseas in the European zone to 8
May 1945.94 This includes 313 women-Canadians resident in Britain, or wives of
Canadian servicemen-who were appointed or enlisted in the United Kingdom. Between 8
May 1945 and 31 October 1945, 988 more women arrived overseas, and nine more were
enlisted, making a grand total of 2981.95 The first draft arrived in Britain on 5 November
1942. By the end of 1943 there were three C.W.A.C. companies in London with their
personnel attached for duty to various branches of C.M.H.Q., while a fourth served
Headquarters, Canadian Reinforcement Units, in the Aldershot area. In addition, 173
women not organized as a company were serving in an Ordnance unit, No. 1 Static Base
Laundry.96 As in Canada, the usefulness of the Corps widened steadily as the war
progressed, and its members took on an increasing variety of tasks. Its strength in the
United Kingdom on 30 April 1945 was 62 officers and 1268 other ranks.97
Early in 1944 the employment of women in the rear areas of theatres of war came
under consideration, and by mid-April it had been decided that this would be proper.98
Almost all the earlier thinking in this connection seems to have been in terms of clerks, etc.,
for North-West Europe; but as it turned out the first C.W.A.C. women to enter a theatre of
war were four girls of the Canadian Army Show, who went not to France, but to Italy,
arriving there on 16 May 1944.99_ (On 6 June the diarist of the Westminster f Regiment
recorded a brigade concert as "A huge success, largely due to the 11 efforts of four very
charming CWACs".) However, not many C.W.A.C. personnel served in Italy; in January
1945 the total there was only one officer and 42 other ranks. Twenty-five of the latter were
in the Army Show; all I, the rest were at "Canadian Section 1st Echelon, Allied Force
Headquarters",
the Canadian static headquarters, then in Rome. A larger group, eight officers and 148
other ranks, were in North-West Europe. The great majority of these were at "2nd
Echelon" ("the Deputy Adjutant-General's office at the Base"),* then located at Alost,
Belgium. A smaller number were at Canadian 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group, at Brussels,
and a few were in other establishments.100 C.W.A.C. women on the Continent were not
organized in Companies.
More C.W.A.C. women would have been sent overseas had it not been that after the
long static period so many men of low medical category were available there for non-
combatant duties; to return these to Canada and replace them by women would have been
uneconomical, particularly with respect to shipping space. However, after the German
surrender women were sent abroad in increasing numbers for administrative duties, both
from Canada to the United Kingdom and from the United Kingdom to the Continent.
Now for the first time C.W.A.C. personnel were employed at Headquarters First
Canadian Army (it would have been difficult to ensure adequate accommodation for them
during active operations). At the end of August 1945, when the overseas strength of the
C.W.A.C. had reached its peak, 1833 all ranks were serving in Britain and 450 in the
Netherlands.101
*Primarily a Canadian personnel records office for the theatre.

CHAPTER VII
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN

FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Problems of Control
T HE control of the military forces of Canada, a relatively small nation and only lately
arrived at nationhood, in a world war in which she was a partner with great foreign
powers as well as with her sister nations of the Commonwealth, naturally presented
special problems.
In field operations, in which all other considerations are secondary to the defeat of
the enemy, Canada inevitably surrendered a very large measure of operational control
over her troops to the designated supreme Allied commanders in the theatres, and to the
commanders of the higher formations in which her troops were serving. In "non-
operational areas" no such surrenders were made. The "external relations" of the
Canadian Army, in theatres of war and in the United Kingdom, are dealt with elsewhere
in this history: in subsequent chapters of the present volume, in the volumes dealing with
major campaigns, and in the volume dealing with the military policies of the country. The
Army, however, also had problems of control within itself: it was necessary to define the
division of responsibility as between the static headquarters and the field headquarters
overseas, and between the two overseas headquarters and National Defence Headquarters
in Ottawa. These domestic questions are the matter of the present chapter.
Relationship Between C.M.H.Q. and Field Headquarters
From the outset it was important to establish clearly the relationship between
Canadian Military Headquarters, London, and the senior Canadian field headquarters
(originally Headquarters 1st Canadian Division and ultimately Headquarters First
Canadian Army); and this of course affected the question of channels of communication
between British and Canadian forces. The Senior Officer at C.M.H.Q. was obviously in a
key position, because of his contacts with the War Office on the one hand and N.D.H.Q.
on the other, but from the start General Crerar made it clear that he I
212
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN FORCES 213
recognized the preeminence of General McNaughton's command in the Canadian Army

Overseas, and the vital necessity of close and friendly relations between C.M.H.Q. and
the Canadian forces in the field. In a memorandum written shortly after his arrival in
England,1 he indicated that he was "being guided by recollections of the organization
which was evolved during the period 1914-18":
In the last Great War, it was endeavoured to solve the problem by setting up an Overseas Ministry
(O.M.F. of C.) and appointing a General Officer Commanding Canadian Forces in the British Isles* as
the Senior Military Officer of that Ministry with duties as indicated by his title. This arrangement proved
to have grave disadvantages. Misunderstandings between the O.M.F. of C., with its large Staff
organization under the General Officer Commanding, and the Canadian Corps in France occurred, and
there was a regrettable lack of co-operation, tending even to competition, between the personnel of the
Canadian Staffs and Forces in the British Isles, and those in France. Thus the O.M.F. of C. became more
of a barrier than a link between the two vital centres of Canadian military effort, i.e. the Department of
National Defence in Ottawa, and the Canadian Corps in France.
Crerar strongly advocated establishing the principle that "the General Officer
Commanding the Canadian Forces in the theatre of war shall have the last word in
recommendations to the Department of National Defence on all questions of
organization, personnel, and particularly appointments to Command and Staff of the
forces" in both England and the theatre. In practice, indeed, there was no doubt about the
preeminence of General McNaughton's position; and in the course of time it was
recognized that apart from his field command he acted in another capacity in which he
became known as Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army Overseas, a term
which "grew into use by custom without becoming formally established by the issuance
of any order".3
The precise scope of the authority of the Senior Officer at C.M.H.Q. was defined by
Crerar in a second memorandum, of 26 February 19404 (an interpretation of McNaughton's
instructions from the C.G.S., dated 9 December 1939), which McNaughton approved:
Canadian non-divisional troops, as detailed from time to time are under the command of the G.O.C.
1st Canadian Division for all purposes. On departure from the United Kingdom of the 1st Canadian
Division, they will come under the command of the Senior Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters,
who will also command Canadian reinforcement depots and all Canadian units in the United Kingdom
other than those forming part of the 1st Canadian Division or subsequently attached thereto by direction
of the Department of National Defence.
The channels of communication to be followed by Canadian commanders in the United

Kingdom, and their relationship to the Canadian High Commissioner in London, likewise
required definition. Crerar defined them as follows:
2. The control of the organization and administration of Canadian Forces overseas, both in Great
Britain and in the theatre of operations, will be exercised by the Minister of National Defence. His
instructions will be issued through the
*The appointment of the senior military officer in the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces was actually Chief of
the General Staff, O.M.F.C.2
Chief of the General Staff to Commanders in the Field and in the United Kingdom, the latter including
Canadian Military Headquarters. The channel for communications on policy will be through the High
Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, who will be advised in military matters by Canadian
Military Headquarters as required.* Similarly, on matters of policy, the channel of communication
between the Minister of National Defence and the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division is through the High
Commissioner. To preserve coordination, it has been arranged that copies of all communications on
Policy questions to and from the Minister of National Defence will be inter-changed between 1st
Canadian Division and Canadian Military Headquarters.
3. The Department of National Defence will communicate with Canadian Military Headquarters direct
on matters of detail. The G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division, and the Senior Officer Canadian Military
Headquarters will maintain direct communication with each other on matters of mutual concern, and the
former will transmit his observations and requirements to the Department of National Defence through
Canadian Military Headquarters.
4. Canadian Military Headquarters will maintain close liaison with the War Office on behalf of the
Department of National Defence and of the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division.
A good start had thus been made in the delicate business of establishing the
relationship that was to exist between C.M.H.Q. and the field commander. General
Crerar's contribution, attested to by General McNaughton, is summed up in the following
telegram of 9 July from the High Commissioner to the Prime Minister of Canada:6
On the conclusion of Crerar's duties as Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., London,. McNaughton has stated
to me that he feels under the deepest obligation to this Officer for the effective organization and set-up at
Canadian Military Headquarters which relieved the G.O.C. of much detailed work otherwise necessary,
thereby freeing time and attention for the particular business of organizing and training Canadian troops.
Fortunately no sharp line of demarcation between the duties of G.O.C. and S.O., C.M.H.Q. was laid
down and in consequence burden has been adjusted as circumstances required. In all matters . Crerar has
shown tact, discretion and has used good judgment. When, from time to time, as was inevitable,
Division or C.M.H.Q. found themselves on wrong paths he was willing and anxious to re-assess position
and correct it where necessary. McNaughton feels that Crerar returns to you with probably as good a
knowledge of military position in Great Britain as anyone in London; that he has clear ideas of the
requirements to be met in Canada both present and future and finally that if he is given sufficient
authority he can make a contribution of the very greatest importance to the military administration of the
Department.
After nine months in London Crerar was now brought back to Ottawa, where as we have
seen he became Chief of the General Staff. It was of great advantage in the crucial
formative period 1940-1941 to have a C.G.S. who had personal experience of the military
situation in the United Kingdom and who was on good terms with the senior Canadian
officers there. At the same time continuity was maintained at C.M.H.Q. with the
appointment of Brigadier Montague as Senior Officer with the rank of major general. A
year
*The C.G.S. queried some details of this memorandum, and took particular exception to the word "advised", pointing
out that his own memorandum limited the duty of C.M.H.Q. to giving information to the High Commissioner.5 For a later
definition of the functions of C.M.H.Q. (June 1940) see above, page 195.
and a half later, with the main job of organization completed in Canada, Crerar of his
own choice gave up the senior appointment in the Canadian Army to take a field
command overseas. He arrived back in the United Kingdom in December 1941 to
command the 2nd Division, but owing to the extended illness of General McNaughton he
immediately assumed acting command of the Canadian Corps.* On his recovery
McNaughton, after a visit to Canada, became G.O.C.-in-C. the newly-established First
Canadian Army. Consequently General Crerar was confirmed in the command of the 1st
Canadian Corps.7 He had been succeeded as Chief of the General Staff by Lieut.-
General Kenneth Stuart, formerly Vice Chief.
Relationship Between N.D.H.Q. and the Army Overseas
As the months passed and the Canadian Army Overseas expanded, it inevitably
began to develop a somewhat independent outlook of its own. That the soldiers overseas
tended to acquire a healthy contempt for those still at home was perhaps of no great
consequence, since it meant little more than pride in their own units and formations.
(They did not stop to think that a large number of General Service men, who would
greatly have preferred overseas postings, were obliged to serve in humdrum tasks in
Canada.) More serious was the growing lack of intimacy between the Canadian
Government and National Defence Headquarters on the one hand and the Canadian Army
Overseas on the other. 'Even on the administrative side, despite the benefits of cable and
telephone, the effort to bridge 3000 miles of ocean was fraught with difficulties.
Geographical remoteness helped to produce different types of thinking on military
problems and Canada's military leaders became increasingly aware of the necessity of
closer liaison between the staffs "on the spot" and those in Ottawa.
One of Crerar's prime concerns as Chief of the General Staff was to maintain the
soundest possible relationship with the Army overseas and his correspondence with
McNaughton indicates that an intimate relationship continued to subsist between them. A
quotation from a letter8 which Crerar wrote to McNaughton on 6 January 1941 serves to
illustrate this point and the problem generally:
As you and I know, there is nothing more important than to build up a sense of mutual trust and
evidence of whole-hearted co-operation between the Department of National Defence in Ottawa and the
Canadian Corps and Canadian Military Headquarters overseas. If these physically separated portions of
the Canadian Army organization develop antagonisms towards one another, then national unity will
suffer and with it our capacity and energy to wage war.
*General McNaughton's temporary respite from the duties of Corps Commander did not affect his status as Senior
Combatant Officer and he continued to transact a considerable amount of business in his sickroom.
2. Since my return to Ottawa in my present appointment I have utilized every opportunity to impress on
those about me, and under me, that our main responsibility is to assist the Canadian Forces overseas in
every way that lies in our
power... .
3. 1 am hoping that you particularly, and also Price [Montague], can convince your subordinate
Commanders and staff that the situation I have described above is indeed developing, if it is not already
in being. I can't imagine anything more to be deplored than a tendency towards division of the Canadian
Army and its Headquarters into two "camps" on either side of the Atlantic; one "knocking" the efforts of
the other in its endeavour successfully to get on with this business of waging war.
Crerar hoped to bring the two parts of the Army closer together by the exchange of
staff officers, but McNaughton, not unnaturally, was worried about the effect of too many
changes on the various staffs that he was building up. On 7 May 1941 Crerar gave the
Ottawa point of view in a telegram9 to General Montague:
Am sure you appreciate that my one ambition is to enable G.O.C. Cdn Corps and yourself to lean
confidently and heavily on me which is reverse of what you suggest. It is essential to this purpose that
from time to time well qualified Staff Officers with Overseas experience return to NDHQ in order that
your difficulties may be constantly appreciated and steps taken to meet them. It is also important that
similar gaff Offrs in Canada should be given occasional opportunity of filling appointments overseas.
Behind the problem of interchanging staff officers lay a more fundamental difference of
opinion over the role of C.M.H.Q., which the C.G.S. regarded as a "forward extension of
N.D.H.Q." Crerar developed his views further in another communication to Montague:10
I would reiterate that I feel the answer to this problem lies in acceptance of the idea that N.D.H.Q.
and C.M.H.Q. are two echelons of a single entity. We want above all to prevent any cleavage and we
want to get the best officers into command and staff vacancies no matter where these officers happen to
be serving. That means constant interchange on the lines I have indicated. If we were separated by 30
miles instead of 3,000 the problem would, I feel, seem simple. But I do not think geographical distance
should be allowed to affect the principle.
While General McNaughton agreed to the general principle of exchanging personnel

he held different views regarding the role of C.M.H.Q. This affected the question of his
own position and the extent of his authority, which, as he said, had never been clearly
defined. He took advantage of Mr. Mackenzie King's visit to the United Kingdom in
August and September of 1941 to broach the subject to him.* The following is an extract
from General McNaughton's memorandum11 of the interview, which includes a summary
of the points made in the form of a letter to the Prime Minister; this may have been
handed to Mr. King during the interview, but this is not specifically stated:
I think ... that it would be well if my authority as Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army in
the U.K. should be clarified so that I will not constantly be worried particularly by minor questions of
my jurisdiction. . . .
*It was during this visit, while speaking to men assembled for a sports day at Aldershot on 23 August, that Mr. King
was "booed" by some of his audience.
I believe that the Government of Canada now look to me to see that all matters relating to our
Army in the U.K. are kept right and it follows that there must be no doubt in anyone's mind as to where
the authority has been placed as regards the decision on policy. It being expected of course that in
carrying out the details I would have the help and the assistance of the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q. and the
Staff which has been set up there for these purposes.
Recently, there has been evident an increasing tendency on the part of the authorities in Ottawa to
develop C.M.H.Q. as a forward Echelon of N.D.H.Q. rather than to regard it as a most important part of
the lines of communication of the Canadian Corps to N.D.H.Q. and to the government of Canada in
Ottawa and as the agent of the Commander in all relations with the War Office specifically.
McNaughton recorded that he had asked for "a clear statement that C.M.H.Q. was
primarily a link in my communications to Canada and not a forward echelon of N.D.H.Q.
in England, except in a few special matters where they might act as an agency for
N.D.H.Q. with the War Office in matters not concerning the Cdn Corps or other Cdn
Troops in the U.K." He also asked authority to fix establishments and to make
promotions up to the rank of brigadier. "All of this," he said, "is not a request for a `blank
cheque'. It is a request for proper authority to implement established policies in
consequential matters which can only be decided here for the reason that the information
and experience is nowhere else available to Canada. The reason for this request is to
enable decisions to be taken promptly on a vast variety of minor matters affecting
detailed administration." Constant reference of such matters to Ottawa led to endless
delay and to choking the channels of communication with vexatious detail when "our
minds should be kept clear for more effective development of policies".
General McNaughton recorded that Mr. King expressed appreciation of his analysis
and undertook to bring these matters before the Cabinet War Committee. He did so on 10
September, saying that the General felt the need of his authority being better defined. The
point mainly dwelt upon in this connection, however, was another complaint made by
McNaughton, relative to his authority to commit Canadian forces to operations outside
the United Kingdom (see below, page 263). Six months later, in the course of discussions
in Canada between Colonel Ralston and Generals McNaughton and Stuart, following the
decision to form the First Canadian Army with McNaughton as its commander,
agreement was reached as to the Army Commander's powers in modifying war
establishments and in making appointments and promotions.* In the latter regard he was
to have power to make appointments and promotions up to the rank of colonel "to fill
vacancies in War Establishments of all Staffs and Units in the U.K. under the control of
Army Headquarters." He was also to be consulted "in respect to the appointment of the
Senior Officer of C.M.H.O. and of any officer detailed to carry out the duties of this
office." Moreover it was agreed that
*The substance of these decisions was given in telegram GSD 602 to C.M.H.Q. (23 March 1942),12 which became
the authority for using these powers.
"provisional appointments at C.M.H.Q. up to and including the rank of Colonel may,

with the agreement of the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., be made by Army Headquarters
subject to confirmation by N.D.H.Q."
The problem of sending staff officers from Canada to the United Kingdom was
settled by an agreement that the C.G.S. might send such officers as he deemed suitable,
for attachment either to C.M.H.Q. or Army Headquarters. Definite appointments for these
officers were to be dealt with by the Selection Board established at C.M.H.Q. With
respect to the modification of war establishments the Army Commander was given, with
certain limitations, "authority to set up Provisional War Establishments to cover
experimental and temporary organizations and special courses of instruction." Other
powers in this respect were defined by an Order in Council13 which gave him power (a) to
amend existing Canadian war establishments by additions up to five per cent of the total
strength in the case of units of 100 or more all ranks, or by adding not more than five
other ranks in the case of smaller units, and (b) to amend establishments to conform with
British amendments by additions up to 10 per cent of the total strength in the case of units
of 100 or more all ranks and up to an increase of 10 all ranks in the case of smaller units.
Authorization for these increases included "consequential changes" in equipment.*
The formation of First Canadian Army also raised questions concerning C.M.H.Q.'s
role after the Army Headquarters was set up. As a result of the discussions between
Ralston, McNaughton and Stuart a division of responsibilities between the two
headquarters was worked out in general terms. Army Headquarters, of course, assumed
many responsibilities formerly exercised by Corps Headquarters. It was also to administer
Line of Communication, Army and Base units, which had hitherto been looked after by
C.M.H.Q., but, on the request of the Army Commander, it was agreed that C.M.H.Q. might
continue to administer such units while the Army remained in the United Kingdom, and
also those units that the Army might leave behind when it proceeded abroad. Significantly
it was decided that C.M.H.Q. was to "continue to be the advanced echelon of N.D.H.Q." in
*Previously, as indicated in the lengthy preamble to the Order, changes involving not more than five per cent of the
cost of the existing establishment had been allowed "subject, however, to confirmation by the Minister of National Defence
and to the final approval of the Governor-in-Council". Changes involving not more than 10 per cent increase in cost could
"be put into effect on the authority of the Minister of National Defence, subject to the final approval of the Governor-in-
Council." Experience showed that reserving all cases for the Minister's approval led to unnecessary delays, while tying the
limitation to a percentage of the increase in cost was impracticable because of the difficulty in making firm financial
estimates. Moreover, it was felt that "His Excellency in Council should not be encumbered" by such a flow of insignificant
amendments for approval as had developed in the past year.
Additional powers regarding the modification of war establishments, along much the same lines as those indicated
above, were granted the Army Commander by telegrams CGS 139, 6 March 1943, and CGS 149, 13 March 1943.14
which capacity it was to act as N.D.H.Q.'s agent with the War Office and, through the
High Commissioner, with other Departments of the British Government.15 Subsequently
General McNaughton explained to the Director of Staff Duties at the War Office that it
was desirable that on all matters of ordinary business C.M.H.Q. should continue to deal
with the War Office only and that Headquarters First Canadian Army should
communicate with G.H.Q. Home Forces only. However, when policy matters arose with
the War Office that required his personal attention, he would, he said, attend at the War
Office, "accompanied by the appropriate staff officers from C.M.H.Q."16 On matters of
detail, he proposed to deal directly with South Eastern Command.
On General McNaughton's instructions a committee, consisting of the D.A. &
Q.M.G. at Army Headquarters and the heads of the three branches at C.M.H.Q., was
formed to work out a more detailed allocation of duties between the two headquarters. It
was recognized that should the Canadian Army operate in a theatre "independently from
other formations" it would be necessary to reconstruct the Headquarters on a G.H.Q.
basis and probably to appoint Commanders of the Line of Communication and the Base
Sub Area. The more likely contingency, however, and the one which actually developed,
was that "the Canadian Army would be under the operational control of a British or other
Allied General Headquarters," which would look after all rearward services. This would
and did necessitate the setting up of Canadian Sections 1st and 2nd Echelons at General
(Army Group) Headquarters to handle Canadian business. It seemed preferable to leave
the "detailed administration of Canadian L. of C. and Base Establishments" to the care of
C.M.H.Q. It was further agreed that where it was deemed advisable matters of detailed
administration involving all Canadian field formations should be routed directly to
C.M.H.Q.17 The accompanying chart, which was drawn up by the Committee, indicates
the complexity of the channels of communication. At the same time a detailed table was
prepared showing the actual allocation of duties as between C.M.H.Q. and Army
Headquarters. Army Headquarters, as the staff of the Army Commander, who was also
Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army Overseas, was generally responsible for
the formation of policy, liaison with G.H.Q. Home Forces (subsequently with 21st Army
Group), and the training and subsequently the operations of its own units and formations.
C.M.H.Q. was primarily concerned with the detailed application of policy in the adminis-
trative field, liaison with the War Office and other British governmental agencies, and the
training of troops under its command, particularly the reinforcement units.18
Theoretically the formation of a Canadian Army Headquarters should have reduced
the responsibilities and consequently the size of C.M.H.Q.
Therefore the committee's final report19 tackled this fundamental question of whether
the functions of C.M.H.Q. might now be curtailed in the interests of efficiency and
economy. The answer was in the negative. Matters of high policy, which always had to be
discussed with the authorities in Canada, were the concern of the Army Commander as
Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army Overseas. In dealing with such matters of
policy, the memorandum observed, "considerable explanation is usually required and
it follows that the necessary staff must be available somewhere to study, appreciate and
prepare the required submissions, and to preserve the record for posterity". The committee
therefore came to the following conclusion:
The organization required to fulfil the above functions if added to Army Headquarters or other
Headquarters exercising command over Canadian troops, would result in a most cumbersome unit, and
undoubtedly would seriously affect the operational efficiency of the Headquarters concerned. It follows
that such a staff must be separately established in the form of a static Headquarters equipped with
complete facilities to enable it to perform its varied functions. It has been and still is the policy of the
Army Commander to free all Operational Headquarters of unnecessary detail by unloading as many
items as possible upon C.M.H.Q. Therefore, any reduction in the Establishment of the latter would
appear to be a retrograde step if Army or Corps Headquarters were thereby caused to reassume duties
now discarded.
Other factors were also to be considered. Although the "operational duties" of the
General Staff at C.M.H.Q. were necessarily curtailed, increased business in connection
with the allocation of equipment led to an expansion of the technical side of its
responsibilities. Moreover the eventual withdrawal of the Army from the United
Kingdom would require the setting up of new "intermediate" base units to look after the
needs of Canadian troops remaining in the country. At the same time it appeared likely
that it would be necessary to increase the strength of the reinforcement units, involving
the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.. in the command, administration and training of some
60,000 troops. Consequently the committee came to the unanimous conclusion that "the
time has not yet arrived when it would be in the public interest to effect any considerable
reduction" in C.M.H.Q.'s establishment. On the contrary it was considered that certain
increases asked for by the General Staff were fully justified "by the volume and
importance of the work presently undertaken."
Changes and Reorganization, 1943-1944
By the autumn of 1943 the war was four years old, and Canada's original overseas
force of one division had been transformed into a small but wellorganized and well-trained
Army. In June one of its five divisions had been sent to the Mediterranean to take part in
the Sicilian campaign. It was then considered likely that this division would return in time
to join in the invasion
of France in 1944. In October, however, as the result of circumstances described in the

volume of this History dealing with the Italian campaign, it was decided to build up a
Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean theatre. Shortly afterwards, and partly as a result of
disagreement with the. Canadian Government on this issue, General McNaughton
relinquished the command of the First Canadian Army.
In December 1943, when this took place, Lieut.-General Stuart, Chief of the General
Staff, took command of the Army in an acting capacity and at the same time became
Chief of Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters (a new appointment replacing that of
Senior Officer).20 Major-General Montague was appointed to the newly-created office
of Major General in Charge of Administration, C.M.H.Q.* This arrangement lasted until
General Stuart was relieved in November, 1944, when General Montague became Chief
of Staff and Major-General E. G. Weeks became M.G.A.21
For a time after the dispatch of the 1st Canadian Corps to Italy and General
McNaughton's retirement, the future of the First Canadian Army seemed to hang in the
balance. The decision, arrived at after consultation with the military authorities of the
United Kingdom, was to keep the Army's headquarters in existence, to place British or
Allied formations under its command for the coming campaign in North-West Europe to
replace the Canadian divisions which had been sent to Italy, and to bring back General
Crerar from the 1st Corps to become Army Commander. The survival of the First
Canadian Army will be discussed in the forthcoming volume of this history on the North-
West Europe campaign.
The changes consequent on McNaughton's departure inevitably caused some
readjustments. The arrival of Stuart as Chief of Staff created an entirely new situation.
Technically he had stepped down from the senior appointment in the Canadian Army but
in a sense it might be said that the Chief of the General Staff had simply moved his office
from Slater Street in Ottawa to Cockspur Street in London. His appointment to the new
post had been made in order to meet a special crisis, but in recommending it to the Prime
Minister Colonel Ralston also wrote, "as Chief Staff Officer at Canadian Military
Headquarters he would take on . . . questions of policy and of `G' [General Staff] matters
particularly, which have been gradually gravitating to the Army Commander".22 The
War Committee approved the appointment on 21 December. Simultaneously the war was
at last approaching its climax. The long preparations were almost completed and the final
year of battle was about to begin in Europe. From this time on the staff in Canada would
be chiefly concerned with administrative matters and
*At the same time, under authority of P.C. 9701 of 20 December 1943, General Montague was formally given the
title of Judge Advocate General Canadian Army Overseas. Previously he had been authorized to exercise "the powers,
duties and functions of the Judge Advocate General".
consequently the office of C.G.S. would no longer be as important as it had been under
Crerar and Stuart in the formative years. Indeed some months later Stuart and Crerar
were to suggest that General Murchie, Stuart's successor as C.G.S., should be made
Adjutant General, since they considered that was now "the most important military
appointment at N.D.H.Q."23 Nevertheless this suggestion was not acted upon, and there
were occasions when Murchie, who had previously been Stuart's V.C.G.S., made it clear
that as C.G.S. he held the senior office.
One English newspaper made an acute comment on Stuart's appointment. On 29
December 1943 the Manchester Guardian observed: "General Stuart comes to England
as Colonel Ralston's senior service lieutenant and thus will bring Canadian troops
overseas under the direct control of the Minister." The underlying rivalry between
National Defence Headquarters and Canadian Military Headquarters seemed to have been
decided in favour of the former. The personal correspondence between the Minister and
General Stuart indicates that they understood each other very well; yet even now the 3000
miles of ocean soon began to exert their influence.
General McNaughton's departure was followed by other command changes in the
First Canadian Army preparatory to its participation in Operation "Overlord". A number
of senior commanders were replaced. This problem was one of the most important facing
General Stuart when he took over his new duties. On 5 January Stuart signalled to Crerar,
then still in Italy, saying that he felt that General Simonds would have to replace General
Sansom in command of the 2nd Corps and asking for Crerar's comments.24 Since
Ralston had previously told Stuart that he doubted the wisdom of "bringing Simonds to
England and sending Burns out there" (he thought it might be more appropriate for the
former to take command of the 1st Corps in Italy), the Minister felt that he should have
been consulted about the change in plan before a wire was sent to Crerar. He wrote
privately25 to Stuart in frank but friendly terms:
Now that is all there is to that particular incident; but speaking generally, I would like it,
particularly in matters on these high levels where questions are bound to be a mixture of policy and
military consideration, if we could have an exchange of views and comments before the matter becomes
"set" in a definite recommendation. We have been doing that for two years and I think we have both
found it a pretty constructive course in reaching the ultimate decision as to the action to be taken. It
doesn't affect your arriving at any recommendations you ultimately feel you should make, but it obviates
later queries and explanations which are generally necessary when the recommendation comes out of the
"blue".
I am sure you would be the first to say yourself that it is just good teamwork anyway, quite apart
from any "drill", for us here to be kept up-to-date and even ahead of time if possible with information in
which we would be interested. As a matter of fact, I believe that probably your sending me a copy of
your wire to Crerar was with that very idea in mind, but as I have said, I think that a direct wire here for
my comments before you sent the wire to Crerar would have been better. Please don't think for a
moment that I question the regularity of your
ascertaining Crerar's views, without committing yourself in the matter, but your telegram to him seemed
to go somewhat farther than that.
Now, having spelled it out, I shall just leave it to your sense of responsibility to us here to take the
course in the light of what I have said which you think the circumstances call for. Of this you can be
sure, that you never can err on the side of giving us too much or too early information.
You know without my saying it, I am sure, that at all times I want you and me to be completely en
rapport, and I shall try to show that. We have recently gone through a pretty difficult time together, and,
as I told you in London, I cannot express adequately the full measure of my appreciation of your counsel
and help. That you have my fullest confidence is apparent from what I have asked you to do. I have no
doubt of your complete co-operation or of your ability, and I think it is grand of you to carry on,
handicapped temporarily as you have been by this unexpected ailment. I only hope devoutly that your
health and strength will enable you to apply these qualities as wholeheartedly as I know you want to do
it to the heavy and worrisome task we have assigned you.
With my warmest personal regards and heartfelt wishes for health and great success...
The relationship between the Minister and the Chief of Staff in London was not
damaged by this incident, but differences between the staffs in Ottawa and London,
specifically in regard to manpower requirements,* continued to worry them. Towards the
end of March Ralston wrote to Stuart,27
I am afraid that the telegrams that have passed within the last week or two have appeared more like
those emanating from partisans on opposite sides than from co-workers in a common cause. I am not
suggesting where the fault lies, because I don't know, but we are seeing to it here that no time is lost in
getting to the bottom of it....
I feel myself that there is a tremendous waste of nervous energy and time and good talent in the
discussion as to whose figures are right and endeavours to reconcile them.
Shortly afterwards Stuart sent a telegram to General Murchie in which he said that,
having handed the Army command over to General Crerar, it was now possible for him
"to look around and adjust certain matters that have been causing trouble."28 Regarding
relations with N.D.H.Q. he made the following observations:
I have already spoken to all senior staff officers at CMHQ on the NDHQ viewpoint in connection
with such matters as reinforcements and equipment of CAO [Canadian Army Overseas]. I propose early
next week to speak to all officers above rank major at CMHQ on this subject. I shall continue to watch
this matter closely and am confident that satisfactory results will be obtained.
I must point out that there are two sides to this question. At CMHQ we are merely an advanced
element of NDHQ. In the past CMHQ has not understood and has not been sufficiently sympathetic to
the broad problems and repercussions other than military that face NDHQ. CMHQ has concentrated on a
presentation of the administrative military problems confronting the CAO. In some cases
*There was already some apprehension over the availability of infantry reinforcements, especially in the light of a
sudden intimation from Headquarters 21st Army Group that infantry casualties in the initial phases of the coming invasion
would probably be higher than those normally calculated for periods of "intense" action. General Stuart had in fact issued
instructions on 14 March that no important communication on reinforcements was to be sent to N.D.H.Q. without being
seen by himself.26
this presentation has been unnecessarily alarming. NDHQ on the other hand has I think tended to
emphasize the broader aspects of the problem at issue. Both of these are perfectly natural developments
and both are perhaps aggravated by the fact that the two parts of NDHQ are 3000 miles apart. The
problem is not only to reconcile the figures involved but of greater importance to reconcile the two
points of view. Representatives from NDHQ are now here and are engaged in the process of reconciling
the figures involved and I am in the process of attempting to broaden the viewpoint of CMHQ in order
to bring it as close as possible to that of NDHQ. I am confident of success at this end provided there is
some give and take at both ends. CMHQ has at times been unnecessarily alarming in its presentation of
alleged facts and I suggest that NDHQ has perhaps been unnecessarily violent [in] its unexpressed but
implied reactions.
Six weeks later, Stuart reported to Ralston:
I feel that we are making considerable progress in respect to the C.M.H.Q. viewpoint, and in
respect to the tendency to write alarmist cables. I feel that all are playing the game and are leaning over
backwards to try and meet my wishes. I am not satisfied that we can win this battle in a day. I am,
however, quite pleased with the progress we are making.
Ralston agreed: "I think", he wrote, "there has been a marked improvement in
understanding between C.M.H.Q. and ourselves."29
At the same time the relationship between First Canadian Army and C.M.H.Q.
required some redefinition. Although the office of Army Commander was still the senior
appointment in the Canadian Army Overseas, the situation had changed considerably
from the days of General McNaughton. The circumstances of Crerar's appointment, and
Stuart's presence in the office of Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q., meant that to a certain extent
these two officers shared the duties formerly carried out by McNaughton as Senior
Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army Overseas. The Minister expected this. He wrote
to Stuart on 15 January 1944:30
I spoke to Montague just before leaving about some terms of reference for you as Chief of Staff,
and for him. He was going to get together with you, examine the "Charter" of the Army and let me have
your and his suggestions. Probably there may be some readjustments necessary:
(a) between C.M.H.Q. and the Army which may have been found desirable as a result of
experience;
(b) To re-allocate functions at C.M.H.Q. on account of your advent;
(c) to cover any matters of general policy or procedure which it might be advisable to specify.
Breadner [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas] has written terms

of reference. Yours would be pretty general. and while doing it I would like to indicate in
them something to strengthen your hand, as well as mine, by some reference expressly
recognizing our responsibilities to the Canadian people. There will quite probably be
some debate in which the question of our attitude towards the views of the War Office
may come up and an expression of our self-dependence even in co-operation would help
to make our attitude clear. As a matter of fact, I am quite satisfied that those in authority
today at the War Office understand and recognize our position thoroughly, and also that
in Government itself there is a great change from the days of the Great War when Sir
Robert Borden had to become very forthright in his communications with them.
Nothing further appears to have been done about drawing up terms of reference for
General Stuart's appointment, but in various orders in council specific powers of his
office were defined. Thus by P.C. 493 of 25 January 1944 certain administrative and
disciplinary powers, particularly with regard to courts martial, were given to "the senior
combatant officer of the Canadian Militia serving with those Military Forces of Canada
which are controlled or administered by or through Canadian Military Headquarters in
Great Britain,* or, the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain,
or the Major-General in charge of Administration at Canadian Military Headquarters in
Great Britain" in respect of "all the Military Forces of Canada which are controlled or
administered by or through Canadian Military Headquarters". Similar powers were given
separately to the acting commander of the First Canadian Army in respect of that
formation only.31 In a subsequent order in council dealing with the same matter the term
"senior combatant officer" was dropped at General Stuart's suggestion32 and the powers
were simply given to "the General Officer of the Canadian Militia commanding 1st
Canadian Army, the Chief of Staff and the Major General in charge of Administration at
Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain."33
Quite apart from these considerations, the imminence of active operations greatly
altered the picture. The case is clearly stated in a memorandum34 prepared at C.M.H.Q.
for the Chief of Staff:
It is abundantly clear that whereas in the past the Army Commander, in his capacity as Senior
Combatant Officer, was primarily concerned with the organization, development and trg of the Canadian
Army Overseas, he will now require to devote his whole effort to the function of comd during the
planning and preparatory phases of forthcoming events and in the actual conduct of operations to follow.
It follows, therefore, that he and his staff will wish to be freed of all possible detail in respect of routine
administration which would otherwise constitute a serious burden upon his and their time and energies.
It was admitted that it would still be necessary to consult the Army Commander on more
important matters of business such as senior appointments and major changes in
organization, but it was suggested "that much time, energy and paper" might be saved if
"his views and directions" were obtained in personal consultation by the Chief of Staff or
the M.G.A. The memorandum continued: "it is suggested, however, that the time has
come when C.M.H.Q. should in its several departments be regarded more as the
advanced echelon of N.D.H.Q. than merely as a clearing house for military business
between it and the Army Commander." It then made proposals as to how these
adjustments might be effected.
*This was to cover General Crerar, who was then commanding the Canadian forces in the Mediterranean area.
The Army Commander expressed general agreement with this memorandum, but took
the occasion to reiterate his general views as to the relationships in question:35
Generally speaking, the proposed action, detailed in Para 11 of the memorandum, [is] in accordance
with the views I have held, and frequently expressed in writing, since my appointment as Senior Officer,
CMHQ, in November 1939. The proper conception of CMHQ is that it represents an "advanced echelon"
of the Department of National Defence, established in London, so that departmental responsibilities
concerning the Canadian Army Overseas can be effectively interpreted and implemented, functioning as a
quite essential "link" between the Department, the GOC in C of the Canadian Army in the Field, and the
War Office. CMHQ is also required to act, in many important ways, as a "rear echelon" of HQ First Cdn
Army.
As I have previously stated, the difficulties in carrying out these several functions will not arise so
long as the Department of National Defence and HQ First Cdn Army, each appreciate, with understanding,
the role CMHQ is required to fill. In practice, this role can only be successfully carried out if the "attitude"
of the Department of National Defence is to regard CMHQ as, primarily, the "rear echelon" of the Cdn
Army in the Field and that of the latter is to consider CMHQ as the "forward echelon" of the Department
of National Defence. It is when either of the two "principal parties" consider and act as if CMHQ was,
primarily, its own adjunct that troubles arise. CMHQ, at all times, must regard itself as the vital and
understanding link between the two "principal parties", and also [with] the War Office.
Specifically Crerar indicated that he would wish to be consulted on details of

organizational changes only where they might be expected to have a definite bearing "on
the operational function and tactical performance" of units or formations under his
command. In the matter of appointments he considered his own approval required only
for appointments of the rank of brigadier and above "throughout the Canadian Army
Overseas" and first-grade staff appointments in formations under his own command. In
effect by agreeing to the C.M.H.Q. proposals the Army Commander redelegated some of
his powers to the Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q., while his special powers to modify
establishments were eventually transferred to the Chief of Staff by order in council.
Stuart reported that Crerar fully agreed that difficulties in coordinating and allocating
priorities in manpower and equipment made it undesirable that the commanders in either
theatre should exercise "organizational authority". "Crerar freely acknowledges this
function of Canmilitry," he wired Murchie, "and furthermore stresses inability Army
H.Q. to deal with organizational matters of this nature due [to] complete preoccupation
with operational comd and administration of field force."36 At the same time Crerar
considered himself fully responsible for all Canadian units in his own prospective theatre.
He successfully resisted the suggestion that commanders of Canadian units or formations
there not under his own operational command might exercise their emergency "right of
reference" to the Canadian Government through the Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q. rather
than through himself.37
The special problems that arose in the control of the Canadian Army Overseas in
1940-44 were largely the product of an exceptional situation which no one had foreseen
in 1939. The system of organization provided, with a static Canadian headquarters in
London, had been based on the assumption that a Canadian field force would be
operating on the Continent. As it turned out, however, the greater part of the field force
remained in the United Kingdom for four and a half years, with its headquarters cheek-
by-jowl with the London headquarters. In these circumstances the senior officer overseas
(the commander of the field force) assumed, in the capacity of Senior Combatant Officer,
Canadian Army Overseas, many responsibilities not directly connected with the actual
work of training his army for action or directing it in operations.* Only in 1944, when the
invasion of North-West Europe was in immediate prospect, did a clearer division of
responsibilities emerge. The Army Commander then concentrated exclusively upon
preparing his Army for its task, leaving static administration, matters of policy and quasi-
political questions to the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q.; he was, however, prepared to give the
latter firm and decided guidance whenever such questions affected the Army's efficiency
or welfare. That efficiency and that welfare were rightly regarded, throughout the war, as
the primary object and concern of the whole organization, to which all else was
subordinated. Throughout the war, also, the commander of the field army was the senior
Canadian army officer overseas. Perhaps a more logical organization would have placed
the senior officer at C.M.H.Q. A strong case could indeed be made for this arrangement;
but decisions in such matters will always be subject to control by contemporary
circumstances, among which the seniority and personal qualifications of the available
officers will be particularly influential.
As for the relationship between National Defence Headquarters and C.M.H.Q., the
question whether the latter was best described as a "forward echelon of N.D.H.Q." or a part
of the lines of communication of First Canadian Army seems largely academic. As General
Crerar indicated, it
*In 1941 a staff officer at N.D.H.Q. suggested that the senior officer in the United Kingdom "should be called the
G.O.C.-in-C. Canadian Army in the U.K." and "should function as the S.O. [Senior Officer], C.M.H.Q. now does".
38
Commenting on this to the C.G.S., Brigadier M.A. Pope (A.C.G.S.) wrote:
While I agree that the S.O., C.M.H.Q., should normally be the senior Canadian Army officer
serving in the United Kingdom, I do not think that it would be wise to make any change because of the
quite abnormal position in which the Canadian Army overseas now finds itself.
Our organization in the U.K. was based on the premise that the Corps would be serving in a
theatre of operations beyond the United Kingdom.... The position of Canadian Military Headquarters
and the Canadian Corps in the U.K. is therefore an anomalous one, but with goodwill and understanding
our present machinery set up for a quite different situation has been made to work, and is working... .
was in fact both. Problems similar to those we have described will arise, in some degree,
whenever a nation is obliged to set up a large military establishment thousands of miles
from its own shores; there will always be a tendency for the home and the distant
establishments to grow apart. This tendency became marked in the Second World War as
a result of the long static period. Such tendencies require to be combatted by careful
definition of channels of communication and echelons of authority, in the light of
experience; but it is at least equally important to seek to ensure that the right personalities
are in the right places; that personal liaison and exchange of officers are carried on
constantly and on a liberal scale; and that all parties, everywhere, subordinate all other
considerations to the military efficiency of the field army.
CHAPTER VIII
TRAINING THE ARMY OVERSEAS

(See Sketch 1)
T HE machinery for training the Army in Canada has already been described. The main
training task there was preparing individual soldiers to carry out their duties when
posted to field units. The collective training of units for battle was almost entirely
conducted in the United Kingdom. To it we must now turn our attention. The story can be
told only in outline.
The Beginning of Overseas Training
At a very early date the principle was established that the responsibility for
supervising the training of the Canadian force overseas rested with the Canadian
commander in Britain, and not with the military authorities of the United Kingdom. The
instructions1 handed to Major-General McNaughton before he sailed from Canada in
December 1939 briefly indicated that "training and administration of personnel" were
matters to be dealt with through Canadian channels. The question was raised in the
following month when the British Army Council, designating the 1st Canadian Division
as part of the "3rd Contingent" of the British Expeditionary Force, proceeded to state that
the General Officer Commanding the 4th Corps would be "responsible direct to the War
Office for the training of all the troops in the 3rd Contingent from the date of his
appointment".2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London, pointed out to the War Office
that this was inconsistent with General McNaughton's instructions and with the existing
legal status of the Canadian force in the United Kingdom, which was governed by the
Visiting Forces Act;3 the Canadians, under that act, were at the moment "serving
together" with the British forces, but had not been placed "in combination" with them and
were not under British command.*
The matter was clarified on 15 March in a conference at the War Office with the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (General Sir Edmund Ironside). who, it transpired,
had not fully appreciated the legal position of the Canadian
*See below, pages 255-6.
230
TRAINING THE ARMY OVERSEAS 231
forces. On 21 March the Army Council issued to the C.-in-C. Home Forces and the
Aldershot Command new orders4 clearing up the question of the respective British and
Canadian responsibilities
All arrangements in connection with movements, quartering, sanitation, passive air defence and the
allocation of training facilities will be the responsibility of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of
the Command in the United Kingdom [in which Canadian forces may be located]. Control in all matters
relating to training policy, discipline and internal administration of the Canadian Forces is reserved for
the appropriate Canadian Service Authorities.
Although Canadian control of training policy was thus vindicated, the Canadian
commander, whose troops were to serve as part of a British force in the field and to use
British equipment, inevitably shaped that policy in close general conformance with
British practice; and the Canadians leaned heavily upon British training establishments
and other facilities, to whose generous assistance throughout the war the Canadian Army
owes a very heavy debt. This began to accumulate even before the arrival of the main
body of the 1st Division. In November 1939 two groups of officers and non-
commissioned officers, totalling 118 all ranks, reached England and began courses in
British schools to fit them for duty as instructors in the Division when it arrived.5
At the time when the Division landed in Britain it had attained only the most
elementary standard of training, having made a small beginning on the first stage-that of
individual training. As we have seen (above, page 50), roughly 50 per cent of the men
who joined the Canadian Active Service Force in September 1939 had no military
training or experience whatever, while of the balance the majority had had only the
limited training received by the pre-war Non-Permanent Active Militia. Thus there was
much to do. General McNaughton discussed his programme with the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff on 22 December, explaining that he proposed to devote the period
down to 28 February to individual training; March would be used for unit collective
training and April for formation training, i.e. exercises at brigade or divisional level. The
C.I.G.S. said this would be satisfactory, as it was not expected that the Division would be
required on the Continent "until early May"; and he told McNaughton that he had given
orders that it should be given priority in supply of training equipment.6 The 1st
Division's "Training Instruction No. 1" was issued on 26 December,7 and at the beginning
of the second week in January 1940, with the units well settled in at Aldershot and
disembarkation leave completed, work began in earnest.8 A feature of the individual
training thus undertaken was the divisional commander's insistence upon a high standard
of musketry.9 Since Bren guns (like many other items) were in very short supply, light
machinegun instruction had to be given on the obsolescent Lewis.
Full advantage was taken of the courses offered by the British authorities. Under
arrangements made by Canadian Military Headquarters, vacancies
were allotted to Canadians, as time passed, in artillery courses at Larkhill; engineer

courses at Chatham; signal courses at Catterick; and anti-gas courses at Winterbourne
Gunner and Tregantle. Instructors in physical training and platoon weapons were trained
at Hythe; armourers at the Royal Army Ordnance Corps School at Portsmouth; armament
artificers at Chilwell; mechanics at the Central Motor Institute in London; men for
sanitary duties at the Army School of Hygiene, Mytchett (near Aldershot); men of the
Provost Corps at the Corps of Military Police depot, Mytchett; and cooks at the Army
School of Cookery, Aldershot. At the same time, selected N.C.Os. were attached to the
Guards for courses as drill instructors.10 Special arrangements were made for training
tradesmen. The British Army had adopted a plan of training artificers and other
specialists by having them work under supervision in civil workshops. During February,
General McNaughton asked the War Office to arrange for vacancies for his troops in this
scheme.11 Every assistance was given and as a result Canadian tradesmen received
training in a wide variety of civil firms.
Officer training got due attention. Divisional Headquarters prepared and directed a
number of map and sand-table exercises followed by outdoor schemes, to demonstrate
the fundamental principles of attack and defence.12 Exercises for senior officers were
arranged by the War Office.13 Specialist officers were given opportunities to improve
themselves; Ordnance officers, for instance, attended courses at the Military College of
Science.14 From time to time there were lectures and demonstrations. Among the former
was a talk by the C.I.G.S. in April which touched on the implications of the German
invasion of Norway, then just beginning.* Provision of trained staff officers was a
problem; there was only a small pool of Permanent Force officers having such
qualifications, although these were reinforced by Non-Permanent Active Militia officers
who had passed the Militia Staff Course. Arrangements were accordingly made, in due
time, for Canadian candidates to attend the special war courses of the Staff College at
Camberley.16
It soon became evident that it would be impossible to maintain the rate of progress
required by Training Instruction No. 1. There were various reasons: ceremonial parades
and the time required to prepare for them;17 the unusually severe winter ("the coldest
conditions since 1894"),18 which necessitated conducting much of the instruction
indoors;19 and shortage of equipment, very acute in the beginning. Lack of transport was
particularly felt.20 Wet boots and clothing also caused wasted time (a second pair of
boots and a second suit of battledress .were not issued until February and March 1940).21
Acordingly it was necessary to extend the period of
*His appreciation proved over-optimistic, for he termed it "a strategical blunder by the enemy giving us our first
opening".15
individual training from the end of February until the middle of March 1940.22
As soon as this period ended, General McNaughton began a very thorough inspection
of all the units under his command. Beginning on 18 March, it was not completed until
the end of April.23 The G.O.C set out to gain first-hand knowledge of the degree of
efficiency reached by the individual man. He selected men at random from the ranks to
be examined in the various subjects in which they were supposed to be proficient.
Equipment, stores, kitchens, messes and orderly rooms were all subjected to scrutiny. At
the conclusion of his inspection, McNaughton expressed himself as generally satisfied
that conditions were as good as could be expected.24 He considered his troops ready to
proceed with the next stage of training, but warned all units that individual training did
not end with the individual training period, but continued progressively throughout the
soldier's service.25
The second Training Instruction had been issued on 9 March and unit collective
training had already begun before General McNaughton's inspection was completed.26
This Instruction allotted the weeks between 18 March and 27 April to unit collective
training; first by squadrons, batteries and companies, then by regiments and battalions.
The various headquarters within the Division were to be exercised in their war functions
during the same period. The G.O.C. laid special emphasis on mobility, which he
interpreted in the widest sense "as including all those elements of quick decision, good
organization and good discipline which enable a unit to move rapidly and without
confusion at short notice."27
The troops welcomed the better weather and the more advanced training that came
with spring. The Division now approached its tasks with new interest.28 Beginning early
in April, the infantry units each spent a 24-hour period in a model trench system that had
been constructed at Pirbright. Here they practised the various activities, such as
patrolling, raiding, standing-to and improving defences, which had been so important in
the First World War, and which the dash of the German armoured columns across France
was so soon to cast into the discard.29 Shortage of transport still plagued the Canadians,
but infantry units pooled their vehicles so that they could carry out mobile exercises in
turn..30
The artillery regiments were equally busy. The army field regiments began to receive
18/25 pounders* at this time; they had formerly had 18-pounders,32 whereas the divisional
field regiments had begun to receive 18/25 pounders in December 1939.33 During the
latter part of April and the beginning of May, the three divisional field regiments carried
out
*The new 25-pounder gun-howitzer did not come into the hands of the British Army before the outbreak of war, but
in September 1939 a fair number of converted 18-pounders were already available.31
firing practice at Larkhill, the British field artillery school.34 General McNaughton,
himself a gunner officer of unusual technical attainments, required that all battery
commanders become efficient in the use of "airburst ranging" as a normal method.35 The
other technical arms worked at their own specialties; the engineer companies, for
instance, engaged in bridging practice during April and May.36
As the second phase of training advanced, events on the Continent suddenly began to
interfere with progress. The German invasion of Norway broke in upon the training of the
2nd Infantry Brigade, a great part of which was mobilized and moved north in readiness
to embark, although it was not actually employed (see below, pages 258-61). The fact
that the 2nd Brigade had to "borrow" for this enterprise all 3-inch mortar stores held by
the 1st37 throws some light on the equipment situation. Towards the end of April the 1st
Division's third Training Instruction38 was issued, prescribing for the period of unit and
formation collective training from 28 April to 5 June. Unit training was to continue;
brigade schemes were planned in conjunction with British armoured and infantry
formations; and it was hoped to obtain air force cooperation. Divisional exercises were to
commence about 6 June. This programme was never completed. Like many others, it was
deranged by developments in France and Flanders.
Training to Defeat Invasion, 1940-1941
The story of the feverish activity of the 1st Canadian Division and ancillary troops
during the summer of 1940, in connection with the unsuccessful attempt to keep France
in the war and the preparations to resist what seemed an imminent German invasion of
Britain, is told in the succeeding chapter. These events marked the beginning of a new
phase in the history of the Army Overseas. Instead of preparing to take part in a
continental campaign, the Canadian field force now faced the probability of fighting its
first battle in the English countryside. The Commonwealth, left without effective allies,
was thrown back on the defensive; and for two and a half years Canadian training
overseas was very largely directed to fitting the troops for the immediate task of
defending Britain.
This was particularly true in the summer of 1940 itself. The deliberate programme
planned in April went by the board. With the 1st Division organized in brigade groups to
meet the imminent threat, training was necessarily conducted mainly at brigade group
level. There was no opportunity for divisional exercises. Emphasis was laid upon the
training of brigade and battalion groups in rapid movement by motor transport, and units
practised night moves. On 18 August General McNaughton, now commanding the 7th
Corps, reported to the Minister of National Defence that all battalions
had completed "dawn attack exercises" with armoured and air cooperation.39 Earlier he
had mentioned that No. 110 Squadron R.C.A.F. (which had arrived in England in
February) was "cooperating in tactical exercises with all formations of 7 Corps".40
Particular attention was given to cooperation of infantry with tanks. The 1st Division had
been almost completed with its basic weapons and transport at the time of the June crisis
when it was preparing to move to France; but technical equipment and special vehicles
were still short.41
We have already mentioned the gradual concentration of the 2nd Canadian Division
in the United Kingdom, beginning in the summer of 1940, and have made it clear that,
through no fault of the Division itself, it was very incompletely trained at this time. One
of the handicaps under which the 1st Division had had to labour was the inadequate
supply of instructors. That division's headquarters accordingly recommended to Canadian
Military Headquarters that representatives of the units and formations of the 2nd Division
should be sent to the United Kingdom in time to complete courses at British schools
before the Division's main body arrived.42 This was done, these potential instructors
reaching England in the Fourth and Fifth Flights in June and July, in advance of the bulk
of their formation.43 In spite of this foresight, many circumstances retarded the 2nd
Divison's progress. Particularly influential were the slowness of its concentration in the
United Kingdom, covering the months from May to December, and the very great
shortage of all military equipment after Dunkirk.
In September Major-General Odium issued his first Training Instruction.44 This
reveals that the level of training within the 2nd Division at this time was very uneven,
and that considerable individual training had yet to be done. This was, of course, due in
great part to the fact that such equipment as Bren guns and 25-pounders was not available
in Canada. Odium directed, therefore, that individual training be completed and that in
addition all units in his formation finish their own collective instruction by the end of
December. Although the G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Division had been granted the right of
independent command by the Canadian Government, he stated on 8 August that in certain
matters, including training, he would seek Lieut.-General McNaughton's approval.45
Thus training policy for all Canadian troops overseas remained in the hands of the senior
Canadian officer in the United Kingdom. In these circumstances, the 2nd Division's
training generally followed the course already outlined for the 1st Division, and there is
little purpose in describing it except to mention certain special points.
In an endeavour to make certain that all sub-units down to platoon or equivalent level
got practice in independent action, General Odium directed that every subaltern should
take his men on an overnight "scheme" to any
location, except the London area, which was between 25 and 50 miles from his unit's
area.46 The artillery was severely handicapped by lack of guns,* but by October the
various batteries began going in turn to Larkhill for ten-day periods. Here, for the first
time, they were able to handle the 25-pounder.48 As this training period drew to a close,
it was possible to conduct limited formation exercises. On 22 November, the complete
division (less engineers) carried out a move by motor transport, and on 12 December the
4th Infantry Brigade conducted a twenty-four-hour scheme involving night driving
through fog and rain.49 Thus the 2nd Division was considered sufficiently ready for
active employment to take its place in the Canadian Corps when that formation was set
up on Christmas Day 1940.50
An important development during 1940 was the planning of a Canadian Training
School overseas and the establishment of its officers' training component. As we have
mentioned before, one of the weaknesses of the 1st Division and ancillary troops, on
arrival in England, was the lack of trained and experienced instructors. We have also
noted the arrangements made for the admission of Canadians to British schools. Since,
however, the British were rapidly expanding their own army, it was not possible to allot
an adequate number of such vacancies. For example, during the period January to April
1940 it was only possible to train regimental instructors in platoon weapons on the basis
of one per platoon, while both Canadian and British authorities considered it advisable
that at least one man per section should be so trained.51 To overcome the difficulty, it
was natural to consider forming a Canadian training establishment in the United
Kingdom. A proposal to this effect was put before the then Minister of National Defence,
Mr. Rogers, during his visit to England in April 1940. No immediate action was taken,
but since the situation showed no improvement in May and June, and the arrival of 2nd
Division units was making the matter more urgent, Canadian Military Headquarters in
June prepared a tentative establishment for a training group, to consist of two wings with
a possible third to take care of officer training.52
At this point officer training policy became the most urgent aspect. During Mr. Rogers'
visit it had been agreed that while it was desirable that about 25 per cent of the officer
reinforcements required overseas should come from the ranks of the units, only in
exceptional cases- would commissions be granted to other ranks of the Canadian Army
before it had been in
*By 5 November 19-.0 the Division's three field regiments, which had been two months in England, had received a
total of 28 guns as against an establishment of 72; and these guns were the obsolescent 75-mm. type. The first six 25-
pounders were received during the week ending 1 February 1941, and the regiments were not complete with them until
September 1941.47
†A few direct commissions were granted to soldiers with special technical qualifications, and some men with
university degrees and former officers went to British Officer Cadet Training Units before August 1940. In all, about a
dozen were commissioned in these ways.53
action.54 This meant postponing setting up an officers' training unit until after the 1st
Division had gone to France. However, the decision to replace Warrant Officers Class III
by subaltern officers (above, page 128) altered the situation. This meant that more
officers were needed; and many of the W.Os. III were officer material. Simultaneously
came the collapse of France and the commitment of the Canadians to the defence of
Britain. Headquarters 1st Division now suggested that the officers' wing of the proposed
Training School be established at an early date.55 Consideration was given to the
possible advisability of using British schools and thus avoiding adding to the Canadian
financial overhead. However, General McNaughton was "strongly of the opinion that all
officer cadets for infantry and machine-gun battalions should be trained in Canadian
schools";56 and on 12 July 1940 National Defence Headquarters approved in principle the
immediate formation of the officer cadet portion of a Canadian Training School.57
Accordingly, the Cadet Wing began its first course on 5 August.58 The general policy
for training Canadian officer cadets was that all should take the basic portion, "common
to all arms", at this Canadian Officer Cadet Training Unit. Infantry and machine-gun
candidates remained there for the training special to their own arms. Candidates from
other arms or services went on to British O.C.T.Us. for this training.59
There was considerable delay before the other wings of the Training School began to
function, as no suitable accommodation could be found for them.60 The need for driving
and maintenance instruction was so pressing, however, that arrangements were made for
training a limited number of Canadians at the London Passenger Transport Board shops
at Chiswick.61 Officer training remained the sole activity of the Canadian Training
School during the rest of 1940. Its later growth is dealt with below.
Steps were also taken to provide staff training for officers. General McNaughton
proposed that a Junior Staff College be established, based on and near Corps
Headquarters.62 The Chief of the General Staff (General Crerar) questioned the
suggestion, since there was a plan to institute a staff college in Canada. It was ultimately
agreed that one course only would be conducted in England, and that future ones would
take place in Canada.63 On 2 January 1941 the Canadian Junior War Staff Course
opened at Ford Manor, Lingfield, Surrey, with Lt.-Col. G. G. Simonds as Commandant.
The majority of the instructors came from the Canadian force in the United Kingdom, but
the War Office lent three British officers with recent battle experience.64
As the year 1940 drew to a close and the danger of invasion temporarily receded, the
Canadian troops in Britain reverted to individual training. (This was forecast in an
instruction issued as early as 27 September.)65 Emphasis was placed on route marching,
infantry units carrying out a march of twenty miles each week. The occupation of a sector
of the Sussex coast by successive
brigade groups* was a welcome change from training routine. The brigades also did
exercises in cooperation with the 1st British Armoured Division and their staffs had
indoor map exercises. There were still many equipment shortages, particularly in the 2nd
Division. Canadian tank training overseas began with the arrival of members of the 1st
Army Tank Brigade for British attachments and courses.66
With the opening of 1941 the stage was set for the large-scale exercises which had
been impossible in 1940 but which were to be a feature of training for the next three
years.
Throughout 1941 and the early part of 1942, all major exercises had one thing in
common: the anti-invasion theme. Exercises "Fox", in February 1941, and "Dog", in
March, were intended to practise the 1st and 2nd Divisions respectively, with Corps
Troops, in a move by road transport to a concentration area, an advance to contact with a
hostile force, and the issuing of orders for deployment and attack. In addition, the
schemes gave the two divisions opportunities to familiarize themselves with areas likely
to be battlefields in the event of a German attempt on England. "Fox" was staged
immediately west of Dover, the action being directed against a theoretical enemy who
had landed in the Dover peninsula. "Dog" was directed against German troops supposed
to have got ashore farther west, in the South Downs area.
These exercises showed that neither division was as yet very efficient in acting as a
formed body. The greatest faults appearing were lack of adequate traffic control and
failure to get orders down to subordinates in time to be acted upon. Monumental traffic-
jams occurred, and artillery could not get forward to support infantry attacks. General
McNaughton remarked after "Fox" that the exercise had "shaken the complacency of
everyone participating, from the Corps Commander to the lowest private soldier". He
prescribed the remedies-primarily, "traffic-mindedness"-and left no doubt in any mind of
the need for improvement.67 Exercise "Hare", 9-11 April, which involved the 1st
Division and Corps Troops, and the 2nd Division's Exercise "Benito", 16-19 April,
indicated that improvement was in fact taking place.68
Manoeuvres on the Grand Scale, 1941
The first exercise in which the Canadian Corps as a whole took part was "Waterloo",
held by Headquarters South Eastern Command on 14-16 June 1941. This exercise, while
based on much the same general idea as those previously described, was on a larger scale,
involving about half the troops
*Below, Chap. IX.

in the South Eastern Command. The main object was to practise 'the Canadian Corps and
the 8th Armoured Division in a mobile counter-attack role. The 4th Corps also took part,
and there was a "live enemy". "Waterloo" was staged in the central coastal region of
Sussex and the countryside behind it, the operations being dominated by the splendid
ridge of the South Downs. Very briefly, it assumed enemy parachute drops and glider
landings on the northern face of the Downs, combined with seaborne landings on the
coast. The "defending" forces developed an attack against the "German" positions on the
Downs and were eventually held to have been successful in their attempts to drive the
invaders back into the sea.69
From 29 September to 3 October 1941 very extensive army manoeuvres, known as
Exercise "Bumper", were carried on north and west of London. The whole of the
operational portion of the Canadian Corps, under General McNaughton's command, took
part in this, probably the largest exercise ever staged in Great Britain. Two army
headquarters, four corps, and twelve divisions (of which three were armoured) were
involved, in addition to two army tank brigades and large numbers of ancillary troops.
The forces engaged amounted to about a quarter of a million men.
As before, a basic object of the exercise was to practise the army in Great Britain in
its anti-invasion role. The Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces (General Sir Alan Brooke)
explained that it was intended to give commanders, including Army Commanders, the
opportunity of handling large forces; it embodied the experiment of "picking up a whole
Command" and using it as a striking force to destroy an enemy lodgement in England;
but at the same time it served "to test the organization with a view to possible action
across the Channel".70 German landings in East Anglia were assumed to have been
successful, and the forces of Southern Command, with some formations from G.H.Q.
Reserve and South Eastern Command, having cleared up other landings on the south
coast, were ordered to destroy the advancing enemy. The "British" forces were
commanded by Lieut.-General H. R. L. G. Alexander, C.-in-C. Southern Command; the
Germans were represented by the troops of Eastern Command, commanded by Lieut.-
General L. Carr. The main action took place in the area of the Chiltern Hills, north-west
of London. The weather was pleasant, though the nights were cool, and the troops on the
whole enjoyed the experience.71
The exercise ended in the discomfiture of the "Germans", who were withdrawing
rapidly when the operations ceased. Without attempting a detailed narrative, it is enough
to outline the points made at the post-exercise conference. Among the satisfactory results
was the obvious progress made in motorized movement, for despite the large numbers
involved there was little congestion. The main criticisms concerned the positions of corps
and army headquarters, which were considered to be too far back; the failure to pass
information; and the continued use of the brigade-group system of
handling divisions. It was emphasized that all corps headquarters must be able to direct
armoured divisions. There was no particular comment on the handling of the Canadian
Corps, though its unit administration was praised; but the Chief Umpire (Lieut.-General
B. L. Montgomery) criticized two divisions (the 2nd Canadian Division and the 6th
British Armoured Division) for missing opportunities.72
Improvements in Organization and Methods
During 1941 the Canadian Training School began work in earnest. We have seen that
lack of accommodation had prevented the opening of any portion of it except No. 1
(Officer Cadet Training Unit) Wing in 1940. Now, on 1 May 1941, the Training School
took over Havannah Barracks, Bordon. On 5 May No. 2 (Technical) Wing began a course
for drivers at No. 1 Canadian Engineers Holding Unit.73 By September all the wings
were functioning. In addition to officer cadet training, No. 1 Wing conducted an infantry
company commanders' school. No. 2 Wing, while concentrating on driving and
maintenance, ran courses for unit anti-gas instructors and (for a time) regimental clerks.
No. 3 (Weapons) Wing was giving training in the 3-inch mortar and platoon weapons by
September, expanding later to include N.C.Os.', Vickers medium machine-gun, snipers',
assault and range-takers' courses.74 On 1 October a new wing, No. 4 (Regimental
Officers) was formed. This took over the functions of the company commanders' portion
of No. 1 Wing and some of those of the Canadian Corps Junior Leaders School. No. 4
Wing was organized to give courses of six weeks' duration for ten company commanders
and thirty platoon commanders at a time.75 There was also an Administrative Wing.
The year 1941 saw the inception of a new and much more realistic type of training.
This was known as "Battle Drill" and "Battle Drill Training". Battle Drill was the reduction
of military tactics to bare essentials which were taught to a platoon as a team drill, with
clear explanations regarding the objects to be achieved, the principles involved and the
individual task of each member of the team. Battle Drill Training, on the other hand, was
more comprehensive.76 It comprised special physical training, fieldcraft, battle drill proper,
battle discipline and "battle inoculation".* Since there is some tendency to confuse battle
drill training with "Commando" training, it should be noted that Battle Drill Training
*Battle inoculation meant exposing the soldier in training to the sights and noises of battle. It involved the use of
"live ammunition" both by the soldier himself and by the simulated enemy, represented by "reliable shots" who could place
their bullets "realistically close to the troops" without causing serious danger.
was not a specialized form of assault training, but merely the normal prebattle type given
to all Canadian or British infantrymen.
The seeds of battle drill training can perhaps be found in Military Training Pamphlet
No. 33, Training in Fieldcraft and Elementary Tactics, published by the British War
Office in March 1940. It attempted to prescribe more interesting methods of teaching
"minor tactics", and to introduce the team idea into field exercises; there was, however,
no provision for the use of live ammunition. From this beginning in 1940, individual
battle training developed further during 1941. The Canadian Training School's syllabus
for July, for instance, shows the following subjects being taught: assault over obstacles,
unarmed combat, tank hunting and booby traps.77 About this time the 47th (London)
Division, commanded by Major-General J. E. Utterson-Kelso, began experimenting with
a procedure which it termed battle drill, in which absolute physical fitness was essential.
This factor, with the addition of the concepts of ruthlessness and battle inoculation, made
the break from the older type of tactical training complete. Drills for movement in battle
were taught: first on the parade square, and later in the field with live ammunition.
Enemy fire was simulated by bullets from small arms aimed over the heads of the
assaulting troops, while mortar fire and shelling were represented by thunderflashes, No.
69 grenades* and buried, electrically-fired charges of gun-cotton.
The introduction of battle drill training into the Canadian Army began through the
association of the 2nd Canadian Division with the 47th Division in the 4th British Corps
during the summer of 1941. In September The Calgary Highlanders began a school in
"battle procedure" for subalterns and senior N.C.Os., and in October they sent three
officers to attend battle drill exercises at the 47th Division's school. On returning to their
unit, these officers immediately set up a similar course of instruction, and each platoon of
the battalion was put through it.78 From this beginning, the battle drill idea spread to
other units and formations in the Canadian Corps. In November the 1st Division sent two
company commanders from most infantry units and one from the reconnaissance
battalion to the 47th Division's Battle School.79 By December all infantry units of the
Corps were conducting their own battle drill training.80
Late in 1941 a small beginning was made with amphibious training. It was planned at
this time to train one company per brigade and ultimately one company per battalion in
the technique of raiding an enemy-held coast, using the South Eastern Command Assault
Landing Craft School at Havant in Hampshire, where Canadian Corps units were already
sending men for this purpose.81 This was a result of the Corps' movement to the south
coast in the autumn (below, page 297). Such developments as this helped to
*A bakelite grenade designed to produce great blast effect and little or no fragmentation.
maintain interest in training among troops who had been overseas for two years and yet
had seen no action.
This year saw the arrival in the United Kingdom of, successively, the 1st Army Tank
Brigade, the 3rd Division, and the 5th Armoured Division. The circumstances under
which these formations began their overseas training were different from those of earlier
days. In particular, equipment became much easier to obtain in 1941 than it had been
during 1939-40. The 1st Army Tank Brigade began to receive tanks on a training scale
during July and by January 1942 had 157 Churchills and nearly its full establishment of
other vehicles and equipment.82 The 3rd Division had a similar experience; for example,
it had received its full complement of 25-pounders by November 1941.83 This division
arrived in England in a relatively high state of efficiency; it had been in existence for over
a year, and some of its units had been mobilized in 1939. The 5th Armoured Division had
unfortunately to wait a long time for its cruiser tanks, only a few, of American type,
being delivered before the end of the year. However, a large proportion of its other
equipment, including guns, was readily available.84 Thanks to these conditions, these
formations were able to make rapid progress with training.
One difficult problem of 1941 was training the new anti-aircraft artillery units
(below, Chap. IX). Throughout the year, 40-mm. Bofors guns, the weapon of light anti-
aircraft regiments, were almost non-existent. During February and March a special unit
was set up at Colchester to train Canadian A.A. gunners. Accommodation difficulties led
to a decision to add anti-tank training, with the result that the Colchester establishment
became known as Canadian Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Group. It was commanded by
Lt: Col. G. A. McCarter.85 Subsequently Headquarters 1st Canadian Anti-Aircraft
Brigade was formed at Colchester with McCarter (promoted Brigadier) in command, and
took over direction of the activities there. But in March the Group possessed only eight
Bofors guns with which to train eleven batteries.86 As late as 31 January 1942, the
Canadian Army Overseas as a whole had only 58 Bofors against an establishment of
280.87 The situation was met, to a certain extent, by assigning the batteries from
Colchester, as soon as they had been to practice camp, to temporary duty manning static
anti-aircraft sites in the Air Defence of Great Britain, under the operational control of the
British Anti-Aircraft Command and using equipment provided by it.88 Subsequently the
units returned to Colchester for mobile training before joining their field formations. This
plan, however, depended on the availability of equipment and did not get under way until
early in 1942.89
Only brief mention can be made of training at .the Reinforcement Units.* These units
were originally set up to hold a pool of reinforcements, and their staffs were inadequate
to deal with the training problems that arose. Brigadier Page, on taking over command of
the Canadian Base Units in January
*See above, Chap. VI.

1941, reported that the drafts arriving from Canada contained a proportion of "raw, or
nearly raw recruits".90 Consequently it was necessary to set up a syllabus of training and
provide qualified instructors and a proper organization to carry it out. This was done
during 1941 and a regular course of training became part of the normal routine at all
Canadian Holding Units. During that year, however, equipment shortages interfered with
progress as they did in field units.91
Offensive Training, 1942-1943
The German invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941, followed by the entrance of
the United States into the war at the end of the year, opened the prospect of offensive
action against Germany and led naturally to a new emphasis on offensive training during
1942.
The introduction of battle drill inevitably required that individual training be renewed
and intensified. Canadian Corps Training Instructions Nos. 5 and 6,92 issued 21
November 1941 and 25 February 1942, prescribed a steady progression in training from
the platoon level in December 1941 to divisional level by May 1942. In order to obtain as
much realism as possible, exercises were to be two-sided wherever feasible.93 Late in
December 1941 General Crerar took over the command of the Corps and threw himself
with great intensity into the work of training it to meet the new situation, prescribing
policy in a succession of circular letters. The first of these, dated 14 January,94 still spoke
of preparation for the "invasion battle" in England as the Canadians' main responsibility;
but by March he was defining the aim as "to train all ranks up to that stage of mental,
physical and professional fitness needed to engage successfully in offensive battle against
the Germans". He emphasized the need for the highest physical fitness, particularly on
the part of infantrymen, since early operations on the Continent would see a drastically
reduced scale of transport, with the consequence that the foot soldier would have to fight
only with what he could carry.95
Exercises "Beaver III" and "Beaver IV" ("Beaver I" and "Beaver 11" were exercises for
headquarters staffs only) were planned to further this policy. Although these exercises were
still "anti-invasion" in character, they were, at the same time, the first in which the
Canadians participated on a large scale as an offensive force. "Beaver III" was carried out
on 22-24 April under Corps direction by the 1st and 2nd Divisions with the former in the
role of a German invasion force attacking the latter. "Beaver IV", on 10-13 May, saw the
2nd Division assuming the offensive role, while the defending force was supplied by the
3rd Division. This was the latter's first appearance in a Corps exercise. In "Beaver III" the
landing was assumed to have been made in the Littlehampton-Worthing area; that in
"Beaver IV"
was between Bexhill and Beachy Head. Both exercises involved the 1st Canadian Army
Tank Brigade and details of Corps Troops. Special points emerging from them were the
speed with which the 1st Division showed itself able to advance by march route, and the
fact that the 3rd Division required further practice in traffic control. This is merely to say
that this division was now going through the teething troubles that the 1st and 2nd had
experienced during "Fox" and "Dog" early in 1941.96
Following closely after the "Beaver" exercises came a much larger one called
"Tiger", conducted by South Eastern Command and lasting from 19 to 30 May. The
Canadian Corps (now known as the 1st Canadian Corps), less the greater part of the 2nd
Division and one battalion of the 1st Army Tank Brigade, took part under General
Crerar.* The 3rd British Division, less one brigade and with the 5th Canadian Infantry
Brigade under command, replaced the 2nd Division in the Corps order of battle. In all, six
divisions as well as large numbers of other troops took part. For the purposes of "Tiger",
Kent and Sussex were assumed to be independent hostile countries, while lying adjacent
was a powerful neutral state, Surrey, whose threats of intervention were utilized by the
Director (Lieut.-General B. L. Montgomery, G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command) to
influence the course of operations -particularly in the direction of making the troops
cover ground. General Crerar commanded the Sussex forces, which were weak in armour
but strong in artillery and infantry and in the air. The Kent forces were under Lieut.-
General J. A. H. Gammell, G.O.C. 12th Corps. The exercise was not planned on an anti-
invasion basis; the two armies advanced to contact and fought an "encounter battle".
There is no space to detail the course of Exercise "Tiger". We can only mention its
results. In his report97 to the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa, General McNaughton
wrote:
Minister and War Cabinet will like to know that in the opinion of both General Montgomery and
myself results reflect the satisfactory state of tactical training and endurance now reached by Canadian
units and formations taking part. This Exercise was specially designed to test capabilities to the limit. It
lasted eleven days in all during which some units marched on foot as much as 250 miles which is about
the life of army boots on English roads. Much of this marching was tactical at forced pace. Transport
was cut to minimum and troops lived hard under conditions approximating active service. Hardships and
heavy tasks accepted by troops most cheerfully and though now very tired they have come through these
strenuous tests with enhanced morale and confidence in themselves. Staff work, road discipline and
supply arrangements were on the whole excellent. I was particularly pleased with Crerar's conduct of the
operations of 1 Cdn Corps.
*The 2nd Division's Headquarters and the 4th and 6th Brigades, together with the 14th Army Tank Battalion, had
begun special training for the Dieppe operation and were, accordingly, not available for "Tiger". The Dieppe training is
described in Chap. X of this volume.
The 1st Corps report for the final week observes, "After long marches throughout the
course of the exercise, in the closing stages some infantry units marched as much as 38
miles in about 18 hours".98 It is evident that the goals of Corps Training Instructions
Nos. 5 and 6 had been largely achieved.99
Training in the 1st Canadian Corps for the remainder of the year was on a more
detailed level. General Crerar, in a letter dated 4 June 1942,100 laid down the programme
for the summer months, ordering all commanders to take every advantage of the
opportunity ("possibly a brief one") now presented for eliminating deficiencies. The
emphasis was to be on individual weapon training, battle practice (field firing exercises
with live ammunition, in areas on the South Downs acquired for the purpose),* combined
operations, and command and staff exercises. On these lines the Corps worked during the
rest of 1942. Field firing exercises were carried out up to the brigade group level and
even higher. On 3 August, for instance, the 3rd Infantry Brigade and the 14th Army Tank
Battalion conducted a scheme near the battlefield of Lewes (1264), supported by three
regiments of field artillery firing live shell over the troops' heads.101
There were some exceptions to the normal course of training during this period. The
3rd Division took part in the only divisional scheme, Exercise "Harold", held in July
under the direction of the 12th British Corps, in which the Canadians simulated an
invasion force attacking the 46th British Division.102 The 2nd Canadian Division's two
Dieppe brigades, the 4th and 6th, lost so many men in that operation that they had to
return to individual and platoon training.103 Finally, some small anti-invasion exercises,
such as "Blackboy" in November, were conducted by the 1st Division. These were
designed to keep the defence organization of the south coast efficient in order to deal
with possible minor raids by the Germans.104
The 5th Canadian Armoured Division, whose arrival in the United Kingdom and
difficulties in obtaining tanks have already been mentioned, was placed under Canadian
Military Headquarters until such time as its training had progressed to the divisional
collective stage. It finally came under command of the First Canadian Army on 25 June
1942. The arrival of tanks continued to be slow† until the end of the year, with the result
that the armoured units' progress was considerably slower than that of the artillery and
infantry. A divisional Training Instruction issued in September mentioned this fact and
extended the period of troop and squadron training
*General Crerar in this connection directed that all sensible safety precautions should be carefully enforced, but
added, "the importance of practising actual fire support, with movement, is so great that legitimate risks must be run".
Inevitably, such exercises
occasionally caused casualties.
†By the middle of June only 112 tanks had been received; these were a mixed lot, including light tanks and
obsolescent types, and only 34 of the new Ram I tanks which were now coming in from Canada.105
for the armoured regiments from 31 August to 31 December, at the same time directing
artillery and infantry units to undertake more advanced collective instruction.106
Training for commanders and staffs within the Division was carried on concurrently.
There were wireless exercises without troops, on brigade and divisional levels, and one
scheme in which all divisional troops and transport took part, the armoured regiments and
infantry being represented by their respective headquarters and squadron or company rear
communications wireless sets.107
To keep abreast of expanding needs, the Canadian Training School was enlarged
during 1942. Early in the year, C.M.H.Q. took steps to organize a battle-drill wing,
following a similar move by G.H.Q. Home Forces. This was known as No. 5 (Battle)
Wing and began operation on 1 May at Rowlands Castle, Hampshire. In July, it was
reorganized into Rifle, Carrier and Mortar Sub-Wings."' A further change, due to
increased emphasis on chemical warfare (including flame projection) was the transfer of
this type of training from No. 2 (Technical) Wing to No. 6 (Chemical Warfare) Wing,
formed for the purpose in December.109 Thus the following wings were in operation at
the end of the year: No. 1, still giving officer-cadet training;* No. 2, anti-gas courses and
driving and maintenance for officers, and both wheeled and tracked (carrier) instruction
for N.C.Os.; No. 3 (Weapons) Wing, small arms courses generally, aircraft recognition,
range-taking, and junior leaders' training for prospective N.C.Os.; No. 4 (Regimental
Officers) Wing, six-week courses in tactics and administration for company and platoon
commanders; and Nos. 5 and 6 as just described.111
The availability of more equipment during the year somewhat eased the problems of
anti-aircraft training, with the result that the light anti-aircraft regiments for the 1st, 2nd,
3rd, and 5th Divisions were able to complete their mobile training and join their
formations.112 The Canadian Army also undertook the instruction of radar operators.
Some Canadians had previously been trained in this work, but after qualification had
been employed with British units. On General McNaughton's initiative a radar unit,
which he desired not to belong to any one arm of the service,113 was formed in January
1942 as No. 1 Canadian Radio Location Unit. After its personnel had completed training
at various establishments, it was concentrated and moved to Colchester; and at the end of
1942 men of this unit were manning Canadianmade radar sets at many points on the
south coast. Early in 1943 the unit was disbanded to conform with British organization.114
Late in 1942 the insufficiency of the vacancies available for Canadians
*As the result of a decision to discontinue .officer cadet training in the United Kingdom, Ottawa had informed
C.M.H.Q. on 13 February that No. I Wing would cease operations after the courses then running had been completed.
Later, however, General McNaughton obtained approval to re-open No. 1 Wing to provide a basic common-to-all-arms
course for artillery, engineers, signals and ordnance cadets, who would then go on to British schools for their specialist
training.110
at the Royal Artillery School at Larkhill led to the institution of No. I Canadian School of
Artillery Overseas, which at first was part of "C" Group, Canadian Reinforcement Units.
It was organized into wings: Field; Medium; Anti-Tank; Anti-Aircraft; and Survey. To
save manpower and equipment, these were set up as adjuncts to existing Artillery
Reinforcement Units. A nucleus of instructors was obtained by posting gunnery
instructors from field and reinforcement units to the new school. At the same time
Larkhill agreed to increase the number of Canadian vacancies for the same purpose. The
school's first courses began on 3 January 1943. Later in the year it became an
independent establishment and moved to Seaford, Sussex.115
The late summer and autumn of 1942 saw the arrival in the United Kingdom of the
4th Canadian Armoured Division. This division arrived overseas in a somewhat more
advanced state of training than earlier armoured formations, mainly because a respectable
number of tanks from Canadian production were now available in Canada for training
use. Anticipating a delay in tank deliveries in England, arrangements were made to obtain
universal carriers as substitutes. By October an initial issue of 255 carriers had been
made, with the result that much useful training in troop and squadron tactics was
possible.116 In October, a divisional training instruction117 laid down the state of training
to be reached by 15 February 1943. Briefly, collective training was to reach squadron
level, and headquarters of formations were to attain enough efficiency to enable them to
handle their units by that date. Like the 5th, the 4th Division was under C.M.H.Q.
command during its early days overseas. However, it passed under Headquarters First
Canadian Army on 21 October 1942, when its training was still in a very early stage.
During 1942 arrangements were made for a considerable extension of combined
operations training. This programme was related to the various operations under discussion
for the Canadians at this period (below, pages 408-12). It was originally planned to begin
on 27 November, but conditions at the Combined Training Centres necessitated a
postponement to 16 December, at which time the 1st Infantry Brigade began its training at
Inveraray.118 This, then, was the only formation to go to Scotland in 1942. However, other
combined training was carried out. In November and December the units of the 8th and 9th
Infantry Brigades of the 3rd Division had three days each on infantry landing ships at
Southampton.119 During December 1942-February 1943 the 9th Brigade battalions went
in turn to Dorlin, Scotland, where a limited number of naval craft were available.120 A
combined training programme for drivers of all arms was started in December. There was a
large representation from the 1st Division and selections from the 2n# and 3rd .121 Certain
Corps and Army Troops, including engineers and army service corps, also took part in
landing practice at the Scottish Combined Training Centres.122 And Combined Operations
Planning Courses were held at the Combined Training Centre, Largs, for the staffs of
both the 1st and 3rd Divisions during December 1942 and January 1943.123
By March of 1943 the two remaining brigades of the 1st Division had completed
their tours at Inveraray.124 Two squadrons of the 14th Army Tank Regiment, three
companies of the Saskatoon Light Infantry and the 9th Field Ambulance also trained in
Scotland during the same period.125 After the decision in April to send the 1st Division
and 1st Army Tank Brigade to take part in the attack on Sicily, these formations had a
further tour of amphibious training in Scotland.
Battle Experience in North Africa
The last important development of 1942 was the decision, after the Allied landings in
North Africa in November, to send Canadian officers and N.C.Os. to serve three-month
attachments to the First British Army in Tunisia. This resulted from the desire to provide
battle experience for as many Canadians as possible before the main body of the army
was committed to action. Except for the two Dieppe brigades, such experience had been
denied to the Canadian troops in Great Britain. Arrangements were made with the War
Office accordingly, and the first group, 78 officers and 63 other ranks, reached Algiers on
3 January 1943. Four more parties were sent; the final total was 201 officers and 147
other ranks.126 These attachments took the form of employing the Canadians, as far as
possible, in the jobs they were best qualified to fill; they went to appropriate units in the
same way as British reinforcements. Thus, an armoured corps officer might find himself
in charge of a squadron of tanks; an infantry captain commanded a rifle company; a
sapper N.C.O. cleared mines and a staff officer did the work of an appropriate staff
appointment.127 That the service was very active is indicated by the fact that 25 of the
Canadians became casualties, eight losing their lives.128
The value of this experiment is beyond question. Nothing can take the place of battle
in the final moulding of the efficient soldier. A Canadian infantry officer wrote from
North Africa, where he was attached to a battalion of the Buffs, "Our training in England
since the introduction of battle drill has been pretty good but no scheme can approach the
physical and mental discomfort of actual battle. If I am able to get across some ideas on
my return it should make the initial impact of actual battle less severe on our troops.129
It is only to be regretted that more Canadians could not have had the same opportunity.
But the was, of course, a definite limit to the number of Canadians the First *Army could
take, and the campaign was not long. As it was, practically every major Canadian unit
had one or more of these North African men on its strength during the final period of
preparation for battle, and their advice was most valuable.
Canadian senior officers also were able to improve their knowledge as a result of the
Tunisian campaign. General Crerar flew out to Tripoli in February 1943 with a group of
British generals and attended a very instructive study period conducted by General
Montgomery at the headquarters of the victorious Eighth Army. In April Brigadier G. G.
Simonds visited the same Army and watched the Wadi Akarit battle.130 On returning to
England he was appointed to command the 2nd Division in succession to General
Roberts (who now took over the Canadian Reinforcement Units), only to be transferred
almost immediately to the 1st following the death of General Salmon. A few weeks later
his division was fighting as part of the Eighth Army in Sicily.
Exercise "Spartan", March 1943
The 1st Division's combined training prevented it from taking part in the very large
exercise called "Spartan", which took place in March 1943 under the direction of G.H.Q.
Home Forces. This exercise closely approached Exercise "Bumper" in size; ten divisions
"fought" in it as against twelve in "Bumper". So far as the number of Canadians
participating was concerned, "Spartan" was the largest exercise of the war.
The original plan was that in this exercise the Canadian army headquarters would
control a force consisting of the 1st Canadian Corps; a British armoured corps including
the 5th Canadian Armoured Division; one or two other British corps, and the 1st
Canadian Army Tank Brigade.131 However, on 15 January 1943 Headquarters 2nd
Canadian Corps came into existence; and four days later General McNaughton agreed
with G.H.Q. Home Forces that this corps would take part, with the 5th Canadian and
Guards Armoured Divisions under command.132 The sequel indicated that it was perhaps
over-optimistic to put a brand-new formation into so important an exercise before its
headquarters had n chance to acquire its complete transport and signals equipment, and at
least to carry out a staff exercise and an exercise without troops. (Signal equipment of
various types, much of it on loan from British formations, arrived at Corps Headquarters
when it was already in the assembly area, just a couple of days before the actual exercise
commenced.)133 On the other hand, the training value of manoeuvres of this type, which
happened so seldom, made "Spartan" an opportunity not to be missed. The unfortunate
aspect of the matter was that a poor performance by any Army or Corps in such
manoeuvres was likely to count heavily against its commander in the opinion of G.H.Q.
Home Forces and the War Office.
In "Spartan", Headquarters First Canadian Army (styled for exercise purposes

Headquarters Second Army) functioned for the first time in the field. General
McNaughton commanded six divisions: the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions,
under General Crerar's 1st Canadian Corps; the 5th Canadian and Guards Armoured
Divisions, under General Sansom's 2nd Canadian Corps; and the 43rd and 53rd British
Divisions, under the 12th British Corps (Lieut.-General M. G. N. Stopford). A Mobile
Composite Group of nineteen R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. squadrons cooperated with
McNaughton's army; this was the first test in the United Kingdom of a system of air
support which had proved successful in North Africa. The "enemy" consisted of the
forces of Eastern Command under Lieut.-General J. A. H. Gammell: the 8th and 11th
British Corps, with another composite air group, also including R.C.A.F. squadrons,
cooperating. In accordance with the offensive strategic thinking of the day, the Second
Army was assumed to be breaking out of a bridgehead established by another army on
the Continent (represented by the south coast of England). This was the role
contemplated at this time for the First Canadian Army and that, indeed, which it finally
played. General McNaughton described "Spartan" as "designed as a strict test of the
physical condition and endurance of the troops, their proficiency in movement and tactics
and of the ability of commanders and staffs to administer, handle and fight their
formations and units".134
Only the highlights of the exercise can be given here. In the opening phase G.H.Q.
Home Forces, which was directing the exercise, made things hard for the Second Army
by allowing the "German" army to advance twenty-four hours before the time (first light
on 5 March) previously notified to General McNaughton for the beginning of his
operations. The "British" force was not permitted to move until the Germans had been on
their way for some hours. This enabled Gammell's units to make contact with
McNaughton's farther south than the latter had appreciated to be probable, and
incidentally they were able to "demolish" a great number of bridges.
In spite of these initial disadvantages, General Crerar's well-trained Corps in the centre
got forward rapidly and on 5 March smashed the "hinge" in the Reading area on which
General Gammell had planned to pivot his defence. The 2nd Canadian Corps was held back
until 7 March, when General McNaughton ordered it to make a wide enveloping sweep to
the westward. The armoured divisions' progress, however, was disappointingly slow; there
were bad traffic jams and petrol shortages; and for a time there was a complete breakdown
in communications between Corps and Army Headquarters. This last was not surprising,
since 2nd Canadian Corps Signals was neither fully equipped nor fully trained. It should
moreover be remembered that this was the first occasion on which the whole of the 5th
Division was actually exercised together as a formation. The Corps Commander regrouped
the divisions on the night of 10-11 March with the two
armoured brigades under the Guards Division and the two infantry brigades under the 5th
Division. General McNaughton at the time disapproved this
regrouping and ordered it reversed. It was subsequently criticized by the C.-in-C. Home
Forces.135
"Cease Fire" was signalled on the morning of 12 March, when General
McNaughton's army had begun to overcome its handicaps and victory was in sight. Since
8 March, in the words of the C.-in-C., the situation had "swung steadily in favour of the
British". General McNaughton's own comments on the exercise,136 cabled to Ottawa the
following day, may be quoted in part:
As you know our Army staff was new and partly set up ad hoc. Nevertheless by the conclusion of
the exercise it was working smoothly and efficiently and our officers have proved their capacity. Our
Engineers, Signals, Supply and Transport, Medical, Ordnance, REME [Royal Electrical and Mechanical
Engineers] and other administrative services were most satisfactory and the officers and staffs in charge
showed a capacity to organize, conduct and administer those matters which was very satisfactory indeed
particularly as this was the first occasion in which we have ever had an opportunity to give them actual
practice full scale....
One of the important matters of organization tested was the new composite group of the Royal Air
Force. In this for the first time I sec a possibility of providing the Army with the air support which it
requires. . . .
The Final Stages, 1943-1944
In April 1943 came the decision to send the 1st Division and 1st Army Tank Brigade
to Sicily; and in July the 3rd Division was selected as an assault formation to take part in
the first phase of the invasion of North-West Europe. The specialized training undertaken
with these tasks in view will be dealt with in connection with those campaigns.
For the rest of the Canadian field army the period to the end of 1943 was
characterized by intensification in all spheres of training. Individual instruction was
interspersed with exercises on every level from battalion to corps. Particularly
noteworthy were wireless schemes for the staffs of army, corps and divisions, infantry-
tank cooperation practice, street fighting, night training,* battle inoculation, range-firing
for tanks and all branches of the artillery, and general training in supply, recovery and
medical evacuation for the services.138 The introduction of self-propelled artillery
equipment and carrier flame-throwers required special instruction for drivers and
operators.139 Canadian officers who had served with the First British Army in North
Africa or with the Canadian forces in Sicily and Italy passed on their experience of
operations in the form of lectures.140
*During the summer the Battle Wing of the Canadian Training School conducted a series of Night Fighting Courses
for senior officers, designed to produce a diffusion of such training throughout the army. The courses aroused wide
interest.137
During 1943 the training programme took the Canadian divisions into areas of
England-notably Hampshire and East Anglia-of which they had hitherto seen little. The
2nd Division, it is true, spent most of the year in Sussex, mainly in exercising in the
breakout battle from a bridgehead. The 5th Armoured Division moved to Norfolk in July
and spent six weeks there engaged in a series of large-scale exercises. By October, when
it left to join the 1st Division in the Mediterranean, the 5th had made much progress, but
still had something to learn about armour in battle. The 4th Armoured Division, which
had not been sufficiently advanced to take part in "Spartan", moved to Norfolk in
September, after the 5th's departure thence. The following month it was exercised for the
first time as a division with all arms and services functioning (Exercise "Grizzly II");
while in Exercise "Bridoon" in November it was pitted against the 9th British Armoured
Division. The Headquarters of the 2nd Canadian Corps also worked in East Anglia; it
directed "Grizzly II" and in September commanded the 61st British Infantry Division and
the 1st Polish Armoured Division in a large exercise called "Link".141
In August and September Exercise "Harlequin" took the 2nd and 5th Divisions (and
the 4th Division's armoured brigade) into Hampshire under the 1st Canadian Corps. This
exercise was designed to test administrative arrangements for moving the force for the
invasion of North-West Europe through concentration and assembly areas in England to
embarkation points. At the same time it formed part of Operation "Starkey", a great
deception scheme designed to make the Germans believe that we intended an invasion of
the Pas de Calais. This ended on 8 September 1943 with an "amphibious feint" in the
Channel, a certain number of troops being embarked in the hope -which was not realized-
of bringing the German Air Force to large-scale action as at Dieppe.142
As 1944 opened, the First Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, reduced to one
corps headquarters, three divisions and one armoured brigade,* with ancillary troops, was
making its final preparations for action. A directive143 issued at this time defined the
purpose of training during the period January-March 1944 as "to prepare and perfect all
ranks individually to reach the highest standard". Unit commanders were reminded that this
was "their last opportunity to make the men of their units fighting fit, and fit to fight": this
period of individual training was accordingly not to be treated as if it were part of a normal
training cycle. As spring advanced and D Day drew nearer, various specialized exercises
were undertaken, although the days of full-scale divisional "schemes" were past. Training
for the breakout from a bridgehead on the Continent dominated the programme of the 2nd
Corps; particularly notable was the practice in assault crossings of tidal estuaries,
*Of these, the 3rd Division and 2nd Armoured Brigade were under the 1st British Corps preparing for the assault.
carried out by the 2nd Division with elements of Corps and Army Troops on the River
Trent in Yorkshire (Exercise "Kate", April-May) and by 4th Division infantry and
engineers on the River Medway in Kent. This training was in fact designed to prepare the
units for the task of attacking across the Lower Seine. Field firing exercises, some on a
considerable scale, were still in progress during May; but before the month was over such
activities had ended.144 The Canadian formations in England had moved, or were
moving, to their final positions, ready to play their parts in the tremendous drama that
was impending.
Thus the long training process was over. What had been accomplished? A very great
deal, but not everything. In 1948 Lieut.-General Charles Foulkes, looking back upon the
process and its sequel, made remarks145 which provide a commentary:
In the last war it took us four years to get ready ... When I took the Second Division into Northwest
Europe it had had four years of hard training. We trained day and night and I thought it was just about as
perfect a fighting machine as we could get. When we went into battle at Falaise and Caen we found that
when we bumped into battle-experienced German troops we were no match for them. We would not have
been successful had it not been for our air and artillery support. We had had four years of real, hard going
and it took about two months to get that Division so shaken down that we were really a machine that
could fight.
There is no doubt that training can do just so much and no more; there is no umpire and
no instructor like the bullet. Other things being equal, in an encounter between an army
with battle experience and one without it the former will win. The Canadians did well in
Normandy; they would have done better had they not been fighting their first battle and
learning as they fought.
Availing ourselves once more of the historian's precious privilege of hindsight, it is
possible also to look back and say that the Canadian Army, though it got tremendous
dividends from its long training period in England, still got rather less than it might have
had. Time was lost in the early days through equipment shortages; and it was only
gradually that the more realistic training methods which finally yielded such good results
were evolved and adopted. It is the present writer's impression, however, that the
Canadian Army also suffered from possessing a proportion of regimental officers whose
attitude towards training was casual and haphazard rather than urgent and scientific: like
the traditional amateur actor, they were cheerfully confident that it would "be all right on
the night" without their having to exert themselves too much. No doubt these people exist
in every army; but it is worth while to observe that in modem war the army that has
fewest of them will have a very great advantage.
CHAPTER IX
ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS, 1940

(See Map 4 and Sketch 1)
The Role and Problems of the Canadian Army Overseas
T HE tasks of the Canadian field army developed in a manner which no one foresaw at
the outset; for no one foresaw the course of the war. Inevitably, Canadian thinking
was largely dominated by the experience of 1914-18, the more so as the beginning of
hostilities in 1939 found a British army again crossing the Channel to cooperate with the
French forces on French soil. It seemed clear that the 1st Canadian Division, and such
other Canadian formations as might follow it to Britain, would in due time go to France
and serve with the British armies there.
This was not the course which events followed. In a lightning campaign in May and
June 1940, the Germans smashed the French armies and drove the British from the
Continent before more than a fraction of the available Canadian force had reached France
and before any of it had got into action. Thereafter, the Canadians found themselves part
of the garrison of the British citadel, a beleaguered garrison which nevertheless
maintained an active defence and constantly directed sorties against the besiegers. This
situation raised a whole series of unexpected problems.
As it turned out, the Canadian force-a volunteer army recruited in the expectation of
early action-spent forty-two months in the United Kingdom, from the arrival of the 1st
Division in 1939, before even a portion of it took part in a protracted campaign. During
this period the Canadians had few active tasks, and only one major contact with the
enemy-the Dieppe raid of 19 August 1942. These few tasks and operations, including the
part which the Canadian force played in the protection of the United Kingdom, are the
theme of this chapter and those that follow. Except for the Dieppe operation they are not
treated in great detail.
Authority to Commit Canadian Forces to Operations
A topic of basic importance is the question of the extent of the authority possessed by
the senior Canadian commander overseas to commit his force,
254
ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS, 1940 255
or portions of it, to operations without reference to his superiors in Ottawa. This involves
a brief preliminary excursion into the constitutional background.
The legal relationship between the military forces of Canada and those of other
countries of the Commonwealth was very largely governed by a group of statutes passed
by the various Commonwealth parliaments half a dozen years before war broke out. Most
important for our purposes are those enacted by the parliaments of Canada and of the
United Kingdom, known as "The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Acts, 1933".
The content of the British and Canadian statutes is, for practical purposes, identical.
The most important sections of the Canadian statute1 may be reproduced here:
"6 (4) When a home force and another force* to which this section applies are serving together,
whether alone or not:—
(a) any member of the other force shall be treated and shall have over members of the
home force the like powers of command as if he were a member of the home force of
relative rank; and
(b) if the forces are acting in combination, any officer of the other force appointed by His
Majesty, or in accordance with regulations made by or by authority of His Majesty, to
command the combined force, or any part thereof, shall be treated and shall have over
members of the home force the like powers of command and punishment, and may be
invested with the like authority to convene, and confirm the findings and sentences
of, courts martial as if he were an officer of the home force of relative rank and
holding the same command.
(5) For the purposes of this section, forces shall be deemed to be serving together or acting in
combination if and only if they are declared to be so serving or so acting by order of the
Governor in Council; and the relative rank of members of the home forces and of the other
forces shall be such as may be prescribed by regulations made by His Majesty."
It will be seen that the Act provides for two types of relationship: "serving together" and
"acting in combination". Under the former, as interpreted by the lawyers, the forces are
independent of each other. With the forces "in combination", however, command is
unified and the commander of one force possesses correspondingly wide powers over the
other. It may be noted at once that during the Second World War a considerable part, at
least, of the Canadian force in the United Kingdom was normally "serving together" with
the British, and not under the control of the War Office or of any British commander.
However, when active operations became imminent, or when a Canadian formation was
assigned a definite operational role in the defence of the United Kingdom, Canadian
forces concerned were placed "in combination" with the British formations detailed for
the task and thus ,passed under higher British command.
The interpretation and implementation of the Visiting Forces Act gave much
employment to lawyers and many headaches to staff officers. At the
*In this statute, "home force" means a Canadian force; "other force" means one belonging to another Commonwealth
country.
outbreak of war the Canadian Government appointed an inter-departmental committee to

consider and report upon the legal and constitutional questions raised by the Act. This
Committee made its report in October 1939.2 On this basis, the Minister of National
Defence recommended that an order-in-council be made placing the Canadian military
forces in Great Britain in the position of "serving together" with those of the United
Kingdom and stating that such forces would be "in combination" with those of the United
Kingdom from the time of embarkation for, and while serving on, the continent of
Europe. Such an order-in-council (P.C. 3391) was duly made on 2 November 1939.3 In
order to meet any situation which might demand a unified command within Britain, it
provided that portions of the Canadian forces might be placed "in combination" by orders
issued by Canadian service authorities designated for the purpose by the Minister of
National Defence.* Subsequently the Minister designated the G.O.C. 1st Canadian
Division and the Senior Combatant Officer of Canadian Military Headquarters, London,
as appropriate "Canadian Service Authorities" under P.C. 3391.
The memorandum of instructions entitled "Organization and Administration of
Canadian Forces Overseas" which General McNaughton received before leaving Canada4
did not define the relationship between the G.O.C. 1st Division aid the British military
authorities beyond providing, "All matters concerning military operations and discipline
in the Field, being the direct responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the British
Army in the theatre of operations, will be dealt with by the General Officer Commanding,
Canadian Forces in the Field, through the Commanderin-Chief, whose powers in this
regard are exercisable within the limitations laid down in the Visiting Forces Act. . . ." In
the conditions of 1939, no further directive seemed necessary; but, as we have already
shown, events were to develop in a manner which nobody foresaw.
During the winter of 1939-40 discussions with the War Office clarified the status of
Canadian troops in Britain vis-a-vis the United Kingdom forces. As we have seen (above,
page 231) these conversations resulted particularly in establishing the fact that training
policy was to be controlled by the Canadian authorities.5
The first necessity for taking action under the Visiting Forces Act in an important
operational emergency arose in connection with the Norwegian campaign.
*"That, in respect of any Military and Air Forces of Canada serving in the United Kingdom, those parts thereof as
may from time to time be detailed for that purpose by the appropriate Canadian Service Authorities as from time to time
designated by the Minister of National Defence, shall act in combination with those Forces of the United Kingdom to
which the same have been so detailed."
The Proposal to Send Canadian Troops to Norway
What the First Lord of the Admiralty called a period of "strange and unnatural calm"
came to a sudden and violent end on 9 April 1940 when the Germans invaded Norway
and Denmark. The latter country was completely overrun at once, and in Norway the
Germans, acting with the combination of unscrupulousness, energy and tactical skill
which they were so often to display in this war, established themselves so firmly in
twenty-four hours in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Kristiansand and Narvik that
they were not evicted from Norway until the general collapse of their European empire in
1945.
The British authorities were caught without either appropriate plans or adequate
organized forces for the campaign thus thrust upon them. It is true that there had been a
plan to intervene, through Norway, on behalf of Finland in the latter's war with Russia
which ended in a Finnish surrender in March; it was also hoped to deny Swedish iron ore
to the Germans. The decision to mine the inshore passages known as the "Norwegian
Leads" (taken by the Anglo-French Supreme War Council on 28 March, as a result of the
Germans' use of the Leads for moving ore to Germany from Narvik, and justified as a
reprisal against German illegalities in the conduct of the maritime war)7 had been
accompanied by a decision to send British and French troops to Narvik, and to dispatch
other forces to Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim, to deny these places to the enemy.
This was a precaution against the mining provoking German action, and the Allies did
not intend actually to land troops in Norway until the Germans had violated Norwegian
territory, or there was clear evidence of their intention to do so.8 The forces for
Stavanger and Bergen were embarked in cruisers at Rosyth on 7 April, but were hastily
put ashore again on the following day when news arrived that the German fleet was out.9
When it became clear that the Home Fleet and the Royal Air Force had not succeeded in
interfering effectively with the German invasion of Norway, it was necessary to make
new plans, although the small forces earmarked for the previous scheme were still
available.
It may be noted here that during the Norwegian campaign the Germans captured
documents revealing the state of British preparations before the invasion. They naturally
made much of these for propaganda purposes.* However, the Nazis had by this period
established such a reputation formendacity that very few people believed them even when
they were telling
*The present writer possesses a beautifully printed volume entitled Britain's Designs on Norway: Documents
Concerning the Anglo-French Policy of Extending the War, published by the German Library of Information, New York,
later in 1940. These include facsimiles of documents captured from the Headquarters of the 148th British Infantry Brigade,
including an operation instruction dated 6 April.
part of the truth. In fact, of course, the German enterprise had been planned long before
the Anglo-French operation took definite shape. The acquisition of bases in Norway was
recommended to Hitler by Admiral Raeder as early as 10 October 1939. In December the
Norwegian traitor Quisling came to Berlin and arrangements were made with him. On 16
February H.M.S. Cossack entered Norwegian waters to rescue British seamen from the
German ship Altmark. Hitler issued his preliminary directive for the attack on Norway on
1 March. On 26 March he agreed to launch the operation ("Weserubung") "about the time
of the new moon" (7 April), and the date was specifically fixed by another directive of 2
April.10
Faced with the need for forces to act in Norway, the War Office turned in due course
to the Canadian military authorities in the United Kingdom. No approach was made to
them, however, until 16 April, a week after the German operation began. In the
meantime, the British had been developing plans for counter-action and taking the first
steps. Two places in Norway commanded particular attention: Narvik, the ore port in the
far north, and Trondheim in Central Norway, which had direct railway connection with
Oslo and offered the hope of effectively supporting Norwegian resistance. By 10 April
British plans had crystallized to the extent of a decision to take both Trondheim and
Narvik. The Narvik expedition was launched first. It was a relatively simple matter to
reassemble the force previously intended for action in Norway, and its first flight sailed
from Britain on 12 April.11
The plan for the enterprise against Trondheim took shape rather more slowly, but it
hardened (at least temporarily) during 13-16 April in the form of a triple operation: there
were to be landings at Namsos, north of Trondheim, and at Aandalsnes to the south of it,
followed by a frontal combined operation against Trondheim itself.12 On 14 April, when
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff issued his instructions to Major-General Carton de
Wiart, who was to command at Namsos and eventually to command the Allied forces in
Central Norway, the plan was still fluid, and there was no reference in the instruction
either to an intended landing at Aandalsnes or to any use of Canadian troops.13 By the
night of 15-16 April, however, the Aandalsnes landing had been added and the plan for
the direct attack on Trondheim further elaborated.14 In this latter phase Canadian
assistance was required.
At eleven o'clock in the morning of 16 April Major-General R. H. Dewing, Director
of Military Operations it the War Office, came to C.M.H.Q. and placed before General
Crerar an outline of the proposed operations, accompanied by a request that the
Canadians, "in view of lack of other trained, troops in the United Kingdom", might take
part. The scheme is thus outlined in General Crerar's war diary:
The proposed operation is that Maj.-Gen. de Wiart's force, having landed at Namsos on 16th will
advance south on Trondheim; heavy naval forces will enter the fjord and 2 battalions of Guards will land
to capture the aerodrome; a subsidiary landing party is planned at Romsdals, to advance north along the
railway on Trondheim. To neutralize the German-held forts commanding Trondheim fjord, it is planned
to land several parties of infantry from destroyers, to take them in rear; 8 parties of about 100 infantry
will be needed, the best type of personnel, and War Office suggests Canadians might furnish these
parties. Leadership and initiative essential qualifications for their task.
General McNaughton at once came to C.M.H.Q. from Aldershot, and he and Crerar went
to the War Office. They saw General Dewing, and McNaughton subsequently had an
interview with the C.I.G.S. McNaughton had already received from the Deputy Judge
Advocate General at C.M.H.Q. the advice that he had the legal authority to detail
Canadian troops for such an operation, and accordingly he agreed to assist.15 General
Ironside said that "under the particular circumstances of the shortage of available troops"
his acceptance was much appreciated. Detailed plans for the attack, it was explained,
were still being worked out.16 Since they did not necessarily involve landings at the
forts, it is possible that the Canadians, if employed at all, might have been used for the
main landings.
General McNaughton immediately set about organizing the force required. It was
drawn from the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade; as the brigade commander, Brigadier G.
R. Pearkes, V.C., was ill, the acting commander, Colonel E. W. Sansom, was appointed
to command the party. Two of the brigade's battalions (Princess Patricia's Canadian Light
Infantry and The Edmonton Regiment) were to take part; they were considered "the most
advanced units in training"17 in the Division, and had some Scandinavians in their ranks.
The heavy administrative tasks of providing special winter clothing, etc., were at once
undertaken; and General McNaughton issued, under authority of P.C. 3391, an "Order of
Detail" placing Colonel Sansom's force "in combination" with the British force organized
for operations in Norway.* The Canadian contingent as finally organized was 1300
strong. It left Aldershot for Scotland on the evening of 18 April, being played to the
station by the pipes of The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. The following evening it
arrived at Dunfermline, and went into camp to await embarkation.19
The embarkation never took place, for the British War Cabinet and its military advisers
had changed their plans. The process of change has been described by Sir Winston
Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and by the British official historian of the
campaign. On 17 April the Trondheim plan as sketched above was described to the War
Cabinet, and the Chiefs of Staff testified that they agreed with it and, while admitting that it
was
*This was Order of Detail No. 2. No. 1 supposedly dealt with teams of Canadian anti-aircraft Lewis gunners lent in
March 1940 for the protection of North Sea trawlers, but it is questionable whether any formal order was finally issued in
this connection.18
risky, considered the risks worth running. However, by the 19th, "a vehement and
decisive change in the opinions of the Chiefs of Staff and of the Admiralty" had taken
place:
This change was brought about, first, by increasing realisation of the magnitude of the naval stake
in hazarding so many of our finest capital ships, and also by War Office arguments that even if the Fleet
got in and got out again, the opposed landing of the troops in the face of the German air power would be
perilous. On the other hand, the landings which were already being successfully carried out both north
and south of Trondheim seemed to all these authorities to offer a far less dangerous solution. The Chiefs
of Staff drew up a long paper opposing "Operation Hammer".
The Chiefs now recommended, in other words, that the frontal attack on Trondheim be
abandoned, and that enveloping movements from the flanks, where we already had troops
ashore at Namsos and Aandalsnes, be adopted instead. Although Churchill himself was
"indignant" at the reversal, he supported the Prime Minister in accepting the Chiefs'
recommendation.20
Essentially, it would seem, then, the Trondheim scheme had already been abandoned
at the time when Colonel Sansom and his men arrived at Dunfermline. However, the
possibility that they might be used elsewhere was now considered, and a paper written by
Mr. Churchill on 19 April suggested that their destination, along with that of the French
troops who were available, could "for today or tomorrow be left open", and that the
Canadians in particular should be considered as reinforcements for the Narvik
enterprise.21 The following day a staff officer at the War Office told Lt.-Col. E. L. M.
Bums of C.M.H.Q. that Sansom's force would "probably" be required for "an operation
similar to that previously intended, in another area"; he would give no details. Later on
the 20th General McNaughton had a conference with General Dewing and it was agreed
that if further plans involving the use of Canadians were made, McNaughton would be
fully informed so that he could satisfy himself concerning the project and ensure that the
troops were properly equipped. Dewing remarked that if the Canadian Division, "now at
the top of the list for completion of equipment", were not available for Norway if
required, then the equipment would have to be diverted elsewhere.22 However, no
further scheme for the employment of the Division, in whole or in part, in Norway was
ever actually presented. For a time Sansom's force remained in reserve at Dunfermline,
but the units were back in their barracks at Aldershot on 26 April .23
Only two men of the 1st Canadian Division, Privates G. Hansen and A. Johannson,
saw active service in Norway. They were soldiers of the Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.),
who spoke Norwegian and were lent as interpreters to the 1st Battalion of the King's,
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, their own unit's allied regiment. They saw action in the
neighbourhood of Dombaas with their adopted battalion, and withdrew with it through
Aandalsnes in due course. (They recorded afterwards that the main language difficulty
they had met was in understanding Yorkshire English.)24
The 1st Division had suffered the first of many disappointments. Whether the frontal
attack on Trondheim could have succeeded, had it been attempted, there is no point in
discussing here. It was clearly a perilous enterprise, and not least the Canadian share in it
as first proposed. That the Canadian commander was prepared to commit his force to so
desperate a venture is evidence that the long period in which the Canadians took no part
in active operations was not the result of any reluctance to embark upon dangerous
projects.
Little further space need be devoted to this "ramshackle" campaign. The Namsos and
Aandalsnes operations belied their early promise, and by the morning of 3 May the Allied
forces had been withdrawn from both areas. At Narvik the attack developed slowly. The
town was captured, but only on 28 May, when orders had already been issued for the
evacuation of Norway. The last British and French troops left the country on 8 June.25 A
greater emergency had already arisen, and a greater reverse been suffered, in France and
the Low Countries. The new crisis was faced by a new British Government. The
Norwegian fiasco had brought down the Chamberlain cabinet, and Winston Churchill
was now Prime Minister.
As we have seen, the situation on 16 April when Generals Crerar and McNaughton
were consulted by the War Office admitted of no delay, and McNaughton, having been
advised that it lay within his legal competence to do so, immediately agreed to permit
troops to go to Norway. He did not refer the question to Ottawa-a procedure which would
inevitably have entailed some loss of time. Only on the evening of 17 April was a
telegram dispatched to the Minister of National Defence through Canada House advising
of the action taken and the intention that the Canadian force should leave Aldershot the
following evening.26 The Canadian Government* did not find this procedure satisfactory.
A reply received in London on the morning of the 18th approved sending the force, but
remarked, "It is considered however that such a commitment should not have been
entered without prior reference to National Defence and approval of Canadian
Government". A concurrent telegram from the Department of External Affairs to the
High Commissioner in London said the same thing in more detail:
We would have expected that Canadian Government would have been informed by United
Kingdom Government immediately participation referred to was required. . . We feel that when
consultation commenced intimation should have at once been given by yourself or G.O.C. to afford
Canadian Government reasonable opportunity pass on a disposition of such importance to Canadian
people as diversion of a portion personnel of present formation to a special Mission of this kind which is
a radical departure pre-considered policy and plan.
*At this moment, in the absence of Mr. King in the United States, Colonel Ralston (then Minister of Finance) was
"executing the functions" of Prime Minister.
The High Commissioner (Mr. Vincent Massey) immediately replied explaining that
the G.O.C. had fully satisfied himself that the military situation justified using Canadian
forces and required that orders be given at once. He continued, "In discharge of his
responsibility in this matter actions of G.O.C. were based on designation of Minister
under authority P.C. 3391 dated 2nd November, 1939, which require that he should act as
necessitated by Military exigency of moment." The authorities in Ottawa, however, were
not mollified. A further telegram of 19 April remarked, "As I previously indicated, we
consider any such proposal should have been made by Government of United Kingdom
to Government of Canada. From your telegram it does not appear why immediately
request was made by C.I.G.S. to G.O.C. advice was not given us to permit consideration
pending receipt of observations and recommendation of G.O.C. arising from consultation
with War Office. Action by Canadian service authority under paragraph III of P.C. 3391
in detailing forces to act in combination is not considered to relate to service beyond
United Kingdom."27
Just at this time, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Norman Rogers) arrived in
the United Kingdom on a visit arranged before the emergency arose. He discussed the
question with General McNaughton, and a telegram which he sent to the Department of
External Affairs on 22 April28 indicates that he had come to the conclusion that there was
force in the G.O.C.'s arguments. The effect of P.C. 3391, he wrote, was under
consideration: "Will advise you later of any revision that appears to be necessary but
wish to emphasize that there are dynamic features in present military situation which
argue against too rigid limitation upon actions taken to meet possible emergencies."
The issue is too clear to require extended comment. On one side the G.O.C. saw
primarily the exigencies of the military situation and the need for immediate action,
circumstances which none could gainsay. On the other, the Canadian Government was
determined that its forces should not be committed to a completely new enterprise
without reference to itself. In this particular instance, the authorities in Ottawa were
understandably nettled by the fact, which emerged during the discussion, that over thirty
hours had passed after the first proposition was made before any information concerning
it was sent to Canada. Such a delay never happened again.
It was plain, however, that military expediency required a more exact definition of
the powers of the senior Canadian commander overseas in such matters, nor was it hard
to see the desirability of his being given a larger discretion than that implied in this
exchange of telegrams. The question was discussed in the Canadian House of Commons
in the spring of 1941, and the Minister of National Defence, Colonel Ralston, committed
himself to a definite statement that troops could not be moved out of the United Kingdom
without the Government's consent. "There is no doubt whatever",
he said, "that the Canadian government was consulted about the Norway expedition, and
it gave its express approval. I wish to say, just to clinch that, that the decision as to the
employment of troops outside the United Kingdom is a matter for the Canadian
government . . . the appropriate Canadian service authority [under the Visiting Forces
Act] cannot authorize the embarkation of Canadian forces from the United Kingdom
without the authority of the Minister of National Defence."29 General McNaughton, who
had felt deeply the censure upon him which he thought was implied in the cables about
Norway, discussed this statement with Mr. King when- the Prime Minister visited
England later in the year. His memorandum of the conversations30 indicates that he asked
for a more liberal policy:
Question of restriction on use of troops. Ralston's statement in Commons which we felt had tied our
hands. His attitude in the Norway affair. Conversation with Rogers. Warning that I would not accept
censure, and that he should be very certain that he was right before he gave it.
On 10 September the Cabinet War Committee discussed the question. The remark was
made that while troops could not be sent out of the United Kingdom on the sole authority
of the Corps Commander under the law as it stood, it might be desirable to extend his
authority to include operations based on the British Isles. As we shall see, this was the
direction in which policy developed.
"Angel Move": The 1st Division and the Crisis

in the Low Countries, May 1940
On 10 May 1940 another phase of the war began. That morning the German forces
drove into Belgium and the Netherlands, two more weak and unoffending neutral states.
This was the beginning of a campaign which in scarcely more than a month destroyed the
Anglo-French alliance and placed Hitler in control of the coasts of Europe as far as the
Pyrenees. These historic weeks passed without the Canadian troops in Britain being
committed to the battle; but there were repeated proposals for sending them to France,
and on one occasion a brigade actually crossed the Channel. These events we must now
review.
In September 1939 a British Expeditionary Force commanded by General Lord Gort,
V.C., was sent to France and took up positions on the Belgian border. Here it spent the
winter, busily engaged in strengthening the inadequate defences of this frontier, along
which the Maginot Line, which covered the Franco-German boundary, had never been
extended. The British force was gradually built up until at the time of the German attack
in May it amounted to ten divisions, plus three more, incomplete, which had been sent
out "for labour duties and to continue training". It was organized in
three Corps. The plan had been to expand it by dispatching 'the 4th Corps from the
United Kingdom "during the late summer". The 1st Canadian Division, which was
training hard in England, was to form part of this Corps.31 These arrangements, of
course, were disrupted by the German blow.
During the winter, while the Allies were building up their forces with complacent
deliberation, the Germans were preparing for a tremendous offensive in the spring. This
operation, known by the code name "Gelb" (Yellow), originated in Hitler's "Directive No.
6 for the Conduct of the War", issued on 9 October 1939, which ordered preparations for
an offensive "at the northern flank of the Western Front". Hitler desired to attack almost
immediately, but was dissuaded. A succession of further instructions followed until 1
May, when orders were issued that a state of readiness should be maintained to enable the
enterprise to be launched at any time on one day's notice.32 The 10th brought the deluge.
The events which now took place are familiar and can be very rapidly summarized.
The Belgians immediately called for help: and in accordance with what was known as
Plan "D", made by the French command for use in such a contingency, the British and
French forces on the frontier moved out of their fortified positions and went forward into
Belgium, pivoting on the region of Sedan. The object was to occupy a position on the
River Dyle, which it was considered would offer a shorter line of defence while at the
same time protecting a large area of Belgium from the enemy. Whether or not this move
was wise, disaster followed. The Germans struck with extraordinary speed and efficiency.
The resistance of the Netherlands crumbled in a few days; the Dutch Army, with which
the British and French had been able to make no effective contact, surrendered on 15
May, and the Queen and her Government took refuge in England. Simultaneously the
whole Allied position in Belgium was imperilled by enemy penetration across the Meuse
to the south. On 13-14 May the Germans broke through at Dinant and Sedan, creating a
great bulge in the Allied line.* On the 16th, accordingly, the B.E.F., and the First French
Army on its right, were ordered to fall back to the Scheldt, and proceeded to do so. It
proved impossible, however, to prevent the Allied forces being cut in two. The bulge
south of Sedan became a break, and the German spearheads, tearing west across the.
communications of the Allied northern armies, reached the Channel coast in the
Abbeville area on 20 May.33
During the next few days the Allies' hopes and plans centred upon severing the
German corridor to the sea and renewing contact between the
*The original German plan had been to make the main effort on the right, enveloping the Allies' northern flank-much
the same scheme that had been used in 1914. This was abandoned in favour of a heavy punch in the Sedan area intended to
lead to the isolation of the Northern armies. Generals Guderian, Blumentritt and Westphal all believe that the new plan
originated with Manstein, Chief of Staff to Colonel-General von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group "A".
northern and southern armies. General Weygand, who replaced General Gamelin as
Allied Commander-in-Chief on 20 May, proposed to stage an offensive along these lines,
but it never materialized. On Thursday, 23 May, the position was roughly as follows. The
Anglo-French forces cut off in the north and fighting with their backs to the sea were
holding a line from Gravelines on the Channel coast inland to the vicinity of Denain, and
thence north to around Menin (south-east of Ypres). From there to the Scheldt estuary it
was prolonged by the Belgian Army. The situation as seen from England was obscure.
Boulogne and Calais were immediately threatened by the German advance up the
Channel coast from Abbeville; and it was not clear whether the land route between these
places and Dunkirk remained open. It was obvious, that either the further operations or
the withdrawal of the B.E.F. would depend upon the possession of one or more of these
three ports. With the object of maintaining the B.E.F.'s essential communications, a
British brigade group with tanks, commanded by Brigadier C. Nicholson, landed at
Calais on 22-3 May. On the 22nd also two battalions of the Guards with some other
troops were sent to Boulogne. This latter force, after considerable fighting with the
advancing Germans, found the position untenable and was evacuated by destroyers on the
night of 23-4 May.34
On the 23rd the 1st Canadian Division was drawn into the Allied calculations.* Early
in the morning General McNaughton was told that he was urgently needed at the War
Office and that a brigade group of the Division should be prepared to move "as early as
possible". A warning order was sent to the commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade
(Brigadier Armand A. Smith), and General McNaughton drove to London. He had an
immediate conference with the C.I.G.S., General Crerar and several senior officers of the
War Office also being present. General Ironside explained how the B.E.F.'s supply lines
had been imperilled by the enemy advance, and said that he wished McNaughton to go to
France "to re-establish the road and railway line through Hazebrouck and Armentieres as
soon as possible". This was to be done by way of Calais, if possible; if not, then by way of
Dunkirk. The C.I.G.S. added that McNaughton would be placed in command, of the troops
in the area, including the brigade group then disembarking at Calais, and suggested that he
might be reinforced by a mixed brigade from his own Division and such additional troops
as were required. As communication with Lord Gort might be difficult if not impossible,
McNaughton was to report directly to the C.I.G.S. The Canadian general
*The episode which follows is recounted in some detail. This seems the more desirable as it is not mentioned either in
the United Kingdom official history of the campaign or in Sir Winston Churchill's memoirs.
accepted the task and told Ironside that the 1st Brigade had been ordered to be ready to
move by noon.35
After a further quick discussion of details, General McNaughton returned to
Aldershot, issued his orders, and then drove to Dover, where the Brigade was to embark.
There he conferred with the Vice Admiral commanding at the port (Sir Bertram Ramsay),
Lieut.-General Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Adjutant General of the B.E.F., who had just
arrived from Calais, and Major-General A. E. Percival, Assistant Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.
From this conference there emerged two written instructions to McNaughton, both
signed by Percival.36 One followed the lines of the conference at the War Office that
morning. The most essential parts of it ran as follows:
1. The communications between the B.E.F. now more or less in their old positions on the Franco-
Belgian frontier and the ports of DUNQUERQUE [sic] and BOULOGNE have been cut .. .
3. It is important to re-establish the road and railway line through ST. OMER—HAZEBROUCK -
ARMENTIERES as soon as possible.
4. You are appointed to command this operation.
It should be carried out with the utmost possible speed and should be based mainly on CALAIS and
DUNQUERQUE . . .
5. Comdr. at CALAIS, Brigadier Nicholson, has been instructed that his primary job is to get supplies
forward to the B.E.F. That the best chance appears to be via DUNQUERQUE, and thence through
YPRES. If enemy pressure necessitates, he is to move such of his troops as are mobile in the direction of
DUNQUERQUE. Those which are not mobile are to remain where they are.
6. A mixed Brigade from the 1st Canadian Division is being prepared now.
7. If the ports will bear any more and you find you can take them a second Mixed Brigade of
Canadians will be sent in the best way.
8. You should go provided to run a moving battle with liaison officers and a large proportion of motor
cycles, as ordinary communications will not be able to be established at first owing to the amount of
enemy mobile troops available.
This was the text of the other directive:
With reference to instructions already issued to you, you yourself with what staff you decide to take
will carry out an immediate reconnaissance.
You should first proceed to CALAIS and review the situation there, then you should proceed to
DUNQUERQUE and after seeing the situation there, you will report to the War Office as to whether you
consider any useful purpose that [sic] can be served by landing a force in or near either CALAIS or
DUNQUERQUE.
On your report coupled with the latest information available at the War Office at the time a
decision will be taken as to whether the force can be despatched or not and if so So what port.
Both orders bore the same date and hour ("23 May 40, 2030 hrs"). In other words,
General McNaughton was given a free choice between them. He could produce the first and
take command in the Pas de Calais if he chose; on the other hand, if on arriving in the area
he decided that the situation was not such that the original instructions remained valid, he
could act on the second and simply report to the War Office.37 Few officers have
had such wide discretion in so great a crisis. With the two sets of instructions in his
pocket, McNaughton, accompanied by his G.S.O.1 (Lt.-Col. G. R. Turner), three junior
staff officers, and ten men of No. 1 Canadian Provost Company,* embarked in H.M.
Destroyer Verity and sailed for Calais, which he reached half an hour before midnight.
At Calais he spent two hours, interviewing various officers, British and French, and
gathering information. He did not see Nicholson, who was out going round his defences.
Not much was known about the enemy. The British troops were holding a close perimeter
and had had contact with the Germans at Sangatte, south-west of Calais. A road convoy,
escorted by infantry and tanks, was about to set out for Dunkirk with supplies for the
B.E.F. At 1:37 in the morning of 24 May the Canadian party sailed in H.M.S. Verity for
Dunkirk. En route, the destroyer was several times attacked by enemy aircraft but arrived
safely at 3:30.38 In the meantime, General McNaughton had wirelessed to the War
Office a report of what he had seen at Calais.39 It remarked, "Most present garrison can
be expected to do is hold perimeter in face of attack", and added that the troops were in
good heart.†
At 4:45 a.m. General McNaughton sent through his staff at Dover a further report to
the C.I.G.S., emphasizing the importance of Calais and expressing the opinion that the
Canadians should be used "to strengthen the situation" there. Conferring with Brigadier
R. H. R. Parminter, Lord Gort's Deputy Quartermaster General, who had been sent back
to hasten supplies, McNaughton learned that the B.E.F. was threatened with an
ammunition shortage. Dunkirk was weakly held, but two French divisions under General
Fagalde had been ordered to take up positions safeguarding the port. Fagalde was being
placed under the direction of Admiral Abrial, the "Amiral Nord", with whom
McNaughton discussed the situation. Early in the morning Fagalde arrived and confirmed
that these divisions were on the way. By this time it was known that the convoy from
Calais had been turned back by enemy armour, only three tanks succeeding in breaking
through. The road from Calais to Dunkirk was now closed. Information concerning
enemy attacks continued to come in. There was pressure on the line of the River Aa,
between Calais and Dunkirk, and Calais itself was being bombed and shelled. Shortly
before ten o'clock McNaughton telephoned one of his staff at Dover and instructed him to
seek permission from General Dewing for him to return to England to discuss the
situation "with a responsible representative of the War Office", for there were aspects
*This company, the 1st Division's military police unit, was raised in 1939 entirely from the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police. See Asst. Commissioner L. H. Nicholson, "Battle-dress Patrol" (Royal Canadian Mounted Police Quarterly,
October 1946-January 1947).
†Brig. Nicholson was later told that he and his men must fight to a finish to keep pressure off the B.E.F. at Dunkirk,
and they did so. Resistance in Calais ended late on 26 May.40
which could not be described over the telephone (see below, page 272). Before a decision
could be obtained from Dewing, a senior staff officer of the War Office, Lt.-Col. A. H.
Hornby, called General McNaughton in another connection and agreed that his return
was desirable.41 General Crerar was with Hornby during this conversation.42
McNaughton and his party left Dunkirk immediately in the Verity, and were back in
Dover about one in the afternoon.
In the meantime, there had been great activity at Aldershot. The force to take part in
what was known as "Angel Move" was to consist of a small divisional headquarters plus
the units of the 1st Brigade (The Royal Canadian Regiment, The Hastings and Prince
Edward Regiment and the 48th Highlanders of Canada), two machine-gun battalions, two
anti-tank batteries, the 3rd Field Regiment R.C.A., the 1st Field Company R.C.E., the 4th
Field Ambulance R.C.A.M.C., and some detachments.43 The machine-gun battalions
were not to go at once, and the field regiment, which was at Larkhill on Salisbury Plain,
was to move through Southampton. The rest of the force was to sail in two flights from
Dover, probably on the morning and afternoon of 24 May. Tremendous efforts were
required to collect the necessary supplies, ammunition being a special problem.44 In the
early morning of 24 May the Canadian units began to arrive at Dover, and by eleven
o'clock those of the first flight, including the Brigade Headquarters, the 48th Highlanders
and the R.C.R., were embarked and ready to sail. However, as a result of General
McNaughton's reconnaissance, they never sailed.
At Dover, the G.O.C. on his return from Dunkirk had found no "responsible
representative of the War Office"; and after telephoning Dewing he drove to London. At
4:50 p.m. he reported to the C.I.G.S. at a meeting in the latter's office which was attended
by the principal officers of the War Office as well as General Crerar and Lt.-Cols. Turner
and Homby. It emerged that, with General Fagalde's two divisions in the Dunkirk area
and two British divisions reported to be moving towards Aire and St. Omer, the small
reinforcement represented by the Canadian brigade group would not contribute materially
to improving the situation; on the other hand, if the French troops were not in a mood to
fight, there seemed little point in throwing the Canadians into the midst of a mass of
dispirited soldiers and civilian refugees. The unanimous conclusion of those present was
that there was no purpose in sending the Canadian force to Dunkirk. McNaughton then
accompanied General Ironside to a meeting of the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff,
which was attended by Mr. Churchill, Mr. A. V. Alexander, Mr. Eden, Sir Archibald
Sinclair, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound (First Sea Lord), Air Chief Marshal Sir
Cyril Newall (Chief of the Air Staff), and others. McNaughton again reported what he
had seen and heard. No final decision was taken, the Prime Minister stating that he
"wished General McNaughton to consider himself at two hours' notice for any
eventuality".45 However, it was impossible for the troops to remain embarked
indefinitely, and they were ordered back to Aldershot. To the men at Dover, who had
waited on board all day, the order was a bitter disappointment. "A very flat feeling for all
of us who had been highly keyed up", recorded the diarist of Brigadier Smith's
headquarters.46
The Canadian Government had been informed of the intended operation as soon as it was
proposed.47 An immediate reply came back: "We have been deeply moved by the
momentous news contained in your telegram. We shall all look forward with deep
anxiety but firm confidence to the part that will be taken by our Canadian men in the hard
and vital task of the next few days."48 The project that had occasioned this message was
formally cancelled on 25 May;49 but more was to be heard of it.
The Dunkirk Evacuation
On the further side of the Channel, Lord Gort was anxious for reinforcements from
England. His situation was becoming increasingly perilous; the Belgian Army on his left
was weakening under the German onslaught, and he was obliged to think in terms of
falling back upon the coast in the hope of being able to evacuate his army through
Dunkirk. Early on 25 May he was informed of the decision not to send Canadians to that
port.50 He considered, however, that it would be useful to have "a nucleus of fresh and
well trained troops on the bridgehead position", and (later on the 25th, it would seem) he
asked the War Office to send him a Canadian brigade.51 The War Office prepared to
comply. At 1:50 a.m. on 26 May, Headquarters 1st Canadian Division was informed that
the previous scheme had been revived, and that the same troops made ready a few days
before would embark on the night of 26-7 May. Warning orders were issued to the units,
and at about 10 a.m. Generals McNaughton and Crerar went to Whitehall to discuss the
project with General Sir John Dill (who had returned from France in April to become
V.C.I.G.S. and was now about to be appointed C.I.G.S.) and General Dewing. The
records indicate that all four generals were in accord in the view that it was useless to
send more troops across the Channel. McNaughton nevertheless made it clear that he was
quite prepared to undertake the operation if it was decided upon, provided only that his
artillery could be dispatched with the rest of the force (it had been indicated that the field
guns would not arrive until at least twenty-four hours after the infantry).52
General Ironside and the Secretary of State for War subsequently joined in the
discussion, and Mr. Eden showed "some perturbation"53 at the doubts
which were being expressed about the operation, as the British War Cabinet, acting on
the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, had decided on the previous evening that the Canadian
brigade should go. McNaughton told Eden that his objection to the plan "was not based
on any timidity but rather on a desire to get the best possible value for the effort made",
and added that while the matter was being further considered he would make every effort
to ensure that the brigade group could "go tonight complete with guns if the Prime
Minister and War Cabinet decide that it should be sent". In the course of the discussion
the British generals had referred more than once to the fact that the defence of Britain
was now an essential consideration and that troops important to this object should not be
thrown away for the sake of what Dewing is reported to have called "a gesture to help the
B.E.F."54
Following this discussion, the C.I.G.S. showed McNaughton and Crerar the draft of a
telegram to Lord Gort informing him that it was unlikely the Canadians would go; but the
project was not cancelled until later in the day, when Mr. Churchill's concurrence was
obtained.55 Soon after noon the troops at Aldershot, who were busy preparing for the
move, received word of this second cancellation. This time, however, the vehicles were
left loaded and the 1st Brigade remained on eight hours' notice. This proved a wise
precaution. Late in the afternoon Gort telegraphed Eden, strongly requesting that the
Canadian brigade should go and be followed if possible by a second. "These troops are
required urgently to assist withdrawal", he wrote. Some hours later he repeated his plea,
stating that the Canadians were required "to enable offensive mobile operations to be
undertaken on Belgian front by other troops in order to safeguard security of
withdrawal".56 Shortly after seven o'clock in the morning of the 27th General Dewing
telephoned General McNaughton to the following effect (the elliptical manner of speech
was adopted in case the conversation was overheard):57
Have had conversation with fellow on the other side [Gort]; he has made an appeal to be passed on. My
recommendation is the same as yesterday, but no one should be far away as the matter will be
considered by the higher ones about 1000 hrs. I have seen our new man [Dill] and his view is the same
as yesterday. However, black coats may not accept and movement control has been warned.
The divisional staff and Brigadier Smith were advised, but nothing was said to the
units. During the day General McNaughton and the staff drew up a revised composition
for the proposed force. "It was agreed that it should be drastically reduced as regards
Headquarters and certain arms, in view of the only result which it could reasonably
achieve."58 But military opinion at the War Office was now strongly against the scheme,
and the "black coats" evidently agreed; for in the course of the afternoon Crerar was able
to tell McNaughton by telephone, "The landing operation show is definitely off".59 Thus
was "Angel Move" finally relegated to limbo.
The Dunkirk evacuation was now under way. It had begun as early as 27 May, when
about 5000 men took ship, but embarkation on a really large scale started only on the
29th. The Anglo-French situation had by then been still further endangered by the
Belgian surrender, which took place on the morning of the 28th.* In the end, in defiance
of the very grim forecasts made in the beginning, some 338,000 British and Allied
soldiers were successfully withdrawn; but their heavy equipment had to be left behind.60
It was an all but disarmed Expeditionary Force that returned to England.
On 27 and 28 May Dewing and McNaughton exchanged letters which merit quotation
at length.61 Dewing's ran:
27 May, 1940.
My dear Andy,
I am afraid your Division, or a good portion of it, have spent a lot of time on fruitless preparations
in connection with their proposed employment yesterday morning. . . . I hope there will be no further
question of putting troops into Dunkirk, though even tonight the question has been re-opened by a
message from Gort asking for support there.
I am absolutely convinced in my mind that to put fresh troops into Dunkirk now with little or no
transport would be militarily quite wrong. The most they could do would be to hold the outskirts of the
town. and that would not secure the port for Lord Gort. In fact, it would be throwing good material into
a quicksand which is already on the way to engulfing far too much. I don't believe it would add anything
to what we should save from the quicksand.
I think, too, there is the greatest importance, as well as the greatest difficulty, at the present time of
seeing more than the drama that is immediately before our eyes. We must remember that we have got to
win this war, first by defending England and giving the German a jolt when he attacks here; and next by
building up a fresh Field Force out of the ruins of the old. Your Division and the 52nd may be vital to
the first task, and with the 51st which is already in France will be the keystone on which the new Field
Force will be built.
These are the reasons which have influenced me in throwing what little weight I have against the
employment of your Division or any part of it in Dunkirk. The part you have been asked to play has
been extraordinarily difficult. You went off on your first visit to Calais and Dunkirk full of fire and
determination to use your troops to save the B.E.F. What you thought of it as a military proposition then
I don't fully know, but you were absolutely determined to do thoroughly whatever might be asked of
you. Today, I think you share a good many of my feelings of the unsoundness of committing fresh
troops to Dunkirk. It was much more difficult for you to express that, because you naturally had the
feeling that you might be giving the impression that you and the Canadian troops were not ready to
undertake a desperate adventure. I can assure you that you did not give that impression. We all know
you far too well for it to be possible for any of us to entertain that suspicion for one moment; and I only
mention it because I think it was in your mind.
The opportunity to use the Division will come soon enough, but it must come in circumstances in
which it can play a sound military role, as dashing as you like, but militarily practicable.
General McNaughton replied next day:

Aldershot, Hants, 28 May, 1940.
My dear Dick,
On my return from Chatham this evening, I have your letter of yesterday's date and I very deeply
appreciate your friendly thought in telling me of your sympathetic
*The Belgian garrison of Fort Pepinster, one of the forts of Liege, which had been resisting since 11 May, gave in only
on the 29th.
understanding of the position in which I found myself in the difficult circumstances of the last few days.
You have clearly penetrated to the motives and considerations which governed my actions and it is a
great comfort to me to know that this is so.
I was all for Calais on the first night because I thought that from that flank we might, at the least,
delay the close investment of Dunkerque and with British troops in effective occupation of the perimeter
there was some certainty that our deployment could be effected in an orderly and proper manner.
As for Dunkerque, from the beginning I could not see our employment there as a practical
operation of war. With our small force we could not go beyond the near perimeter. De Fagalde, under
his mandate, from Weygand, was already in command with his 68th Division in movement and able to
reach position much earlier than we. He, as a French general clearly in close sympathy with the Admiral
du Nord and with all the local naval, military and air intelligence service at his disposal, was better
placed than I, with no British troops on the spot and no staff with local knowledge, to exercise co-
ordination. If I had attempted to do so and produced my instructions from Ironside, they might well have
folded up!
When I heard from De Fagalde of his plan for the withdrawal of his 60th Division [in the Bruges
area] leaving a gap on the left, I was very anxious thinking that it might result in a torrent of German
Infantry behind our lines. a far more serious matter than the five armoured divisions said to be operating
northward in our vicinity. It was to give this, in my view, vital information that I asked permission to
return to Dever and later to the War Office.
As for taking the force the next day or the day after to Dunkerque, I could only see it as a gesture of
no very great value and I thought it was the sort of thing the enemy would like, that is to draw some part
of our not too ample reserves into the melee where they could be dealt with cheaply. For these reasons
and others of like sort I could not enthuse over the project put before me.
After my visit to Macdougall of the Home Forces* on the afternoon of 26 May and in the light of his
explanation of the situation in the United Kingdom I knew that it would have been an act of utter folly to
have sent us over and when, on the morning of 27 May, I heard from you that the project might again be
on I determined to cut our force to a minimum so as not to divert any more men or resources from the
defence of the United Kingdom than was absolutely necessary for the purpose of a gesture and if the
War Cabinet had called on us my orders for a force, armed only with Small Arms and Anti-Tank guns
and without field guns or transport, had been drafted; this force to be landed on the open beach from
Dover so as to save time and perhaps avoid the dangers in the Channel from mines and air bombing.
However, thanks largely I think to the sound military judgment of yourself and of Dill this rather
theatrical sacrifice was not required of us.
Our problem now is to beat Germany and to do this we must maintain at least a toe hold on this
side of the Atlantic until great friendly forces can come. and I have faith they will come, to our
assistance. The coast of the United Kingdom is the perimeter of the citadel which must be held. All else
outside is now of secondary account. . . .
This correspondence provides the best commentary upon the events. And the
outcome of the evacuation operation justified the generals' judgement. It is difficult to see
how sending a Canadian brigade to Dunkirk could have contributed to bringing about a
better result. It would, indeed, have introduced an unnecessary complication, would
almost certainly have meant the loss of more equipment, and might well .have meant the
loss of more men.
*Brigadier A. I. Macdougall, employed as Major General, General Staff, G.H.Q. Home Forces. It was during this
interview that McNaughton suggested organizing his force in mobile groups and using it as a central reserve (see below).
First Measures Against the Invasion Menace
From the time when the Germans broke into the Low Countries, increasing anxiety
was felt for the safety of Britain herself. On 26 May, General McNaughton had produced
the idea of organizing his division in nine mobile groups, each based on an infantry
battalion, for action in the United Kingdom. He suggested that it might move to a central
area (the Oxford region was mentioned) where it could be ready for immediate counter-
attack against an enemy landing anywhere in southern England. This project was
approved, though the area was changed. On 27 May orders were issued for the 1st
Canadian Division to move to an assembly area in the district Kettering-Higham Ferrers-
Northampton.62
Before the move took place, the Division and the Canadian ancillary troops were
formed into a self-contained body known as "Canadian Force"; and on 29 May the new
formation began the march to the Northampton area. It covered four nights, one brigade
group moving each night in civilian buses hired for the purpose."63 (In addition to the
three infantry brigade groups, a "Canadian Force Reserve Group" had been formed from
the ancillary artillery regiments and machine-gun battalions.) At Northampton, Canadian
Force was in "G.H.Q. Reserve": that is, it was a reserve formation directly under G.H.Q.
Home Forces. Its role was that of reinforcing the troops on the east coast between the
north bank of the Thames and the south bank of the Humber in case of attack there. Each
brigade was instructed to reconnoitre one sector of this front, and the routes leading to it.
General McNaughton himself, and other officers of his headquarters, also made
reconnaissance trips in the area where the Force might be required to operate.64
The people of Northampton and the other towns in the new area seemed delighted to
see the Canadians, gave them a great reception and entertained them warmly during their
stay.65 The stay, however, was very short. It was terminated by further events on the
Continent. The Dunkirk evacuation was completed on Tuesday, 4 June. The British
Government at this moment was uncertain as to the Germans' next move. The situation
was frankly stated by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on this same day: "We
must expect another blow to be struck almost immediately at us or at France". Two days
earlier, the Prime Minister had put his views on paper, for the benefit of the Chiefs of
Staff. The memorandum66 ran in part:
3. The B.E.F. in France must immediately be reconstituted, otherwise the French will not continue in
the war. Even if Paris is lost, they must be adjured to continue a gigantic guerrilla. A scheme should be
considered for a bridgehead and area of disembarkation in Brittany, where a large army can be
developed. We must have plans worked out which will show the French that there is a way through if
they will only be steadfast.
4. As soon as the B.E.F. is reconstituted for Home Defence, three divisions should be sent to join our
two divisions south of the Somme, or wherever the
French left may be by then. It is for consideration whether the Canadian Division should not go at
once... .
I close with a general observation. As I have personally felt less afraid of a German attempt at
invasion than of the piercing of the French line on the Somme or Aisne and the fall of Paris, 1 have
naturally believed the Germans would choose the latter. . . . The next few days, before the B.E.F. or any
substantial portion of it can be reorganised, must be considered as still critical.
On 4 June C.M.H.Q. telegraphed to Ottawa,67
It is now planned to move in near future certain divisions in the United Kingdom to France to join 51st
Division at present Abbeville area and thus form the first corps of a reconstituted B.E.F. I am informed
by decision taken yesterday it is not proposed immediately to utilize 1st Canadian Division for this
purpose. Chiefs of Staff Committee views threat of enemy landings between the Thames and the
Humber as definite and imminent and is not willing to release Canadian Force from important
responsibilities now entrusted to it in this connection.
Speculation was ended, and the situation much altered, when on 5 June the Germans
launched an offensive against General Weygand's line along the Somme and Aisne. On
the 6th the War Office ordered Canadian Force back from Northampton to Aldershot. By
the 8th the movement had been virtually completed, and that day Their Majesties the
King and Queen visited the Division.68 This honour was rightly interpreted as indicating
that the units would shortly find themselves on the way to France.69
Forlorn Hope: The Second B.E.F., June 1940
On 29 May, when the Dunkirk evacuation was only beginning, Mr. Churchill had
declared to the French Government his intention of building up "a new B.E.F."70 It was
now becoming a reality, although thehard facts of the situation reduced it to pitiably
small proportions. Lieut.-General Sir Alan Brooke, who had been G.O.C. the 2nd Corps
of the original British Expeditionary Force, was to command it until it could be further
built up. The only British divisions in France after Dunkirk were the 51st (Highland)
Division, which had been in the Saar region and had never joined Lord Gort, and the 1st
Armoured Division, which had landed too late to make contact with him. These divisions
were to be the foundation of the new B.E.F.; but before it could be formed the 51st was
cut off in the Le Havre peninsula and the greater part of it was obliged to surrender on 12
June. The Armoured Division, which had been reduced in the beginning by the force sent
to Calais, had suffered further in fighting on the Somme.71
Every division in England fit to move was now to be sent to France under General
Brooke's command; but the grim fact was that for the moment there were only two such
divisions. The 52nd (Lowland) Division had already been under orders to move; the move
was now somewhat accelerated and began on 7 June.72 The 1st Canadian Division was to
follow as soon as possible. The only other division which could be dispatched in the near
future was the most forward of those evacuated from Dunkirk, the 3rd, commanded by
Major-General B. L. Montgomery. It was warned on 8 June; but its movement could not
begin until the 20th, and only one field regiment of artillery, and an anti-tank regiment
less two batteries, would then be available to accompany it.73 All the other Dunkirk
divisions were still so short of equipment as to be incapable of taking part in an
expeditionary movement for some time to come.
The generosity of Britain's action in sending her "only two formed divisions"74 to
support the French at this desperate moment has been recognized by General Weygand.75
Nevertheless, there was a definite limit to the risks which the British Government was
prepared to run for its ally. It would not throw into the cauldron the whole of the
metropolitan fighter force of the R.A.F., on which Britain's safety depended. In the
middle of May the Chief of the Air Staff supported Air Chief Marshal Dowding, A.O.C.-
in-C. Fighter Command, in arguing that continuing to drain away the home defence force
in attempts to save the situation in France would merely render the future successful
defence of Britain impossible. Mr. Churchill resolved on 19 May that no more fighter
squadrons would leave the country.76
The refusal to throw in all the resources of Fighter Command was deeply resented by
the French. And in a purely military view the decision to commit every available Army
division, while at the same time refusing the air support without which their operations
could scarcely be effective, was a peculiar one. It emphasizes the fact, which indeed
emerges clearly from Mr. Churchill's memoranda, that the formation of a new B.E.F. was
a political rather than a military act; its object was to encourage the French and keep them
in the war. It involved the likelihood of destruction for the divisions concerned, but the
stakes were such that it cannot be said that it was wrong. At the same time, it seems clear
in the light of later events that the British Government was wise to hold back the fighter
squadrons. It seems unlikely that this force could in itself have turned the tide on the
Continent; more probably, it would have been merely engulfed in the devouring
quicksand. But it won the Battle of Britain later in the year and in doing so prevented the
final loss of the war.
General Weygand has suggested that because there is doubt whether Hitler really
intended to invade England, the argument from the Battle of Britain may be invalid.77 It is
difficult to agree with him. It is true that there is reason to think that Hitler never wholly
committed his mind to the invasion project; but had the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain
and obtained air superiority above the Channel, it is hard to believe that invasion would not
have been attempted. It is even possible, though certainly not probable
that Britain might have been brought to ruin by the air weapon alone.*
General Brooke received his orders on 10 June and sailed for France on the afternoon
of the 12th.79 There were officers at the War Office who never expected to see him
again.80
The Canadian Government was being kept fully informed of developments affecting
its forces in Britain. A telegram of 14 May had referred to the possibility of a movement
"to theatre of operations" earlier than 15 June, a date which had been mentioned in earlier
correspondence. With the concurrence of the Minister of National Defence, the C.G.S.
informed General McNaughton on 15 May that this was approved "if you consider the
circumstances warrant it". On 6 June Ottawa was advised of the orders which had been
issued for the return of Canadian Force to Aldershot and the expectation that the Division
would begin to move to France on 11 June. Later telegrams gave further details as these
came to hand.81 To clarify the legal position of the Canadian troops, McNaughton had
executed a new Order of Detail under the Visiting Forces Act on 1 June.82 This was the
first such order in which the right to withdraw troops from combination was specifically
included; it specified that the forces detailed in the Order would continue to act in
combination with those of the United Kingdom "until I shall otherwise direct."
After "a period of intense activity" on the part of the administrative staffs of the 1st
Division, preparations for the cross-Channel move were, for the most part, completed by
9 June. That day a divisional conference was held at which commanding officers were
told the anticipated nature of the operations in France, and a telegram of "heartfelt good
wishes" from the Prime Minister of Canada was read. On 11 June, there was another
conference, dealing mainly with equipment. While it was in progress General Brooke
arrived at Aldershot, accompanied by several members of his staff, and himself presided
over the latter part of the meeting.83 This visit gave General McNaughton an opportunity
of discussing the forthcoming operations with the Corps Commander.
The Role of the Second B.E.F.
It is not surprising that the plans for the operations of the Second B.E.F. are not clearly
recorded, or that all concerned with executing them were not fully apprised of their
nature. With the Anglo-French alliance rapidly falling asunder, and France herself
tottering to ruin, it might have been surprising had it been otherwise. It is our task,
however, to outline, as far as the
*"The crux of the matter is air superiority. Once Germany had attained this, she might attempt to subjugate this
country by air attack alone." (Paper by the British Chiefs of Staff, 26 May 1940).78
available records permit, the ideas which dominated the minds of those in control, and the
nature of the Canadian share in the resulting plans.
The written instructions which General Brooke received from the Secretary of State
for War were brief and general. He was simply informed that he was to command all
British troops in France and to cooperate in the defeat of the enemy under the supreme
command of General Weygand.84
It is necessary here to trace the history of one important project of this period: that for
setting up what was called a "redoubt" (more accurately, a "reduit" or keep) in Brittany,
upon which French forces could retreat, where the French Government might take refuge
and continue to operate on French soil, and to which British assistance could be directed.
It appears that this scheme was first discussed with General Weygand by the heads of the
French Government on 29 and 30 May; and on 31 May the French Prime Minister (M.
Paul Reynaud) gave Weygand written instructions to consider the possibility of forming
"a national redoubt in the neighbourhood of a naval base, which would enable us to
benefit from the freedom of the seas, and likewise to remain in close touch with our
allies". This work, he said, should be laid out and provisioned like a fortress; it "might be
situated in the Breton peninsula". Weygand had no faith in the scheme, but he gave
instructions for work to begin at once with a good Corps Commander in charge.* The
plan was, he says, extended after consultation with the French Navy to cover not only
Brittany but also the Cotentin peninsula, including the port of Cherbourg.86 This
extension made a dubious project still more impracticable. Published information does
not indicate that the British Government was advised of it.
Weygand states87 that the redoubt scheme was approved by Mr. Churchill at the
meeting of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council on 31 May. It was doubtless
discussed at this time, but it would seem that it was not mentioned during the Council's
formal session.88 As we have already seen, however, Churchill's memorandum sent to the
British Chiefs of Staff two days later makes definite reference to the idea of a
"bridgehead" in Brittany. On 11 June the Supreme War Council met again, at Briare. By
this time, the Germans had broken through Weygand's line on the Somme and Aisne, and
the situation was becoming desperate. Sir Winston Churchll has confirmed that at this
meeting he agreed with Reynaud "to try to draw a kind of 'Torres Vedras line' across the
foot of the Brittany peninsula".89
How far this idea was communicated to General Brooke before he embarked for
France does not appear. The records of the conferences at
*It appears nevertheless that when Reynaud on 13 June wrote Weygand emphasizing the importance of the "redoubt"
scheme, the general replied (14 June) that on the 11th, when he drafted his order for general retreat, he had not known of
85
the government's intention to set up a keep in Brittany. Presumably he had regarded the earlier orders as merely
precautionary.
Aldershot on 9 and 11 June give no details of the operational plans proposed to the
Canadians; they were presumably not circulated for security reasons. Other evidence
indicates, however, that Brooke had in mind, and described to General McNaughton, the
Breton redoubt scheme or something very closely allied to it.
On 13 June, the day before McNaughton and his advanced headquarters left
Aldershot, a draft operation instruction was prepared with a view to issue when the
Division arrived in France. As things turned out, it was never issued; but it serves as a
record of the roles of the B.E.F., and of the Canadian Division within it, as they were
understood at McNaughton's headquarters after Brooke's visit.* Its most important
sections (omitting map references) ran as follows:
1. The political object of the reconstituted B.E.F. is to give moral support to the French Government
by showing the determination of the British Empire to assist her ally with all available forces.
2. The military object of 1 Canadian Division is, in conjunction with other formations of 2 Corps, to
threaten from the general line [ST.] NAZAIRE . . . RENNES . . . PONTORSON. . . the flank of a
German advance towards LE MANS ... ANGERS ... NANTES ... and relieve pressure on the FRENCH
Army by drawing GERMAN forces Westwards.
3. The coasts of the peninsula projecting westwards about 150 miles from the line [ST.] NAZAIRE -
PONTORSON have deep water close to the shores and there are many good harbours. The average
width from NORTH to SOUTH is about 70 miles. The flanks of a force operating in this area can be
supported by the Navy. The country is hilly, intersected by many rivers and well wooded. From a study
of the map it does not appear to be suited to the employment of large armoured formations. Apart from
its extent, it is thus a favourable theatre for the operations visualized by the British forces available.
4. 2 Corps of the B.E.F. is to consist of the following formations:
52 Division. Landing at [ST.] NAZAIRE and assembling NORTH of the port.
I Canadian Division and ancillary troops.
Landing at BREST ... and assembling N.E. of the port.
Remnants of 51 Division .. .
Remnants of I Armoured Division .. .
2 Corps Troops.
5. It is the intention of the Corps Commander to concentrate the whole of 2 Corps in the area to the
NORTH and SOUTH of RENNES as soon as formations are assembled.
6. Thus there are two divisions. part of a third, part of an armoured division and 2 Corps troops
available for operations within the area defined above. A division may have to hold up to fifty miles of
front .. .
The movement instructions issued by the War Office for the Canadian Division91
provided that motor transport, which was to move in advance, would embark at Falmouth
and Plymouth; troops moving by rail would embark at Plymouth. Only a small proportion
of drivers were allowed to go on the mechanical transport ships with their vehicles; the rest
went
*A copy of this draft, with covering letter dated 13 June, was sent to the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., for insertion at a
future date in the Division's General Staff War Diary.90 It is interesting to note that at this time, before starting for France,
Divisional Headquarters completed its War Diaries to date and forwarded them to C.M.H.Q., along with divisional files not
required for the operations in prospect. The 1st Canadian Division was, in effect, making its last will and testament,-as it
had good reason to do.
simultaneously on a "driver ship". The 1st Brigade, which had suffered so many
disappointments in May, was to lead; and Brigadier Smith's first road parties left
Aldershot on 8 June. The vehicles belonging to this brigade's three battalions and the 1st
Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, as well as those of some administrative
units, were loaded into ships which sailed for France on the 11th. It is recorded that at
Plymouth all regimental control was lost "from the moment the vehicles reached the
regulating point” at the port, and personnel and vehicles "became individual units in the
hands of the Movement Control".92
The 1st Brigade in France
As we have seen, it had been General McNaughton's understanding that his Division
after landing at Brest would assemble north-east of that port. He had ordered Brigadier
Smith to take command in the assembly area pending his own arrival. Smith was not told
the precise area-the divisional headquarters had no information-but it was assumed that
he would receive the necessary instructions upon arriving at Brest.93 All these
expectations were disappointed. The instructions, apparently originating in the War
Office, which had been issued to Movement Control at Brest, were quite different from
anything contemplated by McNaughton or Brooke. Headquarters Brest Garrison was
informed on 6 June that the movement of the divisions arriving from England would be
in accordance with Plan "W" -the same used for the movement of the original B.E.F. in
1939.94 This involved using an assembly area about Laval and Le Mans, roughly 70
miles in advance of the line across the base of the Brittany peninsula which it had been
suggested the Canadians were to hold. These unsuitable orders were put into effect in an
equally inappropriate manner. When the ships carrying the 1st Brigade's transport docked
at Brest on 12 and 13 June, Movement Control sent the vehicles off up-country in small
parties as they were deposited on the dock. At a collecting point at Landivisiau the
drivers were given route cards and mimeographed instructions and sent on in groups of
ten vehicles, in some cases at least irrespective of units or of whether there were officers
or N.C.Os. with the groups. (The war diary of the 1st Field Regiment, unlike several
others, indicates that at Landivisiau vehicles were "sorted out into units" and an attempt
was made to place "a senior N.C.O. or driver" (sic) in charge of each group.) As was to
be expected, these conditions had an adverse effect on discipline, and there were some
reports of drunkenness and reckless driving.95
The procedure with the rail parties was similar. Those of the 1st Field Regiment and
the Supply Column R.C.A.S.C. landed at Brest on the 13th and were immediately sent
forward by train to their destined assembly point,
Sable-sur-Sarthe, where they detrained on the morning of 14 June and made their way to
their billets at Parce. The Brigade's main body, including its headquarters, embarked at
Plymouth on 13 June and began to land at Brest early the following morning. Brigadier
Smith had difficulty in obtaining orders, and when he received them found to his surprise
that he was instructed to move to Sable. During the day the three infantry battalions and
the brigade headquarters and attached units left Brest for this area in three trains. The first
train carried the headquarters, the 48th Highlanders and the brigade anti-tank company.96
In the meantime, General Brooke had arrived in France and set up his rudimentary
headquarters at Le Mans. Early on 14 June he met General Weygand, and together they
subsequently discussed the situation with General Georges, Commander-in-Chief of the
North-Eastern Theatre of Operations. Brooke in his subsequent report97 stated that
Weygand "spoke most frankly" and said that the French Army was no longer capable of
organized resistance; it had broken up into four groups, considerable gaps existed
between them, and coordinated action was no longer possible.* "He then informed me",
writes Brooke, "that, in accordance with a decision taken by the Allied Governments,
Brittany was to be defended by holding a line across the peninsula in the vicinity of
Rennes." This project, we have seen, must already have been familiar to Brooke. He says
that both Weygand and Georges considered it impracticable for execution with the forces
still available in the French leftward Army (the Tenth), even including the B.E.F.
However, since the creation of the "redoubt" appeared to be the policy of their
governments, the three generals signed a document99 agreeing that with this scheme in
view the British troops then disembarking (the rear echelons of the 52nd Division, the
Canadian Division and the Corps Troops) would be concentrated at Rennes; while those
fighting with the Tenth French Army (the Armoured Division, an improvised formation
known as "Beauman Force", and part of the 52nd) would continue to serve under that
Army but steps would be taken, so far as possible, to facilitate their future grouping with
General Brooke's forces.
Returning to Le Mans, General Brooke communicated with the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff in London. The latter said that he had no knowledge of the Brittany scheme
but would consult the Prime Minister. Brooke recommended, in view of the state of the
French Army, that further movement of British troops and material to France should be
stopped and measures taken for evacuation. An hour later the C.I.G.S. telephoned "to say
that the Prime Minister knew nothing of the Brittany plan", and that
*Weygand's account does not indicate that he gave so grim an appreciation, and might indeed be taken as implying
that he did not. Nevertheless, there is nothing improbable in Brooke's account. On Weygand's own showing, he had
advised his government to sue for an armistice two days before.98
those elements of the B.E.F. not already under the orders of the Tenth French Army were
to be evacuated.100 As we have seen, Mr. Churchill certainly did know something of the
Brittany plan, and the process by which his reply reached Brooke in this form remains
obscure.
Brooke immediately issued orders for the withdrawal of those parts of the B.E.F.
(including the Canadian Division) not fighting under French command. Withdrawing the
troops actually incorporated in the Tenth Army was a more complicated business,
particularly as Mr. Churchill was loath to authorize their evacuation in view of its
possible effect upon relations with the French Government. On 15 June, indeed, he gave
orders that no part of the 52nd Division was to be embarked; and only on the 17th, when
the new Petain Government had already asked the Germans for an armistice, was final
action taken to evacuate the British troops attached to the Tenth Army.101
At the time when the order reversing its movement was issued in the late afternoon of
14 June, the 1st Canadian Division was scattered over an enormous extent of territory
(see Map 4). At least one unit was still at Northampton; many were in Aldershot,
preparing to move; others were at Plymouth and Falmouth, embarked or preparing to
embark; others again were at Brest or scattered along the roads between there and Le
Mans; the 1st Field Regiment R.C.H.A. was, we have seen, at Parce in the assembly area;
and the headquarters of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and its three battalions and some lesser
units, were steaming towards that area in trains. It was simple to reverse the move of
troops in England or on shipboard at Plymouth or Brest; but to extricate the units
scattered across France was bound to be difficult.
The first Canadians to leave France were those who had landed at Brest during 14
June but had not yet entrained. These re-embarked in the course of the evening, and their
ships, along with others whose troops had not landed, sailed for England the following
morning.102 In the assembly area about Sable, the road parties of various units, and the
1st Field Regiment, received the evacuation order in the early hours of 15 June; and Lt.-
Col. J. H. Roberts, commanding the Field Regiment, got confirmation of it a few hours
later from General Brooke himself, who had evacuated Le Mans that morning with his
miniature staff and fell in with the Canadians on the road. The regiment drove back
towards Brest, which the main party reached on the morning of 16 June. In accordance
with orders from Headquarters Brest Garrison, transport vehicles were left outside the
town (and later destroyed) ; the guns and trailers were taken to the congested east quay.
No ships were available that day.103
Brooke's Chief of Staff (Major-General T. R. Eastwood) had issued instructions to
Major-General P. de Fonblanque, a British officer who was G.O.C. Lines of
Communication, that he would be responsible for the
evacuation. Transport and equipment which could not be loaded was to be made
useless.104 On 17 June Headquarters Brest Garrison issued to all units an order beginning,
"The intention is to embark everyone today". Transport vehicles, it proceeded, were to be
destroyed: "Only valuable vehicles and guns already notified to be retained for
loading."105
Only, with difficulty were the guns of the R.C.H.A. saved from destruction. It would
appear that General de Fonblanque* and his staff were apprehensive lest attempts to save
equipment might result in the loss of men. Lt.-Col. Roberts went to Garrison
Headquarters and, in the words of his unit's diary, "fought hard for nearly two hours to
save the guns". The order to destroy them was twice given and twice countermanded; and
it is quite probable that they would finally have been destroyed had not the Garrison
Commandant, Colonel W. B. Mackie, been an ex-cadet of the Royal Military College of
Canada. Mackie spoke to de Fonblanque by telephone and obtained his reluctant
acquiescence in embarking the guns. Roberts was told that he could load as many as he
could get aboard by 4 p.m. It was then 2:15. By four he had loaded not only 24 field guns
but in addition a dozen Bofors guns, seven predictors, three Bren carriers and several
technical vehicles belonging to other units. The R.C.H.A.'s tractors and ammunition
limbers had, however, to be abandoned.106 According to its diary, the steamer
Bellerophon, on which the guns were loaded, had "still had room enough to take
everything that was on the docks". The three vessels carrying portions of the regiment
sailed at 5:15 p.m. on 17 June, and docked the following morning at Plymouth and
Falmouth. The loss of equipment sharpened the gunners' disgust at having had to scuttle
without meeting the Germans. The R.C.H.A. diary commented tartly, "Although there
was evidently no enemy within 200 miles, the withdrawal was conducted as a rout." †
The rail parties of the Canadian infantry left France before the artillery. The trains
were duly turned back in the early hours of the 15th. That carrying The Hastings and
Prince Edward Regiment had reached Laval, that with The Royal Canadian Regiment a
place "believed to have been Chateaubriant" (this is unlikely, as they had already passed
through Laval, which is on a different line). These two trains were back in Brest that
evening and the men upon them were re-embarked on a British steamer which sailed the
next afternoon and made Plymouth on the 17th.107
Brigadier Smith's headquarters and the 48th Highlanders, on the leading train, had a more
complicated experience. This train reached Sable, its
*The strain under which this officer was working can be readily imagined. He died soon afterwards as a result of his
exertions.
†It is a remarkable but incontestable fact that, although one of the R.C.H.A.'s guns had been damaged in a road
accident en route to Parce and turned in to Ordnance, so that the regiment returned to Brest with only twenty-three 18/25
and 25-pounders, it brought its full complement of twenty-four back to England.
destination, before getting the reversal order. It was received from the mouth of a British
Railway Traffic Officer, who was at first suspected of being a fifth columnist but
identified himself satisfactorily.* The train, not without some delay and some dispute
with the engineer, was turned about and headed back towards Brest, with men of the 48th
riding the locomotive as an emergency crew and others with tommy guns on the tender
"to look after the recalcitrant engineer or any person trying to stop the train."109 There
were apprehensions of collision with a German armoured column. No such happening
took place; but there was a mishap which might have been fatal. After leaving Rennes, it
was noted that the train was passing through unfamiliar country. In fact, a mistake had
been made in routing and it was on the way not to Brest but to St. Malo. By great good
fortune, at that port there was a British steamer, the Biarritz. British troops of many
regiments were already on board, but room was made for the Canadians. The overloaded
vessel left harbour on the morning of the 16th and reached Southampton that
afternoon.110
General McNaughton, who knew nothing of these happenings, was at Plymouth
waiting to embark. His first intimation of the reversal of the Canadian movement came
when he heard that Movement Control had ordered the Toronto Scottish Regiment, who
were on shipboard, to go ashore. He then telephoned General Dewing, who said
cryptically that the Canadians were needed now for "another battlefield". He could not
say more over an open line, but McNaughton rightly surmised that the next operation was
the defence of Britain.111
Only a word can be said of the evacuation of the rest of the B.E.F. The 52nd
Division, part of which had got into action, and the remains of the Armoured Division
were safely withdrawn through Brest and Cherbourg. At the latter place there was
considerable German pressure (from Rommel's 7th Panzer Division); nevertheless, some
vehicles and equipment, including 25 tanks, were embarked and saved for the defence of
England.112 When the last troopship left Cherbourg, "the Germans had penetrated to
within three miles of the harbour".113 There seems to have been less panic here than
there was at Brest, where the enemy was much farther away. The commander of the
Armoured Division records experiences at Brest similar to the Canadians': ". . . although
vehicles and stores were on the quayside they had to be left behind—damaged or
destroyed . . . In material losses were severe owing to the last-minute failure to provide-or
to use-the necessary shipping at Brest".114
*Lt.-Col. E. W. Haldenby of the 48th asked him his name. He replied that it was Oates. Haldenby then inquired
whether he had ever had a relative whom he might have heard of. The officer thought this unlikely, but when pressed
admitted that a member of his family had gone to the South Pole with Captain Scott. This was good enough, for it seemed
unlikely that a German agent would know the story of the Captain Oates who sacrificed his life in the hope of saving Scott
and his other companions.108 Brigadier Smith accordingly decided to turn the train around.
A Reckoning of Disappointment
On 20 June C.M.H.Q. advised anxious Ottawa that the latest report indicated "100 to
200 all ranks still not accounted for".115 It was hoped that they would still turn up, and in
fact the vast majority did so. When all returns were in, only six men were found to have
been left behind. One N.C.O., Sergeant D. G. Hutt, R.C. Signals, had been mortally hurt
in a motorcycle accident. Four other men were interned in France but subsequently
succeeded in making their way to England; one of them, Sapper F. P. Hutchinson, 1st
Field Company R.C.E., received for his escape the first Military Medal awarded to any
Canadian during this war. One soldier of The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment,
Corporal R. J. Creighton, remained a prisoner of war until the end of hostilities.116 In
view of the conditions existing in France at the time, it is extraordinary that the loss was
so small.
As already indicated, the story with respect to equipment and transport was less
happy. The 1st Brigade's precious vehicles, most of them only lately issued, were
destroyed by order in France, almost without exception. All told, 216 Canadian vehicles
were lost. A sergeant of the Hastings and Prince Edward managed to embark his
commanding officer's station wagon on a trawler, and twelve Bren carriers, including
those loaded by the R.C.H.A., were also brought away. This was all.117
The chagrin and disappointment of the men of the Division can be imagined. Not
least disgusted was the G.O.C., who took the view that the failure to concentrate the
Division near Brest in accordance with his earlier understanding was a serious error, and
that much equipment had been unnecessarily destroyed. His feelings were reflected in a
signal118 to National Defence Headquarters:
McNaughton specially emphasizes that no Canadian unit fell back until ordered so to do by
competent military authority and that all repeat all equipment was brought back to Brest. The subsequent
destruction was effected under direct orders given by British authorities at the port.
Again, the best commentary on the Canadian share in these abortive operations is
contained in an exchange of personal letters.119 General Sir John Dill had now become
Chief of the Imperial General Staff. On 21 June he wrote to General McNaughton:
My dear Andy,
I cannot tell you how much I regret all the disappointments you have had. It was with many
misgivings that I saw you start for France, and yet while there was a hope that the French Army might
still succeed we felt that they ought to have the best the Empire could give. I do hope that you won’t
think that it was wrong of us. Then when it was quite clear that the French Army was ceasing to offer
any effective resistance we came to the conclusion that it would be a crime to let you enter the cauldron.
Even you and the Canadian Division could not have saved the situation.
BLANK PAGE
It is all rather a sorry tale but I am sure in the circumstances you will realize what our difficulties
were and will forgive us for all the inconvenience you have been caused.
Yours ever
Jack Dill.
On 29 June McNaughton replied, in terms which reflect both his dissatisfaction with
what had happened and the manner in which his eye was now fixed upon the tasks and
perils of the immediate future:
. . . As regards our last essay to go to the help of France, the considerations in my mind at the time this
operation was ordered from the War Office were the same as expressed in your note, namely that it was
imperative that we should go. I was under no illusion as to the probable result but I was content that we
should be used for that purpose provided we were given a chance to concentrate before going into battle
and this, I was assured by Brooke would be arranged.
When the order for reversal was given, I was at Plymouth preparatory to sailing with our 1st
Brigade Group ahead ... I then thought that our troops who had landed were close in to Brest and it was
not until the next morning that I learned that Movement Control in France had ordered the road and rail
parties forward apparently, as they arrived, to the Le Mans area .. .
Meanwhile we secured information, one way and another that all our units in the forward area had
been reversed on Brest and in point of fact they all reached there complete with transport and guns less
one 25-pr (damaged en route forward and handed in to Ordnance) and the rail parties of the
Headquarters of I Inf Bde and 48 Highrs which came back via St. Malo due to a mix-up in R.T.O.
orders.
Eventually, as you know our men saved all our guns and some other supplies as well . . . , but we
lost all our own transport which is very bitter medicine. However, we may well he thankful, as we are,
to Providence, that all except a score of our men got back.
We are now squarely set for what I have long thought was the important task, the defence of those
islands. Two out of three of our Brigade Groups and our reserve of Artillery, Engineers, Machine Gun
Battalions, etc.. all on wheels, are poised to go in any direction and you and the C.-in-C. can count on a
quick moving, hard hitting, determined force which will be prompt to execute your orders.
There are many lessons to be learned from our experience and sometime I hope we may go over them
together but, meanwhile, we have other work to do and you can be sure that we stand with you with all
our hearts.
The Invasion Summer
The last desperate attempt to keep France in the war had failed. On 22 June the
Franco-German armistice was signed, and Hitler now controlled the northern and western
coasts of France. The south-eastern part of the country remained unoccupied for the
moment, and was ruled by Marshal Petain's Government from Vichy; but the Germans
could take over this remnant at any moment. The United States, though shaken, was still
neutral. Britain and the Commonwealth were alone.
The situation seemed desperate, and many of Britain's friends abroad thought at this
moment that she too would. soon be compelled to capitulate. These gloomy
prognostications were not justified by the event. Under the inspired leadership of
Winston Churchill, the British people were
experiencing a national revival which compares with anything in their history.

Tremendous efforts were made to reorganize the Dunkirk divisions and to place the rest
of the army in condition to fight. A new citizen force, the Home Guard, sprang into
existence to meet the threat of battalions dropped from the skies or landed on the
beaches; and in the factories, from one end of the country to the other, the workers of
Britain bent their backs, seven days a week, to the task of replacing the arms and
equipment lost in France and providing those needed for vast new armies.
So far as the Army was concerned, it might have seemed that the situation on the day
of the Franco-German armistice could not have been much worse. Equipment-or rather,
lack of equipment-was the crux of it. The forces in the United Kingdom were "almost
unarmed except for rifles"-and there was, indeed, a serious shortage even of them. "There
were . . . hardly five hundred field guns of any sort and hardly two hundred medium or
heavy tanks in the whole country".120 It would be long before British factories could
replace even the material left in France. Canadian industrial capacity, of which the British
Government had been unwilling to make large use before Dunkirk, suddenly became
important in British eyes;* but many months-even years-would have to pass before the
orders for equipment now belatedly placed could produce results. Canada, we have seen,
was ready to send what help she could from her reserve stores, but because her pre-war
forces and preparations had been so small, she had little to send. Thanks to their low state
of preparedness, indeed, "None of the British Dominions", as Sir Winston Churchill
bluntly phrases it, "could send decisive aid".121 The United States had large reserves, and
in the new state of mind which the crisis in Europe had produced the American
government and people were quite willing to send these to Britain; but getting them there
took time.
On 18 June, by which date nearly all British troops had been evacuated from France,
there were in Great Britain and Northern Ireland a total of 28 field divisions plus 15
independent brigades of various sorts.122 These rather imposing figures, however, give a
misleading impression. Almost all of the divisions were either recovering from Dunkirk or
still incompletely trained; and almost all were without heavy equipment. Of the British
divisions, the most advanced were the 3rd, which as already noted had been re-equipped
with a view to being sent back to France, and the 43rd; but even these cannot have been in
very efficient condition. The strength of the 3rd on 6 June, following its return from
Dunkirk, had been recorded as only 4500 men; and the 43rd was reported, at the same
period, as "rather
*"At the outset, Britain appeared to believe that there would be time to build her own munitions industry, without
calling on North America in a large way. Within the last few weeks, Britain has been asking Canada for practically
anything that can be supplied in the way of munitions and war materials." (Mr. C. D. Howe in the Canadian House of
Commons, 30 July 1940.)
backward" in training and equipment.123 The 52nd (Lowland) Division, we have seen,
had got to France and had been withdrawn, but it had left a "considerable" part of its
transport behind it.124 It was accordingly not in condition to move and fight.
Under these conditions, the 1st Canadian Division was a most important factor in the
calculations of the War Office. In point of both training and equipment-even though its
training was not complete, and one of its three brigade groups was immobilized by the
loss of its transport in France-it was the strongest element in a very weak fabric, and one
of the very few divisions which could be considered fit for a task of mobile counter-
attack. The "Second B.E.F." was hardly back in England, accordingly, before the
Canadians were returned to the G.H.Q. Reserve role which they had occupied before the
forlorn hope. "Canadian Force" came back into existence, and the organization in brigade
and battalion groups, adopted at the time of the move to Northampton, was revived.125 It
was now imitated by the other divisions in Home Forces.126
As a result of discussions on 18 and 19 June, it was decided that Canadian Force
should move to the vicinity of Oxford (the area suggested by General McNaughton some
weeks before), where it would be "more centrally located for G.H.Q. Reserve" than at
Aldershot.127 The move began on 23 June, one group moving each day.128 As before, a
Reserve Group had been formed from the machine-gun battalions and the ancillary
artillery units. The 1st Brigade, unable to move, remained at Aldershot waiting hopefully
for new vehicles to replace those destroyed in France. It did not rejoin the Division until
16 July.129
On 25 June, General McNaughton reviewed the situation and the Canadian
dispositions in a conference at his advanced headquarters at Shotover House outside
Oxford. Some portions of the record130 should be quoted.
The G.O.C. stated that we are a mobile reserve with a 360 degree front; and may have to operate
anywhere in Great Britain from the South coast, to Scotland, or in Wales. We carry, together with the 4
Corps under Lieutenant-General Nosworthy a serious responsibility. The Cdn Force and two Tk Bns of
the 4 Corps with some Lt Armd Units comprise the only mobile force immediately available in Great
Britain. These will be reinforced shortly by the 43 Div ...
The G.O.C.... stated that, after discussion with various commanders he was of the opinion that it
would be approximately ten days before the general situation regarding reserves improves. There are
large numbers of troops in Great Britain but these are not yet organized in the reconstituted divisions.
The degree of re-equipment is lamentably small . . .
McNaughton said that for training purposes it would be assumed that the enemy's attack
plan would comprise, first, a main seaborne landing in the area of the Wash, with minor
diversionary landings to the north and south, and an airborne landing in the Isle of Ely
area; and secondly, a major airborne attack in the rear of the east coast defences. This
latter
would be assumed as taking place in the area Birmingham-WolverhamptonShrewsbury-

Ludlow. The role of Canadian Force would be to deal with this main airborne landing in
the first instance and then move to the support of the troops on the coast opposing the
seaborne landings.
Like the stay at Northampton, that in the Oxford area proved very short. On 26 June
Lieut.-General Paget, Chief of the General Staff at G.H.Q. Home Forces, told
McNaughton that the plans for the defence of the United Kingdom, and the Canadian role
in them, had been somewhat revised. The intention now was to have north of the Thames
one mobile Corps under Lieut.-General F. P. Nosworthy, to consist of the 2nd Armoured
and 43rd Divisions. The mobile reserve south of the Thames was to consist of the 1st
Armoured Division and the 1st Canadian Division, and Paget said the C.-in-C. Home
Forces desired that General McNaughton should command this Corps.131 Further
discussions on this project followed, the proposed new Corps being sometimes referred to
during them as a "Canadian Corps". While a more permanent arrangement was being
worked out, it was provided temporarily that the Canadian and 1st Armoured Divisions'
training would be coordinated, and that General McNaughton would take the Armoured
Division under his operational command "as soon as the flag falls".132 This was not a
satisfactory arrangement, for only a fully organized Corps with its own staff and
communications could meet the needs adequately. On 7 July, accordingly, the C.-in-C.
Home Forces formally asked the War Office for authority to form a new Corps
headquarters.133 The Corps (to be called the 7th) would consist of the 1st Armoured and
1st Canadian Divisions, the "New Zealand Force"—two infantry brigades with some
artillery, lately arrived in the United Kingdom—and selected ancillary troops. Home
Forces stated that the C.-in-C. wished to utilize the services of Major-General
McNaughton as commander, with the rank of Lieutenant General; "the staff to be
selected both from Canadian and British resources".
The War Office concurring, the Canadian Government's views were requested, and
on 11 July the Cabinet War Committee agreed to the United Kingdom suggestion. The
7th Corps came into existence on 21 July, its headquarters being located at Headley Court
near Leatherhead, Surreya mansion which was long to be associated with the senior
Canadian headquarters in the United Kingdom. Brigadier G. R. Pearkes, V.C., was
promoted to the rank of Major General and succeeded General McNaughton as G.O.C.
1st Canadian Division.134
The Corps staff, as already indicated, was composed partly of British, partly of
Canadian officers. The Operations section was entirely British and was headed by
Brigadier M. C. Dempsey—later to command the Second Army in the campaign in
North-West Europe—as Brigadier General Staff (Operations). Colonel G. R. Turner, who
had been G.S.O.1 of the 1st Division, became Brigadier General Staff (Staff Duties), an
appointment subsequently redesignated Brigadier General Staff (Canadian); he handled
questions of organization, particularly those of the Canadian part of the Corps. The senior
administrative staff officer (the Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General) was also a
British Army officer, Brigadier C. A. P. Murison, who was however a Canadian by birth.
The Chief Engineer (Brigadier C. S. L. Hertzberg), the Chief Signal Officer (Colonel J.
E. Genet) and the Commander Corps Royal Artillery (Brigadier J. C. Stewart) were all
Canadians, who had held the equivalent appointments in the 1st Division.135
In accordance with their altered role of G.H.Q. Reserve south of the Thames, the
Canadian brigade groups had been transferred from the Oxford area to a new position of
readiness in Surrey, south of London. They began moving on 2 July and were soon
established in an area which may be roughly defined as extending from Guildford on the
west to Westerham, just over the Kent border, in the east.136 This is the pleasant region
of the North Downs, and the 1st Division were not sorry to have said a final good-bye to
the Aldershot barracks, which were now available for occupation by the 2nd Division on
its arrival from Canada. During the later summer months of 1940, while the shadow of
impending invasion lay darkly across England, the formations of the 7th Corps, as we
have already seen, were training busily to meet the attack. At the same time,
reconnaissance trips were made over the routes the Corps might have to cover in its
mobile counter-attack role, and Canadian officers, and not least the Corps Commander,
were active in giving advice and assistance in preparing defences on the various "stop
lines" designed to delay an enemy attempting to push inland from the beaches.137
We have space for only a few examples of the special tasks carried out by Canadian
units at this period. Canadian Engineers constructed a model strongpoint in the village of
Sarre, on the River Stour in Kent, during July and August.138 Other sappers were
employed in strengthening the old fortifications of Chatham, building new defences in
the Dover area, and constructing anti-tank obstacles on the "G.H.Q. Line"* along the
North Downs.140 Some very rapid roadmaking was done, notably the improvisation of a
by-pass at Redhill to eliminate a bad bottleneck on the routes forward to Dover and
Brighton.141 One artillery project may be mentioned. Early in September General
McNaughton, at the request of G.H.Q. Home Forces, organized two temporary units
(known as "X" and "Y" Super-Heavy Batteries) to man four 9.2-inch guns on railway
mountings for the defence of the Strait of Dover. After the worst invasion crisis was over,
these units were disbanded and the guns taken over by British artillerymen.142
Important changes in organization and equipment were in progress. The lessons of
the disastrous campaign in France had been analyzed by a War
*Work on this line was stopped in August in favour of developing the defences farther forward.139
Office committee headed by General Sir William Bartholomew. Not all its
recommendations need be quoted here, but among the needs emphasized were a more
effective reconnaissance organization and more anti-aircraft guns in forward areas. This
report was complete in draft by the end of July.143 By this time the Canadian authorities
had already taken independent action on the question of reconnaissance units. On General
McNaughton's advice, N.D.H.Q. authorized forming for each infantry brigade a
reconnaissance squadron designed to cover the front and flanks of mobile columns
operating across the English countryside. The squadrons were equipped, as an interim
measure, with three-man motorcycle combinations mounting Bren guns.144 At a later
stage, they were amalgamated into divisional reconnaissance battalions (subsequently
termed regiments) in accordance with British organization. In the Canadian Army,
however, such units were incorporated in the Armoured Corps, whereas in the British
service they formed a distinct Reconnaissance Corps.
As a result of the Bartholomew report, a light anti-aircraft regiment of 48 Bofors
guns was added to the organization of British infantry divisions. Canada followed suit,
but for a long time the change was purely theoretical, simply because there was no
equipment. The Canadians had no anti-aircraft artillery of their own during the Battle of
Britain. On 20 August General McNaughton spoke of their "absolute lack" of light A.A.
guns.145 "We are dependent entirely on small arms fire for local protection against
hostile aircraft," he wrote, "and already casualties are being experienced". (During
August, in fact, at least three Canadian units claimed to have destroyed German aircraft
with machine-gun fire-No. 1 Tunnelling Company and the 1st Pioneer Battalion R.C.E.,
and the 48th Highlanders of Canada.)146 Although the organization of anti-aircraft units
was pushed as rapidly as the equipment situation permitted, and many Canadian batteries
manned Air Defence of Great Britain gunsites during 1941, the first Canadian light anti-
aircraft regiment did not actually join the order of battle of the Canadian Corps until
February 1942.147
The Storm That Did Not Burst
Throughout the summer British intelligence and operations staffs were making
appreciations of probable German intentions and developing plans for countering them with
such means as they had. In the beginning Mr. Churchill and his military advisers took the
view that the main danger was to the east coast.* No great mass of shipping or of small
craft had as
*Professional opinion, naturally, was not unanimous. Lieut.-General Sir Guy Williams, G.O.C.-in-C. Eastern
Command, said on 18 June that the south coast was the most likely place for enemy landings.148
yet appeared in the French ports. On 10 July the British Prime Minister observed that he
found it hard to believe that the south coast was in serious peril at that time. He wrote:
"The main danger is from the Dutch and German harbours, which bear principally upon
the coast from Dover to the Wash". The Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with
him, although the actual distribution of troops reflected a somewhat heavier concentration
towards the south coast than his assessment might have indicated.149
Early in August, however, the intelligence picture began to change. Air
reconnaissance revealed a heavier movement of self-propelled barges and other vessels
through the Strait of Dover into the French Channel ports. Other signs of preparation for
a cross-Channel attack accumulated, one being the multiplication of long-range coastal
batteries. As a result, the British dispositions were revised, the number of divisions in the
coastal area north of the Thames being reduced while that on the south coast from Dover
westward was correspondingly increased. The two mobile reserve Corps, the 4th and 7th,
could of course be employed at fairly short notice in either sector.150
Simultaneously with the increased activity in the French ports came the beginning of
the German air offensive which produced what has come to be known as the Battle of
Britain.* This, it seemed clear, was designed to clear the way for the invasion. It was
"scheduled to begin on approximately August 5";152 the date was later fixed as the 10th.
An R.A.F. historian considers that the battle proper actually started on I2 August, when
the Germans began a systematic assault on British coastal airfields and radar stations. Six
days later, the attack was switched to the inland fighter aerodromes of south-eastern
England; it was obvious that the enemy was determined to shoot the R.A.F. Fighter
Command out of the air or destroy it on the ground. He failed. In the tremendous air
battles fought in the clear skies over Kent during these brilliant summer days, the
Germans sustained a series of great defeats.153 Their losses, it is true, were not so large as
the British thought at the time; but they were much heavier than the R.A.F.'s. During the
whole period from 10 July to 31 October, the enemy, according to his records, lost 1733
aircraft destroyed,† whereas the R.A.F. lost 915 fighters.154 And while Fighter Command
battled him over the southern counties, Bomber Command was attending to the barge
concentrations in the French Channel ports. There is reason to believe
*The first bombs on the mainland of Britain had been dropped on 9 May. The first Canadian casualties by bombing
were suffered by No. 2 Army Field Workshop R.C.O.C. at Aldershot on 6 July, three soldiers being killed and one officer
and 28 other ranks injured.151
†The original British estimate was 2692. The Germans at the time admitted the loss of only 896. (The 10th of July is
the date assigned by Air Chief Marshal Dowding for the beginning of the Battle of Britain. There was heavy air fighting in
the Channel area from that time on.)
that the damage done by these attacks did much to discourage the German strategists.155
In their "position of readiness" in Surrey the Canadian battalions waited, watching
the vapour-trails in the sky that marked the progress of the battle, and themselves
expecting the call to action at any moment. During August reports poured in of increasing
preparations visible across the Channel. On the 31st, a 7th Corps Intelligence
Commentary reported "an advanced stage of land-preparedness for an expedition" and
suggested that, while it was unlikely that invasion would be tried until air superiority had
been achieved, the enemy might make the attempt during the first half of September.156
And on the lovely afternoon of Saturday 7 September the German offensive entered a
new phase. A great force of bombers and fighters fought its way up the Thames and made
a most damaging daylight attack on London—the heaviest such attack the city suffered
during the war. Tremendous fires were started along the river, and through the night
relays of bombers, guided by the conflagration, continued to pound the capital.
By this time, it appeared that German preparations for invasion were so advanced
that the attack might come at any moment, and the British Chiefs of Staff on this same 7
September agreed that the defending forces should now "stand by at immediate notice".
As no arrangement had been made for an intermediate state of readiness, G.H.Q. Home
Forces at 8 p.m. sent out to Eastern and Southern Commands the code word "Cromwell",
signifying "invasion imminent". It went also to formations in the London area and to the
4th and 7th Corps. The coastal divisions went to action stations. That night and for days
to come the Canadians, and in fact everyone in Britain, waited in excited suspense. In
some places Home Guard commanders called out their men by ringing the church bells,
and this produced stories that enemy parachutists were landing.157 There was, indeed, a
spate of alarms and rumours throughout the land. On 8 September the 7th Corps was
placed on four hours' notice* to move.158
Three days later Mr. Churchill told the country frankly159 of the German preparations
for "a heavy, full-scale invasion of this island". He said:
If this invasion is going to be tried at all, it does not seem that it can be long delayed. The weather
may break at any time....
Therefore, we must regard the next week or so as a very important period in our history. It ranks
with the days when the Spanish Armada was approaching the Channel, and Drake was finishing his
game of bowls; or when Nelson stood between us and Napoleon's Grand Army at Boulogne. We have
read all about this in the history books; but what is happening now is on a far greater scale and of far
more consequence to the life and future of the world and its civilization than these brave old days of the
past.
Every man and woman will therefore prepare himself to do his duty, whatever it may be, with
special pride and care . . .
*This situation lasted until 19 September, when the Corps reverted to eight hours' notice. There was another short
spell of four hours' notice on 22-23 September. The termination of this may be said to represent the end of the crisis.
The pride and care were not lacking; but the invasion did not come. On 15 September the
German Air Force made another great effort, and suffered another great reverse. The
R.A.F. was still alive and kicking. It soon became apparent to the watchers in Whitehall
that the immediate crisis was over. There were several days of bad weather; then, on 20
September, came news that German shipping was moving away from the Channel.160
Thereafter, indications that the invasion scheme had been called off for the moment
gradually multiplied.
We now have available a great mass of evidence from the enemy's side concerning
his plans at this period. Much of the essence of this has already been published,161 and
there is no point in attempting more than a brief summary here.
It is clear that the prospect of a seaborne invasion of Britain was not altogether
pleasant in Hitler's eyes. It is significant that his directives for the offensive against
France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940 make no reference to the possibility
of this being followed by such an invasion; on the contrary, emphasis is laid upon the
seizure of the French Channel coast in order to obtain bases for an offensive to be waged
against the United Kingdom with submarines, mines and aircraft.162 Although the
documents afford no sure guidance on this point, certain references in them combine with
the evidence of senior German officers to indicate that Hitler counted upon being able to
frighten Britain into making an accommodation with him without proceeding to the
desperate measure of invasion. This indeed is strongly indicated in the opening passage
of the belated directive issued by the Fuhrer on 16 July for the planning of the invasion
(Operation "Sea Lion") : "Since England, in spite of her militarily hopeless situation,
shows no signs of coming to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against
England and, if necessary, to carry it out."163 German officers have asserted that at the
headquarters of Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, who was to command the enterprise, it was
never taken very seriously;164 and it seems a fair assumption that Hitler hoped and
expected that the weight of his air assault, combined with Britain's isolation, would be
sufficient to produce the result which he desired.
The German military plan when made envisaged an attack on England in that area
which was the primary counter-attack responsibility of General McNaughton's Corps.
The original idea was to land two armies (25 divisions) in the first instance, on the south
coast between Margate and Portsmouth; the initial bridgeheads being established between
Folkestone and Worthing. Thereafter the Germans counted on advancing northward and
establishing themselves on the line of the North Downs as a base for further operations.
There was a tentative proposal to put in a third army subsequently, on the coast about
Lyme Regis. No attempt was made to plan the later phases, for the Germans assumed that
the decisive encounter would take place before
the North Downs were reached, and later events would depend upon its outcome.
Subsequently, as a result of pressure from the German navy, the plan was altered to
provide for a smaller force and a narrower front (between Folkestone and Brighton), with
an airborne landing on the North Downs north-west of Folkestone. The new version was
evidently not to be put into practice except as a sequel to a complete victory in the air.
The scheme had raised serious controversies between the German generals and
admirals, for the latter, with very inadequate forces at their disposal, viewed it with well-
founded misgivings, and the former knew little of amphibious operations. Hitler showed
himself most reluctant to make firm decisions. Only on 3 September was D Day for the
operation finally fixed -at 21 September. A week before the latter date arrived, however,
a decision was taken not to attack on that day, but to continue preparations. On 17
September Hitler postponed the operation indefinitely;* and on 12 October a formal
directive advised that it would not take place before the spring.165
The Canadian Corps
When September passed without bringing the expected invasion, there was a growing
sense of anti-climax among the Canadians in England. Once again their expectations of
action had been disappointed, and the reversion to the dull routine of individual training
underlined the frustration.
The monotony of the winter was somewhat relieved by an arrangement by which the
Canadian infantry brigade groups in succession undertook, for three-week periods, the
guarding of a coastal sector in Sussex. The sector selected was that from Shoreham on the
west to Peacehaven on the east, including the city of Brighton.166 The 3rd Brigade took
over here late in October and was followed by the other brigades of the 1st Division and,
in due course, by the 4th and 5th Brigades of the 2nd Division.167 But, contrary to the
Canadians' hopes, the enemy attempted no enterprises. All was quiet on the Channel
coast that winter.
Something has already been said of the concentration of the 2nd Canadian Division
in the United Kingdom.† After the arrival of the Sixth Flight of Canadian troops in the
first week of September 1940, five of the Division's nine infantry, battalions were
available. From the beginning, arrangements were made for using its units already
present, in emergency, in a defensive
*"The enemy Air Force is still by no means defeated; on the contrary it shows increasing activity.... The weather
situation as a whole does not permit us to expect . . . calm weather lasting several days . .. . The Fuhrer therefore decides to
postpone 'Sea Lion' indefinitely." (German Naval Staff War Diary, 17 September.)
†Above, Chap. Ill.
role in the Aldershot Command;168 but on 7 September plans were laid for two brigade
groups of the 2nd Division to move from Aldershot in event of invasion, to the support of
the 7th Corps.169 They served to replace the New Zealand brigades, which had just
moved into Kent and passed under the command of the 12th Corps.170
Once the invasion menace had been lifted for the moment, and the 2nd Division was
complete in the United Kingdom, it was practicable to dissolve the Anglo-Canadian 7th
Corps and substitute a Canadian Corps. This, as we have seen, was done on Christmas
Day. The Canadian Corps inherited the 7th's G.H.Q. Reserve role,171 but the 1st
Armoured Division passed from under its command on 1 January 1941.172 For a time
certain British staff officers remained at Corps Headquarters, and certain British units
remained on the Corps Order of Battle; but both were replaced from Canadian sources as
this became practicable. As the spring of 1941 approached, and renewed apprehension of
invasion grew, the Canadian Corps was training actively for the battle that might lie
ahead.
CHAPTER X
TASKS AND OPERATIONS, 1941-1942

(See Map 5 and Sketches 1 and 2)
The Situation at the Beginning of 1941
T HE advent of 1941 found the British Commonwealth still confronting Germany and
Italy alone. The United States, Russia and Japans remained neutral, though all three
of these great powers were to enter the war before the year was over. The only major
active land theatre of war was that in North Africa, where in February the Germans began
to intervene to support their Italian allies who had been so sorely smitten by General
Wavell.
The winter's respite had enabled the armies in Britain to make good many of the
equipment deficiencies that had existed after Dunkirk, and the country was now in far
better condition than during the previous summer to resist an invasion. It was clear that a
spring offensive by the Germans was to be expected, and it was quite possible that it
would take the form of an attempt to cross the Channel. Throughout the winter the
German bombing attacks upon the United Kingdom had continued with varying intensity.
The Canadians in Britain shared the experience of the British people, and suffered some
casualties at the hands of the Luftwaffe. For a time, Canadian Military Headquarters,
London, was more directly under attack than any other part of the force: a situation which
impressed veterans of the last war as a strange and not wholly unwelcome reversal of the
course of nature. The months of April and May 1941 witnessed the heaviest individual
attacks on London; but the damaging raid of 10 May proved to be the end of this phase.*
The anticipated German offensive materialized in April in the form of an attack upon
Yugoslavia and Greece; both countries were rapidly overrun,
*The Canadian Army's heaviest losses in any single attack were those in the great raid on the night of 16-17 April,
which caused 22 fatal casualties. The R.C.N. had one fatal casualty and the R.C.A.F. two in the same raid. It may be noted
here that the Army's total casualties by enemy action in the United Kingdom throughout the war (including those caused by
bombs, V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rockets) amounted to 420 all ranks. Fatal casualties numbered eight officers and 112
other ranks.1 Some additional details will be found in The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1944 ("The Canadian Army at
War", No. 1: 2nd edition, Ottawa, 1946).
296
TASKS AND OPERATIONS, 1941-1942 297
and in May the Germans delivered an airborne attack against the small and ill-equipped
garrison of Crete, which was shortly forced to give up the island. But the enemy's great
operation of the year had not yet begun. On 18 December 1940 Hitler had issued his first
directive2 for an attack on Soviet Russia; on 22 June he launched his forces upon that
enterprise, which was to prove a main contributor to his own ruin. The tremendous
campaign thus begun altered the aspect of affairs along the Channel. A German invasion
of Britain was still possible, but as long as Russia continued to contain great German
forces it was much less probable than before. (The British Chiefs of Staff recognized this
fact in July and offered to send large reinforcements of tanks to the Middle East.)3 So far
the Canadian force in the United Kingdom had had a sense of being engaged in an
important mission-securing the citadel of freedom against imminent peril. Now this sense
was greatly lessened, and the force's future employment became a question for
discussion, both official and popular. Nevertheless, the Canadian formations still had a
very long period of garrison duty before them.
The Corps Moves Into Sussex
Through the greater part of 1941 the Canadian Corps retained its role of G.H.Q.
Reserve. In the autumn, however, it relinquished the task of mobile counter-attack and
moved into a static position on the Sussex coast.
This move seems to have been first suggested by the C.-in-C. Home Forces, General
Sir Alan Brooke, in a conversation with General McNaughton on 28 March. Brooke
remarked that the Canadian force was growing so large that soon it would no longer be
sound to keep it in G.H.Q. Reserve. McNaughton said he was prepared to cooperate, but
expressed the hope "that in assuming the role of a static Corps, the claims of the
Canadian Forces to form the spearhead of any offensive would not be forgotten."4 The
transfer was not carried out until the "invasion season" was over, that is, until the autumn
was well advanced. In the meantime, however, the 2nd Canadian Division anticipated the
general move by exchanging positions during July and part of August with the 55th
British Division, which had been holding the beach defences in East Sussex. During this
period the 55th Division was in Aldershot under the operational control of the Canadian
Corps; the 2nd Division was under the operational control of the 4th Corps which was
responsible for the Sussex coast.5
The movement of the Canadian Corps as a whole began in October,
when the 2nd Division returned to the coastal sector; it remained under the 4th Corps
until 17 November, when the Canadian Corps opened its headquarters in Sussex and took
over the 4th Corps area. The Canadian move
was completed only in December, when the 3rd Canadian Division moved into Sussex
from Aldershot and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade also moved over from its
former stations in the Hindhead area.6 The new situation brought the Corps into even
closer relations than before with the British Army and the British people. It now had
under its command the British artillery and other units manning the fixed defences of the
Sussex coast.7 It was also brought into intimate and friendly contact with the Sussex
Home Guard. A special British element was set up at Corps Headquarters to look after
these new responsibilities.
As soon as the Corps moved into Sussex it began a drastic overhaul of the defence
arrangements for the area. Its new role brought it under the operational direction of the
G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command, a new command, organized in February 1941,8
which included the portion of England south of London and the Thames and as far west
as the Hampshire border. This command was taken over, shortly after the Corps came
under its direction,9 by Lieut.-General B. L. Montgomery. This was part of a general
change in senior British military appointments, under which Sir Alan Brooke became
Chief of the Imperial General Staff in succession to Sir John Dill, and Lieut.-General Sir
Bernard Paget, formerly at South Eastern Command, succeeded Brooke at G.H.Q. Home
Forces. Montgomery's dynamic touch, felt throughout the Canadian Corps District from
the beginning, was reflected in the new defence plans.
Montgomery sought to impress upon all under his command the importance of
"offensive mentality".10 The plans accordingly were labelled, not "Plans for the Defence
of Sussex", but "Canadian Corps Plans to Defeat Invasion".11 The scheme, developed
during the winter under the direction of Lieut.-General H. D. G. Crerar, who took
command of the Corps on 23 December, provided in detail for the security of the Corps
area, which extended from the Hampshire border, just short of Portsmouth, on the right,
to Fairlight Church, a couple of miles east of Hastings, on the left. It was assumed that a
combined seaborne and airborne invasion was probable, and emphasis was laid upon
providing against seizure of the South Downs by enemy airborne forces. This line of
noble hills, lying close behind the beach defences held by the Corps, was the chief
topographical feature (and one of the greatest charms) of Crerar's area of responsibility.
The plans so carefully elaborated were never tested in action. Far from attempting
invasion, the enemy at no time directed even the smallest seaborne or airborne raid against
the coasts of England. It was the Canadians' fate to spend many months guarding against a
menace which, however real, never materialized in action. The Corps held the Sussex coast
for a year
and a half without firing any shot in anger except at enemy aircraft.* On 3 June 1943, at
long last, its operational responsibilities, which of late had been largely limited to
precautions against raids, were handed over to a British formation, the Sussex District.12
Sappers at Gibraltar
Only two enterprises took Canadian troops out of the United Kingdom during 1941.
One was a task connected with improving the defences of Gibraltar, the other an
expedition to the Arctic archipelago of Spitsbergen. Neither brought contact with the
enemy.
The entrance of Italy into the war in June 1940 greatly increased the importance of
Gibraltar and called attention to the fact that its defences had of late been very largely
neglected. Work started at once with a view both to immediate improvement of the
defences and to providing on a long-term basis bombproof accommodation which would
enable the garrison to withstand a siege of almost any length. On 23 October 1940 the
Secretary of State for the Dominions wrote to the Canadian High Commissioner in
London asking that part of No. 1 Tunnelling Company R.C.E., then in England, might be
sent to work at Gibraltar.13 Consideration was asked "as a matter of urgency" and the
Canadian authorities acted accordingly. On 24 October the Cabinet War Committee in
Ottawa gave its approval, subject to General McNaughton's concurrence. Accordingly, a
"Special Detachment" of No. 1 Tunnelling Company, 100 strong and equipped with
diamond drills, disembarked at the Rock on 26 November and was soon at work.14 In
December the War Office asked for more Canadian tunnellers for Gibraltar. McNaughton
took the view that these should be provided by organizing a second tunnelling company,
rather than by sending the remainder of No. 1 and thus depriving the Canadian force in
England of all such special engineer assistance. This course was followed. No. 2
Tunnelling Company was formed in the United Kingdom and arrived at Gibraltar on 10
March 1941. It absorbed about half of the Special Detachment of No. 1, the remainder
returning to England.15
*The "blitz" of 1940-41 was over before Canadian anti-aircraft artillery units were organized (above, pages 242 and
290). By the time when enemy attacks were resumed on a limited scale early in 1944, the Canadian A.A. regiments still in
the United Kingdom had been withdrawn from the Air Defence of Great Britain and were preparing for their task across
the Channel. Since attacks during the interim period were small and sporadic, Canadian units gained official credit for only
16 successful- engagements, the enemy aircraft being awarded as destroyed in eight. Some of these successes were shared
with British units or between Canadian ones. In three cases, Canadian units other than artillery were given credit. There
were probably some additional actual successes not officially recognized; in a few instances it is likely that no formal claim
was made. The three cases mentioned on page 290 do not appear in the official list, nor do some others of 1940.
No. 2 Tunnelling Company remained at Gibraltar until December 1942.16 In

addition, a second Special Detachment of No. 1 Company was sent out in January 1942.17
This Detachment worked on the new aerodrome which had been created since 1940 on
the site of the garrison racecourse on the North Front, its task being to provide "fill" for
extending the runway into the Bay of Algeciras. This was done by bringing down the
screes on the face of the Rock, first by diamond drilling and blasting, subsequently by
hydraulic methods.18 The aerodrome was a vital project; without it, the Allied invasion
of French North Africa, launched in November 1942, might not have been practicable.
The major tasks of No. 2 Tunnelling Company itself were the excavation in the heart
of the Rock of a bombproof hospital ("Gort's Hospital") and a "through east and west
tunnel providing direct covered access to the east side of the rock (Harley Street)".19
This tunnel had side chambers for the hospital laundry, etc. The Canadians also worked
on the more southerly of two large new magazines, and carried out a great variety of
lesser tasks. During its stay at the fortress the Company "mined and removed
approximately 140,000 tons of solid rock".20 The Canadians shared the work at Gibraltar
with three British tunnelling companies. The Rock under wartime conditions, with the
greater part of the civilian population evacuated, was a confined and tiresome station. It
grew increasingly unpopular with the Canadian sappers, and they were delighted when it
bcame possible to return them to England late in 1942. But they derived great satisfaction
from kind words21 spoken on 1 December by the Governor, Lieut.-General F. N. Mason-
MacFarlane:
On behalf of all of us I want to wish Godspeed and good luck to our Canadian Tunnellers, who are
leaving us very shortly. They are the only Dominion troops we have had on the Rock, and like all our
tunnelling units they have carved out a monument for themselves which will stand as long as the Rock
remains. They have done a great job of work and we wish them all good fortune and good sound rock
wherever they may go.
Financial arrangements covering the Canadian tunnellers' service at the fortress

produced a tiresome controversy. Since the matter was represented as so urgent, a
specific Anglo-Canadian agreement was not made before the first detachment was sent.
The Canadian authorities later proposed that Canada pay all costs except those of any
local medical arrangements and of transportation to Gibraltar; they also assumed that
expendable stores and pneumatic equipment would be supplied by and chargeable to the
United Kingdom. The War Office, however, was inclined to accept only the
responsibility for pneumatic equipment. The cost of transportation was a bane of
contention for some time. The Canadians took the view that since the Detachment had
been removed from its normal duties, at the request of the United Kingdom Government,
to carry out special work under
War Office control, its transportation to Gibraltar was properly a British responsibility.
The War Office finally agreed, specifying however that this was not to be a precedent.
When the question of sending the second Special Detachment of No. 1 Tunnelling
Company arose late in 1941, the Canadian authorities suggested a clear definition of
financial arrangements, on the basis of Canada's taking responsibility for all charges that
would normally have been incurred had the Detachment remained with the Canadian
forces in the United Kingdom, while the British Government would accept
responsibilities for all additional charges, including transportation to and from Gibraltar.
The War Office accepted these proposals without demur.22
The Expedition to Spitsbergen
The Spitsbergen expedition undertaken in the summer of 1941 was a minor

consequence of Russia's entrance into the war. This distant archipelago, lying only 600
miles from the North Pole, had been comparatively little affected by the conflict until this
took place. Although Spitsbergen is Norwegian territory, Russia had large economic
interests there, and about 2000 of the population of some 2800 were Russian miners.
Spitsbergen is a coal-producing area, and it seemed desirable to deny its coal to Germany.
It also possessed wireless stations which were providing German-controlled stations in
Norway with weather information. At the same time, the possibility of German
occupation of the islands constituted a threat to the convoy route from Britain over which
supplies for Russia were now to pass in such important quantities.
Canadian participation in an expedition to Spitsbergen was first suggested by the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff in a conversation with General McNaughton on 25
July, during which Sir John Dill "offered" McNaughton the operation, and McNaughton
"accepted" it. On 26 July representatives of both the Canadian Corps and C.M.H.Q.
attended a meeting on the subject at the War Office.23 The enterprise proposed at this
time was considerably more ambitious than that finally carried out. It was suggested that
Spitsbergen should be occupied by a force sufficient to protect a naval anchorage and
refuelling base which it was proposed to establish there. Mr. Churchill had signalled M.
Stalin on 20 July, advising him that Britain was sending forthwith "some cruisers and
destroyers to Spitzbergen, whence they will be able to raid enemy shipping in concert
with your naval forces".24 The occupying force was to be withdrawn at the end of four
months, before the winter freeze-up. The proposed Order of Battle for "111 Force", as it
was called, which was placed before the meeting on 26 July, comprised an infantry
brigade (less one battalion), without transport, plus certain attached units. The suggestion
was that the Canadian Corps should furnish the troops, except for some administrative
units and a light anti-aircraft battery.25
It was agreed that the Corps would provide the required units, and that they should be
the headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Brigade with its signal section; the 3rd Field
Company R.C.E.; Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and The Edmonton
Regiment;* and in addition two 50-bed field hospitals (to be provided from the 5th Field
Ambulance R.C.A.M.C.) and a detachment of a Field Cash Office, Royal Canadian Army
Pay Corps. Subsequently, early in August, the War Office decided to add a field battery
(eight 25-pounders) to the force originally proposed, and the one nominated was the 40th
Field Battery R.C.A., a sub-unit of the 11th Army Field Regiment.26
However, by this time doubts had begun to arise as to whether the expedition should take
place in the form proposed. On 30 July the British Chiefs of Staff Committee decided that
further information was necessary before definite orders were issued. In consequence, a
naval force operating in the area was ordered to make a reconnaissance of Spitsbergen.27
In the meantime, the arrangements already made were allowed to stand; the mobilization
of the Canadian units proceeded, and was complete by the time specified in the original
instructions (midnight 3-4 August).
On 6 August General McNaughton, accompanied by Brigadier A. E. Potts,
commander of the 2nd Brigade, and Brigadier ,J. C. Murchie, Brigadier General Staff,
C.M.H.Q., attended a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee at which the whole
question was discussed. The meeting was told that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home
Fleet was, "on balance", opposed to carrying out the original scheme, and that Rear-
Admiral Vian, the senior naval officer operating in the Spitsbergen area, had
recommended that it be abandoned. It was suggested that Vian's observations indicated
that he did not have a full appreciation of the object of the proposed expedition, and that a
further opinion should be sought from him. The Chiefs of Staff decided that the
expedition should not proceed until the Committee had heard further from Admiral Vian,
but that the troops should move to their embarkation port and get some combined
operations training pending a final decision.28 During 5 and 6 August, accordingly, the
Canadian units moved by rail from their stations in Surrey to Glasgow, where they
boarded the transport Empress of Canada, which took them to the Combined Training
Centre at Inveraray. Here some limited training (route marches, landings and boat work)
was carried out during the next few days.29
On 11 August Brigadier Potts attended a further conference at the War Office; and it
was indicated that if the expedition took place it would be on a
*The units which had been disappointed by the cancellation of the Norway project in 1940.
reduced scale. The object would be mainly to disable the coal-mines, and a much smaller
force than that first intended would be used.30 The matter was finally settled only on 16
August, when General McNaughton, accompanied by Murchie and Potts, again attended
a Chiefs of Staff meeting. It was agreed that the chief object was to ensure "that the
Germans get no advantage out of Spitsbergen between now and March, 1942". The
measures to be taken were thus defined:
The operation will include the following:—

(a) The landing of a force for the destruction where necessary (or the removal where applicable)
of:—
(i) Coal mining facilities.
Stocks of free coal.
Transit facilities between mines and wharves. Harbour facilities.
(ii) Wireless Stations.
(iii) Meteorological Stations wherever found.
(b) The repatriation of all Russians to Archangel.
(c) The removal to the United Kingdom of all Norwegians.
Directives for the naval and military commanders were agreed upon. They were informed
that "Russian and Norwegian civil representatives of standing", and a Norwegian officer
who had been nominated as Governor Designate of Spitsbergen, would accompany the
expedition to assist in dealings with the population.31
The greater part of the force at Inveraray had already returned to Surrey, much
disappointed. The total strength of the military force now left under Brigadier Potts'
command for the expedition was 46 officers and 599 other ranks. This included a
detachment of Norwegian infantry (3 officers and 22 other ranks) under Captain Aubert;
14 officers and 79 other ranks of the British Army, including 57 all ranks of the Royal
Engineers; and 29 officers and 498 other ranks of the Canadian Army. The units most
strongly represented were The Edmonton Regiment, whose detachment (one company
plus one platoon) was commanded by Major W. G. Bury, and the 3rd Field Company
R.C.E., commanded by Major Geoffrey Walsh. Also included now was a detachment of
84 all ranks of The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.), in addition to the brigade
headquarters with its Signals personnel and Medical and Pay detachments.32
In the early hours of 19 August Operation "Gauntlet" got under way. when the
Empress of Canada, carrying the reduced force on its adventurous mission, steamed out
of the Clyde. That evening she joined Admiral Vian's Force "A", consisting of the
cruisers Nigeria and Aurora and the destroyers Anthony, Antelope and Icarus. The
combined force went into Hvalfjord, Iceland, where it refuelled and Potts was able to
confer with Vian. It sailed again on the evening of 21 August, and the following night the
Canadian troops were told their destination for the first time.
On the evening of 24 August the squadron made rendezvous west of Spitsbergen with
the oiler Oligarch and her escorting trawlers. Next morning it approached Spitsbergen.
An aircraft reconnoitred the Isfjord (Ice Sound), the great inlet, leading into the interior of
the island of Vest Spitsbergen, on which the most important settlements lie. No enemy
activity was seen, and the ships closed in. At 4:30 a.m. Icarus landed a party of signallers
at the wireless station at Kap Linne at the mouth of the fjord; they were cordially received
by the Norwegian staff. The larger ships now steamed into the Isfjord and at 8:00 a.m.
they entered the arm of it called Gronfjord (Green Bay) and anchored off the Russian
mining village of Barentsburg. Brigadier Potts went ashore to discuss the proposed
evacuation with the local Russian authorities, while military parties occupied the other
Russian and Norwegian settlements along the Isfjord.33
The expedition's first great task was removing the Russian inhabitants of Spitsbergen
to Archangel. The business of embarking the Russian community in the Empress of
Canada gave the Canadian Army one of its very few contacts during this war with its
Soviet allies. All evidence indicates that the general relationship between the Canadians
and the Russians was thoroughly friendly, and the troops were almost embarrassed by the
gifts which were pressed upon them. The official relationship was less uniformly
satisfactory. Admiral Vian in his report observes, "The task of the command lay chiefly
in the instillation of sweet reason". He records that the embarkation proceeded
"somewhat in accordance with the plan", but was delayed by the insistence of the Russian
Consul at Barentsburg on "heavy communal machinery and other stores" being brought
away in addition to the people's personal belongings. The Admiral remarks, "This
situation was met by Brigadier Potts, in his own way, without detriment, I believe, to the
relations which should exist between Allies".34
The embarkation completed, the Empress, carrying the whole Russian population of
Spitsbergen and their property, sailed for Archangel at midnight 26-7 August, escorted by
the flagship Nigeria and the three destroyers. Aurora remained at Spitsbergen to protect
the expedition and assist in the liquidation of the more remote Norwegian settlements.
This was carried out during the next few days. While the Empress was away, the sappers
undertook extensive demolitions at Spitsbergen. The great piles of coal at the mines were
set alight, the estimate being that 450,000 tons were thus destroyed. Large quantities of
fuel oil were poured into the sea or burned, and mining machinery at Barentsburg,
Longyearby and other settlements was disabled or removed. During the operation the
town of Barentsburg was largely destroyed by accidental fire, the cause of which could
not be determined.35
On the evening of 1 September the Empress of Canada and her naval escort returned
to Green Bay, having completed their mission to Archangel.
The following day the whole Norwegian population of the archipelago was taken on
board. At 10:30 p.m. on 3 September, the cruisers and destroyers, with the Empress of
Canada, sailed from Green Bay, leaving Spitsbergen empty of humanity.36 The
occupation had lasted ten days less a few hours. During that time, thanks to the "midnight
sun", it had never been wholly dark. The troops had had to work very hard at embarking
the people and their property, and at the job of demolition. The Signals detachment, with
the help of the Norwegian staffs of the Spitsbergen wireless stations, had done especially
valuable work. Normal transmissions of meteorological information were kept up to
conceal from the Germans the fact that anything unusual was going on. The information
sent out, however, was not wholly accurate. Fog was reported throughout the period
when the Empress was present at Spitsbergen, the object being to discourage enemy air
reconnaissance. The last signal was sent on the evening of 3 September, and the wireless
stations were then put out of action.37 The Germans were completely deceived. When
Force "A" was well out to sea on its homeward voyage one of their stations was heard
calling Spitsbergen "very strongly". The records of their army command in Norway
suggest that it was only on 6 September that they received a report of fires at the Spits-
bergen collieries. On 7 September this was confirmed by air reconnaissance.38
The cruisers parted company with the Empress of Canada on 6 September, bound for
an enterprise against German naval vessels in Norwegian waters. This was successful, the
gunnery training ship Bremse and other vessels being sunk.39 All told, the Spitsbergen
enterprise would seem to have been a satisfactory one from the naval point of view; for it
had had another useful by-product, in the capture of three laden colliers which had been
working for the Germans, one tug, two sealing vessels and a whaling vessel.40
The 800 Norwegians were not the only passengers brought to Britain by the Empress.
She had embarked at Archangel 186 French officers and men, prisoners of war who had
escaped from Germany to Russia and had been interned there until Russia entered the
war.41 They shared the hard work of the final days at Spitsbergen and their spirit greatly
impressed the Canadians. The transport with her freight of many nationalities re-entered
the Clyde on the night of 7-8 September. The following day most of the Canadians
entrained for their stations in southern England.42
It would be easy to exaggerate the importance of Operation “Gauntlet”. However,
Brigadier Potts’ force had carried out its limited mission with complete success. The
enemy had not succeeded in interfering with it or even in discovering that it was in
progress; and not a man had been lost from any cause. It had given a few Canadians an
adventure and a taste of active employment, very salutary after the weary months of
waiting. Sir John Dill wrote a generous note to General McNaughton: “The whole
operation calls for nothing but praise, and I hear from all sides that your men were just
grand."43 In spite of these minor satisfactions, the reflection inevitably obtruded itself
that Canada had now been at war for two years, and her troops had yet to meet the
enemy.
Some later developments at Spitsbergen may be noted in passing. Both British and
German parties visited the archipelago in the autumn of 1941, and the following summer
a small Allied force, chiefly Norwegian, was installed there. In September 1943 the
establishments were raided by a German naval force, but subsequently the garrison were
reinforced and re-supplied, and the islands remained in Allied occupation.44 The
Canadian Army had no connection with these events.
General McNaughton's Authority is Widened
We have described the discussion at the time of the Norwegian project of 1940
concerning General McNaughton's authority to commit detachments to minor operations
without reference to Ottawa. British raiding operations increased during 1941, and there
seemed to be a chance of Canadian troops taking part in such affairs. McNaughton spoke
of this to Mr. C. G. Power, the Canadian Air Minister, when the latter visited the United
Kingdom;* and on 22 July he raised the question again in a discussion with Mr. Ian
Mackenzie, Minister of Pensions and National Health. Speaking of the possibility of
"operations of limited scope which depend for their success on the strictest secrecy", the
general pointed out that considerations of time and security made it undesirable that
special requests should have to be made to Canada every time for authority to take part.
Mr. Mackenzie agreed to take the matter up with the Cabinet on his return to Ottawa;45
but before he could do this the Spitsbergen project presented itself.
On 26 July General McNaughton cabled the Chief of the General Staff that the
"special question" discussed with Messrs. Mackenzie and Power was now a practical
issue; he added that as a result of those conversations he was arranging to cooperate with
the War Office unless otherwise instructed. The Cabinet War Committee discussed the
matter on 31 July, and McNaughton was informed that, assuming the project had been
approved by the "United Kingdom Government War Committee" (i.e., the War Cabinet)
the Government was prepared to leave the decision to his judgement. The C.G.S.
signalled, "In arriving at decision you will no doubt have regard to question as to whether
prospects of success are sufficient to warrant risks involved which include not only
personnel but possible encouragement
*Mr. Churchill's idea of a large raid on the Pas de Calais (see below, page 326) appears to have supplied the occasion
for this conversation.
to enemy if results negative or worse".46 Under this authority McNaughton sent

Canadian troops to Spitsbergen.
Shortly afterwards the Corps Commander's powers were further widened. In October
the Minister of National Defence, Colonel Ralston, then in the United Kingdom, cabled
Mr. Power (who was administering the Department in his absence) that discussion with
McNaughton indicated the need for generalizing the special authority given in the case of
Spitsbergen "to cover future minor projects of similar and temporary nature". Ralston
wrote:
Extreme need secrecy argues against prior submission each case of such plan to Governmental
authority. Recommend War Committee of Cabinet now forward McNaughton general authority to act in
such cases subject to his own judgment. He will notify Minister by most secret means in general terms
prior to event where practicable.
The War Committee agreed on 29 October that it was proper that the Corps Commander
should receive this authority.47
Raiding Projects and the Raid on Hardelot
By this time the possibility of Canadian troops' sharing in cross-Channel raids against
the Germans on the French coast-a natural development of the move into Sussex-was
being actively discussed. Generals Paget and McNaughton had had a conversation on the
subject on 6 September.48 Thereafter small Canadian detachments were given combined
operations training at Chichester Harbour. It was hoped that some minor raids could be
mounted during the coming winter; but although there were specific plans for two such
operations which were proposed for three successive suitable periods, they were
cancelled each time because no landing craft were to be had.49 On taking command of
the Corps at the end of 1941, General Crerar was very anxious for raiding operations for
his troops. On 5 February 1942 he wrote General Montgomery of the "great stimulus" the
Corps would receive "if, in the near future, it succeeded in making a name for itself for its
raiding activities".50 Next month he pursued the matter with General Brooke and with
the Adviser on Combined Operations (Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten).51 The
latter arranged further combined training for Canadian troops; a large detachment from
the 2nd Division trained in April, but contrary to the men's hopes they were not employed
in an actual operation.52
One small operation, however, was carried out during April, and although it turned
out to be merely another frustration, it deserves some notice here as the first occasion on
which Canadian troops took part in such an enterprise, and the first during the Second
World War when men of the Canadian Army came under the fire of German ground
forces.
On 1 April General Crerar heard from Headquarters South Eastern Command that the
Chief of Combined Operations, as Mountbatten was. now called, was "planning a raid
about the middle of April" and that a party of about 50 Canadian soldiers could be used in
it. General McNaughton had lately returned from his visit to Canada and was in London.
Crerar asked and obtained his approval for the project, suggesting that a 1st Division unit
should furnish the troops, as several hundred men of this formation had now taken
combined operations training. It was decided that the favoured unit would be The
Carleton and York Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Brigade.53 Lieutenant J. P. Ensor* of
this unit was designated to command the party, whose total strength was eight officers
and 61 other ranks. The number actually engaged in the ultimate operation was only 50
all ranks. The proposed raid (Operation "Abercrombie") was to be commanded by Major
Lord Lovat of No. 4 Commando. Beginning on 8 April Ensor's party trained under
Lovat's direction on the Solent with the detachment of No. 4 Commando which was to
take part in the operation. On 18 April the force moved to Dover.54
The objective of the proposed raid was the area about the village of Hardelot, half a
dozen miles south of Boulogne. The object, as defined in Lovat's operation order, was
"To effect a landing on the French Coast under cover of darkness, reconnoitre Military
Defences and beaches North and South of Hardelot, attack and destroy Searchlight Post
and return with prisoners and all available information,"55 The plan was that two troops
of No. 4 Commando would land on a beach north of the village, while the Carleton and
York detachment went in on another beach to the south of it. Ensor was to send out
fighting patrols to investigate defences and take prisoners, and was subsequently to
examine and if necessary attack two large warehouses on the outskirts of the village.
On the night of 19-20 April an attempt was made to carry out the operation, but the
weather was bad and although the force set out to cross the Channel it was obliged to turn
back, not before one assault landing craft had been swamped and sunk, with the loss of
two naval ratings by drowning.56 The next night the weather was still unsuitable, but the
attempt was made on the night of 21-22 April, when the sea was completely calm.
Operation "Abercrombie" was pretty much of a fiasco. Lovat's party landed, though
apparently not at precisely the point intended, and three patrols were sent out. However, the
recall rocket had to be fired before the searchlight post could be attacked, and as the enemy
in the beach
*This officer had an unusual record. He was a member of the Non-Permanent Active Militia unit of the Carleton and
York before the war, and on 1 September 1939 was attested into the C.A.S.F. unit and appointed pay sergeant. He was
commissioned overseas and after passing through all the intermediate ranks was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, took
command of The Carleton and York Regiment on 18 December 1944 and commanded it until the end of hostilities. He was
awarded the D.S.O. and the M.B.E.
defences had incontinently fled no prisoners were taken.57 For the Canadians the fiasco
was still more complete; Ensor's men never even got ashore. The naval officer in charge
of their group of craft fell ill on the morning of the 21st and was replaced by a young
officer of less experience. It is also reported that the craft had defective compasses. The
two assault craft carrying the Canadian party, and the support craft carrying the naval
commander, failed to keep station properly and Ensor's boat became separated from the
others. The craft searched for each other without success, and it appears that the
navigators were not certain of their positions.* In these circumstances landings could
only have been made at random and it was out of the question to carry out the plan.
While the craft were still searching, Lovat's recall rocket was seen. Wireless signals
indicated that the Commando men had re-embarked, and the Canadians' craft now
returned to Dover independently. It is doubtful whether the Germans had actually seen
them, and although machine-gun fire had been directed towards them they suffered no
casualties.59
It was one more disappointment to add to the long series. But not many months were
to pass before Canadian forces were engaged in a much larger enterprise on the French
shore, with Lord Lovat again associated with them.
Allied Grand Strategy in 1942
June of 1941 saw the entrance of Russia into the war; December brought Pearl
Harbor and the entrance of the United States. That same month, Mr. Churchill went to
Washington and in a series of conferences (known as "Arcadia") with President
Roosevelt and the British and American Chiefs of Staff,60 set up the Anglo-American
strategic machinery which was to play a great part in winning the war.
During these conferences, what was perhaps the most vital and fundamental strategic
decision of the whole war was re-affirmed. On 27 March 1941 a specific "staff
agreement" known as ABC-161 had been signed by British and American officers. Its
basic concept was the determination to beat the Germans first. It was recognized that
Germany was the predominant member of the Axis and that even in a "global" war the
decisive theatre would be Europe and the Atlantic. This tremendous decision, to defeat
Germany first, and deal with Japan afterwards, was thus taken long before either the
United States or Japan became an actual belligerent. Subsequent events attest its
soundness. Nevertheless, when Mr. Churchill
*It would seem that one of the lessons of this small affair was the desirability of using more experienced naval
personnel in such operations. The Rear Admiral in Charge of Landing Craft and Bases at Combined Operations
Headquarters said in a minute on the reports of the the raid, "I see no excuse except incompetence for the L.S.C. [Landing
Craft Support] missing the beach".58
went to Washington in December 1941 he was entertaining some anxiety lest, under the
impact of the Japanese attack, the Americans might be disposed to alter this decision. No
such tendency appeared. The basic concept of the war remained as it had been established
earlier in 1941.62
An important result of the "Arcadia" meeting was the institution of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. There had been some previous discussion of the formation of an Allied
Supreme War Council to conduct strategic planning on the highest level.63 This now
took shape as the Combined Chiefs. This formidable committee was composed of the
Chiefs of Staff of the American armed forces (including, it should be noted, the Chief of
the Army Air Forces), and "three high officers representing and acting under the general
instructions of"64 the British Chiefs of Staff. Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, himself a
former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, played a vital part in this body on the British
side.* The Combined Chiefs had their permanent headquarters in Washington throughout
the war. Their most important decisions were taken in a series of conferences, mostly
held elsewhere, at which Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt were normally present and
exercised decisive influence. It may be noted that neither China nor Russia was
represented on the Combined Chiefs of Staff; nor was Canada, nor any other country of
the British Commonwealth except the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff
was a purely Anglo-American committee.
During the spring and summer of 1942, British and American statesmen and officers
were vigorously discussing the strategy of the war against Germany, and after serious
controversies further fundamental decisions were made.
The American strategic planners, and particularly the Chief of Staff of the United
States Army, General George C. Marshall, were certain from the beginning that the
decisive measure would be a blow directed across the Channel from the British Isles; and
they desired that this should be struck at the earliest possible moment. Churchill came to
the "Arcadia" conference with a plan for an Anglo-American invasion of French North
Africa; and we are told that "The President set great store" by such a scheme.65 But the
cross-Channel attack was the project for which leading American soldiers contended
most strongly. On 10 March 1942, during his visit to Washington, General McNaughton
had a conversation with Brigadier-General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had just been
appointed Chief of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff.
Eisenhower told him that "he had
*Dill represented Mr. Churchill as Minister of Defence, and was therefore a fourth British member. Later Admiral
William D. Leahy joined in a parallel capacity, as Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt. At the great strategic conferences
the British Chiefs of Staff were normally present in person.
racked his mind to discover how we could present Germany with a second front, and that
the more he thought it out the more firmly had he been driven to the conclusion that it
would be possible to do so only by attacking Western Europe from the British Isles".
McNaughton replied that there was no question but that "the war could only be ended by
the defeat of Hitler and the only way of doing so was to attack him from the West". He
had always been convinced, he said, "that an offensive would sooner or later have to be
launched from the United Kingdom across the narrow seas"; and this view had been
accepted by the Canadian Government the week before.66 "Sooner or later": here was
the immediate crux of the matter.
By 1 April the War Plans Division had a definite plan for the invasion of Northern
France; and General Marshall sent the President a memorandum which presented forceful
arguments for the selection of Western Europe "as the theatre in which to stage the first
great offensive of the United Powers". This American plan looked forward to attempting
the main operation in the spring of 1943, and conceived it as an attack across the Strait of
Dover, the initial landing being made on the front from Etretat to Cape Gris Nez. The
scheme also comprehended a more limited operation which might be attempted about 15
September 1942. This was a diversionary attack on the French coast, which would be
justified only if the situation on the Russian front became desperate, or if the German
situation in Western Europe became "critically weakened". But whether this . took place
or not, the plan proposed establishing "a preliminary active front this coming summer" by
"constant raiding by small task forces at selected points along the entire accessible
coastline held by the enemy".67 On 4 April Marshall, accompanied by Harry Hopkins,
then the President's most trusted civilian adviser, left for London to seek British
concurrence in these plans.
Since 15 March, at least, the British themselves had been wrestling with the problem
of diversionary operations in the West designed to assist the Russians in 1942. This
project they called by the code name "Sledgehammer". The Chiefs of Staff considered the
question repeatedly and on 21 March directed the C.-in-C. Home Forces, the A.O.C.-in-
C. Fighter Command and the Chief of Combined Operations to plan operations designed
to make Germany employ her air forces actively and continuously and to cause protracted
air fighting in the West in an area advantageous to the Allies, in order to reduce German
air support available for the Eastern Front as early as possible. The subsequent
discussions turned on whether this could be achieved by air action alone; whether, if
attacks by ground forces were needed, these should take the form of mere raids, or the
establishment of a permanent bridgehead; and whether the best area for action was the
Pas de Calais (where a much larger scale of air support was possible) or the Cherbourg
peninsula (where the enemy defences were less formidable). No
very definite agreed solution was reached; but a report by the C.-in-C. Home Forces and
his two colleagues dated 14 April expressed the opinion that,leaving aside the question of
air action alone, "a series of medium-sized raids is the only practical solution".68 They
asked the Chiefs of Staff to endorse this policy and authorize the necessary priorities; and
it seems clear that this was done (below, page 314).
During the conferences with Marshall and Hopkins the British representatives
betrayed some doubt about the American schemes; the British, indeed, were for the
moment in the unusual position of arguing the importance of the Japanese front against
the American emphasis on Europe! Nevertheless, agreement was reached on basic
principles for a frontal attack on the enemy in Northern France in 1943. There was
considerable discussion of the scheme for an emergency landing, but nothing like a final
commitment was made. The circumstances which might render it urgent in American
eyes had not yet arisen. The whole situation was reviewed on the evening of 14 April,
when the Americans met the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, and General Marshall
put the American case, incidentally including a strong argument for "repeated
Commando-type raids all along the coast" to harass the enemy and give experience to the
Allied troops.69 Three days later Churchill cabled to Roosevelt:70
The campaign of 1943 is straightforward, and we are starting joint plans and preparations at once.
We may however feel compelled to act this year. Your plan visualised this, but put mid-September as
the earliest date. Things may easily come to a head before then . . . Broadly speaking, our agreed
programme is a crescendo of activity on the Continent, starting with an ever-increasing air offensive
both by night and day and more frequent and large-scale raids, in which United States troops will take
part.
A few weeks later Canada was given an account of the results of the conferences in a
communication from Mr. Churchill to Mr. King71 which described the conference and
proceeded:
In consequence of these discussions it has been agreed that all preparations should be pushed ahead
by the United States and ourselves for action in the following stages—
(A) Conversion of the United Kingdom to an advance base for operations on the Western Front…
(B) Development of preparations on a front from the Shetlands to the Bristol Channel.
(C) Raiding operations to be undertaken in 1942 on the largest scale which equipment will permit
on a front from North Norway to the Bay of Biscay.
(D) Active air offensive to be continued and intensified with the object of inflicting the greatest
possible wastage on German air force.
(E) Reparation of plans to take advantage of any opportunity arising to capture in 1942 a
bridgehead on the continent for an "emergency" offensive if such should become necessary.
(F) Preparation of plans for large scale operations in the spring of 1943 to destroy the German
forces in Western Europe.
The British Prime Minister mentioned that the British negotiators had emphasized that
while it was important to engage as strong enemy air forces in the West as possible, "our
operations in 1942 must be governed by the measure of success achieved by the Germans
on the Russian front and we should have to pursue a more cautious policy as regards
landing troops if the Germans were successful". On this point the American attitude was
the exact opposite of the British.
On 18 April the British Chiefs of Staff approved a memorandum on "Operations on
the Continent", implementing these Anglo-American decisions. The C.-in-C. Home
Forces, the C.-in-C. Fighter Command and the Chief of Combined Operations were
charged with working out plans for the "Sledgehammer" emergency scheme. On raiding,
the memorandum contained the following direction:
We have already approved a policy of raids to be undertaken in the summer of 1942 on the largest
scale that the available equipment will permit. These raids will be carried out on a front extending from
the North of Norway to the Bay of Biscay and will be planned and launched by the C.C.O. in consultation
with the C.-in-C., Home Forces.
The strategic situation during the summer of 1942 was very largely dominated by
events on the Russian front. Although in the summer of 1941 "almost all responsible
military opinion" had held that the Russian armies would shortly be smashed by the
Germans,72 Soviet resistance had continued and the greater part of the German land
forces was tied down in the East. During the winter of 1941-42 the Germans had suffered
severe reverses; but in May they again took the offensive and made large gains. The
Russians from their first involvement in the war had demanded a "Second Front" (and,
indeed, a Third Front-in the Arctic-also).73 They now continued to urge their allies to
invade in Western Europe, and there appeared in fact to be a definite danger of Russia's
suffering defeats which would drive her out of the war. This would have been a
catastrophe for the western powers; and this must be remembered in assessing the
strategic discussions of that summer.*
In May and June M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited London and
Washington. His main object, clearly, was to impel the British and American authorities
into attempting an immediate landing in Western Europe. The British refused to commit
themselves to such an enterprise. Mr. Churchill on 22 May represented strongly to
Molotov the difficulties in the way, but explained that the British hoped to bring on air
battles over the Continent which would force the Germans to withdraw air forces from
the East.74 In Washington Molotov seems to have received rather more
*It is easy to forget the gigantic burden the Russians were carrying. A German return dated 9 December 1942 shows
seven German divisions in Africa; 46 in France and the Low Countries; and 204 on the Eastern front.
encouragement, as was perhaps natural in the circumstances, but he was given no firm
promise. On his return to London en route home, Churchill handed him an aide-memoire
which stated that preparations were being made for a continental landing "in August or
September 1942". It mentioned the shortage of landing craft, and proceeded:
Clearly, however, it would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if,
for the sake of action at any price, we embarked on some operation which ended in disaster and gave the
enemy an opportunity for glorification at our discomfiture. It is impossible to say in advance whether the
situation will be such as to make this operation feasible when the time comes. We can therefore give no
promise in the matter, but, provided that it appears sound and sensible, we shall not hesitate to put our
plans into effect.
On this same day (11 June) the White House in Washington and the Foreign Office in
London issued communiques on the conferences with Molotov. Both included the
statement that in the course of the conversations full understanding had been reached
"with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942". It appears
that Molotov drafted this himself while in Washington. Both Marshall and Hopkins urged
that the date "1942" should be omitted, but the President, with a flash of the gay
irresponsibility which he sometimes displayed, insisted that it should go in.75 This
considerably embarrassed Mr. Churchill when he visited Moscow later in the summer to
inform Stalin that there would be no Second Front that year; but he could and did point to
the phrase "We can therefore give no promise" in the British aide-memoire.
Early in this same month of June, Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten visited
Washington and discussed the situation with General Marshall and other American
officers and officials. He found many of them deeply desirous of an early invasion. On 9
June he dined with President Roosevelt, who mentioned to him the possibility of a
"sacrifice" landing in 1942 intended to help the Russians. This is reported to have
disturbed the British Prime Minister.76 While Mountbatten was exploring in Washington,
Churchill in London was clarifying and crystallizing British strategic thinking. A curious
scheme for a large-scale raid which went by the name of "Imperator" (see below, page
324) was the occasion of his writing as follows on 8 June:
I would ask the Chiefs of Staff to consider the following two principles:
(a) No substantial landing in France unless we are going to stay; and (b) No substantial landing in France
unless the Germans are demoralised by another failure against Russia. It follows from the above that we
should not delay or impede the preparations for "Sledgehammer"* for the sake of "Imperator"; secondly,
that we should not attempt "Sledgehammer" unless the Germans are demoralised by ill-success against
Russia; and, thirdly, that we should recognise
*It seems evident that the code name "Sledgehammer", first used by the British for their own rather vague diversionary
projects in March, had now become attached to the scheme for an emergency landing contained in the "Marshall
Memorandum".
that, if Russia is in dire straits, it would not help her for us to come a hasty cropper on our own.
It would seem wise that all preparations should go forward for "Sledgehammer" on the largest scale
possible at the dates mentioned, but that the launching of "Sledgehammer" should be dependent not on a
Russian failure, but on a Russian success and consequent German demoralisation in the West.
On 11 June the War Cabinet accepted Mr. Churchill's "two principles", which were
also heartily supported by the Chiefs of Staff .77
On 18 June Mr. Churchill arrived in the United States, accompanied by General
Brooke. The Allied leaders now proceeded to discuss both the long-term and short-term
plans for invasion of North-West Europe as well as possible operations in the
Mediterranean. A letter presented by Churchill to the President expressed the gravest
doubts about the emergency landing project.78 At this point, the British in North Africa
suffered serious reverses, Tobruk fell, and thereafter the talks were largely devoted to
immediate measures for meeting the crisis in that theatre. When Churchill returned to
England, it had apparently been agreed that preparations for a cross-Channel operation in
1943 should continue, along with planning for an emergency operation in 1942-and an
alternative in case such an operation should prove impracticable in France or the Low
Countries.79 On 23 June, General Dwight D. Eisenhower flew to England with
instructions to begin preparations for United States participation in operations across the
Channel.80
At the end of the first week in July what the American Secretary of War called "a
new and rather staggering crisis" arose in Washington, in the form of a cable from
Churchill to Roosevelt81 taking a strong line against the 1942 cross-Channel attack and
reviving, instead, the proposal for invading North Africa. Although the British had never
concealed their dislike of the "Sledgehammer" scheme, they had perhaps stated it so
tactfully as to arouse unfounded expectations; and now that Churchill had decided that
"the moment had come to bury 'Sledgehammer’ “, and said so, Secretary Stimson and
Marshall were both "very stirred up" and actually recommended threatening the British
Government with a revocation of the basic decision to beat Germany before Japan.
Marshall and Admiral King made a formal recommendation to this effect to the
President. Stimson wrote in his diary, "As the British won't go through with what they
agreed to, we will turn our back on them and take up the war with Japan". On later
reflection, Stimson was "not altogether pleased" with his own part in this scheme; and his
sober second thought seems more than justified. He writes, "Mr. Roosevelt was not really
persuaded, and the bluff was never tried".82 This is an understatement. Not only was the
President not "persuaded"; he shortly went on record against the Japan scheme in most
decided terms. At this crisis he showed cooler and surer strategic judgement than his
highest professional advisers.
Decision in July
General Marshall, Admiral King and Mr. Hopkins now took off for London (16 July)
for what were in some respects the most momentous strategic discussions of the war.
They carried a very remarkable memorandum of instructions signed by Mr. Roosevelt as
Commander-in-Chief.83 It directed them to investigate "carefully" the possibility of
executing "Sledgehammer". This operation, the President wrote, was "of such grave
importance that every reason calls for accomplishment of it". He proceeded:
You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor,
and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event Russian
collapse becomes probable SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The
principal objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the
Russian Front.
In spite of this, the President was quite prepared for a decision against such an
operation in 1942. The one point upon which he absolutely insisted was that United
States ground and air forces must be in action against Germany somewhere in that year.
Although the War Department had actually included in the draft of these instructions the
threat to turn away to the Pacific, Roosevelt struck it out and wrote instead: "It is of the
utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and
that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of
complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand.... Defeat of
Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life."
Failing "Sledgehammer", the substitute theatres to be considered, the President indicated,
were North Africa and the Middle East.
The discussions in London lasted for several days. The Americans pressed strongly
for the emergency proposal for a Second Front in France in 1942. They are said to have
argued that "the Russians' situation may become so desperate as to make even an
unsuccessful attack worth while"!84 The British would have none of it; and since at this
time there were still only small American ground and air forces in the British Isles,* and
"Sledgehammer" if executed would have been largely a British and Canadian operation,
their attitude was decisive. Finally, on 22 July, it was made quite clear that the British
Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff would not cooperate in anything larger than raids
against the Continent that year.86
As Roosevelt had foreseen, the question now became that of a substitute operation to
provide a major enterprise against Germany in 1942. In the light of the earlier
discussions, it is not surprising that the substitute was found
*Two United States divisions had arrived in Northern Ireland. The Combined Commanders estimated at the end of
July that three would be available for the "initial stage" of the operation.85
in an Anglo-American occupation of French North Africa (Operation "Torch"). Before

Hopkins, Marshall and King returned to America on 27 July, the decision, though still
formally dependent on the course of events in Russia, was virtually definite, and further
discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 30 July did not alter it. That evening the
President converted the tentative decision into a firm one.87
The fundamental strategic difference of opinion just described was not purely Anglo-
American. It was between the British and some Americans; Marshall and Stimson were
prominent among the latter group, but President Roosevelt was not a convinced member
of it. It appears also that U.S. naval officers were less enthusiastic than the Army about
an attack in France in 1942.88 Stimson had recorded that the North African operation was
"the President's great secret baby";89 and the known Roosevelt predilection for this
project had assisted the British negotiators in substituting it for the emergency landing in
France, which they regarded as a foolhardy scheme.
It seems curious now that in 1942 some people thought the North African operation
more perilous than "Sledgehammer". "Torch" was indeed a tremendous undertaking,
involving as it did moving a large expeditionary force directly from the United States to
conduct an assault landing on the other side of the Atlantic; this would certainly have
been considered impracticable a few years before. Yet the opposition to be apprehended
from the Vichy forces in Africa was of an altogether different order from that sure to be
met from the Germans on the coast of France. In the light of later events, in the
discussions of 1942 the advocates of a Mediterranean strategy were clearly right and
those who plumped for an immediate enterprise in France were mistaken.
To begin with, there was in 1942 an extreme shortage of amphibious equipment and
particularly landing craft. The "lift" for a really large-scale invasion simply did not exist,
and the shortage was a major factor in the decision not to try even a more limited assault in
Europe.* Nor had we in 1942 established anything like complete control of the air above
the Channel. To attempt to maintain a permanent bridgehead on the French coast would
have meant committing every existing element of Allied air strength to a continuous battle
against the Luftwaffe in which all the odds would have been in favour of the latter. (It may
be recalled that we now know that in the Dieppe air battle we lost more than twice as many
aircraft as the enemy.) In the summer of 1942, when the United States still had only small
forces
*The Combined Commanders estimated that on 15 October there would be available assault shipping and craft
sufficient to lift two infantry brigade groups (one of two battalions only), with "a reduced scale of supporting arms", on
assault scales; plus one infantry brigade group and three army tank battalions on light scales, and about three commandos.
In addition, enough medium coasters were available to lift the transport of "about five" infantry brigade groups, and
enough barges to lift that of half a brigade group-both on light scales.90
deployed in the United Kingdom and ready to take part, an assault might have produced a
disaster which would have set our preparations for the fullscale attack back almost to
where they were after Dunkirk; at best, it would have been a bottomless pit into which
the resources needed for that attack would have been poured without result.
During these discussions in 1942 General Eisenhower fought hard for the idea of an
invasion that year, although he fully recognized that it would be a very desperate venture.
A member of his staff recorded on 22 July that the General said that that date, on which
the decision against it was made, could well go down as "the blackest day in history". But
in 1949 the former Supreme Commander, looking back across seven eventful years, was
to write, "Later developments have convinced me that those who held the Sledgehammer
operation to be unwise at the moment were correct in their evaluation of the problem.”91
"Sledgehammer" was discussed in many places, and one of the officers who had a
useful word to say about it was Major-General M. A. Pope, then serving in Washington
as Military Representative of the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet. One of
General Pope's tasks was to maintain contact with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and
attempt to gather information for the War Committee on the course of planning which
might affect Canadian forces overseas. On 1 May 1942 he reported to the C.G.S. in
Ottawa on a discussion with Major-General R. H. Dewing, who has appeared in this
narrative in other connections and had lately joined the British Joint Staff Mission in
Washington. Pope referred to the "Sledgehammer" idea as it had reached him, and
remarked that since it seemed to him completely unsound it had puzzled and disturbed
him. He asked Dewing if he could tell him how the matter stood. He reported Dewing's
reply as follows:92
6. Dewing began by saying that for some little time our U.S. friends had been advocating an offensive
with a good deal of enthusiasm. The British were not less desirous of hitting back but, as 1 well knew,
they had no intention of refusing to see the obstacles before them or, as he put it, of waving them aside
even before they came to them. The business of going ashore on the other side of the Channel was a
difficult one and they had no intention of being slap dash about it . . .
7. To his mind there were these three courses of action possible this season:
(a) To continue raiding on the St. Nazaire pattern, but on a larger scale, involving operations requiring
the troops to hold the raided area up to one or two days
(b) To carry out an operation such as the capture of a beach-head in the event
of things going badly in Russia and it being necessary at almost any cost
to afford our Allies every possible relief, and
(c) To carry out an invasion should the enemy crumple up.
8. Courses (a) and (c) required no comment. He, however, could see no virtue in course (b). He entirely
agreed with me that it would afford little real relief to the Russians and we worked out that it would
require an expenditure of the order of 25 per cent. of our actual resources to achieve a diversion of
possibly
less than 5 per cent. of the German forces on the Eastern Front. Again, in the circumstance of an
impending Russian debacle, Britain would be thinking of her own defence against invasion rather than
thinking of invading the continent. 9. Dewing thanked me for having brought the matter up for
discussion between us, while I, on my part, thanked him for having reassured me that there was as yet no
decision to undertake a hazardous and unprofitable operation.
Subsequently, Pope had a chance to speak his mind about the scheme on a somewhat
higher level. On 7 May he "sat in with the British Chiefs of Staff" in Washington, along
with Australian and New Zealand representatives, to discuss the British Mission's draft of
a basic paper dealing with Allied strategy which had been under discussion for some
time. Sir John Dill had called this meeting to give the Dominion representatives an
opportunity to express their views. As Pope knew that the general contents of the paper
were familiar and acceptable to his chiefs in Ottawa, he did not trouble to speak at length;
but one paragraph of his report93 is of interest:
... I took occasion to say that while I agreed with the paper as a whole, there was one point in it
with regard to which it was highly desirable that the Canadian point of view should be made quite clear.
This was the inference that in the event of things going badly with Russia this summer, it might be
necessary to open a second front across the English Channel. I said that so far as I could see such an
operation could only end with a loss of valuable formations and that this would jeopardize our being
able to intervene successfully next year. "And also fail to do the slightest good", added the Field
Marshal, who then went on to say that Mr. King had made this very point to him when in Washington
some three weeks ago. It would, therefore, appear that if this operation is attempted this year, it will be
over the dead bodies of the British C.O.S., and ours too, and that if and when the United States C.O.S.
get down to details, they will realize not only the futility but the recklessness of the idea. Mr. Wrong has
just told me that a very full report of the Prime Minister's meeting with the Pacific Council has just come
down from Ottawa, a passage of which makes this point abundantly clear.
The Canadian Prime Minister had, indeed, made good use of the opportunity
presented by the meeting of the Pacific War Council held in Washington on 15 April.
This body, the Pacific Dominions had apparently hoped, would be an effective organ for
the direction of operations; but the United States Chiefs of Staff did not attend it and its
meetings became merely informal chats between heads of governments or their
representatives, with little real effect upon the course of the Pacific war. In the present
case, President Roosevelt presided and Dr. H. V. Evatt (Australian Minister for External
Affairs) and Mr. Walter Nash (New Zealand Minister at Washington) were among those
attending. During the discussion the President spoke, most confidentially, of the visit
which Marshall and Hopkins were then paying to England; they were there, he said, "to
urge the necessity for offensive action which would help to relieve the pressure on the
Russians by creating another front". He spoke of the Canadian and other forces in Britain
that were "raring to go".
Mr. King felt, in his own words,94 that the President "was crowding the position pretty
strongly"; and to avoid any possibility of its being assumed that he was "agreeing on
Canada's part to an immediate attack on Germany" [sic], he thought it well to speak on
the subject before the meeting broke up. He accordingly emphasized the importance of no
attack being made before all factors had been carefully weighed; "there would have to be
[the] strongest reasons for believing that the attack would be successful, as if it were not,
there would be no saving of Britain thereafter, with the consequences that would flow
therefrom". Mr. King's memorandum of the meeting proceeds:
The President said that we would have to be perfectly sure that we had superior air power and that
he thought we had reached the point where that could be regarded as certain. I stated that what I was
emphasizing particularly was the timing . . . There would have to be great certainty that no single
important aspect could be left to chance.
When I had finished, there was no dissent on the part of anyone from what I had said . . .
Since it was intended that, in the event of "Sledgehammer" being attempted, Canada
would have supplied a considerable part of the force—"one or two" divisions95—her
political and military representatives had every right to express their views on this
question. Mr. King had no military experience and did not often express a direct opinion
on a purely military question. In this case his instinct and his common sense led him to a
very sound conclusion.
A word may be said at this point about the progress of high-level strategic planning
in England, and Canada's connection, or lack of connection, with it.
On 11 June 1942, during one of the rehearsals for the Dieppe operation, General
Paget, the C.-in-C. Home Forces, discussed with General McNaughton the planning
organization for the British "expeditionary force" being set up in the United Kingdom,
which was to be under Paget's direction. It was intended that this force should have a
permanent headquarters and a planning staff to plan future operations. Paget said that it
was now intended to set up an Expeditionary Force Planning Staff Committee, and that
this would be composed of himself as chairman, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay (C.-in-C.
Dover) as Naval representative, Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas (C.-in-C. Fighter
Command) as Air representative, Major-General Chaney (Commanding General, United
States Forces in the United Kingdom) to represent the United States, and General
McNaughton to represent Canada. McNaughton cabled the C.G.S. in Ottawa that he
proposed to provide some staff officers for the planning staff, Paget having requested
this. He added that as a result of these developments he hoped for the first time to be able
to keep the C.G.S. informed of plans for future operations on the Continent.96
The body Paget described duly came into existence under the name of "the Combined
Commanders"; it appears, indeed, that it was already in existence at the moment when he
had this conversation with General McNaughton, for it seems to have held its first
meeting on 15 May.97 In one important respect, its organization differed from that
forecast by Paget. McNaughton was never invited to become a member, and Canada had
no part in it; it was entirely Anglo-American.* The Combined Commanders, after
Eisenhower's arrival, comprised General Paget, Air Chief Marshal Douglas, Admiral
Ramsay and General Eisenhower. Lord Louis Mountbatten was associated with them.
The Combined Commanders worked out in some detail a series of plans for
operations on the Continent, including variants of the "Sledgehammer" project. At the
end of July they submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff specific proposals for an
operation (itself designated "Sledgehammer") whose object was defined as follows: "In
the event of a break in German morale this year, to seize and hold a bridgehead, which
will include the port of Havre and at least 5 aerodromes, with a view to further
operations". At the same time another variant of the "Sledgehammer" project was being
developed under the name "Wetbob". This was a plan for an operation to gain a
permanent foothold on the Continent in the Cherbourg area in the autumn of 1942.
"Wetbob" was considered an alternative to the Havre scheme; it was not to be dependent
on a crack in the enemy's morale, and was to be carried out in 1942 in case of urgent
political necessity.98 Both these projects were virtually obsolete by the time they were
presented in this form; for the decision had already been taken not to attempt a major
operation in France that year. During 1942 the Combined Commanders also developed
plans for Operation "Roundup" (the code name by which the full-scale invasion of France
was known at this time) on the basis of simultaneous or nearly simultaneous assaults in
the Pas de Calais sector and on either side of the Seine Estuary, between Fecamp and
Caen.99
Not only was there no Canadian participation in the Combined Commanders' planning,
but it was a long time before General McNaughton received any information of the
decision to undertake "Torch". On 3 August General Stuart, the Chief of the Canadian
General Staff, who was then in London, went with McNaughton to the War Office and
discussed the strategic situation and its implications with the Acting Chief of the Imperial
General Staff. During this conversation no mention was made of the decision, then of
course very recent, to go into North Africa;100 and it appears that neither McNaughton nor
any other Canadian authority got any information of this project, and its probable influence
in the postponement
*Its status was not entirely clear. The American association with it was apparently "informal". Nevertheless, General
Eisenhower signed Combined Commanders papers on the same basis as the other members.
of Operation "Roundup", until September.* He then pointed out to General Brooke the
unsatisfactory state of things concerning the provision of information to the Canadian
authorities on strategic planning. The best arrangement he was now able to arrive at was
that he would visit the C.I.G.S. at intervals of two or three weeks. Brooke considered this
the most convenient method for keeping him informed.101
The fact that no Canadian was told of the North African enterprise for so long seems
a clear indication that the British Government was well pleased to have the Canadian
formations remain in the United Kingdom, and had no desire to see them in action in
Africa. No record has been found of the possibility of using the Canadians in Operation
"Torch" being canvassed. At a much earlier date, in December 1940, a general Strategical
Appreciation by the British Chiefs of Staff had stated that if the Germans attempted
invasion the Canadian formations in the United Kingdom would play their part in the
most important battle of the war, in which they might well "weigh the balance towards
success", and that until the situation as regards invasion should become less threatening it
was essential to retain them as part of the United Kingdom garrison.†
By 1942 invasion was no longer a serious threat, but the British authorities evidently
had no desire to see the Canadians move. They had, in fact, a very definite reason for not
caring to send them to Africa. During 1941 malicious criticism had represented the
British as pursuing a policy of fighting the war with Dominion soldiers. "I have long
feared the dangerous reactions on Australian and world opinion", wrote Mr. Churchill,
"of our seeming to fight all our battles in the Middle East only with Dominion troops".
He accordingly exerted himself actively to get additional British divisions from the
United Kingdom into action in the Desert with a view to "freeing ourselves from the
imputation, however unjust, of always using other people's troops and blood".102 To
have sent Canadian formations to Africa would have played into the hands of the hostile
propagandists.
Major Raiding Projects, 1942
We have seen that raiding operations on an increased scale were an important

element in the Anglo-American strategic programme agreed upon
*He told General Brooke on 17 September that he first heard of the change of Plans through a casual and incidental
reference in a conversation with the C.-in-C. Home Forces. The date of this conversation does not appear.
†General Crerar, in his notes of a conversation with Sir John Dill at the War Office on 4 December 1940, records that
in answer to a question as to whether there was any desire to use the Canadians in another theatre, such as the Middle East,
the C.I.G.S. said that there were British divisions available and that there would be opportunities for employing the
Canadians "nearer home". Crerar told him that he knew of no desire on the part of the Canadian Government to discourage
the use of its forces "in any operations in which they could usefully play a part, no matter where the theatre might be"
(H.Q.S. 8809, vol. 1).
in April 1942. During that year's campaigning season a whole succession of major raids
were projected and some were mounted; but only one actually took place.
These projects cannot all be mentioned here; but the first, or one of the first, appears
to have been "Blazing", a raid on Alderney in the Channel Islands, which was to have
'been carried out by some 2150 infantry and commando troops with supporting arms
including tanks. The scheme was first discussed at Combined Operations Headquarters in
March. The expedition was assembled in the Isle of Wight and some training done; but
there were differences of opinion between the R.A.F. and military commanders and on 6
May the Chiefs of Staff decided against attempting the operation.103 At this time the
scheme for a raid on Dieppe was well advanced, and the Chief of Combined Operations
submitted it to the Chiefs of Staff a week later.
Interest was not exclusively centred on the Dieppe project thereafter until it was
finally carried out on 19 August. Another plan, the most bizarre of all the year's projects,
had arisen out of the search conducted in March for a diversionary operation in the West
designed to lead to the destruction of large numbers of enemy aircraft. This was
"Imperator", whose projectors proposed, as Mr. Churchill rather acidly put it, "to land on
the Continent a division and armoured units to raid as effectively as possible during two
or three days, and then to re-embark as much as possible of the remnants of the force".104
The inland objectives were never finally settled, but the form in which the operation was
most widely discussed was that of an armoured raid on Paris. The raiding force would
land at one port, send a detachment against Paris to destroy the German headquarters
there, and then, it was hoped, withdraw through a different port. It is not surprising that
the plan excited serious doubts on high military levels. On 8 June Mr. Churchill took aim
at this extraordinary scheme and shot it down. On 11 June he recorded that "Imperator"
had been cancelled as a result of his intervention, and that the Dieppe raid would take
place shortly. On the previous evening he had handed the Soviet ambassador a paper
outlining proposals for assisting Russia, which had included a statement that the policy of
raids against selected points on the Continent would be continued as a means of
preventing the Germans from transferring troops from the west to the east.105
Even after the raid' on Dieppe had been attempted on 19 August, and had failed, at
least one other major raid was projected by Combined Operations Headquarters. This was
"Clawhammer", an attack on radar stations and other installations in the Cap de la Hague
area of the Cherbourgpeninsula, employing five commandos and parachute troops. It was
discussed and elaborated in some detail during September; but it was considered
"extremely hazardous and difficult"-the Dieppe experience had
doubtless had a dampening effect-and it appears that the Chiefs of Staff decided in mid-
October that it should not be attempted.106
There were doubts in some minds concerning this programme of raids. On 25 July
1942 Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay sent to Lord Louis Mountbatten a draft memorandum
which suggested that the Germans probably welcomed our raids as a means of showing
up weaknesses in their defences. "If it is our intention at some future date to make an
attack in force upon the enemy's coast", wrote Ramsay, "we are now doing, or proposing
to do, our best to make that attack less likely to achieve success." Mountbatten replied
that the Chiefs of Staff and War Cabinet had instructed him ."to push on hard with large
scale raids as part of the general decision come to by the Combined Chiefs", and added,
"There are political reasons why I feel certain that they will not cancel them but I will
explain all this at greater length when I come over and see you."107 The "political
reasons", it is fair to assume, related to the situation in Russia and perhaps also to the
agreement with the United States concerning the raiding programme. At the time when
this exchange of views took place, Mountbatten was supervising the final preparations for
the only major raid that was actually carried out: the enterprise against Dieppe. We must
now examine the origins of this raid in greater detail.
Its strategic background has already been made clear. There is no evidence that the
Dieppe project itself was ever considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; but it formed
a part of the tactical programme of Combined Operations Headquarters, which was itself
framed in accordance with the Combined Chiefs' decision to mount a series of large raids.
To see the Dieppe operation in proper perspective, it is essential to bear in mind the
general strategic situation, and particularly the situation in Russia.
The Origins of the Raid on Dieppe
The plan for a raid on the port of Dieppe originated at Combined Operations
Headquarters, London, in April 1942, the month in which General Marshall and Harry
Hopkins, elsewhere in London, were discussing strategy with Mr. Churchill.* Lord Louis
Mountbatten had been appointed Adviser on Combined Operations in the previous October.
In March 1942, by Churchill's direction, he was given the title of Chief of Combined
*The account of the Dieppe raid which follows has much in common with that in the present writer's The Canadian
Army 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary, published in 1948. In a few cases, passages from the earlier book which
seem suitable have been carried over verbatim. In general, however, more detail is given here than could be given in the
one-volume Summary; certain topics for which there was no room in it are now included; and some new information has
been incorporated.
Operations and promoted from Commodore to Vice Admiral. Combined Operations

Headquarters had already been considerably expanded.108
This headquarters had two main functions: the organization of raiding operations to
do immediate limited damage to the enemy, and the development of equipment and
technique for amphibious operations generally and for the ultimate large-scale invasion
of North-West Europe in particular. For many months it had been organizing
"Commando" raids on an ascending scale of importance against the German-held coasts
facing Britain. The attack on St. Nazaire on 28 March 1942, which achieved its main
object, the destruction of the drydock gates, although a great part of the military force
employed was lost, had been the largest enterprise yet attempted by C.O.H.Q.109 It was
hardly over before Mountbatten's staff were considering a still more ambitious one, the
attack on Dieppe. This operation was planned to have an important bearing upon both the
main functions of Combined Operations Headquarters.*
Although the Dieppe raid is in general a very well documented operation, the
documentation with reference to its origins and objects—points of special importance—is
far from complete. In these matters the historian is obliged to rely to a considerable extent
upon the memories and the verbal evidence of informed persons. The fact that "security"
was of such great importance militated against complete records being kept. Almost the
only written description of the larger objects of the Dieppe project which bears a date
earlier than that of the raid itself is that included in Lord Louis Mountbatten's letter of
11/13 May 1942 to the Chiefs of Staff Committee asking approval for the Outline Plan.
He wrote:
Apart from the military objective given in the outline plan, this operation will be of great value as
training for Operation "SLEDGEHAMMER" or any other major operation as far as the actual assault is
concerned. It will not, however, throw light on the maintenance problem over beaches.
It is clear nevertheless that the Dieppe project had, quite apart from its place in the Anglo-
American raiding programme, a far closer relation to the future invasion of the Continent
than any raid yet attempted. It would illuminate what was considered in 1942 the primary
problem of an invasion operation: that of the immediate acquisition of a major port. It has
been suggested that this was one reason for the fateful decision to include in the plan a
frontal attack on the town; for it was feared that an attempt to "pinch out" a port
*The idea of such an operation had long been in the air. As early as 23 June 1941 (the day after the German invasion
of Russia) Mr. Churchill suggested to the Chiefs of Staff a large raid on the Pas de Calais-"something on the scale of
110
twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand men-perhaps the Commandos plus one of the Canadian divisions". In October
1941 the British Chiefs of Staff authorized a general policy of raids. On 7 November they directed that the question of
mounting a large-scale raid, with one or two divisions, in the spring of 1942 should be considered. But it was reported that
such a raid could not be launched before the autumn. On 13 February 1942, accordingly, they abandoned the project,
merely directing that it should continue to be studied and that meanwhile a vigorous policy of small raids should be
continued.
by landings on its flanks might produce delays which would give the enemy time to
demolish the harbour, whereas if the place could be seized by a blow into the centre the
problem would be solved.111
It was also considered important, before launching really large amphibious
operations, that there should be a raid on a sufficient scale to afford a test of the new
technique and material which had been developed. A fairly considerable assault fleet was
being built up, and although Combined Operations Headquarters had had experience of
small operations employing infantry landing ships and assault and mechanized landing
craft, there were now available also tank landing craft which had not yet been under fire;
and there had been no experience of what was involved in handling a fleet of all these
types in action. There had in fact been no major assault landing* since those at Gallipoli
in 1915.112
The selection of the objective was, it is generally agreed, largely influenced by the
question of air cover. Dieppe, some 67 miles from Newhaven in Sussex, was just within
effective range of the fighter aircraft of 1942 when based on English aerodromes. The
place is a resort town with a good though small harbour. It has historic associations with
Canada going back to the days of the early navigators. The coast hereabouts consists
mainly of unscalable cliffs. The only really large gap in the barrier is at Dieppe itself,
where there is nearly a mile of beach between the commanding headlands east and west
of the town; but there is a good beach at Pourville, where the River Scie flows into the
Channel about two and a half miles west of Dieppe harbour, and a much narrower gap in
the cliffs at Puys (called on the maps used in the operation Puits), a little over a mile east
of it. Another possible landing beach was at Quiberville, at the mouth of the River Saane,
eight miles west of Dieppe. Topography thus imposed several limitations upon any plan
of attack.
The Combined Report on the operation prepared at Combined Operations
Headquarters in October 1942 indicates that the question of an attack on Dieppe was first
examined by the "Target Committee" of C.O.H.Q. "early in April, 1942".113 It is stated
that the first meeting to consider a definite plan took place on 3 April. This indicates that
the raid was a purely British conception, but that (although the Americans had nothing to
do with planning it) it almost immediately became an element in the programme agreed
that month with Marshall and Hopkins (above, pages 313, 325). The earliest paper that
appears to have been preserved concerning the planning† is the
*The nearest thing to it was the landings in Madagascar on 5 May 1942. Tanks were landed on that occasion, but
after the beach was secured, not from tank landing craft in the assault. No L.C.Ts. were present. There was little opposition
to the actual landings.
†lt may be noted that the Combined Report gives certain details concerning the planning of the operation not found in
the planning documents preserved at C.O.H.Q., to which the present writer was kindly given access. These additional.
details were presumably added from memory after the operation, when the Report was being prepared. While they may
well be authentic, it has seemed best to base the present account as far as possible upon the records actually kept during the
planning, exiguous and incomplete though these are.
minutes of a meeting at C.O.H.Q. on 14 April which was attended by a representative of

G.H.Q. Home Forces. At this meeting the Naval Adviser to C.O.H.Q., Captain J. Hughes-
Hallett, R.N., "gave a brief outline of the plan for the operation" (the minutes
unfortunately give no detail). Those present agreed "that the project was attractive and
was worthwhile", and that the advisers to C.O.H.Q., along with a Home Forces
representative, should examine it further.114
The recorded conclusions of another meeting, on 21 April,115 indicate that by this date
planning was fairly far advanced. The use of parachutists, gliders, and tanks, and the
inclusion of a "direct assault" against the port of Dieppe, had already been agreed upon.
Upon the development of the plan in detail, prior to this date, there is no strictly
contemporary evidence. An unsigned account dated 14 September 1942 (that is, nearly a
month after the operation and five months after the events described) states that two
alternative outline plans had been produced.116 One included a frontal attack on Dieppe
combined with flank attacks on either side of the town at Puys and Pourville. The other
was to rely entirely on flank attacks, putting in two battalions at Puys and two at
Pourville, retaining a large floating reserve, and making no assault in front. Under this
scheme the tanks would have landed at Quiberville.
The document of 14 September states that about 18 April there was a "verbal
discussion (of which there is no written record)" to decide which of these plans should be
adopted. Senior representatives of G.H.O. Home Forces were present, and it was
generally agreed "that on balance there were advantages in taking the town by a frontal
assault". This was the decision ultimately taken, although it is stated that naval officers
(including Hughes-Hallett, who was not at this particular meeting), regarded the frontal
attack as unduly hazardous. The reasons recorded in the document as influencing the final
decision to attempt the frontal attack include the loss of time involved in distant flank
landings, which "would make a surprise attack on the town more difficult to achieve".
and the fact that tanks landed at Quiberville "would have to cross three factually twos
rivers" to reach the town. (This meant that the brideges would have to be seized in
advance; and there could be no certainty that they would carry a Churchill tank.)
By 25 April an Outline Plan had been completed.117 It provided for a frontal attack on
the town of Dieppe, combined with flank attacks and preceded by a heavy air
bombardment. Tanks were to be employed, being landed, in the first instance at least,
only on the main beach in front of Dieppe. (The conclusions of the planning meeting of
21 April indicate that consideration had been given to landing a squadron at Pourville,
but the idea had been abandoned as this beach seemed "to be more difficult than was
supposed at first".) On 25 April a meeting at C.O.H.Q. discussed this Outline Plan. Vice-
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was in the chair,
and among those present were Major-General J. C. Haydon (Vice Chief of Combined
Operations), Major-General P. G. S. Gregson-Ellis (Deputy Chief of the General Staff,
G.H.Q. Home Forces) and Air Vice-Marshal J. M. Robb (Deputy Chief of Combined
Operations). Captain Hughes-Hallett explained the draft Outline Plan, "which, with minor
amendments, was approved".118
So far, no Canadian officer had had anything to do with the planning, nor had any
Canadian, the record indicates, even known that an attack on Dieppe was contemplated.*
On the morning of 30 April, however, General Montgomery visited General McNaughton
at Headquarters First Canadian Army and broached the project to him. The troops
required, he explained, were one infantry division to be selected from South Eastern
Command. He had been "pressed to agree to" a composite British and Canadian force,
but had replied that it was essential to maintain unity of command and that in his opinion
the Canadian troops "were those best suited". G.H.Q. Home Forces had accepted this
view, and General Crerar (G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps, which was under Montgomery's
operational command) had already been approached and had nominated the 2nd
Canadian Division for the operation.120
These arrangements McNaughton confirmed, "subject to details of plans being
satisfactory and receiving his approval". It was agreed that Montgomery should proceed
with the preparation of plans and advise MajorGeneral J. H. Roberts, G.O.C. 2nd
Division, so that he might start work on planning with the Chief of Combined
Operations.121 On this same date, Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps issued "Training
Instruction No. 9", which laid down a programme of combined operations training
beginning with the 2nd Division and continuing with the 1st and 3rd in that order. This
was simply security cover to prevent dangerous speculation about the training which the
2nd Division was now to undertake for Operation "Rutter", the name by which the
Dieppe project was known at this stage.
There had been a feeling that the relationship between Home Forces and the Chief of
Combined Operations in connection with raids required clarification; and on 5 May a new
directive122 was issued. This provided that if, after consultation with the C.C.O., the
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces agreed that a raiding project should be given further
study, he would decide upon the Command from which the troops were to be found, and
would delegate responsibility for the operation to the G.O.C.-in-C. that Command. The
latter could retain the responsibility himself or delegate it "not below a Divisional
Commander". An outline plan would then be prepared by the combined planning staffs of
Home Forces and C.O.H.Q.,
*The story has been widely circulated that the Chief of Combined Operations made a plan based on flank attacks, and
that "the Canadians" then altered it and insisted on a frontal attack.119 This tale, it will be observed, is quite without
foundation. See also below, page 395.
with participation by the Army, Corps or Divisional Commander nominated and his staff.
Once the outline plan was approved by the Chiefs of Staff, Force Commanders for the
three services would be appointed, and these with their staffs would work out the detailed
plan.
Planning and Training for the Raid
The opening paragraphs of the Dieppe Outline Plan, as approved on 25 April, ran as
follows:123
OBJECT
1. Intelligence reports indicate that DIEPPE is not heavily defended and that the beaches in the
vicinity are suitable for landing infantry, and A.F.Vs [Armoured Fighting Vehicles] at some. It is also
reported that there are 40 invasion barges in the harbour.
2. It is therefore proposed to carry out a raid with the following objectives:—
(a) destroying enemy defences in the vicinity of DIEPPE
(b) destroying the aerodrome installations at ST. AUBIN
(c) destroying R.D.F. stations, power stations, dock and rail facilities and petrol dumps in the vicinity.
(d) removing invasion barges for our own use.
(e) removal of secret documents from the Divisional Headquarters at ARQUES.
(f) to capture prisoners.
INTENTION
3. A force of infantry, airborne troops and A.F.Vs will land in the area of DIEPPE to seize the town
and vicinity. This area will be held during daylight while the tasks are carried out. The force will then
re-embark.
4. The operation will be supported by fighter aircraft and bomber action.
The naval force employed was to comprise some six small destroyers of the "Hunt"
class, a shallow-draught gunboat, seven infantry landing ships, and numerous small craft.
The military forces were to be two infantry brigades with engineers, and "up to a
battalion of Army tanks". The air forces assigned in the Outline Plan were "5 squadrons
of support fighters, one squadron of fighter bombers and sufficient bombers to produce
extensive bombardments on selected areas and targets"; the bomber requirement was
calculated in more detail as "approximately 150 bomber sorties and 2 squadrons of low
level bombers, excluding aircraft for airborne forces". Fighter cover would be provided
from "one hour after the beginning of nautical twilight" throughout the daylight hours of
the operation. The suggested provision of fighter squadrons is ludicrously small when
compared with the number actually employed in the operation; either the planners made a
curious miscalculation, or the figures stated are intended to indicate, not the total number
of squadrons required, but the number required to be in action at any one time.
The plan provided for two infantry flank attacks, at Puys and Pourville, the force
landing at the latter being the stronger and having the special task
of capturing the aerodrome. Simultaneously with these attacks, parachute troops would
be dropped to attack the German divisional headquarters believed to exist at Arques and
the coastal and anti-aircraft batteries in the area. The possible use of glider-borne troops
was also envisaged. Half an hour after the flank attacks, the frontal attack would be put in
at Dieppe itself by "up to 2 infantry battalions and up to 30 or their equivalent load Army
tanks". One infantry battalion would be in "floating reserve", and the balance of the tank
unit would be available, when required, to land either at Dieppe or "to the west" of it.
As for air preparation, the plan included a heavy bomber attack against "the town and
the aerodrome" during the night preceding the raid, commencing at a time "most suitable
to Bomber Command" and ceasing "not later than one hour before the beginning of
nautical twilight". Between 30 and 50 minutes after the beginning of nautical twilight,
there would be "low level bombing by Blenheims followed by Hurricane bombers",
directed against the beach area and other selected areas in the vicinity. Amendments to
the Outline Plan circulated on 15 May changed the objective of the heavy bomber attack
to read simply "the dock area", and eliminated both the low-level bombing by Blenheims
and the two squadrons of aircraft which had been intended for this task.124
The first task of the 2nd Canadian Division's General Staff was to make an
"appreciation" of the Outline Plan as presented to it. This appreciation,125 which was
signed by the Division's G.S.O. 1 (Lt.-Col. C. C. Mann) and is not dated, remarks, "The
question of the right point at which to land A.F.V. in this operation is the outstanding
feature of the Plan", and the paper is largely concerned with this matter. Mann discussed
the possibility of landing tanks at Quiberville, but decided that the effect of the river
obstacles was to limit tank landings to the area between the rivers Scie and Arques. With
reference to the Pourville beach, which was known to have "one exit (a one way track)"
and might have another, the appreciation concluded that this might be useful as a landing
place for later flights of tanks, but not for an initial landing. Of the plan for landing tanks
on the main beach in front of Dieppe, it said in part:
Such a plan, on the face of it, is almost a fantastic conception of the place most suited
to land a strong force of A.F.V. It is however, well worth evaluating with an unbiassed
mind.
Advantages.
(a) It, if successful, puts the A.F.V. in easy striking distance of the most appropriate objectives
for their employment. (b) Surprise.
(c) Could have a terrific moral effect on both Germans and French.
(d) Would be most easily supported by infantry and R.E.
(e) Control and information will be from front to rear, and difficulties of co-ordination to
surmount obstacles, and deal with resistance would be the more easily met.
It was further argued that landing on the main beach would simplify the supply of
ammunition for tanks and of engineer stores for the support of tanks and for demolition
tasks; while the navy considered it best to re-embark the force at one place only. The
proposed plan had "the advantage of simplicity", and it was the best choice in connection
with withdrawal, as a rearguard action to cover re-embarkation would almost certainly be
necessary.
It was recognized that it had disadvantages. It involved "attacking the enemy
frontally", and "where penetration is obstructed and where engineer effort is required";
and the danger of failure to penetrate through Dieppe after the heavy air bombardment
and its attendant damage was also noted. However, the appreciation observed that the
known strength of the garrison at Dieppe was low (it mentioned two companies of
infantry). The final section ran as follows:
Conclusion.
In spite of an initial adverse reaction to the proposal to land A.F.V. on DIEPPE front, it seems to
have a reasonable prospect of success, and offers the best opportunity to exploit the characteristics of
A.F.V. in this operation.
If A.F.V. were omitted from the operation it could be still very useful, but the likelihood of success
in regard to the destruction of the aerodrome would be greatly reduced.
In regard to the withdrawal phase, a proportion of A.F.V. as part of the Rear-guard will materially
strengthen the rear-guard at a time when enemy reinforcements may be deploying for counter-attack
with the object of preventing our withdrawal.
I am in favour of adopting the outline plan.
The Canadian military authorities could, if they chose, have rejected the Outline Plan
and allowed some British formation to undertake the operation. Those who have followed
the story thus far, however, will realize how loath any Canadian officer, in 1942, would
have been to reject any plan, proposed by competent authority, which promised action;
they will realize, too, how violently resentful the ordinary Canadian soldier would have
been had an enterprise like the Dieppe raid been carried out at this time without the
participation of the Canadian force which had waited so long for battle. Such an event
might have had most serious consequences for morale.
Lord Louis Mountbatten submitted the Outline Plan to the Chiefs of Staff Committee
on, apparently, 13 May. The same day he advised the Military and Air Force
Commanders that the Committee had approved their appointments and directives, and
had accepted the Outline Plan as a basis for detailed planning.126 General Roberts was to
be Military Force Commander and Air Vice-Marshal T. L. Leigh-Mallory (Air Officer
Commanding No. 11 Fighter Group) Air Force Commander. The Naval Force
Commander, appointed subsequently, was Rear-Admiral H. T. Baillie-Grohman.
On the same day on which General Montgomery told him of the projected operation,
General McNaughton cabled to the Chief of the
General Staff in Ottawa, referring to the permission given in October 1941 to commit
Canadian troops to "minor" operations without special authority.* This "Most Secret"
personal cable said in part, "Plans are now being made which involve operations of type
indicated but on a scale which cannot properly be classed as 'minor' ”, and asked that
McNaughton's authority be widened by deleting the word "minor" from the phrase
"minor projects of a temporary nature". The War Committee of the Cabinet considered
this on 1 May, and the Army Commander was informed that it had approved his
proposal, subject to the same considerations (as to approval by the United Kingdom
Government, and as to his being satisfied with the plans) which had been laid down when
the Spitsbergen operation was in contemplation.127 In the interest of secrecy, no
information as to the time or place of the raid was requested by or sent to Canada;
Brigadier J. E. Genet, Chief Signal Officer, First Canadian Army, made a trip to Ottawa
at this time and carried a verbal message from General McNaughton to the C.G.S., but
even this did not give these details.128 On 15 May McNaughton sent a cable129 giving a
general indication of the size of the force involved and added:
Outline Plan has been approved by Chiefs of Staff Committee. I am satisfied (a) objective is
worthwhile (b) land forces detailed are sufficient (c) sea and air forces adequate (d) arrangements for
cooperation satisfactory. I have therefore accepted this outline plan and authorized detail planning to
proceed.
On this same date McNaughton had sent to Lieutenant-General J. G. des R. Swayne,

C.G.S. at G.H.Q. Home Forces, a "Most Secret and Personal" letter130 confirming his
acceptance of the arrangements for Canadian participation in the operation, but
suggesting a somewhat different procedure in future:
1. I confirm that I accept the outline plan for Operation 'RUTTER' as approved by the Chiefs of Staff
Committee.
2. I confirm that I authorize the Canadian Commander to proceed with detail planning.
3. It would be appreciated if you would obtain for me a copy of paper giving outline plan of this
operation as approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, this paper to be held by you to my order, for
reference as I may require, and in any event to be handed to me on completion of operation, for
transmission by me to my Government.
4. I suggest that in future Combined operations involving Canadian troops, the outline plan should be
placed before me before submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and that the Chiefs of Staff Paper
should show that in giving their approval they take note of my acceptance; also that I should be included
in the distribution list.
Canadian officers had already joined in the work of developing the Outline Plan into
detailed orders; and instructions had been issued for
*Above, page 308.

specialized training for the troops in the Isle of Wight. Headquarters 2nd Division arrived
on 18 May, and the whole Canadian force was in the island by the 20th.131 It consisted of
the 4th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Sherwood Lett and consisting of The
Royal Regiment of Canada, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and The Essex Scottish
Regiment; the 6th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier W. W. Southam and
consisting of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of
Canada and The South Saskatchewan Regiment; the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment
(The Calgary Regiment), a unit of the 1st Army Tank Brigade; light anti-aircraft and field
artillery detachments (to man captured guns); and considerable numbers of engineers,
plus the necessary administrative units.
The units immediately began an intensive programme designed to harden the men
and otherwise prepare them for the arduous work ahead. It included not only boat work
but also assault courses, unarmed combat, speed marches, etc. Training on a battalion
basis having gone as far as it could be carried in the time available, a large-scale
combined exercise known by the code name "Yukon", which was in fact a dress rehearsal
for the raid, was held on 11-12 June near Bridport, Dorset, on a stretch of coast
resembling the Dieppe area. Generals Paget, McNaughton and Crerar watched the troops
landing at dawn on 12 June.132
"Yukon" did not go well. Units were landed miles from the proper beaches, and the
tank landing craft arrived over an hour late. Lord Louis Mountbatten was in the United
States at the time; but on his return he decided that further rehearsal was essential and
that no attempt should be made to carry out the operation during the favourable moon and
tide period beginning 21 June, as had been intended.133 The force remained in the Isle of
Wight, and on 22-23 June another rehearsal ("Yukon II") was carried out at the same
place as before, both Mountbatten and General Montgomery being present this time.
The results were much more satisfactory, but certain defects were still evident,
particularly on the naval side. General McNaughton asked General Montgomery to take
these matters up with the naval authorities, and General Paget wrote to him to the same
effect.134 Mongomery reported to Paget on 1 July that he had explored the question with
the Chief of Combined Operations and the three Force Commanders and was satisfied
that arrangements which had now been made* would ensure better results on the points
mentioned, which related particularly to lack of precision in time and place
*These included the provision of three special radar vessels, and the presence of two officers with special knowledge
of the Dieppe area of the French coast, who would "lead the flank parties in".
in landings, and to use of covering smoke. In the same letter Montgomery expressed his
general views on the prospect, as follows:
2. I went over to the Isle of Wight yesterday and spent the whole day there. checking over the whole
operation with Roberts, and with the Naval and R.A.F. Force Commanders.
I am satisfied that the operation as planned is a possible one and has good prospects of success,
given:
(a) Favourable weather.
(b) Average luck.
(c) That the Navy put us ashore roughly in the right places, and at the right times …
3. In an operation of this sort I regard "confidence" as an essential ingredient for success.
I am now satisfied that, throughout the Force, Commanders. Staffs. and Regimental Officers have
confidence in the combined plan and in the successful outcome of the operation.
I say "now", because there was a moment when certain senior officers began to waver about lack of
confidence on the part of the troops-which statements were quite untrue. They really lacked
confidence in themselves.
You may be interested to see certain notes I gave to Roberts regarding training. I considered it
necessary to add an extra para 9 to these notes. The matter has been firmly handled.
The notes are attached.
4. Mountbatten, myself, and Leigh-Mallory will be together at 11 Fighter Group H.Q., during the
whole operation.
The Battle once begun can be influenced only by the use of air power, and that is therefore the best
place for us ...
P.S. The Canadians are 1st Class chaps; if anyone can pull it off, they will.
The "extra para 9", to which General Montgomery referred, developed the theme of
"confidence in success", and the essentiality of "an infectious optimism which will
permeate right down through the Force, down to the rank and file". The present writer has
seen no other evidence on this question of "confidence" except General Crerar's letter,
quoted in the succeeding paragraph, which indicates that the reason for the momentary
doubts was the naval errors during the exercises.
The best possible assurances having been received that the weaknesses appearing in
the rehearsals had been corrected, the senior Canadian officers gave their final approval.
On 3 July General Crerar, having seen General Montgomery's letter quoted above, wrote
General McNaughton, in part as follows:
2. I spent yesterday with Roberts. He and his Brigadiers expressed full confidence in being able to carry
out their tasks-given a break in luck. There was previously some doubt as to the ability of the Navy to
touch them down on the right beaches. That has now pretty well disappeared, although I told Roberts
that 100% accuracy should never be expected in any human endeavour, and that some error might be
expected, and should be then solved by rapid thinking and decision.
3. I agree that the plan is sound, and most carefully worked out. I should have no hesitation in tackling
it, if in Roberts' place....
On the same day, McNaughton wrote to Paget, "I now have the reports of Comd 1
Cdn Corps and I am satisfied that all arrangements for Operation ["Rutter"] are in
order and that this operation may now proceed."135
Although McNaughton and Crerar thus endorsed the "Rutter" plan, the reader will
have noted that they had had nothing to do with making it. Montgomery had not
delegated the responsibility for the military planning, but had kept it in his own hands.
Neither McNaughton nor Crerar had a place in the "chain of command" for the operation,
though they could and would certainly have intervened as representatives of Canadian
authority had they thought the plan unsound.
Changes in the Plan
While the Canadians were assembling and beginning their training in the Isle of
Wight, detailed planning was proceeding in London, under the direction of Lord Louis
Mountbatten, the three Force Commanders, and General Montgomery, who himself
attended some of the planning meetings. During this phase the original Outline Plan was
materially altered. The most important change was the elimination of the heavy air
bombardment. This decision was taken by a meeting, presided over by General
Montgomery, on 5 June. The portion of the minutes of this meeting136 relating to the air
plan runs as follows:
5. Air Vice Marshal Leieh-Mallory proposed and the meeting agreed that air bombing of the port
itself during the night of the assault would not be the most profitable way of using the bombers, as a raid
which was not over-powering. might only result in putting everyone on the alert. As an alternative he
proposed bombing BOULOGNE with 70 aircraft with a view of creating a diversion there, and he
proposed al-o the bombing of CRECY and ABBEVILLE aerodromes between 0230 and 0400 hours.* It
was emphasised that the movement of our aircraft in the vicinity of ABBEVILLE and CRECY would
tend to occupy the R.D.F. organisation at DIEPPE and might put out of action, at least for some hours,
two aerodromes which the enemy would wish to use during the day of the operation.
6. It was agreed that cannon fighters should attack the beach defences and the high ground on either
side of DIEPPE, as the first flight of landing craft were coming in to land. it was also agreed that air
action would be taken against
German Headquarters in ARQUES at 0440.
One factor in the discussion of bombing had been the inevitable casualties to the
French population. This was not, however, a major element in the cancellation of the
bombardment. It was the normal rule that targets in Occupied France could be bombed
only when weather permitted a very high degree of accuracy (and this had prevented
bombing in support of the St. Nazaire raid). The Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the
Prime Minister on 19 May that this rule should be relaxed "so far as Combined
Operations are concerned"; and on 30 May Mr. Churchill agreed to this limited
relaxation.137
*These proposed diversionary operations were not carried out on 18-19 August, although Abbeville aerodrome was
bombed in the course of the raid.
The minutes of the meeting of 5 June make no reference to General Roberts' views on
the air bombardment, but he has confirmed138 that an important element in his acceptance
of the Air Force Commander's recommendation for the elimination of it was his fear that
this attack would so block the streets of Dieppe as to prevent the tanks landed on the
beach from getting through to deliver their attack upon the aerodrome to the south. It will
be recalled that this danger had been noticed in Lt.-Col. Mann's original appreciation of
the Outline Plan.
The Detailed Military Plan for Operation "Rutter", a very long document, bore the
date 20 June. A considerable number of amendments were subsequently issued.
Just at the time when Operation "Rutter" was in the final stages of preparation, its
desirability was re-examined at a high level. Mr. Churchill, as we have seen, visited the
United States for a few days in June. He returned home on the 26th, seriously concerned
over the reverses in North Africa and particularly the loss of Tobruk.139 On 30 June* he
held a small private conference at No. 10 Downing Street to seek opinions on the Dieppe
project. The only persons present, according to the recollection of one of them, were the
Prime Minister himself, General Brooke, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Captain Hughes-
Hallett, and two officers of the staff of the Ministry of Defence, General Ismay and
Brigadier Hollis. During the discussion Mr. Churchill showed some anxiety, and asked
Mountbatten whether he could "guarantee success", to which Mountbatten naturally
replied that he could not. Captain Hughes-Hallett had just spent some time training with
The Cameron Highlanders of Canada in the guise of a private soldier ("Private Charles
Hallett"), his object being to find out what combined training looked like to the soldiers.
He was asked his opinion of the troops, and assured the Prime Minister that the men he
had lately been with would "fight like hell".
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff is reported to have now intervened and stated
in decided terms the view that the Dieppe operation was indispensable to the Allied
offensive programme. He told Mr. Churchill that if it was ever intended to invade France it
was essential to launch a preliminary operation on a divisional scale.140 This opinion from
the highest military authority presumably carried the day, and it was doubtless of this
conference that Mr. Churchill was thinking when on 8 September 1942 he told the British
House of Commons, "I, personally, regarded the Dieppe assault, to which I gave my
sanction, as an indispensable preliminary to full-scale operations". The Dieppe plan might
perhaps have been considered to contravene the principle agreed upon a few weeks earlier,
*Sir Winston Churchill's memoirs might suggest that this happened at a later stage. Admiral Hughes-Hallett's diary,
however, establishes the date. It is probably the only written record of the date of the meeting.
"No substantial landing in France unless we are going to stay" (above, page 315).
However, the force involved was somewhat smaller than that proposed for "Imperator",
the scheme which led to the enunciation of that principle.
We have noted above General Montgomery's intention of "watching" the operation,
with Lord Louis Mountbatten and Air Vice-Marshal LeighMallory, from Headquarters
No. 11 Fighter Group at Uxbridge. No Canadian was to be present, and when this came
to his attention General McNaughton wrote to General Paget suggesting that "having
regard to the particular Canadian responsibility in this matter and to maintain the proper
channel of command to the Canadian units involved", General Crerar should be with the
group of senior officers at Uxbridge. G.H.Q. Home Forces did not sympathize with this
point of view, pointing out that Montgomery had retained direction of the operation
himself and that Crerar accordingly would not be exercising active command.141 The
British military authorities, in other words, proposed to treat the question precisely as
though the 2nd Division had been one of their own formations.
On 4 July General Crerar discussed the matter at length with General Montgomery,
pointing out that it was a mistake to "treat the problem of command of Canadian troops
as a simple military issue, capable of solution along strictly British channels of
command". The fact that Crerar's troops had been placed under Montgomery's
operational command did not imply, he argued, "that I could be divested of my
responsibility through Lieut.General McNaughton to the Canadian Government in respect
to the manner in which those troops were committed to actual operations". He left no
doubt in Montgomery's mind that the Canadian force in England could not be regarded
merely as part of the British Army; it was in a special constitutional position:
In order to illustrate this point in a general way I suggested that the position of C.-in-C., Home
Forces, in respect to Lieut.-General McNaughton, and the Canadian Army in the U.K. was very similar
to that occupied by Field Marshal Foch in relation to Field Marshal Haig and the B.E.F. in the last war.
These explanations convinced Montgomery of the importance of having some senior

representation of the Canadian Army at the headquarters from which the operation was to
be directed; he thanked Crerar for his frankness, and proceeded to invite both
McNaughton and Crerar to join him at Uxbridge on the day of the operation.142
The Cancellation of Operation "Rutter"
Amphibious raids, as we have noted, are governed by the moon and the tide, and there
are only a few days in each month when conditions are
suitable. Following the comparatively satisfactory results of Exercise "Yukon II", it was
decided that Operation "Rutter" should take place, on 4 July or one of the days following.
On 27 June General Roberts called a conference of all the officers of his raiding force and
for the first time outlined the plan fully. Even now, however, the actual objective was not
mentioned; and officers were warned that "other ranks are not to be informed until on
board ship".143 On 2 and 3 July the troops were embarked on the infantry landing ships
which were to carry them across the Channel, and thereafter remained "sealed" on board.
They were now told that what had hitherto been referred to as Exercise "Klondike I" was
in fact to be an actual operation. General Roberts and Admiral Mountbatten visited the
ships and spoke to the men. Every soldier was fully "briefed" on his detailed task.144
On 3 July the weather was unsuitable for launching the enterprise, and it was
accordingly postponed for twenty-four hours. The next morning, conditions still being
unfavourable, it was again put off. On the 5th, since the weather was too unsettled to
permit the expedition to sail that night, and seemed likely to remain unsettled for the next
48 hours, a conference was held and the plan for the operation was considerably altered.
It appeared that 8 July was the only possible date remaining; under the existing
conditions, the raid, if carried out that day, would have lasted for two tides, and
withdrawal would not have begun until five in the afternoon. A new element in the
situation was a report that the German 10th Panzer Division, an important factor in our
calculations, had moved closer to the coast and was now at Amiens, only about eight
hours from Dieppe.* The plan was accordingly revised, placing it on a one-tide basis,
with the whole force re-embarking by 11:00 a.m.146
The concentration of shipping about the Isle of Wight had not escaped the enemy's
notice. At 6:15 a.m. on 7 July four of his aircraft struck at vessels of the force lying in
Yarmouth Roads near the west end of the Solent. Bombs hit two landing ships, Princess
Astrid and Princess Josephine Charlotte, both carrying mainly men of The Royal
Regiment of Canada. Fortunately "the bombs passed completely through the ships before
exploding", and the regiment suffered only four minor casualties. This attack in itself was
not enough to cause cancellation of the operation. The Royals were hastily landed and
marched to another anchorage for embarkation in another vessel.147 The naval experts,
however, decided that the weather was still too bad to permit of attempting the operation
on 8 July. It was accordingly cancelled. The bitterly disappointed soldiers left their ships
and the force which had spent so long in the Isle of Wight was returned to the mainland
and dispersed.
*This report was accurate. The German situation map of 28 May shows this Division's headquarters at Soissons; that
of 9 June shows it as having moved up to Amiens.145
As many thousands of men now knew that it had been intended to raid Dieppe, and
once they left the ships it would no longer be possible to maintain complete secrecy,
General Montgomery "recommended to the powers that be that the operation be off for
all time". As it turned out, it was off for a week. Mountbatten had in fact recommended to
the Chiefs of Staff on 6 July that if the raid did not take place on the date then proposed
(presumably 8 July) the force should be disbanded and consideration given to mounting
the operation again at a later date.148
The Revival of the Operation
On the circumstances in which the project of the raid was revived about 14 July, and
on the reasons for the revival, there is comparatively little written evidence. The account
which follows is, accordingly, based in great part upon the recollections of officers who
were closely concerned in the matter.
The cancellation of the Dieppe project had caused deep chagrin at Combined
Operations Headquarters, and there is no doubt that it was the staff of C.O.H.Q. that was
responsible for the revival.* On the evening of the cancellation Capt. Hughes-Hallett
spoke most strongly at a meeting of the C.O.H.Q. "Council and Advisers", going so far as
to suggest an inquiry by some outside authority into the question of whether there was a
defect in the method of planning and whether the recent cancellations of operations had
been justified. On 10 July another meeting, presided over by Lord Louis Mountbatten,
agreed "that an alternative 'Rutter' should be examined" and discussed with the security
authorities.149 The decision to revive the operation followed.
Apart from the fact that the cancellation had seriously disappointed the Canadian
troops, there were other factors which made a major operation in the West expedient at
this moment. The public in the Allied countries was calling loudly for action, and
considerations of morale made it desirable to meet the demand so far as it was practicable
to do so. At the same time, continuing German advances in Russia rendered it essential to
give any diversionary aid possible to our Soviet allies. The writer has found no evidence
that the Russian situation was actually a large direct factor in the decision to revive the
Dieppe scheme (it was not likely to weigh particularly
*" . . . the abandonment of these two raids [Alderney and Dieppe] was rightly felt to be tantamount to a defeat. That
was why so much' importance was attached to re-mounting and carrying out the Dieppe raid after all . not the least
remarkable feature of the operation was the fact of its having been carried out at all, and this was due to the united
determination of the Chief of Combined Operations and his subordinates to drive on, unless told otherwise by superior
authority" (Rear-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett, "The Mounting of Raids", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,
November 1950).
heavily at Combined Operations Headquarters, which worked mainly on the tactical

level), but the news that a big distracting raid in the West was again in prospect was
welcomed by the British Prime Minister, who shortly after the decision was taken found
himself faced with the formidable task of informing Marshal Stalin that there was to be
no immediate "second front". On 25 July, General McNaughton had a conversation with
Lord Louis Mountbatten, during which the latter stated that the Prime Minister and the
War Cabinet had approved the revived raid, now known as Operation "Jubilee". (It
appears that the reference to the War Cabinet was a misunderstanding.) McNaughton's
memorandum of the conversation150 adds:
It appears that Stalin had cabled the Prime Minister asking what was being done to distract the
Germans by raiding. The Prime Minister had been very pleased to be able to reply indicating action was
in hand and in consequence he had approved the highest priority in preparation for J[ubilee].
What had actually happened was that on the evening of 23 July Mr. Churchill had
received from the hands of the Soviet ambassador a telegram from Stalin, which is
published in the Prime Minister's memoirs, complaining bitterly of the decision which
had been taken to suspend Arctic convoys to Russia for the present, and once more
demanding a second front in Europe in 1942. In the course of his conversation with M.
Maisky the Prime Minister told him that heavy raids on the Continent would be carried
out in the near future.
By this time, the reader will have noted, the decision had been taken to abandon
Operation "Sledgehammer". However, the revival of the raid was not a result of that
abandonment; the decision to revive it seems to have been firm at Combined Operations
Headquarters by 14 July (there is a reference to the revival in General McNaughton's
personal war diary under this date), and it was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee
on 20 July;* whereas the final decision against "Sledgehammer" was not taken until 22
July, although the British authorities were undoubtedly certain in their 'own minds long
before that day that the operation would not take place. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
after that decision "Jubilee" served as at least a partial substitute for "Sledgehammer",
and was welcomed in the highest circles accordingly. Whether it was also regarded as
useful security cover for the North African enterprise, in that it would help to focus the
enemy's attention on the coast of France during the period of preparation, remains
conjectural; no documents bearing on this have been found.
In mid-July the Dieppe scheme was the best possibility for an early considerable
operation, such as seemed desirable for so many reasons. It
*The approval is implied in that given to the appointment of Hughes-Hallett as naval commander for "the next large-
scale raiding operation". The absence of more specific approval in the record is probably the result of determination to take
extreme security precautions in connection with the revived operation.
offered a ready-made plan and a force already trained. It was now subject, however, to
serious objections on security grounds; for the possibility had to be accepted that, so
many thousands of men having been ' fully briefed before the cancellation, the enemy
might have got wind of our plan. It could only be revived, therefore, if we could be more
than reasonably certain that information of the revival would not reach the Germans. A
satisfactory formula was found by Hughes-Hallett.
With the military force trained as it was, he suggested, the raid could be re-mounted
in such a way as to make it very difficult of detection in advance; for there was no need
to concentrate the force beforehand. Instead, the various units could move direct from
their stations to their ports of embarkation, and embark there on the same evening on
which they were to sail. Moreover, whereas for "Rutter" all the units had been embarked
in infantry landing ships, with the intention of transferring them to small craft some ten
miles from the French coast, it was now suggested that three of them might make the
whole cross-Channel journey in personnel landing craft. This permitted further
dispersion; and for the actual operation Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal embarked at the small
port of Shoreham in Sussex, and the Cameron Highlanders and No. 3 Commando at
Newhaven. This new basis proved acceptable to all parties; and the selection of Hughes-
Hallett himself as Naval Force Commander was approved by the Chiefs of Staff on 20
July (above, page 341).151
Although in essentials the actual attack plan was the same as before (it had to be if
the operation was to be launched without long delay), there were some modifications. In
particular, since the use of paratroops demanded ideal weather conditions and also
required considerable time for briefing, it was decided to eliminate this element of the
force, substituting Commando units, who would have the task of neutralizing the two
formidable coastal batteries, one on either side of Dieppe, which if left alone would make
it impossible for our ships to lie off the coast.
The "chain of command" was also different. We have seen that for "Rutter" the
responsible military authority had been the G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command, who
had not delegated his control to any subordinate. The G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army
had thus held only an undefined watching brief. General McNaughton now arranged that
the revived operation would be placed on a different basis. On 16 July he discussed the
question with the Chief of Combined Operations and General Roberts. His memorandum
of this meeting152 runs in part as follows:
. . . In reference to the military channel of command I said I would ask General Paget to agree to
General Crerar being named as the responsible military officer to co-ordinate and if this were done I
would arm him with appropriate authority as regards the use of Canadian troops.
I told Lord Louis Mountbatten that the detailed proposals for the Operation when prepared would be
subject to my approval in the same way as C.-in-C. Home Forces and Chiefs of Staff Committee had
approval for operations of British troops.
The following day General McNaughton had an interview with General Paget "and it was
agreed that channel of command would run C.-in-C. Home Forces—Comd 1 Cdn
Army—Comd 1 Cdn Corps—Comd 2 Cdn Div".153 This placed the military command
on an entirely new basis, with the G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command (General
Montgomery) playing no part.* On 24 July Home Forces formally advised South Eastern
Command that the C.-in-C. had made the Canadian Army Commander "the military
officer responsible for the conduct of raiding operations to be carried out by troops under
his command"; and on 27 July McNaughton wrote formally to Crerar, delegating to him,
in accordance with the Home Forces letter of 5 May, the military responsibility for
Operation "Jubilee".154
In the meantime, planning had been resumed. Lt.-Col. Mann had been promoted
Brigadier and appointed Brigadier General Staff, 1st Canadian Corps, as of 13 July.
General Roberts asked General Crerar to lend him so that he might continue the role
which he had played in planning for "Rutter". Crerar agreed, and Mann accordingly
devoted himself exclusively to "Jubilee" during the month that followed.155 The
Combined Plan for the operation was issued under date 31 July.
Certain points arising during the planning should be briefly noted. The broad lines of
the revised plan were sketched in a well-recorded meeting of Force Commanders as early
as 16 July.156 This meeting thought it unlikely that airborne troops could be used "under
the conditions of light that will prevail" and it was provisionally decided to abandon the
idea of using them. At the same time it was agreed that briefing should be deferred "until
the last possible moment, which should not be until the operation is definitely about to
take place". Naval and military commanding officers would, however, "be warned in the
strictest confidence that an emergency operation is being planned for August and may be
ordered to take place at short notice". The Commando side of the operation was to be
separately planned. The officers directing the two Commando landings were to report to
General Roberts at an early date and be "responsible to him for their plans". The
Commandos prepared separate operation orders; there is little reference to them in the
Detailed Military Plan; and in the Order of Battle they were shown as "Under Command
from Landing" only.
At this meeting on 16 July there was further discussion of the question of aerial
bombardment. It was now proposed that the raid should take
*Before the raid actually took place, General Montgomery had in fact left for Egypt to take command of the Eighth
Army.
place during one of two periods (18-23 August and 1-7 September), and the minutes
contain the following passage:
In neither period is ,the state of the moon satisfactory from the point of view of night bombing and
Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory stressed the fact that accurate bombing of the houses on the sea front
could not possibly be guaranteed. If bombing is to be carried out at all, it should be timed to take place as
late as possible, i.e. as close as possible to the time of landing. Alternatively, it was suggested that it
might be better to dispense with the bombing, and to rely entirely on supporting fire from the destroyers.
A final and definite decision on this point is still to be made.
As late as 17 August, according to the Combined Report, the question of bombing was
reviewed by the Chief of Combined Operations and the Force Commanders. The decision
was maintained, General Roberts accepting it because of the apprehension that the
destruction caused by such an attack would make the passage of tanks through Dieppe
difficult if not impossible. He wrote some months later:157
The original plan for bombing envisaged two or three minor bombing raids on Dieppe, prior to the
operation. As these had not been carried out, it was felt that a large scale attack, probably inaccurately
placed, would merely serve to place the enemy on the alert. This was a considerable factor.
At all stages it was insisted that bombing could only be carried out by night, and inaccuracy, rather
than accuracy, was guaranteed.
The units taking part were informed of the revival of the operation only a few days
before it took place, and even then knowledge was restricted to senior officers. By way of
"security cover", orders were issued for exercises and demonstrations that would explain
the preparations which were being made. On 10 August, Headquarters 2nd Division
ordered a combined operations demonstration by the 14th Army Tank Regiment, which
would afford a pretext for the steps being taken by this unit, including waterproofing its
tanks. On 13 August Divisional Headquarters issued instructions for three movement
exercises ("Ford I", "Ford II" and "Ford III"), which were to last "for a month
commencing 15 Aug 42".158 Actually, "Ford I” was simply the movement of the
"Jubilee" units to the embarkation ports.
On 11 August General Crerar reported formally to General McNaughton. His letter
concluded:
I have today gone over in detail the plans for the Exercise, as now agreed to by the Naval, Army
and Air Force Commanders and am satisfied that the revisions made in respect to the previous exercise
plans add rather than detract to the soundness of the plan as a whole. I am, therefore, of the opinion that,
given an even break in luck and good navigation, the demonstration should prove successful.
On 14 August McNaughton went over the plans with Crerar and Roberts, and on the
same day wrote to Crerar confirming that he was "satisfied with these plans and with the
arrangements made in all respects" and finally sanctioning the participation of Canadian
troops in the raid.159
The actual movement to the ports began on the evening of 16 August, when six
troops of the Calgary Regiment's tanks began to move to Gosport, near Portsmouth,
where they were to embark. The main body of tanks embarked at Newhaven, beginning
to move thither on the evening of 17 August.160 The meteorological forecast being
satisfactory though not ideal, the final orders for the operation were issued on the
morning of 18 August,161 and that afternoon the infantry units moved by motor transport
from their stations to the ports. So far, the rank and file had known nothing of what was
planned; only after the troops had embarked on the infantry landing ships were they told
that there was to be an actual raid. "Maps and air photographs* were distributed to all
ranks, and the details of the raid ... were explained to all personnel." The men of the units
which were to cross the Channel in small craft were briefed in specially guarded
buildings at the ports. The battalions were on "assault scales"—each approximately 500
strong. The transport and other surplus personnel, left behind at the normal stations, were
under the impression that the main bodies were on "a two-day exercise".162
Counting Gosport separately from Portsmouth, the force embarked at five different
ports. Six infantry landing ships sailed from Southampton and three from Portsmouth.
Some tank landing craft sailed from Portsmouth and some from Newhaven, from which
two of the three personnel landing craft (L.C.P.(L)) groups also sailed. The third
L.C.P.(L) group sailed from Shoreham. The naval force was organized in thirteen
groups,163 sailing at varying speeds, and the Naval Force Commander had a difficult and
complicated task. All told, his force amounted to 237 ships and landing craft, not
including the 16 vessels of the 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotillas, which were
employed to clear the way through a German minefield which had lately been reported in
mid-Channel.164 No vessels larger than "Hunt" class destroyers (1000 tons, four 4-inch
guns) were included; there were eight of these (Calpe, Fernie, Brocklesby, Garth,
Albrighton, Berkeley, Bleasdale, and the Polish ship Slazak), in addition to the gunboat
Locust and the sloop Alresford.
All told, the military force embarked amounted to approximately 6100 all ranks, of
whom 4963 were Canadians and about 1075 were British.† There were some 50 all ranks
from the 1st U.S. Ranger Battalion-dispersed among various units as observers-and 20 all
ranks of No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando. Of these last, 15 were French, and five were
anti-Nazi enemy nationals who could expect to be shot if captured.165
*Capt. D. F. MacRae, in a narrative attached to the war diary of the Essex Scottish, states that these were new
photographs, taken on 16 August.
†Canadian figures compiled at C.M.H.Q. in 1943, on basis of information supplied by Canadian Overseas Records
Office and Canadian Section G.H.Q. Second Echelon. No exact figures for British units are available except for the Royal
Marine "A" Commando (18 officers and 352 other ranks).
As the infantry landing ships had to sail before dark, they rigged disguises giving
them the appearance of merchant vessels. The first ship to clear the gate of the
Portsmouth defences was H.M.S. Queen Emma, carrying part of The Royal Regiment of
Canada; she passed through at 9:25 p.m. The first tank landing craft left Newhaven
harbour a few minutes later.166 As darkness fell, the various groups of Captain Hughes-
Hallett's force drew into formation and shaped their carefully pre-arranged courses
towards Dieppe.
The Plan of Operation "Jubilee"
At this point the plan for the raid should be described in greater detail than
heretofore.167
As already indicated, it involved attacks at five different points on a front of roughly
ten miles. At 4:50 a.m. (British Summer Time) four simultaneous surprise flank attacks
were to go in.* This hour was calculated as "the beginning of nautical twilight", the
intention being that the craft would touch down while it was still dark enough to make it
hard for any enemy gunners who might be on the alert to see their targets.
The flank attacks, from right to left, were as follows: upon the coastal battery near
Varengeville ("Orange I" and "Orange II" Beaches) by No. 4 Commando, commanded by
Lt.-Col. Lord Lovat; at Pourville ("Green" Beach) by The South Saskatchewan Regiment,
commanded by Lt.-Col. C. C. I. Merritt; at Puys ("Blue" Beach) by The Royal Regiment
of Canada, commanded by Lt.-Col. D. E. Catto; and upon the battery near Berneval
("Yellow I" and "Yellow II" Beaches) by No. 3 Commando, commanded by Lt.-Col. J. F.
Durnford-Slater. The main attack was to go in on the long beach fronting the town of
Dieppe itself half an hour later, i.e., at 5:20 a.m. The reasons for this delay were naval.
Had the frontal and flank assaults been simultaneous, there would not have been sea-
room for all the ships and craft involved; as it was, the concentration of assault landing
craft on the main beaches was perhaps heavier than in any other amphibious operation of
the war. Moreover, an earlier assault on the main beaches would have involved the
infantry landing ships' leaving harbour half an hour earlier, and they would almost
certainly have been sighted by the regular German evening air reconnaissance.168
The frontal attack was to be delivered on the right ("White" Beach) by The Royal
Hamilton Light Infantry, commanded by Lt.-Col. R. R. Labatt, and on the left ("Red"
Beach) by The Essex Scottish Regiment, commanded by Lt.-Col. F. K. Jasperson. The
first nine tanks of the 14th Army Tank
*All times in the narrative that follows, except in direct quotations from German documents, are B.S.T. (one hour in
advance of Greenwich Time). The Germans were operating on the equivalent of British Double Summer Time, two hours
in advance of Greenwich.
Regiment, commanded by Lt.-Col. J. G. Andrews, were to land simultaneously with the

first wave of infantry.169 General Roberts had as "floating reserve" one infantry battalion,
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, commanded by Lt: Col. D. Menard, and the Royal Marine "A"
Commando, commanded by Lt.-Col. J. P. Phillipps. The Marines had the specific task of
operating as a "cutting out party", which would enter the harbour in the gunboat Locust
and six Fighting French "chasseurs". Its task was to "remove as many barges as possible
in the time available, destroying the remainder and any other ships which it is not
possible to remove". If all went well, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal were to land as soon as
the town had been captured. They had the special task of occupying an inner perimeter
and would act as rearguard to cover the final withdrawal.170
Half an hour after the initial assault at Pourville (i.e., simultaneously with the frontal
attack), The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, commanded by Lt.-Col. A.
C. Gostling, were to land there, pass through The South Saskatchewan Regiment and
advance to join up with the tanks moving inland from Dieppe and "capture and destroy
the aerodrome" of St. Aubin. If time permitted, this battalion was to "exploit" to capture
the German divisional headquarters which was mistakenly believed to exist at Arques-la-
Bataille.
Very broadly, the scheme of the operation was to capture Dieppe and establish
around it a perimeter within which extensive demolitions would be carried out by the
Engineers, who were to destroy "the dry docks, swing bridges, harbour installations,
rolling stock, power and gas works and any other suitable objective".171 Outside the
perimeter the Camerons and the tanks would operate against the aerodrome and the
supposed divisional headquarters.
A far larger air force was employed than had been envisaged by the officers who
made the Outline Plan. The air tasks were described in the Air Force Commander's later
report under four headings: Fighter Cover, Close Support, Reconnaissance, and
Strategical Bombing. Fighter Cover involved general protection for the expedition
throughout the hours of daylight, but particularly during the two periods when attack
from the air was most to be feared-those of the landing and withdrawal. Close Support
involved bombing and low-flying fighter attack in direct support of the assault,
occupation and withdrawal, as well as the use of smoke-laying aircraft to neutralize
enemy defences both as pre-arranged and as requested by the Military Force Commander;
while day bomber squadrons were to be employed both against pre-arranged targets and
on request. Reconnaissance included tactical reconnaissance over the area of the raid
(including enemy reinforcements' lines of approach) as well as reconnaissance directed
against enemy submarines and surface vessels. As for Strategical Bombing, the
only enterprise under this head was an attack against the enemy's aerodrome of
Abbeville-Drucat with a view to interfering with the operation of his fighters during the
withdrawal.
All told, the air forces taking part amounted to 74 squadrons. This included 48 fighter
squadrons for cover, three which made diversionary sweeps, and six for close support, as
well as six squadrons of day bombers, two of Hurricane bombers, four army cooperation
squadrons (for tactical reconnaissance), two intruder squadrons and three squadrons for
laying smoke. The Royal Canadian Air Force provided six of the fighter squadrons and
two army cooperation squadrons.* There were also one New Zealand, five Polish, two
Norwegian, two Czech, one French and one Belgian squadron.173 The United States
Army Air Forces provided three of the fighter squadrons, as well as the four Fortress
bomber squadrons that attacked the Abbeville aerodrome.174 All the rest were R.A.F.
The organization of command was as follows. Captain Hughes-Hallett, the Naval
Force Commander, was in the headquarters ship, the destroyer Calpe; with him was
General Roberts, the Military Force Commander. Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory
remained at Headquarters No. 11 Fighter Group, Uxbridge (the best point for controlling
his squadrons), but was represented in Calpe by a senior officer, Air Commodore A. T.
Cole, R.A.A.F. In case Calpe should be destroyed or disabled, a duplicate headquarters
was provided in the destroyer Fernie; in this ship the senior army officer was Brigadier
Mann.175 The two headquarters ships were provided with greatly augmented wireless
facilities. Admiral Mountbatten and General Crerar were at Uxbridge. This, as already
noted (above, page 335) was the only place from which the battle could be influenced
once it had been joined; but in practice the influence that could be exerted from England
was slight. General McNaughton, having delegated the military responsibility for the
operation to Crerar, remained at his own headquarters during the day, but received
constant reports.176
In each headquarters ship was a Fighter Controller. All outgoing closesupport fighter
sorties called the Controller in Calpe when approaching the enemy, and he was able to re-
direct these sorties to any target which the situation demanded as the Military or Naval
Force Commanders might request. The Air Force Commander reported that this method
of control "worked admirably".177
*Nos. 400, 401, 402, 403, 411, 412, 414 and 416 Squadrons. In addition, two aircraft of No. 418 Squadron took
part.172 This squadron is included in the overall total.
CHAPTER XI
THE RAID ON DIEPPE

19 AUGUST 1942
(See Map 5 and Sketch 3)
German Defences in the West in 1942
B EFORE describing what happened at Dieppe on 19 August 1942, we should examine

the general situation of the enemy on the French coast that summer, and describe his
defences and dispositions at Dieppe itself.
When the Germans appeared on the Channel coast in 1940 they were flushed with
victory and looking forward to an early conquest of or surrender by Britain. The British
Commonwealth was in no condition to undertake any but the most minor enterprises
against them. In these circumstances, their dispositions in France were primarily directed
to preparations for offensive cross-Channel operations. During 1941, however, there was
a gradual change in attitude, particularly after it became clear that the Russian campaign
which began in June of that year was not to have an early end. More attention was now
paid to the defence of the French coast, and special orders were issued in September and
October.1 The year's activity, however, was mainly concerned with constructing field
works, and little concrete was poured.2
By December 1941 the German situation was still worse. The offensive in Russia had
come to a standstill, and on 7 December the bombs of Pearl Harbor blew the United
States into the war. On 14 December Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High
Command, issued a directive which specifically stated that the Arctic, North Sea and
Atlantic coasts controlled by Germany were "ultimately to be built into a new West
Wall". Immediate measures, however, were to be largely limited to digging field
fortifications, permanent installations being built only at "the most threatened places".
Norway was given the highest priority, with the Franco-Belgian coast second and the
coasts of Holland and Jutland third.3 As a result, there was considerable activity during
the spring of 1942. And on 23 March Hitler signed his directive No. 40, which dealt with
coastal defence problems.4 It
349
emphasized the importance of unified command arrangements, constant vigilance and

improved defences. About the same time Field-Marshal von Rundstedt was re-appointed
Commander-in-Chief West and took full responsibility for the defence of the French
coast.
As spring came on, the Germans became more and more worried about the
possibility of raids, and the attack on St. Nazaire (28 March) rendered them particularly
sensitive to reports of such enterprises; many raid rumours are recorded in German
diaries of this period. But it was not only raids that they feared now. With American
troops beginning to appear in the British Isles, and the campaign in Russia still going on,
the initiative in the West had passed to the Allies; and Hitler and his generals were
confronted with the possibility of their trying to open that Second Front which was
already the subject of so much speculation. The notorious communiques issued after
Molotov's visits to London and Washington in June (above, page 315) would probably
have been enough in themselves to lead the Germans to take special measures. During the
weeks following them, Hitler issued repeated orders enjoining precautions against a
major landing in the West.
In March 1942 the German forces there had been at a very low ebb; it would seem
indeed that at one moment the armour at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief West in
France and the Low Countries was actually only one tank battalion (stationed in the Paris
area).5 The situation map of 12 March shows in the command one armoured division
(the 23rd) but it is moving out. As the spring advanced the armoured forces in France
were increased; and on 25 June Hitler directed that several of the most formidable
formations in his armies were to "be retained in the West as a reserve until further
notice". Those specified were the 6th, 7th and 10th Panzer Divisions, the S.S. Division
"Das Reich", the 7th Flieger Division (the parachute division which had conducted the
attack on Crete in May 1941) and the "Goring" Regiment, which was to be enlarged.
"Adequate air forces" were also to be held available, and the navy was to keep a reserve
of U-Boats ready for intervention "in the event of a sudden enemy operation".6 On the
following day (26 June) the Fuhrer, "in consequence of the gathering of small vessels on
the south coast of England", ordered that the "Reich" Division, after reorganization, was
to be transferred to the West immediately. He said further that, in the event of Russian
resistance in future operations being less than was expected, he was considering
transferring two other S.S. Divisions, "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Totenkopf"
(Death's-head).7
On 9 July Hitler issued over his own signature a directive which reflected his acute
concern for the western coasts.8 It spoke of the impending necessity for Britain of "either
staging a large-scale invasion with the object of opening a second front, or seeing Russia
eliminated as a political and military factor". He referred to increasingly numerous reports
from agents concerning impending enemy landings, and the "heavy concentration of
ferrying vessels
THE RAID ON DIEPPE, 19 AUGUST 1942 351
along the southern coast of England"; note that the air attack on ships of the Dieppe force
in the Solent (above, page 339) had taken place two days before. Among areas to be
regarded as particularly threatened he listed, "In the first place, the Channel coast, the
area between Dieppe and Le Havre, and Normandy, since these sectors can be reached by
enemy fighter planes and also because they lie within range of a large portion of the
ferrying vessels". In the light of this situation Hitler ordered the immediate transfer to the
West of the available units of the "Reich" Division, without waiting to complete
reorganization; the immediate transfer to the West of the Adolf Hitler Division; the rapid
organization of the S.S. Corps Headquarters (Motorized) and its transfer to the West with
a view to its taking command of all S.S. formations there; and the postponement for the
present of the transfer of one infantry regiment to Denmark. The directive concluded:
In the event of an enemy landing I personally will proceed to the West and assume charge of
operations from there.
These measures were promptly carried out. The German operational map for 24 July9
shows the S.S. Corps Headquarters (Motorized), now re-christened Headquarters S.S.
Panzer Corps, moving by rail to Nogent le Rotrou, while the "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich"
Divisions are similarly moving into areas near Paris and Laval respectively.
By the time of the Dieppe raid, accordingly, the German army in the West had been
greatly strengthened and was in a full state of alert, expecting at any moment what might
be a major Allied enterprise. On 12 March there had been in France and the Low
Countries only 25 normal and two "Ersatz" (reinforcement) divisions; there were now 33
normal and three Ersatz divisions.10 In quality the alteration had been still more striking.
The S.S. Panzer Corps with its two crack divisions was now in the West; and whereas in
March, as we have seen, there had been practically no effective armour there, now three
Panzer Divisions (the 6th, 7th and 10th) were in von Rundstedt's area. There had been a
noticeable movement of formations closer to the coast; and the Pas de Calais had been
particularly strongly reinforced.
During the first half of August Hitler issued still further orders on the defence of the
French coast. It was now that he specifically ordered the construction of what came to be
called the Atlantic Wall. On 2 August, at a Fuhrer conference attended by Keitel and
senior engineer officers, he gave detailed instructions for a new system of coast defence.
Notes on the conference11 (which do not claim to be literal quotations) indicate that he
spoke in part to the following effect:
Development work is very limited and scanty at present. A SOLID LINE WITH UNBROKEN
FIRE MUST BE INSISTED ON AT ALL COSTS.... DURING THE WINTER, WITH FANATICAL
ZEAL, A FORTRESS MUST BE BUILT WHICH WILL HOLD IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The coast was to be developed "after the pattern of the West Wall", making all possible
use of armour, and protecting personnel and weapons "in such a way that they cannot be
destroyed by systematic bombardment and bombs." On 13 August Hitler further
developed this theme in another conference,12 dwelling on the importance of preventing
at all costs "the opening of a second front" and emphasizing that Russia was still fighting
and that "at critical moments the British might create difficulties". The essence of the
matter was expressed in one sentence: "THEREFORE THE FUHRER HAS DECIDED
TO BUILD AN IMPREGNABLE FORTRESS ALONG THE ATLANTIC AND THE
CHANNEL COAST".
All things considered, circumstances were not particularly favourable to the success
of a major raid on the French coast in August 1942.
The Enemy in the Dieppe Area
The specific situation at Dieppe can be reviewed in detail on the basis of German
documents. The highest German military authority in France was the Commander-in-
Chief West, who from his headquarters at St. Germainen-Laye directed affairs from
Groningen in Northern Holland to the Spanish border. Dieppe was in the sector
controlled, under him, by the Fifteenth Army, with headquarters at Tourcoing; this Army
was responsible for the coast from the Scheldt to Dives-sur-Mer near Caen. The Corps
concerned with the Dieppe area was the 81st, whose headquarters was in the outskirts of
Rouen. The Division responsible for Dieppe was the 302nd Infantry Division,
commanded by Lieut.-General Conrad Haase. Its headquarters was not at Arques-la-
Bataille as our intelligence indicated; it had formerly been there, but had moved on 27
April* to Envermeu, six miles east.13
The 302nd Division's front ran from the mouth of the Somme almost to Veules-les-
Roses, some miles west of Dieppe. It was thus roughly 50 miles, a very considerable
frontage. However, it had been shortened when the German defences were reorganized
earlier in the summer; it had formerly extended from the River Authie to St. Valery-en-
Caux.14 The 302nd Division, organized in Germany in November 1940, took over the
Dieppe sector on 10 April 1941.15 Full records of its work on the defences there are
available in its war diary. It is interesting to note that one of its early orders on the
subject, issued on 25 April 1941, assumes that -the ports of Le Treport and Dieppe "will
not be attacked directly by the enemy" but will be assailed by means of "landing attempts
at nearby points".16
*It is curious that the situation maps prepared for the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces at Army Headquarters
in Berlin (O.K.H.) still showed the division’s headquarters as Arques-la-Bataille at the time of the raid. Any Allied agent
relying on these or similar maps for information would have been misled.
Serious fortification of the Dieppe area began in March 1942. On the 15th and 19th
of the month the 302nd Division issued orders defining the various strongpoints to be
developed in the area.17 Construction 'of concrete defences now went forward actively.
In addition the Division busied itself with demolitions designed to facilitate the defence
of important areas. During June and July a certain number of houses adjacent to the
beaches in the sector were blown up.18 Before our raid took place part of the Dieppe
Casino had also been demolished, but the Germans' supply of explosives was not equal to
its complete destruction.19
Under orders issued on 9 June20 the German defences in the area were organized as
follows. The Berneval battery on the right formed an independent strongpoint
(Stutzpunkt). Dieppe itself was designated a "Defended Area" (Verteidigungsbereich),*
sub-divided into three sectors: Dieppe East, including Puys; Dieppe South; and Dieppe
West, including the eastern portion of Pourville and the heights overlooking it. The
Varengeville battery constituted another strongpoint, and in the Quiberville area there
was a "Resistance Nest" (Widerstandsnest). The whole Dieppe Defended Area was
girded on the land side with a continuous barbed wire obstacle. Puys and the heights east
of Pourville were inside this, but Pourville village itself lay outside it.22 A good many
concrete pillboxes and other positions had been completed by the time the raid took
place.
The sector was very strong in artillery. There were three coastal batteries in the area
attacked: that at Varengeville with six 15-centimetre (5.9-inch) guns, that at Berneval
with three 17-centimetre and four 105-millimetre guns, and one near Arques-la-Bataille
with four 15-centimetre howitzers. A fourth battery at Mesnil Val, west of Le Treport,
had four 15-centimetre guns which could fire on the Berneval area. There were also
sixteen 10-centimetre field howitzers (the armament of one of the divisional artillery
battalions) divided between four battery positions, two on either side of Dieppe and all
but one within the wire barrier. In addition, eight French 75-millimetre guns were
emplaced on the front of attack for beach defence.23 (The 302nd Division had taken over
15 of these guns from the division it relieved on the coast.) Anti-aircraft guns were also
fairly numerous in the Dieppe area. A location statement of 14 June 194224 shows one
heavy battery of 75-millimetre French guns, one medium battery of 37-millimetre guns
(plus one troop of 50-millimetre) and one light battery of 20-millimetre guns. There were
no 88-millimetre guns. The main beach of Dieppe was defended by some nine small-
calibre anti-tank guns, including one in a French tank concreted in near the West Mole
and two mounted at the front corners of the Casino.25
*On 8 July, however, due to the relatively small capacity of the port, which disqualified it as a major invasion
objective, Dieppe was "downgraded" to the category "Group of Strongpoints" (Stutzpunktgruppe).21
The German forces in the area were disposed as follows. The garrison of the Dieppe
Group of Strongpoints was controlled by the headquarters of the 571st Infantry Regiment
(equivalent to a British brigade), located on the West Headland at Dieppe. It consisted of
two battalions of this regiment, with headquarters on the West and East Headlands
respectively; a battalion of the 302nd Divisional Artillery, manning the four batteries
already mentioned; the headquarters of the divisional engineer battalion, and two of its
companies; and various minor units, including those of the Luftwaffe which manned the
anti-aircraft guns.26 The remaining battalion of the 571st Infantry Regiment was in
Ouville-la-Riviere, south-west of Dieppe and outside the Group of Strongpoints, as
regimental reserve.
The enemy had large reserves at hand. The 302nd Division's own reserve consisted of
an infantry regiment two battalions strong, with its headquarters at Eu, near Le Treport.
The Corps Reserve was another regiment whose headquarters was at Doudeville, south of
St. Valery-en-Caux, and a tank company at Yvetot. In Army Reserve were four rifle
battalions, lately placed in the area about Barentin, north-west of Rouen; an assault gun
battalion at Motteville, east of Yvetot; and some motorized artillery between Duclair and
Jumieges. We have already noted one element of the Army Group Reserve-the 10th
Panzer Division at Amiens. The S.S. "Adolf Hitler" Division (not yet an armoured
formation) was at Rosny, west of Mantes-Gassicourt, and the 7th Flieger Division near
Flers, west of Falaise.27
Our troops who returned to England after the raid were in general convinced that the
enemy had known in advance that it was going to happen and had strengthened Dieppe
accordingly. Those who became prisoners were even more strongly of this opinion,
having been told that the Germans had been "waiting for us" for days past. Our
intelligence staffs, however, ,reported on the basis of information from prisoners and
other available sources that the enemy had had no warning; and today, with his
voluminous records at our disposal, we can say with complete certainty that he had no
foreknowledge whatever of the raid. Throughout the war, indeed, the Germans'
knowledge of what was going on in Britain was almost ludicrously slight and inaccurate.
The events before Dieppe are thus outlined in the report of the German Commander-
in-Chief West, dated 3 September 1942:28
From the middle of June onwards, information accumulated at G.H.Q. West as the result of
photographic and visual reconnaissance by the 3rd Air Fleet and reports from agents, of an assembly of
numerous small -landing craft on the South Coast of England.
A further photographic reconnaissance, flown only at the end of July because of poor weather
conditions, confirmed the assembly of vessels which had become still more numerous since the large
number observed in June.
No further data-except from agents' reports of an English operation, which could not be checked-
could be obtained up to 15 August. In spite of this, G.H.Q. West appreciated the situation from the
middle of June to be such that it had to reckon with the possibility of an enemy operation, even a major
undertaking, at any moment, and at any point on its extensive coastal front. The U-Boat strongpoints and
defence sectors were therefore strengthened as much as possible, both by manpower and by construction
(the landward fronts not being neglected), and the organization of the forces was repeatedly checked so
that all reserves—local, divisional, corps, and army-would be ready for immediate employment....
On 15 August, a sudden change took place in the English wireless procedure which made our
interception service much more difficult. Numerous flights toward the Channel Coast suggested the
possibility that these were briefing flights, and frequently aircraft shot down were found to have
American crews. No further change in the enemy picture appeared until 0450 hours on 19 August, not
even as a result of the early reconnaissance of the 3rd Air Fleet.*
The reports from "agents" vaguely referred to were evidently not considered
particularly significant; and the references to "briefing flights" and changes in wireless
procedure are somewhat discounted by later passages in this same report. At one point it
states, "up to the commencement of battle action on the morning of 19 August enemy air
operations by day or night had not pointed in any particular way to an impending landing
attempt"; while with respect to wireless it adds, "interception of operational and training
traffic in England presented no deviation from normal".29 Rundstedt's statement that the
first real warning of an impending operation came only with our encounter with a
German convoy at 3:50 a.m. on 19 August could not be more definite. This and all the
other documents now available indicate that the Germans' actual solid information was
limited to the knowledge that during the summer landing craft in considerable numbers
had been assembled on the south coast of England; and this, coupled with their general
estimates of the strategic situation, led them to intensify their defensive measures along
their whole front, including of course the Dieppe area.
Hitler's order of 9 July presumably led to very special precautions. Particular
attention was of course paid to periods when moon and tide were favourable for landings.
On 20 July the G.O.C.-in-C. Fifteenth Army issued an order30 calling attention to three
such periods: 27 July-3 August, 10-19 August, and 25 August-1 September. On 8 August,
accordingly, the headquarters of the 302nd Division ordered a state of "threatening
danger" (drohende Gefahr) for the ten nights from 10-11 to 19-20 August.31 The enemy
coastal garrisons were thus under a special alert at the moment of the raid.
On 10 August, at the outset of this period of alert, the commander of the Fifteenth
Army sent out an order32 beginning, "Various reports permit
*Italics represent underlining in the original document. The time mentioned (3:50 a.m. $.$.T.) is that of the encounter
with the German convoy.
THE PAID ON DIEPPE; 19 AUGUST 1942 157
the assumption that, because of the miserable position of the Russians, the Anglo-
Americans will be forced to undertake something in the measurable future"; he told his
troops that such an attack would be a grim business and urged them to do their duty. A
month earlier, on 10 July, Headquarters 81st Corps had told the 302nd Division that the
C.-in-C. West had ordered precautions because of the Russians' reverses and the fact that
they were believed to be "again" demanding of the British Government the establishment
of a Second Front. It added that there was no information of actual preparations for an
attack, but that the Division was nevertheless to be brought up to full strength forthwith.33
Moreover, its establishment was increased, to provide for manning additional weapons.34
These decisions had considerable effect before the raid. The 302nd received two drafts of
untrained reinforcements (1353 and 1150 men) on 20 July and 10-12 August
respectively, and it had no personnel deficiencies on 19 August.35 Other divisions on the
coast were similarly reinforced.36
There were repeated alarms during the spring and early summer. There was a report,
for instance, that a raid on Dieppe was planned for 6 April37 (at a time when, it would
seem, the raid was only beginning to be considered in London). On 3 July the
Commander-in-Chief West issued an order declaring, "It is our historic task to prevent at
all costs the creation of a `Second Front’ “. All commanders of strongpoints and defended
areas were now to be sworn to defend their positions to the last.38 Accordingly, on 6
July, in the presence of all officers down to the rank of captain, the commander of the
Defended Area Dieppe was solemnly sworn to defend his charge to the death.39
It is interesting that the records of the 302nd Division for the weeks of August
immediately preceding the raid are devoid of the references, so frequent earlier, to agents'
reports of forthcoming landings.
Our Information About the Enemy
Our own intelligence concerning the enemy's defences and dispositions was on the
whole excellent. Thanks to our efficient air reconnaissance, there was not much we did
not know about the defences of the Dieppe area. Field-Marshal von Rundstedt in fact
later commented upon the high quality of our maps, and one of the lessons he drew was
the importance of constructing dummy positions.40 The 81st German Corps, however,
truly observed that while our information on the defences 'was accurate, intelligence of
types more difficult to obtain from air photographs was less complete: "There was a
general lack of knowledge as to the location of regimental and battalion command
posts".41 Other information not easily available
from air reconnaissance was also lacking; notably, although .our maps showed numerous
pillboxes along the main Dieppe beach, there was no indication of their armament or of
the presence of beach-defence or anti-tank guns. Fortunately, as we shall see, these anti-
tank guns were too light to have much effect on Churchill tanks.
Our intelligence staffs made one curious error; luckily, it too had no influence on the
operation. Our information before the raid was that the 302nd German Infantry Division
had been relieved in the Dieppe area by the 110th, thought to be of higher category.42
This was quite inaccurate, for the 110th Division was not in the West at all; indeed, it
seems to have served on the Russian front throughout the war.43 How this mistake came
to be made remains a mystery. The other notable slip of our intelligence -the failure to
observe the move of the 302nd Division's headquarters from Arques-la-Bataille to
Envermeu—has been commented upon above.
The Collision with the German Convoy
The senior officers concerned with Operation "Jubilee" had emphasized in their
comments on the plan that all such operations are greatly at the mercy of fortune.
"Jubilee" ran into bad luck at a very early stage, in the . form of an accidental collision
with enemy vessels about one hour before the first landings.
The report of the German Commander-in-Chief West tells us44 that a German convoy
bound for Dieppe sailed from Boulogne at 8:00 p.m. on 18 August. It consisted of five
motor or motor sailing vessels protected by two submarine-chasers and a minesweeper.
As this little group (which would certainly not have sailed if the Germans had known of
our enterprise) moved slowly down the coast, its movements were reflected on radar
screens in England. The Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth accordingly sent out two
warning signals (at 1:27 and 2:44 a.m.) reporting the presence of small craft. These had
no effect, although they were received by at least some of the vessels of our force. They
are not mentioned by the Naval Force Commander in his report; and even had he
received them it is not clear what action he could have taken without breaking wireless
silence and thereby prejudicing the whole operation. It appears that the warnings were not
heard by the destroyers Brocklesby and Slazak, which were acting as screening force to
the eastward45 In any case, at 3:47 a.m. Group 5, the most easterly group of our force, ran
into the enemy convoy.
Group 5 consisted of some 23 personnel landing craft carrying No. 3 Commando,
whose task it was to assault the Berneval battery. They were escorted by a steam gunboat,
a motor launch and a flak landing craft. In
the violent little naval encounter which now took place, Brocklesby and Slazak played no
part, their senior officer (the Polish commander of Slazak) believing that the gunfire came
from the shore. The British escort vessels were seriously damaged.45 One of the German
submarine-chasers (No. 1404) became "a total loss".47 But, more important, the craft
carrying No. 3 Commando were completely scattered, some of them being damaged. The
Berneval attack was thereby disrupted, and only seven of the landing craft landed their
troops.
What was the effect of this unfortunate encounter upon the enterprise generally? It
was widely assumed after the raid that it resulted in a complete "loss of surprise" which
compromised the whole operation. Colour is lent to this by the report of the German 81st
Corps, which says that as a result of the engagement "the entire coast defence system was
alerted". There is a similar remark in the report of the C.-in-C. West.48 Nevertheless,
detailed analysis of the German documents, and collation of them with our own
information, do not entirely support these statements.
The noise of the sea fight did cause immediate precautions at some places, at least, in
the eastern part of the area to be attacked. In particular, the Luftwaffe men in charge of
the radar equipment at Berneval manned their strongpoint within ten minutes of the fight
beginning;49 from that moment No. 3 Commando's attack had little chance of succeeding.
No evidence has been found indicating when the defences at Puys were manned, though
it seems possible that the Germans here were alerted at the same time. We do know,
however, that the encounter had no practical effect in the central or western sectors. At
Pourville our first wave of infantry landed without a shot being fired at them;* and the
302nd Division's report indicates that in Dieppe itself the 571st Infantry Regiment did not
actually order "action stations" (Gefechtsbereitschaft) until exactly 5:00 a.m., when it had
already heard of the landing at Pourville a few minutes before. The Division ordered
"action stations" one minute later.50 It is important to note that at 4:45 a.m. the
Commander Naval Group West expressed to G.H.Q. West the opinion that the affair was
only a "customary attack on convoy". Destruction of wireless equipment had prevented
the convoy escort from making any report.51
All in all, we seem forced to the conclusion that the convoy encounter did not result
in a general loss of the element of surprise. It did seriously impair our chances of success
in the eastern sector off which the fight took place. To this extent it had an effect upon
the operation as a whole, though in the absence of evidence as to its particular influence
on the garrison of Puys it is difficult to say precisely how important that effect was,
*See below, page 369.

The landing at Puys did not actually take place until a few minutes after that at Pourville
had led to a general alarm being given.
It is clear, of course, that there was great danger of surprise being completely
compromised as a result of the convoy encounter, and the question has sometimes been
asked, why was the operation not abandoned at this point? There were good and definite
reasons.
The orders specified,52 "If the operation has to be cancelled after the ships have sailed
the decision must be made before 0300 hours [3:00 a.m.]." This was the time planned for
the infantry landing ships concerned with the flank attacks to lower their landing craft,
which would immediately start in towards the beaches.53 In order to avoid the landing
ships' being detected by the German radar (which in fact gave the enemy no warning
whatever)54 it was necessary to lower the craft some ten miles from the coast and allow
almost two hours for the run-in. It was impossible to call off the operation at the time of
the encounter with the convoy, which took place nearly an hour after the deadline fixed in
the order, when the assault craft were well on their way to the beaches, and the infantry
landing ships which had lowered them were already returning to England.
The planners, it is of special interest to note, had striven to provide against precisely
the sort of misfortune which had now happened. The naval orders directed that wireless
silence might be broken "By Senior Officer of Group 5 if by delays or casualties it is the
opinion of the senior military officer that the success of the landing at YELLOW beach is
seriously jeopardised".55 But the Group Commander (Commander D. B. Wyburd) was
quite unable to report, for in the fight his steam gunboat's wireless equipment was
destroyed, and wireless traffic congestion foiled a subsequent attempt to signal from a
motor launch. The consequence was that the Force Commanders in Calpe, although sight
and sound had told them that there had been some contact with the enemy, received no
actual account of the clash until about 6:00 a.m.,56 when both-the flank attacks and the
frontal attack had gone in. The whole episode was a remarkable example of how, in war,
the most careful calculations may be upset.
The Attack on the Berneval Battery
It is best to deal separately with the five different areas in which attacks were made,
beginning with the extreme left, where our arrangements were disrupted as a result of the
encounter with the convoy.
As we have seen, the craft carrying No. 3 Commando to Berneval were completely
scattered. Most of them never reached the shore, and Lt.-Col. Durpford-Slater, after
reporting to General Roberts on the headquarters
ship off Dieppe, returned to England without knowing that any of his men had landed.57
In point of fact, however, seven of the 23 craft landed their troops. Thanks to these men's
determination, the attack on the Berneval battery was far more effective than might have
been expected in the circumstances.
Part of No. 3 Commando had been ordered to land on "Yellow I" beach, at Petit
Berneval, east of the battery, and part on "Yellow II" beach to the west of it. Commander
Wyburd's report indicates that, of the seven craft which touched down, six (five first and
another later) landed their troops at "Yellow I" under covering fire from the motor launch
(ML 346). The five craft touched down at 5:10 a.m., 20 minutes late.58 The party landed
here was unable to reach the battery which was the Commando's objective. Heavy
opposition was encountered immediately after landing. Not only did the German
defenders outnumber the small force put ashore, but they were soon reinforced by the
equivalent of three more companies commanded by Major von Blucher, the commander
of the 302nd Division's anti-tank and reconnaissance battalion. By about 10:00 a.m., after
bitter fighting, this small portion of No. 3 Commando was overwhelmed. Perhaps 120
men had been landed at "Yellow I" beach. The Germans claim to have taken 82 prisoners
here.59
The group landed at "Yellow II" had much better fortune, and its action shines like a
star in the gloom which otherwise pervades the eastern flank beaches. Here a single craft,
L.C.P.(L) 15, commanded by Lieut. H. T. Buckee, R.N.V.R., landed three officers and 17
other ranks of No. 3 Commando, the senior officer being Major Peter Young. Access
inland from this beach was by a narrow gully. Undismayed by finding themselves alone
on the French coast, and heartened by the fact that they had landed without being fired
upon or apparently even observed, Young's tiny party climbed up the gully and with
magnificent effrontery advanced against the Berneval battery. To take it was out of the
question, but the Commando men got within 200 yards and sniped at it for about an hour
and a half, preventing the guns from firing against our ships. (A German artillery report
indicates that between 5:10 and 7:45 a.m. the battery fired no shots, except some over
open sights at the snipers, which we know to have been ineffective.)60 The battery was
thus certainly neutralized for over two and a half hours; the actual period may well have
been longer. Young and his men then withdrew without loss to the beach, where they
were taken off by the same faithful craft that had put them ashore.61 The D.S.Os. which
both Major Young and Lieut. Buckee subsequently received were well earned, for few
more daring feats of arms were performed during this war. The Naval Force Commander
wrote in his report, "In my judgment this was perhaps the most outstanding incident of
the operation."
The Attack on the Varengeville Battery
On the extreme right or western flank of the operation, No. 4 Commando,

commanded by Lt: Col. Lord Lovat, was completely successful in its attack on the battery
near Varengeville. The good fortune of this Commando, the only military unit engaged in
the operation to capture all its objectives, was in curious contrast with the ill-luck
encountered by No. 3 on the opposite flank.
Lord Lovat's force amounted to some 252 all ranks, including a small party of United
States Rangers. It was transported in the landing ship Prince Albert and put ashore in
assault craft. The plan was to land on two beaches designated "Orange I" and "Orange
II": the former a very narrow beach at Vasterival, immediately north of the battery, the
latter the eastern section of the much longer beach near Quiberville. The plan was for one
party, 88 strong and commanded by Major D. Mills-Roberts, to land at Vasterival and
engage the battery in front with mortar fire, while the main body under Lord Lovat
landed at Orange II, made a detour and attacked it from the rear.62
This plan was carried out exactly as written. Major Mills-Roberts' party reached the
clifftop successfully, advanced upon the battery, and fired on it with small arms and a 2-
inch mortar. At or about 6:07 a.m. charges stacked beside the German guns ready for use
blew up. The Commando attributes the explosion to a bomb from the mortar, but the
German accounts blame fire from low-flying aircraft.63 The battery never fired again.* It
was kept under fire until 6:20 a.m., when, in accordance with the plan, R.A.F. cannon
fighters made a low-level attack upon it. Simultaneously, Lovat's main party, having
landed and moved inland successfully, attacked it with the bayonet. After a short fierce
fight the positions were cleared and the garrison cut to pieces. Captain P. A. Porteous
particularly distinguished himself. Although painfully wounded, he took command of a
troop which had lost its officers and led it in the final rush across open ground swept by
machine-gun fire. Again wounded, he continued to lead his men until the battery was
taken. He was awarded the Victoria Cross.64
Lord Lovat's force suffered about 45 casualties, including two officers
and ten other ranks killed, but this loss purchased full success. The menace of the battery
to our shipping off Dieppe was wholly removed, for its guns were blown up before the
Commando withdrew according to plan about
*The Commando account is probably accurate, as the Air Force Commander's report indicates no air action against
the battery at this time. A report from the 81st Corps, logged by Headquarters C.-in-C. West at 9.03 a.m., to the effect that
the battery was firing again with two guns, is quite unsupported by other evidence and is probably an error. The 81st Corps
report includes in its list of German material lost six 150-mm. coast defence guns, i.e. the battery's full complement.
7:30 a.m. No. 4 Commando's action is a model of boldness and effective synchronization.
At 8:50 a.m. Lord Lovat reported to the headquarters ship and the Chief of Combined
Operations. The signal to the latter ran: "Every one of gun crews finished with bayonet.
OK by you?"65 Actually, not quite the whole of the German unit had been liquidated, but
it had suffered very heavily. Its strength is variously stated as from 93 to 112 men; its
losses, which vary only slightly in different German accounts, were about 30 killed and
30 wounded66 a proportion which reflects the use of the bayonet. Four prisoners were
taken back to England.
Disaster at Puys
The bad luck of No. 3 Commando on the extreme left extended to the Canadian unit
closest to it: The Royal Regiment of Canada at Puys. The beach here, and the gully
behind it in which the little resort village lay, were both extremely narrow and were
commanded at very short range by lofty cliffs on either side. Success depended entirely
upon surprise and upon the assault being made while it was dark enough to interfere with
the aim of the German gunners. Neither of these conditions was achieved. The German
garrison at Puys was only two platoons, one of the army and one of the Luftwaffe, plus
some technical personnel;67 nor does it appear to have been reinforced during the
morning. In the circumstances, it was quite enough for the work in hand.
The Royal Regiment of Canada had attached to it three platoons of The Black Watch
(Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, and detachments of the 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft
Regiment and the 4th Field Regiment, R.C.A. The artillerymen were to assist in capturing
enemy guns in the area and subsequently to man them. The Royals' general task is best
described in the words of the Combined Plan:
The Royal Regiment of Canada at BLUE beach will secure the headland east of JUBILEE [Dieppe]
and destroy local objectives consisting of machine gun posts, heavy and light flak installations and a 4
gun battery south and east of the town. The battalion will then come into reserve, and detach a company
to protect an engineer demolition party operating in the gas works and power plant.
This task was of special importance, since if the East Headland was not cleared the
numerous weapons there would be able to fire on the main beaches in front of Dieppe.
Although the Detailed Military Plan does not assist us, and none of the Canadian
infantry units issued separate written orders, individuals in positions to know68 state that the
Royal Regiment was to land in three waves: the first to consist of three companies and an
advance group of battalion
headquarters; the second, consisting of the remaining rifle company and the balance of
the headquarters, to land ten minutes later; while the third, formed mainly of the attached
platoons of the Black Watch, was to go in when signalled by the force already landed.
Unfortunately, the naval landing arrangements for Blue Beach went awry. No
operation of war is harder than landing troops in darkness with precision as to time and
place, and the danger of reckoning upon exactitude in such matters was well illustrated at
Dieppe. The Royals were carried in the landing ships Queen Emma and Princess Astrid,
while the Black Watch detachment was in the Duke of Wellington. (The last-named ship's
landing craft flotilla was almost entirely manned by Canadian sailors, and a Canadian
officer, Lieut. J. E. Koyl, R.C.N.V.R., took command of it after the Flotilla Officer was
wounded.)69 There was delay in forming up after the craft were lowered from the ships;
this was mainly, apparently, the result of Princess Astrid's craft forming on a motor
gunboat which, having got out of station, was mistaken for the one which was to lead
them in.* The Flotilla Officer of Queen Emma states that the delay made it necessary to
proceed at a greater speed than had been intended, and as a result the two mechanized
landing craft (L.C.M.) which formed part of this ship's flotilla, and were carrying 100
men each, could not keep up. Ultimately, according to this officer, these two L.C.Ms.,
with four assault craft which had been astern of them, landed as a second wave. In fact,
one of the L.C.Ms. developed engine trouble and consequently touched down in due
course quite alone.70
Thanks to these mischances, the first group of craft carrying the Royal Regiment
struck the beach late. The situation is thus described in the record of a conference held on
13 September 1942 by the senior Canadian officers confined in Oflag VIIB, one of whom
was Lt.-Col. Catto of the Royals:
Only part of three leading assault companies were landed in first wave and these were brought 35
minutes late by Navy. Remainder of companies finally reached beach nearly one hour late. Effect of
darkness and smoke screen entirely lost.
Princess Astrid's Flotilla Officer states that touchdown was at 5:07 a.m., which would
make it 17 minutes late. The time given by the Oflag VIIB conference is only one of
many widely varying estimates made by Army officers and men. On a point of this sort it
seems best to accept the naval evidence, the more so as that of the Germans agrees with it
pretty closely: their 302nd Division gives the time of the first landing as 5:10. Whatever
*Lt.-Col. Catto remembers a flare being dropped by an aircraft at this point. This is not mentioned by Queen Emma's
Commanding Officer or in any other naval report. Certainly no warning reached the Germans at this time.
the exact time, the unit was certainly placed upon the beach so late as to make its task far
more difficult than it would have been at 4:50.
The defenders of Blue Beach were fully on the alert. Fire was opened upon the
leading craft while they were still well offshore; the Princess Astrid Flotilla Officer
estimates that it began when they were "about 100 yards from the beach". He states that
Major G. P. Scholfield, the senior officer of the Royals with the first wave, was slightly
wounded before landing. All accounts agree, moreover, that as this wave touched down
and the craft dropped their ramps machine-gun fire was greatly intensified and heavy
casualties were suffered immediately. The Flotilla Officer says, "In several cases officers
and men were wounded or killed on the ramp as they made to leave the boats."71
At the head of the Puys beach was a sea-wall ten or a dozen feet high, covered with
heavy barbed wire. The wire's presence had not been detected before the operation, but
Lt.-Col. Catto, suspecting it, had seen to it that the unit had "Bangalore torpedoes" for
blowing paths through such obstacles.72 Survivors of 'the Royal Regiment and enemy
documents both testify that the German defence was concentrated upon the east cliff.73 A
brick house which stood here had in its front garden a concrete pillbox disguised as a
summer-house, whose main slit had a murderous command of the beach and the sea-wall
at very short range.74 This "L.M.G. bunker" (which bore bullet-marks when examined in
1944) was probably responsible for a great number of the Royals' casualties on the beach.
It and other positions enfiladed the sea-wall, and caused heavy losses among the men
who ran forward from the boats to take shelter there.
Although several Bangalore torpedoes were exploded on the wall to cut the wire,
very few men succeeded in passing through the gaps alive. The combination of the
absence of surprise with the fact that the assault was made in much broader daylight than
had been intended had been fatal to the Blue Beach attack. In the words of Capt. G. A.
Browne, the artillery Forward Observation Officer attached to the battalion, "In five
minutes time they were changed from an assaulting Battalion on the offensive to
something less than two companies on the defensive being hammered by fire which they
could not locate".75
The second group of craft seems to have landed some twenty minutes later than the
first; Canadian and naval estimates of the time vary from 5:25 to 5:35 a.m.76 Capt.
Browne, who was in this group, has described77 the bearing of the men during the
approach and the landing; he and those with him had been intended to land with the first
wave, and they did not realize that in fact other troops had gone in before them:
In spite of the steady approach to the beach under fire, the Royals in my ALC appeared cool and
steady. It was their first experience under fire, and although I watched them closely, they gave no sign of
alarm, although first light
was broadening into dawn, and the interior of the ALC was illuminated by the many flares from the
beach and the flash of the Bostons' bombs. The quiet steady voice of Capt. [W.B.] Thomson, seated just
behind me, held the troops up to a confident and offensive spirit, although shells were whizzing over the
craft, and [they] could hear the steady whisper and crackle of S.A. [small arms] fire over the top of the
ALC. At the instant of touchdown, small arms fire was striking the ALC, and here there was a not
unnatural split-second hesitation in the bow in leaping out onto the beach. But only a split-second. The
troops got out onto the beach as fast as [in] any of the SIMMER* exercises, and got across the beach to
the wall and under the cliff.
This second wave of assault, in the circumstances, could accomplish nothing; it

simply added to the number of men sheltering on the beach and being pounded by the
German machine-guns and mortars. The landing of the third wave proved equally useless.
No signal having been received, and no information concerning the situation ashore being
available, Lieut. Koyl, in charge of Duke of Wellington's flotilla, and Capt. R. C. Hicks,
in command of the troops, jointly took the decision to land. At Hicks' request, the Black
Watch company was put ashore under the cliff to the west of the sea-wall, where the
main body of survivors of the earlier waves were gathered.78 Virtually every man of the
Black Watch who landed ultimately became a prisoner; one officer was killed.
The men on the beach were cheered by close and constant air support. Aircraft went
in at clifftop level to lay smoke, and in Colonel Catto's words, "The fighters came in
again and again on the batteries while our show was on and later continued their close
attacks while the withdrawal was taking place, and they undoubtedly affected quite
seriously the fire from the east headland." Only one small party of the Royals is definitely
known to have got off the beach.† This was not long after 6:00 a.m. The party,
numbering about 20 officers and men, was led by Lt.-Col. Catto himself. They cut a path
through the wire at the western end of the sea-wall, and the colonel led them up the cliff
between bursts of machine-gun fire. They cleared two houses on the clifftop, "resistance
being met in the first only". The Germans now brought intense fire to bear upon the gap
in the wire, and no more men got through it. The colonel's party moved westward above
the beach in the hope of making contact with the Essex Scottish; but this battalion had
never got off the beach in front of Dieppe. Catto's group lay up in a small wood until it
was obvious that the men left on the Puys beach had been overwhelmed, that the landing
force had withdrawn and that there was no hope of being taken off. At 4:20 p.m., after
equipping a number of active unwounded men with "escape kits" and sending them off
*The code name applied to the special training for the operation.
†Nevertheless, the report of the German 302nd Division, after mentioning what is evidently Catto's party, adds, "An
additional 25 men, suffering losses, scrambled through the wire entanglements reinforced with mine charges; they are
annihilated at 0815 hours [7:15 a.m. B.S.T.] by assault detachment of 23 (Heavy) Aircraft Reporting Company."
in the hope-which proved illusory-that some of them might get clear, the party
surrendered.79
In the face of the German artillery fire (a troop of four howitzers in position only a
few hundred yards south of Puys fired 550 rounds during the morning at craft offshore)80
it was impossible to organize any systematic evacuation of the beach, although valiant
attempts were made by the Navy. Analysis of the naval reports seems to indicate that the
only craft which actually touched down on Blue Beach for the purpose of re-embarking
troops was L.C.A. 209, commanded by Lieut. N. E. B. Ramsay, R.N.V.R. Many soldiers
made a rush for it under heavy fire, and, overloaded and badly holed, it capsized not far
offshore. Lieut. Ramsay was among the killed.81 Several men clung to the bottom, and
two of Duke of Wellington's landing craft, largely manned by Canadians, pushed in
through a hail of missiles and rescued at least three of them, at the cost however of two or
more sailors' lives.82
As was inevitable in the circumstances, it is difficult to build up from the naval
reports a completely coherent picture of the attempts to evacuate the Royal Regiment. It
is clear, however, that Lieut.-Commander H. W. Goulding, Senior Officer Blue Beach
Landings, visited H.M.S. Calpe shortly after 7:00 a.m. He did not know what was
happening on shore, but reported that the Royals had been duly landed. While he was in
the headquarters ship a signal arrived, passed through H.M.S. Garth, operating off Blue
Beach. This untimed message, apparently the only one from Garth to Calpe which has
been preserved, reads: "From Blue Beach: Is there any possible chance of getting us
off".83 Goulding recorded that he was now ordered by the Naval Force Commander "to
take an M.L. [motor launch] for close support and make an attempt to evacuate Blue
Beach". This was done accordingly, but when Goulding approached the beach heavy fire
opened and no craft reached the shore.84 A signal, sent by him, was logged at 11:45 a.m.:
"Could not see provision [? position] Blue Beach owing to fog and heavy fires from cliff
and White House. Nobody evacuated."85 At least one further attempt was made, this time
by four craft from Princess Astrid, whose Flotilla Officer reported that "Fire from the
beach was still terrific", one craft was sunk, and "there was no sign of life on the beach".86
In point of fact, the remnants of The Royal Regiment of Canada on the Puys beach
had probably surrendered a little before 8:30 a.m., rather more than three hours after the
first landing. At 8:35 the 571st German Infantry Regiment informed its divisional
headquarters, "Puys firmly in our hands; enemy has lost about 500 men prisoners and
dead".87
Very few men of the Royals returned to England: all told, two officers and 65 men.
Practically all of these were in one craft-that L.C.M. which,
as described above, had had engine trouble and touched down independently. It pulled
back off the beach under murderous fire, only a few men having landed from it and many
having been hit on board.88
The episode at Puys was the grimmest of the whole grim operation, and the Royal
Regiment had more men killed than any other unit engaged. Along the fatal sea-wall the
lads from Toronto lay in heaps.89 The regiment's fatal casualties, including those who
died of wounds and 18 who died from any cause while prisoners of war, amounted to 227
all ranks out of 554 embarked. And there is no doubt that the setback at Puys had a most
adverse effect upon the raid as a whole, for, as we noted, failure to clear the East
Headland was certain to make success in the centre much less likely. The Naval Force
Commander reports, "There is little doubt that this was the chief cause of the failure of
the Military Plan". It certainly had great influence.
Some indication has already been given of the inadequacy of the information
concerning events at Blue Beach which reached the headquarters ship during the early
stages. Indeed, this extended to the whole of the eastern beaches, for we have seen that
the Force Commanders got no reliable account of what had happened to No. 3
Commando for more than two hours after its encounter with the German convoy.
Information about Puys should have been better, for though the only wireless set working
on the beach was that of Capt. Browne, the Forward Observation Officer, he was in
communication with the destroyer Garth offshore. Garth's commander confirms that the
ship was in touch with Browne from 5:41 to 7:47, "during which time he was held up at
the foot of the cliff and most messages received concerned wounded and the fact that
they were held up, which were passed to CALPE".90 The tragic fact is, however, that
none of the early messages reached the headquarters ship. The Intelligence Log
maintained in Calpe notes at 5:50 a.m. that there is no word from the Royals; and the first
definite statement recorded concerning Blue Beach is at 6:20 and is extremely inaccurate:
"R. Regt C. not landed". Another version appears in the Fernie Intelligence Log at 6:25,
"Impossible to land any troops on Blue Beach. From Navy". This is probably a garbled
version of an untimed message recorded as received by the Naval Force Commander
from the Puys naval beach station: "Impossible to land any more troops on Blue Beach".
It presumably came from the Beachmaster, who had not succeeded in getting ashore. In
any case, the Force Commanders were long left in the belief that the Royal Regiment had
not been landed; and as a result of this General Roberts sent out to the Royals, at 6:40
a.m. or a little before, an order directing them to go to Red Beach to support the Essex
Scottish.91
The Fighting in the Pourville Area
The units landed on "Green Beach", at Pourville to the west of Dieppe, had better
fortune, on the whole, than any other Canadian troops in the operation. Nevertheless, this
success was only comparative, for they attained but few of their objectives.
The Pourville beach, though much longer than that at Puys, is still dominated by
cliffs on both sides. Standing in the village of Pourville and looking east towards Dieppe,
one faces a lofty and forbidding rampart, the eastern ridge of the valley of the Scie. This
obstacle, strongly held by the Germans, proved insuperable on the morning of 19 August
1942.
The South Saskatchewan Regiment was carried across the Channel in the landing
ships Princess Beatrix and Invicta. The trans-shipment to landing craft and the approach
to the beach went without a hitch, and the craft touched down within a very few minutes
of the time planned (4:50 a.m.); the two ships' Flotilla Officers agree in fixing the time at
4:52. A considerable measure of surprise was achieved. The naval reports indicate that
there was no fire as the boats ran in, although it began very soon after the landing. One
craft which touched down two minutes late on the extreme right flank was fired upon and
the soldiers in it suffered casualties as they disembarked.92 The whole unit landed as one
wave. This was the earliest actual landing of troops in this operation, except perhaps for
those of No. 4 Commando on the same flank; we have seen that both the eastern landings,
though timed to take place simultaneously with that at Pourville, were considerably
delayed.
One misfortune during the disembarkation, however, had considerable effect upon
events. The River Scie flows into the Channel near the middle of the Pourville beach, and
the intention had been to land the battalion astride the river, so that the companies
operating against the objectives east of it could deliver their attacks without having to
seek a crossing. Although there is no reference to this in the naval reports (indeed, the
officers of the landing craft may have been unaware of the fact), accounts by officers and
men with The South Saskatchewan Regiment93 leave no doubt that in the semi-darkness
the craft had not been able to strike the precise parts of the beach intended, and almost the
whole of the battalion was actually landed west of the river. This meant that the
companies having the vital task of seizing the high ground to the eastward had first to
penetrate into the village and cross the river by the bridge carrying the main road towards
Dieppe. The delay thus caused nullified the effect of the surprise that had been obtained,
and was probably fatal.
"C" Company, operating to the west of Pourville, promptly occupied all its
objectives, including positions on the hills immediately south-west of the village, and
killed a good many Germans in the process. The companies
working to the eastward had no such success. "A" Company's objective was the radar
station on the cliff-edge roughly a mile east of Pourville. "D" Company's was positions
on the adjacent high ground to the southward, including Quatre Vents Farm and anti-
aircraft guns nearby; it was expected that they would be helped by The Royal Hamilton
Light Infantry and a troop of tanks arriving from Dieppe. Before these two companies,
having been landed west of the Scie, could get across the bridge and reach the heights,
the enemy's posts there were manned and firing. The eastern part of the village, and the
bridge, were completely dominated by them. Soon the bridge was carpeted with dead and
wounded men and the advance of the South Saskatchewans came to a halt.
At this point, Lt.-Col. Merritt, having established his headquarters near the beach,
came forward and took charge himself. Walking calmly into the storm of fire upon the
bridge, waving his helmet and calling "Come on over-there's nothing to it", he carried
party after party across by the force of his strong example. Other men forded or swam the
river.94 The Colonel then led a series of fierce uphill rushes which cleared several of the
concrete positions commanding bridge and village.* Nevertheless, in spite of his
extraordinary energy and dauntless courage, and the best efforts of his men and of the
Camerons who were shortly mingled with them, the posts on the summit, including the
trench system of Quatre Vents Farm and the radar station, could not be taken. Apparently
some of our men got within a short distance of the radar station, but it was heavily wired
and defended and could not be dealt with without artillery support.95 The enemy handled
his mortars and machine-guns skilfully, and our thrusts were all beaten back. One party
actually reached the edge of the Quatre Vents position and killed several Germans before
being forced out.96 Attempts to obtain artillery support from the destroyer Albrighton
were nullified by the Forward Observation Officer's inability to observe and lack of
knowledge of the exact positions of our own troops; he did indicate several targets, but
was unable to spot the fall of the ship's shells.97
The Cameron Highlanders of Canada, who were to pass through the Pourville
bridgehead and operate against the aerodrome in conjunction with the tanks from Dieppe,
were landed about half an hour late. This was due in part at least to the wishes of Lt.-Col.
Gostling, who, according to Commander H.V.P. McClintock, the naval officer in charge,
"preferred to arrive late [rather] than early". The idea (a dubious one) apparently was to
land ten minutes later than the plan provided; however, miscalculations of
*The following information was logged by the 302nd German Division at 8.00 a.m. (7.00 a.m. British time): "At
Pourville-East 4.7-cm. anti-tank gun position is overrun by enemy. Anti-tank gun unable to continue fire due to jamming of
loophole, crew is killed. Enemy advances on height up to orderly room of 6th Company 571st Regiment, is held here. One
beach-defence gun and one heavy machine-gun put out of commission."
speed and course lengthened the delay, and the battalion touched down at 5:50 a.m.98
During the approach, it was apparent that the South. Saskatchewans had not succeeded in
opening up their bridgehead in the manner expected; fighting was clearly in progress in
the outskirts of Pourville, and shells were bursting in the water offshore. With the
Camerons' pipers playing, the craft pushed on; all of them reached the beach and there
were almost no casualties on board. As Lt.-Col. Gostling's own craft ran in, he was
calling cheerfully to his men, identifying the types of fire that were coming down upon
them. When the boat touched down, near the east end of Green Beach, he leaped on to the
shingle and went forward to direct the cutting of wire. Fire immediately opened from a
pillbox built into the headland on the left, apparently the one position closely covering
the beach which the South Saskatchewans had not succeeded in clearing; and the
Commanding Officer fell dead.99 The second in command, Major A. T. Law, took over.
The battalion had been landed astride the Scie, and mainly as a result of this it
became divided into two main sections. The larger, which had landed west of the river,
consisted of "A" Company, two platoons of "B", and evidently the major part of all three
platoons of "C". This main body under Major Law subsequently moved inland and
effected the deepest penetration made by any portion of the force engaged that day. The
rest of the battalion remained in the Pourville area and fought in parties of varying
strength mingled with The South Saskatchewan Regiment.100
Pourville was under heavy mortar fire, and this, plus the lateness of the hour, made it
desirable that the battalion should move inland as rapidly as possible. It was clear that
although the original plan had provided for an advance up the east bank of the Scie and a
rendezvous with the tanks from Dieppe at the Bois des Vertus, the South Saskatchewans
had not made enough progress for this to be practicable. However, an alternative route,
up the west bank, had been planned in case of need, and this Major Law now adopted.101
He debouched from Pourville with his main body at a time which was not recorded.
At first the battalion followed the main road; then, coming under machinegun fire
from the direction of Quatre Vents, it bore to the right to take advantage of the cover of
the woods on the heights overlooking the Scie. It continued to be harassed by German
snipers, and would seem to have advanced slowly. After penetrating roughly a mile and a
half from Pourville, it moved left again towards the hamlet and bridges of Petit Appeville
(Bas de Hautot). Here Law hoped to cross the river and make contact with the tanks.102
Looking down on the crossings from the high ground west of the village, Law saw
enemy forces beyond the river, including what appeared to be a bicycle platoon (we now
know that a German cyclist platoon had been sent
at 5:30 to reinforce the ridge near Quatre Vents Farm).103 There was no sign of the
Canadian tanks; none of them had, in fact, got beyond the Promenade at Dieppe. Law had
no information beyond what he could see, and as time was getting short he resolved to
abandon the attack against the planned objectives, and instead to cross the river and clear
the Quatre Vents area. Orders to this effect were issued about nine o'clock. As the
companies moved towards the road-bridge, there was contact with the enemy coming
from two directions: a party moving south on the road from Pourville (probably a
reconnaissance patrol of engineers which was operating in this area)104 and forces moving
up from the south on the west bank of the Scie. Casualties were inflicted on both. The
Germans, however, were establishing an increasingly firm hold on the area about the
crossings. At 6:10 a.m. their 571st Infantry Regiment had sent an order by dispatch rider
to its 1st Battalion, the regimental reserve in Ouville, to move to the Hautot area for an
attack against Pourville. This unit in the course of assembling ran into the Cameron (a
report of this contact was received by the German divisional headquarters at 9:55 a.m.
from a staff officer who had been sent to the battalion). Law saw a detachment of horse-
drawn close-support guns arrive from the south, cross one of the Petit Appeville bridges
and take up a position on the east side covering the crossings. This was doubtless the
infantry gun platoon "in process of formation" which is known to have been stationed at
Offranville as part of the regimental reserve.105 Although its operations are not
mentioned in the German documents, the 302nd Division's administrative report speaks
of two 75-millimetre infantry guns being in action during the day.
The Camerons' 3-inch mortars having been knocked out in Pourville, they had no
weapons capable of silencing these shielded guns at several hundred yards' range. At the
same time, they were under machine-gun and sniper fire from the high ground
overlooking the crossings. Major Law now decided that it was not practicable to fight his
way across the river. About 9:30 a.m. he gave orders for withdrawal. Immediately
afterwards he heard that his wireless set had intercepted a message from Headquarters 6th
Brigade to The South Saskatchewan Regiment advising of the intention to evacuate from
Green Beach and adding, "Get in touch with the Camerons". The message was
understood as giving the time of evacuation as ten o'clock; thus a speedy retreat was'
essential. After sending a message telling the South Saskatchewans what he was doing,
Law began his withdrawal by the route by which he had advanced. The unit retired under
pressure. On the way it met a South Saskatchewan platoon which had been sent out to
make contact with it, and the combined force re-entered Pourville just before ten.106
The penetration through Pourville was the most important effected during the day,
and it was about this area that the Germans were most apprehensive.
The regiment in Corps Reserve was moved up in that direction and was about to attack
when the operation came to an end.107 Moreover, as we shall see, the Germans' intention
was to employ the 10th Panzer Division in this area. There has been a tendency to
criticize the Military Force Commander for not exploiting the advantage gained here; but
the fact is that he knew nothing of the extent of the penetration. No reports about the
Camerons' progress appear in the headquarters logs during the period when they were
inland.* All General Roberts knew was that they "had penetrated some distance inland
and . . . were out of wireless touch".108 In any case, by the time they reached Petit
Appeville it was too late to begin exploiting, and the infantry reserves had been expended
elsewhere.
The plan had envisaged evacuating all the troops, in the event of success, through the
town of Dieppe. In the circumstances actually existing, however, The South
Saskatchewan Regiment and the Camerons had to be taken off from the same beach at
Pourville on which they had landed. This decision was made and orders given about 9:00
a.m. The time fixed was 11:00 a.m., the same as for the main beach. The boats arrived on
schedule, but the South Saskatchewans and the Camerons lost heavily during the
withdrawal. The enemy was able to bring fierce fire upon the beach from his lofty
positions east of Pourville, and also from the high ground to the west, from which "C"
Company of the South Saskatchewan had retired as the result of a misunderstanding (the
order from the headquarters ship for the battalion to withdraw and re-embark was
apparently passed on to this company and understood by it as an executive order from the
Commanding Officer, although it was not so intended).109 However, the landing craft
came in through the storm of steel with self-sacrificing gallantry (one Cameron wrote
afterwards, "The L.M.G. fire was wicked on the beach, but the Navy was right in
there").110 The naval reports indicate that probably 12 assault landing craft, one support
craft and one chasseur took part in lifting troops from Green Beach. In this task at least
four, and probably five assault craft were lost.111 Several larger vessels gave fire support.
The enemy's troops, who showed little stomach for really close fighting, were kept at
arm's length by a courageous rear guard commanded by Lt.-Col. Merritt. Throughout the
day, Merritt had been in the forefront of the bitter struggle around Pourville, exposing
himself recklessly and displaying an energy almost incredible ("It wasn't human, what he
did", said an officer who was with him).112 Thanks to Merritt's group, the greater part of
both units was successfully re-embarked, though many of the men were wounded. The
rear guard itself could not be brought off. It held out on the beach until ammunition was
running low and there was no possibility of evacuation
*The narrative in the Camerons' war diary states, "We were unable to contact Bde. H.Q. at any time during the
advance inland and subsequent withdrawal, and it was not until approximately 1005 hrs when we returned to Pourville that
this was accomplished."
or of doing further harm to the enemy. At 1:37 p.m. the 571st German Infantry Regiment
reported, "Pourville firmly in our hands".113 Lt.-Col. Merritt subsequently received the
Victoria Cross.
The fatal casualties suffered by the Camerons and The South Saskatchewan
Regiment were respectively six officers and 70 other ranks, and three officers and 81
other ranks.
The Frontal Attack on Dieppe
The frontal attack on Dieppe was to be delivered by The Royal Hamilton Light
Infantry on the right and the Essex Scottish on the left, with the nine leading tanks of the
14th Army Tank Regiment landing simultaneously with the first infantry. The assault was
to be covered by the 4-inch guns of the destroyers and Locust; and close-support fighter
aircraft were to attack the beaches, the buildings overlooking them and the gun positions
on the West Headland "as the landing craft finally approach and the first troops step
ashore on RED and WHITE beaches".114 There was no hope of surprise here, for the
flank landings were scheduled for half an hour earlier; and we have seen that the alarm
was given in Dieppe, following the Pourville landing, 20 minutes before the main assault.
The R.H.L.I. and the Essex Scottish were carried across the Channel in the landing
ships Glengyle, Prince Leopold and Prince Charles. The landing craft were lowered and
made their approach without untoward incident,* and the infantry units touched down on
the long beach in front of Dieppe's Promenade-dedicated once to idleness and pleasure-at
the exact time appointed or within a minute or two of it.
The naval orders called for intense direct bombardment by four destroyers and Locust
from the time when the landing craft were one mile from the beach until they touched
down. These were carried out, except that Locust did not participate; she had been unable
to keep up during the passage.115 The Air Force also played its part precisely as planned.
Smoke was laid to screen the East Headland; and at 5:15 a.m. five squadrons of
Hurricane fighters made a cannon attack upon the beach defences.116 This was ending
just as the Essex Scottish and The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry leaped from their
assault craft and began to scramble through the wire obstacles towards the town. All
witnesses117 agree that the Hurricane attack
*Lt. Col. Labatt states that shells fell near H.M.S. Glengyle while craft were being lowered; and, doubtless on the
basis of his report, the conference of Commanding Officers at Oflag VIIB on 13 Sep 42 recorded that "infantry assault
ships . . . came under fire by 0340 hours from shore batteries". But the German documents disprove this, and the report of
Glengyle's Commanding Officer makes it clear that the firing was that resulting from Group 5's encounter with the German
convoy. He writes, . heavy fire from guns of light calibre was observed (0350) bearing 130'-the direction of 'Yellow'
landing-and a few 'overs' of no importance burst near the ship".
was excellently timed and most terrifying. It was planned to cease at 5:25, and its effect
was of course purely temporary. Naval estimates of the time the first landing craft
touched down vary from 5:20 to 5:23;118 they may thus have been up to a couple of
minutes late. If so, the troops were to this extent less able to profit by the air attack.
There was, however, a more serious error in timing. The three craft carrying the first
nine tanks "approached from too far to the westward and were about 10 to 15 minutes
late in touching down".119 During this period, between the cessation of the naval and air
bombardment and the tanks' arrival, there was no support for the infantry; and the enemy,
recovering from the Hurricane attack, was able to sweep the beaches with fire. This
happened so rapidly that our infantry were pinned down before they could get through the
wire obstacles, climb the sea-wall and cross the broad Promenade into the town. In any
opposed landing, the first minute or two after the craft touch down are of crucial
importance; and it may be said that during that minute or two the Dieppe battle, on the
main beaches, was lost. The impetus of the attack ebbed quickly away, and by the time
the tanks arrived the psychological moment was past.
The enemy had been firing upon the landing craft as they approached the shore.
Some reports suggest a temporary slackening at the moment of landing, possibly the
result of the Hurricanes' blow, but it was followed immediately by an intensification of
machine-gun and mortar fire.120 Officers of the R.H.L.I. state that "D" Company, which
was on the right closest to the West Headland, was almost wiped out immediately after
landing.121 It had, in fact, suffered heavily while still afloat. Two craft, both apparently
carrying platoons of this company, were reported lost. A responsible naval officer122
states that both were "heavily damaged during the approach but touched down; this seems
likely, though an Army witness doubts whether they reached the beach .123
At the west end of the Promenade, in front of the town, stood the large isolated
Casino. The Germans, we have seen, had begun to demolish it, but only the south-west
wing had, been destroyed before the raid. The building, and pillboxes and gun
emplacements near it, were occupied by the enemy, and clearing them took time and cost
lives; but the R.H.L.I. shortly broke into the Casino and rounded up the snipers. "Nearly
an hour was needed before all the enemy were either killed or taken prisoners.124 In this
work Lance-Sergeant G.A. Hickson, R.C.E., leading the survivors of a demolition party
whose assigned task was the destruction of the telephone exchange, distinguished
himself.125 At 7:12 a.m. a report that the Casino had been "taken" was logged on the
headquarters ship; this may indicate when the clearing process was completed.
The Casino constituted a sort of covered avenue between the beach and the
Boulevard de Verdun, the street skirting the front of the town. Thanks largely to this fact,
at least one party of the R.H.L.I. and another led by a Sapper sergeant were able to get
into the town and remain there for some time.
The first party to enter seems to have been a group of about 14 men under Capt. A.C.
Hill. This officer led it from the beach into and through the Casino at about six a.m.,
when our troops had entered the building but not yet cleared it. Covered by Bren gun fire,
they ran across the open to the buildings on the front of the town and broke into one
which let them into a theatre, through which in turn they got into the town. They circled
through several streets, engaging enemy patrols and losing one man killed. Encountering
increasingly heavy opposition, they fell back to the theatre, where they were joined by
some other men of our force. About ten in the morning, when enemy infantry were seen
converging on the theatre, the whole party retired to the Casino, only one man being hit
during the rush across the open.126
At a fairly late hour in the morning Lance-Sergeant Hickson took a party of about 18
men into the town,* profiting by the fire of one of our tanks which had stopped near the
south-east corner of the Casino and had silenced some of the machine-guns in and around
the lofty Castle on the West Headland. The party had trouble with snipers and cleared one
house held by German infantry before withdrawing to the Casino towards noon.127
Hickson was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
On the Essex Scottish beach there was no such feature as the Casino to facilitate
infiltration. It was completely open and was commanded by both headlands as well as by
the high buildings in front. We have mentioned the French tank dug in near the base of
the west mole; and on the mole itself there was a pillbox mounting an anti-tank gun.
These two positions remained in German hands throughout the operation, though the
enemy records that the one on the mole "suffered a direct hit", possibly from naval fire.128
The only party of the Essex Scottish known to have got into the town was led by C.
S. M. Cornelius Stapleton. Only a few minutes after the first landing, this stout Warrant
Officer led a dozen or so men across the fire-swept Promenade into the buildings fronting
the Boulevard de Verdun.†
*A narrative written by Capt. W.D. Whitaker states that another party of the R.H.L.I., led by Lieut. L. C. Bell, also
penetrated into the town. In the opinion of Lt: Col. Labatt, this is an error. Lieut. Bell himself was killed during the
operation. The present writer
however thinks it probable that another party got into Dieppe in the R.H.L.I. area. The German '302nd Division records at
7:45 the capture of a `British assault detachment . . . near Dieppe city hall" (not far from the Casino); and a careful French
observer, M. Georges Guibon, relates what seems to be the same incident.
†How fierce the fire was is indicated by the evidence of a soldier129 who was one of a group who crossed the
Promenade at this time and joined Stapleton in the buildings. He testified that of about nine men in his group only two
reached the houses.
The party killed a number of enemy snipers in the buildings and subsequently penetrated
through the streets to the harbour. It "accounted for a considerable number of enemy in
transport and also enemy snipers"130 before being overpowered; its action is doubtless
reflected in a German report logged at 8:16 a.m., that the enemy had been thrown back
"from the harbour station (100 metres from the beach)".131 C. S. M. Stapleton got back
to the beach and reported to Colonel Jasperson. In due course he received the
Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Capt. D. F. MacRae, the only officer to land with the Essex Scottish who returned to
England after the operation, recorded two attempts to attack across the sea-wall, followed
by a third "on a reduced scale". These took place very soon after the landing and were
beaten back by heavy fire. His estimate was that between 30 and 40 per cent of the Essex
Scottish had been killed or wounded by 5:45 a.m.132 The estimate seems high, but it is
clear that at an early stage the unit was, in MacRae's phrase, "unable to continue
organized fighting" and was forced on to the defensive, using the line of the wall as a sort
of fire-trench. "D" Company had had as one of its tasks the destruction of the Tobacco
Factory, which was supposed to contain explosives. It fired grenades into the building,
which from this or some other cause caught fire and burned fiercely.133
From the time when the first momentum of the assault was lost, the situation on the
beach remained largely static. The men of the R.H.L.I. and the Essex found what cover
they could and tried to return the fire of a largely invisible enemy who continued to pour
down bullets, mortar-bombs and shells. Casualties mounted steadily. Among those who
laboured to assist the wounded during that sombre morning, one was particularly
conspicuous: Honorary Captain J. W. Foote, Chaplain of the Hamilton regiment. He
worked ceaselessly at giving first aid, and repeatedly exposed himself to carry injured
men to the aid post. At the withdrawal, he helped bear the wounded to the boats but
disdained to embark himself, choosing rather to continue his work of mercy as a prisoner.
At the end of the war he received the Victoria Cross-the first ever awarded to a Canadian
chaplain.134
The Navy did its courageous utmost to assist the men on the beaches. The Naval
Force Commander's account of the work of one flak craft (a converted L.C.T. mounting
several anti-aircraft guns) may be quoted. "A brilliant feature of this assault was the
support given by L.C.F.(L)2, who remained close in firing at all positions, for a very
considerable time. She was straddled continually by enemy batteries and under heavy fire
from close range weapons. One by one her guns were put out of action and finally she
sank.135
The Fortunes of the Tanks
It is well to consider separately the experience of the Calgary Regiment's tanks. The
14th Army Tank Regiment was the first unit of the Canadian Armoured Corps ever to go
into action. This was, moreover, the Churchill tank's first battle, as well as the earliest test
of tank landing craft under fire.
It has already been explained that the leading group of tanks, "Flight 1" (nine tanks,
carried in three L.C.Ts.) was perhaps as much as a quarter of an hour late in landing. Of
the three craft carrying this wave, two were lost; one remained on the beach, and another
succeeded in withdrawing but evidently sank shortly afterwards. L.C.T. 2, which touched
down near the east end of the beach, landed its three tanks, though only after some delay.
All three are known to have crossed the sea-wall. The craft got off the beach successfully,
intending to land the engineers who were on board farther to the right; but damage to the
ramp by shellfire prevented its putting in again and these sappers never got ashore.136
L.C.T. 1 landed its tanks, but only one got on to the Promenade. The craft itself sank in
shallow water offshore; it appears in German photographs close to the base of the west
mole. Unfortunately, the leading tank from L.C.T. 3 went off "in very deep water"137 and
was "drowned" and lost. The others landed successfully but did not get beyond the beach.
This was the craft that was unable to withdraw.
Flight IA likewise consisted of three craft, each carrying three tanks. It was due to
land at 5:35 a.m., which was approximately the time that Flight 1 actually did land. The
naval reports indicate that Flight 1 A came in "shortly afterwards".138 The fortunes of the
three craft and their tanks may be briefly stated. L.C.T. 4 landed all its tanks, but none
crossed the wall. This craft evidently sank after withdrawing from the beach. L.C.T. 5 on
the other hand never got off the beach; German photographs show it directly in front of
the Casino. All its tanks landed, but only one got over the wall. L.C.T. 6 likewise landed
its tanks, and all three reached the Promenade. This craft survived the operation.
Flight 2, consisting of 12 tanks carried in four L.C.Ts., was due to land at 6:05 a.m.,
and it appears to have been on time.139 The regimental headquarters troop was in L.C.T.
8. When this craft touched down the leading tank got ashore but "bellied" in the shingle
and blocked the ramp. The craft pulled off and made another approach, but shellfire
severed the cables so that its ramp fell and it touched down in perhaps eight feet of water.
Lt.-Col. Andrews, receiving a signal from a sailor who doubtless thought that his tank
could get off, drove off the craft, and the tank was almost entirely submerged. The young
Commanding Officer and his crew got out, and it would seem that Colonel Andrews
reached, or nearly reached the shore;
but he appears to have been shot down at the water's edge.140 He was a most promising
officer and an agreeable companion; many mourned him.
L.C.T. 8's third tank remained on board. L.C.T. 7 and L.C.T. 9 landed their tanks, and
all of them crossed the wall. L.C.T. 10 likewise put all its tanks ashore but only one
reached the Promenade. All four craft of this flight survived the landing, but L.C.T. 7 was
lost during the withdrawal.*
The remainder of the tank regiment (the whole of "A" Squadron and three troops of
"C") was not landed.141
We have already given some hint of the action of the tanks ashore. It will be noted
that the sea-wall did not present an especially serious obstacle. It has often been assumed
that it was intended to blow holes in the wall to open a passage for the tanks; but the
actual plan was to build timber-crib ramps to enable tanks to cross it in the central
section, where it was highest. To give the tanks traction on the beach and assist them in
climbing the low end sections of the wall, a track-laying device had been invented by
which the leading tank on each craft would lay a path of "chespaling" in front of it.142 In
fact, no ramps were built, nor could they have been built under the conditions that
existed. The Germans had had a mechanical excavator at work in front of the central
section of the wall, and here it was quite impassable; but at either end it rose less than
two feet above the shingle, and the tanks had little difficulty in crossing it at these
points.143
A total of 29 tanks went off the landing craft; two were drowned, and of the 27 that
landed 15 crossed the sea-wall. Major C. E. Page, the senior officer of the Calgary
Regiment in Oflag VIIB, held a conference of the unit's officers in that camp to decide
this point. Collating all their information, they found that 13 tanks had certainly crossed
the wall, but were uncertain concerning two others, which belonged to a troop
commanded by Lieut. E. Bennett, who was in a different camp. Correspondence with
Lieut. Bennett has since established that these two also crossed.144 Some infantry
officers have given much lower estimates of the number that reached the Promenade, but
the evidence of the men who were in the tanks is conclusive. Incidentally, the report of
the German 81st Corps states that eyewitnesses reported that "probably 16" tanks reached
the Promenade. The Commander in-Chief West, it is true, states that only five got there;
this appears to have been the actual number remaining there after the operation. The
author of
*The Naval Force Commander's despatch attributes the damage suffered by the L.C.Ts. in part to the long periods
they remained on the beach "waiting for the miscellaneous troops that they were carrying in addition to the tanks, to
disembark." Only two reports from individual L.C.Ts. are available. One (from L.C.T. 8) complains that after the second
tank "landed" no effort was made to get the third off. The author (not the craft's commanding officer) evidently did not
know of the second tank being drowned or have a clear picture of the circumstances, which are described above. The other
report (from L.C.T. 6) states, "All the Infantry except thirty went ashore, and after waiting 15 minutes for the other thirty to
go ashore, I came off the beach". In this case, "infantry" presumably means simply "men on foot". There were only 35
actual infantrymen in this craft.
this report presumably did not know that, as stated in the 81st Corps report, as well as in
the evidence of the Calgary Regiment officers, many of the tanks that crossed the wall
returned subsequently to the beach.
More formidable obstacles than the wall were the heavy concrete roadblocks barring
the streets leading out of the Promenade into the town. To breach these with explosives
was the engineers' business; but some of the demolition parties had not landed, others had
had equipment destroyed, and others had suffered casualties. The officer in charge on
White Beach, Lieut. W. A. Ewener, was badly wounded.145 Those who could get within
reach went forward gallantly, in spite of the deadly fire from the Castle and other flank
positions. But none of the blocks was breached. Although some charges were actually
placed on a block near the Casino, it appears that the means of detonating them were
lacking; and a sharp-eyed French civilian saw one still there on the following day.146 It
was reported after the operation that three or four tanks had penetrated into the town; but
none actually got farther than the Promenade.
Further progress being prevented by the road-blocks, almost all the tanks on the
upper level returned after a time to the beach, and German propaganda pictures, and our
own aerial photographs taken after the raid, led us to underestimate the number that had
succeeded in crossing the wall. Information about the tanks' action was long very meagre,
chiefly because only one man (Trooper G. Volk) who had been in a tank on shore
returned to England.147 Only when our first prisoners were repatriated (on medical
grounds) in 1943 did the real facts begin to emerge.
Most of the tanks were sooner or later immobilized by damage or by bellying in the
beach shingle. However, they continued firing, operating in effect as pillboxes, and
effectively supporting the infantry, who speak in the warmest terms of the manner in
which they were fought. The Calgary Regiment's chaplain, on an L.C.T. offshore,
listened to the cool and steady voices that spoke over the tanks' radio telephones and
reflected that it might have been a game of bridge.148 The tank fire certainly contributed
to the withdrawal of many infantrymen. The crews did not leave their vehicles until
12:25.149 By this time evacuation had virtually ceased, and this is the explanation of why
almost none of the tankmen returned to England. Thanks to the Churchills' staunchness,
however, the regiment had very few fatal casualties: actually, two officers and 11 other
ranks. The enemy's anti-tank guns were mainly 37-millimetre, against which the tanks'
armour gave complete protection. About nine o'clock the Germans brought into action an
anti-tank company armed with 75-millimetre guns; but the roadblocks prevented these
from firing on the beach at close range.150
The Landing of the Reserves
Something has already been said of the inadequacy of the information available to
General Roberts about progress ashore. We have noted the false report to the effect that
the Royal Regiment had not landed at Puys, which led him to send orders for that unit to
come to Red Beach to support the Essex. This was about 6:40. About the same time,
Roberts decided to land the main body of his floating reserve. This was done because, as
he says in his report, "information received indicated that `Red' Beach was sufficiently
cleared" to permit such action to be properly taken. The "information received" was
evidently a message entered in the Fernie intelligence log at 6:10: "Essex Scot across the
beaches and in houses". This seems to have originated in a message from the Essex to the
R.H.L.I. which is recorded elsewhere and which appears to. describe the penetration
made by C. S. M. Stapleton's little party: "12 of our men in the buildings. Have not heard
from them for some time."151 Reaching the Military Force Commander in the very
exaggerated form which has been quoted, it led him to believe that the Essex had made a
penetration suitable for exploitation, and he ordered Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, whose
Commanding Officer came on board Calpe at 6:10, to land on Red Beach. At 7:00 a.m.,
accordingly, the unit went in in its 26 unarmoured personnel landing craft.152
The Germans observed this "major formation of approaching landing craft" and their
artillery fired on it for ten minutes.153 This was not all. In the words of the naval officer
in charge (Lieut.-Commander J. H. Dathan), when the boats neared the beach "very
heavy firing was opened . . . from buildings in front of the beach, machine guns which
appeared to be on the boulevard, and from the top of the west cliff further heavy machine
gun fire, mortar fire and grenades.154 A considerable number of casualties were suffered
before the craft touched down. But the Fusiliers were not discouraged. Capt. MacRae
recalled later how the boats struck the beach at speed, and the dash with which the men
rushed ashore and charged up the shingle.
Although General Roberts' intention had been that the unit should land on Red Beach,
it was in fact landed along the whole extent of the main beaches, and a considerable part of
it was put ashore on the narrow strip of shingle under the cliffs west of the town.155 The
men landed here could of course accomplish nothing. Of those farther east, some were
active in and around the Casino, while others were pinned down on the beach along with
the greater part of the R.H.L.I. and the Essex Scottish.156 Various parties were reported to
have got into the town, but none is attested by evidence except one including Sergeant P.
Dubuc, which penetrated some distance, was captured, but subsequently overpowered its
guard. Sergeant Dubuc succeeded in getting back to the beach.157 Lt.-Col. Menard was
severely wounded immediately after landing, and suffered further wounds later; and in
general the Fusiliers' losses were very heavy, their total fatal casualties being eight
officers and 111 other ranks. Of the officers who actually landed, only two returned to
England, and both were wounded.
After the commitment of the-Fusiliers, General Roberts had still available as a reserve
(apart from the unlanded tanks) the Royal Marine Commando. The original plan to use
this unit as a cutting-out force against shipping in the harbour was of course
impracticable, and Roberts now decided to utilize it too on the main beaches. Perhaps the
General was unwise in persisting in reinforcing the beaches at this stage; yet deceptively
encouraging intelligence was still being received. Shortly after eight a.m. he believed that
the situation on White Beach was such that additional troops landed there might be able
to penetrate through the town and circle round to clear the East Headland. The Calpe
intelligence log contains at 8:17 the entry, "Have control of White Beach". It was about
this time that General Roberts instructed the Marines to transfer to armoured landing craft
and go in "and support the Essex Scottish through White beach . . . the object . . . being to
pass around the West and South of the town, and attack the batteries on the Eastern cliff
from the South".158 Some of the remaining tanks were ordered to land in support, but
this was cancelled ten minutes later, and the craft carrying the unlanded tanks were
ordered back to England about nine o'clock.159
The information received had been false and the plan over-optimistic. The Marines,
like the Fusiliers, met a most destructive fire as they approached the shore. When Lt.-Col.
Phillipps realized the situation, he stood up in his own craft and signalled to the rest to
retire into the shelter of the smokescreen offshore. His action doubtless saved many of his
men from landing upon a beach where they could have accomplished nothing.* The
Commando's report states that of the seven craft in which the unit was embarked, only
three actually reached the shore; the rest turned back or had already broken down.
Phillipps fell mortally wounded after completing his signal.161
The Headquarters of the 4th and 6th Brigades were in tank landing craft, each divided
into two groups in different craft. In the case of the 4th Brigade, neither group succeeded
in landing. Brigadier Lett was in L.C.T. 8, which, as already noted, touched down twice
and was heavily shelled. On the second occasion the Brigadier was badly wounded, and
instructed Lt.-Col. Labatt of the R.H.L.I. to take over the Brigade. The order was
received, but under the conditions existing on the beach Labatt could
*The detail, frequently repeated, that Phillipps put on white gloves before making his signal, is not in the
Commando's reports. An account by a Marine private who claims to have been in the Colonel's L.C.M. fully confirms the
Commanding Officer's gallantry, but makes no mention of the signal,160 The reports however are much better evidence.
exercise little control. On board the L.C.T., Brigadier Lett was still able to give orders as
he lay on a stretcher.162 Of the 6th Brigade's Headquarters the only officer to land was
Brigadier Southam himself, who followed the tanks from L.C.T. 7 ashore. Although
wounded, he was active on the beach throughout the operation, directing and encouraging
the men. He kept in touch with Force Headquarters, reporting progress and giving
guidance, through a wireless set in the scout car belonging to Major G. M. Rolfe, the
senior signals officer who landed. This car was slightly to the west of the Tobacco
Factory.163
As the morning progressed, an increasingly fierce battle developed in the air. The
Luftwaffe's effort was slow in getting under way-one more indication that the Germans
were surprised-but as the hours passed it threw more and more squadrons in. About ten
a.m. it began to use bombers escorted by fighters,* and in the end, the Air Force
Commander believed, "all his [the enemy's] resources on the Western Front were in
action". The war diary of the German Naval Operations Staff states, "According to data
compiled by the Air Force, 945 German planes were sent into action over the Channel on
19 August". Despite the fact that our aircraft were frequently fired upon by our ships,
whose gunners showed a "low standard of aircraft recognition", the R.A.F. gave most
effective cover to the great assembly of shipping off Dieppe .164 The only major vessel
lost was the destroyer Berkeley, which "received a direct hit with a heavy bomb" about
one o'clock and had to be sunk by British torpedoes. About the same moment, a fighter
attack on Calpe's bridge caused a number of casualties. The Naval and Military Force
Commanders were lucky enough to escape, but Air Commodore Cole was severely
wounded.165
The air force, in addition to providing the large support programme which had been
pre-arranged, and carrying out the special directions of the Fighter Controller in the
headquarters ship, received and met many requests from the men on the beaches for
special emergency missions. However, in such cases there was an inevitable time-lag of
approximately an hour and a half between the request being made and the aircraft being
over the target. To give one example, at 11:48 a.m. Brigadier Mann sent a message to
Uxbridge passing on a request for bomber action against the East and West Headlands
received from Brigadier Southam four minutes before. This was received at Uxbridge at
12:17 and orders for an attack on both headlands by Hurricane bombers and close support
aircraft were issued at 12:43. The attacks were. delivered at 1:30 p.m., after our troops
ashore had surrendered. General Crerar recalls one case at Uxbridge in which Admiral
Mountbatten asked him to intervene by requesting intensive bombing of the East
Headland.
*At 7:11 a.m. British time, nearly two-and-a-half hours after the first landings, the German 302nd Division logged
the message, "Corps H.Q. advises that bomber aircraft will be committed to action".
But since the bombing could not take place for an hour and a half, since there was no
telling what might happen in that period, and since General Roberts had not asked for
such action, Crerar declined the request.166
Withdrawal from the Main Beaches
By nine o'clock, it was evident that the landing of the reserves had been without
effect. The enemy still held both headlands and was sweeping the beaches with fire.
Since "the military situation was serious, and ... it was becoming steadily more difficult
for ships and craft to close the beaches", Captain Hughes-Hallett advised General Roberts
"that the withdrawal should take place with as little further delay as possible, and should
be confined to personnel". He considered 10:30 a.m. the earliest practicable time, as it
was necessary to warn the Air Force Commander and pass orders to the landing craft.
This time was accordingly agreed upon, but shortly afterwards, at Roberts' request, it was
changed to 11:00 a.m. The reasons for Roberts' suggestion were the fear that there might
not be time to make contact with the Camerons, and advice from Air Commodore Cole
that the extra half-hour would ensure more adequate air support for the withdrawal.167
At 10:30 the German fighter airfield of Abbeville-Drucat was attacked by Fortress
bombers of the United States Army Air Force escorted by R.A.F. Spitfires. Of the 24
bombers comprising the four squadrons employed, 22 actually bombed. The bombing
was reported to be very accurate, and the enemy was probably unable to use this
aerodrome for about two hours during the critical stage of the withdrawal.168
The arrangements for the withdrawal had largely to be improvised. The original intention,
had the raid gone according to plan, was to take most of the troops off the beaches in tank
landing craft. In the conditions actually existing, however, it was out of the question to
send these large and vulnerable vessels in, and assault landing craft (small bullet-proof
boats capable of carrying about a platoon of infantry apiece) had to be used.169 These
circumstances increase the credit due the Navy for an evacuation carried out under
conditions probably without parallel in the history of warfare.
At eleven o'clock the landing craft began to go in, covered by naval fire and R.A.F.
fighters; the fighter force over Dieppe had now been increased from three squadrons to
six, and sometimes was as high as nine.170 "The wind was onshore and slightly from the
west, and an effective screen of smoke prevented the landing craft from being fired upon
until they were close inshore.171 The Germans on the clifftops continued to pour down
shells and bullets, taking toll of boats and men alike.
On the Essex Scottish beach, not many craft came in, and of those that did a very high
proportion (six out of eight mentioned in a report from
H.M.S. Prince Charles)172 were lost.* The 'craft from H.M.S. Prince Leopold were
intended for Red Beach but actually went in by mistake to Green Beach (Pourville),
where they did very useful work. This undoubtedly reduced materially the number of
craft available to evacuate the Essex Scottish, but naval records indicate that one of these
boats did get to Red Beach later.174 It appears also that enemy air attacks contributed in
some degree to scattering and disorganizing the landing craft. Commander H. V. P.
McClintock, the Boat Pool Officer, describes such an attack and its effect; it evidently
helped to bring him to the conclusion that further evacuation from Blue, White and Red
beaches was not practicable. At about 12:20 he signalled the Naval Force Commander's
Chief of Staff to this effect. General Roberts, however, "asked that a further effort should
be made", and Captain Hughes-Hallett, although apprehensive that this might merely
mean "greater losses to troops already embarked", decided to give McClintock discretion
in the matter. He accordingly replied. "If no further evacuation possible withdraw"; but as
received by McClintock the signal read, "No further evacuation possible, withdraw".
Since, however, he was already convinced that there was no point in persisting, this error
in transmission had no actual influence on events.175
The Force Commanders were unwilling to leave the area while any hope remained of
bringing off men still on shore. At 12:48 Calpe went close to the beach, with a landing
craft on either bow, and shelled the breakwaters, "on which machine gun posts were
reported to be preventing the troops on Red Beach from reaching the water". Other
destroyers had previously gone close in to assist; H.M.S. Brocklesby reported that she had
actually grounded by the stern for a moment as she turned away.176 Captain Hughes-
Hallett was taking counsel with the shallow-draught gunboat Locust, whose people might
have better knowledge of the state of things on the beaches, when about ten minutes past
one a signal was received from Brigadier Southam's rudimentary headquarters, "Our
people here have surrendered".177
Thanks to the boundless skill and courage of the Navy and particularly of the crews
of the landing craft, a considerable proportion of the force that had landed was
successfully brought away. Of the 4963 Canadians who embarked for the operation, 2211
returned to England. Of these, however, it seems likely that nearly 1000 had never
landed. Analysis suggests that only between 350 and 400 men were evacuated from the
main beaches in front of the town (see Appendix "11"). The larger vessels
*The report of the Commanding Officers' conference at Oflag VIIB states, "No naval craft came in to evacuate this
battalion". In 1952 Colonel Jasperson was still of this opinion, but Colonel MacRae "had the impression that the navy did
make attempts". MacRae himself, however, got off with the aid of a small wooden rowboat full of wounded, which he,
swimming, pushed for two miles, when he and his party were picked up.173
were full of casualties during the return voyage; the little destroyer Calpe brought back
278 wounded soldiers.178
By two p.m. the operation was over. At 1:58 the German artillery finally fell silent.
Its meticulous returns indicate that it had fired 7458 rounds during the battle, not
counting anti-tank and anti-aircraft shell.179 About 2:10 the last craft was reported three
miles from the French coast.180 General Roberts had already sent by pigeon to
Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps a message181 summing up the grim record of the battle:
Very heavy casualties in men and ships. Did everything possible to get men off but in order to get
any home had to come to sad decision to abandon remainder. This was joint decision by Force
Commanders. Obviously operation completely lacked surprise.
Fighter cover was maintained over the force throughout the homeward voyage, and
enemy air attacks did no serious damage to the ships. "The coastal craft and landing craft
reached Newhaven without further incident, and the destroyers and H.M.S. Locust
berthed alongside at Portsmouth shortly after midnight."182 The protection of the flotillas
in the final phase had crowned the work of the air forces, which throughout the operation
had been beyond praise; General Roberts' word for it was "magnificent".183
So ended the brave and bitter day. Under the shaded dockside lights in the English
ports, tired and grimy men drank strong tea and told their tales, and the ambulance trains
filled and drew slowly out. Back on the Dieppe beaches the Germans were still collecting
Canadian wounded, and the Canadian dead in their hundreds lay yet where they had
fallen. On both sides of the Channel staff officers were already beginning to scan the
record and assess the lessons of the raid; and beyond the Atlantic, in innumerable
communities across Canada, people waited in painful anxiety for news of friends in the
overseas army-that army which, after three years of war, had just fought its first battle.
BLANK PAGE
CHAPTER XII
DIEPPE: LOSSES, COMMENTS AND AFTERMATH
Allied Losses at Dieppe
T HE casualties suffered by the Canadian military force in the Dieppe raid were
extremely heavy. In all categories they totalled 3367 all ranks. No fewer than 1946
Canadian officers and men became prisoners of war, at least 568 of them wounded. At
Dieppe, from a force of roughly 5000 men engaged for only nine hours, the Canadian
Army lost more prisoners than in the whole eleven months of the later campaign in
North-West Europe, or the twenty months during which Canadians fought in Italy.
Sadder still was the loss in killed. As now computed, the total of 'fatal casualties was 56
officers and 851 other ranks; these include seven officers and 65 other ranks who died in
captivity, chiefly from wounds received in the operation.1 Of the seven major Canadian
units engaged, only one (Les Fusiliers MontRoyal) brought its commanding officer back
to England-and he, as we have seen, was badly wounded. Little was left of the 4th
Brigade, not much more of the 6th. Months of hard work were required before the 2nd
Division became again the fine formation that had assaulted the beaches.
The detailed casualties of the Canadian force are listed in the accompanying table
(page 389).
According to figures now available, British Army casualties amounted to 18 officers
and 157 other ranks, of whom two officers and 12 other ranks were killed, and 11 officers
and 117 other ranks were missing or prisoner's.* The Royal Marines' total casualties were
seven officers and 93 other ranks. Of these, four officers and 27 other ranks lost their
lives, including those listed as "missing, presumed killed" and as died in captivity.2
The Navy too lost heavily. In ships, its chief losses were one destroyer and five tank
landing craft; but it also left behind it, on the Dieppe beaches or under the adjacent waters,
28 lesser landing craft, of which 17 were L.C.As. In this last category, over 28 per cent of
the craft, engaged were lost. This reflects both the desperate conditions under which the
assault and the
*These were the best figures the War Office was able to furnish in October 1950. Many of the missing must in fact
have been killed.
387
withdrawal were conducted, and the high courage with which the crews of these little
boats did their work. There were 550 casualties to naval personnel, including 75 killed or
died of wounds and 269 missing or prisoners.3
The losses in the great air battle were large on both sides. The R.A.F. had to fight the
enemy in his own air, close to his own fields, and the initial advantage of surprise was
lost long before the battle was over. The gallant and successful fight waged in support of
the operation against the highlyorganized German air defence cost the Allied squadrons a
total of 106 aircraft, of which 98 were fighters or tactical reconnaissance machines: the
R.A.F.'s heaviest loss in the air in a single day since the war began, and indeed the
heaviest of the whole war. Fatal personnel casualties to the Allied air forces (killed,
missing and presumed dead, as known in 1950) numbered 67, including two pilots killed
in crashes when returning from the raid.4 The heaviest losses in proportion were those of
the tactical reconnaissance squadrons, whose duties required them to make deep
penetrations over enemy territory. Of a total of 72 sorties in this category nine resulted in
the loss of pilots, and 10 aircraft were lost.5 The two Canadian tactical reconnaissance
squadrons, although they made between them a total of 42 sorties, were fortunate enough
to lose only two aircraft.6 All told, the R.C.A.F. lost 13 planes and ten pilots. It claimed
ten enemy aircraft destroyed, four probably destroyed and 22 damaged.7
The communique issued by Combined Operations Headquarters after the raid
claimed 91 German aircraft destroyed and "about twice that number" probably destroyed
or damaged. These estimates resulted in the air battle's being regarded as a particularly
satisfactory aspect of the operation. (It will be recalled that a major object of the
programme of large-scale raids had been to bring the Luftwaffe to action and force it to
divert strength from the East.) Post-war examination of German documents, however,
indicates that the enemy lost 48 aircraft destroyed and 24 damaged.8 (At the time, he
admitted the loss of only 35, and claimed to have shot down 127 of ours.)9 Although the
result was thus less satisfactory than was believed at the time, the effectiveness of the
R.A.F.'s share in the raid must be judged, not by these statistics, but by the fact that more
than 200 ships and craft lay off the enemy's coast for a day without suffering important
losses by air attack.
German Losses and German Critiques
The German Army’s losses at Dieppe, though not inconsiderable, were much smaller
than our own. The ommuniqué issued by the High Command after the action admitted
591 casualties suffered by all three services. Figures
in German reports now in our hands vary from this in detail but not in general effect. The
302nd Division reported the Army losses as five officers and 116 other ranks killed, six
officers and 195 other ranks wounded, and 11 other ranks missing.10 Although we took
many prisoners, most of them had to be left behind; the number actually brought to
England was 37, of whom only eight belonged to the Army.11 German losses in material,
in addition to the six 5.9-inch guns destroyed by No. 4 Commando, included two of the
French beach-defence guns and four 37-mm. anti-tank guns.l2 The German Navy lost
Submarine-Chaser No. 1404 with her whole crew of 46; one of the merchant vessels
forming the convoy involved with Group 5 (the Franz) was also sunk.13
The raid had given the German command a severe temporary shock. Great forces had
been set in motion towards Dieppe. In addition to the action of local reserves which we
have noted, a battalion of the 302nd Division's reserve was brought up to the Foret
d'Arques, south-east of Dieppe, and held ready to deal with any unfavourable
development at Dieppe or a possible parachute drop.14 The movement of the regiment in
Corps Reserve towards Pourville has been mentioned. The four battalions of the Army
Reserve also moved forward, though so slowly as to arouse the ire of the 81st Corps.15
And shortly before nine in the morning Field-Marshal von Rundstedt ordered the 10th
Panzer Division from Amiens to be committed under the 81st Corps to clean up the
situation at Dieppe. Its advanced guard reached Longueville-sur-Scie, ten miles south of
Dieppe, at 1:55 p.m.16 By that time fighting was over; had it lasted longer the division
-could have been in action against the Pourville bridgehead before evening.
The Germans had taken even more far-reaching precautions. Shortly after nine
o'clock their air reconnaissance reported off Selsey Bill a convoy of 26 ships, with "decks
closely packed with troops".17 This report was highly inaccurate. Admiralty records
indicate that the only convoy the observer can have seen was "C.W. 116", which
consisted of 14 small merchant vessels en route from the Thames to the Isle of Wight.18
However, when the report reached G.H.Q. West it was taken to indicate that the "Second
Front" was in immediate prospect; and at 10:30 a.m. Rundstedt ordered "readiness for
instant action" for the whole of the Seventh Army (guarding the coasts of Lower
Normandy and Brittany) and the greater part of his Army Group Reserves. This alert was
maintained until the morning of 20 August.19
A copy of the greater part of our Detailed Military Plan fell into German hands, as a
result of its providing that two copies might be taken ashore by each brigade headquarters.
(The Germans state that this copy, No. 37, one of those issued to Headquarters 6th Infantry
Brigade, was found on the body of a dead major on the Dieppe beach. )20 In spite of this,
responsible officers at G.H.Q. West persisted in believing that the raid had actually been
intended as the opening phase of an invasion of France. The fact that the
DIEPPE: LOSSES, COMMENTS AND AFTERMATH 391
26-ship convoy had been reported as returning to Portsmouth convinced them that the
failure at Dieppe had caused the cancellation of the main operation. Rundstedt's staff found
it particularly hard to believe that we would really sacrifice "29 or 30 of the most modern
tanks" for a mere raid. His report, signed by his Chief of Staff, General Zeitzler, suggests
that if Dieppe had fallen new orders would have been issued and the full-dress invasion
launched.21 For this supposition there was, of course, no basis whatever; as we have seen,
the Allied strategic planners had finally turned their backs on France (as far as 1942 was
concerned) about 22 July.*
The Germans studied our operation carefully, with the aid of the captured order. The
Commander-in-Chief West had it translated and circulated. His covering letter23
commented upon it somewhat rudely:
According to German ideas this order is not an order, but an aide-memoire or a scheme worked out
for a map exercise. Nevertheless, it does contain many points of value to us.
First, how much the enemy knows about us.
Second, the peculiarities of his method of landing and fighting.
For that reason, this order is to be thoroughly studied by all staffs, to collect lessons for our coastal
defence and for the training and education of our troops.
But it would be an error to believe that the enemy will mount his next operation in the same
manner. He will draw his lessons from his mistakes in planning and from his failure and next time he
will do things differently. . . .
The Germans generally were of the opinion that the British planners had greatly
underestimated the strength in weapons required for such an operation. The 302nd
Division's report remarked:24
The strength of air and naval forces was not nearly sufficient to keep the defenders down during the
landings and to destroy their signal communications. It is incomprehensible that it should be believed that a
single Canadian Division should be able to overrun a German Infantry Regimentt reinforced with artillery.
The English command at the middle levels . drew up the time-table for the intended withdrawal at
"W" hour in a theoretical manner reflecting inexperience of battle (mit einem kampffremden
Schematismus).‡
The report of the 81st Corps criticized the order for being too detailed and therefore
"difficult to visualize as a whole". It remarked, "The planning
*All German officers were not in agreement with the Zeitzler-Rundstedt interpretation. The war diary of the Naval
Operations Staff, 19-21 August, indicates that the sailors were dubious about it from the beginning, and that Naval Group
West reported on the 21st that the famous 26-ship convoy was possibly "a scheduled westbound Channel convoy
previously located by radio intelligence and radar service". And on 25 September Colonel Ulrich Liss, head of the Western
Intelligence Branch of the Army High Command, wrote a letter22 to an unidentified general asking advice. He had
prepared a detailed report which left no doubt that the Dieppe enterprise was a raid and nothing more. But Zeitzler had just
become Chief of the General Staff in succession to General Halder, and Liss was worried about putting before him a paper
which contradicted his own report! What finally happened is not clear; but no copy of the Liss report has been found. It
was doubtless suppressed.
†Equivalent to a British or Canadian Brigade.
‡This was true enough. The plan for withdrawal contained in the Detailed Military Plan was expressed in thirteen
successive diagrams, each with its appropriate code name, representing successive stages of the gradual retirement and
embarkation.
down to the last detail limits the independence of action of the subordinate officers and
leaves them no opportunity to make independent. decisions in an altered situation."25
Actually this German criticism is less valid than might appear. Although there was much
detail in the order, the action of individual units is not so closely prescribed as a first
glance suggests, and the present writer sometimes had difficulty in constructing from it a
detailed account of the intended movements. One example of a Commanding Officer
making "independent decisions in an altered situation" is Major Law's deciding to
advance inland by the west instead of the east bank of the Scie. This alternative route had
in fact been discussed in advance, but there is no reference to it in the Detailed Military
Plan.
On the quality of the British and Canadian troops engaged there is some
disagreement between the different German reports. That of the 81st Corps26 compares
the Canadians unfavourably with the Commandos:
The Second Canadian Division . were . loaded on to transports and shipped to the French coast
without being told either the objective or the mission, so that the ordinary soldiers were completely in
the dark.* The Canadians on the whole fought badly and surrendered afterwards in swarms.
On the other hand, the combat efficiency of the Commandos was very high. They were well trained
and fought with real spirit. . . .
There is one other adverse comment; it is contained in a report of "Personal Impressions

from the Battlefield" sent on 20 August by General Zeitzler:27 "English fought well.
Canadians and Americans not so well, later quickly surrendered under the influence of
the high bloody losses".
The comments of the 81st Corps are specifically repudiated by Headquarters
Fifteenth Army, which reported28 as follows:
The large number of English prisoners might leave the impression that the fighting value of the
English and Canadian units employed should not be too highly estimated. This is not the case. The
enemy, almost entirely Canadian soldiers, fought-so far as he was able to fight at all-well and bravely.
The chief reasons for the large number of prisoners and casualties are probably:
1. Lack of artillery support....
2. The Englishman had underestimated the strength of the defences, and therefore. at most of his
landing places-especially at Puys and Dieppe-found himself in a hopeless position as soon as
he came ashore.
3. The effect of our own defensive weapons was superior to that of the weapons employed by the
attacker.
4. The craft provided for re-embarkation were almost all hit and sank.
This obviously makes sense; the reason for the large number of Canadian prisoners was
the fact that the Navy simply had no means of taking the troops off the beaches. The
proportion of British prisoners was smaller because No. 4 Commando was successfully
evacuated, and the greater parts of both No. 3 and the Marine Commando were never
landed.
*As we have seen, this was not true, though some individual soldiers may conceivably have escaped briefing and told
this story to German interrogators.
The 302nd German Infantry Division, the formation in direct contact with our troops,
made comments29 which can be read with satisfaction:
The main attack at Dieppe, Puys and Pourville was launched by the 2nd Canadian Division with
great energy. That the enemy gained no ground at all in Puys, and in Dieppe could take only parts of the
beach, not including the west mole and the western edge of the beach, and this only for a short time, was
not the result of lack of courage, but of the concentrated defensive fire of our Divisional Artillery and
infantry heavy weapons. Moreover, his tank crews did not lack spirit. They could not penetrate the anti-
tank walls which barred the way into the town of Dieppe. . . . In Puys the efforts made by the enemy, in
spite of the heavy German machine-gun fire, to surmount the wire obstacles studded with booby traps on
the first beach terrace are signs of a good offensive spirit (Angriffsfreudigkeit). The large number of
prisoners at Puys was the result of the hopelessness of the situation for the men who had landed, caught
under German machine-gun, rifle and mortar fire between the cliffs and the sea on a beach which offered
no cover.
At Pourville the enemy, immediately after landing, pushed forward into the interior without
worrying about flank protection. . . .
The operations against the coastal batteries were conducted by the Commandos with great dash and
skill. With the aid of technical devices of all sorts they succeeded in clambering up the steep cliffs at
points which had seemed inaccessible.
As we have explained, it would have been virtually impossible to mount an operation like
that at Dieppe from England in 1942 without giving the Canadians a share in it.
Nevertheless, an assault operation of this type is obviously not a suitable introduction to
battle for troops who have never fought. Had the 2nd Canadian Division had previous
battle experience, its units might perhaps have accomplished more at certain points; but it
seems questionable whether it could have carried out the operation successfully under all
the conditions which existed on 19 August 1942.
How the Public was Told
From the Canadian point of view the manner in which information concerning this
complex and controversial operation reached the public in the Allied countries was an
unsatisfactory aspect. Canadians themselves were well served by the able and
enterprising Canadian war correspondents who accompanied the raiding force;30 but in
other countries the enterprise at first was made to appear in a somewhat peculiar light.
In the early reports in the world press, the parts played by both the small detachment
of United States troops and the larger but still secondary component provided by the
Commandos were exaggerated at the Canadians' expense. It was natural that Americans,
delighted by the news that their ground troops had fought their first action against the
Germans, should "play up" the story in this manner. On the face of it, it was a trifle more
surprising that newspapers in the United Kingdom should pay so little attention to the
fact that the landing force-and the casualties-were mainly Canadian.* It is fair to say that
the misunderstanding was cleared up only by Mr. Churchill when, speaking in the House
of Commons on 8 September, he said:
It is a mistake to speak or write of this as a Commando raid, although some Commando troops
distinguished themselves remarkably in it. The military credit for this most gallant affair goes to the
Canadian troops, who formed five-sixths of the assaulting force, and to the Royal Navy, which carried
them all there and which carried most of them back.
Some of the misconceptions in the English press can be traced to a definite origin. It
is always extremely difficult to strike a nice balance in matters of publicity between the
components of an international force, and such questions were an embarrassment to the
British Ministry of Information throughout the war. In this particular case the Ministry
made an attempt to give guidance to the press. In the early afternoon of the day of the
raid the Controller, Press and Censorship, issued a "Private and Confidential Memo to
Editors" which contained the following passage:
For your own information, I may say that while Canadian troops comprise the main body of the
raiding force, they constitute approximately one-third of the total personnel of all services participating
in the raid.
This was well meant, although a more imaginative official might have realized that the
first battle of an army which had waited nearly three years for action was not the most
suitable moment for issuing such a suggestion. In any case, it _ had an unfortunate result.
At least one newspaper quoted it almost verbatim,32 and it certainly resulted in a general
playing-down of the Canadians' part in the operation. The Controller attempted to undo
its effect by issuing a further memorandum on the evening of 20 August, asking the
newspapers to "bear in mind that by far the biggest proportion of the troops engaged were
Canadian forces"; but the damage had been done.
The interest of the Canadian people in the raid was such that General McNaughton
was asked to arrange for the preparation of "some authoritative statement in the form of a
White Paper or some similar document" which would afford a detailed picture of the
operation. A lengthy account was accordingly drafted and was released by the Minister of
National Defence on 18 September.33 Although revision carried out to meet the security
requirements of Combined Operations Headquarters had rendered it rather less
informative, it did something to satisfy the natural desire of the public for authentic
facts.†
*A particularly glaring example was the account presented in an English weekly under the inaccurate title "Dieppe:
The Full Story".31 In eleven pages of text and photographs, devoted chiefly to R.A.F. and Commando aspects, the only
mention of Canadian participation was in two obscure sentences on the tenth page. The explanation of this particular article
is the fact that the correspondent who wrote it had accompanied one of the Commandos.
†This "white paper" was drafted by the present writer. It contained some errors, partly resulting from the fact that
there had not yet been time to digest fully the voluminous records of the operation, partly from the incompleteness at that
date of our knowledge of events on
Some months after Dieppe an American correspondent who had been present in the
headquarters ship published a book describing the raid. Although he had of course had no
knowledge of the planning, he commented upon it freely, and asserted with particular
assurance that the use of Canadian troops was the result of General McNaughton's
insistence.* He implied, moreover, that the Canadians were responsible for altering a
more intelligent plan of attack drawn up by Combined Operations Headquarters and
inserting in it the frontal assault.35 How inaccurate these statements were the reader of
the foregoing pages knows. McNaughton was invited by National Defence Headquarters
in Ottawa to contribute to "a corrective statement" refuting them. He declined to do so on
the ground that this would prejudice future Canadian relations with the British
authorities, particularly the Chief of Combined Operations, would "be interpreted as
seeking to shift responsibility from us to them", and would give valuable information to
the enemy.36 It was a sound and patriotic decision, but one which in the end probably did
General McNaughton himself considerable harm.
The immediate consequences of the operation within the Canadian Army Overseas,
and in Canada, merit examination. There is no doubt whatever that in the Army it
produced a new sense of pride. After nearly three years of disappointment and frustration,
it had been demonstrated, it seemed, that this Canadian Army could fight in the manner
of that of 1914-18, and the bad luck and the losses did not diminish the confidence thus
engendered. Those who visited the wounded in hospitals were deeply moved by their
spirit. The censors who read the letters written by soldiers directly after the raid were
impressed by the "great uplift in morale" which they reflected. A special report on these
letters ran in part:
The morale of all appears very good. Regrets are not shown, but just enthusiasm, satisfaction and
pride in achievement, and the Canadians' share in the raid. . . .
Faith in their officers is freely expressed in many letters. . . Generally the raid has had a stimulating
effect on the Canadians, in spite of the losses. . . .
The censors nevertheless noted, "There is evidence of a more realistic tone, which surmises
much heavy fighting in the future, and the probable cost of this is faced soberly". The
experience had led Canadian soldiers to take a more serious view of the question of their
own employment. There would be less demand now for immediate assault upon the
Germans in the west; the magnitude of such an enterprise was more clearly apparent than
before, as
shore. Perhaps the worst mistake was the statement that the radar station was destroyed. This was carried
over from the original C.O.H.Q. communiqué. The destruction of the station was, in fact, reported during the
raid and recorded in operations logs,34 but the report was inaccurate.
*It seems just possible that this is a garbled second-hand reminiscence of General Crerar's discussion with Admiral
Mountbatten early in the spring (above, page 308),
was the need for the most detailed preparation, the most careful training, the most
exacting discipline.
In Canada the effects were different. Soldiers and civilians look at such things from
widely separated points of view. Canadian civilians, particularly those who had lost
relatives, saw only the casualty lists and the failure. It was quite impossible, without
helping the enemy, to make any announcement of the actual lessons learned; and as the
raid was followed by another long period of inactivity by the Canadian forces, the public
mind continued to dwell upon it for months, and comment, frequently very ill-informed,
continued in the press and elsewhere. Although, as has been made apparent, the
responsibility for the tactical plan was widely distributed, and the Canadian share was
limited, it was declared in at least one respectable publication37 that the project of a raid
on Dieppe and the plan for it were almost exclusively the work of Canadian officers and
proved the bankruptcy of Canadian generalship; and there can be little doubt that such
criticism did something to undermine the hitherto unassailable prestige of General
McNaughton with the public.
The Shackling of Prisoners
The raid had one particularly unpleasant aftermath: the shackling of prisoners on both
sides.
It was a practice of the British Special Service Brigade to tie prisoners taken during
raids,38 and this practice was extended to the larger Dieppe operation. The "Intelligence
Plan" included in the Detailed Military Plan contained the following passage: "Wherever
possible, prisoners' hands will be tied to prevent destruction of their documents". General
Roberts states that he argued this point with the Chief of Combined Operations and had
opposed including this instruction. On 2 September the Germans, as a result of the
capture of it, threatened to place in chains all the prisoners taken at Dieppe. The War
Office then announced that if an order for tying prisoners was found to have been issued
as stated, it would be "cancelled". On 3 September the Germans cancelled the proposed
reprisals. On 7 October, however, they issued a second order, stated to be the result of
further investigation concerning Dieppe and of an incident at Sark on 4 October, when
German prisoners taken in a very minor raid were reported to have been tied. British and
Canadian prisoners in Germany were tied on 8 October; later, handcuffs replaced the
ropes.39
On the same date the British War Cabinet decided to undertake reprisals against an
equivalent number of German prisoners and the Canadian Government was asked to agree
and cooperate. There had been no consultation with Canada before the decision, and the
Canadian Government,
moreover, doubted its wisdom; it nevertheless acquiesced, from a desire to avoid public
differences with the United Kingdom. On 10 October, accordingly, a number of German
prisoners were handcuffed in the United Kingdom and in Canada.40 There was resistance
in certain Canadian camps; in Camp 30, at Bowmanville, Ontario, the guard had to fire a
few shots, although nobody was killed.41 This episode was rather exaggerated in some
press reports.42
The situation arising out of these mutual reprisals was so unpleasant that the British
and Canadian governments decided to end the shackling in their camps in the hope that
the Germans would take similar action. The German prisoners were accordingly
unshackled on 12 December 1942, but no reciprocal action by the enemy followed. It
appeared that he was still demanding guarantees against the issuance of further orders of
the type he objected to. After discussion between the United Kingdom and Canada, the
former issued an Army Council Instruction and the latter a Canadian Army Routine
Order forbidding the binding of prisoners of war except in case of operational necessity
on the field of battle.43 The Germans objected to this reservation, and the Canadian and
British prisoners remained shackled until 22 November 1943, when, following
conversations between Dr. Burckhardt of the International Red Cross Committee and the
German authorities, the latter, without formally rescinding the order, stopped all
shackling. In the prisoners' interest, and with a view to giving the Germans no excuse for
further reprisals, no publicity was given to this matter in Britain or Canada.44
The shackling brought additional discomfort to our prisoners in German hands,
whose lot was unpleasant enough without this. After a period of misery, however, the
shackling-perhaps under the influence of Allied victories-fortunately tended to become,
in the words of one Canadian officer, largely "a farce". At one camp at least (Oflag VIIB
at Eichstatt, where the majority of Canadian officers captured at Dieppe were confined),
the handcuffs came to be worn, in practice, only twice a day, on "check-parades"; and as
long as the prisoners observed the conventions at these times the Germans made no
further difficulty.45
Some Comments on the Operation
The raid on Dieppe was one of the most hotly-discussed operations of the war.
Tactically, it was an almost complete failure, for we suffered extremely heavy losses and
attained few of our objectives. After the Normandy landings of 6 June 1944, however, it
appeared in a new perspective. Historically, it is in the light of that later day that it must
be judged; but before attempting to relate the raid to those events it is proper to attempt
some commentary upon the tactical failure.
In this connection, the German critiques quoted above are of much interest. The
enemy was astonished that, in spite of our generally accurate knowledge of his defences,
we attempted an assault on an area strong both by nature and by art, with weapons which
he considered inadequate to the task. His comments chiefly emphasized the insufficiency
of the support given the assaulting infantry. (The 81st Corps Combat Report observed, "A
few light assault guns would probably have been more use to the British in their attack,
than the tanks".) Surveying the operation over a decade later, this may be bracketed with
the frontal attack as the least explicable elements in our planning. It seems impossible to
avoid the conclusion that from the beginning the planners underrated the influence of
topography and of the enemy's strong defences in the Dieppe area.
Reviewing the successive changes in the plan of attack, one returns again and again
to the decision, originally taken at the meeting of 5 June, over which General
Montgomery presided, to eliminate the attack by heavy bombers. This decision,
recommended in the first instance by the Air Force Commander and concurred in by the
Military Force Commander, was supported by arguments of some strength (above, pages
336-7, 344). It must be remembered that General Roberts was told that the R.A.F. night
bombers were quite incapable of hitting with accuracy such a small target as the buildings
fronting the sea at Dieppe;46 and the United States day bomber force in the United
Kingdom was still in its infancy (it made its first small raid two days before the Dieppe
operation). But the decision removed from the plan the one element of really heavy
support contained in it. The assault as a result was backed by nothing more powerful than
4-inch guns and Boston bombers. Surprise, rather than striking power, was the chief
reliance in this operation; yet no surprise could be hoped for in the frontal attack, which
was to go in half an hour later than those on the flanks.
The heavy air support having been removed from the plan, the question arises, why
was heavy naval support not substituted? After the operation, the Naval Force
Commander reported that he was satisfied that a capital ship could have operated in the
Dieppe area during the first two or three hours of the operation without undue risk, and
would probably have turned the tide ashore in our favour. It may seem strange that the
planners never asked for an old battleship to provide fire support, but the fact is that it
was so well known that Admiralty policy at this period was opposed to risking capital
ships in the narrow waters of the Channel that it was considered useless to make the
request.* Sir Frederick Morgan has described "the explosion that
*General Roberts pressed, without success, for a larger vessel than a destroyer as headquarters ship. Capt. Hughes-
Hallett put forward the suggestion that a dozen heavy bombers might be kept in the air "on call" somewhere about peachy
Head, to provide immediate support if required. The Air Force, however, argued that this was impracticable; the bombers
would inevitably be shot down.47
shattered the cloistral calm of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Room" when he suggested
employing one or two capital ships in the Channel in August of 1943.48 The opposition
presumably would have been even stronger a year earlier.
The plan, then, it would seem was unduly optimistic; and it may be asked how it
could happen that in the circumstances action was not taken either to increase the support
or (since the higher authorities could not be convinced of the need for this) to recommend
cancellation of the operation. The writer ventures to suggest that part of the explanation,
at least, is found in the procedure by which the plan was made. The reader will have
observed how very diffused was the responsibility for it. This was undoubtedly a bad
feature, although some dispersion of responsibility is unavoidable in operations involving
all three fighting services. In the present case, Combined Operations Headquarters was
itself an additional element; while on the Army side G.H.Q. Home Forces and
Headquarters South Eastern Command also exerted influence in the early and most
important stages. Subsequently, the headquarters of First Canadian Army and 1st
Canadian Corps became factors. The three Force Commanders inherited a plan already
made and were concerned mainly with detail, although they shared the responsibility for
the basic decision to eliminate the bomber attack. So far as any one individual had
general authority over the operation, it was the Chief of Combined Operations, Lord
Louis Mountbatten; but obviously even his powers were circumscribed. The fact is that
the Dieppe plan was the work of a large and somewhat indefinitely composed committee,
whose composition, moreover, changed steadily as the planning proceeded. A simpler
organization and a greater concentration of responsibility would have been more likely to
result in a sound plan. There were a great many cooks, and this probably had much to do
with spoiling the broth. The episode may be said to demonstrate the force of an old
maxim of the Staff Colleges: The plan of an operation should be made by the same
person who is to execute it. In a large combined operation this is not an easy rule to
enforce; but the closer one comes to it, the more likely the plan is to be a good one.
The operation was of course most closely analyzed, and in October 1942 Combined
Operations Headquarters produced a bulky report incorporating the official "lessons
learned".49 At least the most important of these should be summarized here.
C.O.H.Q. used capital letters and italics to emphasize the point considered of
paramount significance: "The Lesson of Greatest Importance is the need for overwhelming
fire support, including close support, during the initial stages of the attack." The support
should be provided, it was recommended, "by heavy and medium Naval bombardment, by
air action, by special vessels or craft working close inshore, and by using the fire power of
the assaulting troops while still sea-borne". It was indicated that "special close-support
craft, which should be gun-boats or some form of mobile fort" did not exist and required
to be developed.
On the naval side, what was considered the most important lesson was stated as
follows: "The necessity for the formation of permanent naval assault forces with a
coherence comparable to that of any other first line fighting formations. Army formations
intended for amphibious assaults must without question be trained in close co-operation
with such naval assault forces." Developing this, the report remarked, "The need for
discipline, morale, tactical integration and flexibility and professional competence are not
disputed in the case of troops, war vessels and air formations. Precisely the same applies
to assault ships and craft." (The Naval Force Commander had reported that while the
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve crews by whom the light naval forces engaged were
"almost entirely" manned had "acquitted themselves well", nevertheless "the small
leavening of experienced officers of the Royal Navy who were employed in positions of
control was an important factor in the results achieved".)50
Another basic lesson was "The necessity for flexibility in the military plan and its
execution". This was essential, "in order to enable the Commander to apply force where
force has already succeeded"; and it was further stated as desirable that only the
minimum force required for success should be put into the assault, and the maximum
force possible retained as a reserve to exploit success where achieved. General Roberts
had emphasized this in his own report. But the C.O.H.Q. report added, "It must be
recorded, however, that with the state of training of the landing craft crews which
prevailed at the time of the Dieppe operation, a flexible military plan could not have been
put into execution."
The narrative presented above has made it amply evident that the Force Commanders
were never armed with the information concerning the progress of the operation which
alone could enable them to exercise proper direction and commit the available reserves in
an effective manner. It was natural, therefore, that it was noted as one of the lessons that
"the control and communication arrangements should be of the highest standard". The
need for improvement in this respect was certainly fundamental.
One other basic lesson was thus stated: "Unless means for the provision of
overwhelming close support are available, assaults should be planned to develop round
the flanks of a strongly defended locality rather than frontally against it."
In addition to these major lessons, other more specialized and technical ones were
listed. Among these were the. following: Tanks should not be landed until the anti-tank
defences have been destroyed or cleared; a far higher standard of aircraft recognition is
essential, in the Navy and the Army alike; the importance and necessity of using smoke
cannot be over-emphasized; and "some form of light or self-propelled artillery" must be
provided once
an assault has got across the landing place and is making progress inland.
Such, in summary, were the official lessons. Two others, not specifically stated in the
official document, decidedly affected our later planning.51 First, it had been made pretty
clear that the classical plan of securing a beach by landing infantry at dawn was not
practicable in the face of well-organized defences. A new technique of landing and
support was required, and largely on the basis of the Dieppe experience it was developed
before the Normandy assault of 1944. Secondly, it had been shown that the military' plan
in such operations must not depend upon precise timing of the landings. Although a high
general standard of precision was attained at Dieppe, we have seen that in at least two
cases relatively slight inaccuracies in timing had most serious results. This possibility
was avoided in planning the 1944 assault.
The report stated frankly that not all the lessons enumerated in it were new. This was
obvious, for instance, with respect to attacking strong positions from the flanks rather
than frontally. We have seen (above, page 352) that the Germans had assumed that
frontal attack was unlikely to be attempted. Nevertheless, as we have also seen (above,
page 328), the decision to make the frontal attack at Dieppe had not been taken without
thought, and reasons of some force were adduced in support of it.
Some of the other lessons were new, and yet it had not been necessary to attack
Dieppe in order to learn them. This was notably the case with the most important naval
lesson, the necessity for forming permanent assault forces. This had in fact been deduced
by Captain Hughes-Hallett from the training for Operation "Rutter" and had been
reported by him before the raid actually took place.52 It is nevertheless the case that such
recommendations acquire greatly increased force from the experience of action. Had it
not been reinforced by the events of 19 August, Hughes-Hallett's recommendation might
well have been lost sight of.
The conclusions outlined above certainly do not exhaust the effects of the Dieppe
operation on the later course of the war. Account should also be taken of its influence on
Allied leaders' thinking upon the problem of assault on German-held Europe. In the
nature of things this cannot be precisely measured. Yet it is evident that an optimistic
appreciation of the problem which was certainly not justified by the facts was current
before Dieppe. We have noted (above, page 319) that American officers were ready, and
even anxious to make a major cross-Channel attack in 1942; and although the British
strategists resisted this idea, the history of the Dieppe planning would indicate that British
officers also under-rated the difficulties. In 1944 General Crerar said:53
Until the evidence of Dieppe proved otherwise, it had been the opinion in highest command and
staff circles in this country that an assault against a heavily defended coast could be carried out on the
basis of securing tactical surprise, and without dependence on overwhelming fire support, in the critical
phases of closing
the beaches and overrunning the beach defences. . . Although at the time the heavy cost to Canada, and
the non-success of the Dieppe operation seemed hard to bear, I believe that when this war is examined in
proper perspective, it will be seen that the sobering influence of that operation on existing Allied
strategical conceptions, with the enforced realization by the Allied Governments of the lengthy and
tremendous preparations necessary before invasion could be attempted, was a Canadian contribution of
the greatest significance to final victory.
The Dieppe plan represented in fact a very fair sample of the ideas on the tactics of
major assault operations that were held on high Allied military levels in England in the
days before 19 August 1942. The Combined Commanders' plan of 31 July for Operation
"Sledgehammer", the assault intended to seize and hold a bridgehead including Le Havre,
in the event of a break in German morale (above, page 322), lays great emphasis on the
importance of surprise and none at all upon naval or air bombardment in support of the
assault.54 No capital ships or other large naval vessels were scheduled as "required in
Portsmouth Command" for the operation; the only major units so listed were two anti-
aircraft cruisers, 16 "Hunt" destroyers, six Fleet destroyers, and four "V" Class
destroyers. It is not clear how many of these were to be used in the actual assault. It was
clearly not intended to use heavy bombers in preparation for the assault, although it was
hoped to deliver powerful raids on objectives selected to interfere with enemy activity on
D Day. This plan was signed by General Paget, Air Chief Marshal Douglas, General
Eisenhower and Admiral Ramsay.
The Combined Commanders' draft plan for "Wetbob" (the operation intended to
provide a permanent foothold in the Cherbourg peninsula in the autumn of 1942, above,
page 322) is very similar;55 but it notes specifically that direct naval covering fire during
the assault can only be provided by medium support landing craft "of which not more
than 12 will be available", motor gunboats, and such "older destroyers, Locust type
gunboats or similar vessels as the Admiralty may be able to make available".
Bombardment of coastal batteries by Fleet destroyers and modern cruisers was mentioned
as a possibility "if no other means were available"; and again there was no indication of
an intention of using heavy air support in connection with the actual assault. The main
bomber effort was to be used against aerodromes and suitable "focal points for delaying
the movement of reinforcements". The schedule of naval forces "required in Portsmouth
Command" was the same as for "Sledgehammer".
These papers serve to document General Crerar's statement. It is quite clear that the
senior British and United States commanders concerned with planning the cross-Channel
attack in 1942 were prepared to attempt a major assault on the Continent on the basis of the
hope of tactical surprise acid without providing heavy naval and air bombardment to help
overcome the defences. It is equally clear that these optimistic tactical conceptions were
dissipated with the gunsmoke of Operation "Jubilee"; no more was heard of them after
that day on the Dieppe beaches.
Dieppe was the first major amphibious assault attempted by the Allies in the
European theatre during this war,* and the only such assault directed against the fortified
coast of North-West Europe before the invasion in June 1944. Between Dieppe and the
Normandy D Day many amphibious operations took place in other theatres, and all
contributed lessons. It is doubtful, however, whether any other operation had as much
influence as Dieppe upon the Normandy planning. A full analysis of that influence would
require a chapter to itself, but a comparison of the Dieppe and Normandy assault plans,
combined with reference to the Dieppe "lessons" which have been enumerated, should
prove enlightening.
The lesson of "the need for overwhelming fire support" had been very fully learned.
For the puny bombardment by four destroyers which covered the Dieppe frontal attack,
the 1944 plan substituted the fire of a tremendous naval force including five battleships,
two monitors and 19 cruisers; this was the "heavy and medium Naval bombardment"
recommended after Dieppe. The "special vessels or craft working close inshore" were
also in evidence. New support craft of many types had been developed since Dieppe in
accordance with the recommendations then made; notable among them were the L.C.G.
(gun landing craft) and the L.C.T.(R), or rocket bombardment ship.
The preparatory "air action" was also strikingly different from that at Dieppe. In
place of the brief attack by cannon-firing Hurricanes, we have the combined efforts of the
British and American heavy bomber forces, dropping more than 11,000 tons of bombs in
twenty-four hours; and this was supplemented by great blows by the tactical air. forces.
For the Normandy assault, means were duly found also of "using the fire power of the
assaulting troops while still seaborne". We see the Army helping to clear the way for its
own landing with self-propelled artillery firing from tank landing craft; and these guns
were available to assist on shore in the early phases of the attack, likewise in accordance
with the Dieppe recommendations.
New assault devices were available in June 1944 which had not existed in August
1942; and many of them were products, in part at least, of the Dieppe experience. Notable
among these was the AVRE (Assault Vehicle, Royal Engineers), designed to provide
armoured cover for men engaged in engineer demolition tasks such as had been frustrated
by German fire at
*United States Marines had landed on Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands on 7 August, twelve days
before Dieppe. British troops had landed on Madagascar on 5 May The Narvik landings in May 1940 were relatively minor
affairs.
Dieppe.* The amphibious tank was another specialized device, not however stemming
quite so directly from the experience of the raid.
The recommendation for the formation of "permanent naval assault forces", and for
training Army assault formations in close cooperation with them, was carried out and had
the happiest results in the Normandy assault. In fact, the Dieppe assault force was itself
kept in existence as Force "J" (Jubilee), and became an experimental laboratory for the
development of combined operations technique. This force, which had landed the 2nd
Canadian Division at Dieppe, subsequently landed the 3rd Canadian Division on the
Normandy D Day; and the long and intimate association of Force "J" with the Division
during training paid a great dividend.
Finally, Dieppe killed the always more than dubious idea of frontal attack on a major
fortified port, and at least produced grave doubts as to the possibility of the immediate
acquisition of such a port by an assaulting force. British amphibious planners accordingly
were forced to a more detailed examination of the possibilities of supporting a great
invasion operation by maintenance over open beaches. One of the answers to this
problem was the conception of the prefabricated harbour or "Mulberry".
The application of the Dieppe lessons will be further studied in the volume of this
History dealing with the North-West Europe campaign. Enough has been said, however,
to establish the relationship of the two operations. The casualties sustained in the Dieppe
raid were part of the price paid for the knowledge that enabled the great enterprise of
1944 to be carried out at a cost in blood smaller than its planners ventured to hope for.
The Influence of Dieppe on German Thinking
We have made it clear that the Germans studied the Dieppe operation with scarcely
less care than ourselves. It is worth while to attempt to evaluate the lessons which they
drew and their influence upon their subsequent thought and action.
The events of 19 August 1942 tended to confirm the Germans in the belief that any
attempt at invasion could be destroyed on or near the beaches. Their efforts, they decided,
should be concentrated upon preventing landings
*Lt.-Col. G. C. Reeves, head of the Special Devices Branch of the Tank Design Department of the British Ministry of
Supply, accompanied the Calgary Regiment on the raid. On returning to London he posed to his staff the problem of
"developing devices to enable obstacles to be surmounted by a tank or be destroyed by a tank crew without them being
exposed to enemy fire". A Canadian officer attached to the Tank Design Department, Lieut., later Major, J. J. Denovan,
R.C.E., produced by 27 August (eight days after the raid) drawings of an engineer tank. Although the Special Devices
Branch was not allowed to foster the project directly, some facilities were given to Denovan to continue it "unofficially";
he borrowed others, including a Churchill tank.56 On 12 May 1953 the United Kingdom Royal Commission on Awards to
Inventors recommended an award of £ 1500 to Major Denovan in connection with the development of the Assault Vehicle
Royal Engineers.
and particularly those of armour, and upon destroying any force that might succeed in
landing before it could make progress inland. These typically Hitlerian ideas had
appeared to some extent in the Fuhrer's directive of 23 March (above, page 349). They
were repeated by Field-Marshal von Rundstedt in a communication to his Armies dated
25 August, six days after Dieppe:
It must be the aim of our operations to destroy the enemy on the very day of his landing.
To that effect, and further to the measures that have been taken by the Army and Corps
Commanders in respect of their own reserves, I have disposed my motorized Army Group Reserves in
such a manner that, on most of the coastal front, one motorized formation at least will be able to
intervene on the first day.
Eleven months later Hitler stated the same view very specifically during his conference
with Mussolini at Feltre: ". . . at Dieppe ... the attack was broken up by the most
advanced regiment. That regiment accomplished more than could have been
accomplished -later by three entire divisions. We must break up similar attempts before
the enemy can set foot on land."57
We have shown that Hitler ordered the creation of an Atlantic wall a few days before
the raid. It cannot therefore be said that the latter was responsible for this concept, which
continued to dominate German policy down to the invasion of 1944. It appears, however,
that Dieppe strengthened Hitler's resolution and confirmed him in the belief that the
Atlantic Wall idea was sound: On this same 25 August the Commander-in-Chief West
issued an order58 on development of Channel and Atlantic defences. This ran in part:
The Fuhrer has ordered: During the winter half-year 1942-43 the coastal defences in the area of
C.-in-C. West are to be strengthened by using all forces and means for the construction of permanent
fortifications according to the principles employed in the West Wall. This is to be done in such a manner
as to make any attack from the air, sea or land seem hopeless, and to create a fortress which cannot be
taken either frontally or from the rear. Towards this end 15,000 fortifications of a permanent nature are
to be built in the area of C.-in-C. West during the winter half-year 1942-43.
Hitler's own views on the Atlantic Wall and Dieppe are well documented. On 29
September 1942 he delivered a three-hour oration on these subjects at the
Reichschancellery in the presence of Goring and Rundstedt.59 He emphasized that France
was the Allies' most likely choice for a landing. He said, "Above all I am grateful to the
British for having confirmed my views by their various landing operations, and for saving
me from appearing as a visionary before those who are forever saying: `Where then are
the British going to appear? Here on the coast there is definitely nothing wrong; we go
swimming every day and we have never seen one yet.’ “ His specific comments on
Dieppe are worth quoting:
The Fuhrer describes the Dieppe operation as highly instructive (ausserst lehrreich) for both sides.
In particular he stresses the point that, regarding the failure of the operation, this time both sides should
avoid wrong conclusions.
contrary too it previous occasion in military history. The British should not label such operations as
hopeless, and we should not underestimate the danger. As a parallel in military history, the Fuhrer
examined the tank battle at Cambrai in the [First] World War in some detail.... After the failure of this
operation wrong conclusions were drawn by both sides. The British threw all blame on the shortcomings
in technical and fighting qualities of the recently invented tanks.... The erroneous conclusion reached in
Germany . . . was: "The tank is nothing but a bogey to frighten children with... .
In this war, a novelty analogous to the use of tanks at Cambrai in the [First] World War is the first
large-scale and unsuccessful landing operation at Dieppe. As it should never be assumed that the enemy
will draw wrong conclusions therefrom, so we too should avoid the mistake of thinking that the British
have realized that even now they can do nothing against our coastal defence. The enemy will not give up
the idea of forming a Second Front, for he knows that it is definitely his only remaining chance of
achieving victory. And so I regard it as my task to begin immediately doing everything humanly
possible (alles nur menschenmogliche) to increase the defence potential of the coastal area.
The great lesson drawn by Hitler from the Dieppe raid was evidently the desirability
of developing a belt of fortifications along the French coast. Such was, in part at least, the
origin of the elaborate and yet ineffective system of defence which we encountered in
Lower Normandy in 1944: a thin fortified line along the shore, entirely lacking in
"depth", incapable of defeating a really powerfully-supported attack, and offering no
means of resistance once the attack had penetrated beyond the beaches.
At the time when Dieppe was raided, we have seen, the Allies were preparing for a
large-scale invasion of French North Africa, which was actually carried out on 8
November 1942. This operation took the enemy entirely by surprise, and it is interesting
to speculate on how far Dieppe may have contributed to focussing German attention upon
the French coast during the late summer and autumn of 1942, and thereby to the success
of the North African enterprise.
That Hitler's own eyes were fixed upon France after Dieppe is suggested by the
conference of 29 September just described. This impression is further strengthened by an
examination of German measures in France during the period between the raid and the
launching of Operation "Torch" in November. As we have seen, the area of the
Commander-in-Chief West had been reinforced during the weeks before Dieppe, some of
the most formidable troops in the German Army being collected there. After the raid, as
mentioned above, the dispositions of the troops in the area were somewhat altered, the
C.-in-C.'s mobile reserves being moved closer to the coast.
As D Day for the Allied operation in Africa drew nearer, the Germans became more,
not less, interested in the Channel coast. About the end of August Hitler decided to move
seven reserve divisions from Germany to the West.60 Early in September information
concerning British concentrations in the Isle of Wight and the south of England led him to
believe that an Allied landing in the Caen-Cherbourg area was probable, and he ordered
one of his
best formations, the 7th Flieger Division, to move forward from its station south-west of
Falaise to the area east of St. Lo, "to be available on shortest notice for commitment
between Caen and Cherbourg". The matter was treated as most urgent; the order,61 issued
on 4 September, directed that "strong combat elements must be in the new area" by the
following morning. When, late in September, this division was moved to Russia, it was
replaced in the St. Lo region by portions of the two crack S.S. divisions "Adolf Hitler"
and "Das Reich".62 On 9 October further urgent orders were issued as the result of more
reports about imminent landings. Hitler now ordered the whole of the two S.S. divisions
to be concentrated in the areas of St. Lo and Mezidon, and this move was very rapidly
carried out. At the same time the 165th Reserve Infantry Division was set up as a special
operational reserve in the Cherbourg area "to defend the land front of the harbour
strongpoints", and the C.-in-C. West's artillery reserve was ordered to move "as soon as
possible to an area permitting quickest commitment on Norman as well as Breton
peninsulas".63 Simultaneously a heavy "build-up" took place on the Demarcation Line
separating Occupied from Unoccupied France,* a number of the newly-arrived reserve
divisions being used here.66
It seems clear that during the autumn the German High Command-or, at any rate,
Hitler-became increasingly convinced that a major Allied invasion enterprise was
imminent in Lower Normandy, and that a considerable force of elite troops was
concentrated in this area to meet it. It seems clear too that the Germans intended to
invade Unoccupied France as soon as any landing on the Channel coast took place, and
made preparations accordingly. Their concentration remained in the Caen area until after
8 November, when the Allied offensive duly materialized, not in Normandy but in North
Africa. Although completely deceived as to our intentions, the Germans were of course
ready to occupy Southern France, and this operation ("Anton") was put in train at once.
It is interesting and rather amusing to note that in the autumn of 1942, while the
Allies were preparing to land in North Africa, the Germans were watching fixedly those
beaches in Lower Normandy where we actually landed
*The force in the area of the C.-in-C. West, from the Dutch-German border to the Pyrenees, and including this
interior region along the Demarcation Line, increased from 33 regular and 3 reserve divisions on 15 August (four days
before Dieppe) to 40 regular and 12 reserve divisions on 4 November (four days before the North African landings). On 16
June there had been only 26 regular and 3 reserve divisions.64 It might be dangerous, however, to take these statistics at
quite their full face value in terms merely of the menace to the West. At this period France was a rest and training area for
German formations exhausted in Russia or being prepared for service there, and frequently movements to or from France
were connected with developments in that distant theatre. The Eastern Front was Germany's main concern, the great bulk
of her army was concentrated there, and Rundstedt clearly considered the forces at his disposal in the West inadequate to
their prospective tasks. His weekly appreciation dated 28 September, for instance, remarks pointedly that the defence
potential of Normandy after the withdrawal of the 7th Flieger Division "is being maintained to a limited degree by stopgap
measures".65
in June 1944;* but when we did deliver our great blow in Normandy the Germans' main
attention was focussed not upon that area but upon the Pas de Calais.
Speaking in the British House of Commons on 11 November 1942, Mr. Churchill
observed that the Allied planners had decided in July "to hold the enemy on the French
shore, and to strike at his Southern flank in the Mediterranean through North Africa". We
have seen that the record affords no reason for believing that the revived enterprise
against Dieppe was designed by the Anglo-American staffs as cover for Operation
"Torch". Nevertheless, there does seem some reason to believe that in practice it helped
to fix the enemy's attention on "the French shore" and divert it from the area which was,
for the moment, our real objective. In this as in some other respects, Operation "Jubilee"
paid the Allies a dividend which was no part of the calculations of those who planned it.
Problems of Strategic Employment, 1942-1943
Dieppe was followed by another long period of inaction for the Canadian troops in
the United Kingdom. During this period, however, there was constant examination of
strategic tasks in which they might be engaged, and some account of these matters is
relevant here.
One of these large projects was going forward concurrently with preparations for the
Dieppe enterprise. It was Operation "Jupiter", a plan for the seizure of the aerodromes in
Northern Norway from which crippling attacks were being delivered upon the Anglo-
American convoys carrying supplies to Russia. Mr. Churchill believed that about 70
German bombers and 100 fighters, based on two airfields guarded by 10,000 to 12,000
enemy troops, were the whole menace to this vital supply route and all that prevented
Allied entry into Norway. He considered that a successful invasion of this area might
initiate a gradual southward advance, "unrolling the Nazi map of Europe from the top",
and was very anxious indeed to see this operation undertaken. He has explained that his
own strategic programme for the year 1942 was the invasion of French North Africa
combined with this invasion of Northern Norway.68
The British Chiefs of Staff rejected the Prime Minister's "Jupiter" plan as being
"impracticable at the present time". Mr. Churchill, unwilling to accept this refusal, asked
that the project be reviewed by a new and unprejudiced mind. The Deputy Prime
Minister, Mr. Attlee, suggested General
*They had however received some reports suggesting action in Africa. Rundstedt's weekly appreciation dated 5
October remarks, "agents' reports deal increasingly with forthcoming Allied operations against West Africa, the groups of
islands in the Atlantic and Morocco. Intentions for a large scale operation in the area of C.-in-C. West can be read only
from one agent's report, but that one is rather detailed."67
McNaughton; and on 9 July 1942 the Canadian general was invited to meet the Chiefs of
Staff, who told him that the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet wished him to review
Operation "Jupiter". Subsequently he had an interview with Mr. Churchill. After
informing his own government, McNaughton set up a special staff, headed by Brigadier
G. G. Simonds, to assist him in examining the project, and during the rest of July it was
studied intensively.69
On 4 August McNaughton sent his review to the British Chiefs of Staff.70 It did not
paint a hopeful picture. It pointed out that there was little possibility of surprise, and that
success would depend on a combination of weather conditions against which the odds
would be about six to one in December, the month proposed for the attack. The general
conclusion was:
The operation is an extremely hazardous one. With good fortune quick and decisive successes
might be gained-on the contrary, the result might be a military disaster of the first magnitude. In view of
the size of the forces involved it is considered that the risks would only be acceptable if politically the
results to he achieved were judged to be of the highest importance.
The Chiefs of Staff fully agreed with these opinions; but Mr. Churchill was still unwilling
to admit defeat. He invited McNaughton to Chequers on 19 September, argued strongly
for the plan, and suggested that the Canadian might undertake a mission to Moscow to
discuss the operation with the Russians. McNaughton reported this to Ottawa.71 On 22
September, after discussions with the Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Churchill cabled Mr. King
asking authority to propose McNaughton's name to Stalin. He observed, "There will be
no question of any Canadian commitment."72 However, it had been clear to the
Canadians throughout that if the operation were undertaken they would probably be
expected to do it, and in fact Churchill had written to the Chiefs of Staff on 8 July,
"Climate proclaims that the Canadian Army should undertake this task, if it is thought
feasible.” On 22 September also Mr. Churchill telegraphed to President Roosevelt the
text of a telegram which he wished to send to Stalin suggesting the McNaughton
mission.73
General McNaughton himself had recommended an affirmative reply to Churchill's
request, but had added the comment that in spite of the statement that no commitment was
specified, if a practical plan was evolved, "then we are certain to be asked to participate".74
In Ottawa the question was discussed by the War Committee of the Cabinet on 23
September, and Mr. King advised Mr. Churchill thereafter that the Canadian Government
considered it undesirable that McNaughton should head such a mission. It was thought that
it might be embarrassing for him to have to undertake a double responsibility as adviser to
both the Canadian Government and the United Kingdom authorities; moreover, his
selection for a mission to Moscow might lead the enemy to speculate that precisely some
such operation as "Jupiter" was in prospect. The Canadian Government also suggested that
it was important that the United States be consulted about the project. (This,
of course, had already been done). Mr. King remarked that his government's misgivings
would not be so strong if McNaughton were to be a member, though not the head, of a
combined mission upon which both the United Kingdom and the United States were
represented.75 Following another telegram from Mr. Churchill, the matter was again
considered by the Canadian War Committee on 25 September, but the conclusion
remained the same. King telegraphed to Churchill that to have McNaughton undertake
such a mission "without a realistic plan in which he himself has confidence [and] offering
at least a reasonable prospect of success upon which military discussions could be based"
would be to risk consequences prejudicial to relations with Russia as well as to
McNaughton's own future usefulness.76
"Jupiter" was now becoming a lost cause. Sir Winston Churchill has observed that he
"did not receive much positive support" for it.77 It is evident that both the British Chiefs
of Staff and the Canadian authorities had the gravest doubts about the project; but Sir
Winston, writing long after the war, still affirms his allegiance to it.
On 17 October 1942 General Brooke mentioned to General McNaughton another
possible operation in which 'his Army might play a part. It was possible that Spain might be
forced into the war as an active partner of Germany, or compelled to allow German forces
to use bases on Spanish soil. In that event, the use of Gibraltar would almost certainly be
denied to the Royal Navy, and an alternative base would be required. One possible
alternative was found in the Canary Islands, and it was desirable to prepare an operation
there accordingly. This operation, in the event of its becoming necessary, Brooke now
offered the Canadian Army. McNaughton recorded him as saying that this offer grew out of
a request for active employment for the Army presented by the Canadian Minister of
National Defence to Mr. Churchill and Sir James Grigg (Secretary of State for War) in an
interview on 15 October. McNaughton replied* that he would like to study the outline plan;
if he considered it a practicable military operation, he would then seek the necessary
authority from his Government.78 After examining an appreciation drawn up by the British
Joint Planning Staff, he sent to Ottawa on 18 October a telegram79 requesting authority to
undertake the operation. The War Committee considered it on 21 October, and on the 22nd
the Chief of the General Staff replied giving the required authority, subject to
McNaughton's being satisfied of the operation's "military feasibility and
*In his memorandum of the interview written the next day, General McNaughton wrote: "I ... stated that what we
desired, and I was sure this was the view of the Government and people of Canada also, was that Cdn Army should be so
used as to make the maximum contribution of which it was capable; we would act in whole or in part and would give most
careful consideration to any project; we could not act without the approval of our Government except as regards Home
Defence and raids on the Continent of Europe of limited duration.... We were not particularly concerned with fighting for
its own sake or glamour, nor did I think that a prolonged wait for a proper opportunity to strike would have an adverse
effect on morale. Our officers and men were far too sensible."
value compared with risks involved" and of the adequacy of resources and arrangements
for transport and support.80 The next day McNaughton advised the C.I.G.S., naming
General Crerar as commander of the Canadian land forces involved, which were to
comprise the required elements of Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps, the 1st and 3rd
Canadian Divisions, and such other detachments and units as might be necessary and
available.81
The proposal for an operation against the Canaries was not new. As Sir Winston
Churchill has made clear, the British authorities had made preparations to execute it in
1940, and in fact for a long period they kept a considerable expeditionary force with
transports ready to move on a few days' notice.82 The project, known as "Pilgrim", had
been kept alive throughout 1941.83 It was now to be known as "Tonic".
To assist General Crerar a Canadian Planning Staff was set up in a building near the
War Office and work began under a formal directive issued to him, by General
McNaughton on 4 November.84 However, there were many difficulties. The designated
Naval Force Commander, Rear-Admiral L. H. K. Hamilton, was constantly absent at sea
on other duties (General Crerar and members of his staff flew to Scapa Flow and worked
for some days with the Admiral in his flagship); and as a result of the demands of the
North African expedition Combined Operations Headquarters was unable to provide all
the combined training facilities which the Canadian formations required.85 On 19
December 1942 the British Chiefs of Staff virtually decided to shelve "Tonic", as it
appeared that a German move into Spain was improbable for the present; and Crerar was
instructed merely to round off his paper planning, which he proceeded to do.86 Thus one
more project that had seemed to offer the Canadians a prospect of important action had
come to nothing.
On the last day of 1942 the C.I.G.S. informed General McNaughton of still another
projected operation. This was described as an attack against Sardinia or Sicily, which
might involve the employment of one Canadian infantry division.87 McNaughton having
again expressed his willingness to explore any proposal for the employment of Canadian
troops, this possibility - was further examined. By 6 January it had been decided that the
conquest of Sicily should be brought forward at the forthcoming conference at
Casablanca as a joint Allied operation under the code name "Husky", but the Sardinian
project was still under consideration as a British operation entitled "Brimstone". The
proposal was that this should be carried out by a British corps commanded by Lieut.-
General F. E. Morgan. General McNaughton nominated the 1st Canadian Division for the
task and it was given special combined training in Scotland.88 However, before this
training was completed the Casablanca Conference took place and "Brimstone" was
dropped. It thus appeared that the whole of the First Canadian Army would be available
for operations based on the United Kingdom.89
The operations in North Africa begun in November 1942 had moved more slowly
than had been hoped, and the result was to put, a final end to any lingering hope of
mounting a major invasion of North-West Europe in 1943. This was firmly decided by 15
April of the latter year. On that date Mr. Churchill wrote to the Chiefs of Staff, "We
should aim at a steady building up of American forces in this country for an overseas
campaign in 1944."90
During the first weeks of 1943, however, General McNaughton and his staff had been
giving considerable attention to the possibility of the Canadian Army taking part in
limited cross-Channel operations that year-something similar to the "Sledgehammer"
scheme of 1942. In these discussions the assumption was that if a limited opposed
operation was attempted, it would be by a force of three or four divisions, one of which
would do the initial assault. The intention of General Paget (C.-in-C. Home Forces) was
that the First Canadian Army would control this operation, a specially-trained British
division assaulting under its command. Plans were also being discussed for a large-scale
return to the Continent in the event of a German collapse.91 But all this was extremely
nebulous.
Elsewhere in this History* the increasing pressure of public opinion in Canada for an
active role for the Army will be found described. By March 1943, it seemed clear to the
Government and the General Staff in Ottawa that there was very little likelihood of the
First Canadian Army's being required for a cross-Channel operation that year. The result
was strong representations from Mr. King to Mr. Churchill in favour of using some
Canadian troops in North Africa.92 The subsequent developments lie outside the scope
of the present volume. As a result of them, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st
Canadian Army Tank Brigade ultimately took part in the attack on Sicily in July, and
later that year Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps, along with the Corps Troops and the 5th
Canadian Armoured Division, moved to the Mediterranean for operations on the Italian
mainland. Thus, nearly four years after the outbreak of the Second World War, Canadian
soldiers were finally committed to a protracted campaign.
*Volume II, The Canadians in Italy.

CHAPTER XIII
SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE

CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS
A Unique Experience
P REVIOUS chapters recalled how different the experience of the Canadian Army
Overseas in 1939-45 was from that of the Canadian troops of 1914-18 and from that
of other armies in the Second World War.* Its uniqueness consisted in the fact that the
main Canadian field force spent forty-two months doing static duty in the United
Kingdom before being plunged into the bloody campaigns in Italy and North-West
Europe. This long period of garrison duty inevitably produced special problems and
difficulties.
One of these problems was that of providing an adequate supply of competent
officers (including senior commanders) for a rapidly expanding army which was getting
almost no battle experience to train and test the capabilities of its leaders. Another was
that of keeping up the morale of volunteer soldiers who were denied action for three and
a half years during which they were separated from their homes and families. Another,
closely related to the second, was that of establishing and maintaining good relations with
the people of Britain, among whom so many Canadians took up an habitation enforced
during these years. This temporary transplantation of more than a quarter of a million
young men and women from the New World to England is one of the most remarkable
episodes in the history of the Commonwealth, and was not the least extraordinary
incident of a decidedly extraordinary war.
The Problem of Finding Commanders

and Staff Officers
Despite the general neglect of Canada's military forces between the wars, the country
possessed in 1939 a considerable body of competent officers. The older ones had seen
active service in France during the years 1915-18
*See particularly page 254.
413
and many had later kept abreast of military thought and availed themselves of such
command and staff instruction as was to be had. Canada had no Staff College, but 45
serving officers of the Permanent Force1 had passed one of the British Army's staff
courses* and a considerable number of NonPermanent Active Militia officers had
mastered the Militia Staff Course. Thus it was possible in the beginning without too
much difficulty to staff the 1st Canadian Division and the small Canadian Military
Headquarters in London and to expand the army framework at home. Many of the
officers appointed in the autumn of 1939 moved up the ladder of promotion and
responsibility during the formative period of the Canadian Army Overseas, but advancing
age or ill health forced some of the older men to take less onerous positions before
Canadian formations actually came to grips with the enemy in 1943 and 1944. Among
the junior Permanent Force officers, without previous war service, who were given staff
appointments in 1939, were Temporary Major G. G. Simonds and Captain Charles
Foulkes—both of whom were to become corps commanders and lieutenant-generals
during 1944. The officers destined to command divisions during the 1943-45 campaigns
were Major Christopher Vokes and Captains H. W. Foster and D. C. Spry of the
Permanent Force and Majors A. B. Matthews and R. H. Keefler and Captain B. M.
Hoffmeister of the N.P.A.M. The two first named were given junior staff appointments in
1939.
When the staff of the 1st Division was organized in 1939, the General Officer
Commanding and the two senior staff officers came from the Permanent Force. Of the
four brigadiers (the three brigade commanders and the artillery commander) two were
regular officers. When the 2nd Division's headquarters was set up in the following spring,
the G.O.C. and all four brigadiers were officers or former officers of the Non-Permanent
Active Militia, but again the two senior staff officers were regulars. Thereafter, as the
Army expanded and new formations were mobilized, there was a strong tendency to fill
the senior appointments . in them with experienced officers promoted from within the
formations already overseas. In the selection of officers for command and staff
appointments in the new divisions, the recommendations of General McNaughton carried
great weight.
As we have seen (above, pages 51-2), the contrast with the procedures of
1914-18, when Canadian formations drew commanders and staff officers from the British
Army, is notable. The Canadian Army of 1939-45 found its commanders and staff
officers almost entirely within itself. To a considerable extent the Canadian Permanent
Force played the part that the British Regular Army had played in 1914, particularly with
respect to senior staff appointments. As time passed and non-professional officers gained
training and experience, some purely temporary tendency appeared for
*Thirty-two more officers had successfully completed gunnery courses in the United Kingdom, while 19 had obtained
technical qualification in artillery and ordnance courses there.
SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE ARMY OVERSEAS 415
General Staff appointments in field formations to be held by Permanent Force officers,

while administrative staff appointments went to former N.P.A.M. officers,2 though this
was never a matter of rule.* It should be noted in passing that many non-regular officers
made great contributions in these administrative appointments. Professional and business
men in civil life, often of superior education and accustomed to the direction of large
enterprises, they took naturally and effectively to the tasks of army organization.
Where nobody has had much experience of actual operations, the professional
soldier, who has devoted his life to the study of military matters, has a great advantage
over the non-professional. But no peacetime studies can compare with battle experience
as a school for either leadership or staff work; and when the army finally got into large-
scale action the distinction between the regular and the citizen officer, already much
blurred, soon virtually ceased to exist. Early in 1945 the staff lists of Canada's five
fighting divisions showed not one of the ten senior staff appointments (General Staff and
administrative) held by a pre-war regular officer;3 and in the last months of the war, as
we have noted, three of the five divisions were commanded by citizen soldiers, as were
also both the independent armoured brigades. The Army Commander and the two Corps
Commanders, however, were regulars.
When an army is fighting, the problem of selecting commanders tends to solve itself;
success is the criterion. But when, as in the Canadian Army Overseas in this instance, an
army is denied action for a long period and at the same time is expanding rapidly, so that
appointments of many senior commanders have to be made, the problem is a serious one.
It could have been solved, in a sense, by turning to the United Kingdom and appointing
battle-experienced British commanders to Canadian formations; but Canadian opinion,
both military and civilian, would not have countenanced such a solution. All that could be
done was to promote the qualified officers who seemed most promising and hope that
they would be successful under the conditions of active operations. In the nature of
things, this hope was not invariably realized. It was necessary to appoint, as commanders
of divisions and even of corps, officers who had never commanded even a battalion in
action and whose battle experience, if they had had any at all, was limited to junior
appointments in the First World War. Some proved triumphantly successful; others gave
way to other men.
In making appointments up to the rank of Colonel, both of staff officers and
commanders, the senior commanders overseas had the advantage of the advice of a
carefully constituted Selection Committee composed of senior
*Here it may be recalled again that the General Staff Branch dealt with operations, intelligence, training and war
organization, while of the administrative branches that of the Adjutant General dealt with personnel and that of the
Quartermaster General with supply.
officers representing the divisions and higher formations as well as C.M.H.Q. The
committee was placed on this basis in 1941, replacing a smaller one set up the year
before. In 1942 it was split into Senior and Junior Committees, with the latter dealing in
general with appointments not above the rank of major. The Selection Committees also
chose the candidates to attend Staff College and similar courses. Their recommendations
were normally accepted by the Army Commander and the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.; and
their activity served to create confidence in the fact that selection and promotion were on
a strict basis of merit, and (since as a rule periods of regimental duty were made to
alternate with periods on the staff, and an officer who was promoted was almost
invariably sent to a different formation) senior officers were discouraged from building
up staffs of favourites.4
The problem of battle experience was not peculiar to the Canadian Army. Many
officers who did not possess such experience received important appointments in the
Army of the United States. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, though a regular officer of
seniority, had never heard a shot fired in anger previous to his becoming Commander-in-
Chief of the Allied forces in North Africa in 1942. But the matter was complicated for
Canada by her forces' integration with the British Army. The latter laid a very proper
(though sometimes perhaps an exaggerated) emphasis upon the value of recent battle
experience; and the British certainly tended to look down their noses at formation
commanders who lacked it. Few Canadian civilians realize the difficulty of the position
in which General Crerar found himself on taking command of First Canadian Army early
in 1944. He had become a Corps Commander at the end of 1941 without having
commanded any lower formation in action or indeed even under static conditions (for he
took over the 1st Canadian Corps in an acting capacity at the same moment when he was
gazetted to command the 2nd Division). He had seen much service in the First World
War both as a regimental officer and on the staff; but the only battle experience he had
had in the Second was a few weeks when his Corps was in the line on the Ortona front,
which at that time was quiet. He now became an Army Commander, over the heads of
British officers who had commanded Corps for extended periods of heavy action. That he
was successful in the appointment under these disadvantageous conditions says much for
his ability and judgement.*
Something has already been said (above, pages 248-9) of the arrangements made to
give a certain number of Canadian officers and
*General Crerar had repeatedly sought opportunities for operational experience and was prepared to step down in
rank to get it. In September 1943, for instance, when it was reported that General Simonds had fallen ill, General
McNaughton signalled to General Montgomery in Italy proposing to send Crerar out to take command of the 1st Division
for a time. "No question of seniority arises", he wrote, "as Crerar is quite content to serve under any of your Corps
Commanders".5 There is no answer on the file and it seems evident that Montgomery never received the signal. Shortly
afterwards the 1st Canadian Corps was sent to the Mediterranean and Crerar went out in command of it.
N.C.Os. some battle experience by attaching them to the First British Army during the
Tunisian campaign. It was not practicable to do the same for senior commanders,
although as we have seen two Canadian officers who subsequently attained the highest
distinction-Generals Crerar and Simonds -were able to visit the Eighth Army during the
North African operations. But before the First Canadian Army went into action in North-
West Europe in 1944, it was possible to leaven it with senior officers who had seen action
in the Canadian operations in Italy. General Crerar himself, as noted, had had some
service on the Adriatic front. General Simonds, who had commanded the 1st Division
with success in Sicily and Southern Italy, and had subsequently been transferred to the
5th Armoured Division, came back to England to take command of the 2nd Canadian
Corps. He brought with him Brigadiers A. B. Matthews and Geoffrey Walsh, who had
been respectively his artillery and engineer commanders in the 1st Division, to take the
parallel appointments in his new Corps. The command of the 4th Canadian Armoured
Division now went to Major-General George Kitching, a 33-year-old officer who had
been G.S.O.1 of the 1st Division in Sicily and had later commanded the 5th Armoured
Division's infantry brigade for a short time. The 4th Division's armoured and infantry
brigades were taken over by officers who had been distinguished unit commanders in
Italyrespectively, Brigadiers E. L. Booth and J. C. Jefferson; and Brigadier R. A. Wyman
relinquished the command of the 1st Armoured Brigade in Italy and assumed that of the
2nd which was preparing for the Normandy assault.
All this was very useful; but the approach of the summer battles of 1944 in the two
theatres still found one Canadian corps, two divisions and a number of brigades
commanded by officers who had had no battle experience in this war; while the Army,
the other corps, two other divisions and several brigades were commanded by officers
whose experience had been on lower levels. Thus the Canadian Army's pool of command
battle experience was still small, and this valuable commodity was thinly spread across
the force. The circumstances of 1940-43 are perhaps unlikely to recur; but this situation
prompts the observation that, in the event of another long period of static employment
being encountered, it would be desirable to do everything possible to give battle
experience to commanders by arranging long-term loans of Canadian officers, of the rank
of brigadier and higher, to armies engaged in active operations. Such arrangements are
not easy to make, for an army does not like to put another army's untried officers into its
senior commands, nor will it want to relinquish them if they make good. However, the
matter is of sufficient importance to warrant great efforts.
As the war proceeded, it became more and more evident that command under modern
conditions was a task for young men. The British War
Office recognized this fact in making appointments, although it refrained from fixing
definite age-limits for senior ranks. The question of setting Canadian limits came under
discussion during the summer of 1941. That autumn General McNaughton recommended
to the Minister of National Defence and the C.G.S. that, effective 1 January 1942, the
following maximum ages should be prescribed:
Appointment Retirement
Major-General ............................................................................ 53 57
Brigadier and Colonel ................................................................ 49 54
Lieutenant-Colonel .................................................................... 45 51
A latitude of one to two years might be permitted, however, in exceptional cases where
no other officer was available and the present incumbent was medically fit. An order in
council approved on 2 December 1941 and republished as a routine order accepted
McNaughton's proposed limits for field formations and units.6 It contained the following
qualifications:
"(a) The expression `field formations and field units' . . . shall not be interpreted to include Line of
Communication or Base Units.
"(b) Where the officer concerned is category "A" and no other suitable officer is available for the
appointment in question, these special circumstances may be represented to the Minister of National
Defence for his consideration and decision."
The months of January and February 1942 accordingly saw the greatest -shuffle in
commands that had yet taken place. A study of the supplements to Overseas Routine
Orders shows that, within the Canadian Corps alone, there were changes in command in
nine artillery regiments, one engineer battalion, nine infantry battalions and one
divisional signals. Changes in command continued to be frequent thereafter; they were
often occasioned by what were considered poor performances by the officers concerned
(particularly in major exercises), as well as by the operation of the age limits, health
considerations and, of course, the effect of promotions. Thus the army's command policy
developed along the line of advancing young and energetic officers whom their superiors
considered the most competent available.
Age limits for junior officers came later, and after considerable discussion. Everyone
agreed that young and active officers were essential in field units (for example, early in
1942 quite low limits* were fixed for officers of the 4th Armoured Division and 2nd Army
Tank Brigade);7 but it was not considerable desirable to fix arbitrary limits of universal
application, and the only such limits actually promulgated (in 1943)8 were comparatively
* Appointment Retirement
Lt.-Col........................................................................... 45 51
Major ........................................................................... 42 47
Captain ......................................................................... 35 45
Lieutenant .................................................................... 30 35
liberal. They provided for compulsory retirement of all officers of the rank of lieutenant
colonel or below at ages ranging from 51 in field units abroad to 60 in static
establishments at home. The similar range in the case of major generals was from 57 to
60, and in the case of brigadiers and colonels from 54 to 60. Provision was made for
extensions of service in very exceptional cases.
The Problem of Morale
The long Canadian sojourn in the United Kingdom began rather inauspiciously. The
winter of 1939-40 was abnormally cold (above, page 232). The Canadians of this war
were spared the unpleasant experience of their fathers, who spent the winter of 1914-15
under canvas on Salisbury Plain; instead, they were quartered in the permanent barracks
of Aldershot. But neither those barracks nor any other English buildings were designed or
equipped for zero temperatures, and the troops, fresh from the comforts of civil life and
used to central heating, were not grateful for the privilege of living in them. They
probably did not realize that they got a larger allowance of coal than British troops.9
There was a great deal of sickness in January and February.10 Moreover, Aldershot had
been a garrison town since the Crimean War, and its people were too well accustomed to
men in uniform to make any great fuss over arriving soldiers of any nationality, And the
complacent atmosphere of the "phony war" was not helpful. The Western Front was
quiet, no bombs had yet fallen on England, and neither Englishmen nor Canadians had
taken the true measure of the seriousness of the situation. These things had their due
effect. The postal censors who read a batch of Canadian army mail in February evidently
felt that the writers were going somewhat beyond the soldier's traditional right to
"grouse":
Boredom, homesickness and a feeling of not being really needed appear to be the main reasons why
nearly all these Canadian soldiers grumble. The majority of the writers warn their friends and relations
not to join the Army.
The recent bad weather has made them dislike this country considerably . . .
The insufficiency and bad quality of the food annoys the majority of the writers. . .
The Deputy Chief Postal Censor remarked in a covering letter that nothing in this
correspondence was "really more serious than the impatience of an active man cooped up
by bad weather in an unfamiliar country and eating unfamiliar food".11 General Crerar
replied that "with the coming of the better weather, the Canadian troops should be in
much better spirits, when most of the causes for complaint will disappear".12 As we have
seen (above, pages 233, 273) he proved a true prophet; and the warm welcome the
Canadians got from the folk of the Northampton district in May was
the beginning of a better era in relationships with the British people generally. To the
jaundiced eyes of shivering Canadians in that first war winter, the stolid Briton, refusing
to be put out by the war, had sometimes seemed a less than admirable character. But as
the eventful months of 1940 passed and they noted that he remained equally unruffled
under the bombs of the Luftwaffe and the imminent threat of invasion, they formed a
juster appreciation of his qualities.
With autumn drawing on and the invasion danger receding, careful thought was given
to the problem of morale during a second winter in England. As early as 3 September
General McNaughton pointed out that the troops might now be considered highly trained,
and that too intense a syllabus of further training during the winter might only make them
stale. He emphasized, accordingly, the importance of organizing an active educational
programme to occupy men's minds and also make them better citizens when the war was
over. In January 1940 the policy had been laid down that army educational facilities
would be provided by the Canadian Legion War Services in conjunction with the
Canadian Association for Adult Education, working in cooperation with the Department
of National Defence.13 In the nature of things, there was little time or need for
educational work overseas during the active and exciting summer months that followed;
but the situation was now quite different. At this moment General McNaughton received
an offer of service from Mr. J. B. Bickersteth, Warden of Hart House, University of
Toronto, who was on leave in England; and he asked Mr. Bickersteth to undertake a
survey of the educational needs of the Canadian troops. When this was completed,
Bickersteth remained at Corps Headquarters as personal educational adviser to General
McNaughton, doing this work until the summer of 1942, when he went to the War Office
as Director of Army Education.14
Dr. A. E. Chatwin was appointed Director of Educational Services and arrived in
England in November 1940. An Educational Adviser (usually a civilian) was appointed
for each formation, and in each unit an officer (later assisted by a corporal who gave his
full time to the work) was dcsi noted as Unit Education Officer. The programme arranged
for the winter included informal talks and lectures on general and cultural subjects;
practical training in trades through classes or text-booklets; directed reading;
correspondence courses in a wide variety of subjects; and courses in local technical
schools. Unit libraries were set up, carrying both light fiction and serious books, and
stocked from the headquarters of the educational services.15 Along these general lines the
system continued to be conducted in succeeding years, and it certainly made a material
contribution to maintaining the spirits and interest of the men during the long wait in
England.
The education programme was, of course, only one of the influences working to this
end. Long before it was launched in earnest the regimental chaplain* was labouring
quietly among his flock and doing a measureless amount of good. Although conducting
religious services and acting as friend and adviser to soldiers who sought his help were
his official functions, he often found himself saddled with a great miscellany of other
tasks. One unit padre stated later that he had served as education officer, mess secretary,
welfare officer, sports officer and, on one occasion, as a special assistant to the
quartermaster: "I have organized canteens, been in charge of broadcasts, distributed
libraries, promoted shows, entertainments and dances-in fact I have done almost anything
and everything to help our men and promote their welfare".16 Visits to men in hospital
and attendance at the weekly police court sessions at Aldershot as "character" witnesses
or security for the 10 shilling fines levied against soldiers for minor infractions of the law
were other tasks that fell to his lot. Although men dislike being "preached at", both
Protestant and Roman Catholic chaplains bear witness to the fact that "almost from the
beginning, friendly relations were established in units and formations and from many
points of view the soldier began to realize that the chaplain was his friend-somebody he
could rely on-one officer at least who was sympathetically inclined and kept his
confidence".17
It is apparent that the unit chaplain did much for the physical as well as the spiritual
welfare of the men. However, an elaborate separate organization was set up to cater to the
former. In November 1939 the Canadian Government announced that four national
voluntary organizations-the Salvation Army, the Knights of Columbus, the Young Men's
Christian Association and the Canadian Legion-would be responsible for providing
"auxiliary services" for the Canadian forces. Brigadier W. W. Foster went overseas with
the "first flight" to co-ordinate such activities, but it was some time before adequate
Canadian services could be provided for the troops. In the meantime, the men used the
Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes canteens which were a permanent part of the British
soldier's life. When Canadian units used a N.A.A.F.I. canteen the regimental fund was
entitled to a percentage of the profits, just as with British units. A Directorate of
Auxiliary Services was established at C.M.H.Q. in the Adjutant-General's Branch,
composed of serving military officers; but the "supervisors" provided *Forsaking the
system followed in the First World War, when one chaplain service functioned, the
Canadian Government decided in 1939 to provide separate Roman Catholic and
Protestant services. The Right Reverend C. L. Nelligan, Bishop of Pembroke, accepted
the appointment of Principal Chaplain (R.C.) while the Right Reverend G.A. Wells,
Anglican Bishop of Cariboo, became Principal Chaplain (P.). Broadly speaking, the
number of Protestant and Roman Catholic chaplains was proportioned to the strength of
those religious bodies in Canada. An excellent account of the work of Protestant
chaplains is Hon. Major Walter T. Steven, In This Sign (Toronto, 1948). For a personal
memoir by a Catholic chaplain, see R.M. Hickey, The Scarlet Dawn (Campbellton, N.B.,
1949); a parallel account by a Protestant is Waldo E.L. Smith, What Time the Tempest
(Toronto, 1953).
by the four voluntary organizations for work in the units were civilians, although paid by
the Government as captains and given the privileges of officers in the units to which they
were attached.* At the end of March 1940 there were 15 such supervisors serving 23,228
all ranks of the Canadian Army Overseas, and the work of organizing sports and dances,
and providing movies and concerts, reading, writing and recreation rooms, libraries,
mobile canteens and tea vans, and establishing leave hostels and information bureaux for
troops on leave was getting under way. By the end of March 1941 there were 65
supervisors serving 64,504 all ranks. By 31 December 1943 the number of Army
supervisors was 268.18
The four voluntary organizations were not equally well equipped to give assistance to
their supervisors, with the result that there were some complaints of uneven service,
duplication of effort and competition or rivalry. It had been found from experience that
each supervisor serving with a field unit required one motion picture projector, one
mobile canteen, one complete set of sports equipment for 1000 men and supplies of radio
sets, small games, magazines and stationery. The Canadian Government in 1941 sent
Colonel the Hon. R. J. Manion overseas to investigate. He submitted in August a report19
which praised the work of the voluntary organizations but recommended a larger degree
of cooperation and pooling among them, in order to provide uniform service. Even before
the report was made, the organizations had begun to work along these lines. They
arranged to specialize; henceforth, sports and recreation became the particular responsi-
bility of the Y.M.C.A., concerts and entertainment that of the Canadian Legion, canteens
and cinemas that of the Salvation Army and hospitality and social functions that of the
Knights of Columbus.20 Pooling arrangements were made to ensure that each supervisor,
irrespective of affiliation, was outfitted uniformly, and more even service resulted.
The four voluntary organizations had made a successful united appeal for financial
support from the Canadian public in March 1941, but their estimated needs for the
following year rose to $17,000,000. If such a sum was to be collected, it would be
necessary to cease all other appeals for a time, including the sale of Government War
Savings Certificates. Therefore the Government decided that, in future, the work of
auxiliary services should be financed from the public treasury, although the four
voluntary organizations serving Canadian servicemen would still operate. To control
expenditure, an Overseas Committee of the National War Services Funds Advisory Board
was set up in 1942 under the chairmanship of Sir Edward
*Scott Young, Red Shield in Action: A Record of Canadian Salvation Army War Services in the Second Great War
(Toronto, 1950), Alan M. Hurst, The Canadian Y.M.C.A. in World War 11 (Toronto, n.d.), and War Services of Canadian
Knights of Columbus 1939-1947 (n.p., n.d.), are accounts of the work of three of these organizations and how they met the
problems encountered.
Peacock. It comprised representatives of C.M.H.Q., the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters

and the four voluntary organizations.21 During 1942-43 also the Army assumed a larger
direct responsibility for the education programme, which had been tending to outgrow the
resources of the Canadian Legion.22
The Canadian Red Cross Society, unlike the auxiliary service organizations, had to
remain on a voluntary basis in order to maintain an international character and observe
the obligations inherent in the Geneva Convention. In addition to building and equipping
a general hospital at Taplow, on the estate of Lord and Lady Astor, the Red Cross
provided equipment and medical supplies for the other Canadian hospitals and its
workers ministered to the patients. Red Cross personnel eventually staffed four "Maple
Leaf" leave hostels in London, including one for junior officers, and later went to the
Continent to work behind the advancing army.23
It is out of the question even to mention here the many organizations and the
innumerable individuals whose energy and generosity contributed to making Canadian
servicemen comfortable and happy in the United Kingdom during these years. But even
the briefest account must not fail to pay some tribute to the indefatigable activity and
kindness of the Canadian High Commissioner and Mrs. Massey. Of the numerous
enterprises in which they interested themselves there is room to speak of only two. The
Beaver Club, in Spring Gardens close to C.M.H.Q., a fine commodious recreational club
for servicemen below commissioned rank, was established by a committee of Canadians
resident in London; Mr. Massey was chairman of its board of management. It was
officially opened on 23 February 1940, in the presence of the King and Queen. Although
the whole cost was borne in the beginning by the private committee, the Y.M.C.A.
subsequently guaranteed the club's finances to the amount of $50,000 annually.24 In
Cockspur Street nearby Mrs. Massey set up in October 1939 a Canadian Officers' Club
which, under her own supervision, continued to provide lunches and a place of pleasant
rendezvous for officers throughout the war.25
Merely to list the British and Canadian clubs, hostels, canteens, etc., in London and
elsewhere, that served the Canadian soldier, would require much more space than we have
available. And yet these admirable institutions are far from being the whole story. Many a
soldier would say that what mattered most in reconciling him to the long stay in Britain was
simply the kindly friendship and hospitality of individual British families. The English have
a reputation for reserve, not wholly unfounded, and it took time to get to know them. In the
early months, the average Canadian felt much more at home in Scotland; but he did get to
know the English in due time, and in an extraordinary number of cases Canadians found
their way into English homes where they were treated virtually as members of the family.
What
with shortages of every sort, hospitality was difficult in wartime Britain; and yet, in the
midst of all their own embarrassments, the English contrived to be kind to the strangers
from overseas. The Canadian soldier appreciated the kindness, and admired the courage
with which the English civilian faced the peril and misery of war. Enough has been said
to indicate that in the early days relations with the British public left much to be desired.
There is ample documentary evidence that this state of things entirely changed as time
passed. By the spring of 1944 the censors who read the soldiers' letters, who had often
had to report that a good many Canadians were making hostile references to their British
hosts, were telling a very different story. A report based on the reading of 11,652 letters
during the period 6-20 April 1944 makes this very remarkable statement: "The relations
between British civilians and Canadian troops continue to be very cordial, and not one
adverse comment has been seen."26 Relations with British servicemen were not so
universally satisfactory, but a censorship report covering the period 16-31 May 1944
noted that of over 19,000 letters read 98 writers spoke of relations with British troops as
good, while only 28 called them bad.* (Not many men spoke of relations with United
States troops, but there were only 14 "good" references as against 35 "bad" ones.)27 It is
notable that so few men thought it worth while to speak of these matters at all.
The relationship between the troops and the British public was reflected in the
number of Canadian soldiers who married in the United Kingdom. There were 1222
marriages during 1940; and the number increased year by year until the total just before
the Normandy D Day stood at 17,390. It was the period after VE Day, however, that
produced the largest number. By 30 November 1946, when repatriation was virtually
complete, 34,296 officers and men of the Canadian Army had been married in the United
Kingdom.28 A few of the brides were Canadian women or women of non-British
nationality; but the great majority were of course natives of the British Isles. Thus one
result of the Army's long sojourn in Britain was to bring to Canada a large group of new
and in general most excellent citizens. The dependents of servicemen were transported to
Canada at public expense; the Canadian Wives Bureau at C.M.H.Q. (above, page 201)
handled this large task for all three services.29 All told, from April 1942 through February
1948, 43,464 wives and 20,995 children were brought to Canada under this
arrangement.30 The vast majority came from Britain; similarly, the vast majority were
dependents of Army men.
*Relations with the Home Guard were of course a different and separate matter. General Crerar believes that nothing
did more to improve relations with the British people generally than the close connections which his Corps established with
the Home Guard in 1942.
Discipline and Deportment
It would not be difficult to assemble a file of clippings from English wartime

newspapers which would give the reader the impression that the Canadians were a
thoroughly badly behaved army and a constant source of worry to the English police.
And it is needless to say that plenty of soldiers did get themselves into trouble. A modern
army is a cross-section of the nation, and every nation has its proportion of trouble-
makers; and "single men in barracks" were no more likely to grow into plaster saints
during the Second World War than they were when Kipling wrote. But the impression
sometimes created by the more lurid London papers was unjust to the Army.
The periods when morale tended to sink lowest and trouble was most prevalent were,
of course, the winters, when military activity was reduced and the blackout helped to
make everyone miserable. The winter of 1941-42 was probably the most difficult time of
the war; not least because it was the third of a succession of uncommonly cold winters.*
As in 1939-40, the state of the war tended to make matters worse. Hitler's attack on
Russia had made a German attempt at invading England seem much less probable; the
Luftwaffe was busy in the east, and there was little of that bombing of Britain which had
had such a bracing effect on soldier and civilian alike in 1940-41; and the outbreak of war
in the Far East in December, and the Japanese victories that followed, strengthened the
impression that the United Kingdom was now a backwater. These conditions were
reflected in some lowering of morale; a censorship report of November 1941 made the
comment that, while in general it remained good, a certain number of men were showing
discouragement, and this seemed commonest in the 1st Division31 (which had of course
been longest in the country). In turn, this produced some friction in Sussex. The Deputy
Chief Constable of Brighton, for instance, was reported in the press as having remarked
during a court case which resulted in three Canadian soldiers being fined that there had
recently been "rather serious" disturbances at night: "Our men have been extremely
tolerant with the Canadians, but recently they have had to draw their truncheons in self-
defence 11.32
The fact remains that the record shows that even at this difficult period it was only a
small proportion of Canadians who got into trouble. A detailed report33 on the discipline
of the Canadian Army Overseas was prepared at
*"In striking contrast with the weather of 1914-18, when wet winters predominated, the outstanding feature of the
weather of this war has been the unusually cold winters. Taken together, January and February, 1942, were appreciably
colder over England and Wales than the similar period in 1941, and very slightly colder than that of 1940." (The Times,
London, 13 March 1942.)
C.M.H.Q. in September 1942. It made the following comments on the question of civil
offences:
"(a) The most prevalent offences . . . are those involving theft, larceny and burglary and the next most
prevalent are those involving assault.
"(b) A total of 923 soldiers have been convicted by the civil courts during the period under review
[December 1939 through August 1942]. This figure is not entirely accurate by reason of the fact
that records for the early stages are not complete but is sufficiently accurate to show that the
proportion of our troops involved in civil prosecutions is relatively small."
At 21 September 1942, 156 Canadian soldiers were serving sentences awarded by United
Kingdom civil courts. Surveying the whole disciplinary situation from the beginning, the
report concluded:
"(a) The proportion of troops committing offences has, subject to certain seasonal fluctuations, steadily
decreased.
"(b) The great majority of offences, approximately 90%, are purely breaches of military discipline.
"(c) The proportion of troops involved in civil offences is small and has steadily decreased."
Two circumstances somewhat qualify the statistics given. First, as stated, the figures
for the early days are admittedly not complete. Secondly, the figures are those of
convictions, and there would doubtless have been more of these but for the tendency of
English courts to be lenient to Canadians. At the request of the military authorities, the
High Commissioner had spoken to the Home Secretary asking that, in the interest of
discipline, "Canadian soldiers charged with offences should be dealt with strictly on the
merits of the case" and given no special indulgence.36 There is no doubt, however, that
there often was some leniency in practice.
Whatever doubt may attach to the early figures, there is none about those from 1942
onwards, and they fully support the general conclusions of the report just quoted. For
example, for the three months ending 30 June 1943, the total number of civil convictions
was 241; for the three months ending 30 September 1943, it was 219; and for the three
months ending 31 December 1943 it was 216.37 On these three dates respectively the
strength of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom38 was 201,406 all ranks, 204,981 all
ranks and 171,273 all ranks (the decrease is accounted for by the dispatch of troops to the
Mediterranean). This backs up the statement made in a C.M.H.Q. report, "As an average
figure, 4 to 5 soldiers out of every 10,000 are involved with the civil authorities each
month".39 The statement might, it is true, have been more accurately phrased, "involved
*Unlike the United States forces, which tried all cases occurring in the United Kingdom by their own military courts,
as provided in The United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act passed by Parliament in 1942,34 the Canadian forces
accepted the jurisdiction of British civil courts even in cases of capital offences. Six Canadian soldiers were convicted of
murder and hanged by the judgement of United Kingdom courts. The Canadian authorities took the responsibility in such
cases of ensuring that the accused was competently defended and had every chance.35
with the civil authorities to the point of conviction"; but with every qualification allowed
for, the figure is still very small.
The picture of the morale and behaviour of the Canadian soldier in the United
Kingdom has its dark spots, but viewed as a whole it is remarkably bright and
satisfactory. The maintenance of the spirit of the troops during this very long period of
inaction, and the steady improvement of their relations with the British people, constitute
together something of a triumph. On the eve of the Normandy landings the postal censors
who read letters written by the Canadians in the 21st Army Group reported,40
This is a cheerful mail revealing eagerness for action, and a fine fighting spirit. These troops are
confident in themselves and confident in victory. . Regimental pride and a fine esprit de corps is
evident.... References to English civilians continue to be flattering and show a very friendly spirit.
This was written four and a half years after the first Canadians came to England.
The credit for these results must be widely distributed. A large share must go to the
higher command of the Army, and to those who operated the various welfare services
which the command provided and directed. A large share must go also to Britain's brave
and hospitable people. But no small meed of praise is due to the troops themselves.
General McNaughton pointed this out in the course of a press conference on 17
December 1942, the third anniversary of the arrival of the first flight of the 1st Division
in the United Kingdom. He then said that the maintenance of morale at the highest level
in spite of many disappointments and frustrations was a great tribute to the men of the
army. The result was due to the fact that "our men have good common sense"; they were
a very intelligent body of men, not an army of adventurers, but men who had come to
Britain to serve a cause.41 There is of course no doubt that the Canadian soldier intensely
disliked the inaction which was imposed upon him so long; but he knew his time would
come; and it came in 1943 and 1944, in the hard and victorious campaigns in Italy and
North-West Europe.
Leave to Canada
The question of leave to Canada was certain to become important as the war continued.
The psychological effect of prolonged absence from home began to be apparent in many
men after two years' absence and, of course, was most pronounced on those who had left
wives at home. After three years the strain of long separation began to have its effect in
many families. During 1943 the British Army instituted a system of home postings
("Python") for men who had been abroad for six years and by the beginning of 1944
this period had been reduced to five years. By that time New Zealanders had received
home leave after three or more years abroad and the United States Army was working out
the details of a liberal repatriation scheme. A Canadian system of rotation leave came
into effect in the autumn of 1944, when some Canadian soldiers had been overseas nearly
five years.
Long before this, measures had been taken to deal with the most urgent aspects of the
problem. Within a few months of the 1st Division's arrival in England there were requests
to return to Canada on "compassionate grounds". Where such a request was granted the
man was "struck off strength" the Canadian Army Overseas; incidentally, an officer
usually was required to pay his own passage home. The whole question of leave came up
for discussion during September 1941 and it was decided that leave in Canada would be
granted "only in very exceptional cases" and not ordinarily at public expense; subsequent
discharge would be considered only in cases where extreme hardship would result from a
soldier's retention in the army.42 Administrative details were promulgated in a routine
order dated 24 October 1941.43 The only real complaint against the procedure now set up
was its slowness. A report prepared at C.M.H.Q. on 15 April 1943 indicated that of 647
applications submitted during the period since 1 October 1942, 338 had been referred to
N.D.H.Q. for investigation, but only 112 cases had been approved for return to Canada.44
Steps were taken to speed up the procedure but it was obvious that, as the period of
absence from Canada lengthened, the backlog would tend to grow greater.
Beginning in the autumn of 1940 some officers and men of the overseas army were
sent back to Canada for service as instructors or to take officer cadet training or staff or
other courses (above, pages 136, 246). By 31 July 1944 some 944 officers and 3750
men45 had been returned for such reasons and had had the opportunity of spending some
time with their families. Another and rather larger group of soldiers were sent home as
escorts for prisoners of war being sent to North America (above, page 151). The first
such escort sailed on 23 December 1941, and the twenty-second and last in November
1944. The total strength of these escorts was 4758 all ranks. They included from time to
time a proportion of men returning on compassionate leave and men whose age or
medical category made them unsuitable for further overseas service. Some men going to
Canada for officer training or duty as instructors were also included in escorts; there is
thus some duplication between the two sets of figures given in this paragraph.46 It is
apparent that the number of men given leave by these various expedients was very small
in proportion to the number of long-service men overseas.
By the early weeks of 1944 the problem was becoming increasingly serious. On 17
February the Director General of Medical Services at Ottawa (Major-General G. B.
Chisholm) informed the Adjutant General that the Consultant Neuropsychiatrist then
visiting Canada from the United Kingdom
had suggested that men overseas were suffering from the long separation from their
homes and families and that it might be advisable to allow leave to Canada for men who
had completed, say, four and a half years of overseas service.47 Four days later the matter
was discussed by the Military Members of the Army Council. However, "In view of the
many administrative difficulties involved, including the question of provision of
reinforcement replacements, it was the opinion of Military Members that such a scheme
was impracticable and should be deferred until such time as there is a more definite
indication of the future trend of operations now contemplated."48
The military difficulties were indeed formidable. The invasion of North-West Europe
was impending, as were large-scale operations in Italy; and to remove from the units at
this moment large numbers of long-service men who in the nature of things were soldiers
of exceptional experience was obviously undesirable. It has moreover been made clear
that the general manpower situation had been unsatisfactory for a year past; in these
circumstances, finding the additional reinforcements that a large programme of home
leave would make necessary was certain to be extremely difficult. Finally, there was the
question of shipping. Vessels were available to move the normal flow of reinforcements,
but could enough be obtained to accommodate the much larger movement that a rotation
leave scheme would involve? The fact that the shipping was not under Canadian control
made this less likely. In the spring, when the Deputy Minister of National Defence
(Army), Lt.-Col. G. S. Currie, was at C.M.H.Q. discussing the question,* General
Montague observed that his own "quick appreciation" of it was that "we would be glad to
have a system for leave to Canada established, but ... it would be entirely dependent on
N.D.H.Q. producing the shipping".49
Nevertheless, the problem could not be avoided, for it was growing more pressing
month by month. It presented its worst face in Italy, where the 1st Division (overseas
since 1939) was serving. On 19 April 1944 General Burns, commanding the 1st Corps
there, wrote to the Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q. concerning the problem of "compassionate
leave and the return to Canada of personnel with long service overseas".50 These two
subjects, he said, were closely connected in the minds of Canadian soldiers in Italy:
"Many of these men have been away from home for four years and, briefly, their feeling
is that few homes can be expected to hold together when the husband has been away for
so long". That he did not exaggerate is evidenced by a censorship report from the Italian
theatre, covering Canadian mail read during the period 16-31 July 1944:51
The increasingly large volume of comment on the question of home leave indicates how large this
problem is now looming in the minds of the troops. Those who have served for nearly five years are
acutely conscious of the fact
*It had become a serious issue in the Canadian press as the result of an article in the Eighth Army News written by the
chaplain of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment.
that they are unable to look forward to a period of leave as a duly-earned right, and the authorities are
bitterly criticised for failing to make provision in this respect. The granting of compassionate leave in
exceptional circumstances, and the detailing of men for P/W escort duty, have merely tended to
aggravate the question in the eyes of the remainder.
"The authorities" had in fact been working hard on the problem for months without
achieving a solution. A minor ameliorative measure taken in the summer was the
adoption of the British War Office's "Tri-Wound Scheme". As applied to the Canadian
Army, this provided for returning to Canada (or, if preferred, the United Kingdom), for
duty for a period of six months, men who had been wounded "otherwise than trivially"
three times, or had three years' overseas service and had been wounded twice. But the
number of men who could qualify was very small.52
In September 1944, after prolonged consideration, Headquarters First Canadian
Army informed C.M.H.Q. that the reinforcement situation appeared to warrant putting a
leave scheme into operation. Shortly afterwards the Minister of National Defence
(Colonel Ralston) returned from a visit to Italy convinced of the importance of such a
scheme. It was calculated at C.M.H.Q. that the reinforcement position would only justify
giving leave to 500 men per month, since to give a man thirty clear days at home would
involve his being lost to his unit for three months. On 1 November a firm plan, agreed
upon by the Military Members of the Army Council, was submitted to the Minister; it
cautiously provided for a quota of only 250 men per month. Generals Crerar and
Montague recommended an increase to 450, and on this basis the scheme went into
effect. Eligibility was limited to officers and men with "five years satisfactory continuous
service overseas", but each completed month of service in an active theatre of operations
(the Mediterranean or North-West Europe) counted as two months.53
The first drafts sent under the scheme-200 officers and men from Italy, 250 from
North-West Europe and the United Kingdom-sailed for home at the end of November and
early in December 1944. Later drafts were larger, and 1428 all ranks were embarked
during February. Although it had been planned that Rotation Leave men would return to
duty overseas, few actually did so.* Of the 1992 all ranks making up the first three
monthly quotas, only 53 were sent back; and in the early spring of 1945 N.D.H.Q. placed
the scheme on a new footing. It was decided that men returning to Canada on the rotation
quota would normally be retained there; and all returns to Canada were categorized under
one of four headings: (a) Rotational Duty, mainly for long-service men; (b) Specific Duty
(attendance at courses, etc.); (c) Long Service Leave; (d) Miscellaneous
*The immediate manpower problem had of course been considerably eased by the decision to send N.R.M.A. men
overseas and by the fact that casualties had been fewer than expected.
(medical or compassionate reasons, etc.). Men under (a) and (d) were to be retained in
Canada. Those under (b) would return overseas, as would those under (c) at the end of
thirty clear days' leave. The men in this last category were those who would normally
have been eligible for Rotational Duty, but whose services overseas were required for
special reasons. After the new scheme became effective at the beginning of April,
practically all long service men going back to Canada went on Rotational Duty; all told,
only 26 all ranks went on Long Service Leave.54
Down to 21 June 1945, when the rotation programme ceased to operate, merging into
the general process of repatriation, a total of 626 officers and 9603 other ranks were
returned to Canada on Rotation Leave, Long Service Leave, or Rotational Duty (387
officers and 6022 other ranks coming under the last-named heading).55 Though the figure
was not large, there can be no doubt that the introduction of the programme had a
material influence in keeping up the morale of the overseas army during the final months
of the war. It was a pity that it had to begin so late, and to be on such a limited scale. The
separation of families was not the least of the disasters caused by and inseparable from
the war; and Canada paid a heavy price in social misery and broken homes for the long
sojourn of her troops overseas.*
Repatriating the Overseas Army
That getting the overseas troops back to Canada would be a large and complicated
task was of course obvious, and the authorities were making plans for it long before the
fighting ended. The great difficulty was going to be shipping, and there was bound to be
some international competition for the available bottoms, and some conflict between the
needs of repatriation after the end of the war in Europe and those of "redeployment" in
preparation for the final phase of the continuing war against Japan.
In March 1945 the Canadian Prime Minister visited Washington and in conversation
with him President Roosevelt agreed that servicemen not required for occupation duty
should be brought back from Europe to North America in strict "chronological priority",
i.e. those who had been overseas longest, whether Canadians or Americans, should be
brought back first. Whether the President did anything along these lines before his death
on 5 April does not appear.58 At the end of March the British War Office indicated that it
might be possible to move about 90,000 Canadian service
*It is worth noting that approximately 370,000 all ranks had gone overseas from Canada to Europe by 31 May 1945,
when the repatriation programme was getting under way; during the same period approximately 70,000 all ranks were
returned to Canada.66 Medical reasons were the commonest cause of return, accounting for 32,489 cases.57
men home during the six months following the defeat of Germany. This was not a
satisfactory prospect, and on 20 April the Canadian Government instructed the High
Commissioner in London and the Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q. to press the United
Kingdom authorities for an allocation of shipping sufficient to bring at least 150,000 men
back during those six months. It appeared for a considerable time that this minimum
might not be met; on 4 July, nearly two months after VE Day, the Department of National
Defence issued a press release indicating that in spite of strong representations in London
and Washington the prospect was that it might not be possible to move more than
126,000 Army and R.C.A.F. men during the second six months of 1945.59 However, this
forecast proved pessimistic. The actual grand total of Army and R.C.A.F. personnel
repatriated during those six months was to be about 192,000.60
Demobilization planning, long in progress, was accelerated early in q1944. In
February it "became policy" to set up a demobilization directorate at Ottawa for each
service.61 Within the Army overseas a Demobilization Committee had existed at
C.M.H.Q. since early in 1943;62 and, as we have seen,* a Director of Reorganization and
Demobilization was appointed there in September 1944, when it seemed possible that
Germany was about to collapse. An Army plan for releasing men under a point-score
system based on length of service had been accepted in principle in August. The Cabinet
War Committee at Ottawa agreed on general principles governing repatriation and
demobilization on 23 September, and a special cabinet committee approved a more
detailed plan on 19 April 1945.63 In February work began at C.M.H.Q. on drafting a
pamphlet to explain the scheme to the troops. It could not be put into final shape until
information was available on the basis on which the Army's Pacific Force was to be
formed, and this was not known until after Mr. King's statement in Parliament on 4 April
(see below, page 514). The pamphlet was then revised and printed and, by great efforts,
was published on 11 May, only three days after VE Day, under the title After Victory in
Europe.64
The plan described in the pamphlet was, speaking very broadly, based on the
principle "first in, first out", but it was explained that the needs of the service made it
impossible to observe this principle to the letter. Japan still had to be defeated, Germany
had to be controlled, and the administrative framework of the army had to be maintained.
Subject to these requirements being met, "priority for individual release" would be based
on "a point score system" under which one month of service in Canada counted two
points, and one month of service overseas counted three; while the scores of married
personnel, or widowers or divorcees with dependent children, were increased by 20 per
cent. As for the process of repatriation,
*Above, page 200.

the highest priority for return went to those who volunteered, and were accepted, for the
Pacific Force; these were to have "thirty clear days' leave at home before undertaking any
further service". Thereafter, the men with the highest point-scores (so far as they could be
spared) would be returned to Canada in drafts. The third stage would be the return of
major units in the same general order in which they came overseas. The units thus
returned would be composed basically of their own lower-priority personnel, so far as
these came from the units' home districts, supplemented by men from those districts
drafted in from other units. Questionnaires were distributed in mid-May, every individual
being allowed to indicate his or her preference: service with the Pacific Force; service
with the Occupation Force in Germany; or "reallocation in accordance with individual
priorities and the requirements of the service"-in other words, discharge.65
The movement homewards began sooner than might have been expected. A large
allocation of shipping unexpectedly became available for the month of June; haste was
made to take advantage of it, and a total of 15,665 men and women of the Army left the
United Kingdom for home that month.66 This included the whole of the 1st Parachute
Battalion, which was sent because it was available in England in spite of the fact that it
contained some low-priority men; it thus became the first unit to return to Canada as
such.67 In July, 33,775 Army personnel moved towards Canada.68 Notwithstanding the
speed with which the repatriation mill had begun to grind, one unpleasant incident took
place among the troops awaiting return. There was rioting in Aldershot on 4 and 5 July,
and much damage was done to property (by 31 March 1946, Canada had paid $41,541 to
meet damage claims). This would have been deplorable in any circumstances; it was
particularly indefensible in that it took place so soon after the end of hostilities and at a
time when the movement back to Canada was developing rapidly. General Montague
expressed the opinion that the ringleaders in the disturbances were certain Pacific Force
volunteers "whom I cannot describe otherwise than as racketeers". (There was a suspicion
that some men were volunteering for the Pacific Force merely as a means of getting back
to Canada at an early date.) In fact, of the six soldiers convicted by courts martial as a
result of the riots, three were Pacific volunteers. Most of the six had long records of
misconduct.69 The citizens of Aldershot magnanimously forgave the many the misdeeds
of the few, and on 26 September conferred "the freedom of the borough" on the Canadian
Army Overseas.70
On VE Day (8 May 1945) the strength of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom
and on the continent of Europe was 281,757 all ranks.71 Between that date and the
following 31 December 184,054 Army men and women left that zone for Canada. A few
hundred, chiefly individuals
whose services were urgently required in Canada in connection with the Pacific Force or
otherwise, were sent by air. Every sort of available shipping was utilized. The great mass
went by troopship; but a small number went by "berth ship" (i.e. as passengers on cargo
vessels, etc.), and a larger number by hospital ship; and nearly 3000 were taken back,
during 1945, in Canadian naval vessels.72 By 31 March 1946 Canadian troops in the
United Kingdom numbered only 17,745 all ranks; on the Continent there were fewer than
800 apart from the 17,000 men of the Canadian Army Occupation Force.* During the
spring and summer the troops who had formed the C.A.O.F., and those who had staffed
the Repatriation Depots (the former Reinforcement Units) in the Aldershot area, were
returned to Canada. The strength of the overseas army at 31 January 1947 was down to
630 all ranks.73 Headquarters, Canadian Repatriation Units, had ceased to exist on 22
July 1946; the last Repatriation Depot was disbanded on 21 February 1947. Canadian
Military Headquarters itself, once so huge, had a strength of only 20 officers and 45 other
ranks at 31 March 1947; and during the following month it changed its name to Canadian
Army Liaison Establishment, London, and formally embarked on a peacetime career.74
The repatriation of the Canadian Army Overseas was a tremendous administrative
task and a great administrative triumph. There has been no room for the details here, but
the rapidity and smoothness of the movement reflected great credit on those who
organized it, on the Continent, in Britain and in Canada. It is probable, however, that the
task could not have been. so rapidly completed had it not been for the Japanese surrender
in the late summer of 1945. The period of largest movement was. December 1945 and
January 1946; during these two months 82,474 all ranks of the Canadian Army left the
United Kingdom.75 The shipping for such a movement might not have been available
had war still been in progress in the Pacific.
*The C.A.O.F., and the movements of Canadian formations on the Continent after the end of hostilities, are described
in Volume III of this history.
PART THREE
The War Against Japan,

1941-1945
BLANK PAGE
CHAPTER XIV
THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG

DECEMBER 1941
(See Maps 6 and 7 and Sketches 4, 5 and 7)
The Army in the Pacific War, 1941-1945
T HE Second World War may be said to comprise, basically, three great series of
operations: the campaigns of the Western Allies against Germany; the operations
between the Germans and the Russians on the Eastern Front; and the war waged against
Japan in the Pacific. It is with the first of these that the history of the Canadian Army is
chiefly concerned. Its main effort was exerted in Europe against the Germans. The
Japanese did not enter the war for more than two years after its outbreak in Europe; and
by the time of their attack in December 1941 Canada had already built up a large field
army in the United Kingdom. Until the defeat of the Germans in May 1945 the support
and development of that army continued to be Canada's primary concern, and Germany's
collapse was followed by Japan's before large Canadian forces could be re-deployed in
the Pacific.
Nevertheless, the Army played a part, though not a very extensive one, in the Pacific
war. Two Canadian battalions helped to defend Hong Kong in 1941; an infantry brigade
was employed in the enterprise against Kiska in 1943; and a force of divisional strength
was being organized for action in the Pacific at the time of the final Japanese surrender.
Along with some minor activities, and the home-defence measures in British Columbia
already described, these episodes constitute the record of Canadian Army participation in
the war against Japan. They are the subject of the chapters which follow.
The Situation in the Far East, 1939-1941
Something has already been said of the development of the Japanese menace during
the period following the outbreak of war in Europe. We have noted the fears about
Japanese intentions which were current in the
437
summer of 1940, and the steps taken in Canada in consequence.* No attack took place at
that time; Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September, but
remained neutral; and the Canadian force in Britain continued to be built. up. As 1941
advanced, however, the situation in the Pacific deteriorated. Relations between the United
States and Japan grew worse and it was more and more obvious that the aims of the two
countries were impossible to reconcile. Active discussion was going on between them
from the spring of 1941 onwards, without important progress being made towards a
settlement. The United States had no intention of condoning Japan's programme of
expansion; and Japan had no intention of abandoning that programme. As we now know,
on 2 July a Japanese Imperial Conference decided to continue diplomatic negotiations
while also completing preparations for military action.1 Nevertheless, it was long before
the United States and Great Britain wholly abandoned hope of continued peace-or, at any
rate, postponement of war-in the Pacific.
Britain's unavoidable weakness in the Far East-the consequence of the death-struggle
in which she was engaged in Europe-had produced painful searchings of heart in London
as to the policy to be pursued at Hong Kong. This was particularly the case after Dunkirk.
In August 1940 the Chiefs of Staff considered the matter and decided that the colony
should be "regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible"; it was recognized that in
the event of war with Japan it could neither be reinforced nor relieved. In October the
Governor of the Colony, Sir Geoffrey Northcote, recommended the withdrawal of the
garrison "in order to avoid the slaughter of civilians and the destruction of property which
would follow a Japanese attack". The Chiefs of Staff, after consultation with the Foreign
Office, opposed this suggestion on political grounds-such action, it was felt, would
discourage China, encourage Japan and shake American faith in Britain. However, a
request the same month from Major-General A. E. Grasett, G.O.C. British Troops in
China, for an extra infantry battalion to reinforce the four already at Hong Kong was
refused on the ground that it could only be supplied by India at the expense of
reinforcement for the Middle East.2
At the beginning of 1941 the newly-appointed British Commander-inChief in the Far
East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham) pressed his superiors to reinforce
the garrison of Hong Kong. Mr. Churchill had no sympathy with these representations,
and he has published3 a memorandum which he wrote on the subject:
Prime Minister to General Ismay 7 Jan. 41

This is all wrong. If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong
Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall' suffer there. Instead of increasing the
garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolical scale. Any trouble arising there must be dealt with at
*Above, Chapters III and V.

THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG, DECEMBER 1941 439
the Peace conference after the war. We must avoid frittering away our resources on untenable positions.
Japan will think long before declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two or six
battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her choice. I wish we had fewer troops there, but to
move any would be noticeable and dangerous. .
Subsequently the British Prime Minister was to "allow himself to be drawn from this
position". (This would seem to have been one of those cases where second thoughts are
not best.) In the meantime, however, the Chiefs of Staff informed Brooke-Popham that
reinforcement was not considered desirable. They viewed Hong Kong "as an undesirable
military commitment", they told him, but demilitarization was not now possible in view
of the effect it would have in both Japan and China. It had been decided, however, to
increase the official "period before relief" for the fortress from 90 to 130 days, and to
build up all its reserve supplies accordingly. A decision to build up food and ammunition
reserves to this standard had been taken earlier.4 The words "period before relief", it
should be explained, are simply the usual formula on which fortress reserves are
calculated; the use of the phrase did not necessarily imply an opinion that it would
actually be practicable to relieve the colony after 130 days.
The Commander-in-Chief in the Far East returned to the charge. His appreciation of
the situation in his area was confident. "To us out here", he wrote on 18 January 1941, "it
seems no longer a question of reducing our losses in Hong Kong but of ensuring the
security of places that will be of great value in taking offensive action at a later stage of
the war." The War Office, however, felt that this was too rosy a view, and the Chiefs of
Staff adhered to their previous decision.5'
The Request for Canadian Help at Hong Kong
In August of 1941, General Grasett, who had just retired from his appointment in
China, returned to the United Kingdom by way of Canada, his native country. In Ottawa he
had "long discussions" with the Chief of the General Staff, General Crerar, who later
recalled that Grasett had said that "the addition of two or more battalions to the forces then
at Hong Kong would render the garrison strong enough to withstand for an extensive period
of siege an attack by such forces as the Japanese could bring to bear against it." Grasett,
however, did not raise the question of, obtaining these battalions from Canada.6 On 3
September, after reaching England, he met the Chiefs of Staff and argued strongly for such
a reinforcement, now suggesting that Canada might supply the units. The Chiefs were
convinced, and
on 10 September sent to Mr. Churchill a memorandum7 recommending an approach to

the Canadian Government. The essential paragraphs ran:
3. The Chiefs of Staff have previously advised against the despatch of more reinforcements to Hong
Kong because they considered that it would only have been to throw good money after bad, but the
position in the Far East has now changed. Our defences in Malaya have been improved and Japan has
latterly shown a certain weakness in her attitude towards Great Britain and the United States.*
4. A small reinforcement of one or two battalions would increase the strength of the garrison out of all
proportion to the actual numbers involved, and it would provide a strong stimulus to the garrison and to
the Colony. Further, it would have a very great moral effect in the whole of the Far East and it would
show Chiang Kai Shek that we really intend to fight it out at Hong Kong.
The Chiefs did not argue that the situation had improved to the point where it would be
practicable to relieve Hong Kong in the event of war with Japan. The Chief of the
Imperial General Staff had produced a draft memorandum suggesting that relief might be
possible after four and a half months; but the Chief of the Naval Staff "considered this
misleading" and it was deleted.8
The Prime Minister accepted the Chiefs' advice, making however one reservation. He
wrote on 15 September: "It is a question of timing. There is no objection to the approach
being made as proposed; but a further decision should be taken before the battalions
actually sail.”9 Accordingly, on 19 September the Dominions Office, London, dispatched
the following telegram10 to the Government of Canada:
MOST SECRET
United Kingdom Government has been conferring with late G.O.C. who has lately returned to this
country upon the defences of Hong Kong. In the event of war in the Far East accepted policy has been
that Hong Kong should be considered as an outpost and held as long as possible. We have thought
hitherto. that it would not serve any ultimate useful purpose to increase the existing army garrison which
consists of four battalions of infantry and represents bare minimum required for its assigned task.
Situation in the Orient however has now altered. There have been signs of a certain weakening in
attitude of Japan towards United States and ourselves. Defences of Malaya have been improved. Under
these conditions our view is that a small reinforcement (e.g. one or two more battalions) of Hong Kong
garrison would be very fully justified. It would reassure Chiang Kai Shek as to genuineness of our
intention to hold the colony and in addition would have a very great moral effect throughout the Far East.
This action would strengthen garrison out of all proportion to actual numbers involved and would greatly
encourage the garrison and the colony.
We should be most grateful if Government of Canada would give consideration to providing for this
purpose one or two Canadian battalions from Canada. Your Government will be well aware of difficulties
now being experienced by us in providing the forces demanded by the situation in various parts of the
world, despite the very great assistance which Dominions are furnishing. We consider that Canadian
Government in view of Canada's special position in the North Pacific would wish in any case to be
informed of the need as seen by us for the
*The army strength in Malaya increased from nine battalions in August 1940 to 32 on 7 December 1941. Two capital
ships (H.M. Ships Prince of Wales and Repulse) were sent to Singapore before the Japanese attack.
reinforcement of Hong Kong and the special value of such a measure at present time, even though on
very limited scale. The fact that the United States have recently sent a small reinforcement to the
Philippines may also be relevant. If the Government of Canada could co-operate with us in the
suggested manner it would be of the greatest help. We much hope that they will feel able to do this.
We would communicate with you again regarding the best time for despatch in the light of the
general political situation in the Far East if your government concur in principle in sending one or two
battalions.
There is no need to dwell upon the contrast either between this communication and the
rugged common sense of Churchill's earlier appreciation, or between the situation as
presented in it and the actual facts as known to us today. The historian's hindsight is
always far, far better than the foresight of the men, groping in the dark, who had to do the
work at the time.
The War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet considered the telegram on 23
September, but deferred decision pending examination by the General Staff and
consultation with the Minister of National Defence (Colonel Ralston), who was then in
the United States. On 24 September General Crerar sent a memorandum to the Acting
Minister, Mr. C. G. Power. This paper itself made no specific recommendation on the
point of policy, but indicated that it would be possible to provide two battalions, as
requested by the British Government, "without reducing the strength of our Coast
Defence garrisons and without further mobilization". That evening however Crerar spoke
by telephone with Ralston in Los Angeles, telling him that he had "definitely
recommended that Canadian Army should take this on". Ralston approved in principle.11
On 27 September a message arrived from Colonel Ralston conveying his approval
and specifying that the units "should be sent from troops now in Canada and not from
England".12 On the 29th the Canadian Prime Minister, in his capacity as Secretary of
State for External Affairs, cabled to the Dominions Office that the Canadian Government
agreed in principle to send two battalions to strengthen the Hong Kong garrison, and
would be glad to consider arrangements for their dispatch.13 On 2 October, accordingly,
the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, remembering Mr. Churchill's reservation, asked his
approval for going ahead with arrangements to send the battalions. He gave it, subject to
the concurrence of the Foreign Secretary, which was immediately forthcoming. On 8
October the Chiefs of Staff authorized the reinforcement operation to proceed.14
It is worth while to examine the reasons for the Canadian Government's decision.
Canada had at this period no intelligence organization of her own capable of making a fully
adequate estimate of the situation in the Far East; essentially, Ottawa depended upon
London for such information. Nor was any military appreciation requested of or prepared
by the Canadian General Staff as to the situation of Hong Kong in the event of war with
Japan.15 The Canadian Government had not been told of Mr. Churchill's earlier doubts.
It was of course amply clear however that the garrison's position in war would be most
perilous. The Government's decision was evidently made mainly upon the circumstances
as presented in the Dominions Office cable. Colonel Ralston retrospectively explained16
the reasoning which led him to concur in the dispatch of the Canadian force:
Without labouring it the considerations set out in the telegram were very largely the factors which
influenced me in connection with it.... I had at the end of the consideration of the telegram this in mind,
that the furnishing of one or two battalions would do a great deal more than a force of that size would
usually do. It seemed to me from what I knew generally that above all things we needed time, and I had
very definitely in my mind, rightly or wrongly, that if Japan did come into the war the United States
would be in, too; and I had it definitely in my mind that the United States were none too ready to come
in, and anything which would either defer or deter Japan from coming in would be highly desirable from
our point of view. . . . It seemed to me that we had an opportunity to make a contribution, perhaps not
large in numbers but certainly effective in its results which we should not disregard.
A similar account was given by the Naval Minister, Mr. Angus L. Macdonald.17 On 2
October the Minister of National Defence reported to the Cabinet War Committee that
the United Kingdom Government's suggestion had been referred to him and approved,,
after examination by the General Staff. The Committee confirmed the approval for the
dispatch of the two battalions, noting that the actual units would be selected by the
Minister of National Defence in consultation with the General Staff.
The selection received careful attention. The Director of Military Training was asked
to prepare a list of infantry battalions in Canada in order of priority according to training,
and sent it to the Director of Staff Duties on 24 September.18 The ten battalions which he
listed under Class "A", i.e., those best trained, were with one exception units of the 4th
Division, which at this time was still in Canada.* Seven other units were included in
Class "B", these being either units of the newly-organized 6th Division or employed on
coast defence. Finally, the D.M.T. listed nine battalions, which "due either to recent
employment requiring a period of refresher training, or to insufficient training, are not
recommended for operational consideration at present".
On 26 September the Director of Staff Duties (Colonel W. H. S. Macklin) made a
submission19 to the Chief of the General Staff, based on these recommendations, providing
for consideration lists of alternative selections from both Class "A" and Class "B". The
G.O.C. 4th Division (MajorGeneral L. F. Page) strongly reprobated the suggestion that his
formation should be robbed of two battalions for the Hong Kong task;20 and after
considering the whole situation the C.G.S. decided that the best course was
*See above, pages 91, 99.

to select two battalions, The Royal Rifles of Canada and The Winnipeg Grenadiers,
which had been included by the Director of Military Training among those not
recommended for operational consideration. Both had recently returned from garrison
duties in areas adjacent to Canada (the Royal Rifles from Newfoundland, the Winnipeg
Grenadiers from Jamaica), and the D.M.T. had presumably considered that they were
among those in need of "refresher training".
On 30 September the C.G.S. made his formal recommendation21 to the Minister. He
wrote: "As these units are going to a distant and important garrison where they will be
detached from other Canadian forces, a primary consideration is that they should be
efficient, well-trained battalions capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any
circumstances." It would be unsound, he said, to "disrupt" the 4th Division, and it seemed
to him best to select units from among those on coast defence duty or from the 6th
Division. In recommending specifically the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers,
General Crerar wrote:
10. As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica
respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which
awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they have had will therefore be of no small
value to them in their new role. Both are units of proven efficiency.
11. In my opinion, the balance of argument favours the selection of these two battalions. I would be
very reluctant to allot them indefinitely to a home defence role as the effect on their morale, following a
period of "semi-overseas" responsibilities would be bound to be adverse. The selection represents both
Eastern and Western Canada. In the case of the Royal Rifles, there is also the fact that this battalion,
while nominally English-speaking is actually drawn from a region overwhelmingly French-speaking in
character and contains an important proportion of Canadians of French descent.
The Minister approved this recommendation on 9 October.22

On 11 October the War Office, through C.M.H.Q., asked for a brigade headquarters
and various specialists details including a signal section. This request had originated the
previous day with the G.O.C. Hong Kong.23 Mr. Power (now again Acting Minister)
immediately approved the proposal and the recommendation of the C.G.S. that Colonel J.
K. Lawson, a Permanent Force officer then serving as Director of Military Training,
should be appointed to the command with the rank of Brigadier. Colonel Ralston had
been consulted. Simultaneously approval was given for the appointment of Colonel P.
Hennessy, Director of Organization, as officer-in-charge of administration under the
brigade commander.24
It may be noted here that after the Canadians reached Hong Kong, and a few days
before war broke out in the Far East, C.M.H.Q informed the C.G.S. that the British Chiefs
of Staff Committee had recommended increasing the Canadian force to a brigade group by
asking Canada for a third infantry battalion and ancillary troops.25 This suggestion had in
fact
been made by the G.O.C. Hong Kong by 19 November, three days after the Canadians'
arrival. He reported that it originated with Brigadier Lawson, who recommended that
Canada be asked to provide a third infantry battalion, a field regiment of artillery, a field
company of engineers, a field ambulance and certain personnel of other arms and
services. Lawson had expressed the opinion that these would be provided with alacrity.26
Before proceeding with the matter, the British Chiefs of Staff took the significant
precaution of checking with the Far East Command to make certain that no one had
suggested to the Canadian Government that air support for the Hong Kong garrison was
yet in view.* They also observed that they could not agree with the suggestion of the
G.O.C. Hong Kong that this reinforcement would enable him to hold permanently the
Gin Drinkers Line on the mainland, but did agree that it would greatly increase the
security of the island. On receiving the required assurance, they recommended that a
further approach be made to Canada. On 6 December the War Office formally invited the
Dominions Office to ask Canada for the additional units; but the approach was never
made.28 The reason is obvious. The Japanese attack began the following day, and the
reinforcement of Hong Kong ceased to be practicable.
The Royal Rifles of Canada had been mobilized on 8 July 1940 and in the following
winter were sent to Newfoundland for garrison duty. They returned to Canada in August
1941 and in September were assigned to coast defence duty at Saint John, N.B., where
they were serving when warned for duty with the expedition to Hong Kong. The unit was
commanded throughout its active service by Lt.-Col. W. J. Home, a Permanent Force
officer.29 The Winnipeg Grenadiers were mobilized as a machine-gun battalion on 1
September 1939, and as we have seen were dispatched to the West Indies to relieve a
British battalion in the early summer of 1940. At this time the unit was converted to a
rifle battalion. It returned to Canada in September and October 1941 and was warned for
Hong Kong almost immediately. It had been commanded since June 1941 by Lt.-Col. J.
L. R. Sutcliffe.30
The establishment adopted for each of the battalions sent to Hong Kong totalled, with
attached personnel, 34 officers and 773 other ranks.31 It was decided that, in addition, the
battalions should take "first reinforcements" amounting to six officers and 150 other
ranks each. At the time when the
*The C.-in-C. Far East, when apprised of the forthcoming reinforcement, had inquired whether this implied a basic
change of policy at Hong Kong. The Chiefs of Staff replied on 6 November that policy was unaltered-the colony was still
an outpost, to be held as long as possible; but it had become practicable for Britain and the United States to "take a more
forward line in the Far East". It was emphasized that air resources were still insufficient to permit the stationing of air
forces at Hong Kong.27 It is worth noting that the terms of the message sent to Canada on 19 September (above, page 440)
seemed to imply that the "outpost" policy had been abandoned.
units were selected, the Royal Rifles were at full strength and indeed had three officers
and 59 other ranks surplus to establishment. The Winnipeg Grenadiers, who at an earlier
time had been on a lower (garrison) establishment, were still five officers and 52 other
ranks under strength. Subsequently, some 80 men of the Grenadiers and some 71 of the
Rifles were struck off strength, for medical or other reasons.32 To bring the battalions up
to strength and provide them with first reinforcements, then, approximately 440 new men
in all were required, and had to be provided during the very short period (14-16 days)
between the time when the two units were warned for duty (9 October) and their
entrainment for Vancouver. It was also essential to maintain secrecy concerning the
projected trans-Pacific move, and this somewhat hampered the process of collecting the
necessary men.
The policy adopted was that the men required would be found from among those
volunteering to serve overseas in a "semi-tropical" climate. Those for the Royal Rifles
were provided from Military District No. 2 (102 from two Advanced Training Centres at
Camp Borden, and 52 from The Midland Regiment). The Winnipeg Grenadiers got 252
men from Military District No. 10 (189 from an Advanced Training Centre at Winnipeg,
which also provided 12 officers; 40 from No. 10 District Depot; and 23 from a Basic
Training Centre at Portage la Prairie), and 30 from an Advanced Training Centre at
Dundurn in Military District No. 12.33
The standard of training of the men thus added to the two battalions was one of the
main points considered by the Royal Commission which subsequently investigated the
dispatch of the force. The accepted policy governing reinforcements for the Corps in
Britain was that men should not leave Canada without undergoing "the full period of
training laid down", which was 16 weeks.34 The Commissioner (Sir Lyman Duff), after
careful analysis, found that "approximately 120 men were included in the expedition
before they had completed their prescribed periods of training".35 (An army analysis
indicates that of all the men added to the two units, 23 had served for two months or less,
while 172 had served for twelve months or more.)36 These 120 men amounted to about
six per cent of the whole force dispatched. The Commissioner concluded that the fact that
this small number of men fell short, in varying degrees, of the accepted standard of
training at the time when the force sailed, did not detrimentally affect its fighting
efficiency. There is no reason to disagree with this finding. The total proportion was
small, the majority of these men had been trained for the greater part of the period
prescribed, and a young soldier learns his duties more rapidly as a member of a field unit
than in a training centre. And all the men concerned had opportunities for improving their
training to some extent before the war with Japan began on 7 December.*
*The greenest men in the force were three who had only 38 days' service when it sailed, and 78 days at the time of the
Japanese attack.37
The Training and Equipment of the

Expeditionary Force
A more important question is that of the general state of training of the battalions that
went to Hong Kong.
The Royal Rifles had completed basic training before going to Newfoundland. In the
island the battalion was at first divided, but in the spring of 1941 it was concentrated as a
unit at St. John's and thereafter was in a position to train somewhat more effectively.
Company exercises were frequent, but the unit's records indicate that it had little chance
to exercise as a battalion in mobile warfare. Range facilities in Newfoundland were not
very good, but there was considerable firing with both rifle and Bren gun, and T.O.E.Ts.
(Tests of Elementary Training) were carried out for both weapons.38
The Winnipeg Grenadiers had made respectable progress before being sent to
Jamaica. All personnel had "been taught to use the rifle and carried out T.O.E.T."39 The
majority of men had fired the rifle classification before going to the West Indies. In
Jamaica, where the unit was under British authority, hardly any ammunition for training
could be spared at this period, but a few more men classified there. After the battalion
had been warned for Hong Kong, the St. Charles ranges at Winnipeg were set aside for it
for one week and some 600 men fired "a course with rifles at various ranges".40 Its duties
in Jamaica had kept the unit busy and scattered, and there is no record of any tactical
exercises on the battalion level. A 'useful programme of field training had been carried
out at Montpelier Camp, one company at a time.41
Both units' training had been considerably hampered, as was generally the case at this
moment, by deficiencies in certain types of arms and ammunition. This was particularly
the case with respect to mortars and anti-tank weapons. The Royal Rifles in
Newfoundland had 3-inch mortars, but no ammunition, and only one 2-inch mortar for
instructional purposes. Before leaving Newfoundland the unit received four Thompson
machine carbines, but no ammunition. It had no Boys anti-tank riffles, and grenade-
throwing was practised with dummies, no live grenades being available for training. The
Winnipeg Grenadiers in Jamaica had anti-tank rifles for instruction, but no ammunition;
they had no 2-inch mortars, and although 3-inch mortars were available, again there was
no ammunition for training. Of these deficiencies, that preventing adequate 3-inch mortar
training was probably the most serious in practice.42
Writing on 15 November from the transport that carried the greater part
of the force across the Pacific, Brigadier Lawson made this report on his men's state of
training:43
H.Q. Details-These appear to have been well selected. They are keen, anxious to work, well
behaved and so far as can be judged on board ship, are well trained.
Units - Both units contain excellent material and a number of good instructors. Having been
employed most of their time since mobilization on coast defence duties, neither has done much field
training, even of sub-units.
Neither has completed its T.O.E.T.s for infantry weapons since many of these have not previously
been available for them.*
Despite the crowded situation on board ship training has been carried out regularly since the 30th
October, time prior to that being required for re-organization of battalions on their new establishments,
assimilation of new men, changes in administrative arrangements on board ship, drawing of Khaki drill,
etc.
Emphasis has been laid on physical training, weapon training, P.A.G. [protection against gas] and
such specialist training as could be carried out... .
The two battalions had clearly not reached that advanced state of training which one
would wish troops to attain before being sent against the enemy. The lack of range
practice for the Grenadiers in Jamaica is particularly striking, though compensated for in
some degree by the week of intensive work at Winnipeg. The absence of tactical
exercises at battalion level, the result of the nature of the units' duties in Newfoundland
and Jamaica, is noticeable. But to say baldly that they were "untrained" is to give a quite
wrong impression. And it must constantly be kept in mind that both British and Canadian
authorities believed that the troops were going to Hong Kong for garrison duty, and (in
the light of the Dominions Office cable of 19 September) there seemed every reason to
anticipate a considerable period during which any training deficiencies could be
remedied.
There were no troops in Canada in the autumn of 1941 which can be said to have
attained a really high standard of field training. To obtain two battalions whose training
was clearly equal to immediate battle, it would have been necessary to bring back units
from the Corps in Britain.f But the British authorities had specifically asked for battalions
"from Canada" and had emphasized in a cable of 9 October the importance of their
moving "at a very early date".44 It was out of the question to send units from England,
nor did the circumstances as known in London and Ottawa at the time indicate that such
action was necessary.
The units, having been completed with personnel, moved according to schedule. The
Royal Rifles left Valcartier on 23 October and were joined
*Tests of Elementary Training are normally carried out at the end of a soldier's recruit training. Brigadier Lawson's
statement refers specifically only to tests concerning those weapons which the units did not have. We have noted above
that both units had carried out T.O.E.Ts. with the rifle. Both had been adequately supplied with light machine-guns and had
undoubtedly carried out T.O.E.Ts. with this weapon also.
†One could go further and say that, apart from the few divisions actually in contact with the enemy, there were in
1941 no troops in the Commonwealth properly trained as training was understood at a later period of the war. We still had
lot to learn.
at Ottawa the same day by the Headquarters details which had concentrated there. The
Winnipeg Grenadiers left Winnipeg on 25 October. The trains reached Vancouver on the
27th and the men went aboard at once. The bulk of the force embarked on the Awatea,
the British transport provided for the expedition; but four officers and 105 other ranks of
the Royal Rifles were carried in the escorting ship provided by the Royal Canadian Navy,
H.M.C.S. Prince Robert. The ships sailed later the same night.45
There were some deficiencies in both personnel and equipment. A total of 51 men, all
but one belonging to The Winnipeg Grenadiers, were found to be absent without leave.
As the brigade commander pointed out, the Grenadiers were in an exceptionally
unfavourable position, having had an especially large number of men lately posted to the
regiment, and having taken no less than 15 new officers on strength. Both units, he
remarked, "had a number of men who did not know, and were not known by, their
officers". Referring to the absences his report proceeded, "some men never entrained,
others did not reach the port of embarkation, while others who were employed on loading
parties, etc., apparently took the opportunity to absent themselves, the fact that they were
absent not being discovered until after the ship sailed."46
There was an incident at Vancouver before sailing. The Awatea was crowded and
uncomfortable. Lawson reported, "While the officers, W.Os., N.C.Os. and the men
generally realized that conditions would improve, some 30 or 40 men determined to
break ship. They were, however, restrained, force being necessary at one period to do
this. The men implicated, were I understand, without exception, those who had not been
with the unit long enough to get to know, or be known by their officers".47 A report from
the Embarkation Staff Officer at Vancouver describes how "about fifty" men forced their
way "off the gangway into the shed", but were "persuaded by their officers and N.C.O's
to return in a matter of about twenty minutes".48
All told, the actual strength of the force which sailed was 96 officers (plus two
Auxiliary Services supervisors) and 1877 other ranks. This included two medical officers
and two nursing sisters (in addition to regimental medical officers); two officers of the
Canadian Dental Corps with their assistants; three chaplains; and a detachment of the
Canadian Postal Corps. There was in addition one military stowaway, a soldier of the
R.C.A.M.C. who was sent back to Canada in Prince Robert.49
With respect to the force's mechanical transport there was both bad luck and some
inefficiency. Canada was to provide this transport, amounting to a total of 212 vehicles.*
It was out of the question for the Awatea, which
*45 motorcycles, 6 Ford cars, 57 Universal carriers, 63 15-cwt. trucks, 2 15-cwt. water-tanks, and 39 3-ton trucks.50
had little cargo space, to carry more than a few of them, and no other ship was available
to sail simultaneously with the balance. When it came to light that the Awatea could carry
some vehicles, arrangements were made to fill space by loading six carriers, two water-
tanks, and as many 15-cwt. trucks (probably about 12) as there was room for. The
vehicles, however, did not reach Vancouver until 28 and 29 October, when the Awatea
had already sailed. It is not entirely certain that they could have been loaded, even had
they arrived on time, for the ship's captain had indicated that it might be necessary to use
the space for additional oil fuel.51 However, the Royal Commissioner after reviewing the
record was of the opinion that the vehicles could have been loaded and that it should have
been possible to arrange for them to accompany the force. He reported:52 "Had more
energy and initiative been shown by the Quartermaster General's Branch, charged with
the movement of the equipment for the force, the availability of this space would have
been ascertained earlier and the vehicles would have arrived in time for loading on
October 24; and there is, in my opinion, no good reason for thinking that, had they
arrived at that time, they would not have been taken on board."*
The result was that no transport went with the Canadian force, and in the event it
received no Canadian vehicles before it was plunged into action. The whole 212 vehicles
intended for it were loaded on the American freighter Don Jose, which sailed from
Vancouver on 4 November, a week after the force, and in normal circumstances would
have reached Hong Kong about 6 December. Under orders from the United States naval
authorities, this ship was routed by Honolulu and Manila, and reached the latter only on
12 December, after the outbreak of war with Japan.54 On 19 December the War
Committee of the Canadian Cabinet approved diverting the vehicles to the use of the U.S.
forces then struggling to defend the Philippines against the Japanese.
The Canadian force was fully equipped with armament at contemporary scales when
it sailed from Canada, except for anti-tank rifles (of which only two were available) and
ammunition for 2-inch and 3-inch mortars and for signal pistols. The British authorities
had agreed to supply these items at Hong Kong, although the full scale could not be
provided at once.55
Brigadier Lawson had been given a comprehensive directive from the Chief of the
General Staff.56 This authorized him to place himself and his troops "in combination
with" the British forces of the Hong Kong garrison in accordance with the terms of the
Visiting Forces Act (above, page 255) ;
*There were changes in the personnel of the Quartermaster-General's Branch at the Department of National Defence
after the facts came to light but before the Royal Commissioner reported. The Quartermaster General, the Director of
Supplies and Transport, and the A.Q.M.G. (Movement Control) were all retired during the early months of 1942.53
and he was instructed to do so at the time of landing in the colony. He was not to
withdraw his force from combination "other than in circumstances that you judge to be of
compelling necessity, in which case you are to seek further instructions from Canada".
Other portions of the directive ran:
2. Your mission is limited to the reinforcement of the British garrison serving at Hong Kong (including
the Leased Territory) and to participate [sic] to the limit of your strength in the defence of the colony,
should occasion arise requiring you so to do... .
6. In the fulfilment of your mission, you will bear in mind that all matters concerning Military
operations will be dealt with by you through the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, whose
powers in these respects in relation to the Force under your command are exercisable within the
limitations laid down in the Visiting Forces Act (Canada). Insofar as discipline is concerned, the General
Officer Commanding has not, under the Act mentioned, been vested with authority to convene and
confirm the findings and sentences of Court-Martial, in respect of Canadian personnel serving under
your command... .
8. You will keep constantly in mind the fact that you are responsible to the Canadian Government for
the Force under your command. In consequence your channel of authority and communication on all
questions (except those concerning military operations referred to in paragraph 6 of these instructions)
including matters of general policy as well as of transfers, exchanges, recalls and reinforcements, will be
direct to National Defence Headquarters.
9. The general maintenance of your Force will be undertaken by British administrative services in Hong
Kong.
10. You will keep me constantly informed as to your situation generally.
"C" Force, as Brigadier Lawson's force was called, reached Honolulu on 2 November
and Manila on the 14th. At Manila the escort was reinforced by a British cruiser, H.M.S.
Danae; the Admiralty had arranged this "in view of the altered circumstances”57
(presumably the advent of the Tojo government in Japan). On 16 November the
Canadians arrived at Hong Kong and were welcomed by the Governor, Sir Mark Young.
They were given quarters in Sham Shui Po Camp, on the edge of the mainland city of
Kowloon. Secrecy had been maintained until the move was completed; however, since a
major object in sending the force was the moral effect which it was optimistically hoped
its arrival would have in the Far East, an immediate announcement was now made: "A
Canadian Force under the command of Brigadier J. K. Lawson has arrived at Hong Kong
after a safe and uneventful voyage.58
The Development of the Japanese War Plans
Throughout 1941 the Japanese were getting ready for the war with the
Commonwealth, the United States and the Netherlands which would be launched if those
countries failed to acquiesce in Japan's imperialistic designs. Japanese planning has been
carefully investigated since the war. The report

of the United States Joint Congressional Committee on the attack on Pearl Harbor59 is a
very valuable source of information on the whole situation during 1941. More recently
there has been thorough research by American official and semi-official historians60 as
well as by independent scholars.61
The Japanese Imperial Conference of 2 July (above, page 438) decided to adhere to a
programme of southward expansion. Late in July, in the face of strong British and
American representations, the Japanese forced Vichy France to agree to their entering
French IndoChina. This was followed by the "freezing" of Japanese assets in the United
States and Commonwealth countries. On 1 August President Roosevelt imposed what
amounted to an embargo on the export of motor and aircraft oils to Japan. These events
brought decision nearer. In an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on 6 September, the
Emperor used his influence against immediate hostilities, at least; but the Army and Navy
were authorized to prepare for offensive operations.62 Thus, at the time when the British
Government requested Canadian assistance at Hong Kong, the Japanese were actively
getting ready for war; but they had not yet made the decision to commence it and
presumably would not have done so had they found it possible to gain their ends in the
Far East without conflict with Britain and the United States.
While the Canadian expeditionary force was being organized, there was a change of
government in Japan. Prince Konoye had been reluctant to take the responsibility of
making a decision for war. He resigned on 16 October, and on the 18th General Tojo,
formerly War Minister, became Prime Minister.63 (It was mainly the Army that was
forcing the pace.) The new government, it is now clear, was essentially a war
government, and its accession marked a decisive advance in Japanese aggressive policy.
But this was not fully recognized at the time in London, Washington and Ottawa. It is
clear that at first, and for a considerable time, the significance of the change was
misconceived. It is important to establish just what the potential Allies' appreciation of
the situation was during the next few weeks.
The immediate American reaction is represented in a warning64 sent on 16 October to
the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, which ran in part:
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it
will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will
be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U.S. In either
case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held
responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack
these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions. . . .
Similar views were held in London, and continued to be held after Tojo formed his
government. On 21 October General Lee, the American
Military Attache in London, reported65 that he had received comments from the Chief of
"the British Far East Intelligence" as follows:
1. It is thought that Japan will not advance southward, except possibly into Thailand, because of the
danger of becoming embroiled with the United States and Britain, especially in view of the firm stand
taken by the U.S. However, Japanese troops will be strengthened in Indo-China. . . .
2. Agreement among all previously divergent opinions in the army and navy in order to make certain
of their assistance in any future projects launched is one aim of the new cabinet, which is unquestionably
geared for war. The new Premier is wholly pro-German. It is believed that the Japs will advance on
Vladiavostok [sic] and the Maritime Provinces [of Siberia] the minute Soviet disintegration appears
imminent. In the meantime, speeches by the new cabinet should be viewed as obscuring their real
intention. . . .
In other words, British Intelligence accepted the fact that Tojo's was a government of
extremists, but the experts could not yet bring themselves to believe that the war it
contemplated was one against the United States and Britain. They believed that the
Japanese would attack Russia, who had been at grips with Germany since June.
(Actually, the Japanese had set aside all idea of an attack on Russia by the decision of 2
July.)
On 26 October Canadian Military Headquarters, London, sent to the Department of
National Defence a Most Secret telegram66 reporting the latest War Office views of the
war situation generally as obtained in "informal discussion". The Japanese situation was
dealt with as follows:
Situation Japan. (a) Consensus opinion that war in Far East unlikely at present. While no immediate
action by Japan expected, however will be probably more vigorous assertions what she considers her
rights. Japan apparently only prepared at moment to assist Germany by rattling sabre to contain Russian
troops Far East. Japan realises how she can aid Germany but cannot see quite so clearly what Germany
can do for her. (b) Generally considered that when time arrives initial movement of Japanese force will
probably he northerly against Russia and not to south against our forces ....• (c) Factors in favour
northerly expansion by Japanese appear to be, first, presence of Vladivostock within easy bomber range
Japan; second, oil in northern half of Island of Sakhalin; third, fishing rights in Gulf of Perzbinski
[?Penzhinsk]. (d) Strength Japanese forces Canton area three divisions, one independent bde, one-tank
bn. Dispositions follow. Area Canton incl Sunmanfow 104 Div and one tank bn. Area west of Canton
incl Samshui Koming 38 Div and 228 Inf Regt. Area south of Canton incl Sunwui 229 Inf Regt.
Sheklung 18 Div. Tsengshing 23 Inf Bde. Tamshuihu 35 Inf Bde. Japanese frontier force radius 30 miles
Hong Kong strength 3000 with 18 guns. (e) Understand Chinese Government have undertaken to attack
Japanese in rear of Canton if Japs attack Hong Kong. Chinese claim to be prepared to use 10 divisions
for this effort.
This message was sent the day before the Canadian force sailed for Hong Kong. It will be
noted that the War Office did not entirely discount the possibility of a Japanese attack on
the colony, but the opinion is very definite, first that war in the Far East is unlikely at
present, and secondly that when
*Details of Russian and Japanese troop dispositions omitted.

and if Japan does attack she is more likely to turn against Russia than against the British
Commonwealth.
On 5 November Mr. Churchill sent President Roosevelt a personal message67 which
indicates that he did not yet expect immediate war with Japan. The italics have been
supplied:
. . . What we need now is a deterrent of the most general and formidable character. The Japanese
have as yet taken no final decision, and the Emperor appears to be exercising restraint. When we talked
about this at Argentia you spoke of gaining time, and this policy has been brilliantly successful so far.
But our joint embargo is steadily forcing the Japanese to decisions for peace or war . . .
No independent action by ourselves will deter Japan because we are so much tied up elsewhere.
But of course we will stand with you and do our utmost to back you in whatever course you choose. I
think, myself, that Japan is more likely to drift into war than to plunge in....
Such were the views held on the highest level in . London when Brigadier Lawson and
his-men were in mid-Pacific on their way to Hong Kong. It is clear that the Royal
Commissioner was fully justified in expressing the opinion "that nothing occurred
between September 29 and October 27 that would have furnished any cogent reason" for
Canada's withdrawing from the responsibility she had taken up.*
At the beginning of November (the precise date does not appear) the Japanese Army
and Navy arrived at a "Central Agreement"70 for their tremendous campaign of cold-
blooded aggression. Nothing less was intended than the occupation of "the Philippines,
Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, the Bismarcks, Java, Sumatra, Borneo,
Celebes, Timor"; and as is well known the whole programme was duly carried out.
On 5 November the Japanese government decided to make war if a settlement with
the United States had not been reached by 25 November. The same day the Chief of the
Naval General Staff ordered Admiral Yamamoto, Commander of the Combined Fleet, "in
view of the fact that it is feared war has become unavoidable with the United States,
Great Britain, and the Netherlands," to complete "the various preparations for war
operations . . . by the first part of December". Yamamoto instantly issued Combined Fleet
Operation Order No. 1, which had been in readiness.71 While
*During the public discussions later there were repeated references to half-a-dozen secret cables from the Dominions
Office to the Department of External Affairs. These have been examined by the present writer. They were commentaries on
the international situation, and the United Kingdom Government found itself unable to agree to a Canadian suggestion that
they be published, the reason being that such telegrams "are framed on the basis that they will not be published and the
whole system of full and frank communication between His Majesty's Governments would be prejudiced if telegrams of
this nature had to be prepared on the basis that this rule might not eventually be observed" 68 The British Prime Minister
confirmed however that none of the messages contained any warning that "early hostile action by Japan against the United
Kingdom or the United States was expected".69 The reader of the foregoing paragraphs will have realized that there is no
need of these telegrams to establish that no such expectation was entertained in London. They merely provide additional
confirmation of a situation which is made quite clear in published papers.
thus whetting the dagger, Japan was still busy on the diplomatic front. On 15 November a
special Japanese ambassador, Saburo Kurusu, arrived in Washington. It would seem that he
had a dual role. He was to make a final effort to induce the Americans to accept Japan's
terms; there was still time to halt the war machine if Japan could gain her ends without
fighting. At the same time, Kurusu's presence in Washington would serve to distract
American attention from the military movements and help to ensure a successful surprise
attack. The United States Government was far from completely deceived. Its experts had
broken the Japanese ciphers, and wireless messages addressed to the Japanese ambassadors
were frequently on the American Secretary of State's desk before they reached those for
whom they were intended. Mr. Hull knew, accordingly, that a message dated 5 November
had set the 25th of the month as the last day by which an agreement could be completed.
On 22 November another intercepted message extended the deadline to the 29th and added,
"After that things are automatically going to happen".72
On 1 December another Imperial Conference in Tokyo, at which the Emperor sat
silent, took the final irrevocable decision to commence hostilities. The same day the
Chief of the Naval General Staff sent to the C.-in-C. Combined Fleet the following
message:
Japan under the necessity of her self-preservation, has reached a decision to declare war on the
United States of America, British Empire, and the Netherlands. Time to start action will be announced
later....
The naval task force that was to attack Pearl Harbor was already at sea.73
Not until the first week of November did the British and American governments
begin to believe that an immediate attack by Japan upon themselves was likely.
Following the interception of the first "deadline" message, Mr. Hull, at a Cabinet meeting
in Washington on 7 November, delivered a warning concluding with these words: "In my
opinion, relations are extremely critical. We should be on the lookout for a military attack
by Japan anywhere at any time."74 This may be said to indicate the onset of really acute
apprehension.
At the beginning of November the British in the Far East were still sanguine. A
"combined situation report" produced by Intelligence at Hong Kong and dated 1
November expressed the view that visible Japanese preparations were "more likely part
of a general tightening up to concert pitch rather than the final touches before plunging
off the deep end". But about 20 November Japanese military movements suggesting the
possibility of early attack began to be apparent to British and American intelligence
staffs. On 22 November the British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, made an appreciation
which reflects an increasing sense of the danger of such
attack. The same day, precautions were taken; in particular, air reinforcements were sent
to Northern Malaya.75 Only at the end of the month, however, did G.H.Q. at Singapore
come to believe that Japan "might be actually on the verge of starting war". On l.
December G.H.Q. ordered "No. 2 degree of readiness" and the volunteer forces in the
British colonies were mobilized.76 The British there and in London, who had long
viewed the prospect with considerable optimism, now had somewhat less doubt of the
real facts,* and when the attack came a week later it did not take them by surprise.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the actual Japanese orders for their stealthy
attack were not issued until after "C" Force had sailed from Canada, and that the British
authorities in the Far East did not become convinced that attack was really probable until
about a fortnight after Brigadier Lawson's force arrived at Hong Kong.
The Defences of Hong Kong
The Crown Colony of Hong Kong consists of Hong Kong Island, off the coast of
China, south-east of the city of Canton; the adjacent mainland peninsula of Kowloon; and
beyond Kowloon the "New Territories", which are leased to the British Crown. The total
area is 410 square miles. The island itself has an area of about 29 square miles. It is
extremely mountainous. The strait separating island from mainland is less than half a
mile wide at its narrowest point, the Lye Mun Passage at the island's north-east corner.
The Colony's population early in 1941 was 1,500,000, the vast majority being Chinese,
many of them refugees from the Japanese aggression which had been in progress in
China since 1931.
Hong Kong was the headquarters and base of the Royal Navy's China station, and
had always been a "defended port" of some strength. The Washington treaties of 1922,
however, had included an agreement to maintain the status quo in matters of fixed
defences in this part of the Pacific. This agreement lapsed only in 1937, and while it was
in force the British authorities were precluded from increasing the armament of Hong
Kong. In 1935-36, however, they undertook a programme of modernizing and
reorganizing the existing armament. By December 1941 the 9.2-inch guns forming the
backbone of this armament had been re-sited (three on Mount Davis, three at the south-
eastern point of Stanley Peninsula, and two at the point of Cape D'Aguilar); some had
been given higher-angle mountings.77 The main concern
*Nevertheless, the last combined situation report prepared by the Intelligence staffs at Hong Kong, dated 1
December, observes that it is still doubtful "if war has actually been decided on": "The danger is rather that Japan may drift
into war by continuing her present foreign policy which is bound to lead to a conflict with. the Democratic Powers sooner
or later."
was still resistance to seaborne attack.* But by July 1939 the War Office in London was
planning on the assumption that the Japanese, being now well placed on the adjacent
Chinese mainland, were henceforth less likely to attack the colony from the sea.78
In December 1941, when war came in the Far East, the fixed defences of Hong Kong
mounted eight 9.2-inch guns, fifteen 6-inch, two 4.7-inch, and four 4-inch. The mobile
artillery was largely extemporized and included none of the latest types, the guns being
twelve 6-inch howitzers, four 60-pounders, and eight 4.5-inch and eight 3.7-inch
howitzers. There were also six 18-pounders and four 2-pounders for beach defence. The
"approved scale" of anti-aircraft defence for the Colony was 32 heavy and 30 light guns,
of which, however, only 14 heavy and two light guns (plus two naval guns) were on
hand; four heavy and eight light guns were en route but never arrived. Two of the heavy
guns were 4.5-inch and four were 3.7-inch, the others being of earlier models. There was
no radar equipment.79 In view of the absence of air support, this weakness of the anti-
aircraft artillery was particularly unfortunate. In justice to the British authorities,
however, it must be noted that in October, immediately after the final decision was taken
to reinforce the Colony, the War Office cancelled an existing ruling forbidding the C.-in-
C. Far East to allocate additional A.A. guns to Hong Kong. He was authorized on 13
October to send any guns he could; but none arrived before the Japanese attack.80
By the time of the attack, all major naval vessels had been withdrawn to European
waters or south to Singapore. The largest vessel remaining under the Commodore Hong
Kong (Commodore A. C. Collinson) was the old destroyer Thracian; two other
destroyers were sailed for Singapore the day of the attack. There were also several
gunboats and a flotilla of motor torpedo boats.81 A worse weakness was the colony's
total lack of air support. At its single airfield, at Kai Tak on the mainland, there was only
"a station flight . . . for target towing purposes for which no war role was envisaged apart
from local reconnaissance; the aircraft here were two Walrus amphibians and three
Vildebeeste torpedo bombers.82 The nearest R.A.F. station was Kota Bharu in Malaya,
nearly 1400 miles away to the south-west. With Japan comparatively near, and Japanese
forces in Formosa and on the Chinese mainland, this isolation was the insuperable factor
in Hong Kong's strategic situation. British planners nevertheless considered that it should
be able to hold out for a long time. We have seen General Grasett's views and noted that
reserve supplies for 130 days were now maintained at the fortress.83
*The fortress guns were able to engage landward targets (General. Maltby records that "calculations to hit one
hundred points" had been worked out in peacetime), but the events of the siege were to show that the quantity of suitable
ammunition available for this sort of shooting (25 rounds per gun) was inadequate.
The G.O.C. Hong Kong, Major-General C. M. Maltby, an Indian Army officer who
had succeeded General Grasett in July 1941, had under his command for the defence of
the Colony a total force, including the Canadians, of some 14,000 all ranks.* This
however includes many non-combatants (nursing sisters, St. John Ambulance Brigade,
etc., etc.) and also includes Naval and R.A.F. personnel. Maltby later estimated the
maximum strength in actual "fighting troops" at 11,000.84 The military force included
the 8th and 12th Coast Regiments and 5th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (all
three containing many Indian personnel); the 1st Hong Kong Regiment, Hong Kong and
Singapore Royal Artillery (Indian troops with British officers); the 965th Defence
Battery, R.A. (also including many Indians), which manned the beach-defence guns; and
the 22nd and 40th Fortress Companies, Royal Engineers, many of whose personnel were
Chinese.
There was one battalion of British infantry (the 2nd Battalion, Royal Scots); one
British machine-gun battalion (the 1st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment); and two Indian
infantry battalions (the 5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 14th
Punjab Regiment). The Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps included units of artillery,
infantry and other arms, and was to do most gallant and useful work during the defence.
Counting non-combatants, the whole force amounted to 8919 British, Canadian and
Colonial personnel, 4402 Indians, and 660 Chinese.85 The garrison was thus
extraordinarily mixed in its composition; in the words of the "C" Force report, it was
"hardly a combination likely to make an efficient fighting force". Its training likewise
showed some deficiencies. Of the Canadians we have already spoken. The other
battalions also suffered from shortages of special weapons and ammunition similar to
those which had affected the Canadian training. General Maltby writes in his Dispatch:86
It was unfortunate that the equipment situation in other theatres of war had not permitted earlier
despatch of the garrison's infantry mortars and ammunition. For instance, the worst case, the 2/14
Punjab Regt. had had one 3 in. mortar demonstration, of a few rounds only, but ammunition in any
appreciable quantity did not arrive until November and then only 70 rounds per battalion both for war
and for practice. Hence these mortars were fired and registered for the first time in their battle positions
and twelve hours later were in action against the enemy.
The 2 in. mortar situation was worse, for there had been no receipt even of dummies, consequently
the men had had no instruction in detonating. There had been no preliminary shooting and the 2 in.
mortar ammunition was delivered actually in battle.
Surviving officers of the Canadian units are generally of the opinion that those units'
battleworthiness was not inferior to that of the others of the garrison.87
*A very detailed list in the report of Headquarters, "C" Force gives a total of 13,981 all ranks. Air Chief Marshal
Brooke-Popham's despatch gives the approximate strength as 14,564.
The Royal Scots had been at Hong Kong since January 1938 and the Middlesex
Regiment since August 1937. General Maltby remarks in his dispatch that the former had
had a high incidence of sickness, including much malaria. The Rajput Regiment had
arrived in June 1937 and the Punjab Regiment in November 1940.88 The Canadians, of
course, landed only three weeks before war began. It was unfortunate that the last troops
to reach Hong Kong did not have more time to become familiar with the rest of the
garrison as well as with their battlefield.
The Hong Kong Defence Plan
The defence of Hong Kong was necessarily planned in two successive phases: a
delaying action in the mainland territories, followed (assuming that the attack was
pressed by large forces) by a prolonged defence of Hong Kong Island. As we have seen,
the British had considered for some time past that attack from the direction of the
mainland was likely; General Maltby nevertheless records89 that throughout the siege he
anticipated a landing on the southern shores of the island which never came to pass. The
Commanderin-Chief in the Far East* (Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham)
emphasizes that the plan was to conduct the main defence on the island. "Whilst the
enemy were to be delayed as long as possible in any advance over the leased territory on
the mainland, the troops had orders to retire if attacked in force, as they were required for
the defence of the Island itself".91
Until the impending arrival of the Canadian battalions was reported, the intention was
to employ on the mainland only one infantry battalion, its task being "to cover a
comprehensive scheme of demolitions and to act as a delaying force".92 An "Interim
Defence Scheme" prepared in 1939 noted that in these circumstances little resistance
could be offered on the mainland, as the battalion there was required for the defence of
the island and it was essential that it withdraw without serious loss. There was, however,
provision for a delaying action astride the Devil's Peak peninsula.93 Sir Robert Brooke-
Popham in his submission of 18 January 1941 (above, page 439) wrote, "From personal
reconnaissance on the spot and full discussion with the Service heads concerned, I came
to the conclusion that one Battalion on the mainland could only offer a slight resistance
and that its evacuation to the Island might have to take place in 48 hours, but that if the
one battalion could be multiplied by three the period of resistance would in all probability
be multiplied by six." The news about the Canadians enabled General Maltby to change
his plan and adopt a defence scheme "which had
*The C.-in-C. Far East, with Headquarters at Singapore, exercised `operational control and general direction of
training"90 over Army and Air forces in Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong. The naval forces in his area were not under his
command.
been originally outlined in 1937" but had "never been fully practised" as there had never
been enough troops available. It envisaged employing three infantry battalions on the
mainland, holding a prepared position known officially as the Inner Line, but more
commonly, from the fact that its left flank rested on Gin Drinkers Bay, as the Gin
Drinkers Line. This line, some ten-and-a-half miles long, was "sited on very commanding
country" but had very little depth.94 The one-battalion plan had provided merely for
holding rear guard positions astride the "main defiles" on it.95 Before the Canadians
actually arrived, detailed reconnaissances had been made and "the exact defence plan" for
holding the Gin Drinkers Line worked out. Maltby writes, "A considerable amount of
work was found to be necessary, for (except for the centre sector) the line was in its
partially completed form of three years previously, when the general policy of defence
was altered and the Gin Drinkers Line abandoned". A few days before the Canadians'
arrival large working parties were provided by the three battalions now to be deployed on
the mainland, and a little later the battalions occupied their sectors permanently to push
the work on faster.
General Maltby believed that if he had time to develop the Gin Drinkers Line, and if
the enemy did not launch a major offensive, this position would protect Kowloon, the
harbour and the northern part of Hong Kong Island from artillery fire from the land. In
the event of a major attack, moreover, he hoped that the prepared mainland positions
would ensure enough time to complete demolitions on the mainland, clear vital supplies
from mainland to island, and sink shipping in the harbour. He records that he saw no
reason why he should not be able to resist on the mainland for seven days or more.96
The Gin Drinkers Line consisted of entrenchments reinforced at intervals by concrete
pillboxes. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham observed in his post-war dispatch, with perhaps
some slight exaggeration, that although the line was naturally strong and much work had
been done on it, "it would have required two divisions or more to hold properly".97 As it
was, Maltby, with his three battalions, planned to hold it with a system of "platoon
localities", the gaps between these being "covered by fire by day and by patrolling at
night". All the battalions were in the line, and only the Royal Scots, on the left, could
spare a company for local reserve; the 2/14 Punjab's fourth rifle company was forward as
advanced troops, the 5/7 Rajput's, though not in the line, was earmarked as brigade
reserve.98 Maltby deployed in support of the Mainland Brigade a considerable part of his
mobile artillery (one troop of 6-inch and one of 4.5-inch howitzers, and two troops of
3.7s).99
The G.O.C. chose for the mainland the three battalions which had been some time
under his command: the 5/7 Rajput Regiment as right battalion, the 2/14 Punjab
Regiment in the centre and the 2nd Royal Scots on the left. These units were organized
into a Mainland Brigade commanded
by Lt.-Col. C. Wallis, Indian Army, who was given the local rank of Brigadier. Under the
new arrangements, Brigadier Lawson on his arrival took command of the Island Brigade,
composed of the two Canadian battalions and the 1st Middlesex Regiment. The latter
unit's task was to hold the system of concrete pillboxes (numbered from 1 to 72) which
had been constructed around the island's shores. The Canadian signal section was allotted
to the Mainland Brigade.100 Such was the defence scheme in which the Canadians took
their places.
As we have seen, although the Canadian units' battle stations were on the island, they
were quartered on the mainland. During the three weeks between their arrival and the
outbreak of war they were busy. The first few days were occupied with "smartening up
drill to offset effects of voyage" and administrative arrangements, but also with
reconnaissance by all officers and N.C.Os. down to section commanders of the terrain
which the plan required them to defend. Some weapon training was also done.101 The
following week the units were exercised in occupying their action stations. Brigadier
Lawson's report for the week ending 29 November ran in part, `Battalions have carried
out two 48-hour manning exercises each for approximately 50% of strength. Those not
manning continued weapon training".102 Throughout this training period at Hong Kong,
special emphasis was placed upon mastery of infantry weapons.103
Beginning on 1 December, an actual "partial manning" was undertaken, evidently as
the result of the apprehension of war. In each battalion, one platoon of each company
plus some details from battalion headquarters and from the headquarters company took
up their positions. They would normally have been relieved by other platoons after a
week, but when relief was due war appeared so imminent that they were left where they
were.104
The Canadian battalions' task under the defence scheme was static: beach defence, to
counter that landing from the sea which Maltby expected. The Winnipeg Grenadiers were
allotted the south-west sector of the island, the Royal Rifles the south-east one. As a
result of the reconnaissances (which were carried out both by car and by motor launch)
and the exercises, the units, when the attack came, had some knowledge of the difficult
terrain over which they had to fight, though much less of course than they would have
had at a later time. But since there was no attack from the sea, they were ultimately
employed in a role quite different from that for which their brief training at Hong Kong
was designed to fit them. They did considerable actual fighting in the general areas
assigned to them in the original plan; but it took the form of mobile warfare against an
enemy advancing across the island from the direction of the mainland.
The transport situation was difficult, for military transport generally was
short at Hong Kong* and as we have seen the Canadians' own vehicles never arrived. In
the first instance, during the training period, only half a dozen trucks per battalion were
available for them.106 After the outbreak of war, civilian vehicles were requisitioned, but
the supply was never adequate, particularly since many were driven by Chinese who were
prone to desertion and sometimes sabotaged the vehicles as well. It is recorded that the
Royal Rifles never had more than 12 trucks at one time, but the Grenadiers "operated
over 30 vehicles" which served brigade headquarters as well as the battalion.107 The
Royal Scots lent each Canadian battalion one universal carrier for training purposes.
These were retained after war broke out and were the only carriers the Canadians had,108
apart from some belonging to units of the Volunteer Defence Corps which were attached.
Since the rugged terrain restricted any kind of vehicle movement largely to the roads, the
lack of these tracked vehicles was not particularly keenly felt; but the shortage of trucks
for moving men from place to place meant unnecessary fatigue for the troops, who had to
move on foot, and slowed our tactical movements.109 The dozen trucks which ought to
have been loaded on the A watea would not in themselves have improved this situation
very much; but the arrival of the general body of Canadian transport loaded on the Don
Jose would have helped the defenders a great deal.
As for the general equipment situation, it will be recalled that the battalions left
Canada almost fully equipped, the only important deficiencies being anti-tank rifles and
mortar ammunition. The Royal Rifles' war diary records that 3-inch mortar bombs were
drawn on 4 December. The G.O.C. signalled the War Office on 24 November that the
anti-tank rifles available at Hong Kong would be redistributed throughout his command,
and this was done. These weapons, however, were of little use in the operations.110'
The Japanese Attack Begins
The operations at Hong Kong present the historian with a difficult task. There are
almost no strictly contemporary records on either side. The "war diaries" and "reports"
which must be used as the basis of the narrative of the defence were compiled months if
not years after the events, in Japanese prison camps, under the most difficult conditions
and almost entirely from memory. In these circumstances discrepancies and differences
of opinion are inevitable. British and Canadian versions of the same event sometimes
differ, nor do individuals of the same nation by any means always agree. The information
available from the Japanese side is incomplete and defective. Faced with this intractable
material, the chronicler can only do his best. The
*General Maltby lists as one of the major disabilities of his force "the lack of regular transport driven by disciplined
drivers".105
narrative which follows is the writer's own interpretation of evidence which is often
unsatisfactory. Some of those who were there will doubtless not agree with it.
It has been made clear above that although the British authorities in the Far East did
not become convinced that war was probable until a late date (if indeed-they ever became
fully convinced), the Japanese nevertheless did not succeed in surprising them. At Hong
Kong, every battle position was manned and ready for action. It is very evident, however,
that the energy and skill with which the enemy delivered his sudden stroke were greater
than the local British command had expected.
The Japanese plan called for virtually simultaneous attacks at widelyseparated points.
The blow struck by carrier-borne aircraft at the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii, was only one enterprise of many. The same day saw attacks on Northern Malaya,
the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, and Hong Kong. The first bomb fell on Pearl Harbor
at 7:55 a.m. on 7 December, Hawaiian time - which is 12:15 p.m. on the same date by
Ottawa time, and 1:25 a.m. on 8 December by Hong Kong time.* The attacks on the
other objectives followed hour by hour as the daylight, moving westward, showed their
targets to the Japanese airmen. Both the Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong attacks were
delivered not long after dawn; but the former thus preceded the latter by over six hours.
We now know that on 6 November the General Commanding the Japanese China
Expeditionary Army had been sent orders to prepare to attack Hong Kong, in cooperation
with the Navy, with a force of which the 38th Division under the direction of the
commander of the Twenty-Third Army "would form the core".111 The operations had
been referred to in the "Central Agreement"112 between the Japanese Navy and Army in
the following terms:
Hong Kong Operations.

One group of 23d Army, and 2d China Fleet as nuclear force.
Annihilate local enemy shipping, assault enemy positions on the Kowloon Peninsula, occupy Hong
Kong. After completion of the occupation, the group above will be assembled as the group to occupy the
Netherlands East Indies.
Although Allied estimates of the military force employed against Hong Kong run as
high as three divisions, it is clear from the Japanese sources now availablet that it was
only one reinforced infantry division. The
*All dates and times in the account that follows are those of Hong Kong unless otherwise noted.
†The basic source is a narrative prepared by Japanese officers under the direction of the United States occupation
authorities in Tokyo, and kindly made available by those authorities. This "First Demobilization Bureau" account is based
partly on documents (it contains many direct quotations, or what appear to be direct quotations) and partly on personal
recollections. Many of the original Japanese documents are stated to have been destroyed by bombing or otherwise and
their sense "reconstructed from memory"; though it is indicated that use has been made of papers preserved by individual
Japanese officers. There is much more detail on
BLANK PAGE
Twenty-Third Army (which in western military parlance would have been called a Corps)
was the formation operating about Canton. It was commanded by Lieut.-General Takashi
Sakai. Before the outbreak of war in the Far East, it was composed of three divisions, one
independent mixed brigade and two infantry regiments (equivalent to Canadian brigades).
In the autumn of 1941 it was given another division.113
The force assigned to the capture of Hong Kong, as already indicated, was the 38th
Division, commanded by Lieut.-General Sano Tadayoshi, with Major-General Ito Takeo
as infantry commander under him. The division was composed of the normal three
infantry regiments, the 228th (Colonel Doi Teihichi), the 229th (Colonel Tanaka
Ryosaburo) and the 230th (Colonel Shoji Toshishige). It had the usual units of artillery,
engineers, signals, etc.114 For the Hong Kong operations it was strongly reinforced with
additional troops. The translated Japanese accounts of the order of battle are difficult to
interpret, but there was a large force of artillery, apparently the whole of the Army
Artillery of the Twenty-Third Army. This included a Siege Unit which is listed as
consisting of a heavy artillery regiment armed with 15-centimetre howitzers, two
independent heavy artillery battalions armed with 24-centimetre (9.4-inch) howitzers, and
an independent mortar battalion. Special engineer units (including a landing craft unit)
and transportation units were provided. In addition, the division was assisted by the
"Araki Detachment", consisting of the 66th Infantry Regiment (three battalions) with an
artillery battalion and other troops attached.115 This force did not take part in the attack
on Hong Kong, but had the task of covering the besieging troops against possible
interference by the Chinese. A considerable air force was assigned to co-operate with the
38th Division under command of the Twenty-Third Army. It consisted116 of three
independent air squadrons, three reconnaissance "planes" and a light bomber regiment.
The plan of attack was simple. The Japanese were well aware of the existence of the
Gin Drinkers Line and expected that the main opposition
the plans than on the operation itself. The shortcomings of this source are evident. We also have, however, the records of
the interrogation of senior officers (Ito, Tanaka and Shoji) by the British authorities, some other papers based on
interrogations, and an account written by Doi on the basis of his diary and recollections; and these independent accounts
support the general authenticity of the First Demobilization Bureau narrative. This narrative is designated "Japanese
Studies in World War II, No. 71 (Operation Record of China Theater) Vol. II". The Hong Kong portion is Chapter 3,
Section 3. There are some other similar Japanese narratives, but this is the most important.
*This is the version given in the text of the main First Demobilization Bureau narrative. The order of battle tables
accompanying it gave rather different details. In some matters of minor detail this narrative contradicts itself. A narrative of
air operations (included in "Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 76") states that the force directly cooperating with the
Twenty-Third Army was "an air unit with one light bomber regiment as its nucleus (about 40 planes)", and that a heavy
bomber regiment (18 planes) went into action on 16 December. It seems probable that the latter unit continued to take part
until the surrender, but this is not specifically stated.
encountered would be along it. They proposed to move immediately after news arrived
that their operation in Malaya had definitely begun, attacking across the boundary with
the 228th and 230th Regiments and three mountain artillery battalions, grouped under
General Ito, on the right, and the 229th Regiment on the left. They would press forward
to the Gin Drinkers Line, and organize a major attack to break through it. Having cleared
the Kowloon peninsula, they would prepare to attack Hong Kong. The plan was to land
on the northern side of the island "and from there enlarge our gains.117 To facilitate this
they proposed to stage an important demonstration against the southern beaches to lead
the British to expect a landing there. They intended to make free use of landing craft to
turn the British flanks during the operations in the Kowloon Peninsula.118
On 6 December, Headquarters China Command at Hong Kong issued a "warning of
impending war" and ordered all officers to keep in touch with their units.119 On the
morning of the 7th, the entire garrison was ordered to war stations.120 The Canadian
units were ferried across from Kowloon to the island, and by five in the afternoon they
had manned their battle positions overlooking the south shore and Brigadier Lawson's
headquarters had been set up in a group of shelters provided for the purpose at Wong Nei
Chong Gap, in the middle of the island. Even on this day, General Maltby sent an
optimistic appreciation to the War Office, expressing the view that reports of Japanese
concentrations near the frontier were "certainly exaggerated" and had been fostered by
the Japanese "to cover up their numerical weakness in South China". But he took no
chances, and his garrison's dispositions were completed some fifteen hours before the
first shot was fired.121
At 4:45 a.m. on 8 December Intelligence at Hong Kong reported that Tokyo had
broadcast a warning to the Japanese people that war was imminent. Maltby's headquarters
immediately sent orders to "blow" the obstructive demolitions on the frontier, and at 6:45
the garrison was warned that war had begun.122 Pearl Harbor had been attacked about
five hours before. The first blow at Hong Kong followed immediately. At about 8:00 a.m.
there was a heavy and skilful attack by 48 Japanese aircraft.* All the very few R.A.F.
machines at Kai Tak aerodrome were either damaged or detroyed, as were a number of
civil planes. The nearly-empty camp at Sham Shui Po was also bombed, causing the first
Canadian casualties, two men of the Royal Canadian Signals wounded.123
From an early hour on 8 December the Japanese ground forces were moving across
the frontier of the New Territories and were in touch with the British forward troops (a
company of the 2/14 Punjab with some armoured
*General Maltby writes in his dispatch, "The efficiency of the enemy air force was probably the greatest
surprise to me."
cars and carriers). These troops fell back towards the Gin Drinkers Line, inflicting
casualties and concentrating upon ensuring that the demolitions were carried out. In
general, this is said to have been effected, although General Maltby writes, "some failed
to provide the measure of delaying action anticipated".124 Actually, the Japanese seem to
have been very little discommoded. At dawn on the 9th the British forward troops were
on Monastery Ridge, just in advance of the Gin Drinkers Line. That evening they
withdrew into the Line in accordance with orders.125
The Loss of the Gin Drinkers Line and

the Withdrawal to the Island
The Japanese, expecting serious trouble with the Gin Drinkers Line, had planned a
pause before it during which they would "make preparations for a major attack". It is
stated that orders issued on the morning of the 9th defined the main point of attack as the
high ground south-west of Jubilee Reservoir, and the preparations were to be completed
"within a week". However, "the operations progressed much faster than anticipated".126
The most important position on the left flank of the Gin Drinkers Line was Shing
Mun Redoubt, on the north end of Smuggler's Ridge, directly overlooking the Reservoir-
the high ground which the Japanese had seen as their chief objective. It was held by a
platoon of the Royal Scots, who also had a company headquarters there. On the afternoon
of 9 December Colonel Doi, commanding the Japanese 228th Regiment, who had had the
forethought to obtain the divisional commander's concurrence in his exploiting any
opportunities that might arise, went forward with a small party to reconnoitre this area.
He says he formed the impression that the British were not expecting an early attack.
Although the position was in the 230th Regiment's sector, he accordingly ordered a night
attack led by his 3rd Battalion, which assaulted Shing Mun Redoubt about midnight. For
some time there was fierce fighting, both in underground tunnels and on the surface; but
the redoubt fell into Japanese hands.127
This was a disaster. General Maltby writes, "The capture by surprise of this key
position, which dominated a large portion of the left flank and the importance of which
had been so frequently stressed beforehand, directly and gravely affected subsequent
events and prejudiced Naval, Military and Civil defence arrangements." The surprise was
doubtless facilitated by the fact that the British had believed that "Japanese night work
was poor".128 This had now been proved to be the reverse of the truth. Maltby discussed
with Brigadier Wallis "the possibility of mounting an immediate counterattack", but this
was ruled out "as the nearest troops were a mile away, the
ground precipitous and broken, and the exact situation round the Redoubt very
obscure".129 No attempt was made to use the Royal Scots' reserve company (above, page
459) and no counter-attack was made against Shing Mun Redoubt then or later. The
G.O.C., however, ordered an artillery concentration to be put down upon it in the early
hours of 10 December. Earlier, as soon as it was clear that the Redoubt was gone, he
decided to send to the mainland "D" Company of The Winnipeg Grenadiers, which was
at Wong Nei Chong Gap as reserve for the Island Brigade. The company, placed at
Wallis's disposal, was in position at his headquarters early in the morning. ' It stood by in
Kowloon throughout 10 December.130
The Japanese command disapproved of Doi's initiative, which was considered
irregular, and he testifies that in spite of the precaution he had taken before the attack he
was actually ordered to withdraw from the Redoubt! He declined to do so and about noon
of the 10th- obtained his superiors' consent to remain. But no further major attack was
made that day. Early on the morning of 11 December the Japanese attacked the Royal
Scots' left flank, driving them back some distance and "exposing the junction of the
Castle Peak and Taipo Roads",131 thus endangering the withdrawal of the troops on the
right of the line.* The situation was critical, and General Maltby moved up the Winnipeg
Grenadiers company and a Bren carrier force from Kai Tak aerodrome to cover the
gap.132 During the afternoon the Grenadiers' forward platoons exchanged shots with the
Japanese and came under intermittent shellfire, but there was no heavy engagement and
apparently no Canadian casualties.133 The Japanese give no details of this day, merely
observing that, encouraged by their unexpected success at Shing Mun, they attacked on
the 11th and "easily" broke through the British line.134 The Gin Drinkers position was
now hopelessly compromised, and in consequence, at midday on the 11th, Maltby
ordered the mainland troops to withdraw to the island, except for the 5/7 Rajput
Regiment, who were to hold the Devil's Peak peninsula.135
The withdrawal was carried out that night. "D" Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers
covered the Royal Scots' retirement down the Kowloon peninsula. There was no enemy
pressure, but the Grenadiers speak of "slight opposition from fifth columnists in Kowloon".
The Royal Scots were in their barracks in Victoria City by 10:30 p.m. The company of
Grenadiers were in the quarters where they were to have a day's rest three hours later.136
"Much mechanical transport, nearly all carriers, and all armoured cars" were reported
evacuated.137 Not all of the 2/14 Punjab Regiment could be withdrawn that 'night, and the
battalion headquarters and two companies remained on the Devil's Peak peninsula during
the following day. To
*The TO Po road ran down the east side, the Castle Peak road down the west side of the peninsula. They came
together at the north end of Sham Shui Po.
conform to the other movements, the garrison of Stonecutters Island, off Sham Shui Po,
had been withdrawn on the 11th, the coastal guns there being destroyed. (Nevertheless,
the Japanese air narrative records that aircraft continued to attack Stonecutters on the
12th, 13th and 14th, "silencing the guns.)138
Late in the afternoon of 12 December the Japanese attacked the 5/7 Rajput Regiment
in the prepared Ma Lau Tong position across the base of Devil's Peak peninsula. The
attack was not covered by artillery fire and was beaten off with considerable loss, the
island guns intervening with effect.139 At ten p.m. General Maltby ordered the 5/7 Rajput
to withdraw to a shorter prepared line in rear, at Hai Wan. The remainder of the 2/14
Punjab were ferried over to the island in the course of the night, followed by the single
troop of 3.7-inch howitzers which had been left to support the defenders of Devil's
Peak.l40 As morning approached, Maltby took the decision to withdraw all remaining
troops to the island immediately. The pre-war defence plans had envisaged a rather more
prolonged delaying action on the peninsula, recognizing however that everything would
depend on the general situation.* Devil's Peak overlooked the north-east comer of the
island at short range, and with it in their hands the Japanese would find it very easy to
cross the narrow Lye Mun Passage to the island; but the General "foresaw the greatest
difficulties and even the impossibility of maintaining the 5/7 Rajput Regt. with
ammunition and supplies in their isolated position". He also needed this unit to hold the
north-east sector of the island. The Rajputs were accordingly ordered back at once; the
last covering troops from the mainland reached the island at 9:20 a.m. on 13 December.
Fortunately, there was no Japanese air interference with the movement's final stage,
which had had to be carried out in daylight.141
The retirement to the island had been well conducted and little equipment was lost.
The artillery was successfully evacuated, although some ammunition had to be
abandoned and the desertion of Chinese ferry personnel resulted in the loss of most of the
transport mules;142 this was unfortunate in view of the general transport situation and the
nature of the island's terrain. If the Japanese had exerted more pressure, they could have
made much trouble during this phase. As it was, it is conjectured, they had been so
surprised by their own rapid success that they failed to make the most of their
opportunities.
Successful though the actual withdrawal had been, it must be said that the defence of
Hong Kong had begun very badly. At the first moment of contact with the Gin Drinkers
Line, the Japanese had won a success which had a fundamental effect upon all the later
phases of the little campaign, and had established a moral superiority over the defenders
which was never
*This is the picture presented in Plan "B" (two battalions on mainland) included in the Interim Defence Scheme of
1939. Plan "C" (three battalions on mainland) was to be issued when occasion demanded; no copy has been found.
overcome. The effect upon the civilian population, white and yellow, was particularly
bad. The white residents had tended to overrate the strength of the fortress, and the easy
success of the Japanese, and the fact that the retirement to the island came only five days
after their attack, had a proportionately discouraging effect upon them.143 At the same
time, the disaffected elements among the Chinese population were encouraged in the
same degree. The prospect for a prolonged defence of Hong Kong Island was not bright.
Following the withdrawal to the island, the defending forces were reorganized. The
infantry continued to form • two brigades, but they were differently constituted. The East
Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Wallis and consisted of The Royal Rifles of
Canada and the 5/7 Rajput. The West Brigade, under Brigadier Lawson, comprised The
Royal Scots,* The Winnipeg Grenadiers and the 2/14 Punjab, with the Canadian
signallers attached. The Middlesex battalion was directly under Fortress Headquarters,
though its detachments manning pillboxes were under the operational command of the
battalions in whose areas they were located.144 The new arrangement had the serious
disadvantage of separating the Canadian battalions and removing one of them from
Lawson's command. He recognized the unsatisfactory aspect of this in a telegram sent on
14 December, which explained the action by the "undesirability in present circumstances
of taking moves which can be avoided".145 The point was well taken, doubtless, but the
Canadians would have been more effectively employed fighting together under their own
brigadier, especially as they had not had time to get to know the British commanders and
staff officers properly. Both Canadian units were still charged with the immediate task of
defending the southern beaches; General Maltby, with no air reconnaissance to help him,
continued to apprehend a seaborne attack and feared to concentrate against the obvious
menace to the north coast. The new system of command became effective at midnight 13-
14 December. Lawson's headquarters remained at Wong Nei Chong; Wallis established
his at Tai Tam Gap, a central position in the eastern sector. The inter-brigade boundary
ran just east of the central north-south road across the island.146
On the morning of 13 December a Japanese envoy delivered under a flag of truce a
letter from General Sakai "requesting surrender of colony and threatening severe artillery
and aerial bombardment in the event of refusal". The request was of course rejected. During
the day Japanese shelling increased. A 9.2-inch gun on Mount Davis was knocked out by a
direct hit, Belcher Fort nearby was also shelled, and there were serious fires in the
*This battalion held the north-east sector of the island until the night of 14-15 December. when it was relieved by the
'5/7 Rajput and withdrawn into reserve. General Maltby considered that it needed a. period of recuperation after its
experiences on the mainland.
urban communities in the north-western region. The situation report for the day
remarked, "Our Chinese labour situation grave and majority of mechanical transport
drivers deserted.147
The next day Hong Kong reported that the shelling had grown more intense and more
accurate; more coast-defence guns were hit, and difficulty with the civilian population
continued.148 On the 15th the shelling of the batteries went on and at the same time a
systematic bombardment of the pillboxes along the north shore was reported, several
being knocked out. The Japanese were collecting small craft in Kowloon Bay and were
clearly preparing to cross. On the night of 14-15 December H.M.S. Thracian entered the
Bay and shelled two river steamers, which blew up, while a special agent destroyed a
third ship believed to be serving as an observation post for enemy artillery. It was
reported that Japanese air attacks so far had been "for reconnaissance and nuisance value
only".149
In the evening of 15 December the Japanese were reported to have made "an
attempted landing" at Pak Sha Wan on the Lye Mun Passage, "using small rubber boats
and improvised rafts". The garrison brought down heavy artillery and machine-gun fire.
"C" Company of the Royal Rifles sent a party to occupy the Pak Sha Wan coast-defence
battery, which had apparently been evacuated by its garrison, but when the Canadians
advanced no enemy was met.150 There is no explanation of this affair in any Japanese
account available. It may have been a feint intended to induce the defenders to reveal
their positions.
On the 16th there was a noticeable increase in both air activity and shelling. This was
the day the Japanese brought their heavy bombers into action (above, page 463, n.). By
the end of the day "more than half" of the pillboxes on the eastern sector of the north
shore, from Lye Mun to Bowrington, had been knocked out.151 The next day the Japanese
sent a second flag of truce with another demand for surrender signed by Sakai and by the
Naval Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Niimi. General Maltby telegraphed, "Envoys
apparently genuinely surprised and disconcerted when proposal was summarily rejected.
They left with hint that bombardment would be more indiscriminate than hitherto.152
Through 18 December the shelling and bombing continued. More damage was done,
two 18-pounder beach-defence guns at Braemar were destroyed, and just before and after
dusk there was "an extremely heavy bombardment by artillery and mortars" of the Lye
Mun peninsula.153 The fifth column was very active; in the early evening two successive
fires at the West Brigade ,garage shelter destroyed five cars.154 Large fires were burning
along the shore, including a particularly bad one in petrol and oil tanks at North Point. In
the morning the Rajput Commanding Officer had decided that "exhaustion from
perpetual enemy fire" made it necessary to relieve-his right forward platoon, at Pak Sha
Wan, but that this could not be-done
until after nightfall. It was apparently effected. Late in the afternoon Wallis visited the
Rajput headquarters, and "it was jointly appreciated that the long and persistent fire of all
natures, air attacks and the heavy pall of smoke drifting across the waterfront were almost
certain to prelude an attempt to land after dark".155
The Attack on Hong Kong Island
The Japanese narrative observes, "Encouraged by the unexpected[ly] rapid capture of

Kowloon Peninsula, the Army decided to follow it up with an immediate attack against
Hong Kong, denying the enemy the opportunity to gather themselves." Arrangements
were made for the Navy to support the landing and make a demonstration along the
island's southern shore as in the original plan; and for the siege artillery to take up
positions "on the highland in the northern region of Kowloon City" and bombard the
British batteries and beach defences. As in the advance down the Kowloon peninsula, the
229th Regiment was to operate on the left, embarking about Kung Tong Tsai and landing
near Sau Ki Wan. The main body, on the right, would embark at Kowloon and Tai Wan
Tsun and land in the North Point-Braemar Point area. It was to consist of the 228th and
230th Regiments, with the former on the left. Each regiment was to be without one of its
three battalions. The whole main body was evidently to be commanded by General Ito,
although Ito does not mention this in his own statement. This force was to break through
our beach positions and swing right, advancing westward over the northern half of the
island. The 229th Regiment, attacking without its 1st battalion, which was to be held in
reserve, was likewise to swing right after landing and advance westward over the island's
southern half.* The 3rd Battalion of the 228th and the 1st Battalion of the 230th were to
remain in Kowloon City for protective duty. The landing craft were apparently provided
by a "landing engineer unit" composed of the 20th Independent Engineer Regiment and
the 1st and 2nd Bridging Material Companies from the 9th Division.156
The Japanese account states that beginning at dusk on 18 December the navy made
its demonstration against the island's south-western shore. This, if it really happened,
seems to have attracted no British attention. The bombardment had left small doubt in the
defenders' minds that the attack was coming in on the north shore; and it actually began
about 8.30 p.m.†
*The First Demobilization Bureau narrative indicates that part of the 229th's main body was to attack Stanley
Peninsula. The evidence of the regiment's commander, Tanaka, however, is that this task fell to the 1st Battalion, from
divisional reserve.
†This is the time estimated by Fortress Headquarters.157 The Japanese narrative says that the landing began at nine.
Doi states that his first wave crossed the harbour by rowing in collapsible assault boats;
the second wave went in powered landing craft, and in collapsible assault boats towed by
landing craft. At Lye Mun Passage "motor boats and small craft" are said to have plied
back and forth across the strait.158
The first brunt of the assault fell upon the 5/7 Rajput, who were manning the shore
pillboxes in the area attacked. Their Commanding Officer's report indicates that machine-
guns and mortars took a considerable toll of the Japanese.159 Probably because of
uncertainty at higher headquarters as to what was really happening, and the difficulty of
seeing targets (the smoke interfered with the operation of such searchlights as were
workable),160 it appears that the heavy guns of the fortress did not come into action until
some time after the first landings, when Brigadier Wallis brought down a series of 6-inch
concentrations on the docks at Quarry Point and adjacent areas.161 The Japanese narrative
is very brief at this point and does not refer to losses during the landings. Col. Tanaka,
commanding the 229th Regiment, says that his 3rd Battalion met "stiff opposition . . .
during the crossing of the harbour" from machine-guns on the east side of Aldrich Bay.
Doi also reports intense machine-gun fire. An account based upon information from
Tanaka, Shoji and. Lt.-Gen. Higuchi, who was Vice Chief of Staff of the Twenty-Third
Army,162 states that machine-gun fire from the direction of Causeway Bay caused "30 or
40 casualties" to Shoji's second and third waves landing at North Point. The Japanese
landings were facilitated by the fact that fifth columnists had been cutting the beach
defence wire.163 In the eastern sector, Tanaka's 2nd (left) Battalion moved by way of Lye
Mun Barracks upon Sai Wan Hill, while another portion of it pushed south towards Boa
Vista. His 3rd Battalion, coming ashore in the middle of Aldrich Bay, advanced straight
up the steep slope of Mount Parker* and seized the summit.164
The enemy's immediate objectives in the Sai Wan area were Sai Wan Fort, an old
walled redoubt on the hill of the same name, with an anti-aircraft site not far away, and
the coast-defence battery at Pak Sha Wan. This whole area had been heavily bombarded
by the Japanese 9-inch howitzers; and the Chinese gunners at Pak Sha Wan had
decamped or been released on 14 December, reducing the battery's effectiveness.165 It
appears that at the very outset of the landings a truckload of fifth columnists or Japanese
disguised as coolie labourers got into Sai Wan Fort and seized it.166 "C" Company of
The Royal Rifles of Canada was supporting this sector, and when the situation became
clear the company commander (Major W. A. Bishop) organized a counter-attack with
two platoons. It went in at 10:35 p.m.,
*Major G.B. Puddicombe, who went over the ground with Tanaka at the time of the latter's trial, was impressed with
the fact that the Japanese troops must have been in remarkably fine physical condition.
apparently supported by two 6-inch howitzers sited nearby. The hillside in front was
cleared, but the old fort's walls kept the assailants out. Another platoon failed to recover
Lye Mun Barracks. The attack on Sai Wan cost -nine men killed.* "At midnight the fight
was going fiercely" and repeated Japanese attacks were being beaten back. The fact that
the company possessed unusual firepower-it had a number of extra automatic weapons-
enabled it to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. At about 1:30 "C" Company, then clearly
in danger of encirclement, was ordered to retire southward.168
Other elements of the Royal Rifles went into action on the west side of Mount
Parker. From midnight onwards three different platoons were ordered forward
successively from the Boa Vista area to reinforce the posts on and around Parker, though
there is some conflict of evidence as to the orders they received.169 Since a great part of
Tanaka's 3rd Battalion was on Mount Parker, these parties had no chance. The whole of
one platoon and two sections of another became casualties.170
All along the front of attack, it is clear, the Japanese had got ashore in large numbers,
though not without losses. The three regiments worked forward rapidly, Shoji's and Doi's
moving south from North Point and Braemar Point respectively, in some confusion in the
dark (both regimental commanders claim that their men captured Jardine's Lookout).171
Before the morning of the 19th dawned the Japanese were in the area of Wong Nei
Chong Gap. Throughout, they displayed accurate knowledge of the terrain and the
defences; and once more, contrary to the belief so strongly held by the British before the
outbreak of war, they had given "conclusive proof of a very high standard of night
training".172
A message received in London at 5:15 a.m. British time on the 19th told a grim story:
"Situation very grave, deep penetration made by enemy". It added that cipher books and
equipment were being destroyed.173 General Maltby, however, had not abandoned hope.
In a situation report sent through naval channels the same day he wrote, "Japanese will
undoubtedly try to ferry more men over tonight and continue infiltration but I hope to be
in a position to launch a general counter-attack tomorrow at dawn 11.174
Operations in the Eastern Sector
In the course of 19-20 December the East and West Brigades were separated, when
the Japanese reached the south shore of the island at Repulse Bay. It is convenient,
accordingly, to deal with the rest of the defence in
*There was much misunderstanding about this attack. Brigadier Wallis recorded a British officer's report that it was
not made:'" but the records of the Royal Rifles, who were on the spot, are quite definite.
two sections, relating first the events in the eastern area where Brigadier Wallis was in
command.
The 5/7 Rajput, upon whom the enemy's initial attack had fallen, had virtually ceased
to exist.175 Wallis's East Brigade now consisted in practice of the Royal Rifles and some
units of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, with some Middlesex machine-
gunners. About 9:30 a.m. on the 19th Wallis discussed the situation with Maltby and
recommended withdrawing southward. The enemy was well established on the high hills
from Mount Parker to Jardine's Lookout; piecemeal platoon operations against him had
failed, and piecemeal company operations were likely to have the same result. Wallis
considered that the best course was to concentrate the available infantry and mobile
artillery in a secure base area and thus create a reserve capable of effective counter-attack
against the high ground. Maltby approved and orders were issued for a withdrawal to the
area Stone HillStanley Village.176 Unfortunately, the direction of this retirement, as it
turned out, contributed to touch being lost between the two brigades.
Early in the afternoon the Royal Rifles began to fall back, and by nightfall the
battalion had taken up its new positions. Brigade Headquarters was set up at Stone Hill,
where there was a telephone exchange, with the headquarters of the Royal Rifles
alongside. The Rifles had companies at Palm Villa (on the coast of Tai Tam Bay), Stone
Hill, Sugar Loaf Hill, Stanley View and Stanley Mound. The battalion's strength had
already been much reduced as a result of the fighting around Mount Parker and Sai Wan
Fort.177
During the day the coastal batteries at Capes D'Aguilar and Collinson on the island's
east coast were abandoned, the guns being destroyed before the withdrawal. This
disappointed Wallis; since the guns were in selfcontained forts he had expected them to
remain in action after the infantry withdrew.178 Moreover, some much-needed mobile
artillery (at Red Hill and Gauge Basin) was destroyed during the retirement-in the
brigadier's opinion, unnecessarily.179
Wallis's plan was to counter-attack either through Gauge Basin or by the more
westerly route along the shore of Repulse Bay. He had wished a company of the
Volunteer Defence Corps to remain in the Gauge Basin area and had relied on its
presence to cover an advance by this route. The company, however, had beer; driven out
after offering fierce resistance to Tanaka's advance; and Wallis accordingly decided to
move by Repulse Bay, the object being to reach Wong Nei Chong Gap and make contact
with the West Brigade. The Royal Rifles' main objective was to be Violet Hill.180 The
advance began at 8:00 a.m. on 20 December, with "A" Company of the Rifles in the
lead.181 The plan called for support by two 3.7-inch howitzers, the only effective mobile
guns remaining to the East Brigade. But they could not help, for they "were only getting
into position and sorting
equipment and were unable to fire at this time"; and the heavy coast-defence guns at the
tip of Stanley Peninsula could not be brought. to bear.182
The Japanese had forestalled the Canadians at Repulse Bay, but only by a narrow
margin. During the night Tanaka's two battalions had moved south, seizing Violet Hill,
and by 8:00 a.m. the 3rd Battalion had reached the Repulse Bay Hotel, where it met
resistance from a Middlesex detachment.183 "A" Company of the Rifles found the
Japanese holding the hotel garage; they were also on the hillside above the hotel in
strength. The Rifles cleared out the platoon in the garage, but could not evict the enemy
above. Attempting to push on up the coast road, "A" Company ran into heavy fire. The
advance came to a halt, and the company took up a defensive position around the hotel
and a large house called Castle Eucliffe. It was ordered to hold the hotel until the many
civilians there could be removed. "D" Company of the Rifles was subsequently pushed
forward across the hills on the right towards Violet Hill. Failing to dislodge the Japanese
from there, it withdrew to Stanley View. "B" Company, late in the afternoon, was ordered
to advance through "A"; these orders were subsequently countermanded by Brigade,
repeated, and again countermanded.184
On the 21st Brigadier Wallis made another attempt. Believing that the enemy were
not so strong on the eastern part of his front, he decided to advance through the area of
Tai Tam Tuk Reservoir. Fortress Head-. quarters approved, and he issued verbal orders
early on the morning of the 21st.185 The movement began about 9:15 a.m. A quarter of
an hour later the advanced guard came under heavy fire from the hills ahead. The Rifles
pushed forward, and by about noon they had driven the enemy off the hills immediately
south of the Reservoir. Thereafter the advance was held up by a machine-gun post at the
crossroads at the Reservoir's south end, but Bren carriers were brought up and the troops
on the spot, about 30 men of the Rifles and the Volunteer Defence Corps, with two
carriers, "rushed the position under a rain of hand grenades (many of which failed to
explode)" and wiped out the enemy in it.186 But despite the degree of success that had
been achieved, the advance had broken down. The enemy was still in strength nearby, the
Royal Rifles' companies, occupying the hill positions they had seized, had become
separated, and the regiment had run out of 3-inch mortar ammunition and was weakened
by casualties. The brigade commander was forced to the conclusion that he must
withdraw and "harbour his force in its former positions.187
In the course of the afternoon, General Maltby had ordered Wallis to send all available
men to Repulse Bay and make a new attempt to break through on this line to Wong Nei
Chong. The brigadier accordingly sent Major C. R. Templer, R.A., with two carriers and 30
or 40 men, to take charge in the Repulse Bay area and carry out this operation.188 "A"
Company
of the Rifles had previously pushed two platoons northward to join up with some British
administrative details who were holding a house called "The Ridge", some 400 yards
short of Wong Nei Chong Gap. Templer now took the balance of the company and
advanced north, picking up one of the detached platoons on the way. The attack against
the Gap failed, and "A" Company withdrew to the area of "The Ridge" for the night.
Subsequently, however, two platoons were ordered by Fortress Headquarters (which was
still in touch with the troops in this area) to occupy a water "catchment", on the hills
overlooking the junction of the coastal road and the road north to the Gap, which the
enemy was believed to be using as a supply route. The platoons were ambushed, suffered
heavily, and withdrew to positions near Repulse Bay.189 They had probably struck
Tanaka's main force.*
It may be well to tell here the rest of the story of the fighting in the Repulse Bay area.
Early on 22 December Major C. A. Young, commanding "A" Company, was again
ordered forward to "The Ridge". He occupied the house, reinforcing the British troops
who were still there, with what men he had, and the position was held throughout the day.
The senior British officer decided to try to break through the enemy lines. Major Young,
feeling that chances would be better after nightfall, held the Canadians in their position,
and then withdrew to Castle Eucliffe under cover of darkness.190
Late on the night of 22-3 December, "A" Company received through Major Templer
orders to retire to the Royal Rifles' position at Stanley. A China Command situation
report the following day stated, "Garrisoned hotel was evacuated by Stanley force last
[night] as surrounded and untenable, and small party of women and children unable to
walk had unfortunately to surrender".191 This was the end of resistance to the Japanese in
the Repulse Bay area. The best chance of rejoining the battalion seemed to lie in splitting
up into small groups, and in this manner part of the company reached Stone Hill that
night. The next night Major Young with a considerable party got across the Bay to
H.M.S. Thracian, which was lying aground on Round Island. (The destroyer had been
damaged by grounding during her operation on the night of 14-15 December and had
been run ashore here after much of her equipment had been removed.)192 They remained
on board for two days, and after dark on the 25th paddled over to Stanley Peninsula in
Carley. floats. But the island was already fully in Japanese hands. The party turned back,
and finally surrendered.193
*In spite of the disjointed nature of our operations in this area, they gave the Japanese much trouble and imposed
much delay. Tanaka testified that he himself remained three whole days (20-23 December) in a position on the hill about
500. yards north-west of the Repulse Bay Hotel, and it is clear that almost the whole of his two battalions was in the area.
Tanaka writes that the commander of the 3rd Battalion "later reported that he had suffered heavy casualties in the vicinity
of Repulse Bay and that his battalion had taken no prisoners". This battalion had been so badly mauled that it took no part
in the final phase of the operations.
The End on Stanley Peninsula
After 21 December no further attempts were made by Wallis's main force to drive
northward, for the troops were in bad shape and the 22nd and 23rd saw constant attacks
by the Japanese, who had been reinforced.*
The numbers, physical condition and morale of the Royal Rifles were declining. For
several days before the enemy landings, the men had had no hot meals and no sleep
except what they could catch in the scattered weapon-pits which they were continuously
manning. Even in the earliest stage of the island fighting, it is recorded, "some would fall
down in the roadway and go to sleep and it took several shakings to get them going
again".194 Now they were nearly at the end of their rope, utterly beaten down by fatigue.
The Brigade war diary and the observations of Canadian officers indicate that there was
little mutual confidence between Wallis and this depleted and exhausted battalion which
was practically the whole of his infantry force.
At noon on 22 December the enemy took Sugar Loaf Hill, but later in the day three
parties of volunteers from "C" Company went forward and by nightfall had retaken the
position. "B" Company, however, was forced off the top of Stanley Mound, to the south-
west, and when it attempted to recover the position early on the 23rd the fire of enemy
troops who had infiltrated to the south of the Mound broke up the attempt.195 That
evening orders were given for a general withdrawal to Stanley Peninsula. Lt.-Col. Home
had reported that 18 of his officers were now killed, wounded or missing, and the
strength of his main body ("A" Company being at Repulse Bay) was only 350 men.196
He evidently recommended the retirement in the belief that his worn-out troops would
have a better chance on the flatter ground around Stanley Village. It was accordingly
carried out after dark.197 On the morning of 24 December, then, the Royal Rifles were
holding positions in and around Stanley Village, across the narrow neck of the peninsula.
"B" Company had been sent to occupy an anti-aircraft position at Chung Hum Kok, a
subsidiary peninsula to the west, where it would protect the left flank. Part of the
company lost its way in the dark, and found itself with the main body in Stanley Village;
but about 65 all ranks reached Chung Hum Kok and held on there until the end.198
*It is impossible to be completely definite on the question of what Japanese troops were employed at Stanley, for no
evidence is available from any enemy officer who actually fought there. Tanaka said that his 1st Battalion, which was
detached from his command, took Stanley. Ito said that after the British advance towards Tai Tam Tuk Reservoir (i.e., on
21 December) Divisional Headquarters ordered to Stanley the reserve battalion of Shoji's regiment (from Kowloon). Doi
states that the other battalion from Kowloon (his own 3rd Battalion) was brought from there and returned to his command
on the Japanese right flank on 24 December. It seems very probable, then, that Tanaka's 1st Battalion, from immediate
divisional reserve, was the first unit employed at Stanley, and that on 21 December it was reinforced by the 1st Battalion of
Shoji from Kowloon
During the morning there was a discussion, apparently rather acrimonious, at Brigade
Headquarters, which was now in the officers' mess at Stanley Prison. "No R.R.C.
personnel had had any rest night or day for a period of 5 consecutive days",199 and the
unit diary records that "Lt.-Col. Home insisted that the Battalion should be relieved
otherwise he would not be responsible for what would happen". There was still telephone
communication with Fortress Headquarters, and after a conversation between Home and
General Maltby it was decided that the unit would be relieved that night and go back to
Stanley Fort, farther down the peninsula, to rest.200
On Christmas Eve, accordingly, the Royal Rifles were relieved by composite units
under Middlesex and Volunteer Defence Corps officers, and fell back to Stanley Fort
where sleeping space was allotted; "the last stragglers" came in about 11:00 p.m.201 In
the course of the 24th an attempt to reinforce "B" Company at Chung Hum Kok had
failed, and during the night Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps troops tried to relieve
the force in that position but were ambushed.202 About 2:30 a.m. Brigadier Walls
telephoned Lt.-Col. Home and instructed him to occupy the high ground immediately
north of the fort. This was necessary, he said, "as the enemy were attacking in Stanley
Village and there was grave danger of a breakthrough". These orders were carried out by
"C" Company. The rest of the battalion got a full night's rest and was reorganized the
following morning.203
During the morning the Brigadier, finding that the Japanese had gained ground in the
Stanley Village area and south of it, ordered the Royal Rifles to counter-attack. "D"
Company delivered the attack without artillery support; the hills in the peninsula
prevented the coastal batteries at its south end* from firing into the area of the isthmus.
The attack failed, and "D" Company lost 26 men killed and 75 wounded; late in the
afternoon it fell back to Stanley Fort.206 About the same time, Wallis instructed the
Rifles to relieve the artillery, acting as infantry, who were holding part of the front line.
As the new "A" Company which had been organized during the morning moved forward
down the main road to Stanley Village, it came under an artillery concentration and lost
six men killed and 12 wounded. "About this time all enemy firing ceased and a motor car
flying white flags came up the sloping road towards the entrance to the Fort."207 In it
were two British officers who informed Wallis that the Governor had surrendered the
colony. He was unwilling to capitulate without written authority, but told the Rifles
*These batteries had been intervening actively in the island fighting to the extent to which they could be brought to
bear. The 9.2-inch guns used up all their serviceable land ammunition and were reduced to using armour-piercing shell.204
The two 3.7-inch howitzers, near the prison, had been doing active work, but at this point were out of action as an attempt
was being made to withdraw them to a safer position. During the movement the detachment was caught by heavy fire, the
lorry being used was riddled and it appears that the guns were never in action again.205
"that effective immediately all firing would cease and that the unit would not fire unless
attacked". Early the following morning written confirmation was obtained; the force at
Stanley then formally surrendered.208
The Fight for the Western Sector
It is now necessary to go back a week and deal with the story of the West Brigade
and the Winnipeg Grenadiers.
On 18 December this Brigade was disposed with the Winnipeg Grenadiers covering
the south-west and west coasts of the island, the Royal Scots in reserve in the Wan Chai
Gap-Mount Parish area, the 2/14 Punjab in Victoria City and a company of the Middlesex
around Leighton Hill.209 The Winnipeg Grenadiers' headquarters was at Wan Chai Gap;
their "D" Company was now back. in Brigade Reserve at Wong Nei Chong. On Brigadier
Lawson's orders, "flying columns" had been organized from platoons of the Grenadiers'
Headquarters Company, to be available at a moment's notice. These platoons were
billeted in houses south of Wan Chai Gap.210
When on the evening of 18 December the enemy was reported landing on the north-
east coast, Headquarters West Brigade ordered out the flying columns to back up the
landing area in case of a breakthrough. One platoon remained through the night at the
road-junction north-west of Wong Nei Chong Gap. Another under Lieut. G. A. Birkett
reached Jardine's Lookout shortly before first light. It was attacked by superior numbers
and forced off the hill, the platoon commander being killed while covering the with-
drawal with a Bren gun. The third column, under Lieut. C. D. French, was ordered to
Mount Butler, but was repelled by the Japanese holding that hill, French being wounded
and subsequently killed.211
About 2:30 in the morning of 19 December, Lawson called "A" Company of the
Grenadiers, commanded by Major A. B. Gresham, to his headquarters from its position at
Little Hong Kong, and on its arrival ordered it to clear Jardine's Lookout and apparently
to push on to Mount Butler. It advanced accordingly. Reports of its action are confused,
largely because so many officers and men became casualties. It appears, however, that it
became divided, and that part of it, led by Company Sergeant Major J. R. Osborn, drove
right through to Mount Butler and captured the top of the hill by a bayonet charge soon
after dawn. Two or three hours later a heavy counterattack forced this party back
westward. It appears to have rejoined the main body, but in attempting to withdraw to
Wong Nei Chong the whole force was surrounded. The Japanese began to throw grenades
into its position, and Osbom caught several and threw them back. Finally one fell where
he could not retrieve it in time; and Osborn, shouting a warning, threw himself upon it as
it exploded, giving his life for his comrades: A sergeant who had
stood beside him believed that Osborn's gallantry saved him "and at least six other men
who were in our group".212 Shortly afterwards the Japanese rushed the position and "A"
Company's survivors became prisoners. All the officers had been "killed or severely
wounded",213 Gresham being among the dead. After the defeat of Japan, Osborn was
awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.*
An attempt to reinforce the Wong Nei Chong area in the early morning had produced
a minor disaster. Three naval platoons on their way up in lorries were ambushed when
close to the Gap and lost 24 men killed.214
When it became clear that the Japanese were close to the West Brigade headquarters
in the shelters in Wong Nei Chong Gap, Brigadier Lawson decided to withdraw to a new
site previously selected on the south side of Mount Nicholson. But before the movement
could be completed the headquarters was overrun. About ten in the morning Lawson
spoke to General Maltby on the telephone and told him that the enemy was firing into the
shelters at pointblank range and that he was "going outside to fight it out".215 In doing so
he lost his life, and no witness survived to tell the story. His body was found close to the
shelters. Colonel Shoji visited the spot on 23 December. He wrote later, "We wrapped up
the body in the blanket of Lt. Okada, O.C. No. 9 Company, which had captured the
position. I ordered the temporary burial of the officer on the battleground on which he
had died so heroically.”216 In 1946 Shoji helped the Canadian authorities find the
grave.217
After Lawson's death there was no brigade commander in the western sector until
about noon on 20 December, when Colonel H. B. Rose of the Hong Kong Volunteer
Defence Corps, a British regular officer, was appointed to command the West Brigade. In
the interval the Winnipeg Grenadiers took orders direct from Fortress Headquarters. The
Headquarters of the West Group of fortress artillery had been with the brigade
headquarters and was overrun at the same time, the officers and men being killed. A new
West Group Headquarters was organized in rear later on the 19th.218
It appears that after Lawson's position was overrun a company of the Royal Scots was
ordered forward to counter-attack the Gap. It suffered extremely heavy losses and the
survivors were brought to a stand a couple of hundred yards north of the headquarters
shelters.219
"D" Company of the Grenadiers had been stationed in another group of shelters in
Wong Nei Chong Gap across the main road from the brigade headquarters. Two of its
platoons in positions north of the Gap were cut off and overrun early on 19 December, but
the remaining platoon, another brought up from the west of the island, the company
headquarters and some
*It would seem inherently more probable that the hill captured and held for some time by Osborn's party was
Jardine's Lookout rather than Mount Butler; but the evidence of the men who were with him specifically identified it as the
latter.
individuals of the Grenadiers and other units made a prolonged defence of the shelters.
The Grenadiers here were commanded successively by Capt. A. S. Bowman (killed on 19
December while dealing with snipers), Capt. R. W. Philip (subsequently wounded) and
Lieut. T. A. Blackwood (also wounded).* The garrison had automatic weapons and
plenty of ammunition, and it was able to take heavy toll of the Japanese .222
"D" Company's position was of great importance, as it commanded the one north-
south road across the island. And it served to impose a most decided delay upon the
enemy's operations generally. The fighting hereabouts and at Repulse Bay are the only
episodes of the campaign which the Japanese narrative describes as particularly difficult
and expensive. It contains the following passage:223
. . . The advance of our assault troops met with many setbacks. The following day [ 19 December]
the first assault wave by the troops to the right of our right flank [sic] came upon a powerful group of
sheltered positions, provided with emplacements at the Eastern foot of Nicholson Hill. The enemy fire
from these positions was so heavy that not only was the advance balked, but our troops were thrown into
confusion. Our left flank units also faced heavy enemy fire from the defenders occupying a hotel on the
Southern side of Tsu-Lo Lan Hill [evidently the Repulse Bay Hotel], and their advance was impeded.
Furthermore the terrain in this area was so rugged and separated by interlocking ravines that our contact
with the advance units was at one time entirely broken.
Colonel Shoji's independent evidence accords with this. He states that in the fighting on
the 19th around the Gap his 3rd Battalion suffered heavy casualties, including the
battalion commander; and that he sent a message of apology to the divisional commander
on the evening of the 20th for having incurred so many casualties-he says, approximately
800. His account indicates very considerable disruption of the Japanese operations by the
resistance in this area, and he reports much uncertainty, particularly in the early stages, as
to the whereabouts of the Japanese units on his flanks. During the confusion, it appears,
at least one of Doi's battalions got across Shoji's line of communication and came up on
his right.224
The fighting in the Gap finally ended on the morning of 22 December. At this time
the enemy blew in the steel doors and window shutters of the shelters with a light gun.
Ammunition was almost gone and the position was full of wounded men. At 7:00 a.m.,
after two small parties had left in what proved successful attempts to filter through to
battalion headquarters, the remnant of "D" Company surrendered.225
Another small isolated party had fought a similar gallant fight on the island's north
shore. Here a group of Volunteers, chiefly men over military
*Major C.A. Lyndon, Brigade Major, "C" Force, reached the position on the 20th from the site in rear which had
been selected for the new brigade headquarters; he was apparently killed on the 21st. Lt.-Col. R.D. Walker, H.K.V.D.C.
Engineers, was also present but severely wounded.220 Throughout 19 December Eurasian machine-gunners of the
H.K.V.D.C., commanded by Lieut. B.C. Field and reinforced by a few Canadians, held two pillboxes on the slopes of
Jardine's Lookout above the Gap with "superb gallantry" and killed many Japanese?221
age, a few Fighting French soldiers, and some men of the Middlesex, were cut off by the
Japanese advance on the night of the first landings; but they held the North Point power
station with great determination, and General Maltby records that the delay they imposed
was very valuable to him. They could not be relieved, and resistance in this area seems to
have ended on the afternoon of 19 December.226
On the afternoon of the 19th also Fortress Headquarters had ordered a general
advance eastwards with the object of reaching a line running north from Middle Spur
(west of Repulse Bay) through Wong Nei Chong Reservoir.227 This operation made little
progress. As part of it, the Headquarters Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers attacked
towards Wong Nei Chong Gap in an attempt to capture the enemy positions there—
particularly the police station built on a commanding knoll at the south end of the Gap —
and relieve "D" Company. As the company was much under strength, a platoon was
borrowed from "C" Company at Aberdeen and some men of the Royal Scots were
attached. With a flanking platoon moving over the summit of Mount Nicholson to protect
the left, the force moved forward along the mountain's southern slope. A footing was
obtained in the Gap, contact was made with "D" Company, and Major E. Hodkinson,
who was in command, got orders from Fortress Headquarters to take the police station
and then attack Mount Parker. But the assault on the police station failed, Hodkinson and
most of his men becoming casualties.228
It is clear that the death of Brigadier Lawson, and the consequent absence of any
coordinating authority in the forward area during 19 December, had serious results. There
is record of two other company attacks on the police station, and one on Jardine's
Lookout (respectively by "B" and "C" companies of the Royal Scots, and a composite
company of the same unit) during the night of 19-20 December.229 Could arrangements
have been made for more effective command above company level, something solid
might have been achieved. Even as it was, we have seen that the Japanese were seriously
delayed and confused and suffered heavy casualties.
General Maltby's expressed hope of launching a general counter-attack at dawn on 20
December (above, page 474) was not realized. The only major offensive action attempted
that day seems to have been the advance of the Royal Rifles of the East Brigade into the
Repulse Bay area. The lack of coordination in the forward area of the western sector was
still being felt. Colonel Rose took command of the West Brigade at some unnamed hour "in
the morning" and apparently began to influence the situation only in the early afternoon.230
He wished the Royal Scots to push eastward, clear up the situation at Wong Nei Chong and
establish themselves in the Stanley Gap area.231 It evidently proved impossible to do this.
However, "B" Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers (Major H. W. Hook), which was still
in its original position at Pok Fu Lam in the west end of the island, was brought up to
counter-attack towards Wong Nei Chong. The plan was to send one platoon around the
north side of Mount Nicholson, while the main body attacked along the south side. The
two parties were to advance during the evening of the 20th to pre-arranged points on
either side of the hill, take up positions for the night there, and launch their attack at 7:00
a.m. on the 21st.232 There was discussion of the desirability of this attack being made
simultaneously with the East Brigade's (above, page 476), but the latter could not start so
early. It was accordingly decided that the West Brigade should move at seven and the
East Brigade at nine.233 This "West Brigade attack" was in fact delivered by the single
company of Grenadiers.
The plan was disrupted on the evening of the 20th, when Hook's main body, pushing
forward through fog and rain, ran into the enemy on the south side of Mount Nicholson
near the position where it was supposed to spend the night. The fact is that Doi's 1st
Battalion had just seized the hill under cover of the dirty weather, having advanced the
time of a planned attack to take advantage of it. The Canadian party retired to Middle
Gap, having lost two officers and 20 men. At first light it went forward again, the left
party going into action at the same time. A very bitter fight followed, in which the
Japanese had the advantage of superior numbers; then "B" Company fell back, having
suffered further heavy losses.* Of the 98 all ranks who had gone into the operation, all of
the officers, the company sergeant major, six N.C.Os. and 29 men had become
casualties.234
The Japanese position was steadily improving. They had continued to land in large
numbers through the 19th. Commodore Collinson, noting the absence of effective
resistance to this movement early that morning, ordered his motor torpedo boats to attack
the landing craft. One or more of the latter were sunk, but two of the M.T.Bs. were lost to
air bombing and gunfire.235 On the 20th the Japanese brought artillery ashore on the
island, and the following day, their narrative notes, their advanced troops "began to
recover" from their initial confusion.236 The situation report sent out from Hong Kong on
22 December237 painted a dark picture, recounting the failure of the Grenadiers' counter-
attack and that of the Royal Rifles towards Tai Tam Tuk (above, page 476). It mentioned
further enemy landings and added, "Our troops are very tired and have suffered heavy
casualties." It also reported the death of Colonel Patrick Hennessy, Senior Administrative
Officer of the Canadian force. Shortly before ten in the morning of the
*The account of this attack in General Maltby's Despatch is incomplete. It gives the impression that the operation was
intended to take place on the evening of 20 December and makes no mention of the fighting on the early morning of the
21st. But Colonel Doi writes, "At dawn on the 21st, the enemy counter-attacked with about 400 men, but they were
repulsed after fierce fighting. In that engagement the unit defending the summit exhausted all its hand grenades and fought
by throwing stones. This fighting cost one company about 40 per cent in casualties including the company commander and
platoon leaders."
20th, the house on Victoria Peak which had been allotted to him as office and quarters
was struck by a large-calibre shell. Capt. R. M. Davies, the Field Cashier, was killed
instantly and Colonel Hennessy so severely wounded that he died on the way to
hospital.238
The Japanese were now firmly in control of Mount Nicholson, and the next hill to the
westward, Mount Cameron, became of great importance. On the morning of the 21st Lt.-
Col. Sutcliffe ordered his second-in-command, Major G. Trist, to gather all available men
and hold this position. Trist occupied an area "along the top of the ridge immediately
behind the crest" with about 100 men and held it through the afternoon and evening under
intermittent artillery and mortar fire.239 On 22 December he was reinforced by a platoon
of Royal Engineers and the troops on Mount Cameron were reorganized. That afternoon
there was heavy bombardment and some casualties.
At 8:00 p.m. Colonel Doi attacked Mount Cameron with his 2nd Battalion and a
company from the 1st. Again he reports fierce fighting and heavy Japanese losses. But
after half an hour or so a serious threat developed to the rear of the Canadians' right flank.
The Grenadiers' report says, "This information was relayed to Lt.-Col. Sutcliffe who,
after a conference with Acting Brigadier Rose issued an order to withdraw to Wan Chai
Gap". There is a contradiction in evidence here, as Colonel Rose states that the
withdrawal was not authorized by Brigade.240 The troops fell back, apparently "somewhat
disorganized".241 The following day, after a period of uncertainty, the situation in this
area was stabilized, when the Royal Scots aided by some Marines succeeded in
establishing themselves on Mount Cameron's western slopes.242
Throughout the operations the Royal Navy had taken the fullest part that its slender
local means allowed. The gunboat Cicala bombarded enemy positions from Deep Water
Bay on the 20th and 21st; on the latter date she was sunk by dive-bombing. Thereafter
her people fought as infantry, as did the Thracian's also.243
The Fall of Hong Kong
At the time of the action on Mount Cameron, one company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers
had not yet been deeply involved in the operations. This was "C", which was still holding
its original positions to the south around the Aberdeen Reservoirs and Bennet's Hill,
although two platoons had been taken away for action elsewhere. The battalion records that
about midnight of 22-23 December, as a result of the precipitate withdrawal from Mount
Cameron, Brigade Headquarters ordered this company to retire to
Aberdeen Village; it was suggested that there was no time to reach Mount Gough, to
which other troops were pulling back. However, the company tried to reach Mount
Gough by the roundabout route by Pok Fu Lam. Here, on communicating with Fortress
Headquarters, it was ordered back to its original positions. The troops were too exhausted
at the moment to make the move, but it was carried out on the afternoon of the 23rd, "C"
Company having been reinforced by 80 more men. In the meantime, naval platoons from
Aberdeen had moved into the Bennet's Hill area.244
At midnight 23-24 December, the West Brigade was disposed as follows. On the
right were the naval detachments, sharing the defence of Bennet's Hill with the
Grenadiers, whose line ran thence to the vicinity of Mount Cameron, their battalion
headquarters having returned to Wan Chai Gap. In front, a company of the Middlesex
was holding out at Little Hong Kong, almost isolated, although ammunition lorries were
still getting through to the magazine there. The Royal Scots were on the northern and
western slopes of Mount Cameron, and small remnants of the two Indian battalions were
disposed to the north of it. On the extreme left another Middlesex company, much
reduced, was holding Leighton Hill with undiminished courage.245
It was clear now that the defence could not last much longer. A report246 sent to
London and Ottawa at midday on the 23rd ran:
Enemy has slightly improved his position in last 24 hours but lines hold generally as yesterday.
Troops are very tired indeed but spirit. generally good and it is understood that every day's resistance is
of value to Allied cause. Water position in City and on Peak is most precarious since principal reservoirs
are in enemy's hands ... Very heavy shelling mortaring and dive bombing all morning and extremely
difficult to maintain communications. Further fighting will be uncontrolled and confined to centres of
resistance of unit[s] as [?and] sub-units. No water in hand and all men physically exhausted after days of
continuous fighting. Very heavy mortaring and dive bombing of Mount Cameron just reported with
incendiaries setting all that countryside alight.
In both capitals the developments had been watched with an anxiety which was
deepened by the utter impossibility of doing anything for the garrison. The Japanese
landings on the island had evidently surprised Mr. Churchill. He sent this
communication247 to the Governor:
21 Dec 41
Prime Minister to Governor, Hong Kong
We were greatly concerned to hear of the landings on Hong Kong Island which have been effected
by the Japanese. We cannot judge from here the conditions which rendered these landings possible or
prevented effective counterattacks upon the intruders. There must however be no thought of surrender.
Every part of the island must be fought and the enemy resisted with the utmost stubbornness.
The enemy should be compelled to expend the utmost life and equipment. There must be vigorous
fighting in the inner defences, and, if need be, from house to house. Every day that you are able to
maintain your resistance you help the Allied cause all over the world, and by a prolonged resistance you
and your men can win the lasting honour which we are sure will be your due.
The Canadian Government was disturbed by the paucity of information from the
besieged colony. On 20 December the Minister of National Defence sent through the War
Office a message248 to Brigadier Lawson asking for such as could be sent by whatever
means might be available. It added, "The anxious hearts and the hopes and confidence of
Canadian people are with you all in magnificent fight you are putting up against heavy
odds." Before this message was sent Lawson was dead, and when it reached Hong Kong
the senior surviving Canadian officer (Lt.-Col. Home) was cut off in Stanley Peninsula.
Lt.-Col. Sutcliffe answered it on 22 December, though for some reason the reply249 did
not reach Ottawa until the 27th. It reported the casualties to senior officers and said also:
. . . Situation critical. Canadian troops part prisoners residue engaged casualties heavy . . . Troops
have done magnificent work spirit excellent.
This was the last communication from the Canadians at Hong Kong.
The only possible hope of relief for the colony lay in the Chinese armies of Chiang
Kai-Shek, and they could do nothing in time. On 21 December the British military
attaché at Chungking informed the garrison that the main Chinese attack could not start
before 1 January but it was hoped that bombers could operate at once against Japanese
aerodromes. There is a vague report of some actual bombing at Kowloon on 20
December.250 The Japanese, we have seen, had disposed a regimental group, the Araki
Detachment, to prevent Chinese interference with the siege. It was stationed about
Tamshui, some 40 miles north-east of Hong Kong. The Japanese narrative states that
during the Hong Kong battle a Chinese force about one and a half divisions strong
advanced towards the detachment but attempted no active enterprise.251
A situation report from Hong Kong covering the period down to 5:00 p.m. on the
23rd again emphasized the fatigued condition of the troops and added, "Water and
transport situation still very grave." The Middlesex at Leighton Hill had beaten off a
determined attack..252 On the 24th it was reported that the Royal Scots had been driven off
the top of Mount Cameron during the night and were holding the lower western slopes. In
the late afternoon the Japanese, after heavy bombardment, finally captured Leighton
Hill.253
There were two enemy attacks in the Winnipeg Grenadiers' sector on this day. One,
directed against positions on the south slope of Mount Cameron about 9:30 p.m., was
beaten off after severe fighting.254 About midnight on Christmas Eve a Japanese attack
estimated as about two companies in strength pushed one platoon out of its position in the
Bennet's Hill area, but another platoon and the sailors held their ground tenaciously and
drove the enemy back.255
The dawn of Christmas Day found Hong Kong's defenders in desperate straits.
Nevertheless, when the Japanese that morning sent another request for surrender, carried
by two civilian prisoners, it was still refused, and the Governor reported to London,
"Stout fighting is going on. Enemy working toward centre of town. . . . All in very good
heart and send Christmas greetings”.256 This was a last gesture. A the :e-hour partial truce
resulted from the Japanese overture. When it expired at midday the enemy attacked
immediately and made rapid progress along the north shore. Mount Parish fell, the
Japanese got into Wan Chai Gap and were close to Fortress Headquarters.* All
communication with the isolated force in Stanley Peninsula had now been severed; and
the main body had only eight- mobile guns left, "with about sixty rounds per gun".258
In these circumstances General Maltby decided that more fighting meant merely
useless slaughter, and at 3:15 p.m. he and the Naval Commander advised the Governor
that "no further effective military resistance" could be made. Accordingly, the white flag
was hoisted;259 and the silence of defeat descended upon Hong Kong.
The Cost of the Defence
Canadian losses at Hong Kong were heavy. A total of 23 officers and 267 other ranks
were killed or died of wounds: five officers and 16 other ranks of Brigade Headquarters
(including Signals), seven and 123 of the Royal Rifles, and 11 and 128 of the Winnipeg
Grenadiers. This includes some who were murdered by the Japanese when trying to
surrender or after they had surrendered. Twenty-eight Canadian officers and 465 other
ranks were reported wounded.260 The enemy committed numerous acts of wanton
barbarism, and many of the defenders who had become prisoners were found butchered.$
The aid post at the Salesian Mission near Sau Ki Wan was the scene of particularly
revolting atrocities when it was overrun on the morning of 19 December.261
The casualties of the British, Colonial and Indian forces cannot be stated exactly.
General Maltby's dispatch indicates them as approximately 955 all ranks killed or died of
wounds, and 659 missing. These statistics are clearly far from final, but no better ones
have so far been compiled.
*The statement in General Maltby's Dispatch, that Bennet's Hill "had been completely surrounded and ... forced to
surrender" was evidently based on a false report. Evidence including the naval reports indicates that both the Winnipeg
Grenadiers and the sailors withdrew from the hill only after they had been notified of the general surrender.257
†This is the version given in the Royal Artillery report. The G.O.C.'s dispatch says six guns.
‡Major-General Tanaka Ryosaburo was in due time convicted by a War Crimes Court p4 sharing the responsibility
for the atrocities, and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.
The Japanese paid a considerable price for their victory, though it was not so high as
the British estimated it to be. General Maltby, who mistakenly believed that three
divisions had been engaged, thought that their losses might run as high as 3000 killed and
9000 wounded. The Japanese narrative now available states the casualties as 675 killed
and 2079 wounded.262 These categorical figures carry some conviction. They indicate that
Maltby's polyglot force exacted a very respectable toll.
Only a word can be said of the harrowing experiences of the Canadian prisoners of
war. Until 1943 all of them were kept in camps at Hong Kong. Mainly as a result of
conditions there, four officers (including Lt.-Col. Sutcliffe) and 124 other ranks died. In
addition, four soldiers were shot by the Japanese without trial when captured after
escaping.* A diphtheria epidemic in the summer and autumn of 1942 took 50 lives, the
chief reason being the refusal of proper medical facilities by the Japanese. The Canadian
medical officers nevertheless believe that this epidemic may have actually saved some
lives, for the Japanese ultimately put into isolation men suspected of having the disease,
who would otherwise have been forced to labour on Kai Tak aerodrome. Formerly, it had
been necessary to send sick and half-starved men out to work.263
Beginning in January 1943 a total of one Canadian officer (Capt. J. A. G. Reid,
R.C.A.M.C.) and 1183 other ranks were taken to Japan, where they were forced to work
in various industries, chiefly mining. Here again conditions were extremely bad, as
evidenced by the fact that 136 of these men died.264 Of the 1975 Canadians who sailed
from Vancouver in October 1941, there were 557265 who never returned to Canada.†
Some Comments on the Hong Kong Campaign
The sudden attack by Japan resulted in the Canadians who helped to defend Hong
Kong going into battle in unfavourable circumstances. The basic cause of their
misfortune was the inaccurate appreciation of Japanese intentions made by the western
powers in the early autumn of 1941. As we have seen, it was universally anticipated that
the Canadians would serve as garrison troops and would have ample time to accustom
themselves to conditions at Hong Kong and get further training. These expectations were
*Col. Tokunaga, Commandant of the Hong Kong prison camps, and Capt. Saito, Medical Officer, were tried by a
War Crimes court at Hong Kong in October 1946-February 1947 and sentenced to be hanged. The sentences were
commuted to life imprisonment and 20 years' imprisonment respectively, later further reduced to 20 years and 15 years.
†one man had died on the original voyage to Hong Kong. The two Canadian nursing sisters were repatriated in 1943.
disappointed, and the battalions were plunged into action without having
had a chance either to acquire a really thorough knowledge of their battleground or to
complete their training, which as we have seen left something to be desired. Nor did the
conditions of the short and nasty campaign permit the gradual acquisition of battle
wisdom through experience. The extraordinarily rugged terrain of Hong Kong was one of
the hardest battlefields on which Canadians fought in any theatre; and after their long sea
voyage, followed by brief training for a static role which they were never called upon to
play, the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers were not in good shape for fighting
on scrub-covered mountainsides.
The British dispositions for the campaign’s final phase-the defence of the island-left
the Canadians on the south shore facing the sea and gave other units the task of meeting
the first shock of the attack from the mainland. This arrangement was probably
influenced both by the desire to maintain the arrangements made before the outbreak of
hostilities (and to make no unnecessary moves), and to avoid placing the Canadian units,
whose field training was less advanced than the others’, in the front line. In practice, it
did not prove a particularly good one; once the Japanese had landed on the island and
made some progress, the Canadian battalions were practically the only reserve available
for counter-attack. This was the task for which their training least fitted them. At the
same time, General Maltby’s persistent and unfounded fear of a seaborne landing on the
south shore, by preventing a timely concentration against the menace from the land side,
helped to assure the Japanese of decisive numerical superiority in the actual engagements
on the island. It was unfortunate, also, that the dispositions did not permit of keeping the
two Canadian units together under their own brigadier.
The Royal Rifles of Canada and The Winnipeg Grenadiers would doubtless have
been more effective units if they had received more advanced training before going to
Hong Kong. But too much can be made of this. Their casualty lists show that their
contribution to the defence was a large one, and the Japanese accounts which have been
quoted attest the battalions’ solid fighting qualities. It is satisfactory to read in those
accounts that it was in areas where these battalions were the major units engaged that the
enemy encountered his greatest difficulties and suffered his heaviest losses.
We can see today that the decision to reinforce Hong Kong was a mistake. The idea
that the arrival of two Canadian battalions in the Far East could exercise an important
deterrent effect upon Japan was shown up, in the event, as an egregious absurdity, and
one which cost the Allied cause the
BLANK PAGE
loss of 2000 soldiers. However, the seventeen and a half days' fighting at Hong Kong was
not wholly useless. The colony's defenders inflicted nearly 3000 casualties upon the
Japanese and imposed some delay upon the further operations in which they swept on to
conquer the whole of South-East Asia and the East Indies.*
*The Japanese plan provided, as we have seen, that after completing the occupation of Hong Kong the troops
employed would be used against the Netherlands Indies. The 38th Division was in fact used in this manner. The 228th
Infantry Regiment was employed successively in Amboina, Timor and Java; the 229th and 230th went to Sumatra and later
to Java. Fate subsequently caught up with the 38th Division. The greater part of it was sent to Guadalcanal and was very
largely destroyed there during January and February 1943.266
CHAPTER XV
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE ALEUTIANS

(See Sketch 6)
The War in the Pacific, January-June 1942
F OR half a year after the fall of Hong Kong, the tide of Japanese conquest flowed
strongly and, it seemed, irresistibly. Allied naval power in the Pacific had been
temporarily crippled by the loss of H.M. Ships Prince of Wales and Repulse off Malaya
on 10 December 1941, and the tremendous damage done to the United States fleet at
Pearl Harbor.* And the Japanese made hay while the Rising Sun shone.
The Allies were astonished by the enemy's ability to conduct simultaneous offensives
in a number of widely separated areas. Invasion operations were launched in December
against Malaya, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, and smaller expeditions took Guam,
Wake Island and North Borneo. In January the Netherlands Indies were attacked, and the
attack there widened during the next month. On 15 February Singapore surrendered. The
last American garrison in the Philippines, that of the island of Corregidor in Manila Bay,
was overwhelmed on 6 May. By that time, the Japanese were also in control of most of
Burma and had footholds in New Guinea and the Solomons.
Although the Japanese had no immediate intention of attempting the conquest of
Australia, and still less of invading the mainland of North America, they undertook at this
period a further advance intended to widen their own defensive perimeter and cut their
enemies' supply lines. This entailed the completion of the occupation of New Guinea and
the Solomons; the seizure of Midway Island and bases in the Aleutian chain; and the
occupation of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa. The attempt to achieve the first of these
objects was checked in the Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May). The second was attempted
at the beginning of June. The Japanese hoped that it would bring on a successful fleet
action with the United States Pacific
*In fact, although six battleships were sunk at Pearl Harbor, the vessels which turned out to be most important-the
three aircraft carriers-were absent from the base at the time of the attack and escaped damage. Moreover, all naval shore
facilities at Pearl Harbor remained intact. These circumstances go far to explain the rapid renaissance of American naval
power.
492
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE ALEUTIANS 493
Fleet. It actually brought on the Battle of Midway (4-7 June) in which they were soundly
beaten. Midway remained in American hands; but the Japanese did gain a foothold in the
Aleutians. The third stage was never initiated, for the tide had turned.1
The Japanese Invade the Aleutians
On the map or on a globe, the Aleutian island chain appears to form something like a
natural bridge between North America and Asia and accordingly to be an area of great
strategic importance. These appearances are deceptive. The Aleutians themselves are
barren and very mountainous, with no natural resources to attract or maintain a
conqueror; and the weather conditions in those seas-persistent overcast, very frequent
fog, very high and variable winds - are acutely unfavourable to either air or naval
operations. Moreover, the distances are very great. It is true that it is only some 700
nautical miles from Attu, the westernmost island in the chain, to Paramushiro in the
Kuriles, the nearest pre-war Japanese base; but from Attu east to Dutch Harbor on
Unalaska Island at the base of the chain, the only American pre-war base in the
Aleutians, is about 800; and Dutch Harbor is some 1650 miles from Vancouver, and
Paramushiro roughly 1000 from Tokyo.2
The aims of the Japanese in going into the Aleutians in 1942 were evidently mainly
defensive-to obtain a firm anchor for the left flank of their perimeter and to prevent the
Americans from using the islands as an offensive base; although their records, it appears,
do not support the idea that they feared an actual American attempt to invade Japan by
this route.3 It was hoped that the islands would provide useful bases for flying boat
patrols. Probably prestige-the effect both in Japan and in the United States of the
occupation of territory which could be claimed as part of North America—had a good
deal to do with the project. At any rate, it was carried out as a secondary part of the
Midway offensive. Three Japanese naval forces were employed in it. The Second Mobile
Force, built around two aircraft carriers, was to deliver an air attack against Dutch Harbor
and cover and support two occupation forces. One of these was to seize the islands of
Adak and Attu (the former being occupied only long enough to destroy any American
installations);* the other was to occupy Kiska. The plan in the first instance was to
withdraw from the islands before the winter.4
The plan was carried out, but not as written. The first air "strike" went in on Dutch
Harbor on 3 June, causing limited damage. A second the
*There were none. The Japanese knew remarkably little about the American forces and dispositions in the Aleutians.
following day was more successful. This was the day the Japanese lost four carriers at
Midway. This untoward event led Admiral Yamamoto to cancel the Aleutian occupation,
but almost immediately he reversed himself and ordered it to proceed. Adak, however,
was not occupied. American fighters from a new airfield on Umnak Island, of whose
existence the Japs had been ignorant, had taken toll of the attackers, and this may have
influenced the decision to leave Adak alone. Japanese forces landed on Kiska on the
afternoon of 6 June and on Attu early the following morning.* There were no American
troops on either to oppose them, and the Americans did not discover the occupation until
four days after it had begun.5
Following the landings of 6 and 7 June, the Japanese build-up was comparatively
slow. Kiska was reinforced with 1200 men early in July, and most of the Attu garrison
was moved to Kiska in August and September. In the autumn, however, the enemy high
command decided to retain the islands permanently. Attu was reoccupied at the end of
October and a programme of constructing defence works and airfields was put in hand
with February 1943 as the target date for completion. A limited air effort was maintained,
but weather and Allied aircraft combined to make it of very little value. The garrisons of
Attu and Kiska were gradually reinforced, with increasing difficulty as the U.S. blockade
tightened, until in the spring of 1943 Attu had about 2500 men. Kiska had close to 6000,
including a considerable number of civilians. No further Japanese advances took place
and the enemy led a precarious and uncomfortable existence until evicted.6
The Counter-Offensive Against the Islands
United States Army Air Force bombers from Cold Bay at the tip of the Alaskan
peninsula, staging through Umnak, attacked Kiska as early as 11 June 1942. From then
on, Kiska was hit frequently. Attu had to wait until new American bases were established
farther west than Umnak. These were found at Adak (occupied on 30 August 1942), and
Amchitka—only 80 miles from Kiska—where American forces landed on 12 January
1943. Attu was under air bombardment at intervals from November 1942 onwards.7 In
these air operations the Royal Canadian Air Force played a part. No. 8 (Bomber
Reconnaissance) Squadron and No. 1.11 (Fighter) Squadron moved to Anchorage from
bases in British Columbia, 2-8 June 1942, and in July an air and ground party of No. 111
moved forward to Umnak. No. 14 (Fighter) Squadron went to Umnak in March 1943 and
the next month relieved No. 111, which had moved up to Amchitka; thereafter these two
squadrons alternated in operations in the forward area. The R.C.A.F. had
*All times and dates are those of the Alaskan zone.

just one air combat, in which a Japanese Zero was shot down; otherwise, the enemy
opposition took the form of anti-aircraft fire against the strafing Canadian planes. In the
Aleutians airmen found the weather more dangerous than the Japs.8
The United States Navy was also busily harassing the intruders. Its submarines were
active around the islands, and on 7 August 1942 a cruiser force delivered the first of
many bombardments against Kiska. On 18 February 1943 Attu was bombarded, and on
19 February a munition ship bound for that island was intercepted and sunk. On 26
March an attempt by the Japanese Navy to reinforce Attu was frustrated by Rear Admiral
C. H. McMorris, who beat off a superior force in the Battle of the Komandorski Islands.9
A strong case could have been made for leaving the Japs to freeze in their own juice
on Kiska and Attu, where they were at most a nuisance to American operations in the
Pacific. However, their presence naturally worried the inhabitants of Alaska, British
Columbia and the Pacific Coast states, and there was thus a "political" motive for ejecting
them. Lieut.General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the U.S. Western Defence
Command (which included the Alaska Defence Command) asked the War Department in
Washington as early as 14 June 1942 to set up an expeditionary force for the purpose.
Washington, however, recognizing that there were far more urgent problems at that
moment, proceeded with caution. The only immediate action taken was the occupation of
Adak. Later, in December 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in authorizing the
occupation of Amchitka, ordered General DeWitt to prepare a force for an attack on
Kiska. The Americans went to the Casablanca conference next month intending to
advocate this operation; but General Marshall "came to fear" that the British might
construe such a proposal as implying the diversion of large forces to a secondary Pacific
theatre, and a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs dated 22 January 1943 accordingly
merely advocated that Allied policy should be to "make the Aleutians as secure as may
be". This vague and modest formula was written into the agreed conclusions of the
conference.10
The result of this was that the Kiska operation was postponed; but RearAdmiral
Thomas C. Kinkaid, U.S.N., Commander North Pacific Force and in overall command of
all three services in the Alaska theatre, proposed instead an attack on Attu, where the
enemy's garrison and defences were weaker. This would not entail much diversion of
forces from other theatres. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the scheme in March 1943;
and after due preparation the 7th Division of the U.S. Army assaulted Attu on 11 May.
This was the beginning of a thoroughly nasty little campaign, in which the Japanese
fought to be killed and the Americans obliged them. A final Banzai charge on 29 May
was followed by mopping up. The U.S. commander
reported 2350 Japs killed; only 24 allowed themselves to be taken prisoners.11

The garrison of Kiska remained to be dealt with. The question received some
attention, along with much more important matters, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff
during the "Trident" conference in Washington (12-25 May 1943). The U.S. planners
argued that until the Japanese were driven out of Kiska the United States would have to
keep large air and ground forces in the Aleutians and was obliged to "disperse naval
forces to that area"; the Japanese must therefore be expelled. This argument was accepted
by the Combined Chiefs, and the final conclusions of the conference, as approved by
President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, included "Ejection of the Japanese from the
Aleutians" as one of the objects of operations in the Pacific in 1943-44.12 On 24 May, the
second-last day of the conference, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly authorized
planning and training for the attack on Kiska, and subsequently gave final approval for
the enterprise.13
We have already noted the part played by the R.C.A.F. in Alaska. The Royal
Canadian Navy, although it had only minor forces available on the Pacific Coast, placed
these vessels and its port facilities at the U.S. Command's disposal as soon as the threat to
the Aleutians developed. At this time the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean
Areas, placed "all Army, Navy, and Canadian forces in the Alaskan-Aleutian theater"
under the Commander Task Force 8, later North Pacific Force (then Rear-Admiral Robert
A. Theobald).14 The Canadian Army's activity in Alaska was limited in the first instance
to the anti-aircraft defence of Annette Island (above, page 174). Now, however, it was
brought into the Kiska project. This piece of cooperation resulted from very informal
American suggestions which were warmly taken up in Canada. On 19 April General
DeWitt had visited General Pearkes at Vancouver and given him an outline of the
operations projected in the Aleutians commencing early in May. Pearkes reported this to
Ottawa. There had apparently been no actual suggestion of Canadian assistance.* On 10
May, however, General Pope in Washington reported to the Chief of the General Staff
(General Stuart) that the Secretary of the American section of the Permanent Joint Board
on Defence, Mr. J. D. Hickerson, had suggested to him that it would be eminently
appropriate if Canadian forces cooperated in removing the existing threat in the
Aleutians. The following day General Stuart telegraphed General Pearkes referring to the
latter's earlier report and inquiring whether it was "too late to consider some form of army
participation".15 (The C.G.S. did not know that U.S. troops had landed on Attu that day,
for the operation was not announced until some days later.) On 12 May General Pope was
instructed to approach General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,
*The General Staff report on the organization of the Kiska force, prepared later, states that the matter was discussed
on this occasion, but there is no reference to it in General Pearkes' report sent at that time.
and had an interview with him the following afternoon. Marshall received the suggestion
of Canadian assistance cordially and proceeded to consult the_ Western Defence
Command. On 24 May he wrote Pope that he had had a message from General DeWitt
stating that both he and Major-General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General, Alaska
Defence Command, were "delighted at the prospect of having units of the Canadian
forces associated with his Command in present and future operations in the Aleutian
area".16
DeWitt now presented to Pearkes two requests: one for the immediate provision of
one infantry battalion and a light anti-aircraft battery "to be ready to move 15 June to
reinforce Amchitka or Attu in case of counteroffensive"; the other, the provision in
August of a brigade group for "offensive operations"-that is, the attack on Kiska. These
proposals were placed before the Cabinet War Committee at a special meeting on 27
May, and although final decision was postponed pending a more formal approach from
the United States the consensus was that the second of the two proposals was preferable.
On 31 May a further meeting of the Committee considered a letter from the U.S.
Secretary of War (Colonel Henry L. Stimson) to Colonel Ralston, extending a formal
invitation in general terms;* and approval was then given for the employment of a
brigade group. The battalion scheme was not proceeded with.17 Arrangements had already
been made, on the initiative of General Pearkes, to send ten Canadian officers to the
Aleutian theatre as observers.18
The decision was taken to use the headquarters of the 13th Infantry Brigade and the
three infantry battalions in Pacific Command which were numerically strongest: The
Canadian Fusiliers, The Winnipeg Grenadiers (re-formed after the destruction of the
previous active battalion at Hong Kong), and The Rocky Mountain Rangers.19
Subsequently, it being considered desirable to include a French-speaking unit, Le
Regiment de Hull was added.20 It took the place of the battalion of Combat Engineers
included in the assault organization of the U.S. regimental combat team, which was
equivalent to a Canadian brigade group, and one of its companies was attached to each of
the three battalion combat teams into which the Canadian force was divided. The other
major units chosen were the 24th Field Regiment and the 46th Light Anti-Aircraft
Battery R.C.A., the 24th Field Company R.C.E., a company of The Saint John Fusiliers
(M.G.), and the 25th Field Ambulance R.C.A.M.C.21 The code name "Greenlight" was
assigned to the special training to be given the force (the actual operation against Kiska
was called "Cottage").22
*This letter was written on the suggestion of the Canadian Army Staff, Washington, acting on the instructions of the
Minister of National Defence. The idea caused some initial surprise at the War Department, which was accustomed to work
through more exclusively military channels.
The G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army was asked to nominate a commander for the
force, and Brigadier H. W. Foster was brought back from England to take the
appointment. With him came Major W. S. Murdoch, for the appointment of Brigade
Major. As it was decided to organize the brigade headquarters on the U.S. staff system he
was promoted lieutenant colonel and appointed Chief of Staff.23
The units were brought up to strength and were assembled as soon as possible for
combined operations training, two battalion combat teams at Nanaimo and one at
Courtenay. The major units were concentrated by 1,4 June.24 The programme included
hardening and toughening training, weapon and tactical training, and amphibious training
comprising work with assault craft, organization of beaches, and loading and unloading
of vehicles.25 It was complicated by the arrival of unfamiliar American equipment.
Although in general Canadian weapons were to be used, the U.S. 81-millimetre mortar
was substituted for the Canadian 3-inch, and in the field artillery regiment a proportion of
25-pounders (12) was replaced by U.S. 75-millimetre pack howitzers, to provide a
support weapon capable of being manhandled across rough country. The U.S. 30-calibre
carbine was used as a personal weapon for officers.26 All transport vehicles were of
American types, but little transport of any type could be used on the Aleutian terrain. The
Canadians wore their own battledress, but were outfitted with U.S. special Alaskan
clothing and U.S. web equipment. American sleeping bags were issued. The
administrative task resulting from these equipment adjustments was tremendous, and
there were even larger ones on the personnel side. Not only had the units to be brought up
to full strength, but it was necessary to ensure that no men were included who had not
had four months' training, or who were not physically fit for action. The job was made
heavier by the fact that while it was in progress the date of the operation was put forward
and the time available reduced from two months to six weeks.27
The units contained a great many soldiers enrolled for compulsory service under the
National Resources Mobilization Act. One of the reasons adduced by the C.G.S. for
taking part in the Kiska enterprise was that "The use of Home Defence personnel in an
active theatre will serve to break down the hostile attitude with which Home Defence
personnel are regarded by large sections of the Canadian public."28 As we have seen
(above, page 123) an order in council of 18 June 1943 authorized the employment of such
personnel in Alaska, including the Aleutians.29 This was put into effect with some
caution. Under its terms, the Minister of National Defence issued on 11 July a
"Direction" permitting the dispatch of the "Greenlight" force for "training, service or
duty" at Adak or points in Alaska "east of Adak"-i.e., those parts of the Aleutians then
firmly in American hands.30
Only on 12 August,* following receipt of a formal report32 from the Vice Chief of the
General Staff (Major-General Murchie), who went to Adak for the purpose, that the state
of the force was in all respects satisfactory and the plan represented "a practical operation
of war", was "Direction No. 2" issued removing this limitation, and Pacific Command
authorized to allow the force to proceed.33
Fiasco at Kiska
On 12 July the 13th Infantry Brigade Group sailed from the Vancouver Island ports
of Nanaimo and Chemainus in four U.S. transports. Its actual embarkation strength was
4831 all ranks. j- At this time 165 men were reported absent without leave.35 Pacific
Command attributed these absences largely to the fact that "in the space of about a
month, or less, we had to replace about one third of the existing personnel in every unit",
and to resultant resentment among men who had found themselves tossed from one unit
to another.36 It is perhaps significant that Le Regiment de Hull, which had suffered less
disruption of its "other ranks" than the other units, had only six men absent, while the
other battalions had considerably larger numbers.37
The status of the Canadian brigade commander in relation to the American forces was
defined in instructions approved by the Cabinet War Committee on 18 June and
subsequently issued by the Chief of the General Staff to the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific
Command38 and transmitted by the latter to Brigadier Foster in a formal letter of
appointment.39 An order in council40 authorized an arrangement, similar to that made earlier
with respect to the First Special Service Force (above, page 108), by which each member of
the U.S. armed forces serving in Alaska should "for the purposes of command only (but not
discipline and/or punishment) be deemed to be a member of the Military Forces of Canada
with rank therein equivalent to that held by him" in the U.S. forces. This was on a
reciprocal basis between the two national forces. Brigadier Foster was instructed that "the
operational control exercisable by the United States Commander shall be
*This was at the very last moment, since the force sailed from Adak on 13 August. Generals Murchie and Pearkes
had arrived there on 6 August. Since it would have been scarcely practicable for the Canadians to have disrupted at this
stage what seemed an important Allied operation, the V.C.G.S.'s report appears little more than a formality. General Pope
in Washington subsequently commented that this episode seemed to indicate that "what is needed is a little more political
confidence at home".31 It seems likely that these precautions had their origins in the criticisms directed at the Government
in connection with the organization of the Hong Kong expedition.
†This was as reported on 5 August. The report sent on the day of embarkation indicated exactly 4800.34
observed in letter and spirit as fully as if he were a Canadian officer". However, certain
emergency powers were, as usual, held in reserve. . General Pearkes wrote:
10. Each Government has reserved itself . . . the right under extraordinary circumstances to withdraw
from the undertaking. You as the Senior Combatant Officer are empowered to exercise this right of
withdrawal, but it cannot be exercised at any lower level. The authority extends to withdrawal of the
whole or any part of the force but any such action should only be taken after consultation with me
except where there is not sufficient time to enable consultation feasibly to be carried out and it is
necessary to act without consultation.
11. In addition to the foregoing the Canadian participation in the campaign is subject to the retention by
you as Senior Combatant Officer of the right to refer to the Canadian Government through this
Headquarters in respect of any matter in which such force is likely to be involved or committed.
No occasion for the use of these emergency powers ever arose.

Brigadier Foster was informed that his force upon arrival at Adak would come under
the command of Lieut.-General Buckner (as he had now become); subsequently Buckner
would place it under MajorGeneral C. H. Corlett, the Military Task Force Commander.41
Admiral Kinkaid controlled the whole Kiska operation, taking his orders in turn from
Admiral Nimitz, C.-in-C. Pacific Ocean Areas.42
The 13th Brigade Group were not the only Canadians taking part. The "Trident"
conference had briefly discussed the employment of the First Special Service Force
("Plough" Force) and the view had been expressed that it should be given some battle
experience as soon as possible. General Marshall said it was perhaps a pity that it had not
been used at Attu; but there might be an opportunity of using it in "another operation in
that area".43 The United States proceeded to suggest using the force in the Kiska attack,
and the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet approved this on 11 June.* A month
later the Force with its Canadian component sailed from San Francisco Bay for
Amchitka. There it did its final training.45
On 21 July the 13th Brigade Group disembarked at Adak, where it joined the main
body of General Corlett's "Amphibian Training Force 9".46 Here a programme of intensive
combined training was carried out under the direction of Major-General Holland M.
Smith, U.S. Marine Corps. Its high point was a landing exercise held on Great Sitkin
Island the first week in August.47 Thereafter nothing remained but the operation. On 8
August General Pearkes established at Adak an Advanced Headquarters, Pacific
Command from which he could observe at close quarters.48 D Day was 15 August; on 30
July a conference of officers at Adak, at which Brigadier Foster was not present, had
recommended putting it off until the 24th to permit of further training, but Admiral
Nimitz refused to allow this.49 On
*This approval following an informal suggestion, anticipated a formal request which was made next day.44
13 August, accordingly, the assault force sailed from Adak for Kiska. General Corlett had
under his command 34,426 soldiers; of these, including the 1st Special Service Battalion,
some 5300 were Canadians.50
In the light of the sequel, there is no point in describing the assault plan in great
detail. Fire support was very heavy. The island had been heavily bombarded on 22 July
and 2 August by air and sea forces, and less heavily on other occasions; and to cover the
landings there were three battleships, two cruisers and 19 destroyers. The main Japanese
defences and installations were on the south and east side of the "caterpillar-shaped
island".51 The scheme accordingly was to deliver the bombardment support and a feint
landing on this side, while the real landings were made in two sectors on the north and
west. On both these sectors units of the First Special Service Force would be the first men
ashore. On 15 August they would precede U.S. troops landing in the Southern Sector; on
16 August the Northern landing, in which the 13th Brigade would take part, was to be
made. American troops would land here on the left portion of the sector, followed by the
Canadian brigade on the right. The Northern Sector was commanded by Brig.-Gen.
Joseph L. Ready.52
The landings took place as scheduled, but there was no opposition. The Japanese had
decamped, and the invasion was a blow in the air. Conviction that the enemy was really
gone came to the attackers only gradually — the more so as the Southern force on the
first day "reported having seen a few laps and received a few rifle shots".53 There were
cases of mistaken identity in the fog, and some casualties in consequence. The Canadians
had one soldier wounded by unidentified machine-gun fire on 16 August, and one officer
killed by a mine the following day; later three other fatal casualties were caused by
enemy booby-traps or accidents with ammunition.54
The story of the evacuation is now available from Japanese sources. While the
fighting on Attu was still in progress, the Japanese decided to withraw the Kiska garrison
and use it to strengthen the Kuriles. The decision was promulgated in an Imperial
Headquarters directive of 21 May.55 An attempt was made to remove the men by
submarine, and 820, more than half of them civilians, are said to have been safely
brought away in this manner; but this was done at a cost of four submarines lost to the
U.S. Navy or navigational hazards, and three others damaged; and the effort was
abandoned late in June.56 Orders were then issued for the job to be done by surface forces
under cover of fog. The force detailed for the enterprise made one unsuccessful attempt,
being driven back to Paramushiro on 17 July by unsuitable weather and shortage of fuel.57
A second try was favoured by fortune, in spite of collisions on 25 July which
incapacitated two ships. On 28 July (West Longitude date), while one light cruiser stood
off south of Kiska, two others and a flotilla of destroyers dashed in through the fog to the
island. The garrison was waiting eagerly, and the whole remaining force-according to the
best Japanese source,58 5183 servicemen and civilians-were jammed aboard the cruisers
and six of the destroyers in, it appears, less than one hour. The force dashed out again and
reached Paramushiro in safety.59
The American naval blockade of Kiska had heretofore been notably effective, and the
failure to intercept the evacuation force was due to bad luck as well as to Japanese skill in
utilizing Aleutian weather. On 23 July a U.S. aircraft reported radar contact with vessels
south-west of Attu. What vessels, if any, these were, is unknown; but the American
battleship and cruiser force in the area moved against them, and the two destroyers
blockading Kiska were taken off station to join it. On the night of 25-26 July the
American ships' radar appeared to indicate the presence of enemy vessels, and heavy fire
was directed at these radar targets; but it subsequently appeared that what had been seen
were merely "return echoes" from distant islands. On 28 July, while the Japs were
running in to Kiska, the American force, including a destroyer detailed to re-establish the
blockade, was fuelling from a tanker 105 miles south-south-east of the island.60
The Japs left Kiska eighteen days before the Americans and Canadians made their
abortive assault. How did it happen that U.S. Intelligence at Adak did not detect their
absence? This misfortune, which led to an attack by 34,000 men on an empty island,
requires some analysis.
Fog prevented aerial reconnaissance of Kiska between 26 July and 2 August. On the
latter date photographs were taken which showed many buildings destroyed and many
barges formerly present missing. However, a number of returning pilots reported some
machine-gun and small arms fire from the ground, and similar reports continued to be
made on subsequent days. There were also reports of fresh digging, etc. But there were
no radio transmissions from the island after 28 July, and pilots reported its radar no
longer working; and repeated naval bombardments drew no reply, except for one report
of "very light" return fire on 3 August and a similar one on 12 August.61
The reports made by No. 14 (Fighter) Squadron, R.C.A.F., on its Kittyhawk sorties
over Kiska represent a fair sample of the intelligence picture. Beginning on 3 August and
continuing through 12 August the squadron flew seven missions (a total of 33 individual
sorties) against Kiska. The only indication of the presence of the enemy resulting from
any of these was the report of a single pilot (one of seven in the mission) on 3 August that
he had seen seven bursts of anti-aircraft fire. On 10 August the mission reported "no A.A.
or M.G. fire of any kind, encountered during the whole
trip-all at low levels". On 11 August the report was "No signs of life seen anywhere . . .
No A.A. or M.G. fire received."62
Looking at the record a decade later, it may seem remarkable that the evidence on the
side of evacuation did not receive more credence. But in 1943 the Japanese were
credited-and with reason-with unusual talent for ingenuity and trickery; and the
interpretation of the evidence adopted at Adak seemed plausible. The 13th Brigade's
operation order, dated 9 August, observed, "As a result of heavy air and naval
bombardments enemy forces have been driven into the hinterland and may be met with in
small groups on any part of the Island. It is not known which of the installations ... are
now occupied and which have been vacated." On 17 August, when the real situation was
becoming clear, General Pearkes wrote from Adak, "At the beginning of August he [the
enemy] apparently evacuated his main camps and moved, so everyone thought here, into
battle positions on the beaches and in the hills. His radar and radio ceased operating and
it was believed that they had been put out of action. There was considerable movement of
barges around the coastline of the Island which seemed to fit in with the general ideas of
the redistribution of the enemy forces on the Island.”63
How is one to explain the rather numerous reports by airmen of antiaircraft fire from
Kiska after 28 July? It has been suggested that the Japanese left behind a rear party which
was to fire light weapons to deceive Allied airmen and naval observers, and which was
later removed by submarine.64 The suggestion is inherently improbable, for the one thing
which any deception party would have been certain to do was keep the radio operating.
But in any case the information from Japanese sources now available offers no support
whatever for the idea of a rear party.65 Capt. Arichika Rokuji, chief of staff of the 1st
Destroyer Squadron which conducted the evacuation, said in 1945, "There was no one
left ashore except for three dogs; however, timed explosives were left to detonate a few
days later to give the impression that troops were still present and going about the
business of changing the defences."66 These delayed-action charges, plus fog and cloud,
must be the explanation of the reports made by the sailors and airmen.
It appears that suggestions were made that it would be desirable to undertake a
reconnaissance of the island with boat parties; but "doubts of enemy resistance were not
compelling enough to result in advance reconnaissance of Kiska except from the air67." In
the light of hindsight, this decision seems unfortunate. It was a pity to give the enemy the
satisfaction of laughing at us.
On the basis of the experience of Attu, the Kiska enterprise might have produced a
very bloody campaign. Thanks to the Japanese withdrawal,
this was avoided. The enemy had lost his only foothold in the North American zone, and
this was a source of satisfaction. From the Canadian point of view, however, it was
particularly unfortunate that the episode could be presented as such a ridiculous anti-
climax. It had been hoped, as we have seen, that participation by N.R.M.A. soldiers in an
active campaign would improve the attitude of the public towards them. The Kiska affair
certainly had no such result. This was the more regrettable as the N.R.M.A. men had
behaved admirably. Their discipline was good and their morale high, and Brigadier
Foster received many compliments from United States officers on their general standard
of behaviour.68
The 13th Infantry Brigade Group remained on Kiska for more than three months,
living in "winterized" tents, and engaged in road and pier construction, transport fatigues,
building and manning defences, and carrying on such training as conditions permitted.
Fog, rain and wind made the island an acutely unpleasant residence, and the troops were
heartily glad when the withdrawal to British Columbia began in November 1943. The last
shipload of Canadians left Kiska on 12 January 1944.69 The Special Service Force had
left much earlier, and were back in the United States by 1 September .70
Though the Kiska enterprise had not brought the action that had been expected, it had
been well completed and had set some precedents. This was the first occasion when
Canadian units operated in the field under United States higher command and on United
States organization. These arrangements worked very satisfactorily. It was also the first
occasion in history when an expedition left the shores of Canada prepared and equipped
with a view to immediate offensive action, and the arduous task of administration which
this necessitated appears to have been well performed.
CHAPTER XVI
PACIFIC PLANS AND ENTERPRISES

1943-1945
(See Sketch 7)
I F WE disregard the work of a few individuals, the Canadian Army did no fighting in
the Pacific in the later stages of the war. However, Army units and personnel did some
useful work of other sorts, and had the war against Japan been prolonged a considerable
force of Canadian soldiers would have taken part in it.
Eyes on the Kuriles
With the Aleutians cleared of the Japanese, American planners in the North Pacific
began to think of the possibility of pursuing the enemy into his base in the Kurile Islands,
to which he had retired from Kiska. General Pearkes, when at Adak for the Kiska
enterprise in August 1943, found "Generals DeWitt, Buckner, Admiral Kinkaid and all
the Senior Officers . . . terribly anxious to get on to the Kuriles". The question of
Canadian participation naturally arose. Pearkes. wrote privately to his Brigadier General
Staff, "My own view is, as you know, that it is of the utmost importance that we get in
this battle if we are to be considered as a Pacific Power. . . . If Canadian troops are to be
employed I feel that we should have not less than 3 Bde. Groups; 2 possibly to take part
in the initial operation and one to be in the Aleutians ready as reinforcements or to follow
up the initial successes gained. The Regt. de Hull is doing so well here that I am inclined
to think that it might be of great political value if one of the Bdes. were composed of
mainly French Canadians."1 On 13 August General Pearkes wrote to the Chief of the
General Staff along these lines, recommending that the force then at Kiska should be
"expanded to three Tactical Groups or Combat Teams (total 12 Battalions plus attached
troops)", with a view to the possibility of an attack on the Kuriles.2
506
PACIFIC PLANS AND ENTERPRISES, 1943-1945 507

The 6th Division, as we have already seen (above, page 185), was reorganized
accordingly, the War Committee of the Cabinet being told on 31 August that this would
meet the possibility of participation in further operations in the North Pacific area.
However, the idea of an enterprise against the Kuriles ultimately found favour neither in
Washington nor in Ottawa. The Anglo-American strategists, meeting at Quebec
immediately after the occupation of Kiska, cautiously included in their approved Pacific
programme for 1943-44 "Consideration of operations against Paramushiro and the
Kuriles".3 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff referred the matter to their Joint Planning Staff,
which was doubtful of the project. It was considered that it was unlikely to be useful
unless Russia entered the war against Japan; and with this rather remote possibility in
view immediate measures authorized in the Aleutians were limited to a moderate
programme of base expansion. No invasion of the Kuriles was ever attempted, but for the
rest of the war they suffered sporadic bombing from the Aleutians, and the Japanese kept
large forces tied up there to provide against the menace.4
In Ottawa the Prime Minister subsequently discouraged the idea. He suggested that it
would be undesirable to incur large commitments in manpower merely to provide against
the possibility of American requests for cooperation, or for the Canadian government to
put itself in the position of inviting such requests, which might lead to commitments
beyond Canadian capacity. The upshot was that the prescribed tasks of the 6th Division,
one of which was to serve "as a trained force for any future commitments which may be
undertaken in the Pacific Theatre of operations", were maintained (Colonel Ralston
specified that this was the case even in March 1944, when he approved withdrawing
General Service personnel from the Division for service overseas);5 but no further
operational commitments were made or suggested.
Observers in the Pacific
When the part to be played by the Canadian Army in the Pacific after the defeat of
Germany came under discussion, the question immediately arose of sending officers to
the Pacific theatres to gain some preliminary experience of conditions there. And when it
began to be evident that there was a possibility of Canadian forces being closely
associated with U.S. forces in the final stages of the war against Japan it was evident that
officers should be sent as soon as possible to become acquainted with American
organization and methods.
In February 1944 arrangements were made for ten Canadian officers to be attached to
the U.S. Army in the Pacific, eight to Australian forces . and two to New Zealand forces.
(These two subsequently joined the group with the Australians, which was also enlarged
by the addition of three intelligence officers.)6 During the following summer these
officers saw a good deal of the Pacific War; most of those attached to the Americans
were present during the bitter fighting on Saipan, while the group sent to the Australians
saw training in Australia, operations in New Guinea and (with a U.S. division) the
capture of Morotai in the Moluccas.7 Two officers not included in the twenty just
mentioned had special attachments. One (Major R. F. Routh) went to G.H.Q. South West
Pacific Area and subsequently to H.Q. South East Asia Command, and was wounded
while attached to a British battalion in Burma; the other (Lt.-Col. W. A. Bean) spent
several months in Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas command and was with the 1st
U.S. Marine Division in the assault on Peleliu.8
Arrangements had been made about the same time with the War Office in London for
attachment of 20 officers of the Canadian Army Overseas to the South East Asia
Command. The number was later increased to 22. The party left England in the early
summer of 1944, a twenty-third officer following in the autumn. After a period of attach-
ment to training units and establishments, the members of the group were sent to the
Fourteenth Army and 15th Indian Corps in Burma, and were very actively employed in
command or staff appointments in the same manner as the Canadians sent earlier to the
First Army in Tunisia (above, page 248). After seeing a great deal of mixed service, they
were returned to the United Kingdom early in 1945. One of them had been wounded in
action.9
In November 1944 the U.S. authorities were asked and agreed to accept three
successive groups of ten Canadian officers each for attachment to American units in the
Pacific. In March 1945 they agreed to take fifteen more officers.10 As a result of these
arrangements, Canadian observers were present during the later stages of the liberation of
the Philippines* and through the bloody campaign on Okinawa (1 April30 June 1945)
which gave the U.S. forces a base only some 300 miles from the southernmost of the
Japanese home islands.12 Three Canadians were wounded during this latter campaign.13
From these various observation missions a considerable number of Canadian officers
gleaned important information concerning the practice both of our allies and our enemies
in the Pacific; and the observers' written reports were the means of disseminating this
information widely in the army.
*In addition, at least one of the original group had been present during the initial larding on Leyte on 1 October
1944.11
In June 1945 it was calculated that a total of 95 Canadian Army officers had had
actual experience in the various Pacific. theatres of operations-33 on the staff and 62 as
regimental officers.14 In addition, four officers had attended the Staff School (Australia)
as students or instructors, and 16 had attended or were. attending various staff courses in
the United States. There was thus a respectable nucleus available for training and guiding
the Canadian Army Pacific Force.
Canadians in Australia
Apart from these attachments of officers made for Canadian purposes, some 400
officers and men of the Army were sent to Australia by way of technical assistance to the
Australian forces.
In 1944 radar equipment of Canadian design and manufacture (see above, page 159)
was being sent to Australia for use in northern Australia, New Guinea and various island
outposts. In March 1944 Australia asked for technicians to maintain these sets, and a
small cadre for instructional duty at the radar wing of the Australian School of Electrical
and Mechanical Engineering. The Cabinet War Committee concurred on 26 April, and
the party, totalling nine officers and 64 other ranks, arrived in Australia in the following
September. These experts worked in the Australian zone until the end of the war with
Japan. In the summer of 1945 a number of them were posted to anti-aircraft units in
Borneo and Morotai.15 Other Canadians employed in Australia were the personnel of No.
1 Special Wireless Group, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, which was sent out early in
1945.16
A few Canadians went to India, in charge of mules. Early in 1944 the British Army
Staff, Washington, then initiating shipment of mules on behalf of the Government of
India, asked if Canada could provide men to "conduct" mules from New York to Karachi.
The Canadian authorities agreed, and four shiploads of mules were taken to India by
Canadian Army parties, the first sailing in March 1944, the last in April 1945. Three of
the parties were furnished by the Veterans Guard of Canada, the fourth by No. 2 General
Employment Company. In all, 179 Canadians* made the trip to India, escorting about
1600 mules.17
Policy on Participation in the Pacific
Serious consideration began to be given to Canadian participation in the final phase

of the war against Japan about the beginning of 1944. When
*Not counting one man in the last party who became ill on the outward voyage and was dropped off at Gibraltar. One
officer and three other ranks who made two trips are counted only once.
the Prime Minister of Canada went to England for the Conference of Commonwealth
Prime Ministers held in May of that year he took with him a General Staff appreciation
which did little more than point out that Canadian Army forces might operate either with
British forces from Burma and Malaya, or with U.S. forces "on the other flank", through
Hawaii and perhaps the Aleutians. In the former case the troops might come from the
Canadian Army Overseas (one division was suggested "as a basis for discussion"); in the
latter case the troops "would be best supplied from the Army in Canada"-as many brigade
groups as could be "secured from the forces available". No recommendation was made as
between the two possibilities, nor is it entirely clear whether the two were considered
mutually exclusive.18
There was little discussion of the question at the London conference, but after Mr.
King's return to Canada the Canadian civil and military authorities dealt with it further so
far as they could do so in the absence of information of any settled overall strategy. On
27 June Mr. King cabled Mr. Churchill suggesting that Canada's position in the matter
was subject to certain "special considerations". The message dealt . mainly with the
R.C.A.F., and the direction in which opinion in Ottawa was moving was indicated in the
remark, "It would clearly be very difficult to have the major Canadian air effort based,
say, on South East Asia if large United States forces were to operate from Northwest
America".19 General Murchie, the Chief of the General Staff, had written on 13 June, "it
would appear desirable that the Canadian Army participation should take place at a stage
and in a theatre where its operations would be directed against Japan proper or against the
Japanese Army in China proper rather than in preliminary campaigns in Burma or the
Malay Peninsula"; this would entail less retraining than operations in tropical areas.20
Churchill referred the matter to the British War Cabinet's Joint Planning Staff, which on
24 July produced an aide-memoire on the employment of Canadian forces after the defeat
of Germany.21 This, while again unable to offer a firm recommendation "until the main
strategy is decided", agreed that it might be appropriate for Canadian land forces to make
their contribution in the North Pacific in the event of the main invasion threat against the
Japanese homeland being directed from that area. It recommended that Canadian land
forces allocated to the war against Japan should be moved to Canada as soon as
practicable; and suggested that an appropriate contribution, allowing for some
demobilization after the defeat of Germany, would be two divisions, in addition to one
employed in the occupation of Germany.
The Canadian Chiefs of Staff reviewed this paper and on 6 September made formal and
definite recommendations to their Ministers.22 They considered that "Canada's contribution
should be based on Canadian capabilities and proportionate to the continuing effort of the
United Kingdom
and the United States". It emphasized the importance of the North Pacific area to Canada
and recommended that, in the event of a major effort being inaugurated by way of this
area, either through Hawaii or the Aleutians, Canada should "be represented in the final
assault on the Japanese homeland". It was specifically recommended that with this in
view "the Canadian Army operate in the North or Central Pacific area", using "one
division with necessary ancillary troops". It was recognized that this would entail acting
under American command. The R.C.N. should reinforce the Royal Navy in the Pacific;
the R.C.A.F,'s main effort should be in conjunction with the R.A.F., but it should be
represented by a token force in the event of a major operation taking place in the North
Pacific.
The same day the whole Cabinet considered the matter and agreed that, after the end
of the war in Europe, Canadian military forces should participate in the war against Japan
in operational theatres of direct interest to Canada as a North American nation, for
example in the North or Central Pacific, rather than in more remote areas such as South-
East Asia; that government policy with respect to employment of Canadian forces should
be based on this principle; and that the form and extent of participation by the three
services should be determined following the second Quebec Conference, then in
immediate prospect.23 On 8 September the Cabinet further authorized, "as a basis for
planning, but without any commitment", one division and ancillary troops as the Army
quota for the Pacific war.24 With policy thus crystallized, Canadian ministers approached
the contacts with British and American authorities that would accompany the conference.
The Canadian Army Pacific Force
When the "Octagon" conference opened at Quebec on 12 September, Allied

prospects were bright. A brilliant victory had been won in NorthWest Europe and it
appeared that there was a possibility of an early German collapse. In the Pacific,
American forces were firmly established in the Gilbert, Marshall and Mariana Islands and
about to land on Morotai and in the Palaus; the invasion of the Philippines could now be
undertaken. A Japanese invasion of India designed to interfere with Allied air transport to
China had been beaten back into Burma by British and Indian forces, while the Allies
were also advancing in Northern Burma and the re-opening of land communication with
China was in sight.
On 14 September the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet held a special meeting
at the Citadel of Quebec. Mr. King was in the chair. Mr. Churchill attended, as did also
Lord Leathers (British Minister of War
*As in previous cases, Canada was not a party to the second Quebec Conference (except as host); but there were
concurrent discussions, on this occasion, with both British and American civil and military authorities.
Transport) and the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff. Mr. King explained the
Canadian policies that had been developed. These discussions were followed on the same
day by a meeting between the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff,25 on 15 September by
a conference between Messrs. King, Roosevelt and Churchill,26 and on 16 September by
a conversation between Generals Murchie and Pope* on one side and General George C.
Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, on the other. General Murchie explained the
situation as to Canadian Army participation, emphasizing the Canadian desire "to share in
the final assault on Japan".27 General Marshall received the Canadians very cordially
and told them he could see no obstacle in the way of meeting their government's wishes;
but no commitment was made on either side.28
The "Octagon" conference did not produce a final strategic plan for the defeat of
Japan; the Americans, with whom the primary responsibility rested, were considering
alternative lines of operation through Formosa and through Luzon (Philippines).29 But
the final report of the conference30 expressed agreement upon a programme of lowering
Japanese ability and will to resist by air and sea blockades, intensive air bombardment,
and destruction of Japanese air and naval strength; followed ultimately by invasion and
the seizure of "objectives in the industrial heart of Japan". Mr. Churchill had mentioned
at the plenary session on 16 September that the Canadian Government were "anxious for
an assurance in principle that their forces would participate in the main operations against
Japan", adding that they would prefer that they should act in the more northern parts of
the Pacific, "as their troops were unused to tropical conditions".31 The final record
accordingly noted briefly, "Canadian participation is accepted in principle".32
During the weeks that followed, the matter was canvassed in the War Committee on
22 and 27 September, and 11 and 20 October. The three services' Pacific proposals were
examined, and those of the Navy and Air Force were considerably reduced. Finally, on
20 November, the full Cabinett approved the programme, including Canadian Army
participation to the extent of one division, with necessary ancillary troops as required, up
to a total of 30,000 men. It was accepted that the bulk of the force would have to be
selected from men then serving overseas, since there were not enough trained men in
Canada and battle-experienced troops were wanted; and that transportation, refitting and
leave in Canada would require six months.33
Detailed planning for the Canadian Army Pacific Force now proceeded. The
Canadian proposals were put before the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Letson,
who had succeeded General Pope in Washington, and were accepted, "with the
understanding that this force will be available for
*General Pope was now Military Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee.
†The War Committee did not meet between 9 November and 11 December.
use in any of the operations mounted in the Pacific".34 On 7 March 1945 the War
Committee agreed that the whole Canadian programme should be re-examined with a
view to the possibility of a greater degree of integration between the Canadian services;
but the Chiefs of Staff reported on 20 March that participation on a self-contained
Canadian basis was impossible without a greatly increased commitment by all three
services and the creation of a separate logistic organization.35 The War Committee
accepted this on 22 March and the plan was not altered. On 4 April the Prime Minister
made a statement on the Pacific programme in the House of Commons. This included the
information that the men to be employed against Japan would "be chosen from those who
elect to serve in the Pacific theatre"; in other words, there would be no compulsion.
Four days after this statement, and as a result of this policy concerning voluntary
service, the C.G.S. and the Adjutant General (Major-General A. E. Walford)
recommended that an armoured division should be substituted for an infantry division in
the plan. (It is likely that they had been influenced by the fact that Generals Crerar and
Montague had lately expressed the opinion that the men required from the overseas army
could not be obtained by volunteering.)36 They pointed out that an armoured division
would give an opportunity to men of the four overseas armoured brigades (as well as the
reconnaissance units) who otherwise could continue to serve only by transferring to other
arms. At the same time, however, by reducing the infantry requirement from three
brigades to one, they wrote, "we limit the numbers needed from the arm from which it
can be expected there will be the greatest difficulty in securing volunteers"; and the
"overall war establishment commitment" would be reduced, as the armoured division
would be only about 10,800 strong as compared with about 14,000 for an infantry
division on U.S. tables of organization.37 This plan was accepted by a Special Committee
of the Cabinet* on 19 April; but it did not meet with American concurrence. On 15 May
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a letter to General Letson covering a
memorandum by their Joint Staff Planners which remarked,
It is believed that the force should consist of an infantry division, possibly reinforced with armor,
and including a proportion of service and supporting troops, rather than an armored division. It appears
that General MacArthur would prefer such a unit and that it would receive much more gainful
employment, It is also preferable from a standpoint of supply and maintenance.38
The Americans agreed to all the other Canadian suggestions. The same letter detailed
the plan:
. . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest . . .that the Canadian Army force . . . should:
(a) consist of an infantry division, possibly reinforced with armor, with a proportion of service and
supporting troops.
*The Cabinet War Committee held its 339th and last meeting on 11 April. Thereafter there were three meetings of a
Special Committee which served Much the same purposes,
(b) be employed as a follow-up unit in the main operation.

(c) use United States Army equipment and maintenance, except for uniforms.
(d) be reorganized along United States Army lines (unless further examination indicates such
action will delay employment).
(e) be trained in the United States under the over-all supervision of the United States Army
Ground Forces.
(f) be supplied as a normal United States Army division and based in accordance with
operational plans.
(g) be returned to North America after cessation of hostilities in a priority consistent with that
applied to other forces engaged in the Pacific war.
These proposals were approved in principle by the Canadian Cabinet on 17 May.39

It may be noted that General Crerar was doubtful of the need for organizing the
division on American lines and suggested that the switch to non-Canadian organization
would be "generally unpopular" in the Army.* It appears that this element in the plan was
not originated by the United States. The first suggestion that American organization
might be necessary was made by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) in Ottawa on
16 September 1944.41 The detailed Canadian plan presented to the U.S. Joint Chiefs in
the following April42 contained the remark, "We feel it will be necessary to organize the
Canadian Force along U.S. army lines in order to facilitate their staff arrangements for
movement, maintenance and operations". The American reply, as we have seen, agreed;
the U.S. Joint Staff Planners remarked, "Reorganization along United States Army lines
would facilitate issuance of supplies and equipment, maintenance and possibly
movement. The only question is whether or not such reorganization can be effected
without delaying employment."43 The adoption of U.S. organization, though in many
ways convenient, would not seem to have been a vital part of the plan, and normal
Canadian divisional organization, with some modifications to suit American equipment,
would probably have met the situation.
As it was, U.S. staff organization was adopted, the system of three staff branches
(General Staff, Adjutant-General's Branch, Quartermaster-General's Branch) inherited
from the British Army being replaced by the unified General Staff with four branches (G-
1, Personnel; G-2, Intelligence; G-3, Operations and Training; and G-4, Supply).
Similarly the units of the proposed division and ancillary troops were planned and
designated in accordance with U.S. tables of organization, modified in slight degree to
meet the circumstances.
Originally it had been hoped to reconstitute the 1st Canadian Infantry Division for the
Pacific Force, since it was the senior formation of the First Canadian Army and its units
gave excellent territorial representation to all parts of Canada. For operational reasons it
had not proved possible,
*This was in a signal of 6 June 1945,40 repeating a "personal view" given earlier, possibly in a conference with
General Murchie on 22 May. By this time, however, firm arrangements had bean made with the Americans,
however, to withdraw this formation from active operations prior to VE Day, and
subsequently General Crerar insisted that it would be more practicable to give all
volunteers first priority passage to Canada and leave the work of organizing a new
division to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa.44 This reasoning was accepted by
the Minister of National Defence (now General A. G. L. McNaughton), who decided that
the new formation should be known as the 6th Canadian Division.* The term "brigade"
was dropped in favour of the American "regiment", but the new 1st, 2nd and 3rd
"Canadian Infantry Regiments" contained battalions of the same units, from Ontario,
Western Canada and Eastern Canada respectively, that had composed the 1st, 2nd and
3rd Brigades of the old 1st Division. Field artillery "regiments" similarly became
"battalions". The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.), which had been the 1st Division's
machine-gun battalion, provided "cannon companies" for each infantry regiment, while
the divisional reconnaissance "troop" was found by The Royal Montreal Regiment. The
Canadian quota of corps and army troops called for 151 officers and 1070 other ranks;
this included the tank battalion to support the division j- (provided by The Canadian
Grenadier Guards), an Evacuation Hospital and three liaison increments to serve with the
headquarters of American formations. Base units totalling 239 officers and 1691 other
ranks included a 2nd Echelon for personnel administration and a Replacement Group
corresponding to the Base Reinforcement Groups which had functioned in Italy and
North-West Europe.45
Major-General B. M. Hoffmeister, who had commanded the 5th Armoured Division
with distinction in Italy and North-West Europe, was selected to command the Canadian
Army Pacific Force. Brigadier W. P. Gilbride, who had served latterly as D.A. & Q.M.G.
of the 1st Canadian Corps, was appointed Deputy Divisional Commander, a post for
which there was no Canadian equivalent. Other command and staff appointments were
filled by officers who had served with the Canadian Army Overseas. The infantry
regiments were commanded by brigadiers, not by colonels as in U.S. formations.
Recruiting and Training the C.A.P.F.
Following the lead of the United Kingdom and the United States, Canada authorized
special "Japanese Campaign Pay" (amounting in the case of private soldiers to 30 cents
extra per day)46 for the Canadian Army Pacific
*The Home Defence division bearing this designation had been disbanded in December 1944 (above, page 186).
†General McNaughton had gladly embraced the U.S. suggestion that such a component might be provided.
Force.* Volunteering began with the distribution overseas of the pamphlet After Victory
in Europe on 11 May 1945 (above, page 432). The result was moderately satisfactory. By
17 July (the latest date for which figures are available) the grand total of "electors" was
9943 officers and 68,256 other ranks. But 1412 of these were nursing sisters, and 446
officers and 6075 other ranks belonged to the Canadian Women's Army Corps; while a
great many of the male volunteers were unfit for active duty by reason of age or medical
category. The "most select group", those suitable for service in the C.A.P.F., was defined
as men of high medical category, between the ages of 19 and 33 and (in the case of
overseas volunteers) single. Of the volunteers, only 2796 officers and 36,386 other ranks
were males in this group.47
Although the actual strength of the proposed division would be only 790 officers and
15,058 other ranks, and of the whole C.A.P.F. only 1180 officers and 17,819 other
ranks,48 the immediate and prospective manpower requirement was much larger than this.
It was calculated that, including three months' reinforcements and a small "contingency
reserve",49 1513 officers and 27,435 men were required in the first instance, while
replacements for eight further months of operations (to 30 September 1946) would
amount to 1665 officers and 28,735 men more. As compared with the total of electors of
all arms in the "most select group", then, there was an overall deficiency of 382 officers
and 19,784 men. This deficiency centred in the infantry; the actual shortage in this arm
was 835 officers and 20,775 men. The total of infantry volunteers in the most select
group was 996 officers and 18,339 men, as against an infantry strength for the division of
375 officers and 9,276 men.50 The immediate requirement, including three months'
reinforcements, was well covered, with something to spare; but on the basis of past
experience there was some reason to fear that in the event of the division's being heavily
engaged for a long period a shortage of infantry replacements would develop.
By the end of August 1945, a total of 1963 officers and 22,058 other ranks had
actually been posted to the Canadian Army Pacific Force. Of these, 1536 officers and
20,238 other ranks had been returned from Europe.51 Since the men of the force were
almost all well-trained soldiers, the main training problems were accustoming them to
American equipment and to the conditions of the Pacific theatre. The plan was to
concentrate the units of the C.A.P.F. at nine stations across Canada where they would be
introduced to these new problems; the whole force, including the three months'
reinforcements, would then move to Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky,
*By order in council P.C. 1286 of 17 March 1949, this additional pay was granted to survivors of the Canadian Hong
Kong force as from 1 June 1945, the date from which such pay was originally authorized, until two months after their
return to Canada.
for individual and unit training and divisional exercises. Nine teams of experts from the
U.S. Army were to come to Canada to demonstrate weapons during the preliminary
phase; and an instructional cadre was formed, whose members would go to the United
States in advance of the Force for training as instructors. Special orientation courses for
commanders and staff officers were to be conducted at the Royal Military College.52
The Japanese surrender interposed before this programme was more than nicely
under way. The American weapon training teams duly arrived early in August;53 and
large numbers of the instructional cadre and other members of the C.A.P.F. went to the
United States on courses. By 17 August 1945, 347 officers and 1391 other ranks were
attending such courses.54 But the Force as a whole never moved.
Training for Intelligence work required particular attention, and in this field
Canadians of Japanese origin had a special contribution to make. By August 1945 the
Japanese Language School, an Army unit established at Vancouver, B.C., in 1943, had
114 students in training; of these, 52 were "Nisei".55
The End in the Pacific
On 6 April 1945 General Douglas MacArthur assumed command of all United States
Army Forces in the Pacific and with Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander of Naval
Forces, began to plan the final operations against Japan. By this time the liberation of the
Philippines was approaching completion. Since 24 November 1944 U.S. B-29 bombers
based in the Marianas had been attacking the Japanese home islands with devastating
effect. The conquest of Iwo Jima (February-March 1945) provided airfields which made
it possible to give these bombers fighter escorts and enabled damaged B-29s to make
emergency landings. The capture of Okinawa (above, page 509) placed the Allies even
closer to Japan proper. In Burma the Japanese were on the run; British forces entered
Rangoon on 3 May. In July the U.S. Pacific Fleet, reinforced by a strong British unit in
which the Royal Canadian Navy was represented for a time by H.M.C.S Uganda, began
to attack Japan both with carrier-based aircraft and with shellfire.
The plan for the final invasion of the Japanese islands ran thus. The first phase,
Operation "Olympic", later re-christened "Majestic", called for a three-pronged attack by
the Sixth U.S. Army on the southernmost island, Kyushu, in the autumn of 1945. The
second phase, Operation "Coronet", in which the 6th Canadian Division was to have a role
that was never
precisely defined, was to begin in the early spring of 1946 with an assault by the veteran
Eighth and Tenth U.S. Armies against the main island. of Honshu. They were to be
followed ashore by ten infantry divisions under the First U.S. Army, redeployed from
North-West Europe. These armies were to beat down Japanese resistance and occupy the
Tokyo-Yokohama area; subsequently the Allied forces would fan out to the north and
occupy the remaining islands.56
This last campaign was not required. Since the fall of the Tojo government in July
1944 Japanese leaders had been becoming more and more convinced that the war must be
ended. After hostilities ceased in Europe in May 1945 an approach was made to Russia,
asking that country for intercession; but Russia would give no definite answer. On 26
July came the Potsdam Declaration by Great Britain, the United States and China
threatening Japan with "complete and utter destruction" and demanding unconditional
surrender. The Japanese government let it be known that this would be ignored,57 but in
fact they were still discussing it when on 6 August the most terrible weapon of
destruction humanity had seen,* an atomic bomb, was detonated over Hiroshima. It may
have killed as many as 90,000 people. Adolf Hitler, with the best will in the world, had
succeeded in killing only 60,000 civilians by his five-year bombardment of Great
Britain.59 On 8 August, in accordance with a promise made to the United States and
Britain at the Yalta Conference in February,60 the Soviet Union entered the war against
Japan. On 9 August a second atomic bomb was dropped, on Nagasaki. Early the next
morning an Imperial Conference in Tokyo decided to sue for peace.61
Active hostilities ended on 14 August. The same day a Special Cabinet Committee in
Ottawa recommended that Canada, having already undertaken a commitment for the first
stage of the occupation of Germany, should take no part in the occupation of Japan. On 1
September orders were issued for the disbandment of the Canadian Army Pacific Force.62
Japan's war against the West, launched in treachery at Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong
in 1941, brought her within four years to total and humiliating defeat. Her abasement was
expressed in the instrument of unconditional surrender which her representatives
subscribed on 2 September 1945 under the upthrust guns of the battleship Missouri in
Tokyo Bay. General MacArthur signed in acceptance as Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers; and representatives of nine of those Powers, including Canada, set their
names to the paper. So ended the Second World War. It had begun in Europe,
*Nevertheless, it should be noted that a single "conventional" incendiary attack on Tokyo (ml 9-10 March 1945 had
killed more than 83,000 people.58
six years and one day before, when Adolf Hitler's armoured divisions marched into
Poland. Having caused untold misery and desolation in scores of lands, it now drew to a
close on the further side of the globe; and, even though the significance of the dreadful
thing that had happened at Hiroshima was not yet fully clear, men and women in every
continent prayed that the collective intelligence of mankind might be equal to the task of
ensuring that no such conflict would ever come again.
APPENDIX "E"
OPERATIONAL UNITS OF THE ACTIVE ARMY IN THE

NORTH AMERICAN ZONE, 24 APRIL 1943
Only major units of the Armoured Corps, Artillery and Infantry, plus divisional units and units stationed in adjacent
territories, are listed. Numerous non-divisional units of other Corps performed important operational tasks but limitations
of space prevent their being listed here.
ATLANTIC COMMAND
(Headquarters:-Halifax, N.S.)
Areas and Units Location of Area or Formation H.Q.
Newfoundland...................................................................................................................................................... St. John's, Nfld.

25th Anti-Aircraft Regiment R.C.A.
103rd Coast Battery R.C.A.
106th Coast Battery R.C.A.
Le Régiment de Joliette
The Pictou Highlanders
Le Régiment de St. Hyacinths*
The Lincoln and Welland Regiment*
GOOSE BAY DEFENCES ....................................................................................................................... Goose Bay, Labrador

The New Brunswick Rangers
SYDNEY AND CANSO DEFENCES ...................................................................................................................Sydney, N.S.

16th Coast Regiment R.C.A.
23rd Anti-Aircraft Regiment R.C.A.
Fusiliers du St. Laurent (less two companies) †
2nd/10th Dragoons C.I.C.---Attached from 7th Division
HALIFAX FORTRESS Halifax, N.S.

1st (Halifax) Coast Regiment R.C.A.
21st Anti-Aircraft Regiment R.C.A.
The Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment
2nd Bn. The Black Watch (R.H.R.) of Canada-Attached from 7th Division
SHELBURNE DEFENCES ............................................................................................................................... Shelburne, N.S.

SAINT JOHN DEFENCES ............................................................................................................................... Saint John, N.B.

3rd (New Brunswick) Coast Regiment R.C.A.
22nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment R.C.A.
Le Régiment de Chateauguay (Mit)
The Prince Edward Island Highlanders
GASPS DEFENCES .................................................................................................................................................Gasps, P.Q.

*Le Regiment de St. Hyacinthe relieving the Lincoln and Welland Regiment. Relief completed 11 May 43.
†One company with Shelburne Defences; the other with Gasps Defences.
APPENDIX "E" 537
7th CANADIAN DIVISION ...................................................................................................................................Debert, N.S.
Divisional Troops
20th Field Regiment R.C.A.
23rd Field Regiment R.C.A.
8th Anti-Tank Regiment R.C.A.
10th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment R.C.A.
15th Field Company R.C.E.
23rd Field Company R.C.E.
5th Field Park Company R.C.E.
7th Divisional Signals R.C. Sigs.
7th Divisional Ammunition Company R.C.A.S.C.
7th Divisional Petrol Company R.C.A.S.C.
7th Divisional Supply Company R.C.A.S.C.
No. 71 General Transport Company R.C.A.S.C.
No. 20 Field Ambulance R.C.A.M.C.
7th Divisional Ordnance Workshop R.C.O.C.
15th Infantry Brigade ...............................................................................................................................................Debert, N.S.

Le Regiment de Montmagny
Le Regiment de Quebec
Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke
17th Infantry Brigade .............................................................................................................................................. Sussex, N.B.

Victoria Rifles of Canada
The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada
Attached:--- Les Voltigeurs de Quebec
20th Infantry Brigade ...............................................................................................................................................Debert, N.S.

3rd Bn. The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
3rd Bn. The Royal Winnipeg Rifles
Attached:-The Algonquin Regiment
MILITARY DISTRICT No. 5

(Headquarters:-Quebec, P.Q.)
59th Coast Battery R.C.A ...............................................................................................................................Lauzon, P.Q.

24th Anti-Aircraft Regiment R.C.A ................................................................................................................Arvida, P.Q.
21st Infantry Brigade ..........................................................................................................................................Valcartier, P.Q.

3rd Bn. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
3rd Bn. Le Regiment de Maisonneuve
Le Regiment de Levis
21st Brigade Group Company R.C.A.S.C.

(Headquarters:-Montreal, P.Q.)
The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (M.G.) ............................................................................................... Sherbrooke, P.Q.

(Headquarters:-Toronto, Ont.)
40th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery R.C.A..........................................................................................Sault Ste. Marie, Ont.

The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) ............................................................................. Chippawa, Ont.
The Scots Fusiliers of Canada .................................................................................................. Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ont.
1st Garrison Battalion .............................................................................................................. Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ont.

(Headquarters:-Winnipeg, Man.)
25th Field Regiment R.C.A..............................................................................................................................Shilo, Man_

1st Canadian Parachute Battalion .................................................................................................................... Shilo, Man.

(Headquarters:-Regina, Sask.)
30th Reconnaissance Regiment
(The Essex Regiment) C.A.C......................................................................................................................Dundurn, Sask.
PACIFIC COMMAND
(Headquarters:-Vancouver, B.C.)
VANCOUVER DEFENCES ............................................................................................................................Vancouver, B.C.

15th (Vancouver) Coast Regiment R.C.A.
The Royal Rifles of Canada
The Canadian Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)
19th Infantry Brigade ............................................................................................................................................. Vernon, B.C.

The Winnipeg Light Infantry
The Prince Albert Volunteers
3rd Bn. Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment)
6th CANADIAN DIVISION ............................................................................................................................. Esquimalt, B.C.
Divisional Troops
9th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment R.C.A.
22nd Field Company R.C.E.
6th Divisional Signals R.C. Sigs
6th Divisional Ammunition Company R.C.A.S.C.
6th Divisional Petrol Company R.C.A.S.C.
13th Infantry Brigade ..................................................................................................................................... Port Alberni, B.C.

The Brockville Rifles
1st Bn. The Edmonton Fusiliers
2nd Bn. The Canadian Scottish Regiment
18th Infantry Brigade .................................................................................................................................... ;.... Nanaimo, B.C.

The Saint John Fusiliers (M.G.)
The Rocky Mountain Rangers
1st Bn. Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment)
The Sault Ste. Marie and Sudbury Regiment
APPENDIX "E" 539
Victoria and Esquimalt Fortress ......................................................................................................................... Esquimalt, B.C
31st (Alberta) Reconnaissance Regiment C.A.C.
5th (B.C.) Coast Regiment R.C.A.
21st Field Regiment R.C.A.
3rd Bn. The Regina Rifle Regiment
Le Régiment de Hull
8th CANADIAN DIVISION ...................................................................................................................... Prince George, B.C.
Divisional Troops
8th Divisional Signals R.C. Sigs.
No. 29 General Transport Company R.C.A.S.C.
14th Infantry Brigade ............................................................................................................................................. Terrace, B.C.

22nd Field Regiment R.C.A. (One battery with Prince Rupert Defences)
21st Field Company R.C.E.
The Kent Regiment
The King's Own Rifles of Canada (Two companies with Prince Rupert Defences)
No. I Field Ambulance R.C.A.M.C.
16th Infantry Brigade .................................................................................................................................. Prince George, B.C.

The Oxford Rifles
The Prince of Wales Rangers (Peterborough Regiment)
3rd Bn. The Edmonton Fusiliers
Prince Rupert Defences ................................................................................................................................ Prince Rupert, B.C.

17th (North British Columbia) Coast Regiment R.C.A.
34th Anti-Aircraft Battery R.C.A. (at Annette Island, Alaska)
The Midland Regiment (Northumberland and Durham)
The Winnipeg Grenadiers
ADJACENT TERRITORIES
UNITED STATES
2nd Canadian Parachute Battalion .............................................................................. Camp Bradford, Norfolk, Virginia
JAMAICA
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
of Canada (Princess Louise's) ....................................................................................................................... Kingston
BERMUDA
Special Infantry Company (Pictou Highlanders) ................................................................................................. Warwick
BAHAMAS
No. 33 Company, Veterans Guard of Canada ........................................................................................................ Nassau
BRITISH GUIANA
No. 34 Company, Veterans Guard of Canada ................................................................................................Georgetown
APPENDIX "F"
PERSONS HOLDING PRINCIPAL APPOINTMENTS

CANADIAN ARMY 1939-1945*
The list of appointments for the Canadian Army Overseas ends with the cessation of hostilities against Germany; that
of appointments in Canada continues until the surrender of Japan. The only staff appointments in Canada included are the
Heads of Branches at N.D.H.Q.
Officers are shown with rank and decorations as of the day on which they relinquished the appointments concerned.
Names of officers who held acting appointments or were detailed temporarily to command are not shown unless they were
subsequently confirmed in the appointments. No distinction is made between acting and confirmed rank.
APPOINTMENTS IN CANADA
(to 14 Aug. 45)
Minister of National Defence

Hon. Ian A. Mackenzie ................................................................................................................. 23 Oct. 35 - 19 Sep. 39
Hon. Norman McL. Rogers . .........................................................................................................19 Sep. 39 - 10 Jun. 40
Col. the Hon. J. L. Ralston, C.M.G., D.S.O........................................................................................5 Jul. 40 - 2 Nov. 44
Gen. the Hon. A. G. L. McNaughton,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O ...................................................................................................................... 2 Nov. 44 - 21 Aug. 45
Deputy Minister (Army)†

Maj.-Gen. L. R. La Fleche, D.S.O ...................................................................................................3 Nov. 32 - 16 Oct. 40
Lt.-Col. H. DesRosiers, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D................................................................................ 8 Sep. 39 - 31 Aug. 45
Lt.-Col. G. S. Currie, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C .................................................................................... 1 Sep. 42 - 30 Sep. 44
A. Ross, Esq., C.M.G ........................................................................................................................ 1 Oct. 44 - 13 Jan. 47
Chief of the General Staff

Maj.-Gen. T. V. Anderson, D.S.O ..................................................................................................21 Nov. 38 - 21 Jul. 40
Lt.-Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, D.S.O ..................................................................................................... 22 Jul. 40 - 23 Dec. 41
Lt.-Gen. K. Stuart, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.......................................................................................... 24 Dec. 41 - 26 Dec. 43
Lt.-Gen. J. C. Murchie, C.B., C.B.E ............................................................................................... 3 May 44 - 20 Aug. 45
Vice Chief of the General Staff

Maj.-Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, D.S.O ......................................................................................................6 Jul. 40 - 21 Jul. 40
Maj.-Gen. K. Stuart, D.S.O., M.C ................................................................................................ 13 Mar. 41 - 23 Dec. 41
Maj.-Gen. M. A. Pope, M.C ..........................................................................................................24 Dec. 41 - 14 Feb. 42
Maj.-Gen. J. C. Murchie, C.B.E.......................................................................................................15 Feb. 42 - 2 May 44
Maj.-Gen. R. B. Gibson, C.B., C.B.E., V.D ...................................................................................... 5 Sep. 44 - 2 Feb. 46
Adjutant General
Maj.-Gen. H. H. Matthews, C.M.G., D,S.O ................................................................................... 15 Aug. 38 - 8 Apr. 40
Maj.-Gen. B. W. Browne, D.S,O., M.C...............................................................................................6 Jul. 40 - 1 Feb. 42
Maj.-Gen. H. F. G. Letson, C.B.E., M.C., E.D. ............................................................................. 2 Feb. 42 - 30 Sep. 44
Maj.-Gen. A. E. Walford, C.B., C.B.E., M.M., E.D........................................................................... 1 Oct. 44 - 4 Jan. 46
*Adapted from Appendix "A", The Canadian Army 1939-1945: An Official Historical
Summary.
†When war was declared, the Department of National Defence had a single Deputy Minister-Maj.-Gen. La Fleche.
Although not actively employed as such from 8 Sep 39, he continued to hold this appointment until 16 Oct 40. He was on
sick leave from 8 Sep 39 to 17' Jan 40; was appointed Military Attaché in Paris on 18 Jan 40; and became Associate
Minister of National War Services on 17 Oct 40. Lt.-Col. DesRosiers was appointed an "Associate Acting Deputy
Minister" of National Defence and detailed to carry out those duties in respect to the Militia Service usually performed by
the Deputy Minister. On 1 Sep 42, Lt.-Col. Currie became a Deputy Minister (Army). At the same time Lt.-Col.
DesRosiers' appointment was changed from that of an Associate Acting Deputy Minister to Deputy Minister (Army).
APPENDIX "F" 541
Quartermaster General
Maj.-Gen. H. F. H. Hertzberg, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.
(acting from 15 Aug. 38) ...................................................................................................... 21 Nov. 38 - 8 Apr. 40
Maj.-Gen. E. J. C. Schmidlin, M.C.
(acting from 9 Apr. 40) .......................................................................................................... 24 Jul. 40 - 12 Jan. 42
Maj.-Gen. J. P. Mackenzie, D.S.O..................................................................................................... 2 Feb. 42 - 6 May 43
Maj.-Gen. H. Kennedy, C.B.E., M.C...............................................................................................7 May 43 - 15 Sep. 44
Maj.-Gen. H. A. Young, C.B.E., D.S.O.........................................................................................16 Sep. 44 - 29 Mar. 46
Master General of the Ordnance

Maj.-Gen. W. H. P. Elkins, C.B.E., D.S.O.
(acting from 7 Oct. 38) '...........................................................................................................9 Nov. 38 - 31 Jul. 40
P. A. Chester, Esq ........................................................................................................................ 15 Aug. 40 - 30 Nov. 40
V. Sifton, Esq., C.B.E ...................................................................................................................... 1 Dec. 40 - 30 Jun. 42
Maj.-Gen. J. V. Young, C.B.E ........................................................................................................... 1 Jul. 42 - 30 Jun. 45
Maj.-Gen. J. H. MacQueen, C.B.E ..................................................................................................... 1 Jul. 45 - 6 Apr. 47
G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command

Maj.-Gen. W. H. P. Elkins, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O..............................................................................1 Aug. 40 - 15 Jul. 43
Maj.-Gen. L. F. Page, C.B., D.S.O .................................................................................................16 Jul. 43 - 26 Aug. 44
C.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command

Maj.-Gen. R. O. Alexander, D.S.O.................................................................................................17 Oct. 40 - 30 Jun. 42
Maj.-Gen. G. R. Pearkes, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., M.C......................................................................... 2 Sep. 42 - 15 Feb. 45
Maj.-Gen. F. F. Worthington, C.B., M.C., M.M ..............................................................................1 Apr. 45 - 22 Jan. 46
HOME DEFENCE FORMATIONS

G.O.C. 6th Division
Maj.-Gen. A. E. Potts, C.B.E., E.D................................................................................................ 20 May 42 - 11 Oct. 43
Maj.-Gen. H. N. Ganong, C.B.E.................................................................................................... 16 Oct. 43 - 15 Dec. 44
G.O.C. 7th Division

Maj.-Gen. P. E. Leclerc, C.B.E., M.M., E.D ................................................................................. 20 May 42 - 15 Oct. 43
G.O.C. 8th Division

Maj.-Gen. H. N. Ganong .................................................................................................................11 Jul. 42 - 15 Oct. 43
Commander Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces Newfoundland

Brig. P. Earnshaw, D.S.O., M.C .................................................................................................... 16 Oct. 40 - 24 Dec. 41
Maj.-Gen. L. F. Page, C.B., D.S.O ................................................................................................... 25 Dec. 41 - 5 Jul. 43
Maj.-Gen. F. R. Phelan, D.S.O., M.C., V.D ......................................................................................6 Jul. 43 - 15 Oct. 43
Maj.-Gen. P. E. Leclerc, C.B.E., M.M., E.D-................................................................................16 O&. 43 - 15 Dec. 44
Maj.-Gen. H. N. Ganong, C.B.E................................................................................................... 16 Dec. 44 - 31 May 45
CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

(to 8 May 45)
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, LONDON

Senior Combatant Officer
Maj.-Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, D.S.O ...................................................................................................17 Oct. 39 - 5 Jul. 40*
Maj.-Gen. the Hon. P. J. Montague, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., M.C., V.D............................................................................................................................. 6 Jul. 40 - 26 Dec. 43
Chief of Staff
Lt.-Gen. K. Stuart, C.B., D.S.O., M.C...........27 Dec. 43 - 11 Nov. 44 Lt.-Gen. the Hon. P. J. Montague, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., M.C., V.D......................................................................................................................... 22 Nov. 44 - 17 Sep. 45
*General Crerar was first appointed to C.M.H.Q. as "Brigadier, General Staff".

Major General in Charge of Administration
Maj.-Gen. the Hon. P. J. Montague, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., M.C., V.D................................................................................................................ 27 Dec. 43.- 21 Nov. 44
Maj.-Gen. E. G. Weeks, C.B.E., M.C., M.M.................................................................................30 Nov. 44 - 15 Oct. 45
FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army
Lt.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O....................................................................6 Apr. 42 - 26 Dec. 43
Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, C.H., C.B., D.S.O ........................................................................................20 Mar. 44 - 30 Jul. 45
G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps

Lt.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O ................................................................... 19 Jul. 40 - 5 Apr. 42*
Lt.-Gen. H. D. G Crerar, C.B., D.S.O. (detailed
temporarily to command from 23 Dec. 41) .......................................................................... 6 Apr. 42 - 19 Mar. 44
Lt.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C...............................................................................20 Mar. 44 - 5 Nov. 44
Lt.-Gen. C. Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O ......................................................................................10 Nov. 44 - 17 Jul. 45
G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Corps

Lt.-Gen. E. W. Sansom, C.B., D.S.O...............................................................................................15 Jan. 43 - 29 Jan. 44
Lt.-Gen. G. G. Simonds, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O................................................................................ 30 Jan. 44 - 25 Jun. 45
G.O.C. 1st Canadian Infantry Division

Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O ...................................................................17 Oct. 39 - 19 Jul. 40†
Maj.-Gen. G. R. Pearkes, V.C., D.S.O., M.C ....................................................................................20 Jul. 40 - 1 Sep. 42
Maj.-Gen. H. L. N. Salmon, M.C .................................................................................................... 8 Sep. 42 - 29 Apr. 43
Maj.-Gen. G. G. Simonds, C.B.E., D.S.O ..................................................................................... 29 Apr. 43 - 31 Oct. 43
Maj.-Gen. C. Vokes, C.B.E., D.S.O .............................................................................................. 1 Nov. 43 - 30 Nov. 44
Maj.-Gen. H. W. Foster, C.B.E., D.S.O...........................................................................................1 Dec. 44 - 15 Sep. 45
G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Infantry Division

Maj.-Gen. V. W. Odium, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.................................................................... 20 May 40 - 6 Nov. 41
Maj.-Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, D.S.O .................................................................................................23 Dec. 41 - 5 Apr. 42‡
Maj.-Gen. J. H. Roberts, D.S.O., M.C.
(acting from 7 Nov. 41) .........................................................................................................6 Apr. 42 - 12 Apr. 43
Maj.-Gen. G. G. Simonds, C.B.E...................................................................................................13 Apr. 43 - 28 Apr. 43
Maj.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, O.B.E., M.C...........................................................................................6 May 43 - 10 Jan. 44
Maj.-Gen. C. Foulkes, C.B.E ........................................................................................................... 11 Jan. 44 - 9 Nov. 44
Maj.-Gen. A. B. Matthews, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D ............................................................................10 Nov. 44 - 6 Oct. 45
G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Infantry Division

Maj.-Gen. E. W. Sansom, D.S.O ...................................................................................................26 Oct. 40 - 13 Mar. 41
Maj.-Gen. C. B. Price, D.S.O., D.C.M., V.D ..................................................................................14 Mar. 41 - 7 Sep. 42
Maj.-Gen. R. F. L. Keller, C.B.E ...................................................................................................... 8 Sep. 42 - 8 Aug. 44
Maj.-Gen. D. C. Spry, D.S.O ........................................................................................................18 Aug. 44 - 22 Mar. 45
Maj.-Gen. R. H. Keefler, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D .............................................................................23 Mar. 45 - 19 Nov. 45
G.O.C. 4th Canadian Armoured Division

Maj.-Gen. L. F. Page, D.S.O. 10 Jun. 41 - 24 Dec. 41
Maj.-Gen. F. F. Worthington, C.B., M.C., M.M ............................................................................. 2 Feb. 42 - 29 Feb. 44
Maj.-Gen. G. Kitching, D.S.O ........................................................................................................1 Mar. 44 - 21 Aug. 44
Maj.-Gen. H. W. Foster ............................................................................................................... 22 Aug. 44 - 30 Nov. 44
Maj.-Gen. C. Vokes, C.B.E., D.S.O .................................................................................................. 1 Dec. 44 - 5 Jun. 45
*General McNaughton actually relinquished active command of the Canadian Corps on 14 Nov. 41 as the result of an
illness. When recovered he left on a visit to Canada, and on returning to England took command of First Canadian Army.
†Maj.-Gen. McNaughton was promoted Lt.-Gen. 10 Jul 40 and appointed to command the 7th Corps 19 Jul. 40.
‡General Crerar never actually commanded the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division as on the same day on which he was
appointed he was detailed temporarily to command the Canadian Corps.
APPENDIX "F" 543
G.O.C. 5th Canadian Armoured Division
Maj.-Gen. E. W. Sansom, D.S.O ................................................................................................... 14 Mar. 41 - 14 Jan. 43
Maj.-Gen. C. R. S. Stein ................................................................................................................ 15 Jan. 43 - 18 Oct. 43
Maj.-Gen. G. G. Simonds, C.B.E., D.S.O ....................................................................................... 1 Nov. 43 - 29 Jan. 44
Maj.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, O.B.E., M.C........................................................................................ 30 Jan. 44 - 19 Mar. 44
Maj.-Gen. B. M. Hoffmeister, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.,
E.D........................................................................................................................................... 20 Mar. 44 - 6 Jun. 45
APPENDIX "G"
NOTE ON THE EQUIPMENT OF THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS, 1939-1945

This very brief note deals only with the most important items of armament and
equipment used during the Second World War; the object is to give the general reader a
non-technical bird's-eye view of the subject, indicating very briefly how the weapons of
1918 pattern with which the Canadian Militia was equipped in 1939 gradually gave place
to modern equipment, much of it manufactured and some of it developed in Canada.
Only weapons and armoured fighting vehicles are dealt with, and even in these fields
only items issued generally and in large numbers. In the interest of brevity, transport
vehicles are omitted, as is also Engineer, Signals and other specialized technical
equipment.
INFANTRY WEAPONS
Rifles. Until November 1942 the rifle of the Canadian Army was the .303-inch Short
Magazine Lee-Enfield No. 1 (Marks III and III*) as used in the First World War; during
the following months it was replaced by the No. 4, which in June 1943 became available
from Canadian sources. Features of the new rifle were greater simplicity of design, the
aperture battle-sight which allowed quicker aim, an improved distribution of weight, and
the shorter spike type bayonet. The No. 4 rifle was generally, though by no means
universally, preferred to the No. 1; the chief objection was to the battle sight, which
could be set only at 300 and 600 yards. In July 1944 this device began to be replaced by
the more satisfactory aperture leaf sight.
Machine Carbines (Sub-Machine-Guns). The machine carbine issued to the Canadian
Army early in the war was the American Thompson (.45-inch). In 1942 the 9-millimetre
Sten was introduced, and in June 1943 the Canadian-made Sten was adopted as standard
issue. The Sten was cheap, light, and extremely simple; it had a greater magazine
capacity than the Thompson, and could fire captured 9-millimetre ammunition. The Sten
was first used by Canadians at Dieppe. It was not, especially at first, a particularly
popular weapon; but many cases of unsatisfactory performance were attributable to
inadequate training. In conformity with British practice Canadian formations in the
Mediterranean used the Thompson, but on rejoining the First Canadian Army in 1945 they
were again given the Sten.
Light Machine-Guns. The light machine-gun was a basic weapon of the infantry. It
used the same ammunition as the service rifle. Until early in 1940 Canadian units
overseas were still equipped with the Lewis, which had been used in the First World War;
only gradually during 1940-41 was this gun replaced by the Bren. The first Canadian-
made Brens arrived overseas in November 1940. The Bren was a very satisfactory weapon.
Medium Machine-Guns. The medium machine-gun is an infantry support weapon
capable of more accurate and sustained fire than the light machine-gun, and at longer
range. It has been effectively employed mounted on a carrier, but is normally fired from a
tripod. The medium machine-gun of the Canadian Army was the .303 Vickers which had
been used during the First World War; a dial sight had been added to it and with the
introduction of new ammunition its range had been considerably increased. It was a first-
class weapon in spite of its age.
Mortars. The Canadian Army used three types of mortar: the 4.2-inch (firing a 20-
pound bomb), adopted in December 1942; the 3-inch, firing a 10-pound bomb; and the 2-
inch, an infantry platoon weapon using a 21h-pound bomb. In the summer of 1941 the
issue of Canadian-made 2-inch and 3-inch mortars commenced. In the winter of 1943-44
the range of the 3-inch mortar was increased from 1600 to 2800 yards.
Infantry Anti-Tank Weapons. In the autumn of 1942 infantry anti-tank platoons were
equipped with the 2-pounder gun; this was replaced in the summer of 1943 by the 6-
pounder. Other anti-tank devices of the infantry included the No. 68 grenade and
APPENDIX "G" 545
the .55-inch Boys anti-tank rifle (which in 1942 became available in considerable
quantity from Canadian sources); both these weapons were replaced early in 1943 by the
Projector Infantry Anti-Tank. This "PIAT" was a shoulder-controlled weapon firing a
hollow-charge bomb designed to penetrate armour. Despite its short range it proved
highly effective against buildings, pillboxes and all types of tank. The incidence of
failure of the bomb to explode on an oblique hit was greatly reduced by the adoption of
the "graze" fuse early in 1944.
Flame. Late in 1942 the Ronson flame-thrower, developed in the United Kingdom with
Canadian cooperation and manufactured in Canada, was received. This weapon, mounted
on a specially modified Universal carrier, was subsequently replaced by the Wasp, a
similar device with longer range. The Canadian variant of the Wasp known as the Wasp
Mark IIC proved effective in operations, as did the Badger, a Canadian development
consisting of a "Kangaroo" armoured personnel carrier mounting a Wasp II flame gun.
ARTILLERY WEAPONS
General. In distinguishing between "field" and "medium" artillery, it is convenient to

think of a field gun as projecting a 25-pound shell up to seven miles, and a medium as
firing an 80- to 100-pound shell up to ten miles.
Field Artillery. In 1939 the new 25-pounder gun-howitzer* was not yet available, but
field regiments of the Royal Canadian Artillery overseas were equipped from British
stocks with 18/25 pounders (converted 18-pounders); of necessity, obsolescent 18-
pounder and 75-millimetre guns were also used for a time. These were replaced during
1941 by the 25-pounder. Commencing 1 July 1941 this weapon was received from
Canadian sources. It was an excellent gun.
Self-Propelled Field Artillery. During 1943, two other types of field gun were
adopted. These were "self-propelled" (mounted on tank chassis, rather than towed). One
was the Canadian-designed and Canadian-manufactured 25-pounder Sexton, using a Ram
chassis, received late in 1943; the other was the American 105-millimetre Priest. Self-
propelled artillery was used in armoured formations, and by the 3rd Infantry Division in
the assault landing in Normandy.
Medium Artillery. The original equipment of the Canadian medium artillery in the
Second World War was the 6-inch howitzer. This began, in October 1941, to be replaced
by the 5.5-inch gun-howitzer. In view of there being insufficient supplies of the 5.5 to
meet increased demands, the 4.5-inch gun-howitzer was introduced in Italy in February
1944, as a stop-gap measure. This weapon, which had greater range and accuracy, proved
quite popular and some were therefore retained, supplementing the 5.5.
Anti-Tank Artillery. In January 1942 it was decided that the 2-pounder gun should be
completely replaced in anti-tank regiments by the 6-pounder. Other anti-tank guns
subsequently used were the 17-pounder, the American self-propelled 3-inch M-10 and the
self-propelled 17-pounder. The towed 17-pounder and 6-pounder were retained, but on a
decreasing scale.
Anti-Aircraft Artillery. The light anti-aircraft gun of the Canadian Army was the
Bofors (40-millimetre); the heavy equipment was the 3.7-inch. In view of the declining
strength of the enemy air force, it was found possible-and effectiveto employ both these
weapons against ground targets. The Bofors was available from Canadian as well as
British sources; in October 1943 the proportion of Canadianmade Bofors increased to
almost 40%. Another weapon incorporated into light anti-aircraft regiments, brigade
support groups and certain armoured formations was the 20-millimetre gun.
Comparatively little need was found for this weapon in its primary role, and its mounting
was not well suited to ground use; in August 1944 accordingly it was withdrawn from use.
In light anti-aircraft, as in most other artillery, a trend developed in favour of self-
propelled equipment.
*A "gun-howitzer" is a weapon capable of firing either at a low angle as a gun or the

high angle characteristic of a howitzer.
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
General. The only vehicles dealt with are those employed in close contact with the enemy, and in considerable
numbers; namely tanks, carriers, armoured personnel carriers, light tanks, armoured cars and scout cars. The last two are
wheeled vehicles, the remainer are fully tracked; no "half-tracks" are included.
Tanks. On arrival in the United Kingdom Canadian armoured formations were equipped with the British Churchill
and Matilda infantry tanks, and the American General Lee cruiser tank. The first intention was that the Churchill should
become standard equipment for army tank brigades, and the Canadian Ram cruiser for armoured divisions. The Churchill
was used at Dieppe, but even before that operation it had been decided to replace it with either the Ram or the American
General Sherman. The Ram (which began to arrive from Canada early in 1942) did not promise to be as satisfactory an
operational tank as the Sherman, which was of later design and may have been influenced by a "mock-up" model of the
Ram; but it gave good service for training purposes, and some Rams served in the field as armoured personnel carriers,
flame-throwers, observation post tanks or armoured gun towers.* The Sherman, a 30-ton "medium" cruiser tank, was
adopted for all Canadian armoured formations and used in the campaigns in Italy and North-West Europe. Its armament
normally consisted of a 75-millimetre gun and two .30-inch machine guns; later some Shermans mounted the British 17-
pounder or the 105-millimetre. The Sherman was a good tank, particularly reliable mechanically, but its armour was
vulnerable to the best German guns, to which moreover the 75-mm. gun was inferior.
Carriers. Uses of the carrier included the conveyance of infantry carrier platoon personnel and their weapons,
carrying the 3-inch mortar and the medium machine-gun (and occasionally mounting the latter), towing the 6-pounder anti-
tank gun and the 4.2-inch mortar, and mounting the Ronson and Wasp 2 flamethrowers. For towing purposes the
American-made Universal T16 was used; otherwise the standard carrier of the Canadian Army was the Canadian-made
Universal.
Armoured Personnel Carriers. The armoured personnel carrier ("Kangaroo") was a modified tank or self-propelled
gun, used for carrying infantry into battle with a minimum of casualties: its normal load was about 12 men. "Kangaroos"
were first used in Operation "Totalize" in Normandy (7-9 Aug. 44). The original armoured personnel carrier was a self-
propelled Priest with the gun removed; this was succeeded by a modified Ram cruiser.
Miscellaneous. The standard light tank, used as a general-purpose vehicle in armoured formations, was the American
General Stuart ("Honey"). Scout cars, employed in reconnaissance and liaison roles, included the Humber. Among other
armoured vehicles of the Canadian Army were the American Staghound and the British Daimler armoured cars.
*See J. de N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply (Ottawa, 1950), I, 99.
APPENDIX "H" 547
APPENDIX "H"
THE NUMBER OF MEN EVACUATED FROM THE DIEPPE BEACHES

It is impossible to determine with complete certainty the number of men evacuated
from the Dieppe beaches on 19 August 1942. The difficulty is that, although fairly
reliable statistics are available for the men of each unit who returned to England (see
page 389), there is in most cases no basis for settling precisely how many of these men
had actually landed.
The 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment reported after the operation that only three
men of this unit had landed and returned (only one having been a member of a tank crew).
Returned personnel of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal completed questionnaires which indicate
that, of 103 individuals who filled these out, 52 had landed. Three more who did not
complete questionnaires are known to have landed and returned. On the basis of statistics
of men returned, some 20 others were in hospital or otherwise unavailable to complete the
forms; assuming that half of these had landed, some 65 all ranks of this unit landed and
returned to England. The report of the Commanding Royal Engineer 2nd Division
calculates that 169 R.C.E. personnel landed and only 17 were evacuated. The other major
units on the main beaches can be dealt with only by reviewing the fortunes of the tank
landing craft in which some parties of their personnel were carried; it can be assumed
that nearly all men carried in assault craft landed. In the case of the Royal Hamilton
Light Infantry, 12 men were in L.C.T. 15, which did not touch down, and some men may
not have landed from L.C.T. 6; we may perhaps assume altogether a total of about 25 not
landed. The Essex Scottish had no large party on craft which did not touch down; in this
instance it may be safe to assume that not more than 10 did not land. There seems to be
no basis for calculation in the case of the Royal Marines, Royal Canadian Signals and
miscellaneous units; it would seem to be conservative to assume for them a total of 50
men as landed and evacuated. On this admittedly unsatisfactory basis, the following very
approximate figures emerge for men evacuated from the main beaches in front of Dieppe:
14th Army Tank Regiment ............................. 3

R.H.L.I .................................................... 192
Essex Scottish .......................................... 41
Fusiliers Mont-Royal ................................. 65
R.C.E ....................................................... 17
Miscellaneous ........................................... 50
Total 368
As for the units on the Pourville beach, virtually the whole of their strength was in
assault craft, and it may perhaps be assumed that not more than 10 men in each case were
not landed. From this we get the following figures for men landed and evacuated:
Camerons of Canada ................................. 258

South Saskatchewan Regt ........................... 348
Total 601
From the Puys beach only a very few individuals who landed succeeded in returning -
perhaps half a dozen. This would give a total of 975 for all the Canadian beaches.
In addition we have from the flank beaches the whole strength of No. 4 Commando
(less unreturned casualties), and 20 men of No. 3 Commando. This amounts to 247, and
would raise the grand total evacuated to 1222 all ranks. It must again be emphasized that
this is only an approximation. But to say that 1200 men were brought away would
probably not be very far wrong.
APPENDIX "I"
NEWFOUNDLAND ARMY UNITS OVERSEAS

Shortly after, the outbreak of the Second World War, the Newfoundland authorities agreed with
the British War Office that one or more artillery regiments should be formed from men offering their
services in Newfoundland. Accordingly, on 6 February 1940, a Proclamation by His Excellency the
Governor of Newfoundland called for volunteers to "form one complete Heavy Royal Artillery
Regiment, and, as far as possible, other Heav y Royal Artillery Regiments". The call met a ready
response. In March a recruiting party from the United Kingdom arrived in Newfoundland, and by the
middle of April the first draft of 403 volunteers was on its way overseas. By the end of September
1940, 1373 men for the Royal Artillery had been dispatched from Newfoundland.
The first unit to be formed from these drafts was the 57th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment R.A.
Two months later, on 15 June 1940, the 59th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment R.A. was formed.
Both regiments were built around a small skilled core of English officers and other ranks, although it
was not long before Newfoundland personnel were sufficiently trained to take over the duties of
English N.C.Os. In due course some Newfoundlanders were commissioned.
In England in 1940 the two units played somewhat similar roles. The Newfoundlanders helped to
man the heavy guns on England's south-eastern coast. At the same time, the 59th Regiment was
prepared to assume an infantry role and take over a sector of the Tunbridge Wells defences. As the
threat of invasion lessened, more emphasis was placed on regular training as artillery units. The 59th
Regiment remained in the Tunbridge Wells area for several years. Here it took part in many large-
scale exercises, and early in 1944, with its four batteries newly equipped with 7.2-inch howitzers and
155-millimetre guns, it was undergoing intensive training for the part it would play in the Normandy
invasion. Meanwhile, the new C.O. of the 57th Regiment, Lt.-Col. H.G. Lambert. had "agitated on
behalf of the men for a change to field guns so they could get real action". As a result this unit
became the 166th (Newfoundland) Field Regiment R.A. on 15 November 1941, and its former heavy
equipment was replaced with 25-pounders.
In January 1943 the 166th Field Regiment left the United Kingdom for North Africa. By the end
of February all its batteries were actively engaged on the central sector of the Tunisian front. The
Newfoundlanders supported French and British units until the end of the Tunisian campaign. In
October the Regiment was ordered to Italy, and upon arrival came under command of the 5th British
Corps. Almost immediately it went into action supporting the 8th Indian Division's 17th Brigade in
the San Salvo area north of the Trigno River. Late in November the Regiment supported the attack on
the Sangro River line at Mozzagrogna. Thereafter, together with the remainder of the 5th Corps
artillery, it supported the 1st Canadian Division's attack south of Ortona on 18 December. It took
part in the famous "Morning Glory" barrage opening this operation, the second phase of which was
recorded as "one of the biggest barrages which the Regiment had yet fired".
After giving support to Canadian, Indian, British and other Eighth Army formations early in the
New Year, the unit was given a short rest preparatory to moving to the Cassino front. Here it
supported the 2nd New Zealand, 4th Indian and 78th British Divisions in turn. It returned to the 5th
British Corps on 11 April and relieved the 11th Field Regiment at Castelfrentano where it suffered
heavy casualties from shelling. Early in June the Regiment was given the role of supporting
APPENDIX "I" 549
the 184th Italian Infantry Brigade, but shortly afterwards was withdrawn for a rest and
calibration of guns at Vinchiaturo.
After the fall of Rome the 166th moved north under command of the 10th British
Corps, then fighting in the mountainous terrain west of Ancona. During the first weeks of
August the Regiment was engaged in the Citta di Castello area north of Perugia. For the
remainder of the month, still in the mountains south of Florence, it supported Indian
infantry formations near Anghiari, troops of the 85th U.S. Infantry Division and later the
24th Guards Brigade. At the beginning of September the Regiment crossed the Arno River
and continued the advance through Castiglione to a position near Vergato, south of
Bologna. During the winter of 1944-45 the 166th remained in support of the 24th Guards
Brigade, then serving in the Fifth U.S. Army. Snow and ice made living conditions
miserable and movement in the Apennines was hazardous. On 19 February 1945 the
Regiment was taken out of the line for a rest, so ending an 18-month period during which
it had been almost continuously active on the various fronts. It saw no more action.
On 5 July 1944 the 59th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment R.A., commanded by Lt.-
Col. R.C. Longfield. landed at Courseulles in Normandy under the command of the 1st
British Corps. Within 24 hours its batteries were engaging the enemy.
The 59th Regiment was very active during the Normandy campaign. On 7 August it
supported the 2nd Canadian Division in the breakout attack towards Falaise, after which
it occupied successive positions at Montigny, Angoville and Noron l'Abbaye before being
moved up to cover the crossing of the Seine. On 28 August the 23rd Battery was detached
to support the 12th British Corps' advance. Its 155-mm. guns were in action at Nijmegen
at the time of the airborne landing at Arnhem in September.
Late in September the Regiment came under command of the First Canadian Army.
While one battery, under the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, was bombarding shipping
in Flushing Harbour, the remaining two (the 23rd was still with the 12th British Corps
and was not ordered to rejoin the Regiment until 6 November) gave support to the
Canadians in Belgium and south-west Holland. In October, the Regiment took part in the
fire plan supporting "Switchback", the 3rd Canadian Division's operation designed to
clear the "Breskens pocket" south of the Scheldt. Subsequently it fired in support of the
2nd Canadian Division's operation on South Beveland. On 6 November the 59th came
under command of the Second British Army and supported various British formations
eliminating enemy resistance west of the Meuse in the Venlo-Roermond area.
The beginning of 1945 found the Regiment divided again: two batteries were
supporting the British and American units at the tip of the German bulge in the Ardennes
sector while the two remaining batteries were still active on the VenloRoermond front.
During January both groups were constantly engaged. Early in February the Regiment
moved to the Grave area where it was to take part in the First Canadian Army's opening
attack of Operation "Veritable". Supported by over 1000 guns, this operation was
designed to clear the enemy west of the Rhine, and for the 59th Heavy Regiment it was
the beginning of its most strenuous period in action. Throughout February and early
March it gave valuable supporting fire to the 30th British and 2nd Canadian Corps in
their struggle to clear the enemy from his well-fortified positions between the Maas and
Rhine Rivers. After taking part in the battle in the Goch-Wesel area, the Regiment was
moved to a less active position in preparation for the attack across the Rhine.
On 23 March it fired for eight hours in support of this attack. Four days later it went
forward with the 12th British Corps attack near Wesel. The 59th Regiment subsequently
took part in the final operations in the British sector of the Western front -the capture of
Bremen and the crossing of the Elbe at Lauenburg.
A total of 2327 Newfoundlanders served overseas with the Regiments. Of these 72
lost their lives.
On the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit, see Chapter VI, above.
The foregoing account is based mainly on the war diaries of the two artillery
regiments; on an article on the 166th Field Regiment in the Eighth Army News, 2 January
1944; and on an unpublished draft history prepared on the initiative of the Newfoundland
Government.
ABBREVIATIONS 551
ABBREVIATIONS
A.A. (Ack Ack) .................................... Anti-aircraft
A.A.G .................................................... Assistant Adjutant General
A.A. & Q.M.G. ..................................... Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General
A.C.G.S ................................................. . Assistant Chief of the General Staff
A.D.A.G................................................. Assistant Deputy Adjutant General
A.D.Q.M.G. (AE) ................................. Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General (Army Equipment)
Adv ........................................................ Advance(d)
A.F.V ..................................................... Armoured fighting vehicle
A.G ........................................................ Adjutant General
A. & Q ................................................... Administrative Branches of the Staff
A.H.Q .................................................... Army Headquarters
A.L.C ..................................................... Assault Landing Craft
A.O.C..................................................... Air Officer Commanding
A.O.C.- in-C .......................................... Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
A.Q.M.G................................................ Assistant Quartermaster General
Armd ..................................................... Armoured
A.V.M.................................................... Air Vice-Marshal
Bde......................................................... Brigade
B.E.F...................................................... British Expeditionary Force
B.G.S ..................................................... Brigadier, General Staff
Bn .......................................................... Battalion
Brig ........................................................ Brigadier
Bty ......................................................... Battery
C.A. (A) ................................................. Canadian Army (Active)

C.A.C..................................................... Canadian Armoured Corps
Canmilitry ............................................. C.M.H.Q. [Address used in telegrams]
C.A.O..................................................... Canadian Army Overseas
C.A.O.F ................................................. Canadian Army Occupation Force
C.A.O.R.O ............................................. Canadian Army (Overseas) Routine Order
C.A.P.F .................................................. Canadian Army Pacfic Force
Capt........................................................ Captain
C.A.R.O ................................................. Canadian Army Routine Order [issued in Canada]
C.A.S.F .................................................. Canadian Active Service Force
C.B......................................................... Companion of the Order of the Bath
C.B.E ..................................................... Commander of the Order of the British Empire
C.B.R.D ................................................. Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot
C.C.O..................................................... Chief of Combined Operations
C.C.S...................................................... Combined Chiefs of Staff
C.D......................................................... Canadian Forces Decoration
Cdn ........................................................ Canadian
C.E.F...................................................... Canadian Expeditionary Force (1914-19)
C.F.C......................................................: Canadian Forestry Corps
C.G.S ..................................................... Chief of the General Staff
C.I.C ...................................................... Canadian Infantry Corps
C.I.G.S ................................................... Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C: in-C ................................................... Commander-in-Chief
Cmdr. (Cdr) .......................................... Commander (Naval)
C.M.F..................................................... Central Mediterranean Force
C.M.G .................................................... Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George
C.M.G.T.C............................................. Canadian Machine Gun Training Centre
C.M.H.Q ................................................ Canadian Military Headquarters, London
C.M.S.C ................................................. Corps of Military Staff Clerks
C.O......................................................... Commanding Officer
C.O.H.Q................................................. Combined Operations Headquarters
Col ......................................................... Colonel
Comd ..................................................... Commander
C.O.S ..................................................... Chiefs of Staff
C. of S....................................................: Chief of Staff
C.O.T.C ................................................. Canadian Officers Training Corps
Coy ........................................................ Company
Cpl ......................................................... Corporal
C.R.S...................................................... Captured Records Section (U.S. Dept. of the Army)
C.R.U..................................................... Canadian Reinforcement Units
C.S.C...................................................... Chiefs of Staff Committee
C.S.M..................................................... Company Sergeant-Major (Warrant Officer, Class II)
C.W.A.C ................................................ Canadian Women's Army Corps
D.A.G ................................................... Deputy Adjutant General
D.A. & Q.M.G....................................... Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General
D.C.G.S ................................................. Deputy Chief of the General Staff
D.C.M .................................................... Distinguished Conduct _Medal
D.D.E.M ................................................ Director(ate) of Design, Equipment and Mechanization
D.D.M.O. (0) ........................................ Deputy Director of Military Operations (Overseas) [War Office]
Defensor ............................................... N.D.H.Q. (Address used in telegrams]
D.G.C. & A.A........................................ Director General Coast and Anti-Aircraft Defences
D.G.M.S................................................. Director General of Medical Services
D.H.S ..................................................... Director Historical Section
Div ......................................................... Division
D.J.A.G.................................................. Deputy Judge Advocate General
D.M........................................................ Deputy Minister
D.M. & A............................................... Director(ate) of Mechanization and Artillery
D.M.O.................................................... Director(ate) of Military Operations
D.M.O. & I ............................................ Director(ate) of Military Operations and Intelligence
D.M.O. & P ........................................... Director(ate) of Military Operations and Planning
D.M.T .................................................... Director(ate) of Military Training
D.M.T. & S.D ........................................ Director(ate) of Military Training and Staff Duties
D.N.D .................................................... Department of National Defence
D.O.C..................................................... District Officer Commanding
D. of T. & M.......................................... Director(ate) of Transport and Movements
Dominion .............................................. High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom
[Address used in telegrams]
D. Org .................................................... Director(ate) of Organization
D. Pers. Serv .......................................... Director(ate) of Personal Services
D.Q.M.G................................................ Deputy Quartermaster General
D.Q.S ..................................................... Director(ate) of Q.M.G. Services
D.S.D ..................................................... Director(ate) of Staff Duties
D.S.O ..................................................... Companion of the Distinguished Service Order
D.S.T...................................................... Director(ate) of Supplies and Transport
D.T.R ..................................................... Director(ate) of Technical Research
D.V.A .................................................... Department of Veterans Affairs
E.D......................................................... Canadian Efficiency Decoration
External ................................................ Cdn. Dept. of External Affairs [Address used in telegrams]
Fervour ................................................. G.O.C. Hong Kong [Address used in telegrams]
F.O.O ..................................................... Forward Observation Officer
G.C.M.G. ............................................... Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George Gen General
G.H.Q .................................................... General Headquarters
G.O ........................................................ General Order
G.O.C..................................................... General Officer Commanding
G.O.C.- in-C .......................................... General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
G (Ops) ................................................. General Staff (Operations)
G.S ......................................................... General Staff
G.S.O. 1 ................................................ General Staff Officer, Grade 1
H/Capt ................................................... Honorary Captain (Canadian Chaplain Service)
H.D ........................................................ Home Defence
H.K.V.D.C............................................. Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps
H.M.C.S................................................. His Majesty's Canadian Ship
H.M.S .................................................... His Majesty's Ship (Royal Navy)
Hon ........................................................ Honourable
H.Q ........................................................ Headquarters
ABBREVIATIONS 553
Inf .......................................................... Infantry
Int........................................................... Intelligence
J.A.G...................................................... Judge Advocate General

J.W.E.C.................................................. Junior War Establishments Committee
L.C.A ..................................................... Landing Craft, Assault

L.C.F. (L) .............................................. Landing Craft, Flak (Large)
L.C.M .................................................... Landing Craft, Mechanized
L/Cpl...................................................... Lance-Corporal
L.C.P. (L) .............................................. Landing Craft, Personnel (Large)
L.C.T...................................................... Landing Craft, Tank
Lieut. (Lt.) ............................................ Lieutenant
L.M.G .................................................... Light machine-gun
L. of C.................................................... Lines of Communication
L/Sgt ..................................................... Lance-Sergeant
Maj......................................................... Major
M.B.E .................................................... Member of the Order of the British Empire
M.C........................................................ Military Cross
M.D........................................................ Military District
M.G........................................................ Machine-gun
M.G.A.................................................... Major General in charge of Administration
M.G.O.................................................... Master General of the Ordnance
M.I.L.O.................................................. Military Intelligence Liaison Officer
Mit ......................................................... Mitrailleuses
M.M ....................................................... Military Medal
M.N.D.................................................... Minister of National Defence
M.S ........................................................ Military Secretary
M.T.B .................................................... Motor Torpedo Boat
N.C.O..................................................... Non-commissioned officer

N.D.H.Q................................................. National Defence Headquarters
N.P.A.M................................................. Non-Permanent Active Militia
N.R.M.A ................................................ National Resources Mobilization Act
N.S.H.Q ................................................. Naval Service Headquarters
O.B.E ..................................................... Officer of the Order of the British Empire

O.C......................................................... Officer Commanding
O.C.T.U ................................................. Officer Cadet Training Unit
O.I.C ...................................................... Officer in charge ....
O.K.H..................................................... Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command, Berlin)
O.K.W .................................................... Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command)
O.M.F.C................................................. Overseas Military Forces of Canada (1914-19)
Ops......................................................... Operations
O.S.A.C ................................................. Officer Selection and Appraisal Centre
O.T.C ..................................................... Officers' Training Centre
P.C.M.R. ................................................ Pacific Coast Militia Rangers
P.F.......................................................... Permanent Force
P.J.B.D................................................... Permanent Joint Board on Defence
P.P.C.L.I ................................................ Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
P.S.M ..................................................... Platoon Sergeant-Major (Warrant Officer, Class III)
Pte .......................................................... Private -
P.W ........................................................ Prisoner of War
Q.M.G.................................................... Quartermaster General
Q.M.S .................................................... Quartermaster-Sergeant (Warrant Officer, Class II)
R.A......................................................... Royal Regiment of Artillery
R.A.A.F ................................................. Royal Australian Air Force
R.A.F ..................................................... Royal Air Force
R.C.A..................................................... Royal Canadian Artillery
R.C.A.F.................................................. Royal Canadian Air Force
R.C.A.M.C............................................. Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
R.C.A.& C ............................................. Royal Canadian Army Service Corps
R.C.E .......................................................... Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers
R.C.E.M.E .................................................. Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
R.C.H.A ...................................................... Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
R.C.M.P ...................................................... Royal Canadian Mounted Police
R.C.N.......................................................... Royal Canadian Navy
R.C.N.V.R ................................................. Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve
R.C.O.C ...................................................... Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps
R.C.R .......................................................... The Royal Canadian Regiment
R.C. Sigs..................................................... Royal Canadian Corps of Signals
R.D.F .......................................................... Radio Direction Finding (now called Radar)
R.E .............................................................. Corps of Royal Engineers
Regt............................................................. Regiment
RH.L.I......................................................... Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
R.M............................................................. Royal Marines
R.M.C ......................................................... Royal Military College
R.N.............................................................. Royal Navy
R.N.V.R ...................................................... Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
R.O.............................................................. Routine Order
R.R.C .......................................................... Royal Rifles of Canada
R. Regt. C ................................................... Royal Regiment of Canada
S.C.A.P ....................................................... Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
S.D. and T................................................... Staff Duties and Training
S.D. (W) ..................................................... Staff Duties (Weapons)
Sec .............................................................. Secretary
Sgt............................................................... Sergeant
S.O .............................................................. Senior Officer (C.M.H.Q.)
S.O.M.E ...................................................... Senior Ordnance Mechanical Engineer
Spr............................................................... Sapper
Sqn.............................................................. Squadron
S.S............................................................... Schutzstaffel (Protective Unit) (Nazi party organizations,
including military formations) Stats Statistics
T.C .............................................................. Training Centre
Tk................................................................ Tank
T.O.E.T....................................................... Test of Elementary Training
Tpr .............................................................. Trooper
Troopers ..................................................... War Office [Address used in telegrams]
U.K ............................................................. United Kingdom
U.S .............................................................. United States
U.S.A .......................................................... United States Army
U.S.N .......................................................... United States Navy
V.C.............................................................. Victoria Cross
V.C.C.O ...................................................... Vice Chief of Combined Operations
V.C.G.S ...................................................... Vice Chief of the General Staff
V.C.I.G.S .................................................... Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff
V.D ............................................................. Colonial Auxiliary Forces Officers' Decoration
W/C ............................................................ Wing Commander
W.D ............................................................ War Diary
W.O. III ..................................................... Warrant Officer, Class III
REFERENCES
(All files cited are those of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa,
unless otherwise specified.)
CHAPTER I
The Canadian Militia on the Eve of War
1. Col. A. F. Duguid, Official History of the Maj.-Gen. E. C. Ashton, Mackenzie Papers, file
Canadian Forces in the Great War 19141919, X-4.
General Series, Vol. I (Ottawa, 1938), viii. 20. Ibid.
2. Report of the Department of National Defence, 21. C.G.S. to Minister, "Canadian Defence
Canada, for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, Requirements", 15 Jul 38, Mackenzie Papers, file
1926 (Ottawa, 1926), page 95. X-4.
3. Ibid., 1938, pages 12-13. 22. "The Requirements of Canadian Defence: A Review
4. C.E.F. Routine Order No. 1913, 23 Apr 19. 5. of the Position as of 1 January 1937", by Maj.-Gen.
Table "J", H.Q. 426-16-1, vol. 1. E. C. Ashton, Mackenzie Papers, file X-4.
6. Memorandum "The Defence of Canada" by Maj.- 23. Ibid. Cf. reference by Senior Air Officer in paper
Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, 28 May 35, in presented to Defence Committee, 14 Nov 38,
McNaughton Papers, Historical Section (G.S.), Privy Council Office.
Army Headquarters, Ottawa. 24. Circulated by Mr. Mackenzie with the letter referred
7. Half-Yearly Strength Statement N.P.A.M., 1 Jan to in note 27, below.
31-30 Jun 31, McNaughton Papers, Book "C"; 25. C.G.S. to Minister, 8 Sep 36, Mackenzie Papers,
Report of D.N.D., 1931, page 45. file X-50.
8. General Staff "Memorandum on the Land Forces 26. Mackenzie Papers, file 149-30.
of Canada, 1930", Part II, McNaughton Papers, 27. Copy No. 13 of circular letter, Privy Council
Book "C". Office.
9. Note 6, above. First version dated 5 May 35, 28. Compiled from statements of appropriation
revised version 28 May 35. accounts in annual reports of the Department for
10. Letter in The Times (London), 5 Nov 48. the years concerned.
11. Supplementary Estimates for the Fiscal Year 29. "PM's remarks at Caucus, Jan 20/37", Mackenzie
ending March 31, 1936, 3. Report of D.N.D., Papers, file X-4.
1936, page 14. 30. Statements in House of Commons, Mr. King, 25
12. "The Requirements of Canadian Defence -A Jan and 19 Feb 37, and Mr. Mackenzie, 15 Feb
Review of the Present Position" (Copy in 37.
Mackenzie Papers, file X-4, Public Archives of 31. "Imperial Conference - Defence" (24
Canada). May 37), Mackenzie Papers, file A-3.
13. Mackenzie to King, 4 Sep 36, ibid., file CNS-57. 32. C.G.S. to Minister, 31 May 38, H.Q.C. 4948, vol.
14. Canada: Estimates for the Fiscal Year ending 8.
March 31, 1937 (Ottawa, 1936), 26. 33. C.G.S. (Ashton) to Minister, 24 Sep 37,
15. Statement by the Prime Minister, House of Mackenzie Papers, file X-4. C.G.S. to D.M., 19
Commons, 19 Feb 37. Order in Council P.C. Dee 38, H.Q.C. 4948, vol. 9.
2097, 20 Aug 36. 34. King to Mackenzie, 12 Jan 38, Mackenzie
16. Memoranda of 12 Nov 35 (above, note 12) and 22 Papers, file CNS-57.
Apr 36, Mackenzie Papers, file X-4. 35. C.G.S. to Minister, 31 May 38, above, note 32.
17. "Memorandum on the Land Forces of Canada, 36. Ibid.
1930", above, note 8. 37. C.G.S. to Minister, 16 Nov 38, Mackenzie
18. H.Q.S. 5199, vol. 4. Papers, file D-72.
19. "The Requirements of Canadian Defence: A 38. Mackenzie Papers, file X-50.
review of the position as of April 22nd, 1936", by
555
556 REFERENCES FOR PAGES 17-26
39. C.G.S. to Minister, 16 Nov 38, Mackenzie Papers, 58. "The Requirements of National Defence (A
file D-72. Statement on Militia Armament and Supply)", 23
40. Enclosure to C.G.S. to D.M., 19 Dec 38, Sep 37, with covering memo C.G.S. to Minister
above, note 33. 24 Sep 37, Mackenzie Papers, file X-4.
41. C.G.S. to D.M., 19 Dec 38, above, note 33. 42. 59. "The Munitions Supply Organization of Australia",
C.G.S. to Minister, 19 Dec 38, H.Q.C. 4948, vol. with covering memo C.G.S. to Minister 18 Oct
9. 37, ibid.
43. Correspondence on H.Q.C. 7679. See G.O. 195, 60. D.M. to Minister, 27 Oct 36, Mackenzie Papers,
1938. Cf. RCAF Logbook (Ottawa, 1949), 53. file 149-30.
44. "The Defence of Canada" (note 6, above). 61. Mackenzie to King, 29 Oct 36, ibid.
45. Correspondence on H.Q.S. 5902, vol. 4. "The 62. C.G.S. to Minister, 16 Nov 38, above, note 39.
Scheme for the Reorganization of the Canadian 63. C.G.S. to M.G.O., 4 Feb 39, H.Q.S. 7827.
Militia", accompanying memo D.M.O. & I. (for 64. C.G.S. to Minister, 16 Mar 39, ibid.
C.G.S.) to D.Os.C., 15 Jul 35. 65. "Statement of Supplementary Estimates 1939-40
46. Detail of reorganization, Report of D.N.D., 1937, which it is Intended to Submit", Mackenzie
pages 83-98. Copy of Minister's announcement, Papers, file 187-3. D.M. (LaFleche) to Minister,
and other documents, Mackenzie Papers, file D-2. 30 Mar 39, H.Q.S. 7827.
Globe and Mail (Toronto), 16 Dec 36. Deputy 66. Mac`-"' to King, 17 Jul 37, ibid., file CNS-57.
Minister, D.N.D., to the writer, 18 May 38. 67. 3 George VI, Chap. 42 (assented to 3 June 1939).
47. Adapted from Canada Year Book, 1939, page The question as discussed in public during 1938-
1081. 39 is summarized in C.P. Stacey, The Military
48. Statement of Minister of National Defence in Problems of Canada (Toronto, 1940), 125-39.
House of Commons, 26 Apr 39. Statement of 68. Correspondence in H.Q.S. 6754.
C.G.S., Defence Council minutes, 14 Aug 39. W. 69. Correspondence in H.Q.C. 6661, vol. 2.
J. Bennett to Miss A. Dixon, 12 Sep 44, 70. Report of the Royal Commission on the Bren
Mackenzie Papers, file 10-86 (on Bren guns). Machine Gun Contract, 46.
49. Correspondence on H.Q.S. 7018, vol. 2. 71. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the National
50. Statement of C.G.S., 14 Aug 39, above, note 48. Research Council of Canada, 1939-40, 10.
Cf. Director of Mechanization and Artillery to Documents on H.Q.C. 1129C-44. Cf. H. Duncan
M.G.O., 6 Sep 39, W.D., D.M. & A., September Hall, North American Supply ("History of the
1939. Second World War, United Kingdom Civil
51. For Borden's views, see Minutes of Proceedings Series") (London, 1955), 80.
of the Colonial Conference, 1907 (Cd. 3523, 72. Correspondence on H.Q.S. 7827. See also The
London, 1907), 101, 105; cf. "Memorandum, Industrial Front, 133-4, and J. de N. Kennedy,
Quebec Arsenal", forwarded to Minister of History of the Department of Munitions and
National Defence by C.G.S. 12 May 30 (H.Q.C. Supply (2 vols., Ottawa, 1950), I, 192, 34-5. Hall,
7232-1, vol. 1). Resolution of Imperial War North American
Conference, 24 Apr 17, quoted in General Staff Supply, 9.
"Observations concerning the formation of a 73. Documents on H.Q.S. 5091, vol. 3. Re respirator
Canadian 'Principal Supply Officers Committee'", container, memorandum "General Stores Vote,
September 1930, H.Q.S. 5178, vol. 1. 1935-36 to 1938-39", Mackenzie Papers, file D-
52. "Memorandum on the Land Forces of Canada" 51. "Review of Progress in the Militia Service
(note 8, above). since the close of the Fiscal Year 1935/36", 6 Dec
53. H.Q.C. 72-32-1, vol. 1. 38, H.Q.C. 4948, vol. 9.
54. Documents in ibid., vol. 2. 74. Report of D.N.D., 1937, page 109; 1938, page 81.
55. Report of D.N.D., 1938, pages 5, 84-5; 1939, 75. Report of the Royal Commission on the Bren
pages 5, 90. Statement of Minister of National Machine Gun Contract (note 56, above).
Defence, House of Commons, 26 Apr 39. 76. Mackenzie Papers, file 10-86.
56. Report of the Royal Commission on the Bren 77. Bennett to Dixon, 12 Sep 44, note 48,
Machine Gun Contract. Hon. Henry Hague Davis, above.
Commissioner (Ottawa, 1939), 10-11. 78. Canadian War Data (Reference Papers,
57. The Industrial Front (Ottawa, Department of Canadian Information Service, No. 4),
Munitions and Supply, 1944), 48, 127. 29.
REFERENCES FOR PAGES 26-40 557
557
79. Report of D.N.D., 1937, page 109; 1938, page between the United States and Japan. 11 Apr 38.
81; 1939, page 86. Statement of Minister of Correspondence on H.Q.S. 3497, vol. 1.
National Defence in House of Commons, 16 May 95. C.G.S. to Minister of National Defence, 11 Jan
39. Documents on H.Q.S. 6619, vols. 1-3. 32, and minute by C.G.S., 20 Jan 32, H.Q.S. 3498,
80. Comments by Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, 14 Sep 51, vol. 2.
and Lt.-Gen. M. A. Pope, 24 Aug 51, H.Q.C. 96. C.G.S. to Minister of National Defence, 15 Mar
1453-21-5, vol. 1. 37, H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 22.
81. Papers on H.Q.S. 5199-C, vols. 1 and 2. 97. Defence Scheme No. 3. Major War. 15 Jan 38.
82. C.G.S. to Deputy Minister, 6 May 39, H.Q.S. 98. Minister of National Defence to C.G.S., 17 Mar
7362, vol. 2. 37, H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 22.
83. Defence Scheme No. 3, Appendix I, dated 6 Jul 99. H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 8.
38. 100. D.M.O. and I. to C.G.S., 11 May 39, H.Q.S. 3498,
84. Papers on H.Q.S. 5199-C, vol. 3. Cf. vol. 11.
"TheRequirements of National Defence", above, 101. D.M.O. and I. to various District Officers
note 58. Commanding, 11 Jul 39, ibid.
85. Statements of Minister of National Defence 102. Government of Canada, War Book (Provisional).
inHouse of Commons, 26 Apr and 16 May 39. Cf. Co-ordination of Departmental Action in the
"Review of Progress in the Militia Service", Event of War or Emergency Real or Apprehended.
above, note 73. Report of Director of Engineer Summary of Important Action to be taken by
Services, 29 Aug 39, H.Q.S. 8024. Government Departments. May, 1939.
86. Director of Military Operations and Intelligence 103. Copy of draft in possession of Historical Section
to C.G.S., 13 Sep 37, H.Q.S. 5199-C, vol. 3. (G.S.).
87. To Deputy Minister, H.Q.S. 8024. 104. To Director Historical Section, H.Q.S. 6615.
88. C.G.S. to Deputy Minister, 7 Nov 38, H.Q.S. 105. Report of D.N.D., 1939, page 10; 1940, pages 10-
5199-C, vol. 3. 12.
89. C. G. S. to Minister, 19 Aug 39, H.Q.S. 5199-C, 106. Minister of Finance to Minister of National
F.D. 15. D.M.O. and 1. to C.G.S., 22 Aug. 39, Defence, 21 Sep 39, H.Q.C. 8215, vol. 1.
ibid. Director of Engineer Services to Q.M.G., 29 107. "Strength Return Permanent ForceMonth of July
Aug 39, H.Q.S. 8024. "Report on Action taken by 1939" (Historical Section).
Engineer Services Branch", 5 Sep 39, Mackenzie 108. Report of D.N.D., 1937, page 82; 1939, pages 31-
Papers, file CNS-59. 2, 70. Report on Permanent Force collective
90. Circular letter to Military Districts, 5 Apr 21, training, 1938, H.Q. 98014-10.
H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 1. 109. Ibid., 1935, page 40; 1939, pages 60, 40, 46.
91. Correspondence and draft Scheme, H.Q.S. 5718. "Review of Progress in the Militia Service",
92. Defence Scheme Number 1. (The United States). above, note 73.
In custody of Historical Section, G.S. Comments 110. The Second World War: The Gathering Storm
in G.S. "Memorandum on the Land Forces of [Toronto], (1948), 336.
Canada, 1930" (note 8, above). 111. H.Q.C. 7526, vol. 1.
93. Appreciation, 29 Jan 31, H.Q.S. 5902, vol. 1. 112. House of Commons Debates, 30 Mar 39.
94. Defence Scheme No. 2. Combined Service Plan 113. "Minutes of a Meeting of the Interdepartmental
for the Maintenance of Canadian Neutrality in the Committee on the Control of Profits on
Event of a War Government Armament Contracts", 24 Jan 38,
H.Q.S. 6836, vol. 4.
CHAPTER II
The Outbreak of War and the Mobilization of

the Active Service Force, 1939
1. To Department of External Affairs, H.Q.S. 7375, 4. Correspondence in H.Q.S. 7674.

vol. 5. 5. H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 11.
2. To Department of External Affairs, 22 Aug 39, 6. C.G.S. to Minister of National Defence,
ibid. 12 Jun 39, ibid., vol. 22.
3. Canadian Minister in Paris to Department of 7. H.Q.S. 20-7-1, vol. 1.
External Affairs, 24 and 25 Aug 39, ibid. 8. H.Q.S. 5876, vol. 2.
9. Documents in H.Q.S. 7697, vol. 1.
10. Ibid. 35. C.G.S. to D.M., 5 Sep 39, but cf. same to same, 6
11. Statement of Mr. King in House of Com Sep 39 and 8 Sep 39, with enclosures, all in
mons, 8 Sep 39. Mackenzie Papers, file D-94.
12. H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 13. Cf. W.D., D.M.O. 36. Col. A. F. Duguid, Official History of the
& I., 25 Aug 39. 13. Ibid. Canadian Forces in the Great War 19141919,
14. C.G.S. to A.G., etc., H.Q.S. 7697, vol. 1. 15. General Series, vol. I (Ottawa, 1938), 4-5, 22-24,
H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 13, memorandum of 26-28.
D.M.O. & I., 27 Aug 39. 37. H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 14.
16. H.Q.S. 5199, vol. 6: Minutes of 66th 38. Statement in House of Commons, 11 Sep 39.
Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee, 39. Statistics furnished by Director, War Service
31 Aug 39. Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 14 Jul
17. W.D., D.M.O. & I., 26 Aug 39. Cf. personal 54.
diary, Maj. E. G. Weeks, 25 and 26 Aug. 40. "Report on Inspection of units of the 1st Division
18. Joseph Schull, The Far Distant Ships: An Official in M.Ds. 2 and 4", Appendix XI-2 to W.D., G.S,,
Account of Canadian Naval Operations in the H.Q. 1st Div., 5 Oct-17 Dec 39.
Second World War (Ottawa, 1950), 15. 41. Report of D.N.D., 1939, page 70.
19. RCAF Logbook (Ottawa, 1949), 58-9. 42. Entry covering 1-21 Sep 39.
20. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 43. Statistics furnished by Director, War Service
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 26 Nov
1947-49), IX, 596. Cf. Peter de Mendelssohn, The 48.
Nuremberg Documents: Some Aspects of German 44. W.Ds., Regiment de Maisonneuve, 5 and 6 Sep
War Policy, 1939-45 (London, 1946), 126; L. B. 39; Fusiliers Mont-Royal, 4 and 5 Sep 39; 1st Bn.
Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, 19381939 (London, Black Watch of Canada, 21 Sep 39.
1948), 293-331; and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, 45. "Minutes of an Informal Meeting of Defence
The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Council ... 14th September, 1939." Capt. J. D.
Politics, 1918-1945 (London, 1953), 447-55. Londerville, The Pay Services of the Canadian
21. Proclamations and Orders in Council Passed Army Overseas in the War of 1939-45 (Ottawa,
under the Authority of The War Measures Act, 1950), 215-16.
Vol. I (Ottawa, 1940), 17, 19, 26. 46. Daily Strength Returns, C.A.S.F., for dates
22. Original in possession of Historical Section. quoted, amended to include N.D.H.Q. 30 Sep (file
23. H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 14 in possession of Historical Section G.S.).
24. Cf. Proclamations and Orders in Council, 47. Statistics furnished by Director, War Service
Vol. 1, 32 (P.C. 2498). Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, July
25. G.S. Memorandum, 20 Feb 39, H.Q.S. 1954.
3498, vol. 10; Circular letter to D.Os.C., 48. Canadian Annual Review, 1914, 143.
24 Jun 39, ibid., vol. 11. 49. D.O.C. M.D. 13 to Secretary, D.N.D., 5 Sep 39,
26. H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 11 (10 Jul 39). H.Q. 54-27-3-6, vol. 1.
27. C.G.S. to Minister, 12 Jun 39, ibid., vol. 50. "Minutes of an Informal Meeting" (above, note
22. 45).
28. Odium to McNaughton, 25 Oct 40, 1st Cdn Corps 51. Minutes of 68th Meeting of Chiefs of Staff
file 1/161 (G). Comments by Maj.-Gen. Odium, Committee.
29 Aug 51, and Maj.Gen. Leclerc, 24 Aug 51, 52. W.Ds., 48th Highlanders, 13 Sep 39; Edmonton
H.Q.C. 145321-5, vol. 1. Regiment, 12 Sep 39; Seaforth Highlanders, 22
29. Various cables, 1st Cdn Corps file 1/161 (G). Sep 39; Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, 30 Sep
30. Comment by Lt.-Gen. M. A. Pope, 24 39.
Aug 51, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 1. 53. W.Ds., 2nd and 8th Medium Batteries R.C.A.,
31. Documents in H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 14. 32. H.Q.S. September 1939.
5199-S, vol. 1. 54. W.Ds., P.P.C.L.I., September 1939; Royal 22e
33. Minister's Private Secretary to Deputy Regiment, 30 Sep 39.
Minister "for attention of The Chiefs of 55. Daily Strength Return, C.A.S.F., 30 Sep 39.
taff", 5 Sep 39, Mackenzie Papers, file 56. "Statement of the Measures Taken to Date for the
187-3. Defence of Canada . enclosed with C.G.S. to
34. C.G.S. to D.Os.C., 6 Sep 39, H.Q.S. 207-1, vol. D.M., 4 Sep 39, Mackenzie Papers, file D-51.
1. 57. W.D., Org 2, Adjutant-General's Branch,
N.D.H.Q., 12 Sep 39.
58. Copy in H.Q. 305-3-77, vol. 1.
59. Documents in H.Q. 462-20-1, vol. 1.
60. DesRosiers to Vaughan, 16 Sep 39 (in files of 83. H.Q.S. 5199-S, vol. 1. 84. Copy in ibid.
Canadian Commercial Corporation). On cloth, 85. Ibid.
M.G.O. to D.M., 3 Nov 39, Mackenzie Papers, 86. C.G.S. to Minister, 11 Oct 39, ibid.
file 10-11. 87. External to High Commissioner in U.K., ibid.
61. W.D., Ordnance Depot M.D. No. 1, 28 Oct 39. 88. Cables in ibid.
Dept. of Munitions and Supply, Record of 89. Sec. of State for Dominions to Sec. of State for
Contracts Awarded from July 14, 1939, to March External Affairs, 25 Oct 39; Sec. of State for
31, 1940 (Ottawa, 1940), 12. Comments by Maj.- External Affairs to Sec. of State for Dominions, 1
Gen. W. H. P. Elkins, 20 Aug 51, and Gen. A. G. Nov 39 (ibid.).
L. McNaughton, 2 Jan 52, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 90. Crerar to C.G.S., 2 and 3 Nov 39, C.M.H.Q. file
1. 1/Non Div/1.
62. M.G.O. to D.M., 3 Nov 39, above, note 60. 91. "Matters Discussed at Meeting in Minister's
63. Correspondence in H.Q. 54-27-8-1, vol. 1. 64. Office on Morning of 6 November 1939", W.D.,
Correspondence in H.Q.S. 20-4-1. 65. To C.G.S., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., 5 Oct17 Dec 39.
9 Sep 39, ibid. 66. Documents in ibid. 92. Notes of meetings in ibid., and correspondence in
67. Documents in ibid., and telegram Org 282, A.G. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Non Div/1.
to D.Os.C., 11 Oct 39, H.Q.S. 20-4-2-E. 93. C.G.S. to G.O.C. 1st Div., 26 Nov 39, H.Q.S.
68. Military Secretary's Office, 2 vols. of documents 5199-S, vol. 1.
labelled "Army", now in custody of Historical 94. G.O.C. 1st Div. to C.G.S., 27 Nov 39, ibid.
Section, G.S. Referred to hereafter as "M.S. 95. External Affairs to High Commissioner in U.K.,
Papers". 30 Nov 39, M.S. Papers.
69. Ibid. 96. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Non Div/1.
70. Ibid. 97. Crerar to High Commissioner, 10 Dec 39; High
71. "Memorandum on Suggestions of the British Commissioner to Secretary of State for War, 16
Government for Co-operation by the Canadian Dec 39; Secretary of State for War to High
Army", H.Q.S. 5199-S, vol. 1. Commissioner, 2 Jan 40, all in C.M.H.Q. file
72. Ibid. 1/Non Div/2.
73. Ibid. (same memorandum of 16 Sep). 74. M.S. 98. Documents in C.M.H.Q. files 1/Fin Can UK/ 1;
Papers. On Col. Loggie's appoint 1/Formations/1/2; 1/Formations/3 and 1/Conf/6.
ment, Militia Order 498, 3 Nov 37, and 99. H.Q.C. 8215, vol. 1.
H.Q.C. 6-L-300, vol. 3. 100. Ibid.
75. Ottawa Journal, 20 Sep 39. 76. M.S. Papers. 101. Ibid.
77. Ibid. 102. M. M. Postan, British War Production ("History
78. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Div/1 (to C.G.S., 21 Sep 39). of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil
79. C.A.S.F. Routine Order No. 34, 30 Sep 39. Series") (London, 1952), 81-2.
80. Documents in H.Q. 54-27-36-13, vols. 1 and 2. 103. M.S. Papers; also in H.Q.S. 5199-S, vol. 1.
81. H.Q.S. 3498, vol. 14. 104. H.Q.S. 8215, vol. 1.
82. Reports attached as appendices to W.D., 105. H.Q.S. 5199-S, vol. 1.
G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., 5 Oct-17 Dec 39. 106. H.Q.S. 8140.
107. H.Q. 54-27-35-1, vol. 1.
CHAPTER III
The Expansion of the Army, 1939-1943
1. W.Ds., various units. On Division's general 4. Canmilitry to Defensor, 10 and 13 Feb 40,
state of training, C.G.S. to Minister, 17 Feb C.M.H.Q. file 1/Formations/1.
40, H.Q.S. 20-1-2. 5. External to Dominion, 14 Feb 40, ibid.
2. H.Q.S. 5199-S, vol. 2. 6. Same to same, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Formations/1/2.
3. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 1/IV Corps/1 7. Same to same, 27 Feb 40, ibid.
and 1/Formations/1. Cf. Lord Gort's 8. Canmilitry to Defensor (McNaughton for Rogers),
"Second Despatch" (Supplement to London 3 Mar 40; Massey to External, 3 Mar 40 (both in
Gazette, 17 Oct 41), 5906. ibid.).
76. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 462. 104. Memorandum of meeting in Gen. McNaughton's
77. "Note of Meeting . . . 2nd January, 1941", note 75 office, 3 Apr 42, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn Army/1.
above. 105. Notes of Conference with C.G.S. at C.M.H.Q., 3
78. Ibid. Aug 42, C.M.H.Q. file 1/ Conf/ 10/3.
79. Ibid. 106. General Order 281/43. Canadian Army Overseas
80. Cable Min. 40, Ralston to Prime Minister and Routine Order 3035, 22 Jan 43.
Power, 5 Jan 41, copy on H.Q.S. 8675. 107. W.Ds., Irish Regiment of Canada and Princess
81. Crerar to McNaughton, 4 Mar 41, McNaughton Louise Fusiliers, November 1942. Programme for
file CC7/Crerar/6. conversion of Division to armour, W.D., G.S.,
82. W.D., H.Q. 1st Army Tank Bde., February, H.Q. 4th Div., February 1942, Appendix 53. On
March, June, 1941. Cf. "A Brief History of 1st Ram tanks, W.D., 21st Armd. Regt., 8 Apr 42.
Canadian Army Tank Brigade, February 1941- 108. General Order 132/42.
June 1943", prepared by the Brigade, 29 Jun 43. 109. Tel. GS 1998, Canmilitry to Defensor, 12 Jun 42,
83. Report No. 43 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 15 C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn Army/1.
Aug 41. W.D., H.Q. 7th Inf. Bde., 1 Sep 41. 110. Memorandum by McNaughton, 26 Oct 42,
84. Canadian Army Routine Order 993, 22 Mar 41. McNaughton personal War Diary, October 1942.
85. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 9/5 Armd Diva' 1. 111. "D.S.D.'s Notes regarding Proposed Composition
86. Documents on H.Q.S. 20-1-4, vol. 1; of Canadian Forces", C.M.H.Q. file l/Cdn Army/
H.Q.S. 20-1-7, vol. 1; H.Q.S. 20-4-7. 1.
87. "Appreciation: The Nature of the Canadian Army 112. C.M.H.Q. letter 1/Cdn Army/2 (S.D. 1), 15 Aug
Effort Mid-Summer 1941 to Spring 1942" by 42.
Maj.-Gen. Crerar, 18 May 41 (copy in Hist Sec). 113. Memorandum by McNaughton, 20 Nov 42,
Ministerial authority for reconstitution of 4th McNaughton personal War Diary, November
Division, 10 May 41, H.Q.S. 20-1-4, vol. 1. 1942.
88. General Order 135/41. 114. Tel. CGS 615, Defensor to Canmilitry, H.Q.S. 20-
89. Information from Directorate of Supplies and 1, vol. 5.
Transport, A.H.Q. 115. Tels. GS 3941, Canmilitry to Defensor, 21 Nov
90. Report No. 54 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 30 42, and CGS 643, Defensor to Canmilitry, 25 Nov
Nov 41. 42, C.M.H.Q. file 1/ Cdn Army/1/2.
91. Statistics from A.G. (Stats), C.M.H.Q. 92. 116. Tel. GS 3890, Canmilitry to Defensor, 17 Nov 42,
McNaughton Papers, file CC7/Crerar/6. 93. ibid.
McNaughton to Crerar, 11 Sep 41, ibid. 94. Crerar 117. Tel. GS 3941, note 115 above. Cf. memo
to the Minister, 29 Sep 41, H.Q.S. randum 20 Nov 42, note 113 above.
20-1, vol. 1. 118. Tel. GS 4182, Canmilitry to Defensor, C.M.H.Q.
95. Brig. E. L. M. Bums to Turner, 30 Jul 41, ibid. file 1/Cdn Army/1/2.
96. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 42/Min N.D./1. 119. Tel. GS 4221, same to same, ibid.
97. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Formations/4/6. 98. H.Q.S. 20-1- 120. Note 118, above.
9, vol. 3. 121. Tel. CGS 697, Defensor to Canmilitry, 26 Dec 42,
99. Tel. No. 2496, Dominion to External, for Ralston ibid.
from McNaughton, 27 Dec 41, C.M.H.Q. file 122. Tel. GS 4221, note 119, above.
1/Cdn Army/1. Cf. memorandum of conference 123. Rodger to Senior Combatant Officer, Cdn Army
on McNaughton file PA 5-3-2. Overseas, 27 Mar 43, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn
100. From Ralston to McNaughton, 30 Dec 41, H.Q.S. Army/1/3; Memorandum by Personal Assistant to
20-1, vol. 1. G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, 6 Apr 43, ibid.
101. Brooke to McNaughton (handwritten), 124. H.Q.S. 20-1, vol. 16.
7 Jan 42, McNaughton file PA 5-3-2. 125. C.G.S. letter to A.G., Q.M.G., and M.G.O., 7 Jan
102. Report of the Labour Supply Investigation 43, ibid.
Committee to the Labour Co-Ordination 126. C.G.S. to C.M.H.Q., 7 Aug 44, C.M.H.Q. file
Committee, Ottawa, October, 1941, 157. 1/Cdn Army/1/5.
103. Memoranda of interviews, Lt.-Gen. McNaughton's 127. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 1/Cdn Army/1/3
personal War Diary, March 1942. See extracts in and 1/Org C.A.C./1.
C. P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945 128. Tel. GS 1502, Canmilitry to Defensor, 26 Jun 43,
(Ottawa, 1948), 47. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn Army/ 1/3.
129. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 1/Para Tps/1 and
6/1 Para Bn/1. H.Q.S. 8846-1, vols. 5 and 11.
130. W.D., 1st Parachute Bn., July, August, 1943. 142. McQueen to C.G.S., 8 Oct 42, H.Q.S. 20-4-32,
131. Lt.-Col. R. D. Burhans, The First Special vol. 1. Cf. Burhans, 35-7.
Service Force, A War History of the North 143. McNarney to Pope, 13 Nov 42, H.Q.S. 20-2-32.
Americans, 1942-1944 (Washington, 1947), Chap. 144. Treasury Board minute P.C. 76/3711, 5 May 43,
I. Documents on H.Q.S. 20-1-32, vol. 1. H.Q.S. 20-1-32, vol. 1.
132. J. de N. Kennedy, History of the Department of 145. W.D., 1st Cdn Special Service Bn., 30 Oct 42.
Munitions and Supply (2 vols., Ottawa, 1950), f, Calculations, 5 Sep 42, on office file B.D.F. S.D.
60-61; W. Eggleston, Scientists at War (Toronto, 3-5-6, N.D.H.Q.
1950), 97100; G. M. Barnes, Weapons of World 146. Frederick to Pope, 19 Jan 43, H.Q.S. 201-32, vol.
War 11 (N.Y., 1947), 288-9. 1.
133. "Memorandum-For File" by Col. Ralston, 27 Jun 147. Documents on H.Q.S. 20-4-32, vol. 1. Ralston to
42, and Minute by Ralston, 14 Jul 42, on C.G.S. C.G.S., 28 Oct 42, H.Q.S. 201-32, vol. 1.
to Minister, 11 Jul 42, H.Q.S. 20-4-32, vol. 1. 148. "Activities of the First Canadian Special Service
134. Documents on H.Q.S. 20-4-32, vol. 1. Battalion C.A.(A). from 1 November 44 to 9
135. Table of organization, 5 Jul 42, ibid. January 45", H.Q.S. 2016-32, vol. 5.
136. Burhans, First Special Service Force, 15n. 137. 149. "Note for File" by Lt: Col. W. A. B. Anderson,
Maj.-Gen. R. T. Frederick to Deputy S.D. 1, 23 Jul 42, H.Q.S. 204-32, vol. 1.
Director Historical Section, May 1946, 150. P.C. 629, 26 Jan 43, H.Q.S. 20-1-32, vol. 1.
H.Q.C. 1453-11. 151. Sec. 49 (Manual of Military Law, 1929, 476-7).
138. Military Attaché, Washington, to De See, e.g., "Activities of The First Canadian
fensor, 6 Aug 42, H.Q.S. 20-4-32, vol. 1. 139. Special Service Battalion . from 1 October 44 to
Ralston to C.G.S., 14 Apr 43, H.Q.S. 20 31 October 44", H.Q.S. 20-16-32, vol. 5.
1-32, vol. 1. 152. Canadian Army Overseas Routine Order 5941, 4
140. Approved submission, C.G.S. to Minister, 28 May Jul 45.
43, ibid. 153. Ibid.
141. Burhans, 22.
CHAPTER IV
Recruiting and Training in Canada
1. Debates, House of Commons, 1939, III, pp. 2426,

2441 (speeches of Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King and 12. C.A.S.F. R.O. 543, 29 Jun 40.
Dr. R. J. Manion, 30 Mar 39). 13. C.A.S.F. R.O. 138, 18 Nov 39.
2. Ibid. 14. A.G. circular letter, 13 Dec 39, H.Q.C.
3. W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War 6075, vol. 4.
Economy ("History of the Second World War, 15. C.A.S.F. R.O. 708, 3 Oct 40.
United Kingdom Civil Series"; London, 1949), 65 16. Strength Returns compiled by Directorate
and 67. Cf. Maj. L. F. Ellis, The War in France of Organization, N.D.H.Q.
and Flanders, 1939-1940 ("United Kingdom 17. Statistics from Director of War Service
Military Series"; London, 1953), 5-6. Records, D.V.A., November 1951.
4. Hancock and Gowing, 68. 18. Progress Report No. 5, Canadian Army,
5. A. F. W. Plumptre, Mobilizing Canada's 18 Mar 41.
Resources for War (Toronto, 1941), 1315. 19. Department of National Defence Press
6. Quotations from Recruiting Memorandum No. 2, Releases Nos. 647, 648, 649, 8 Apr 41.
which is somewhat more categorical than No. 1. 20. D.N.D. Press Release No. 681, 11 May 41.
7. G.O. 110/40. On depots generally, H.Q.C. 70-5- 21. D. Press Release No. 759, 16 Jul 41.
314, vol. 1, and H.Q.C. 6969, vols. I and 2. 22. "The Directorate of Army Recruiting"
8. Information from Director, War Service (Narrative prepared by Directorate, 1945);
Records, D.V.A., November 1951. "History of Recruiting Activities, 1939
9. A.G. to D.Os.C. M.Ds. 3, 4, and 5, 4 Jan 1945" (also prepared by D.A.R.); cf.
40, H.Q.S. 3498-5, vol. 1. Report of D.N.D., 1942, page 14 and
10. Information from Director, War Service 1943, page 47.
Records, D.V.A., November 1951. 23. W.D., Directorate of Army Recruiting,
11. C.A.S.F. R.O. 5. June 1943, Appendix 42.
24. Documents in H.Q.C. 70-5-578, vol. 1. 25. Report 56. 6 George VI, Chap. 29.
of D.N.D., 1943, page 47. 57. P.C. 4105. 58. P.C. 7995.
26. Ibid.; cf. W.D., Army Show, October 59. P.C. 8347, 14 Sep 42. 60. P.C. 10,003, 3 Nov 42.
1943, Appendix 5. 61. P.C. 5011. 62. P.C. 6296. 63. P.C. 6901. 64. P.C.
27. Compiled from statistics furnished by Director, 8800.
War Service Records, D.V.A., November 1951. 65. H.Q. 54-21-4-147.
28. Ibid. 66. Documents in H.Q. 54-27-32-7, vols. 1 and 2.
29. Compiled from statistics furnished by Director of 67. Ibid.
War Service Records, D.V.A., November 1951 68. H.Q. 54-27-111-1, vol. 1.
and March 1952. Deserters from monthly reports, 69. A.G. to Minister, 4 Apr 41, ibid.
"Discharges from the Canadian Army (Active)", 70. To Secretary, Cabinet War Committee, Privy
compiled by Director of Records, N.D.H.Q. Council Office file W-30.
30. "Discharges from the Canadian Army (Active)". 71. Minutes of a Meeting held in the Office of the
31. Statistics from Director of War Service Records, Adjutant-General, 23 Jun 41, H.Q. 54-27-111-2,
D.V.A., February 1952. vol. 1.
32. Compiled from statistics furnished by Director of 72. D.N.D. Press Release No. 734, 27 Jun 41.
War Service Records, D.V.A., November 1951. 73. Statistics from Director of War Service Records,
33. Proclamation, Canada Gazette, 7 Aug 40. 34. 4 D.V.A., November 1951.
George VI, Chap. 22. 74. Canadian Army Routine Order No. 1422, 8 Nov
35. Canada Gazette, 27 Aug 40. 41.
36. C.G.S. circular letter to D.Os.C., 30 Jul 75. P.C. 1956.
40, H.Q.S. 8624, vol. 1. Comment by 76. "The Canadian Women's Army Corps
Gen. Crerar, 14 Sep 51, H.Q.C. 1453-21 Regulations" (P.C. 6289, 13 Aug 41), Sec. XII.
5, vol. 1. G.O. 318, 1943.
37. A.G. to D.Os.C., 16 Sep 40, H.Q. 11611-5, on 77. A.G. circular letter, 26 Aug 43, H.Q.S. 20-4-Y,
A.C.G.S. office file, Historical Section. vol. 1.
38. P.C. 4904, 17 Sep 40. 78. Documents in H.Q. 54-27-111-2, vol. 2.
39. Militia Order No. 187, 19 Sep 40. 79. Returns in C.M.H.Q. file 44/Statements/ 1/5.
40. D.N.D. Press Release No. 591, 22 Jan 41. H.Q. Extract from Army Council minutes, 29 Jul 42,
1161-1-11, vol. 1. H.Q.S. 8984, vol. 1.
41. "The Canadian Army", 3 Sep 40, H.Q.S. 8675. 80. C.M.H.Q. files 1/CWAC/1 and
42. Canada Gazette, 24 Mar 41. 1/CWAC/2.
43. Reserve Army (Special) Regulations 1941, sec. 81. Strength Return dated 25 Apr 45, Historical
8(f). Section. Information from Director of War
44. Ibid., sets. 8(k) and 23. Service Records, D.V.A., January 1949.
45. C.G.S. circular letter, 9 Dec 40, H.Q.S. 20-3-18, 82. Mobilization Instructions for the Canadian
vol. 1. Militia, 1937, Part II, Sec. IX.
46. Comment by Maj.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, 83. H.Q.S. 8122.
4 Feb 52, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 1. 84. British War Establishment II/1931/12B/ 3.
47. D.N.D. Press Releases Nos. 663 (24 Apr 41) and Documents in C.M.H.Q. file 5/Inf Bn/1.
692 (26 May 41). 85. A.G. to Commandant, R.M.C., 26 Sep 39, H.Q.C.
48. C.G.S. to A.G., 13 Apr 41, H.Q.S. 20-6, vol. 4. 1-1-89, vol. 8. W.D., R.M.C., 14 Oct, 20 Dec 39.
Debates, House of Commons, 1941, III, 2297 (28 A.G. to Commandant, etc., 21 Dec 40, H.Q. 74-
Apr 41). 116-1, W.D., D. Org., December 1939. The
49. National Resources Mobilization Act (Army) Recruits' Handbook (R.M.C., 1948), 8-9.
Regulations, 1943 (Canada Gazette, 30 Oct 43). 86. To D.M.T. & S.D., 10 Aug 40, H.Q. 5427-69-2,
50. Canadian Army [Reserve] Order No. 132, 10 Jul vol. 1.
41. 87. W.D., D.M.T., N.D.H.Q., 5 Mar 41. Progress
51. Documents in H.Q. 1161-1-11, vols. 1-4. 52. A.G. Report No. 14A, Canadian Army, 13 Mar 41.
Memorandum, 26 May 41, H.Q. 1161-1-19, vol. Canadian Army Training Pamphlet No. 8, 1941,
2. paras. 5(a)-5(e).
53. Ibid. P.C. 5439, 24 Jul 41 (Canada Gazette, 16 88. "Officer Training-Men Serving in the Ranks"
Aug 41). (Appendix to C.A.O.R.O. 397, 4 Nov 40).
54. Statistics from Director of War Service 89. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 2/Trg School/ 1.
Records, D.V.A., November 1951.
55. Canada Gazette, 23 Jun 42.
90. H.Q.C. 301-3-3, vol. 2; cf. C.A.S.F. R.O. 70, 18 116. Montague to Secretary, D.N.D., 11 Sep
Oct 39. 43, H.Q.S. 20-3, vol. 4.
91. C.A.S.F. R.O. 379. K.R.(Can.), 1939, para. 145. 117. C.G.S. to Montague, 15 Dec 43, ibid. 118. D.M.T.
92. A.G. to D.O.C. M.D. 5, 28 May 41, H.Q. 54-27- Liaison Letter, I Jul-31 Dec 43,
69-2, vol. 1. "Instructions concerning D.C.G.S.(A) file "Link Training Plan".
Recommendations for Commissions in the Cf. Report of D.N.D., 1944, page 24. 119. Report
Canadian Army (Canada)", circulated 1 Aug 41, of D.N.D., 1945, page 39.
ibid., vol. 2. 120. Ibid., but "one Signal Corps" should read "one
93. Documents on H.Q.S. 8686-2. W.D., D.A.G.(O), Army Service Corps". D.C.G.S.(B) to C.G.S., 11
30 Nov 42. Cf. Report of D.N.D., 1943, page 41. Nov 44, H.Q.S. 20-1-18, vol. 9.
94. Minutes of Army Council meeting, 10 Dec 42. 121. W.D., Canadian School of Army Administration,
95. C.G.S. to Minister (note for speech in July 1941, April 1942, November 1942.
House of Commons), 8 Apr 43, H.Q.C. 122. Report of D.N.D., 1944, page 24.
7434-3-1, vol. 1. 123. Ibid., 1943, page 41. G.O. 29/43.
96. Report of D.N.D., 1942, page 14. 124. Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 19,
97. A.G. Circular Letter, H.Q. 54-27-7-280, October 1942, 79. 125. Ibid. No. 27, June 1943,
vol. 1. 26.
98. C.G.S. to Minister, 8 Apr 43 (above, note 95). Cf. 126. Report of D.N.D., 1944, page 24.
speech by Ralston in House of Commons, 18 May 127. Report to D.M.T., 30 Sep 43, H.Q.S. 20
43. Documents on H.Q.C. 7434-3-1, vol. 1, and 3, vol. 4.
W.D., D.A.G. (0), N.D.H.Q., FebruaryJune, 1943. 128. Report of D.N.D., 1942, page 13.
C.A.R.O. 3319, 17 Jun 43. Syllabus of tests at 129. "Outline History of Trades Training"
O.S.A.C., W.D., A.17 C.M.G.T.C., April 1943, (prepared by Directorate of Trades
Appendix IV. Training).
99. Press Release, D.N.D. (Army), 25 Aug 43. W.D., 130. Ibid., Appendix "M".
O.T.C. (Eastern Canada), June 1945. Report of 131. Documents on H.Q.S. 70-5-200, vol. 1.
D.N.D., 1944, page 25. Report of D.N.D., 1943, page 42; 1944,
100. Statistics from War Service Records, D.V.A., page 28.
November 1951. 132. D.A.G. to D.M.T., 3 Nov 41, H.Q. 54
101. C.A.S.F. R.O. 22. 27-111-26, vol. 1.
102. To C.G.S., 12 Aug 39, H.Q.C. 6974, vol. 3. 133. Circular letter from Officer Administer
103. Documents on H.Q.S. 3498-5, vols. I and 2. On ing C.W.A.C., 13 Feb 42, ibid. Report
P.F. training centres, G.Os. 16/36, 56/38 and of D.N.D., 1942, page 12; 1943, page 39. 134.
188/39. Documents on H.Q.S. 8984, vol. 1. Re
104. A.G. Summary, Daily Telegraphic Returns, 29 port of D.N.D., 1943, pages 42.3.
Feb 40. Documents in H.Q.C. 6974, vol. 4. 135. "How to Qualify" (Canadian Army Train
105. G.O. 145/40. ing Pamphlet No. 8, 1941). Canadian
106. Documents on H.Q.S. 8624, vols. 1-4. (List of Army Training Memorandum No. 7,
Training Centres, 4 Aug 40, vol. 2). October 1941, Appendix XXIV.
107. Report by Major J. H. W. T. Pope, 11 Nov 40, 136. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 6/OCTU/1. 137.
ibid., vol. 4. Report of D.N.D., 1943, page 40.
108. Debates, House of Commons, 1941, II, 1429-30 138. Tel. AG 4643, Defensor to Canmilitry
(11 Mar 41). (Stuart from Letson), 4 Aug 43,
109. List of Training Centres, G.O. 250, 7 Nov 41. C.M.H.Q. file 6/OCTU/1/3.
W.D., A.24 T.C. (Coast Defence and Anti- 139. Report of D.N.D., 1944, page 25.
Aircraft), May, 1941. 140. A.G. letter, 20 Feb 42, H.Q. 54-27-69-2,
110. Documents in H.Q.S. 20-1-18, vols. I and 2, and W.D., Director Personal Services, Feb
H.Q.S. 20-1, vol. 2. Report of D.N.D., 1943, page ruary 1942. W.D., 01 Officers Training
40. Centre, 13 Aug 41. Report of D.N.D.,
111. Comment by Maj.-Gen. Letson, 21 Mar 52, 1942, page 12.
H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 1. 141. Report of D.N.D., 1942, page 13.
112. Report of D.N.D., 1943, page 40. 142. C.G.S. letter, 24 Sep 42, H.Q. 54-27-35
113. Weeks to D.M.T., 7 Nov 42, H.Q.S. 201-18, vol. 60, vol. 8.
3. 143. Documents in H.Q. 8679-4-6, vols. 1-4,
114. Canadian Army Routine Order 3862, 1 Dec 43. and H.Q. 8679-1-10, vols. 1-17. Cf. Report
115. C.G.S. to G.Os.C. and D.Os.C., 8 Jul 43,
of D.N.D., 1943, page 41; 1944, page 25.
H.Q.S. 20-1-18, vol. 4. Report of D.N.D.,
144. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 2/Staff/3.
1944, page 24.
145. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 2/Staff/3/2. H.Q. (prepared by Directorate of Army Cadets,
8542-2, F.D. 73, on vol. 17. Report of D.N.D., 1944).Information from D.M.T., A.H.Q., 2 May
1944, pages 26-7; 1945, pages 42-3. 51. G.O. 90, 1933.
146. Report of D.N.D., 1944, pages 26-7. 148. W.D., No. 60 (B) T.C., December 1942, January
147. Report of D.N.D., 1943, page 40; 1944, pages 29- 1943.
30; 1945, page 46. "Royal Canadian Army 149. Canadian Army Orders 128-1, 24 Apr 50, and 128-
Cadets, Historical Notes" 2, 1 May 50.
CHAPTER V
Defending the Soil of Canada, 1939-1945
22. Internment State, 1200 hrs 21 Oct 44,

1. W.D., 56th Heavy Battery R.C.A., 26 Aug 39; H.Q.S. 7236-1-2. "Preliminary Historical
Diary of Fortress Fire Command attached. Narrative of the Directorate, Prisoners of
2. W.D., 15th (Vancouver) Coast Brigade R.C.A., War", compiled by the Directorate, June
September 1939. Information from Maj. T. M. 1945.
Hunter. 23. A.G. to D.Os.C., 14 May 41, H.Q.S. 20
3. W.D., 102nd (N.B.C.) Heavy Battery 2-14, vol. 1.
R.C.A., September 1939. 24. D. Org to D.A.G., 9 Apr 41, H.Q.S.
4. W.D., 16th Coast Brigade R.C.A., Sep 8480, vol. 1.
tember 1939. Messages from D.O.C. M.D. 25. Weekly Strength Summary, week ending
6, 10 and 16 Sep 39, H.Q.S. 7362, vol. 1. 5. W.D., 19 Jun 43. Units from D. Org Ledgers.
3rd (N.B.) Coast Brigade R.C.A., 26. Minutes of Defence Council, 15 Feb 40.
September-November 1939. 27. Cable GS 0787, Defensor to Canmilitry,
6. W.Ds., 59th Heavy Battery and 94th Field 5 Oct 40, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Conf/3/2.
Battery, R.C.A., August 1939. 28. "Review of Progress in the Militia Ser
7. G.S. Appreciation, 20 Jun 40, H.Q.S. vice since the close of the Fiscal Year
8613, vol. 1. 1935/36", 6 Dec 38, H.Q.S. 4948, vol. 9.
8. Information from Naval Service H.Q. (re arrival 29. Documents on H.Q.S. 66, vols. 15 and 16.
of S.S. Balmoral Wood), and W.D., No. 6 30. High Commissioner for United Kingdom
Detachment, R.C.O.C., January 1940. Tel., High to Prime Minister of Canada, 4 Nov 40,
Commissioner in Great Britain to External, 30 ibid., vol. 16. Progress Report No. 35,
Nov 39, H.Q.S. 7018, vol. 2. Canadian Army, 8 Aug 41.
9. Progress Report No. 51, Canadian Army, 26 Nov 31. Progress Report No. 59, Canadian Army,
41. 22 Jan 42.
10. D.M.O. & I. to C.G.S., 3 Oct 39, H.Q.S. 3545, 32. Ibid., No. 68, 26 Mar 42. 33. Ibid., No. 143, 2 Sep
vol. 3. 43.
11. W.D., Esquimalt Fortress Fire Command, 34. Ibid., No. 29, 25 Jun 41; No. 183, 12
attached to that of 56th Heavy Battery R.C.A., Dec 44.
August-September 1939. 35. Consolidated Survey of Activities of
12. Comment by Gen. Crerar, 14 Sep 51, H.Q.C. Militia Service, 31 Mar-30 Jun 40, H.Q.S.
1453-21-5, vol. 1. 8480.
13. W.Ds., H.Qs. M.Ds. 6 and 11, September 1939; 36. GS 0787, above, note 27.
H.Q.S. 8139-1, vol. 7; W.D., Rocky Mountain 37. Progress Report No. 38, Canadian Army,
Rangers, September-November, 1939. 27 Aug 41. Financial arrangements re
14. H.Q.S. 8613, vol. 1 (20 Jun 40). Daily 10-inch guns, H.Q.S. 5199-W-2, vol. 2.
Strength Return, 1 Jun 40. 38. Progress Report No. 111, Canadian Army,
15. Report of Sub-Committee on Vulnerable 21 Jan 43.
Points, 18 Jul 39, H.Q.S. 6717, vol. 2. 39. Ibid., No. 38, 27 Aug 41.
16. C.G.S. to Minister, 28 Sep 39, ibid. 40. Ibid., No. 82, 2 Jul 42.
17. Documents in ibid., vols. 2 and 3. 41. GS 0787, above, note 27.
18. C.A.S.F. R.O. 61. 42. Alexander to Secretary, D.N.D., 4 Nov 40, H.Q.S.
19. Correspondence on H.Q.S. 6717, vol. 3. Report of 8704-4, vol. 1.
Sub-Committee on Vulnerable Points, 31 Oct 39, 43. Documents on ibid., vol. 2, including
ibid., vol. 2. D.M.O. & I. to D.T.R., 4 Dec 41.
20. Appendix "E" to Part III of Defence of Canada 44. Progress Report No. 182, Canadian Army,
Plan, August 1940, H.Q.S. 3496, vol. 3. 13 Nov 44; ibid., No. 179, 14 Aug 44.
21. Tel. GS 0788, Defensor to Canmilitry,4 Oct 40, 45. GS 0787, above, note 27.
H.Q.S. 5199-C, F.D. 15.
46. W.D., 15th (Vancouver) Coast Brigade R.C.A., 73. Commander E. V. St. J. Morgan, "Sea
October 1939, October and November 1941. Raiders in the 1939-45 War" (Journal of
47. Progress Report No. 176, Canadian Army, 10 the Royal United Service Institution,
May 44. XCIV, February, 1949). Capt. S. W. Ros
48. Documents in H.Q.S. 5199-C, F.D. 15. kill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945 ("United
49. Appendix "A", Table IV, to Part III of Chiefs of Kingdom Military Series"), I (London,
Staff Committee Plan for the Defence of Canada, 1954), Chaps. XIV, XVIII.
February 1941, H.Q.S. 3496, vol. 3. 74. H.Q.S. 3496, vol. 3.
50. Progress Reports, passim. National Research 75. Chiefs of Staff to Minister, ibid.
Council of Canada, The War History of the Radio 76. C.G.S. to Minister, 23 Jul 40, ibid.
Branch (Ottawa, August 1948), 61-9. W. 77. Ralston to Crerar, 24 Jul 40, ibid.
Eggleston, Scientists at War (Toronto, 1950), 46- 78. Ibid.
50. 78. Above, note 76.
51. To the Ministers, H.Q.S. 6717-5, vol. 1. 80. Above, note 77.
52. Minutes of Joint Service Committee, 4 Apr 41, 81. Chiefs of Staff Committee Plan for the Defence of
H.Q. Atlantic Command file ACS 10-10, W.D., Canada, August 1940, Part III, para. 21, H.Q.S.
H.Q. Atlantic Command, April 1941. 3496, vol. 3.
53. Progress Report No. 15, Canadian Army, 18 Mar 82. Ibid., Appendix "N".
41. 83. Ibid., Appendices "0" and "P".
54. W.D., 14th A.A. Battery R.C.A., June 1941. 84. Ibid., para. 19.
55. Table in H.Q.S. 5199-C, F.D. 15. 85. 24 Feb 41, H.Q.S. 3496, vol. 3.
56. Report by O.C. Sault Ste. Marie and Sud 86. In ibid.
bury Regiment, 11 Jun 41, H.Q.S. 5839, 87. Two cables, ibid.
vol. 3. 88. "Instructions for the Guidance of General Officers
57. Documents on H.Q.S. 7018-2, vol. 1. Commanding-in-Chief Atlantic and Pacific
58. U.S. Military Attache to D.M.O. & P., 15 Oct 42, Commands", 26 Feb 41, H.Q.S. 8704.
ibid. 89. To Secretary, D.N.D., 16 Dec 40, W.D., H.Q.
59. Documents in ibid. R.C.A.F. progress report, 29 Pacific Command, December 1940.
Aug 42, to meeting of Permanent Joint Board on 90. W.D., H.Q. 10th Inf. Bde., March 1941
Defence. (introductory summary).
60. Canadian Army Staff, Washington, to Sec 91. Ibid., May 1941.
retary, D.N.D., 6 Nov 42, H.Q.S. 9019. 92. E.g., W.D., A.C.G.S. (Maj.-Gen. M. A. Pope), 6
61. Documents in H.Q.S. 7018-2, vol. 2. Nov 41.
62. Contract Demands on files H.Q. 466-M218, 466- 93. "Appreciation, Defence of Pacific Coast of
M2-19, 466-M2-20, 466-M2-21, 466-M2-32, 466- Canada", 18 Nov 41, and covering letter C.G.S. to
M2-33. Minister same date, H.Q.S. 8613, vol. 1.
63. "Canadian War Data" (Reference Paper No. 4, 95. Ibid.
Canadian Information Service, Department of 96. Progress Report No. 58, Canadian Army,
External Affairs, 1946), 28. 15 Jan 42; ibid., No. 55, 26 Dec 41.
64. Documents on H.Q.S. 8023, vols. 1 and 4, and 97. Col. G. S. Pacific Command to O.C. Victoria and
C.M.H.Q. file 55/5930/1. Eggleston, 38-46. Esquimalt Fortress Area, 25 Feb 42, W.D., G.S.,
65. Documents on H.Q.S. 8023-10-3, vol. 3. 66. H.Q. Pacific Command, February 1942.
H.Q.S. 7018, vol. 4. 98. Progress Report No. 73, Canadian Army, 30 Apr
67. Progress Report No. 70, Canadian Army, 42.
9 Apr 42 (week ending 4 Apr) ; ibid., No. 99. W.D., D.M.O. & I., 12 Dec 41. W.D., 18th
54, 18 Dec 41. (Manitoba) Reconnaissance Bn., 20 Dec 41.
68. Table, 29 May 42, H.Q.S. 5199-C, F.D. 15. W.D., G.S., H.Q. Pacific Command, December
69. Amended table of March 1943, H.Q.S. 1941, Appendix 91.
5199-C, vol. 6. Cf. Progress Report No. 100. Documents on H.Q.S. 20-4-5. Progress Report
149, Canadian Army, 14 Oct. 43, and Pro No. 55, Canadian Army, 26 Dec 41. W.D., 21st
gress Report C. and A.A. Defences, month Field Regt. R.C.A., 13 Mar 42.
ending 30 Sep 43, H.Q.S. 8538-10, vol. 3. 101. Progress Report No. 57, Canadian Army,
70. Table, 29 May 42, note 68, above. 8 Jan 42 (re 20th Field Coy. R.C.E.).
71. Table, 19 Nov 43, H.Q.S. 5199-C, vol. 6. 102. Ibid., No. 59, 22 Jan 42.
72. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1940 103. W.D., G.S., H.Q. Pacific Command, December
(London, Admiralty, 1947), 12. 1941, Appendix 17.
104. Ibid., Appendices 57 and 62.
105. Ibid., Appendix 52. W.D., 58th Special Light A.A.
Bty., 1 Jul 42.
106. W.D., G.S., H.Q. Pacific Command, December 133. W.D., H.Q. Prince Rupert Defences, 31 May, 1
1941, Appendix 58 ("Operational Report on Jun 42. Cf. RCAF Logbook, 69.
Events ... December 6th to 11th, 1941"). 134. Progress Report No. 79, Canadian Army, 11 Jun
107. To Secretary, D.N.D., ibid. 42.
108. To C.G.S., 30 Dec 41, ibid., Appendix 105. 135. W.D., No. 1 Armoured Train, various dates. W.D.,
109. Forrest E. LaViolette, The Canadian Japanese and G.S., H.Q. Pacific Command, July 1942,
World War 11 (Toronto, 1948), Chap. II. Appendix 152. Tel. 2666, G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific
110. Speech of Mr. R. W. Mayhew. Command to C.G.S., 31 Jul 42, W.D., G.S., H.Q.
111. 14 Feb 42, Mackenzie Papers, file CNS57. Pacific Command, July 1942.
112. S. E. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine 136. Monthly Strength Return, Pacific Command file
Actions (Boston, 1949), 165. The Times (London), 27-27-2, vol. 1.
25 Feb 42. 137. Documents on Pacific Command file P.C.S. 602-
113. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds., The Army Air 27-1.
Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1948-55), I, 138. Canada Year Book, 1945, 706-9.
283-6. 139. Documents on Pacific Command file P.C.S. 504-
114. Documents on H.Q.S. 8704-1, vol. 3. 28-9. W.D., 62nd A.A. Bty R.C.A., June-August
115. Alexander to C.G.S., 17 Mar 42, ibid. 1943.
116. Same to same, ibid. 140. Progress Report No. 133, Canadian Army, 24 Jun
117. Minutes of a meeting of Directors, N.D.H.Q., 27 43.
Feb 42, H.Q.S. 20-1-6, vol. 1. 118. H.Q.S. 20-1-5, 141. Weekly Strength Return, Pacific Command, 27
vol. 2. Mar 43, W.D., O.I.C. Administration, H.Q.
119. RCAF Logbook (Ottawa, 1949), 67, 70. Pacific Command, March 1943. G.O.436/43.
120. H.Q.S. 20-1-25. 142. Progress Report No. 125, Canadian Army, 29 Apr
121. H.Q.S. 20-1-11-E, F.D. 3. Progress Report No. 66, 43.
Canadian Army, 12 Mar 42. 143. Compiled from formation and unit war diaries,
122. D.S.D. memo, 20 Feb 42, H.Q.S. 8704-.1, F.D. 18 and other sources. Weekly Strength Return, 7th
(cf. G.O. 97/42). Progress Report No. 71, Div., 5 Jun 43, and Operational Location
Canadian Army, 16 Apr 42. Statements for defended areas, Atlantic
123. Telegram GS 010, C.G.S. to G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command, March, June 1943.
Command, 11 Mar 42, H.Q.S. 8704-1, vol. 3. 144. Progress Report No. 125, Canadian Army, 29 Apr
124. Progress Report No. 73, Canadian Army, 43.
30 Apr 42; ibid., No. 77, 28 May 42. 145. Information from Directorate of Naval
125. Pacific Command Operation Instruction Information, Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa,
No. 33, 1 Sep 42. 8 Cdn Div Operational 28 Jun 51.
Plan, 27 Feb 43, as amended 20 Apr 43, 146. W.D., G.S., H.Q. Atlantic Command, May 1942,
W.D., G.S., H.Q. 8th Div., April 1943. Appendix 5.
126. Documents in H.Q.S. 5199-1, vol. 2. 147. Telegram, G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command to
127. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submar C.G.S., 26 May 42, H.Q.S. 3544-A, vol. 4.
ine Actions, 79-80. 148. W.Ds., G.S., H.Q. Atlantic Command, 1617 Jul
128. W.D., H.Q. Prince Rupert Defences, 20 May 42. 42; Lake Superior Regiment, 17-18 Jul 42.
129. Ibid., 1 Jun 42; W.D., H.Q. Military District No. 149. Ralston to J. S. Roy, M.P., 2 Jun 42, H.Q.S. 3544-
11, 30 May 42. A, vol. 2.
130. Ottawa Journal, 11 Jun and 16 Jul 42. 150. Documents on H.Q.S. 9027.
131. Japanese Monograph (Navy) #110-Submarine 151. Documents on H.Q.S. 3544-A, vol. 3, and H.Q.S.
Operations in Second Phase Operations, Part I, 9027-2. Redesignation, G.O. 402/ 44.
April-August 1942 (G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., Japan; 152. Information from Naval Service H.Q., and G.N.
kindly extracted by Canadian Liaison Mission, Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada (Ottawa,
Tokyo). Evidence of Capt. Tagami of 1-25, 1952), II, 185.
Associated Press story, Ottawa Citizen, 7 Apr 50. 153. D.N.D. Press Release (P.N. 106-46), 8 Feb 46.
Reports of R.M. Lally, lightkeeper, Estevan Point, Various reports on H.Q.S. 88722, vols. 1-5, and
20 Jun 42, and Commodore W.J.R. Beech, H.Q.S. 9012-560, vols. 15-16.
Commanding Officer Pacific Coast, 1 Jul 42 154. W.D., D.M.O. & P., N.D.H.Q., January 1945,
(copies, Historical Section). Appendix 7.
132. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine 155. Information from Air Historian, R.C.A.F., 28 Sep
Actions, 169, 162-3. 49.
156. Documents on H.Q.S. 7410, vol. 1. Copies of 174. C.G.S. to G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command,
documents on H.Q.C. 1453-8. H.Q.S. 20-1-19, F.D. 18 (copy on H.Q.S.
157. Documents on H.Q.S. 7410-2, vol. 1. 6265, vol. 6).
158. Documents on H.Q.C. 1453-8, H.Q.S. 175. C.G.S. letter, 21 Feb 42, H.Q.S. 20-3-21,
7410, vol. 1 and H.Q.S. 5091, vol. 4. F.D. 1.
159. Documents on H.Q.S. 20-1-15, vol. 1. 176. G.Os. 283/42, 488/42, 25/43, 362/43.
160. W.Ds., Black Watch, June and August, 1940; 177. C.G.S. letter, 21 Feb 42, note 175 above.
Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, August, 1940. 178. C.A.R.Os. 1897 (22 Apr 42, effective 2
161. "Minutes of Meeting held at Government House on Feb 42) and 3845 (27 Nov 43, effective 31
August 20th, 1940 . . , "W" Force file W.F.S. 13-0- Oct 43).
2. 179. Report of D.N.D., 1944, pages 28-9.
162. Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Secretary, 180. D. Org Strength Summaries and Ledgers.
Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland, 19 National War Services Regulations, 1940
Mar 42, J.S.S.C. file JSSC-6. (Recruits), Sec. 13(2).
163. C.A.RO. 1579, 17 Jan 42. 181. Progress Report No. 125, Canadian Army,
164. "Strength Return as of 2359 Hours . 29 Apr 43.
15th December, 1943 . Force 'W' 11. 182. Ibid., No. 124, 22 Apr 43.
165. Documents on H.Q.S. 7410-28, vol. 1. 183. C.G.S. to Minister, 30 Aug 43, H.Q.S.
166. W.D., G.S., H.Q. "W" Force, September 20-1, vol. 12.
1942. 184. D.N.D. Press Release, P.N. 446, 13 Sep
167. Strength Return, note 164 above. Emerson to 43.
Howell, 23 May 45, H.Q. T.D. 51464, vol. 2. 185. The Times (London), 15 Sep 43.
"History of the Participation by Newfoundland in 186. P.N. 449.
World War II" (MS), 46. 187. C.G.S. to Minister, 30 Aug 43, note 183
168. Atlantic Bridge: The Official Account of R.A.F. above.
Transport Command's Ocean Ferry (London, 188. W.D., H.Q. 13th Inf. Bde., May 1944, Ap
1945), 28-9. W.D., New Brunswick Rangers, June pendix 7, and 8 Jun 44.
1942-July 1943. Progress Report No. 121, 189. Documents on H.Q.S. 20-1-5, vol. 3.
Canadian Army, 1 Apr 43. 190. Documents on ibid., vol. 5. W.D., G.S.,
169. Documents on Defended Area Goose Bay files H.Q. 6th Div., 2 Dec 44.
G.B.S. 1-2-2 and 5-10-0, and H.Q. M.D. No. 6 file 191. Progress Report No. 183, Canadian Army,
H.C. 110-7-10-1-1. 12 Dec 44.
170. W.D., Winnipeg Grenadiers, May, June, August, 192. Detailed plan in appendices to C.G.S. to
1940. Minister, 30 Aug 43, note 183 above.
171. H.Q.S. 20-1-16, vols. 1-3. W.D., "B" 193. Progress Report No. 149, Canadian Army,
Force, November 1942. 14 Oct 43, and later reports.
172. H.Q.S. 8962-3. H.Q.S. 8962-4, vol. 1. H.Q.S. 20-1-27,194. Ibid., No. 182, 13 Nov 44.
vols. 1-5. 195. Ibid., No. 183, 12 Dec 44. W.D., H.Q.
173. H.Q.S. 20-1-28, vols. I and 2. H.Q.S. Atlantic Command, 14 Dec 44.
8982, vol. 1. H.Q.S. 8982-2. 196. G.Os. 21 and 56/46.
CHAPTER VI
The Growth of the Army Overseas and Organization in Britain
1. The sailing statistics in this section are based ReductionsRecapitulation". Strengths after 29 Feb
largely on C.M.H.Q. ("Q" Moves) Sailing 40 mainly from A.G. (Stats) C.M.H.Q. Strength
Records, Book No. 31, and C.M.H.Q. Eastbound Control Books and C.M.H.Q. files 22/Strength/2
Sailing Charts, both held by Hist. Sec. On arrivals and (for nursing sisters) 11/Nurse Str/1.
by air, C.M.H.Q. file 15/Air/2 and subsequent 4. Iceland figures from documents in C.M.H.Q. files
volumes. Enlistments in U.K. from Director of 15/Iceland/1 and 15/Iceland/4.
War Service Records, D.V.A. 5. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 15/AT/56.
2. Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces 6. D. of T. & M. to N.S.H.Q., 21 Dec 42, H.Q.S. 80-
in the Great War 1914-1919, vol. I, 94-104. 704, vol. 2.
3. Strengths to 29 Feb 40 compiled from Book No. 7. Montague to McNaughton, 18 Dec 42, C.M.H.Q.
31 (above, note 1); C.M.H.Q. Part II Orders; and file 1/Mov/1/2; Q.M.G. to C.G.S., 8 Nov 43,
A.G. (Stats), C.M.H.Q., "Arrivals, Departures H.Q.S. 80-704, vol. 2.
8. D.S.T. Sailing Records, N.D.H.Q., Book No. 39. 34. C.M.H.Q. Circular Letter No. 56, 27 May 40, with
9. H.Q. M.D. 6 to Os.C. Transit Camps, 7 Nov 43, attached chart, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Headquarters/3/2;
copy on Hist. Sec. file NA 4-1-2. Circular Letter on Organization and
10. Tel. 1744, External to Dominion, 24 Sep 42; copy Responsibilities of C.M.H.Q., 10 Jun 40,
of letter Massey to Attlee, 25 Sep 42, C.M.H.Q. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Headquarters/6.
file 1/Mov/1/2. 35. Montague to Secretary, D.N.D., 30 Sep
11. Memorandum by Brig. N. E. Rodger, C.M.H.Q., 8 40, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Headquarters/3/3.
Oct 42, and Tel. 2552, Massey to External, 20 Oct 36. Tables on C.M.H.Q. file 22/Strengths/1 and
42, ibid. subsequent volumes. Memorandum on
12. Sailing Records, Books Nos. 31 & 39. relationship of strength of C.A.O. to C.M.H.Q., 30
13. War Diaries of units. Dec 42, C.M.H.Q. file
14. Report No. 110 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 5/CMHQ Gen/1/2.
Appendix "E", "Notes on the Passage of A.T. 61" 37. Stuart to Heads of Branches, C.M.H.Q., 9 Feb 44,
by Lieut. J. R. Martin. C.M.H.Q. file 6/CMHQ/1/2; to all Branches of
15. Report No. 1 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 31 C.M.H.Q., 15 Jun 44, 1/Cdn Army/1/5, copy on
Dec 40 (re passage of T.C. 8). C.M.H.Q. file 6/CMHQ GS/1/2.
16. Report No. 54 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 38. Report and Proceedings of Special W.E.
17. Report No. 28 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., Committee, 26 Jan 43, C.M.H.Q. file 5/ CMHQ
which is based on the narrative of Lt: Col. G. C. Gen/1/2. Further on work of this committee,
Smith, a survivor, and contains an account by the C.M.H.Q. file 5/WEC/3.
Nerissa's Chief Officer. 39. Brig. A. W. Beament, D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., to
18. Canadian Expeditionary Force, Ledger of Vital Senior Officer, 31 Jan 43, C.M.H.Q. file 5/CMHQ
Statistics, The Great War 1914-18, 1 (prepared for Gen/1/2.
Historical Section by Machine Records). 40. A.G. I Memorandum, 19 Apr 45, C.M.H.Q. file
19. D.S.T. Sailing Records, Book No. 31. 6/CMHQ A/1/2; J.W.E.C. memorandum, 7 Feb
20. Report No. 45 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q. 44, 5/CMHQ A/1/2.
21. Sources as in note 3, above. 1946 figures 41. List, 21 Jul 44, C.M.H.Q. file 1/COS/36.
from monthly returns of A.G. (Stats), 42. Organizational Chart, C.M.H.Q., dispatched to
C.M.H.Q., and C.A.O.F. Stats. N.D.H.Q., 12 Mar 45, D.N.D. file HQS 8676, vol.
22. Report on Functions and Organization of 6 (dated by error 12 Feb 44, but obviously should
Canadian Military Headquarters, 13 Jul 42, be 12 Feb 45).
C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn Army/1. 43. Tel. GS 941, Stuart to Murchie, 29 Mar
23. Duguid, Official History, Vol. I, Appendix 44, C.M.H.Q. file 6/CMHQ GS/1/2.
8. 44. The figures in this and the following paragraphs
24. Tel. 595, Crerar to Prime Minister, 1 Nov are based on War Establishment Cdn IV/85/6,
39, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Headgrs/1. effective 16 Mar 45 (P.C. 44/3723), C.M.H.Q. file
25. Memorandum by C.G.S., 22 Sep 39, 5/CMHQ/1/4.
C.M.H.Q. file 1/Headqrs/l. 45. Memorandum by B.G.S., 30 Sep 43, C.M.H.Q.
26. C.M.H.Q. circular letter, 10 Jun 40, file 6/CMHQ GS/1.
C.M.H.Q. file 1/Headquarters/6. Crerar's 46. Ibid.
original instructions, 18 Oct 39, C.M.H.Q. 47. Ibid.
file 1/Headgrs/1. 48. Tel. GS 546, Murchie to Stuart, 8 Sep 44,
27. W.D., Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 30 Oct 39. C.M.H.Q. file 1/COS/35; see also Tel. COS 225,
28. Tel. 585, Crerar to C.G.S., 30 Oct. 39; Tel. 528, Stuart to Crerar, 4 Sep 44 and Tel. C. 89, Crerar to
External to Dominion, 10 Nov 39, C.M.H.Q. file Stuart, 6 Sep 44.
1/Headqrs/1. 49. Anglin to J.A.G., 30 Nov 44, C.M.H.Q. file
29. W.Ds., Medical Branch, C.M.H.Q., 4-12 Nov 39, 10/Anglin, W.A.L/1.
and A.A. & Q.M.G., C.M.H.Q., 16 Nov 39. 50. Correspondence on C.M.H.Q. file 10/ Anglin,
30. Massey to External, 7 Nov 39, and Defensor to W.A.I./l and Overseas Routine Order 5740, 28
Dominion, 8 and 13 Nov 39, Canada House file. Apr 45.
31. W.D., Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 1 and 13 Dec 39. 51. D.Q.M.G. to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 13 Aug
32. Report No. 137 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q. 42, C.M.H.Q. file 5/CMHQ-DQMG/1.
33. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 6/CMHQ/1, 52. C.M.H.Q. file 1/COS/36.
1/Headgrs/1 and 1/Headquarters/3/2; W.D., 53. C. of S. to M.G.A., 10 Jun 44, ibid.
Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 5, 18, 20 Mar 40. 54. Memoranda by Brig. A. E. Walford, D.A. &
Q.M.G., First Cdn Army, 16 Jul 44, and Brig. C.
C. Mann, C. of S., First Cdn Army, 26 Jun 44,
ibid.
55. Memoranda by Brig. M.H.S. Penhale, 15 Jun and 76. Overseas R.O. 5391. C.A.R.O. 4230, 15 Mar 44.
20 Jul 44; Brig. C. S. Booth, 16 Jun and 21 Jul 44; 77. Tel. GS 1870, Canmilitry to Defensor, 12 Sep 41,
Brig. J. H. MacQueen, 13 Jun and 24 Jul 44; also C.M.H.Q. file 42/DMM/1; Minutes of conference
Brig. A. W. Beament to Gen. Montague, 6 Sep 44, with Minister, 15 Oct 41, McNaughton file PA 5-
ibid. 3-1; Tel. GS 2256, Canmilitry to Defensor, 20 Oct
56. M.G.O. to the Minister, 3 Jul 44, ibid. 41, C.M.H.Q. file 16/R.C.O.C./2; W.D. 1 Cdn
57. C. of S., C.M.H.Q., to Secretary, D.N.D., 11 Sep Base Ord. Workshop, January, 31 May, 30 Jun 42.
44, ibid. 78. Overseas R.Os. 5391 and 5941.
58. Overseas R.O. 5391 (Composition of Cdn Army 79. A.G. (Stats) C.M.H.Q. Monthly Strength Returns.
Overseas, 30 Nov 44). Actual strengths compiled Overseas R.O. 5391 (Composition of Cdn Army
from A.G. (Stats) C.M.H.Q. Monthly Strength Overseas, 30 Nov 44).
Returns. 80. Correspondence on C.M.H.Q. file 1/Forestry/1.
59. Tel. GS 86, Canmilitry to Defensor, 3 Jan 40, 81. C.M.H.Q. Administrative Instructions, No. 5, 26
C.M.H.Q. file 1/Depot/1; Crerar to Minister, 8 May 41, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Fin Can UK/9.
May 40, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Depot/3; W.D., H.Q. 'B' 82. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 1/Fin Can UK/9
Group (Holding Units), June 1940. and 6/C.F.C./1.
60. Page to C.M.H.Q., 11 Jan 41, W.D., A. & Q., 83. W.Ds., H.Q. C.F.C. and companies, October
H.Q. Cdn Base Units, January 1941, Appendix 6. 1940-July 1941. Maj. G. F. G. Stanley, "The
61. Tel. GS 751, Canmilitry to Defensor, I May 41, Canadian Forestry Corps, 1940-1943", Canadian
Memorandum, 21 Mar 41, Minutes of Meeting 8 Geographical Journal, March 1944.
Mar 44, C.M.H.Q. file 6/Reinf/2. 84. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 6/C.F.C./1 and
62. C.M.H.Q. Adm. Order No. 28, 31 Jan 43. 3/Forestry/1, particularly J.A.G. opinion, 24 Aug
63. Phelan to Turner, 18 Jul 41, C.M.H.Q. file 42, 6/C.F.C./1.
6/Reinf/2. 85. Rodger to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 29 May 42,
64. C.M.H.Q. Administrative Order No. 46, 23 Mar 3/Forestry/1.
44. 86. "Order Preliminary to Order of Detail", issued by
65. Brigadier G.S., C.M.H.Q., to G.O.C.-in-C. First Maj.-Gen. Montague, 14 Jul 41, ibid.
Cdn Army, 9 Mar 44, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Org RU/1; 87. Tel. GS 343, Canmilitry to Defensor, 4
C.M.H.Q. Adm. Order No. 46, 23 Mar 44. Mar 41, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Forestry/1/3.
66. War Establishments. C. of S., C.M.H.Q. to Sec. 88. Cranborne to Massey, 12 Jul 41, and other
D.N.D., 29 Mar 44, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Org RU/1. documents, ibid. Information from A.G. (Stats)
67. Report No. 133 of Historical Officer, strength summary dated 15 Oct 44.
C.M.H.Q., 29 Mar 45, para. 25. 89. Statement by Col. Ralston in Canadian House of
68. C.M.H.Q. Adm. Order No. 2, 3 Jan 45. 69. Burns Commons, .15 Feb 44.
to O.C. Holding Unit Group, Bor 90. Documents on 1/Forestry/1/3. Strength summary,
don, 12 Jun 40, C.M.H.Q. file 3/Plans/2. A.G. (Stats), C.M.H.Q., dated 15 Oct 44.
70. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 3/Plans/2 91. W.D., H.Q. C.F.C., 31 Aug 45.
and 3/Plans/2/2. 92. Ibid., June 1945, Appendix 6.
71. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 3/Reinf/1. 93. History of the Participation by Newfoundland in
Report No. 94, Historical Officer, World War II (MS), 31-34.
C.M.H.Q., 12 May 43. 94. C.M.H.Q. Ledger "Arrivals, Additions,
72. Overseas R.O. 5391 (above, note 58). Departures and Reductions of Personnel in the
73. Ibid. United Kingdom".
74. Ibid. 95. Enlistment statistics from Director of War Service
75. Memorandum of meeting to discuss Q.M.G. Records D.V.A.; other increases from A.G. (Stats)
services, 7 Mar 41, W.D., G.S., H.Q. Cdn Corps, C.M.H.Q. Strength Control Book, 1945.
March 1941, Appendix XIX; Minutes of 96. W.Ds., No. 41 Coy C.W.A.C., November 1942
conference with Minister of National Defence, 15 and December 1943; Nos. 42, 43 and 200 Coys
Oct 41, McNaughton file PA 5-3-1; Tel. GS 3056, C.W.A.C. and No. I Static Base Laundry
Canmilitry to Defensor, 29 Dec 41, C.M.H.Q. file R.C.O.C., December 1943.
6/CCOD/1; Stuart to Minister, 18 Feb 42, .
McNaughton file PA 5-3-2-276.
97. A.G. (Stats) C.M.H.Q. strength summary, 100. 101. A.G. (Stats) C.M.H.Q., "Strength Summary of
C.M.H.Q. file 22/Strength/2/2. 101. 98. Correspondence
Canadian Army on C. Personnel
M. H. Q. fileServing Outside
1/CWAC./2. Canada about 31 Aug 45", C.M.H.Q. file
99. W.D., No. 1 Detachment Canadian Army Show, 22/Strength/2/2.
May 1944.
100. Returns in C.M.H.Q. file 22/CWAC/1.
CHAPTER VII
.Command and Control of Canadian Forces in the United Kingdom
I. "Memorandum on Organization of Command of 18. Ibid., Addendum, 2 May 42, and Memo
and Channels of Communication to Canadian randum by B.G.S., 9 May 42.
Troops Overseas," sent to Hon. T. A. Crerar, 9 19. "Report on Functions and Organization of
Dec 39, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Comm/1. Canadian Military Headquarters," 13 Jul
2. Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces 42, ibid.
of Canada, 1918, 9. 20. Overseas R.O. 4128, 27 Dec 43. 21. Overseas R.O.
3. B.G.S. to C. of S., C.M.H.Q., 24 Mar 44, 5310, 8 Dec 44.
C.M.H.Q. file 6/CMHQ GS/1/2. 22. Ralston to King, 19 Dec 43, Department
4. "Command and Administration of and Channels of External Affairs file 22-P(s).
of Communication to Canadian Troops Overseas", 23. Stuart to Currie, 21 Apr 44, C. of S.,
H.Q.S. 8538, vol. 1. C.M.H.Q. file "Personal Correspondence"
5. C.G.S. to S.O., C.M.H.Q., 26 Mar 40, and S.O. to with Prime Minister, Ralston, Young.
C.G.S., 20 Apr 40, H.Q.S. 8538, vol. 1. 24. Tel. GS 40, Montague to Minister and
6. Massey to External, 9 Jul 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Murchie, 5 Jan 44, including text of
Cdn Div., July 1940, Appendix LXXIII. message sent to Crerar, C.M.H.Q. file
7. Overseas R.Os. 1423, 24 Dec 41 and 1828, 10 9/Senior Appointments/1/2.
Apr 42. See also McNaughton files CC7/Crerar/6 25. Ralston to Stuart, 10 Jan 44, C. of S.,
and PA 5-3-2. C.M.H.Q., file "Personal Correspondence".
8. McNaughton file CC7/Crerar/6. note 23, above.
9. C.M.H.Q. file 6/CMHQ/1. 26. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 1/Wastage/2. 27. 26
10. 18 Aug 41, McNaughton file CC7/105. See also Mar 44, "Personal Correspondence" file,
S.O., C.M.H.Q., to C.G.S., 22 Jul 41, ibid. Cf. note 23 above.
H.Q.S. 8676-4. 28. 1 Apr 44, H.Q.S. 8809, vol. 1.
11. Undated memorandum of conversation of 29. Stuart to Ralston, 13 May 44, "Personal
5 Sep 41, McNaughton file CC7/105. Correspondence" file, note 23 above. Ral
12. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn Army/1. See also ston to Stuart, 25 Jun 44, ibid.
Memorandum, 17 Mar 42, "Decisions reached at 30. Minister of National Defence file, Stuart,
Series of Discussions between the Minister, Lieut.-Gen. K., 783-14A.
General McNaughton and General Stuart," 31. Copy of P.C. 493 on H.Q.S. 8249, vol. 3.
C.M.H.Q. file 7/Memo/6. 32. Tel. COS 58, Stuart to Letson, 25 Apr. 44,
13. C.G.S. to S.O., C.M.H.Q., 12 May 42, with copy ibid.
of P.C. 44/3723 attached, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn 33. P.C. 3740, 18 May 44; copy on ibid.
Army/1. 34. B.G.S. to C. of S., C.M.H.Q., 24 Mar 44,
14. C.M.H.Q. file 1 /Cdn Army/ 1/2. C.M.H.Q. file 6/CMHQ/GS/1/2.
15. Memorandum, 17 Mar 42, C.M.H.Q. file 35. G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army to C. of S.,
7/Memo/6 and Tel. GSD 602, 21 Mar 42, Stuart C.M.H.Q., 3 Apr 44, ibid.
to Montague and Crerar, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn 36. Tel. GS 1618, Canmilitry to Defensor,
Army/1. 30 May 44, C.M.H.Q. file 6/1 Army/1/2. 37.
16. McNaughton to Watson, 19 Apr 42, ibid. Correspondence (May 1944) on C.M.H.Q.
17. Memorandum of Conference (of Cdn file 1/COS/6.
Army Organizational Planning Committee) at 38. A.C.G.S. to C.G.S., 8 Sep 41, A.C.G.S.
C.M.H.Q., 10 Apr 42, ibid. office file "Command of and Position
Canadian Army Serving in U.K."
CHAPTER VIII
Training the Army Overseas
1. Memorandum "Organization and Adminis-tration H.Q. 1st Div., February 1940, Appendix I.
of Canadian Forces Overseas", 7 Dec 39, H.Q.C. Telegram, Equip IA-516, M.G.O. to Can
8249, vol. 1. militry, 18 Mar 40, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Conf /1/2.
2. War Office letter 79/Mob/3259 (S.D.1(b) ), 25 Jan 22. Minutes of Divisional Conference No. 4, 12 Feb
40, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Formations/1. 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., February 1940,
3. Crerar to Under-Sec. of State, War Office, 27 Feb Appendix XXV.
40, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Formations/ 1/2. 23. General Reports, March and April 1940,
4. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Comm/1/2. Memoran on H.Q. 1st Div. file 1 CD/GS 4-8.
dum of discussion at War. Office, by Lt. 24. General Report for week ending 27 Apr 40, ibid.
Col. G. R. Turner, 16 Mar 40, ibid. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., 18 Mar 40.
5. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 6/1 Div/4. 25. "General Points Noted during G.O.C.'s
6. "Visit of G.O.C. 1 Cdn. Div. to C.I.G.S. 22 Dec. Inspection", 10 Apr 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div.,
1939", memo by Lt.-Col. Turner, W.D., G.S., April 1940.
H.Q. 1st Div., December 1939, Appendix XII-22. 26. 1st Div. Training Instruction No. 2, 9 Mar 40,
7. Ibid., Appendix XII-27. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., March 1940, Appendix
8. W.D., Edmonton Regt., 8 Jan 40. Preliminary XXVI.
Training Syllabus, 22 Jan to 17 Feb 40, W.D., 27. 1st Div. Training Instruction No. 2, para. 6(a).
Toronto Scottish Regt., February 1940, Appendix 28. W.D., Royal Canadian Regt., 30 Apr 40.
I. 29. W.Ds., infantry units, 1st Div., April 1940.
9. Notes for Conference at H.Q. 3rd Brigade, 25 Jan 30. Ibid.
40, W.D., H.Q. 3rd Inf. Bde., January 1940, 31. United Kingdom records.
Appendix III. 32. W.Ds., 8th Army Field Regt., 13 Apr 40, and 11th
10. Particulars of Personnel of 1st Cdn. Division and Army Field Regt., 20 Apr 40.
Ancillary Troops on Courses as of 9 Jun 40, 33. W.Ds., 1st Field Regt., 27 Dec 39 and 2nd Field
C.M.H.Q. file 2/Gen/1/2. Regt., 22 Dec 39.
11. Memo by Lt: Col. Turner of meeting, 22 Feb 40, 34. W.Ds., 1st and 2nd Field Regts., 30 Apr
W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., February 1940, 40, and 3rd Field Regt., 12 May 40.
Appendix XLVII. 35. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., January 1940, Memo
12. Appendix "G" to 1st Div. Training Instruction No. of meeting held by G.O.C. 1st Div. on artillery
1, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., December 1939, training, 25 Jan 40. W.D., 3rd Field Regt., I May
Appendix XII-27. W.D., H.Q. 3rd Inf. Bde., 40.
January 1940, Appendix 1. W.D., H.Q. 1st Inf. 36. W.Ds., 1st, 3rd, 4th and 12th Field Coys., April
Bde., 9 Mar 40. "Notes on Training of 1 Canadian and May 1940.
Division", by Maj. G. G. Simonds [Feb 1940], 37. W.D., H.Q. 1st Inf. Bde., 17 Apr 40.
H.Q. 1st Div. file 1 CD/GS 4-8. 38. 1st Div. Training Instruction No. 3, 27 Apr 40,
13. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., 18-20 Jan 40. 14. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., April 1940, Appendix
Memo by S.O.M.E., 1st Cdn Div., 20 Feb LXIII.
40, H.Q. 1st Div. file 1 CD/GS 4-8. 39. General Report for week ending 17 Aug 40, H.Q.
15. W.D., H.Q. 1st Inf. Bde., 17 Apr 40. 1st Corps file 1/104 (G).
16. Memo of discussion at Camberley, 30 Mar 40. General Report for week ending 27 Jul 40, W.D.,
40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., March G.S., H.Q. 7th Corps, Appendix XXXVIII.
1940, Appendix LXXVII. 41. General Report, weeks ending 1 and 8 Jun 40
17. Telegram, McNaughton for Rogers, 18 Feb (H.Q. 1st Div. file 1 CD/GS 4-8), 17 and 25 Aug
40, ibid., February 1940, Appendix XLIII. and 8 Sep 40 (H.Q. 1st Corps file 1/104 (G)).
18. The Times, 29 Jan 40. 42. Walford to Senior Officer, 7 Apr 40, C.M.H.Q.
19. Summary of Training Progress Reports file 1/Infm/1.
for week ending 3 Feb 40, W.D., G.S., 43. "Arrivals in UK from Canada, 1940", compiled by
H.Q. 1st Div., February 1940, Appendix X. A.G. Stats, C.M.H.Q.
20. General Report, 1st Div., week ending 24 Feb 40, 44. 2nd Div. Training Instruction, 4 Sep 40, W.D.,
H.Q. 1st Div. file 1 CD/GS 4-8. G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., September 1940, Appendix
21. 1st Div. Orders, Nos. 291, 2 Feb 40, and 6.
431, 17 Feb 40, W.D., A.A. & Q.M.G., 45. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., 8 Aug 40.
46. G.S. letter, 21 Oct 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q.
2nd Div., October 1940, Appendix 55.
47. Information on C.M.H.Q. file 1/Release Equip/1. 69. Report No. 34 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 31
General Reports for weeks ending 1 Feb 41 and Jul 41. Exercise papers, and "Closing Address by
13 Sep 41, C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/2. the Army Commander", C.M.H.Q. file
48. 2nd Div. General Report for period ending 12 Oct 2/Exercises/5.
40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., October 1940, 70. Report on conference, Maj. C. P. Stacey to
Appendix 35. W.Ds., 6th Field Regt., 15-25 Oct B.G.S., C.M.H.Q., 10 Oct 41, C.M.H.Q. file 3/Ex.
40, and 4th Field Regt., 30 Nov 40. Bumper/1.
49. 2nd Div. General Report for period ending 23 71. Notes of Field Censors (Home) on Canadian
Nov 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., November Army mail examined 29 Sep-12 Oct 41.
1940, Appendix 49. W.D., H.Q. 4th Inf. Bde., 12 72. Report on conference, above, note 70. Report No.
Dec 40. 49, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 27 Oct 41.
50. Canadian Corps Special Secret Routine Order, 25 Exercise papers, and comments by C.-in-C. Home
Dec 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. Cdn Corps, December Forces, C.M.H.Q. file 3/Ex. Bumper/1.
1940, Appendix LXXII. 73. W.D., Cdn Training School, 5 May 41.
51. Unsigned "Memo. on Canadian Training School", 74. Ibid., 15 Jun, I Sep, 11 Sep, 11 Nov, and 30 Nov
4 Jul 40, C.M.H.Q. file 2/Trg School/ 1. 41, and September-December 1941 generally.
52. Memo by Lt.-Col. F. C. Hanington, 25 Jun 40, "Training Resume-C.T.S.", July 1940 to October
ibid. 1941, C.M.H.Q. file 2/Reports/4.
53. Extract from memo of meeting at C.M.H.Q., 30 75. W.D., Cdn Training School, October 1941,
Aug 40, C.M.H.Q. file 9/Com-Prom/1. Appendices 1 and 3.
54. Turner to Senior Officer C.M.H.Q., 23 Jun 40, 76. The Instructors' Handbook on Fieldcraft and
C.M.H.Q. file 2/Trg School/1. Battle Drill, reprinted in Canada December 1942.
55. Ibid. 77. W.D., Cdn Training School, July 1941.
56. "Memo. on Canadian Training School", above, 78. Information from Lt: Col. H. R. Chater, 4 Aug 44,
note 51. Turner to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 23 Report No. 123 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q.,
Jun 40, C.M.H.Q. file 2/Trg School/1. 31 Aug 44. W.D., Calgary Highlanders,
57. Tel. GS 862, Defensor to Canmilitry, ibid. September 1941, 22 Oct 41, November 1941.
58. Instructions for 1st Course, 31 Jul 40, ibid. 79. Minutes of Staff Conference, 20 Nov 41, W.D.,
59. "Memo. on Canadian Training School", above, G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., November 1941, Appendix
note 51. 25.
60. Hanington to B.G.S., 7 Oct 40, C.M.H.Q. file 80. General Report for week ending 20 Dec 41,
2/Trg School/1. C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/2.
61. Documents on ibid. 81. General Report for week ending 27 Dec 41, ibid.
62. Tel. GS 2057, McNaughton to Crerar, 24 Information from Maj. J. E. Ganong, Report No.
Sep 40, C.M.H.Q. file 2/Staff/3. 58, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 19 Jan 42.
63. Exchange of telegrams in ibid. 82. W.D., H.Q. 1st Army Tank Bde., 8 Jul 41.
64. Documents on ibid. W.D., Junior War General Reports for weeks ending 31 Jan and 7
Staff Course (Overseas), 2 Jan 41. Feb 42, C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/2.
65. 7th Corps Training Instruction No. 1, 83. General Reports for weeks ending 16 Aug,
W.D., G.S., H.Q. 7th Corps, September 6 Sep, 13 Sep and 22 Nov 41, ibid.
1940, Appendix CXVI. 84. United Kingdom records. Returns on C.M.H.Q.
66. General Reports "for 7 Corps Cdn personnel", file 1/Min Rets Equip/1.
October-November 1940, C.M.H.Q. file 85. Report No. 18, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 22
4/Progress/2. Mar 41, and Addendum, 26 May 41.
67. Report No. 11, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 22 86. C.M.H.Q. to War Office, 27 Mar 41,
Feb 41. Cf. Report No. 13, 8 Mar 41, and Cdn C.M.H.Q. file 1/Release A.A. Equip/1.
Corps report on "Fox" and "Dog", 8 Mar 41, 87. Equipment State, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Min Rets
C.M.H.Q. file 2/Exercises/5. Equip/1.
68. Cdn Corps Report. on Exercise "Hare", 22 Apr 88. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 3/A.D.G.B. /1, and
41, C.M.H.Q. file 2/Exercises/5. Report No. 23, see Report No. 57 of Historical Officer,
Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 26 Apr 41. On C.M.H.Q., 30 Dec 41.
"Benito", W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., April 1941, 89. W.D., H.Q. 1st A.A. Bde., January 1942.
Appendix 1. 90. Page to C.M.H.Q., 11 Jan 41, W.D., A. & Q., H.Q.
Cdn Base Units, January 1941, Appendix 6.
Liaison, Cdn Corps, to Senior Officer

91. See, e.g., W.D., No. 1 Armoured Corps C.M.H.Q., 21 Jan 42, W.D., No . 1 Radio
Holding Unit, 31 Oct 41. Documents on Location Unit, January 1942, Appendix 2.
C.M.H.Q. file 2/Reinf/1. 114. W.D., No. 1 Radio Location Unit, espe-
92. W.D., G.S., H.Q. Cdn Corps, November cially 31 May 43.
1941, Appendix 35, and February 1942, 115. "History of I Canadian School of Artillery
Appendix 34. (Overseas)". Overseas R.O. 5418.
93. Cdn Corps Training Instruction No. 6. 116. Circulars, 28 Sep 42, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 4th
94. GOC 4-0, 26 Mar 42. Armd. Div., September 1942, Appendix 26.
95. Ibid. W.D., South Alberta Regt., 2 and 14 Oct 42.
96. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 3/Ex Beaver/3 117. 4th Armd. Div. Training Instruction No. 10,
and 3/Ex Beaver/4. Report No. 70 of 8 Oct. 42, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 4th Armd. Div.,
Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 18 May 42. October 1942, Appendix 6.
97. Canmilitry to Defensor, 1 Jun 42, 118. W.D., H.Q. 1st Inf. Bde., December 1942.
C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/2/2. Documents in C.M.H.Q. file 2/Comb Ops/1.
98. General Report, week ending 31 May 42, 119. W.D., H.Q. 8th Inf. Bde., November 1942.
ibid. 120. W.D., Highland Light Infantry of Canada,
99. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 3/Ex Tiger/2. December 1942.
Report No. 73, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 121. General Report, First Cdn Army, weeks
24 Jun 42. ending 28 Nov and 26 Dec 42, C.M.H.Q.
100. GOC 4-0. file 4/Progress/11.
101. General Report, First Cdn Army, week 122. Ibid., weeks ending 12 and 19 Dec 42 and 9 and
ending 8 Aug 42, C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/11. 16 Jan 43.
Diary o f Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 3 Aug 123. W.Ds., G.S., H.Qs. 1st Div., December 1942
42. and January 1943, and 3rd Div., December 1942.
102. Papers in Crerar memoranda file, Historical 124. Weekly Training Reports, 1st Div. file 1
Section. General Report, First Cdn Army, CD/GS 4-0-3.
week ending 25 Jul 42, C.M.H.Q. file 125. Ibid. W.D., 14th Army Tank Regt., January
4/Progress/11. 1943.
103. General Report, First Cdn Army, week 126. Documents in C.M.H.Q. files 1/Attach Ops/1,
ending 5 Sep 42, ibid. 8/Attach Ops/1, 8/Attach Ops/ 1/2 and 18/N.
104. Instructions for Exercise "Blackboy", 9 Nov Africa/1.
42, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., November 127. Reports by Lt.-Col. W. A. Bean, C.M.H.Q. file
1942, Appendix 11. 1/M.E./1/2.
105. 5th Armd. Div. Weekly Progress Report, 128. Records on C.M.H.Q. file 18/N. Africa/1.
week ending 13 Jun 42, C.M.H.Q. file 129. Letter of Capt. G. M. MacLachlan, Royal
4/Progress/1/4. Regiment of Canada, 14 Feb 43, Report
106. 5th Armd. Div. Training Instruction No. 11, No. 95 of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 12
W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5th Div., September 1942, May 43.
Appendix 2. 130. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 1/M.E./ 1/2.
107. Ibid., June 1942, Appendix 7-13, Exercise Report No. 95 of Historical Officer,
"Ram III"; November 1942, Appendix 16, C.M.H.Q.
Exercise "Endeavour"; and December 1942, 131. "Minutes of a Conference held at H.Q. First
Appendix 2, Exercise "Mission." Cdn Army . 10th January 1943" (Personal
108. Penhale to Senior Officer C.M.H.Q., 10 Apr 42, Diary, Gen. McNaughton, January 1943,
C.M.H.Q. file 2/Battle School/ 1, and Young Appendix "M").
to Commandant Cdn Training School, 14 Jul 132. B.G.S., First Cdn Army to formation
42, C.M.H.Q. file 2/ Battle School/1/2. commanders, 20 Jan 43, C.M.H.Q. file 2/Ex
109. W.D., Cdn Training School, 4 Dec 42. Spartan/1.
110. Tel. GST 192, Defensor to Canmilitry, 11 133. Comment by Maj.-Gen. H. A. Young,
Feb 42, C.M.H.Q. file 6/OCTU/1. B.G.S., 15 Jul 52, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 2.
First Cdn Army, to Senior Officer C.M.H.Q., 5
134. Tel. GS 560, Canmilitry to Defensor, 13
Aug 42, ibid.
Mar 43, C.M.H.Q. file 2/Ex Spartan/ 1/2. On
111. W.D., Cdn Training School, December 1942.
role as planned, Tel. GS 4260, Canmilitry to
112. 112. Weekly Progress Reports, 28 Mar-3 Apr 42
Defensor, Stuart from McNaughton, 2 Jan
and 5 Sep-11 Sep 42, W.D., H.Q. 1st Anti-
43, C.M.H.Q. file 1/ Cdn Army/1/2.
Aircraft Bde., April 1942, Appendix 1 and
September 1942, Appendix 3. 113. Cdn
135. G.H.Q. Exercise "Spartan": Comments by W.Ds., G.S., H.Q. 5th Amid. Div., AprilOctober
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces. G.H.Q. 1943; G.S., H.Q. 4th Amid. Div., September-
Exercise "Spartan": Narrative of Events. Ops December 1943; G.S., H.Q. 2nd Corps,
Filter Room Log, H.Q. Second Army. Report No. September-October 1943 (Report on "Grizzly II",
94, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 12 May 43. Appendix 29 to Oct. diary).
136.Tel. GS 560, above, note 134. 142.General Report, First Cdn Army, various weeks,
137.W.D., Cdn Training School, September 1943. C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/ 11. C.M.H.Q. Location
138.General Report, First Cdn Army, various weeks Statements Nos. 23 and 24, with amendments. Lt.-
ending 2 Apr-17 Dec 43, C.M.H.Q. file Gen. Sir F. Morgan, Overture to Overlord
4/Progress/11. (London, 1950), Chap. IV.
139. W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, August 1943, 143.First Cdn Army Training Directive No. 18, 15 Dec
Appendix 7, and December 1943, Appendix 16. 43, W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, December
140.Ibid., April 1943, Appendix A, and November 1943, Appendix 16.
1943, Appendix 12. 144."Weekly Progress Report to Canada", weeks
141.General Report, First Cdn Army, various weeks, ending 11 Mar-20 May 44, C.M.H.Q. file
C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/11. Comment by Maj.- 4/Progress/11/2.
Gen. E. L. M. Burns, 2 Jul 52, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, 145.Canadian Infantry Association: Proceedings of the
vol. 2. Annual Meeting, 1948, 72-3.
CHAPTER I X
Alarums and Excursions, 1940
1. 23-24 George V, Chap. 21. 11. hurchill, The Gathering Storm, 610.
2. Report of "Committee on Legal and Con- United Kingdom records.
stitutional Questions Affecting Canadian 12. The Gathering Storm, 614-15, 622-3.
Forces Serving Outside of Canada", 26 Oct United Kingdom records.
39, H.Q.S. 197-30-1, vol. 3. 13. Despatch by Lt.-Gen. H. R. S. Massy
3. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 29/Vis Forces/ 1. (Supplement to London Gazette, 29 May
Proclamations and Orders in Council passed 46), Appendix "C". Derry, Appendix
under the Authority of the War Measures 14. C.I.G.S. to Carton de Wiart, 0020/16
Act, I, 165-6. Apr.
4. C.G.S. to G.O.C. 1st Div., 7 Dec 39 (with 15. W.D., Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 16 Apr
enclosure approved by Minister of National 40.
Defence same date), H.Q.C., 8249, vol. 1. 16. Memorandum, "Proposed Operations of
5. Documents in C.M.H.Q. files 1/Forma- Canadian Forces in Norway", by Lt.-Col.
tions/1, 1/Formations/1/2 and 1/Comm/1/2. G. R. Turner, 16 Apr 40, C.M.H.Q. file
6. Speech in British House of Commons, 11 Apr 3/Norway/1.
40. 17. Ibid.
7. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: 18. D.J.A.G., C.M.H.Q. to J.A.G., N.D.H.Q.,
The Gathering Storm [Toronto], (1948), 7 Apr 44, H.Q.S. 197-30-1, vol. 9.
579. 19. W.Ds., H.Q. 2nd Inf. Brie. and units,
8.. T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway April 1940.
("History of the Second World War, United 20. The Gathering Storm, 624-8. Date more
Kingdom Military Series") (London, 1952), accurately given in Derry, 75.
Chap. II. 21. Ibid., 629-30.
9. Ibid., pp. 60-61. Cf. Col. A. G. Hingston, 22. Memorandum by Bums and McNaughton,
"A Territorial Battalion in Norway, 1940" 20 Apr 40, C.M.H.Q. file 3/Norway/1. 23.
(Army Quarterly, October 1949). W.D., H.Q. 2nd Inf. Bde., April 1940. 24.
10. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939 W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., May 1940,
(Admiralty, 1947), 27, 53-9; ibid., 1940, 15- Appendix XCI.
17, 22. Fuehrer Directives and Other Top- 25. Massy Despatch (above, note 13).
Level Directives of the German Armed Despatch by Admiral of the Fleet Lord
Forces, 1939-1941 (Washington, 1948), 92. Cork and Orrery (Supplement to London
Derry, 16-24. Gazette, 10 Jul 47).
26. Tel. No. 460, Massey to External, 17 Apr 40: 40. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 78-82. E. Linklater,
originated 1840 hours, dispatched by code room The Defence of Calais (London, 1941). Maj.-Gen.
2010 hours (C.M.H.Q. file 3/Norway/1). Sir H. Wake and Major W. F. Deedes, Swift and
27. Exchange of telegrams, 18-19 Apr 40, ibid. On Bold: The Story of the King's Royal Rifle Corps
Ralston's executing the office of Prime Minister, in the Second World War, 1939-1945 (Aldershot,
information from Mr. F. A. McGregor, 4 Nov 52; 1949), 1-29.
cf. P.C. 1488, 11 Apr 40. 41. "Memorandum . Operation No. 1". Cf. Appendix
28. C.M.H.Q. file 3/Norway/1. "F" ("G.S.O. 2's Diary of Events").
29. Debates, House of Commons, II, 1941, 2049 (1 42. W.D., Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 24 May 40.
Apr 41); cf. ibid., 2004-5 (31 Mar 41). 43. "Record of Meeting held on 23rd May, 1940",
30. McNaughton file CC7/105. C.M.H.Q. file 3/1 Div/1.
31. Second Despatch of F. M. Lord Gort (Supplement 44. Lt.-Gen. E. W. Sansom to the writer, 29 Nov 43,
to London Gazette, 17 Oct 41). C.M.H.Q. file 24/Narratives/1.
32. Fuehrer Directives . 1939-1941, 66-7, 95. Felix 45. "Memorandum . Operation No. 1". Cf. W.D.,
Gilbert, ed., Hitler Directs his War (New York, Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 24 May 40.
1950), 170. 46. W.D., H.Q. 1st Inf. Bde., 24 May 40.
33. Gort Second Despatch (above, note 31). 47. Tel. No. 670, Canmilitry to Defensor,
Churchill, The Second World War: Their Finest 23 May 40, C.M.H.Q. file 3/1 Div/1.
Hour [Toronto], (1949), 27-73. Historical Section 48. External to Dominion, 23 May 40, M.S. Papers,
of the Netherlands General Staff, Beknopt vol. I. The version (as received) in C.M.H.Q. file
Overzicht van de Krijgsverrichtingen der 3/1 Div/1 omits several words.
Koninklijke Landmacht, 10-19 Mei 1940 (The 49. War Office Order (S.D. 1(b)/C/25A/40),
Hague, 1947). Historical Service of the Belgian C.M.H.Q. file 3/1 Div/1.
Army, The Campaign of May 1940 (Brussels, 50. Secretary of State for War to C.-in-C., 0145 hrs
n.d.). M. Fouillien and J. Bouhon, Mai 1940: La 25 May 40.
bataille de Belgique (Brussels, n.d.). P. Lyet, "La 51. Gort Second Despatch, para. 47.
campagne 1939-1940", Revue historique de 52. "Proposed Operations in France, Operation No. 2"
l'armee, January-December 1946. Der Feldzug in (Memo by Lt.-Col. Turner, 27 May 40, H.Q.S.
Frankreich vom 10. Mai bis 25. Juni 1940 8522, etc., as in note 35 above). W.D., Senior
(German operational maps reproduced by Officer C.M.H.Q., 26 May 40. Lt.-Gen. H.D.G.
Historical Division, U.S. Army, 1950). Heinz Crerar to the writer, 8 Jun 44, C.M.H.Q. file
Guderian, Panzer Leader (London, 1952), Chap. 24/Narratives/1.
5. Various authors, "La campagne de France 53. "Proposed Operations in France, Operation No.
(Mai-Juin 1940)", Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme 2", Appendix "A".
guerre mondiale, June 1953. Maj. L. F. Ellis, The 54. "Proposed Operations in France, Operation No.
War in France and Flanders, 1939-1940 ("History 2".
of the Second World War, United Kingdom 55. Ibid.
Military Series") (London, 1953). 56. Gort to Secretary of State for War, 1725 hrs 26
34. Maj. D. J. L. Fitzgerald, History of the Irish May 40; to War Office, 2215 hrs same date.
Guards in the Second World War (Aldershot, 57. "Proposed Operations in France-Operation No. 3"
1949), 85-99. Maj. L. F. Ellis, Welsh Guards at (Memo by Lt: Col. Turner, 27 May 40, H.Q.S.
War (Aldershot, 1946), 96-106. On the general 8522, etc., as in note 35 above.
situation, note 33, above. 58. Ibid.
35. "Memorandum on Proposed Operations Canadian 59. Ibid.
Forces in France, Operation No. 1" (by Lt.-Col. 60. Despatch by Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay
G. R. Turner, 27 May 40), H.Q.S. 8522; also on (Supplement to London Gazette, 17 Jul 47). A.D.
C.M.H.Q. file 3/1 Div/1 and W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Divine, Dunkirk (New York, 1948).
Div., May 1940. 61. Copies in W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., May 1940,
36. Ibid., Appendices "A" and "B". Appendix LXV, and in C.M.H.Q. file 3/1 Div/1.
37. Interview with Gen. McNaughton, Up Waltham, 62. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., May 1940. Documents
Sussex, 27 Feb 41. on C.M.H.Q. file 3/1 Div/1.
38. "Memorandum . . . Operation No. 1" (above, note
35).39. Ibid., Appendices "C" and "CI" (as
sent and as received).
63. 1st Div. Operation Order No. 2, 29 May 40, W.D., 90. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., June 1940, Appendix
G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., May 1940, Appendix LXI.
LXXXIV. 91. "WT Movement Instruction 6/2", 7 Jun 40,
64. 1st Div. Operation Order No. 4, 4 Jun C.M.H.Q. file 3/CAOS-FR/1.
40, ibid., June 1940, Appendix XIV. 92. W.D., 1st Field Regt., R.C.H.A., June 1940.
Other documents on same diary. 65. W.Ds., 93. Enclosure to Brig. A. A. Smith to Director
various units. Historical Section, 15 Dec 43, H.Q.C. 1453-2,
66. Their Finest Hour, 140-41. vol. 4.
67. Canmilitry to Defensor, M.S. Papers. 68. W.D., 94. W.D., H.Q. Brest Garrison, June 1940. Cf. Gen.
G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., June 1940. McNaughton's memo. of discussion with Maj.-
Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 3/CAOS Gen. T. R. Eastwood, 4 Aug 40, McNaughton
FR/ 1. Papers, P.A. 69-C4.
69. W.D., 3rd Field Regt. R.C.A., 8 Jun 40. 70. Their 95. Report by Lt. A. F. Macpherson, 20 Jun 40, W.D.,
Finest Hour, 106-7. 1st Inf. Anti-Tank Coy., June 1940. W.D., 1st
71. E. Linklater, The Highland Division Field Coy. R.C.E., June 1940, Appendix I.
(London, 1942). Maj.-Gen. R. Evans, 96. W.Ds., H.Q. 1st Inf. Bde. and units, June 1940.
"The 1st Armoured Division in France", Smith to D.H.S., 15 Dec 43, note 93 above.
Army Quarterly, November 1942-May 97. Note 79 above.
1943. 98. The Role of General Weygand, 135-41, 128-9.
72. W.D., A. & Q., H.Q. 52nd Div., June 1940. Recalled to Service, 157-8.
73. United Kingdom records. 99. Printed in The Role of General Weygand,
74. Their Finest Hour, 147. Appendix VII, and in Brooke's Despatch,
75. Commandant J. Weygand, The Role of General Appendix A; partially reproduced by Lyet, above,
Weygand: Conversations with his Son (London, note 85.
1948), 90. 100. Brooke Despatch, paras. 7-8.
76. Their Finest Hour, 154, 258. Despatch by Air 101. Ibid., paras. 16, 28-32.
Chief Marshal Dowding, Supplement to London 102. W.Ds., No. 1 Provost Coy. (R.C.M.P.) and 1st
Gazette, 11 Sep 46, para. 40. Maj.-Gen. Sir Div. Petrol Coy. R.C.A.S.C., 1415 Jun 40.
Edward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe (2 103. W.D., 1st Field Regt. R.C.H.A., June 1940.
vols., London, 1954), I, 306. United Kingdom 104. Operation Instruction No. 1, H.Q. B.E.F., 16 Jun
records. 40.
77. The Role of General Weygand, 94. Cf. Gen. M. 105. Copy, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., June 1940,
Weygand, Recalled to Service (London, 1952), Appendix CXLIV.
115-17. 106. W.D., 1st Field Regt., June 1940. Interview with
78. Their Finest Hour, 87-9. Cf. Capt. S. W. Roskill, Maj.-Gen. J. H. Roberts, 13 Nov 43.
The War at Sea, 1939-1945, I (London, 1954), 107. W.Ds., Hastings and Prince Edward Regt. and
250. Royal Canadian Regt., 15-17 Jun 40.
79. Despatch by Lt.-Gen. Brooke (22 Jun 40), 108. Interview with Brig. E. W. Haldenby, Avellino,
Supplement to London Gazette, 22 May 46. Italy, 28 Mar 44.
80. Interview with Brig. M. A. Pope (B.G.S., 109. W.D., 48th Highlanders, 15 Jun 40.
C.M.H.Q.), 3 Feb 41. 110. Ibid., 16 Jun 40.
81. Documents in M.S. Papers [vol. I] and 111. "Memorandum of Activities, Adv. H.Q. 1 Cdn
C.M.H.Q. file 3/CAOS-FR/1. Div" by Col. G. R. Turner, C.M.H.Q. file
82. C.M.H.Q. file 29/Vis Forces/5. 3/CAOS-FR/1 and W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div.,
83. Documents on W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., June 1940.
June 1940. 112. Evans, "The 1st Armoured Division in France",
84. Eden to Brooke, 10 Jun 40. Army Quarterly, May 1943.
85. P. Lyet, "La campagne 1939-1940: la 113. Brooke Despatch, Appendix B.
bataille de France" (Revue historique de 114. Evans in Army Quarterly, May 1943.
l'armee, December 1946). 115. Tel. GS 632, Canmilitry to Defensor, C.M.H.Q.
86. The Role of General Weygand, 88-9 and file 3/CAOS-FR/1.
Appendix II. Cf. Recalled to Service, 116. Information from Casualty Section, Canadian
108-9, 140, 148. Overseas Records Office, 1944. Personal files.
87. The Role of General Weygand, 141. 117. Returns on C.M.H.Q. file 3/CAOS-FR/1. W.D.,
88. Their Finest Hour, 109-13. The Private Hastings and Prince Edward Regt., 19 Jun 40.
Diaries ... of Paul Baudouin ... (London, 118. Tel. GS 632, note 115 above.
1948), 68-74. Spears, Assignment to 119. McNaughton Papers, P.A. 6-9-C4,
Catastrophe, I, 294-317.
89. Their Finest Hour, 192. Cf. Assignment to
Catastrophe, II, 154-5, 158.
120. Their Finest Hour, 256. 121. Ibid., 255. 149. Their Finest Hour, 284-96.
122. United Kingdom records. 150. 150. Ibid., 296-300.
123. United Kingdom records. Memo by Gen. 151. Front Line, 1940-41. The Official Story of the
Crerar, 6 Jun 40, C.M.H.Q. file 3/CAOS FR/ 1. Civil Defence of Britain (London, 1942), 6.
124. United Kingdom records. W.D., No. 2 Army Field Workshop, 6 Jul 40.
125. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., June 1940, 152. Directive from Hitler's Headquarters, I Aug 40,
Appendix XCII. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1940
126. Ibid., Appendix LXXIII (Memorandum, (Admiralty, 1947), 81.
"Home Defence", 19 Jun 40). 153. Dowding Despatch, note 76 above. Denis
127. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., 18 Jun 40. 128. Richards, Royal Air Force 1939-1945: Vol. I, The
Canadian Force Operation Order No. 7, Fight at Odds (London, 1953), Chap. VI. Cf. Gen.
22 Jun 40, ibid., Appendix XCIX. Sir F. Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain's Defence Against
129. W.D., H.Q. 1st Inf. Bde., July 1940. 130. W.D., Air Attack During the Second World War
G.S., H.Q. 1st Div., June 1940, (London, 1949), Chap. XI.
Appendix CXVIII. 154. Statement by Mr. P. Noel-Baker in the British
131. Memorandum of discussion, ibid., Ap House of Commons, 14 May 47. Their Finest
pendix CXXV. Hour, 338-40.
132. Memorandum of meeting at H.Q. Alder 155. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1940, 97-
shot Command, 29 Jun 40, ibid., Appen 8.
dix B. 156. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 7th Corps, August 1940,
133. Copy, First Cdn Army file CC7/1. Appendix CII.
134. Documents on ibid. Overseas R.O. 206, 24 Jul 40. 157. "German Preparations for Invasion in 1940"
135. List of officers as of 7 Aug 40, First Cdn Army (written answer by Mr. Attlee in the British House
file CC7/1. of Commons, 18 Nov 46).
136. "Summary of Activities of Major-Gen. 158. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 7th Corps, 8 Sep 40.
McNaughton and Col. Turner", W.D., G.S., H.Q. 159. Randolph S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle. Speeches
1st Div., June 1940, Appendix CLI. Movement by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill (London,
order from Home Forces, ibid., Appendix CLIII. 1941), 273.
137. Various reports, etc., on H.Q.S. 8522, W.D., G.S., 160. 7th Corps Sitrep, 21 Sep 40 (reporting movements
H.Q. 7th Corps, July 1940, and First Cdn Army seen 20 Sep), W.D., G.S., H.Q. 7th Corps,
file CC7/14. September 1940, Appendix C.
138. First Cdn Army file CC7/7, and W.D., G.S., H.Q. 161. See particularly "German Preparations for
7th Corps, August 1940, Appendix XLIV. Invasion" (above, note 157); Their Finest Hour,
139. Documents on H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file 1/56(G). 301-16, 337; Fuehrer Conferences on Naval
140. W.Ds., No. 1 Tunnelling Coy. R.C.E., June-July Affairs, 1940 (published in Brassey's Naval
1940, and 1st Pioneer Bn. R.C.E., 1 and 10 Jul 40. Annual, 1948).
141. W.D., No. 2 Road Construction Coy. R.C.E., 162. Hitler's "Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the
September-October 1940. War", 9 Oct 39, Fuehrer Directive'
142. Documents on First Cdn Army file 1/ 201/G. 1939-1941, 66-7, Cf. Fuehrer Conferences on
W.Ds., "X" and "Y" SuperHeavy Batteries Naval Affairs, 1939 (Admiralty, 1947), 49.
R.C.A., September 1940. 163. "German Preparations for Invasion".
143. Summary on C.M.H.Q. file 1/Re-Org/1. 164. Special Interrogation Report, General Guenther
144. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 1/Reconn/1. Blumentritt, C.M.H.Q., 22 May 46. Cf.
145. To Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., C.M.H.Q. file Blumentritt's book Von Rundstedt, The Soldier
1/Release Equip/1. and the Man (London, 1952), 84-7.
146. General Report for week ending 24 Aug 40, 165. "German Preparations for Invasion".
C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/2. W.Ds. of units. 166. Memorandum of discussion with Brig. J. G.
147. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 3/A.D.G.B. /1 and Swayne, 16 Sep 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 7th Corps,
3/1 AA Bde/1/2. Overseas R.O. 1217, September 1940, Appendix LXXVIII. Operation
Amendment No. 11. W.D., 2nd Light Anti- Instruction No. 13, 1st Cdn Div., W.D., G.S.,
Aircraft Regt. R.C.A., 7 Feb 42. H.Q. 1st Div., October 1940, Appendix LXXX.
148. Memorandum, "Home Defence", 19 Jun 40, 167. W.Ds., H.Qs. 3rd Inf. Bde., October 1940, 4th Inf.
above, note 126, Bde., December 1940, and 5th Inf. Bde., January
1941.
295-302579 579
REFERENCES FOR PAGES
168. "2nd Cdn. Div. Instructions for Action in Case of 170. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 7th Corps, September 1940, text
Emergency", 20 Aug 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd 5 Sep and Appendix XXVII.
Div., August 1940, Appendix 31; 2nd Div. 171. Canadian Corps Operation Instruction No. 14, 31
Operation Instruction No. 2, 6 Sep 40, ibid., Dec 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. Cdn Corps, December
September 1940, Appendix 12. 1940, Appendix XCII.
169. Memorandum of discussion, 7 Sep 40, W.D., G.S., 172. Canadian Corps Operation Instruction No. 13, 29
H.Q. 7th Corps, September 1940, Appendix Dec 40, ibid., Appendix LXXXV.
XXVIII. 2nd Div. Operation Instruction No. 3, 14
Sep 40, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., September
1940, Appendix 36.
CHAPTER X
Tasks and Operations, 1941-1942
1. Information from Canadian Overseas Records

Office, and R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. headquarters 16. W.D., No. 2 Tunnelling Coy., December 1942.
overseas, May 1941. Overall statistics from 17. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 6/1 Tun Coy/2.
Canadian Overseas Records Office, May 1945, 18. Col. T. W. R. Haycraft, "The Gibraltar Runway",
C.M.H.Q. file 18/Air Raids UK/1 as amended by Royal Engineers Journal, LX (September, 1946).
information from Director, War Service Records, Documents on H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps Engineer file
D.V.A., August 1954. 1-8-3.
2. Fuehrer Directives and other Top-Level 19. Col. T. W. R. Haycraft, "The Gibraltar Tunnels",
Directives of the German Armed Forces, 1939- Royal Engineers Journal, LX (December, 1946).
1941 (Washington, 1948), 127. 20. W.D., No. 2 Tunnelling Coy. R.C.E. (numerous
3. Chiefs of Staff to Auchinleck, 19 Jul 41, references). "Summary Report", 13 Mar 41-26
Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 402. Nov 42, by Maj. J. G. Tatham, O.C. No. 2
4. Notes of discussion, W.D., A. & Q., H.Q. Cdn Tunnelling Coy., H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps Engineers
Corps, March 1941, Appendix "P1". file 1-8-3.
5. 2nd Division Operation Order No. 1, 22 Jun 41, 21. W.D., No. 2 Tunnelling Coy., December 1942,
W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., June 1941, Appendix Appendix 1.
49. General Report, Cdn Corps, weeks ending 5 22. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 6/1 Tun Coy/2.
Jul and 16 Aug 41, C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/2. 23. Memo by. Maj. H. E. T. Doucet, 25 Jul 41, H.Q.
6. General Report, Cdn Corps, weeks ending 18 Oct, Cdn Corps file 1/23/74 (G). "Notes on meeting"
22 Nov, 6 Dec and 20 Dec 41, C.M.H.Q. file by Maj. C. R. Archibald, ibid.
4/Progress/2. 24. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 385.
7. Canadian Corps Order of Battle, 18 Nov 41, 25. "Notes", • above, note 23; "Minutes of Meeting ...
W.D., G.S., Cdn Corps, November 1941, 26 Jul 41" by Lt.-Col. H. A. Young, C.M.H.Q. file
Appendix 30. 3/Cdn Corps/3; "Instructions for the Preparation
8. Army Council Instruction No. 349 of 1941. of 111 Force", 25 Jul 41, H.Q. Cdn Corps file
9. Quarterly Army List, April 1942, Part I, 66 (25 1/23/74 (G).
Dec 41). 26. Revised "Instructions for the Preparation of 111
10. W.D., H.Q. 1st Inf. Bde., 2 Jan 42. Force", 26 Jul 41, C.M.H.Q. file 3/Cdn Corps/3.
11. W.D., G.S., H.Q. Cdn Corps, February 1942, Memo by Maj. Archibald, "Exercise `Heather"', 3
Appendix "B". Aug 41, H.Q. Cdn Corps file 1/23/74 (G).
12. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps, June 1943, 27. Memorandum by Lt: Col. Young of information
Appendix 1. On successes against enemy aircraft, from War Office, 30 Jul 41, C.M.H.Q. file 3/Cdn
correspondence with H.Q. Anti-Aircraft Corps/3.
Command, C.M.H.Q. file 3/Enemy Aircraft/1. 28. Memorandum by Brig. Murchie, 6 Aug 41, and
13. Cranborne to Massey, C.M.H.Q. file 6/1 Tun amended version by Lt.-Gen. McNaughton, 8 Aug
Coy/2. 41, ibid. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Extract from
14. W.D., Spec. Det. No. I Tunnelling Coy. R.C.E., Minutes of Meeting held on 6th August, H.Q. 1st
November-December 1940. Cdn Corps file 1/23/74 (G).
15. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 6/1 Tun Coy/2.
W.D., No. 2 Tunnelling Coy. R.C.E., March 1941.
48. Memorandum of discussion, by Lt.-Col. G. G.

29. W.D., H.Q. 2nd Inf. Bde. (Supp.), August- Simonds, 8 Sep 41, H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file Ops
September 1941. 3-3-5, vol. 2.49. Documents on ibid.
30. Memorandum by Brig. Murchie, 11 Aug 41, 50. H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file Ops 3-3-1. 51.
C.M.H.Q. file 3/Cdn Corps/3. Memoranda on ibid.
31. Memorandum by Brig. Murchie, 16 Aug 41, ibid. 52. Cdn Corps Training Instruction No. 7, 16 Mar 42,
Draft Directives for Naval and Military W.D., G.S., H.Q. Cdn Corps, March 1942.
Commanders, ibid. Information from Mr. Ross Munro, 9 May 42.
32. Order of Battle as compiled at C.M.H.Q from all 53. Documents on H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file
available sources, December 1941 (copy on W.D., Ops 3-3-1-1 Div.
H.Q. 2nd Inf. Bde. (Supp.), August-September 54. Report by Lt. Ensor, 25 Apr 42, H.Q. First Cdn.
1941). Army file 7-1-1/Ops. Memorandum of interview
33. W.D., H.Q. 2nd Inf. Bde. (Supp.), August- with Capt. J. P. Ensor, 22 Jul 42, Appendix "A" to
September 1941. Rear-Admiral P. Vian, Report No. 81, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q. 55.
"Operation 'Gauntlet': Report of Proceedings", 4 Operation Order No. 1, attached toLovat's report,
Sep 41. The whole expedition is described in Ross H.Q. First Cdn Army file
Munro, Gauntlet to Overlord: The Story of the 7-1-1/Ops.
Canadian Army (Toronto, 1946), Chap. XII. Mr. 56. United Kingdom records.
Munro was present as correspondent for the 57. Lovat's report, note 55 above. 58. United
Canadian Press. Kingdom records.
34. Vian report, note 33 above. Information from 59. Report by and interview with Ensor, note 54
various participants, including Maj. W. S. above. Report by naval officer in command to
Murdoch. Report of Maj. C. A. H. B. Blake, Flotilla Officer 8th A.L.C. Flotilla, 22 Apr 42.
M.I.L.O., 28 Aug 41, Appendix "J" to report of Various other reports, H.Q. First Cdn Army file 7-
Military Commander, H.Q. Cdn Corps file 1-1/Ops. United Kingdom records.
1/23/74 (G). 60. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 625ff. Robert E.
35. Vian report (including Appendix V, report of Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Intimate
H.M.S. "Aurora"). Engineer report by Maj. G. History (New York, 1949), Chap. XX.
Walsh, Appendix "'L" to report of Military 61. Text in Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the
Commander. Proceedings of Court of Inquiry re Joint Committee . (U.S. Congress, 79th Congress
fire at Barentsburg, Appendix "D.1" to ibid. 1st Session), Part 15, 1485ff.
36. Vian report. W.D., H.Q. 2nd Inf. Bde. (Supp.), 62. The Grand Alliance, 641, and cf. Churchill to
August-September 1941. Ismay, for Chiefs of Staff, 10 Jan 42, 700-4.
37. Signals report by Capt. W. H. T. Wilson, 63. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948, 2
Appendix "N" to report of Military Commander. vols.), II, 1116-24.
Interview with Capt. Wilson, 8 Dec 41. 64. Speech by Mr. Churchill in Parliament, 27 Jan 42.
38. Report of Military Commander, para. 6. Cf. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds., The Army
Captured Records Section, Department of Air Forces in World War II, I (Chicago, 1948),
the Army, Washington, 19070/13. 253ff., and Ray S. Cline, Washington Command
39. The Times (London), 15 Sep 41. Post: The Operations Division (Washington,
40. Vian report. 1951), 97-104.
41. Jean Brilhac, The Road to Liberty: The Story of 65. The Grand Alliance, 646-51, 705.
One Hundred and Eighty-Six Men who Escaped 66. Memo by Maj.-Gen. M. A. Pope, 11 Mar 42,
(London, 1945). McNaughton Papers, file P.A. 5-32-5.
42. W.D., H.Q. 2nd Inf. Bde. (Supp.), 67. Memorandum "Operations in Western Europe",
August-September 1941. accompanying Chief of Staff's undated
43. 10 Sep 41, H.Q. Cdn Corps file 1/23/74 "Memorandum for the President" (copy furnished
(G). by Chief of Military History, U.S. Department of
44. United Kingdom records. the Army). Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of
45. Minutes of meeting 22 Jul 41, W.D., G.S., H.Q. Fate [Toronto], (1950), 313-15. Sherwood,
Cdn Corps, July 1941, Appendix XXXIV. Roosevelt and Hopkins, 519-20. Gordon A.
46. Tels. GS 1458, Canmilitry to Defensor, 26 Jul 41, Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington,
and GS 203, Defensor to Canmilitry, 31 Jul 41, 1951), Chap. I. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M.
C.M.H.Q. file 3/Cdn Army/ 1. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,
47. Tels. GS 2322, Canmilitry to Defensor, 26 Oct 41, 1941-1942 (Washington, 1953), 183-87.
and GS 284, Defensor to Canmilitry, 31 Oct 41,
ibid.
68. United Kingdom records. 96. Memorandum by Gen. McNaughton, 22 Jun 42,
69. The Hinge of Fate, 317-20. Roosevelt and ibid., June 1942, Appendix "F" (includes text of
Hopkins, 535. cable GS 1997, Canmilitry to Defensor, Stuart
70. 17 Apr 42, The Hinge of Fate, 320-21. 71. 5 May from Me. Naughton, 12 Jun 42). See also
42, records of Department of External Affairs. C.M.H.Q. file 6/Exp Force/1.
72. The Grand Alliance, 393. 97. United Kingdom records.
73. Stalin to Churchill, 18 Jul 41, ibid., 383. 74. The 98. C.C. (42) 45 (Final), note 85 above. Combined
Hinge of Fate, 332-5. Commanders' appreciation C.C. (42) 42 (3rd
75. Roosevelt and Hopkins, 577. The Hinge Draft), 30 Jul 42. Cf. Lt.Gen. L. K. Truscott,
of Fate, 341-2. Communiqués, The Times, Command Missions (New York, 1954), 45-53.
London, 12 Jun 42. 99. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Chap. I.
76. Roosevelt and Hopkins, 581-3. Henry L. Stimson 100. Memorandum, Discussion with V.C.I.G.S., 4 Aug
and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in 42, Personal War Diary, Lt.-Gen. McNaughton,
Peace and War (New York, 1948), 423. August 1942, Appendix "B".
77. The Hinge of Fate, 346-8, 433. 101. Memorandum by Gen. McNaughton, 20 Sep 42,
78. Ibid., 381-2 (20 Jun 42). Roosevelt and Hopkins, of interview with Gen. Brooke, 17 Sep 42, ibid.,
589. September 1942, Appendix
79. The Hinge of Fate, 383-4 (note of "military 102. Churchill to Auchinleck, 17 Sep 41, and to Chiefs
conclusions" as recorded by General Ismay). of Staff, 18 Sep 41, The Grand Alliance, 413-14,
Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 424. 495-7.
80. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Eu 103. United Kingdom records. Rear-Admiral 1. Hughes-Hallett, "The
ope (New York, 1948) 50-52, 484. Mounting of Raids", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,
81. The Hinge of Fate, 434-5 (8 Jul 42). November1950.
82. On Active Service, 424-5. Harrison, Cross 104. The Hinge of Fate, 346-8.
Channel Attack, 27. 105. UnitedKingdomrecords.TheHingeofFate,346--8.
83. Text, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 603-5 (16 Jul 42). 106. United Kingdom records.
On the background of this document, Harrison, 107. United Kingdom records.
Cross-Channel Attack, 28. 108. United Kingdom records.
84. Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with 109. Despatch by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles M.
Eisenhower (New York, 1946), 28. Forbes, 13 Apr 42, Supplement to London
85. Combined Commanders' appreciation C.C. (42) Gazette, 2 Oct 47. Cf. Commander R. E. D.
45 (Final), 31 Jul 42. Ryder, V.C., The Attack on St. Nazaire (London,
86. The Hinge of Fate, 444-8. Roosevelt and Hopkins, 1947).
607-11. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for 110. The Grand Alliance, 773-4.
Coalition Warfare, 273-8. 111. Information from Brig. A. H. Head (formerly
87. "Operations in 1942/43: Memorandum by the representative of Chief of Combined Operations
Combined Chiefs of Staff', C.C.S. 94, 24 Jul 42. on Joint Planning Staff, War Cabinet Offices), 15
Roosevelt and Hopkins, 610-15. Cross-Channel Mar 46. Cf. Brig. Head's lecture, "Amphibious
Attack, 30-32. Strategic Planning for Coalition Operations", Journal of the Royal United Service
Warfare, 282-4. Institution, November 1946.
88. Roosevelt and Hopkins, 610. 112. United Kingdom records.
89. On Active Service, 425. 113. The Dieppe Raid (Combined Report) 1942,
90. Combined Commanders' appreciation, 2.
note 85 above. 114. "Minutes of Meeting held at Combined Operations
91. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 29. Headquarters . . . 14.4.42. to discuss Operation
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 71. Cf. Cross- 'Rutter"', 18 Apr 42.
Channel Attack, 29. 115. "Conclusions of meeting held at C.O.H.Q. on
92. Report No. 7 to C.G.S., file 11/C.G.S./ 5, vol. 1, Tuesday, 21st April".
Canadian Joint Staff, Washington. 116. "Operation 'Rutter' and 'Jubilee': Notes on
93. Report No. 8 to C.G.S., 8 May 42, ibid. Principal Changes in the Military Plan"
94. Memo by Mr. King, "Meeting of Pacific War (addressed to V.C.C.O.).
Council, at Washington, D.C., Wednesday, April 117. "Operation 'Rutter'--Outline Plan" (Appendix II to
15, 1942" (King Papers). letter Mountbatten to Force Commanders, 13 May
95. Minutes of a meeting held in General 42).
McNaughton's office, 3 Oct 42, Personal War 118. "Minutes of a Meeting held at 1100 hours
Diary, Lt.-Gen. McNaughton, October 1942, Saturday 25th April at C.O.H.Q. to discuss
Appendix "B1". Operation 'Rutter".
119. See, e.g., Gen. Sir F. Pile, Ack-Ack (London, 143. "Notes on Meeting held Informing Bdes about
1949), 261. Forthcoming Operation 'RUTTER': 1430 hrs--27
120. "Notes of a meeting between Lt Gen AGL Jun 42". W.Ds., Royal Regt. of Canada and Essex
McNaughton and Lt Gen BL Montgomery Scottish Regt., 27 Jun 42.
... 1000 hrs 30 Apr 42 (given to Lt Col GP 144. W.Ds., especially "Simmerforce" R.C.E., Group
Henderson by Lt Gen McNaughton at 1600 hrs 30 2, and Royal Regt. of Canada, July 1942.
Apr 42)", W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, July 145. Situation maps, Lage West, O.K.H., Berlin,
1942 (preserved and added to diary later). 28.5.42 and 9.6.42 (C.R.S.).
121. Ibid. 146. Memoranda, H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2
122. H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div. 123. Div.
See note 117 above (plan printed with 147. Combined Report, 8. W.D., Royal Regt. of
very slight variations in the Combined Canada, 7 Jul 42. Information from Brig. C. C.
Report). Mann, 10 Nov 42.
124. "Operation 'Rutter', Amendment List No. 1", 15 148. Brig. M.S. Chilton (B.G.S. South Eastern
May 42. Command) to Crerar, 7 Jul 42, H.Q. 1st Cdn
125. "Observations upon the Outline Plan, by Lt: Col. Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div. Cf. memo on
C.C. Mann, G.S.O. I". cancellation of "Rutter" by Lt.-Col. B.H. Darwin,
126. Mountbatten to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 11 7 Jul 42, W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, July
May 42, with amendment 13 May. Mountbatten to 1942 (from H.Q. First Cdn Army file 8-3-4/Ops).
Force Commanders, 13 May 42. United Kingdom records.
127. Tel. GS 1480, Canmilitry to Defensor, C.M.H.Q. 149. United Kingdom records.
file 3/Cdn Army/1. Tel. CGS 180, Defensor to 150. H.Q. First Cdn Army file 8-3-5/Ops.
Canmilitry, 2 May 42, ibid. 151. Information from Brig. A.H. Head, 15
128. Note by Gen. McNaughton on draft of Tel. GS Mar 46, and Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, 29-30
1658, Canmilitry to Defensor, 15 May 42, W.D., Sep 46.
G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, July 1942 (added to 152. H.Q. First Cdn Army file 8-3-5/Ops.
diary later). 153. Memorandum by Gen. McNaughton, 20
129. Tel. GS 1658, note 128 above. Jul 42, ibid.
130. W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, July 1942 154. Letters on ibid.
(added later). 155. Information from Brig. Mann, 18 Nov 42. 156.
131. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Division, May 1942. Minutes, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div.,
132. Documents on ibid., August 1942. August 1942, Appendix 53.
133. Undated memorandum by Lt.-Col. G. P. 157. Roberts to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 18
Henderson, W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, Mar 43, C.M.H.Q. file 24/Dieppe/1.
July 1942. W.Ds. of units, particularly Royal 158. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., August 1942,
Regt. of Canada and South Saskatchewan Regt., Appendices 17 and 29.
12 Jun 42. 159. Letters on H.Q. First Cdn Army file
134. Copies of correspondence from H.Q. First Cdn 8-3-5 /Ops.
Army file 8-3-4/Ops, now on W.D., G.S., H.Q. 160. W.D., 14th Army Tank Regt., August 1942.
First Cdn Army, July 1942. 161. See, e.g., W.D., Royal Regt. of Canada, 18 Aug
135. Ibid. 42.
136. United Kingdom records. 162. Ibid.
137. United Kingdom records. 163. "Operation 'Jubilee', Naval Operation Orders", 10
138. To Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 18 Mar 43, Aug 42, Appendix "A". 164. H.Q.C. 1453-6-5,
C.M.H.Q. file 24/Dieppe/1. vol. 3.
139. The Hinge of Fate, 387-90. Roosevelt and 165. W.D., No. 10 (I.A.) Commando, 19 Aug 42.
Hopkins, 592-3. 166. United Kingdom records. W.D., 14th Army Tank
140. Information from Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, 29 Sep Regt., 18 Aug 42.
46. Letter, Hughes-Hallett to the writer, 30 Dec 167. "Operation 'Jubilee'. The Combined Plan",
52. C.O.H.Q., 31 Jul 42.
141. McNaughton to Paget, undated but evidently of 3 168. Information from Capt. Hughes-Hallett, 29-30
Jul 42, W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, July Sep 46.
1942 (from H.Q. First Cdn Army file 8-3-4/Ops). 169. 14th Army Tank Regt. Operation Instruction No.
Swayne to McNaughton, 4 Jul 42; Paget to 1, W.D., 14th Army Tank Regt., August 1942.
McNaughton, 5 Jul 42, ibid. 170. Combined Plan, paras. 38 and 29,
142. "Memorandum on Conversation with Lieut.- 171. Ibid., para. 78,
General B.L. Montgomery", by Lt.-Gen. H. D. G.
Crerar, 5 Jul 42, ibid.
172. Information from Air Historian, R.C.A.F., June University Library, U.S. Air Force, May
1950. RCAF Logbook (Ottawa, 1949), 69. 1950.
173. United Kingdom records. Report of Air Force 175. Combined Plan, para. 5.
Commander, 5 Sep 42. 176. Personal War Diary, Lt.-Gen. McNaughton,
174. Information from Historical Division, Air 19 Aug 42.
177. Combined Plan, para. 7. Report of Air
Force Commander, 5 Sep 42, para. 16.
CHAPTER XI
The Raid on Dieppe
1. Directive by Keitel, 25 Sep 41, Fuehrer Directives 22. Map "Stutzpunktgruppe Dieppe, Stand von
and other Top-Level Directives of the German 19.8.42" (Appendix 2 to Report of 81st Corps) .
Armed Forces, 1939-1941 (Washington, 1948), 23. Ibid., and chart "Gliederung der . Gesamtkrafte
215. Directive by Hitler on defence of the der 3 Wehrmachtteile" (Appendix 3 to Report of
Channel Islands, 20 Oct 41, ibid., 224. C.-in-C. West).
2. W.D. 2, 302nd German Inf. Div., 6, 7, 13, 24. W.D. 3, 302nd Div., C.R.S. 24353/4, vol. "C" of
and 20 Dec 41, C.R.S. 17840/1. Appendices.
3. Fuehrer Directives ... 1939-1941, 234. 25. Maps "Verteidigung Dieppe (19.8.42) ",
4. Ibid., 1942-1945 (Washington, 1948), 10. Appendix 5 to Report of C.-in-C. West, and
Printed as Appendix "C" to Gordon A. "Defences of Dieppe West", The Dieppe Raid
Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washing (Combined Report) (based on information from
ton, 1951). Cf. G. Blumentritt, Von prisoners).
Rundstedt, The Soldier and the Man 26. Map "Stutzpunktgruppe Dieppe", above, note 22.
(London, 1952), 125 ff. 27. Maps "Gliederung d. 302 I.D. and Korpsreserve",
5. O.K.H. Situation Maps (Lage West), Appendix 1 to Report of 81st Corps, and
12.3.42 and 26.3.42. "Ausgangslage: Gliederung in and hinter dem
6. W.D., O.K.W./WFSt, 25 Jun 42. Kustenverteidigungsabschnitt der 302. I.D.
7. Ibid., 26 Jun 42. (19.8.42)", Appendix 2 to Report of C.-in-C.
8. Fuehrer Directives ... 1942-1945, 34. West; also O.K.H. situation map, Lage West,
9. O.K.H., Loge West 24.7.42. 15.8.42.
10. Ibid., Lage West 12.3.42 and 15.8.42. 28. "Gefechtsbericht fiber Feindlandung bei and
11. C.R.S., H22/87a. beiderseits Dieppe am 19.8.42".
12. Notes in ibid. 29. Ibid., part III(b).
13. O.K.H., Lage West, 15.8.42. W.D. 3, 302nd 30. W.D. "B", H.Q. Fifteenth Army, C.R.S. 26621/4.
German Inf. Div., 27 Apr 42 (C.R.S. 24353-1). 31. "Divisional Order for Coast Protection No. 105",
14. Situation Maps, O.K.H., Lage West, 5.1.42 and W.D. 3, 302nd Div., Vol. "C" of Appendices.
15.8.42. 32. W.D., H.Q. Fifteenth Army, C.R.S. 75084/1.
15. W.D. 2, 302nd German Inf. Div., 6-10 Apr 41, 33. W.D. 3, 302nd Div., 10 Jul 42.
C.R.S. 17840/1. 34. Memorandum of 15 Jul 42, ibid., vol. "C" of
16. "Divisional Order for Coast Protection, No. 6", Appendices.
ibid., C.R.S. 17840/5. 35. 302nd Div. Report on Dieppe Raid, above, note
17. "Divisional Order for Coast Protection, No. 44", 19, part VII (E).
15 Mar 42, and special order 19 Mar 42, C.R.S. 36. Order by Fifteenth Army, 13 Jul 42, W.D., H.Q.
17840/4. Fifteenth Army, C.R.S. 26621/9.
18. Roger Lefebvre, Zone Cotiere: Journal d'un 37. W.D., 302nd Div., 3-7 Apr 42, C.R.S. 24353/1.
secretaire de mairie sous l'occupation (Dieppe, 38. "Basic Order No. 10", in "Divisional Order for
n.d.), 41-2. Coast Protection No. 90", 4 Jul 42, W.D. 3, 302nd
19. Report of 302nd German Inf. Div. (Operations Div., Vol. "C" of Appendices.
Section) on Dieppe Raid, part VII (M), W.D. 3, 39. W.D. 3, 302nd Div., 6 Jul 42.
302nd Div., C.R.S. 24353/8. Cf. G. Guibon, A 40. "Basic Observations of the Commanderin-Chief
Dieppe le 19 Aout 1942 (Dieppe, n.d.), 2. West, No. 8", 23 Aug 42, in "Glefechtsbericht",
20. "Divisional Order for Coast Protection, No. 72", note 28 above,,
W.D. 3, 302nd Div., C.R.S. 24353/4.
21. "Basic Order No. 11", C.-in-C. West, C.R.S.
H22/85.
41. 81st Corps "Intelligence Report", para. 7. 42. 65. H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div., vol. II.
Detailed Military Plan, Operation "Jubilee", 66. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), parts I (B)
Appendix "A". and VI; 81st Corps "Combat Report", part III;
43. Order of Battle of the German Army, 1 March "Personal Impressions of Arty Troop 813" by
1945 (Washington, War Department), 175. Chief of Staff C.-in-C. West, "Gefechtsbericht",
44. "Gefechtsbericht", part 1. Other details in W.D., part IX.
German Naval Operations Staff, 19 Aug 42. 67. Map "Stutzpunktgruppe Dieppe", above, note 22.
45. United Kingdom records. 68. Evidence of Maj. J. C. H. Anderson, 29 May 43,
46. Despatch by Capt. Hughes-Hallett, 30 Aug C.M.H.Q. file 24/Dieppe/1. Report of conference
42 (London Gazette Supplement, 14 Aug at Oflag VIIB, 13 Sep 42, para. 10.
47), 3825. 69; Information from Lieut. Koyl, 27 Nov 42.
47. W.D., German Naval Operations Staff, 20 Aug 70. Evidence of Maj. J.C.H. Anderson, 29 May 43.
42. 71. United Kingdom records.
48. 81st Corps "Combat Report and Experiences 72. Report of conference at Oflag VIIB, para. 10.
Gained", part III. C.-in-C. West Information from Lt: Col. Catto, July 1952.
"Gefechtsbericht", part II. 73. Evidence of Cpl. L.G. Ellis. Map "Stiltz-
49. 302nd Div. report (Operations Section), part punktgruppe Dieppe".
II(A). 74. Examination of site by the writer, 5 Sep 44.
50. Ibid. 75. Capt. G.A. Browne, "Report on the Operation at
51. C.-in-C. West "Gefechtsbericht", Part II. # 1 Dieppe, 19 Aug 42" (undated, but previous to 11
W.D., German Naval Operations Staff, 21 Aug Nov 42).
42. Action Report of Sub Chaser 1411, n.d. 76. Ibid., and United Kingdom records.
52. Detailed Military Plan, para. 27. 77. "Report on the Operation at Dieppe", above, note
53. Naval Operation Orders, Appendix "B", Table 1. 75.
54. C.-in-C. West "Gefechtsbericht', part III (C). 78. Information from Lieut. Koyl, 27 Nov 42.
55. Naval Operation Order No. 1, para. 32 (C). 79. Comment by Lt.-Col. Catto, 8 Jul 52, H.Q.C.
56. Intelligence Log maintained in H.M.S. Calpe, 1453-21-5, vol. 2. Capt. G.A. Browne, "Report on
0610 hrs. United Kingdom records. the Operation at Dieppe". Cf. report of conference
57. Brig. J. Durnford-Slater, Commando (London, at Oflag VIIB, para. 10. Interview with Lt: Col.
1953), 105. Catto, 9 Jul 52.
58. United Kingdom records. 80. W.D., H.Q. 302nd Div., Quartiermeister
59. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part 11 (B); abteilung (C.R.S. 24361/1), 25 Aug 42.
81st Corps "Combat Report and Experiences 81. Personal accounts of several soldiers, particularly
Gained", part III. Pte. E. J. Simpson. United Kingdom records.
60. Report of Artillerie - Kommandeur 117 (W.D., 82. Account by Pte. Simpson (above, note 81).
81st Corps, C.R.S. 32648/4). Information from Sub-Lt. J.E. Boak, R.C.N.V.R.,
61. Account by Sub-Lt. D. J. Lewis, R.C.N.V.R. 24 Aug 42.
(Beachmaster, in L.C.P.(L) 15), 24 Aug 42. 83. W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., August 1942,
United Kingdom records. Appendix 51.
62. No. 4 Commando Operation Order, W.D., G.S., 84. United Kingdom records.
H.Q. 2nd Div., August 1942, Appendix 58. 85. H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div.
Reports on Operation "Cauldron" by Lt.-Col. 86. United Kingdom records.
Lord Lovat and Maj. D. Mills-Roberts. 87. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part 11 (C).
63. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part 11 (D); 88. Account by Mr. Ross Munro, Canadian Press
81st Corps "Combat Report", part III; C.-in-C. correspondent who was in this craft, Globe and
West "Gefechtsbericht", part IX. Comments by Mail (Toronto), 22 Aug 42. Cf. his Gauntlet to
Brig. D. Mills-Roberts on C. Buckley, Norway, Overlord (Toronto, 1945), 325-8. Account by Cpl.
The Commandos, Dieppe (London, 1951). F.H. Ruggles.
64. Reports on Operation "Cauldron" by Lt.-Col. 89. German newsreel film of the operation.
Lord Lovat and Maj. D. MillsRoberts. 90. United Kingdom records.
Recommendation for V.C., Capt. P. A. Porteous, 91. Calpe Intelligence Log.
The Times, 3 Oct 42. "Notes from Theatres of 92. United Kingdom records.
War, No. 11" (War Office, February 1943).
93. See especially account by Capt. H.B. Carswell, 121. Narrative by Capt. W.D. Whitaker, W.D.,
F.O.O.; information from Major J.E. McRae, 25 R.H.L.I., August 1942, Appendix 21; information
Feb 43; and various accounts by men of "A" and from Lieut. Counsell, above, note 120.
"D" Companies. 122. United Kingdom reords.
94. Accounts by Lieut. J. S. Edmondson, L/Cpl. H. 123. Information from Lieut. Counsell, above, note
McKenzie, Pte. J. Krohn, etc. Wallace Reyburn, 120.
Rehearsal for Invasion: An Eyewitness Story of 124. Narrative by Capt. Whitaker, above, note 121.
the Dieppe Raid (London, 1943), 59-62. 125. W.D., 7th Field Coy. R.C.E., 19 Aug 42.
Recommendation for V.C., Lt.-Col. C.C.I. Recommendation for D.C.M., L/Sgt. G.A.
Merritt. Hickson.
95. Account by L/Cpl. A.F. Bales. 126. Information from C.S.M. J. Stewart, 26 Oct 42.
96. Account by Sgt. K.A. Williams. 127. Information from L/Sgt. G.A. Hickson, 13 Oct 42.
97. Account by Capt. H.B. Carswell. Cf. account by Spr. W. Price, 2nd Field Coy.
98. United Kingdom records. R.C.E.
99. Information from Maj. A.T. Law, 3 Dec 42, Sub- 128. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part Ill.
Lt. J.E. O'Rourke, R.C.N.V.R., 24 Aug 42, and 129. Pte. J.T. Fleming, 4 Nov 43.
Capt. J. Runcie, 11 Dec 42. Account by Pte. W.J. 130. Letter from Lt: Col. Jasperson, 23 Aug 42,
Coll. C.M.H.Q. file 10/Jasperson F.K./1.
100. Information from Maj. Law, Capt. Runcie, and 131. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part 11 (C).
Capt. R.M. Campbell. 132. Account by Capt. MacRae, above, note 117.
101. Information from Maj. Law, 3 Dec 42. 133. Information from Pte. J. Maier, 29 Dec 42.
102. Ibid. See also battalion and company narratives Comment by Col. D.F. MacRae, 23 Jul 52,
appended to W.D., Camerons of Canada, August H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 2.
1942. 134. Recommendation for V.C., H./Capt. J.W. Foote.
103. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part II (C). 135. United Kingdom records.
104. Ibid. 136. Report by Maj. B. Sucharov, R.C.E., 2 Sep 42,
105. Ibid., part I (B). C.M.H.Q. file 55/7116/9/2.
106. Information from Maj. Law, 3 Dec 42, and W.D., 137. W.D., 14th Cdn Army Tank Regt., 19 Aug 42.
Camerons of Canada, August 1942. 138. United Kingdom records.
107. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part if (C). 139. Report of Lt.-Col. R.D. King.
108. General Roberts to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 11 140. Comment by Brig. Sherwood Lett, 17 Jul 52,
May 43, C.M.H.Q. file 24/Dieppe/1. H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 2. Information from Cpl.
109. Lt.-Col. Merritt to the writer, 10 Mar 47, T.L. Carnie (a member of crew of this tank), 29
H.Q.C. 1453-6-5, vol. 1. Oct 43.
110. Account by Cpl. R.R. Hughes. 111. United 141. Sources for account of tank landings: allocations
Kingdom records. 112. Capt. J.C. Runcie, 11 Dec to craft and flights, loading tables in Detailed
42. Military Plan; list of tanks landed (names and
113. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part troops), W.D., 14th Cdn Army Tank Regt., 19
11(C). Aug 42; list of tanks crossing wall, information
114. Combined Plan, para. 25 (iii). from Maj. C.E. Page, 6 Nov 43. Information from
115. United Kingdom records. various individuals. See also above, notes 136-40.
116. "Detailed Chronological Air Narrative", 142. Report of Maj. Sucharov, above, note 136.
Appendix "D" to Report by the Air Force 143. Information from Maj. Page, 29 Oct 43.
Commander. 144. H.Q. 1451-202/14.
117. Account by Capt. D. F. MacRae, W.D., Essex 145. W.D., 7th Field Coy. R.C.E., 19 Aug 42.
Scottish, August 1942, Appendix VI; account by 146. Accounts by L/Cpl. M.D. Sinasac and Spr. L.W.
C.S.M. J. Stewart, R.H.L.I.; and United Kingdom Laur, and information from C.S.M. J. Stewart, 26
records. Oct 42. Guibon, A Dieppe le 19 Aout 1942
118. United Kingdom records. (above, note 19), 19.
119. Despatch by Naval Force Commander, Narrative, 147. Memo of evidence of Tpr. Volk, H.Q. 1st Cdn
para. 13. Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div.
120. See, e.g., accounts by Ptes. C. Johnson and J. 148. E.g., C.S.M. Stewart, above, note 146, and Capt.
Telfer and Sgt. F.B. Volterman, and information Whitaker, above, note 121. "Narrative of
from Lieut. L.C. Counsell, 6 Jun 44 (all R.H.L.I.). Experiences at Dieppe" by Lt.-Col. R. R. Labatt,
para. 23. Waldo E. L. Smith, What Time the
Tempest (Toronto, 1953), 77-9.
149. Wireless Log, regimental command net, W.D., 14th 167. Despatch by Naval Force Commander,
Cdn Army Tank Regt., August 1942, Appendix 7. Narrative, pare. 26-8. Roberts to Senior
150. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), parts II (C) Officer, C.M.H.Q., 11 May 43, C.M.H.Q.
and III. file 24/Dieppe/1.
151. Untimed message heard by listening set, H.M.S. 168. Information from Historical Division, Air
Calpe. University Library, United States Air
152. Calpe Intelligence Log. United Kingdom records. Force, 24 May 50.
153. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part 11 (C). 169. Despatch by Naval Force Commander,
154. United Kingdom records. Narrative, para. 27.
155. Analysis of 103 questionnaires filled out 170. Report by Air Force Commander, para. 55. 171.
by individual soldiers, Fusiliers Mont Despatch by Naval Force Commander,
Royal. Narrative, para. 28.
156. Information from Lieut. A.A. Masson, 30 Jan 43, 172. United Kingdom records.
P.S.M. L.A. Dumais, 23 Oct 42, and other 173. Comments by Lt.-Col. Jasperson, 12 Jun
personnel of Fusiliers MontRoyal. 52, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 2, and by Col.
157. Information from Sgt. Dubuc, 3 Nov 42. 153. MacRae, 23 Jul 52, ibid. Recommendation
Report by Capt. P.W.C. Hellings, R.M. for M.C., Capt. D.F. MacRae.
Cf. entry of 0818 hrs in Calpe Intelligence Log. 174. United Kingdom records.
159. Naval Message, 0837 hrs, W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2nd 175. United Kingdom records. Despatch of
Div., August 1942, Appendix 51. Despatch by Naval Force Commander, Narrative, para.
Naval Force Commander, Narrative, para. 25. 31.
United Kingdom records. 176. Despatch of Naval Force Commander,
160. James Spenser, The Awkward Marine (London, Narrative, para. 33. United Kingdom
1948), 58-66. records.
161. United Kingdom records. 177. Despatch of Naval Force Commander,
162. Narrative by Maj. M.E.P. Garneau, W.D., H.Q. 4th Narrative, para. 33. W.D., H.Q. 6th Inf.
Inf. Bde., August 1942, Appendix 15A. Account by Bde., August 1942, Appendix 13.
C.S.M. W. Dean, R.H.L.I. Narrative by Lt.-Col. 178. Despatch of Naval Force Commander,
R.R. Labatt, above, note 148. para. 37. Cf. Lt.-Gen. L.K. Truscott,
163. Memorandum by Maj. G.M. Rolfe, 11 Feb 46, H.Q. Command Missions (New York, 1954),
1451-202/14. Information from Maj. C.E. Page, 6 67-72.
Nov 43. "Report on Approach, Landing, and 179. 302nd Div. report (Administrative Sec.)
Subsequent Events, Dieppe", by Brig. W.W. plus ibid. (Operations Sec.), part VII (F).
Southam. 180. Report by Air Force Commander, para.
164. Report by the Air Force Commander, and Covering 66.
Letter. 181. Message 1340 hrs, H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file
165. Despatch by Naval Force Commander, Narrative, Ops 3-3-1-2 Div., vol. 2.
para. 33. 182. Despatch of Naval Force Commander,
166. Fernie Messages, Appendix 63, W.D., G.S.,H.Q. Narrative, para. 35.
2nd Div., August 1942. "Detailed Chronological 183. Report of Military Force Commander,
Air Narrative", note 116 above. Comment by Gen. 27 Aug 42, para. 5.
Crerar, 7 Jun 52, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 2.
CHAPTER XII
Dieppe: Losses, Comments and Aftermath
1. From Directorate of War Service Records, 6. Report of C.O., 35 Wing R.A.F., above, note 5.
Department of Veterans Affairs, as of July 1954. 7. RCAF Logbook (Ottawa, 1949), 69.
2. United Kingdom records. 8. Figures supplied by Air Ministry, London, from
3. United Kingdom records. records of the Quartermaster-General's
4. United Kingdom records. Department of the German Air Ministry.
5. Report by Air Force Commander,
Appendix "C". Combined Report, 36.
Report of Commanding Officer, 35 Wing
R.A.F., H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div.
9. The Times (London), 22 Aug 42. 42. Time, 26 Oct 42.
10. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), part VI. 43. C.M.H.Q. file 67/Treatment/1. Army Council
11. Combined Report, para. 319. Instruction 266, 1943. Canadian Army Overseas
12. 81st German Corps "Combat Report", part VII Routine Order 3364, 19 Apr 43, replacing 3323 of
(k). 10 Apr 43.
13. W.D., German Naval Operations Staff, 20 and 21 44. H.Q.S. 9050-17. German situation report,
Aug 42. Report of H.Q. Naval Group West, 21 O.K.W./WFSt, 22 Nov 43.
Aug 42. 45. Information from Maj. C.E. Page, October 1943.
14. 302nd Div. report (Operations Sec.), parts 11 (C) Comment by Lt.-Col. R.R. Labatt, 13 Aug 52,
and III. H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 2. Cf. W. Wynne Mason,
15. Operations Log of 81st Corps, W.D., H.Q. 81st Prisoners of War ("Official History of New
Corps, C.R.S. 32648/4, volume Zealand in the Second World War") (Wellington,
"Landungsunternehmen Dieppe". 1954), 238-40, 248-9, 257-9.
16. Report of 10th Panzer Div., 25 Aug 42, copy in 46. Comment by General Roberts, 19 Jul 52, H.Q.C.
ibid. Cf. C.-in-C. West "Gefechtsbericht", part III. 1453-21-5, vol. 2.
17. "Gefechtsbericht", part III. 47. Information from Capt. Hughes-Hallett, 29-30
18. United Kingdom records. Sep 46.
19. C.-in-C. West "Gefechtsbericht", parts III 48. Lt.-Gen. Sir F. Morgan, Overture to Overlord
and IX. (London, 1950), 107.
20. Intelligence Report of 302nd Div., W.D., 49. The Dieppe Raid (Combined Report), 1942.
H.Q. 302nd Div., Volume "Dieppe I", 50. Despatch of Naval Force Commander, para. 11.
Appendix 14 (C.R.S. 24353/8). 51. Suggested by Capt. Hughes-Hallett, 29-30 Sep 46.
21. "Gefechtsbericht", part VIII. 52. Information from Capt. Hughes-Hallett, 29-30
22. C.R.S. H2/136. Sep 46.
23. 24 Aug 42: "Basic Observations of the 53. Address to Canadian officers, 7 Jun 44.
Commander-in-Chief West, No. 9" (signed by 54. C.C. (42) 45 (Final), Appreciation and Outline
F.M. von Rundstedt), "Gefechtsbericht", part IX. Plan for "Sledgehammer", 31 Jul 42.
24. Operations Sec., part IV (C). 55. C.C. (42) 42 (3rd Draft), Operation "Wetbob"--
25. 81st Corps Intelligence Report, para. 6. 26. Ibid., Appreciation, 30 Jul 42.
para. 7. 56. United Kingdom records.
27. "Gefechtsbericht", part IX. 57. Rundstedt to Army Commanders, etc., 25 Aug 42,
28. Comments on 81st Corps report, 27 Aug C.R.S. H22/39. "Summary of a Review of the
42, "Gefechtsbericht", Appendix II. Situation by Hitler", 19 Jul 43.
29. Operations report, part IV (C). 58. Basic Order No. 14 of C.-in-C. West, 25 Aug 42,
30. Chapter XI, notes 88 and 94. C.R.S. H22/85.
31. Picture Post, 5 Sep 42. 59. "Fuhrerrede zum Ausbau des AtlantikWalles am
32. Daily Sketch, 20 Aug 42. 29.9", 3.10.42, C.R.S. H22/88.
33. Ottawa Journal, 18 Sep 42. Cables, etc., 60. Notes of Ministerialrat Dr. Helmuth Greiner, 3
C.M.H.Q. file 4/Dieppe/1. Sep 42, Office of Chief of Military History, U.S.
34. Calpe Intelligence Log, 0556 hrs. (W.D., Department of the Army, MS # C-065a.
G.S., H.Q. 2nd Div., August 1942, Appen 61. W.D. 13, Seventh Army, Appendix 1, 30 Sep 42,
dix 51). C.R.S. 28863/2.
35. Quentin Reynolds, Dress Rehearsal, The Story of 62. C.-in-C. West appreciation, 28 Sep 42, C.R.S.
Dieppe (New York, 1943), 261-3. H22/41. Cf. Greiner Notes (above, note 60), 5, 9
36. Cables CGS 146, Defensor to Canmilitry, 10 Mar and 30 Oct 42.
43, and GS 554, Canmilitry to Defensor, 13 Mar 63. Signal from O.K.W./WFSt, C.R.S. H22/88.
43, C.M.H.Q. file 4/Dieppe/1. 64. O.K.H. Situation Maps, Lage West, 16.6.42,
37. O.T.G. Williamson, "Responsibility for Dieppe", 15.8.42 and 4.11.42.
Saturday Night, 12 Jun 43. 65. Above, note 62.
38. See, e.g., operation orders for Operations 66. O.K.H. Situation Map, Lage West, 12.10.42.
"Abercrombie" and "Cauldron". 67. C.R.S. H22/41.
39. Comment by General Roberts, 19 Jul 52, H.Q.C. 68. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War
1453-21-5, vol. 2. The Times (London), 3 and 4 [Vol. IV], The Hinge of Fate [Toronto], (1950),
Sep 42; Evening Standard (London), 8 Oct 42. 323-5, 348-50.
40. Correspondence, etc., H.Q.S. 9050-17 and 69. Personal War Diary, Lt.-Gen. A.G.L.
C.M.H.Q. file 45/Treatment/1. McNaughton, July 1942.
41. Reports, H.Q.S. 7236-74, vol. 1. File of No. 30 70. Copy in McNaughton Papers, file PA 1-7-1.
Internment Camp Staff.
71. Tel. GS 3284, Canmilitry to Defensor, 20 Sep 42, 83. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 143, 437-8.
ibid. 84. File PA 1-11-1.
72. Prime Minister to Prime Minister, ibid. 85. Documents on ibid. and on First Cdn Army file 7-
73. The Hinge of Fate, 436, 572. 1-2(Ops). Comment by Gen. Crerar, 7 Jun 52,
74. Tel. GS 3305, Canmilitry to Defensor, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 2.
22 Sep 42, PA 1-7-1. 86. Documents, file PA 1-11-1.
75. Repeated in Tel. GS 2300, Defensor to 87. Gen. McNaughton's memorandum of interview,
Canmilitry, 24 Sep 42, ibid. Personal War Diary, December 1942, Appendix
76. Repeated in Tel. CGS 475, Defensor to "0".
Canmilitry, 26 Sep 42, ibid. 77. The Hinge of 88. Gen. McNaughton's conversation with Brig.
Fate, 355. Simpson, D.D.M.O.(O), War Office, 6 Jan 43,
78. Gen. McNaughton's memorandum of meeting, 18 ibid., January 1943, Appendix "F". General
Oct 42, Personal War Diary, October 1942. On 15 Report, First Cdn Army, weeks ending 19 Dec 42
Oct meeting (as described by Gen. Stuart on basis and 20 Mar 43, C.M.H.Q. file 4/Progress/11.
of information from Mr. Ralston), another 89. Gen. McNaughton's memorandum of
memorandum by Gen. McNaughton, 18 Oct 42, conversation with Gen. Brooke, 9 Feb 43,
ibid. McNaughton Papers, file PA 1-0-4.
79. GS 3577, Canmilitry to Defensor, 90. The Hinge of Fate, 948.
McNaughton Papers, file PA 1-11-1. 91. Minutes of conference of C.-in-C. Home Forces
80. Tel. CGS 552, Defensor to Canmilitry, with G.Os.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command and
ibid. Cdn Army, 12 Apr 43, file PA 1-0-4.
81. Letter McNaughton to Brooke, ibid. 92. Tel. No. 47, King to Churchill, 17 Mar 43,
82. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 519, 625. McNaughton Papers, file PA 5-0-33.
CHAPTER XIII
Some Special Problems of the Canadian Army Overseas
1. Defence Forces List, Canada, Part I, November 13. Tel. AG 327, Defensor to Canmilitry, 27 Jan 40,
1939. C.M.H.Q. file 23/Educ/1.
2. List of officers holding Command, Staff, and 14. Documents on ibid. Reports Nos. 53 and 66,
Services Appointments in the Canadian Army Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 30 Nov 41 and 10
(Overseas), Compiled as at 1 Jan 43. Apr 42.
3. Ibid., as at 1 Feb 45. 15. Memo by Senior Officer Auxiliary Services,
4. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 6/Committee/3 and C.M.H.Q., 4 Nov 40, "Educational Services for
later volumes. Overseas R.Os. 334 (1 Oct 40), 979 the C.A.S.F." (Appendix to Report No. 53,
(15 Sep 41) and 1887 (22 Apr 42). Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q.). Booklet, 15 Sep
5. Tel. GS 2425, 30 Sep 43, McNaughton file PA 6- 41, "Educational Opportunities available to
9-M-4. Canadian Forces Overseas".
6. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 1/Conf/8, 16. Account by H/Maj. J. G. Jones, from records of
1/Conf/10/2, 9/Age Limits/1, and 42/Min N.D./1. Principal Chaplain (P.) Overseas.
Overseas Routine Order 1560, 30 Jan 42. 17. Account by H/Capt. E. J. Weaver, from records of
7. Tel. AG 199, Defensor to Canmilitry, 18 Principal Chaplain (R.C.) Overseas.
Feb 42, C.M.H.Q. file 9/Age Limits/1. 18. Reports on C.M.H.Q. file 23/Reports/1 and
8. Overseas R.O. 3797, 8 Sep 43. subsequent volumes.
9. Correspondence on C.M.H.Q. file 19. Copy (undated) on C.M.H.Q. file 23/Visits/2.
14/Fuel/1. 20. Report No. 23, Auxiliary Services Overseas, 31
10. W.D., No. 2 Field Hygiene Sec. R.C.A.M.C., 30 Aug 41, C.M.H.Q. file 23/Reports/1/2.
Jan 40; ibid., March 1940, Appendix IV. 21. Report No. 36, ibid., 30 Sep 42, 23/Reports/1/3.
11. To Maj.-Gen. Crerar, 23 Feb 40, C.M.H.Q. file 22. Documents on McNaughton file PA 5-8-1, vols. 2
4/Censor/1. and 3.
12. To Deputy Chief Postal Censor, 24 Feb 40, ibid.
23. Press release by Minister of National War 52. Overseas R.O. 4902, 9 Aug 44. Documents on
Services, 28 Feb 42. On hostels, White to Asst. C.M.H.Q. file 8/Tri-Wound/1.
Director of Auxiliary Services, C.M.H.Q., 19 Nov 53. Documents on H.Q. 54-27-55-11 and C.M.H.Q.
45, C.M.H.Q. file 23/Accom/1/5. file 19/Canada/2. Cdn Army R.O. 5150, 6 Dec 44.
24. The Times (London), 24 Jan 40. W.D., 1st Corps Ammunition Park 54. Documents on H.Q. 54-27-55-11, vol. 2, and
R.C.A.S.C., 23 Feb 40. Information fromMr. Massey, 21 Apr 43. E. C.M.H.Q. files 19/Canada/2 and 19/Canada/2/2.
D. Otter, "Data of Operations of the Canadian Y.M.C.A. Overseas C.A.R.O. 5585, 18 Apr 45. Statistics from A.G.
withtheCanadianArmy,Dec1939--Dec1942". (Stats) C.M.H.Q. working file, "Long Service
25. Personal knowledge, supplemented by Leave-Details and Dispositions".
information from Mr. Massey, 21 Apr 43. 55. A.G. (Stats) file, note 54 above.
26. Report dated 23 Apr 44. 56. Table, above, page 191. D.A.G. (A) office file in
27. Censorship Report [Canadian units of 21st possession of N.D.H.Q. Statistics.
Army Group], 1 Jun 44. 57. Information from D.G.M.S., Statistics Section.
28. Returns on C.M.H.Q. file 6/Births/1. 58. Massey to Secretary of State for the Dominions,
29. Documents on H.Q.S. 8536-1 and 10 May 45, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Release/1.
C.M.H.Q. files 1/Repat/1 - 2 and 23/Cdn 59. Documents on ibid.
Wives/1/2. 60. Army figures, A.G. (Stats), C.M.H.Q., Strength
30. Information from Statistical Unit, Immi Control Books (Departures from U.K.); R.C.N.
gration Branch, September 1951. and R.C.A.F. figures, N.D.H.Q. Movement
31. Report dated 27 Nov 41. Control Book (Westbound Surface Moves,
32. Evening Standard (London), 31 Dec 41. Arrivals in Canada).
33. Senior Officer C.M.H.Q. to G.O.C.-in-C. 61. Report of D.N.D., 1944, page 39.
First Cdn Army, 29 Sep 42 (copy with 62. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 1/Demob/1 and
C.M.H.Q. file 20/Offence/1). 1/Demob/1/2.
33. The Times (London), 5 Aug 42. 63. Documents on H.Q.S. 8350-36, vols. 1-3.
35. C.M.H.Q. files 29/Civil/1 - 6. 64. Diary, Historical Officer C.M.H.Q., February-
36. Memorandum of conversation, 6 Nov 40, May 1945.
C.M.H.Q. file 20/Civil/1. 65. Ibid., 17 May 45. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file
37. Reports with C.M.H.Q. file 20/Offence/1. 1/Demob/2 and later volumes.
38. C.M.H.Q. file 22/Strength/2/2. 66. Strength Control Books, note 60 above.
39. Senior Officer C.M.H.Q. to G.O.C.-in-C. 67. Tel. COS 515, Canmilitry to Defensor, 1 Jun 45,
First Cdn Army, 13 Jul 43, C.M.H.Q. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Release/1.
file 20/Offence/1. 68. Strength Control Books.
40. Censorship Report [Canadian units of 21st Army 69. Chairman Cdn Claims Commission to Financial
Group], 1 Jun 44 (covering letters read 16-31 Supt. C.M.H.Q., 6 May 46, C.M.H.Q. file
May). 29/Claims Commission/1/4. Tel. COS 645,
41. Report No. 88, Historical Officer, Canmilitry to Defensor, 6 Jul 45, C.M.H.Q. file
C.M.H.Q., 28 Dec 42. 20/Aldershot/2. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file
42. Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 19/Com 20/Canada Drafts/1 and personal files. Court of
passionate/ 1. inquiry, 60/Aldershot/1.
43. Overseas R.O. 1156. 70. Howard N. Cole, The Story of Aldershot
44. Tel. A 1237, Canmilitry to Defensor, 15 (Aldershot, 1951), 243-4.
Apr 43, C.M.H.Q. file 19/Compassionate/1. 71. Strength Control Books.
45. Statistics from A.G. (Stats), C.M.H.Q. 72. C.M.H.Q. Movement Control Records, Atlantic
Cf. C.M.H.Q. file 1/Instructors/1. Westbound Sailings.
46. C.M.H.Q. files 45/Trans/3 and 6/1 POW 73. A.G. (Stats), C.M.H.Q., Monthly Strength Return,
Escort/1, 6/2 POW Escort/1, etc. and C.A.O.F. 2nd Echelon Monthly Return,
47. H.Q. 54-27-55-11, vol. 1. March 1946. C.M.H.Q. "Strength Summary of
48. " Extract from Record of Discussions of Canadian Army Serving Overseas about 31
Military Members held Monday 21 Feb January 1947".
44", ibid. 74. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 1/Demob/1 /3 and
49. To D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 13 Apr 44, 1/Org RU/1/5. C.M.H.Q. Administrative Order
C.M.H.Q. file 19/Canada/2. No. 53, 12 Feb 47.
50. C.M.H.Q. file 19/Compassionate/1/2. 75. Strength Control Books and A.G. (Stats),
51. C.M.F. Appreciation and Censorship C.M.H.Q., Monthly Strength Return, January
Report No. 49. 1946.
CHAPTER XIV
The Defence of Hong Kong, December 1941
1. Joseph W. Ballantine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor: 19. D.S.D. to C.G.S., letter BDF. SD 10-2-5-5 (copy
The Foreign Policies of Japan" (Foreign Affairs, on file of Exhibits in office of M.N.D.).
July 1949). Herbert Feis, The Road To Pearl 20. 20. Memorandum on D.S.D. letter of 26 Sep 41
Harbor: The Coming o/ the War Between the (above, note 19) by Maj.-Gen. L. F. Page (copy in
United States and Japan (Princeton, 1950), 215- ibid.).
16. Louis Morton, "The Japanese Decision for 21. C.G.S. to Minister, 30 Sep 41, H.Q.S. 20-1-20,
War" (United States Naval Institute Proceedings. vol. 1.
December 1954). 22. Endorsement on recommendation, above, note 21.
2. United Kingdom records. 23. United Kingdom records. Tel. GS 2152,
3. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 177. Canmilitry to Defensor, 11 Oct 41, H.Q.S. 20-1-
4. United Kingdom records. 20, vol. 1.
5. United Kingdom records. 24. Brig. Stuart (for C.G.S.) to the Minister, 11 Oct
6. Evidence of Gen. Crerar, quoted in Report on the 41, and approval by Mr. Power same date, ibid.
Canadian Expeditionary Force to the Crown 25. Tels. Canmilitry to Defensor, GS 2743, 4 Dec 41
Colony of Hong Kong, by Right Hon. Sir Lyman and GS 2849, 12 Dec 41, H.Q.S. 20-1-20, vol. 2.
P. Duff, G.C.M.G., Royal Commissioner (Ottawa, 26. United Kingdom records.
1942), 14. Full text of Gen. Crerar's evidence, Tel. 27. United Kingdom records.
No. 1000, Crerar to W. K. Campbell, 11 Apr 42 28. United Kingdom records. Under-Sec. for External
(through High Commissioner's Office, London) Affairs to D.M., D.N.D., 18 Feb 46, H.Q.C. 1453-
(copy from office of Minister of National 10, vol. 1.
Defence). References to Grasett visit, H.Q.S. 29. Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 25-
8641-9, vol. 1. Crerar to Stacey, 23 Oct 53, 8. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada.
H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 3. 30. Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 28-
7. United Kingdom records. 32. W.D., Winnipeg Grenadiers.
8. United Kingdom records. 31. War Establishment Cdn 11/1940/12F/1.
9. United Kingdom records. 32. Part II Orders, Royal Rifles of Canada and
10. Copy on C.M.H.Q. file 3/Cdn Ops OS/1. Winnipeg Grenadiers, October 1941.
it. C.G.S. to Minister, 24 Sep 41, H.Q.S. 20-1-20, 33. Documents on H.Q.S. 8884-5, vol. 1. Report on
vol. 1. "Record of Conversations on Important the Canadian Expedtionary Force, 36.
Subjects", 2220 hrs 24 Sep, initialled by Gen. 34. The basic instruction, dated 18 Aug 40, is printed
Crerar, H.Q.S. 8251, vol. 21. in Report, 44.
12. Telegram No. 413, Canadian Minister in 35. Ibid., 45.
the U.S. to Dept. of External Affairs, copy 36. Table "A" attached to A.G. to Minister, 18 Jan 42,
in H.Q.S. 20-1-20, vol. 1. H.Q.S. 8884-5, vol. 5.
13. Signal in ibid. 37. Ibid.
14. United Kingdom records. 38. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, especially 8, 11
15. Evidence of Gen. Crerar ("Answer to Drew and 15 Apr 41; 9, 12 and 20 May 41; 13 Jun 41;
question No. 1"), above, note 6. numerous entries, July and August 1941. Cf.
16. Proceedings of Royal Commission appointed . to Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 25-
inquire into and report upon the Organization, 8. Information from Brig. F. T. Atkinson
Authorization and Dispatch of the Canadian (Adjutant, R.R.C., 1941), 27 Nov 52.
Expeditionary Force to the Crown Colony of 39. Inspector-General's Report, quoted in Report on
Hong Kong, pp. 312-14. Quoted in Report on the the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 30.
Canadian Expeditionary Force ..., 15. 40. Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 31.
17. Proceedings of Royal Commission , 41. Ibid., 30-31. W.D., Winnipeg Grenadiers,
p. 299. especially 13 Oct 40, 22 Feb 41, 22 Mar 41, 10
18. Lt.-Col. H. A. Sparling (for D.M.T.) to D.S.D., 24 May 41. Weekly Reports, "Y" Force, July-August
Sep 41 (H.Q.S. 20-16-0). (Copy on file of 1941, H.Q.S. 8538-3, vol. 2.
Exhibits in office of M.N.D.).
42. Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 25- 1948). Cf. Morton, "The Japanese Decision for
32. Summaries of training reports, H.Q.S. 8538- War", above, note 1.
11. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, especially 7 61. E.g., Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor.
Aug 41 and 11 Aug 41. Weekly Reports, "Y" 62. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, 227-70.
Force, above, note 41. Comment by Brig. J. H. 63. Ibid., 282-91. Morton, "The Japanese Decision for
Price (Second in Command, R.R.C., 1941), 13 War".
Nov 52, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5, vol. 3. 64. Senate Document No. 244 (above, note 59), 96.
43. To C.G.S., H.Q.S. 8538-11. 65. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, 2140.
44. Tel. 176, Dominions Office to External Affairs, 66. C.M.H.Q. file 4/Gen Apprec/1.
H.Q.S. 20-1-20, vol. 1. 67. Senate Document No. 244, 340.
45. Reports on H.Q.S. 63-302-334. 68. Globe and Mail (Toronto), 12 Mar 48.
46. Report to C.G.S., 15 Nov 41, above, note 43. On 69. Cables read in Canadian House of Commons, 29
absentees, Tels. CA I and CA 2, Orinoco ("C" Apr 48.
Force) to Defensor, 3 and 16 Nov 41, H.Q.S. 70. Translation in The Campaigns of the Pacific War,
8538-11. 43-6.
47. To C.G.S., 15 Nov 41, above, note 43. 71. Ibid., 15, 49. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 13, 431 ff.
48. To Movement Control, N.D.H.Q., 28 Oct 41, Morton, "The Japanese Decision for War". Cf.
H.Q.S. 63-302-334. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 86.
49. Parade State, Force "C" (Report of "C" Force 72. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., N.Y.,
Headquarters and Details). Tel. CA 1, above, note 1948), 11, 1062-74, 1056-7, 1074. Cf. Feis, 291-7.
46. 73. The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 51, 15. Feis,
50. Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 50. Chap. 41.
51. Detailed analysis in ibid., 50-61. Cf. Q.M.G. to 74. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1057-8.
Minister, 19 Dec 41, H.Q.S 20-1-20, vol. 2. 75. Brooke-Popham to G.O.C. Malaya and A.O.C.
52. Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 8. Far East, 22 Nov 41. Air ViceMarshal Sir Paul
53. H.Q.C. 6-S-226, vol. 3; H.Q.C. 6-L-174, vol. 3; Maltby, Report on the Air Operations during the
H.Q.C. 6-S-232, vol. 2. Statement by Colonel Campaigns in Malaya and Netherlands East Indies
Ralston in the House of Commons, 27 Jul 42. ... (London Gazette Supplement, 26 Feb 48),
54. Report on the Canadian Expeditionary paras. 140-43.
Force, 51. See also Chief of Naval Staff 76. Despatch, Operations in the Far East, from 17th
to Q.M.G., 16 Jan 42, H.Q.S. 63-301-666. October 1940 to 27th December 1941, by Air
55. Telegrams on H.Q.S. 20-1-20, vol. 1. 56. Ibid., 20 Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham
Oct 41. (London Gazette Supplement, 22 Jan 48), paras.
57. Signal, Admiralty to C.-in-C. China, 24 Oct 41, 95, 132. A. V. M. Maltby's Report, para. 146.
N.S.S. 1037-14-2, vol. 3. 77. United Kingdom records.
58. Report of "C" Force Headquarters and Details. 78. United Kingdom records.
Globe and Mail (Toronto), 17 Nov 41. 79. "Note on Hong Kong", 25 Oct 41, H.Q.S. 8902.
59. Pearl Harbor Attack. -Hearings before the Joint Brooke-Popham Despatch, Appendix “F”.
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl 80. United Kingdom records.
Harbor Attack; Congress of the United States, 81. United Kingdom records.
Seventy-Ninth Congress, First and Second 82. A.V.M. Maltby's Report, para. 49, modified by
Sessions (Washington, 1946: 39 parts). The actual information from United Kingdom records.
Report of the Joint Committee is Senate 83. "Note on Hong Kong", above, note 79.
Document No. 244, 79th Congress, 2d Session. 84. Information from Gen. Maltby, 25 Jun 46.
See also The Campaigns of the Pacific War 85. List in "C" Force Report.
(United States Strategic Bombing Survey 86. Appendix "A", para. 8.
(Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Washington, 87. Evidence of, e.g., Brig. F. T. Atkinson and Lt. F.
1946). G. Power, R.R.C.
60. See, e.g., Louis Morton, The Fall of the 88. Brooke-Popham Despatch, Appendix "H".
Philippines ("United States Army in World War 89. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, para. 8.
II, The War in the Pacific") (Washington, 1953) 90. "Directive to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East",
and S. E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, Brooke-Popham Despatch, Appendix "A".
1931-April 1942 ("History of United States Naval 91. Ibid., para. 32.
Operations in World War II", III) (Boston, 92. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 1.
93. United Kingdom records. 124. United Kingdom records.

94. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 1. 125. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 16.
95. United Kingdom records. 126. First Demobilization Bureau narrative, part D.
96. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", 127. Col. Doi's "Battle Progress Report of the 228th
paras. 3-4; text, paras. 4, 7. Infantry Regiment in the Hong Kong
97. Brooke-Popham Despatch, para. 32. Invasion Operations in December 1941,"
98. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", prepared in September 1952 from his diary and
para. 2, modified by sketch in W.D., from memory.
Mainland Inf. Bde. 128. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A",paras. 20
99. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", and 10.
para. 4. 129. Ibid., para. 20.
100. Ibid., paras. 4-5. 130. Ibid., para. 21. W.D., Mainland Inf. Bde. and
101. Tel. G.1, Fervour (G.O.C. Hong Kong) Attached Troops, p. 15. Cf. Winnipeg Grenadiers
to Defensor, 24 Nov 41, H.Q.S. 8538-11. report, 10 Dec 41.
102. Tel. G.2, Orinoco ("C" Force) to 131. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A",para. 25.
Defensor, 30 Nov 41, ibid. 132. Ibid.
103. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, December 133. Winnipeg Grenadiers report, 11 Dec 41.
1941. 134. First Demobilization Bureau narrative,part D.
104. "C" Force Report. 135. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A",
105. Despatch, para. 8(f.) para. 25.
106. Lt. R. W. Queen-Hughes, "Report on 136. Winnipeg Grenadiers report, pp. 8, 5.
Transport Operations at Hong Kong", 137. Tel. 1754, Fervour to Defensor, 12 Dec
H.Q.C. 1453-10, vol. 1. 41, H.Q.S. 8902.
107. Ibid., and report by Capt. W.A.B. Royal, 138. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A",
same file. paras. 29 and 27. Japanese Studies in
108. Queen-Hughes report, and Maj. T. G. World War II, No. 76.
MacAuley to Maj. G. W. L. Nicholson, 139. Information from Combined Inter-Services
5 Jan 46, H.Q.C. 1453-10, vol. 1. Historical Section (India and Pakistan).
109. Information from Lt: Col. J. H. Price, W.D., H.Q. Mainland Inf. Bde., 12 Dec 41.
22 Mar 46. 140. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 33.
110. United Kingdom records. Information 141. Ibid., paras. 35-6. Information from
from Brig. F. T. Atkinson, 27 Nov 52. Combined Inter-Services Historical
111. Japanese narrative The Capture of Hong Section, India and Pakistan.
Kong, included in Operation Record of 142. Tel. 1754, above, note 137. W.D., H.Q.
Chinese Theater, Vol. II, prepared by First Mainland Inf. Bde., 13 Dec 41. United
Demobilization Bureau ("Japanese Studies Kingdom records.
in World War II", No. 71). 143. Tel. 1754, above, note 137. Cf. Thomas
112. The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 43-6. 113. F. Ryan, Jesuits under Fire in the Siege
First Demobilization Bureau narrative, part A. of Hong Kong, 1941 (London and Dublin,
114. Ibid., parts C and D. Order of Battle of the 1945), 55.
Japanese Armed Forces, 26 April 1944 (War 144. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 46.
Department, Washington, 1944), 87-8. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 11 Dec 41.
115. "Standard Table of Strength assigned to the 145. Tel. G.8, Orinoco to Defensor, 14 Dec
Capture of Hong Kong", First Demobilization 41, H.Q.S. 8902.
Bureau narrative, part A. "Outline of the 146. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., p. 4.
Disposition of Forces", ibid. 147. Tel. 1759, Fervour to Defensor, 14 Dec
116. Ibid., part B. But cf. "Table" and "Outline" cited 41, H.Q.S. 8902.
above, note 115. 117. Ibid., part C. 148. Tel. 1767, Fervour to Defensor, 14 Dec
118. Ibid., part B. 41, ibid.
119. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 6 Dec 41. 149. Tel. 1775, Fervour to Defensor, 15 Dec
120. United Kingdom records. 1, ibid. United Kingdom records.
121. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 7 Dec 41; 150. United Kingdom records. W.D., Royal
Winnipeg Grenadiers report; "C" Force Rifles of Canada, 15 Dec 41. "Hong Kong
R eport. United Kingdom records. Diary, `C' Coy., Royal Rifles of Canada",
122. United Kingdom records. 15 Dec 41.
123. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", 151. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A",
para. 14. Tel. 1732, Fervour to Defensor, 8 Dec para. 54.
41, H.Q.S. 8902.
152. Tel. 1784, Fervour to Defensor, 18 Dec 41, 177. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, December
H.Q.S. 8902. 1941, pp. 29-36.
153. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 62. 178. Information from Brig. C. Wallis, 3 May
154. Report, "C" Force Brigade Headquarters and 46.
Details, 18 Dec 41. 179. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 19 Dec 41.
155. "Report by O.C. 5/7 Raj (Taikoo) on Events on 180. Ibid. "E.G.S.", "The Fight at Quarry
North Face ...". Information from Combined Inter- Gap", The Volunteer (Journal of the Royal Hong
Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan). Kong Defence Force), Summer, 1952.
156. "The positions of the Landing Troops on Hong 181. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 20 Dec 41.
Kong", First Demobilization Bureau narrative, 182. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., pp. 38-9, 44.
part D. 183. "Translation of an Account. by Maj. Gen.
157. United Kingdom records. Tanaka". United Kingdom records.
158. Ibid. "Report by O.C. 5/7 Raj" (above, note 155). 184. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 20 Dec 41.
159. "Report by O.C. 5/7 Raj". 185. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 20 and 21 Dec 41.
160. United Kingdom records. 161. "Report by O.C. 5/7 186. Ibid., 21 Dec 41. W.D., Royal Rifles of
Raj". Canada, 21 Dec 41.
162. South East Asia Translation and Interrogation 187. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 21 Dec 41. 188. Ibid.
Centre, Historical Bulletin No. 249, "History of 189. Information from Major C. A. Young, 22 Mar 46.
Japanese 38 Div" and "Hong Kong Operation". W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 21 Dec 41.
163. United Kingdom records. 190. Information from Major C. A. Young,
164. "Translation of an Account of the Attack on Hong 22 Mar 46.
Kong ... by Maj. Gen. Tanaka Ryosaburo . .", and 191. Ibid. Situation report to 1700 hrs 23 Dec, passed to
accompanying marked map. N.D.H.Q. by War Office 24 Dec 41, H.Q.S. 8902.
165. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 43. 192. United Kingdom records.
Cf. Tel. 1767, Fervour to Defensor, 14 Dec 41, 193. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 23-25 Dec
H.Q.S. 8902. 41. Information from Major Young.
166. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 18 Dec 41. 194. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, "C"
167. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 18 Dec 41. Company narrative, 19 Dec 41.
168. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, "C" Company 195. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 22-3 Dec 41.
narratives, 18 and 19 Dec 41. "C" Coy. Diary, 196. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 23 Dec 41.
above, note 150. Interview with Lt: Col. W. A. 197. Ibid. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 23 Dec 41.
Bishop, 3 Mar 53. 198. W.D., Royal Rifles of Canada, 23 Dec 41.
169. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 18 Dec 41; W.D., 199. Ibid., 24 Dec 41.
Royal Rifles of Canada, Bn. H.Q. narrative, 18 200. Ibid.
Dec 41; and report of Capt. W. F. Clarke, 19 Dec 201. Ibid., 25 Dec 41. 202. Ibid., 24 Dec 41. 203. Ibid.,
41. Cf. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", 25 Dec 41.
para. 63 (o). 204. Maj. J. H. Monro, "Hong Kong Overrun"
170. Report of Capt. W. F. Clarke, above, note 169. (The Royal Artillery Commemoration
171. "Translation of Statement by Maj. Gen. Shoji Book 1939-1945 [London], (1950),
Toshishige . concerning the activities of the Shoji 139-44).
Butai during the capture of Hong Kong . .", and 205. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 25 Dec 41. 206. W.D.,
accompanying marked map. Doi, "Battle Progress Royal Rifles of Canada, 25 Dec 41. 207. Ibid.
Report". 208. Ibid. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 25 Dec
172. Tel. Commodore Hong Kong to Admiralty, 19 41.
Dec 41, H.Q.S. 8902. 209. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A",
173. Unnumbered, Fervour to Defensor, 19 Dec 41, paras. 36-46.
H.Q.S. 8902; cf. Tel. GS 2970, Canmilitry to 210. Winnipeg Grenadiers report, p. 9. 211. Ibid.
Defensor, 21 Dec 41, ibid. 212. Ibid. Statement of Sgt. W. J. Pugsley,
174. Naval message 525, H.Q.S. 8902. 12 Jan 46, copy on H.Q.C. 1453-10, vol. 1.
175. Information from Combined Inter-Services 213. Winnipeg Grenadiers report, p. 9.
Historical Section, India and Pakistan. Cf. Gen. 214. United Kingdom records.
Maltby's Despatch, para. 13 (c). 215. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A",
176. W.D., H.Q. East Inf. Bde., 19 Dec 41. Gen. para. 63 (y). United Kingdom records.
Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 68.
216. "Translation of Statement by Maj.-Gen. Shoji 249. Signals Admiralty to Defensor, 27 and 29 Dec 41,
Toshishige . . ', 18 Nov 46. ibid.
217. Maj. G. B. Puddicombe to Lt.-Col. G. W. L. 250. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", paras. 81
Nicholson, 30 Nov 50, H.Q.C. 1453-10, vol. 2. and 101. Communique of uncertain date, repeated
218. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", paras. 82, in Tel. 59713, Troopers to Defensor, 23 Dec 41,
63 (y), 65. United Kingdom records. H.Q.S. 8902
219. United Kingdom records. 251. First Demobilization Bureau narrative, part E.
220. Report, "C" Force Headquarters and Details, 19 252. Tel. 60010, Troopers to Defensor, 24 Dec 41,
and 21 Dec 41. H.Q.S. 8902.
221. United Kingdom records. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, 253. Tel. 0923, Commodore Hong Kong to
para. 13 (d). [Admiralty], passed to Defensor 29 Dec 41, ibid.
222. Winnipeg Grenadiers report, 19-22 Dec 41. 223. 254. Winnipeg Grenadiers report. Account by Lieut. L.
First Demobilization Bureau narrative, part D. Corrigan.
224. Shoji statement, above, note 216. Cf. "Hong Kong 255. Lt.-Col. J. A. Bailie (O.C. "C" Company,
Operation", above, note 162. Winnipeg Grenadiers) to the writer, 1 Feb 51,
225. Winnipeg Grenadiers report, 22 Dec 41. H.Q.C. 1453-10, vol. 2. United Kingdom records.
226. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", paras. 63 256. Tel. Admiralty to Defensor, 26 Dec 41, repeating
and 71. United Kingdom records. message from Commodore Hong Kong.
227. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", para. 71. 257. United Kingdom records. Lt: Col. J. A. Bailie to
228. Winnipeg Grenadiers report, 19 Dec 41. the writer, 1 Feb 51, above, note 255. Evidence
229. United Kingdom records. from Col. P. C. Giles, R.M., and Cdr. A. L. Pears,
230. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", R.N.
para. 82. United Kingdom records. 258. United Kingdom records.
231. United Kingdom records. 259. Message, Governor to Secretary of State, repeated
232. Winnipeg Grenadiers report, 20 Dec 41. in unnumbered telegram Admiralty to Defensor,
233. United Kingdom records. 25 Dec 41, H.Q.S. 8902. Cf. Gen Maltby's
234. Winnipeg Grenadiers report. Doi, "Battle Despatch, Appendix "A", paras. 142-50.
Progress Report". 260. Casualty information from Director of War ervice
235. United Kingdom records. Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, March
236. First Demobilization Bureau narrative, 1953, plus return of wounded compiled by Acting
part D. Brigade Major, "C" Force, 9 Sep 45.
237. Commodore Hong Kong to Admiralty, 22 Dec 41, 261. Charge sheets concerning Maj.-Gens. Tanaka
H.Q.S. 8902. Ryosaburo and Shoji Toshishige. "C" Force,
238. Report of Q.M.S. V. J. Myatt, 29 Dec 41, attached Reports of Medical Officers.
to Report, "C" Force Headquarters and Details. 262. First Demobilization Bureau narrative, part D.
239. Winnipeg Grenadiers report. 263. Information from Brig. J.N.B. Crawford, October
240. Ibid., and Doi, "Battle Progress Report". 1945 and June 1955.
Information from Lt.-Col. H. B. Rose, 8-9 Jun 46. 264. "Report of Conditions Affecting Canadian
241. United Kingdom records. Prisoners of War at Hong Kong" (prepared by a
242. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", paras. committee of officers at Sham Shui Po Camp).
122-6. "Notes" by War Crimes Investigation Section, 8
243. United Kingdom records. Jan 46.
244. Winnipeg Grenadiers report.United 265. Casualty information from Director of War
Kingdom records. Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs,
245. Gen. Maltby's Despatch, Appendix "A", March 1953.
paras. 117-26. 266. Order of Battle of the Japanese Armed Forces, 26
246. Commodore Hong Kong to Admiralty, repeated to April 1944 (War Department, Washington, 1944),
N.D.H.Q., Ottawa, 25 Dec 41, H.Q.S. 8902. 88. John Miller, Jr., Guadalcanal: The First
247. The Grand Alliance, 634. Offensive (Washington, 1949), 138-9, 348-9.
248. H.Q.S. 8902.
CHAPTER XV
The Campaign in the Aleutians
1. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), 12. C.C.S. 239/1, 23 May 43. C.C.S. 242/6, 25 May
Naval Analysis Division, The Campaigns of the 43.
Pacific War (Washington, 1946), 52-3, 58-60. S. 13. The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV, 387.
E. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine 14. The Aleutians Campaign, 4-5. Cf. J. Schull, The
Actions ("History of United States Naval Opera- Far Distant Ships (Ottawa, 1950), 122-3.
tions in World War II", IV) (Boston, 1949), 1-6; 15. Documents on H.Q.S. 9055, vol. 1, and Pacific
and review by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Military Command file P.C.S. 504-1-10-1. W.D., Maj.-
Affairs, XIII, Winter 1949. Gen. Pope, 4-8 May 43, with text of telegram 10
2. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine May.
Actions, 160-63, and Aleutians, Gilberts and 16. W.D., Maj.-Gen. Pope, 13 and 24 May 43.
Marshalls ("History of United States Naval 17. Documents, including Tels. PCO 2020, Stuart
Operations in World War II", VII) (Boston, 1951), from Pearkes, 25 May 43; CAW 356, Stuart from
3-7. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate. The Army Air Pope, 28 May 43; and CAW 357, Stuart from
Forces in World War 77 (Chicago, 1948 -55), IV, Pope, 29 May 43, with text of letter Stimson to
359-64. Ralston, 29 May 43, on H.Q.S. 9055, vol. 1.
3. Reviews of Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and 18. Documents on Pacific Command files P.C.S. 504-
Submarine Actions by Ohmae (above, note 1) and 1-10-1, vol. 1, and P.C.S. 5091-10-1, vol. 1.
Gordon W. Prange, American Historical Review, 19. General Staff (Pacific Command) Report on
LV, April 1950. Greenlight Force, Period from Inception to
4. The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 78-80. Despatch to Adak, 24 Jul 43, H.Q.S. 9055-1, vol.
Japanese First Demobilization Bureau narrative 5.
"The Aleutian Islands Campaign" ("Japanese 20. Record of Discussions of Military Members . 7th
Studies in World War II, No. 51"), kindly made June, 1943, H.Q.S. 9055, vol. 1.
available by Office of Chief of Military History, 21. Appendix "A" to G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific
U.S. Department of the Army. "Naval Operations Command to C.G.S., 27 Jun 43, ibid.
in the Northern Area" ("Japanese Studies in 22. Tel. CGS 633, Pearkes from Stuart, 5 Jun 43,
World War II, No. 57"). H.Q.S. 9055, vol. 1. The Army Air Forces in
5. The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 78-81. The World War II, IV, 387.
Army Air Forces in World War 11, I, 462-70. 23. Documents on H.Q.S. 9055, vol. 1. C.A.R.Os.
Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, 160- 3388 and 3873, 8 Jul and 4 Dec 43.
84. 24. Tel. PCO 6002, Stuart from Pearkes, received 14
6. The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 80-81. Jun 43, H.Q.S. 9055, vol. 1.
Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, 3-21, 25. Pacific Command Training Directive No. 1 for
59. Greenlight Force, 5 Jun 43, Pacific Command file
7. The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV, 364- P.C.S. 502-1-10-2. W.Ds., Winnipeg Grenadiers
77. and Rocky Mountain Rangers, June and July
8. Information from Air Historian, R.C.A.F., 24 Apr 1943.
and 22 Oct 52. RCAF Logbook (Ottawa, 1949), 26. Appendix "C" to G.S. report on Greenlight Force,
69. Flying Officer D. F. Griffin, First Steps to note 19 above.
Tokyo: The Royal Canadian Air Force in the 27. Administrative Report on Greenlight Force, 22 Jul
Aleutians (Toronto, 1944). 43, H.Q.S. 9055-1, vol. 5. Covering letter, Pearkes
9. Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, 3-36. to C.G.S., 24 Jul 43, ibid.
Office of Naval Intelligence, U.S.N., The 28. C.G.S. to Minister, 26 May 43, H.Q.S. 9055, vol. 1.
Aleutians Campaign (1945). 29. P.C. 5011, 18 Jun 43.
10. The Army Air Forces in World War 11, IV, 366- 30. Tel. GS 783, Pearkes from Murchie, 12 Jul 43,
78. C.C.S. 168, 22 Jan 43. C.C.S. 170/2, 23 Jan H.Q.S., 9055, vol. 3.
43.
11. The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV, 378-
87. Office of Naval Intelligence, The Aleutians
Campaign. Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and
Marshalls, 20-21, 37-51.
31. Pope to A. D. P. Heeney, 10 Jun 44, W.D., Maj.- 53. Pearkes to Bostock from Adak, 17 Aug 43,
Gen. Pope, June 1944. On Gen. Murchie's trip, Pacific Command file P.C.S. 504-1-10-2, F.D. 1.
see V.C.G.S. to Minister, 9 Jul 43, H.Q.S. 9055, 54. Pacific Command file No. 25, "Greenlight
vol. 3, and Log, Advanced Pacific Command Casualties".
Headquarters, Pacific Command file P.C.S. 504- 55. The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 82.
1-10-2, vol. 5. 56. "Naval Operations in the Northern Area" (above,
32. Tel. PCO 7001, C.G.S. from Murchie, 10 Aug 43, note 4). Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, 56-7.
Pacific Command file P.C.S. 504-1-10-2, F.D.1. Cf. interrogation of Commander Mukai Nifumi,
33. Tel. PCO 6110, Pearkes from Bostock, 12 Aug U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval
43, ibid. Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese
34. Tel. PCO 6081, DeWitt from Pearkes, 12 Jul 43, Officials (2 vols., Washington, 1946), 105
W. D. "Greenlight", G.S., H.Q. Pacific Command, 57. Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 100, 113
July 1943, Appendix 87. Macklin to Sec. D.N.D., (Commander Miura Kintaro and Commander
5 Aug 43, Pacific Command file P.C.S. 609-25-1- Hashimoto Shigefuso).
34 (30). 58. "Naval Operations in the Northern Area".
35. Macklin to Sec. D.N.D., 5 Aug 43, note 34 above. 59. Ibid. "The Aleutian Islands Campaign" (above,
36. Administrative Report, note 27 above. 37. note 4.) Notebook of Ensign Nakamura (JICPOA
Macklin to Sec. D.N.D., 5 Aug 43, note 34 above. Item No. 4986). Interrogations, etc., cited in notes
38. H.Q.S. 5618, F.D. 76, 18 Jun 43; on Pacific 55-57, above; also those of Capt. Arichika and
Command file P. C. M. S. 504-1-10-2-1. Lt.-Col. Fujii, Interrogations of Japanese
39. 28 Jun 43, ibid. Officials, 306-7, 368-9. The Campaigns of the
40. P.C. 5012, 18 Jun 43. Documents on Pacific War, 82. Aleutians, Gilberts and
H.Q.S. 9055, vol. 2. Marshalls, 57-9.
41. B.G.S. Pacific Command to Foster, 6 Jul 43, 60. Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, 59-61.
Pacific Command file P.C.M.S. 504-1-10-2-1. 61. Analysis of daily evidence in The Enemy on
42. The Aleutians Campaign, 100-101. Kiska (prepared by G-2, H.Q. Alaska Defence
43. C.O.S. (43) 281(0), p. 33. Command), 63-73. Aleutians, Gilberts and
44. Documents on H.Q.S. 20-2-32. Marshalls, 61-2. The . Aleutians Campaign, 99.
45. W.D., 1st Special Service Bn., 11 and 25 Jul 43. 62. Operations Record, No. 14 (F) Sqn., R.C.A.F.,
46. W.D., H.Q. 13th Inf. Bde., July 1943. August 1943.
47. Ibid., August 1943. Holland M. Smith and Percy 63. To Bostock, note 53 above.
Finch, Coral and Brass (New York, 1949), 105. 64. The Aleutians Campaign, 104. The Army Air
48. Signal, Bostock from Pearkes, 8 Aug 43, Pacific Forces in World War II, IV, 391-2.
Command file PCS 504-1-10-2, F.D.1. 65. Report by Mr. J. J. McCardle, Canadian Liaison
49. The Aleutians Campaign. 101. Foster to Mission, Tokyo, on examination of Japanese
Stacey, 12 Jun 52, H.Q.C. 1453-7, vol. 2. narratives at G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., 25 Oct 49.
50. The Aleutians Campaign, 100. 66. Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 307. Cf.
51. Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, 62.
10. 67. The Aleutians Campaign, 104. Cf.
52. Field Order No. 1, H.Q. Landing Force 16.8, 1 Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, 62.
Aug 43, and 13th Inf. Bde. Operation Order No. 68. Foster to Stacey, 26 Mar 53, H.Q.C. 1453-21-5,
1, 9 Aug 43 (W.D., H.Q. 13th Inf. Bde., August vol. 3.
1943, Appendices 11 and IX). 69. Brigade and unit diaries. Documents on H.Q.S.
9055, vol. 2.
70. W.D., 1st Special Service Bn., 1 Sep 43.
CHAPTER XVI
Pacific Plans and Enterprises, 1943-1945
1. To Bostock, 9 Aug 43, Pacific Command file 504-1- 2. Ibid.

10-2, F.D.J. 3. C.C.S. 319/5, 24 Aug 43.
33. C.G.S. to Minister, 20 Nov 44, with marginal note

4. W.F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces by Gen. McNaughton same date, H.Q.S. 9131,
in World War II (Chicago, 1948-55), IV, 392-401. vol. 1. On naval programme, G. N. Tucker, The
5. Minute on C.G.S. to Minister, 21 Mar 44, H.Q.S. Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History (2
20-6-22, vol. 24. vols., Ottawa, 1952), II, 99-104, 464-7.
6. Documents on H.Q.S. 7375-2, vole. 1, 2 and 4, 34. Admiral Leahy to Gen. Letson, 21 Dec 44, ibid.,
and H.Q. 338-12-63, vol. 2. vol. 2.
7. Reports on Pacific Command files P.C.S. 509-1- 35. Minutes of 319th meeting, Chiefs of Staff
10-9, vol. 1, and P.C.S. 509-1-10-8, vol. 1. Committee.
8. D.Pers. Serv. to D.M.O. & P., undated, H.Q.S., 36. Tel. GS 886, Murchie from Montague, 6 Apr 45,
7375-2, vol. 3. Report of Maj. R. F. Routh, P.C.S. C.M.H.Q. file 1/F.E./1.
509-1-10-8, vol. 1. Report of. Lt.-Col. W. A. 37. C.G.S. to Minister, 8 Apr 45, H.Q.S. 9131, vol. 2.
Bean, 28 Oct 44. 38. Tel. CAW 213, Gibson from Letson, 15 May 45,
9. Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 1/Attach FE/1 and ibid.
1/Attach FE Reps/1. Casualty information from 39. Military Secretary to C.G.S. and A.G., 18 May 45,
Director of War Service Records, D.V.A., 18 Jun ibid.
52. 40. Tel. C 195, Murchie from Crerar, C.M.H.Q. file
10. W.D., Maj.-Gen. H. F. G. Letson (Washington), 1/FE/1.
November 1944, Appendix "G", and 13 Mar 45. 41. To C.G.S., H.Q.S. 9131, vol. 1.
11. Report of Capt. A. L. Rogers, R.C.A., Pacific 42. Appendix "A" to draft letter enclosed in Murchie
Command file P.C.S. 509-1-10-8, vol. 2. to Commander Canadian Army Staff,
12. Letson diary, June 1945, Appendix "G". Various Washington, 20 Apr 45, ibid., vol. 2.
Canadian reports from Philippine theatre. 43. Note 38, above.
Canadian Observers' Reports, Okinawa 44. V.C.G.S. to the Minister, 16 Jun 45, H.Q.S. 9131,
Operations, including covering letter Lt.-Col. J. G. vol. 4.
Charlebois to Sec. D.N.D., 9 May 45. 45. H.Q.S. 9131, vol. 5.
13. Letson diary, 11 Jun 45. Report by Capt. J. E. 46. Cdn Army Routine Order 5729, 30 May 45.
Hilliker, 3 Oct 45. 47. Reports, 17 Jul 45, H.Q.S. 9131, vol. 7.
14. Nominal rolls, Appendices "B" and "C" to 48. Chart, I1 Jul 45, ibid., vol. 5.
minutes of meeting with Commander and Staff 49. C.G.S. to Minister, 12 Jun 45, ibid., vol. 3.
C.A.P.F., 15 Jun 45, H.Q.S. 9131-3, vol. 1. 50. Reports, 17 Jul 45, note 47 above.
15. Documents on H.Q.C. 8932-8, and "Master File, 51. Report by Canadian 2nd Echelon (C.A.P.F. Base
Canadian Radar Detachment on Loan to H.Q.), 8 Oct 45.
Australian Military Forces". 52. Appendix "A" to D.C.G.S. (B) to D.G.C.
16. 1 Canadian Special Wireless Group Royal Canadian & A.A., 9 Jul 45, H.Q.S. 9131-3, vol. 4.
Corps of Signals Souvenir Booklet, 1944-45. 53. Documents on H.Q.S. 9131-3, vol. 8.
17. Documents on H.Q.C. 8932-1, vols. 3-12. 18. Oprs 54. Location and Strength State, ibid., vol. 5.
181-T, revised 24 Apr 44, H.Q.S. 9131, vol. 1. 55. G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command to Sec. D.N.D.,
19. Ibid. 31 Aug 45, Pacific Command file P.C.S. 504-22-
20. To A.D.P. Heeney, ibid. J.L.S., vol. 5.
21. Ibid. 56. General Marshall's Report: The Winning of the
22. C.S.C. 175, ibid. War in Europe and the Pacific [New York, 1945],
23. Enclosure to Heeney to Ralston, 11 Sep 44, ibid. 84-6. Craven and Cate, V, 686-9.
24. Ralston to Heeney, 11 Sep 44, ibid. 57. The Times (London), 28 Jul 45.
25. Minutes of meeting, ibid. 58. Craven and Cate, V, 617.
26. "Note for File" by J.L.R., 16 Sep 44, 59. The Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima
ibid. and Nagasaki: Report of the British Mission to
27. Murchie to Minister, 16 Sep 44, ibid. 28. Note by Japan (London, 1946), 18. Craven and Cate, V,
Gen. Pope, 17 Sep 44, ibid. 29. C.C.S. 417/8, 9 722.
Sep 44. 60. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins
30. C.C.S. 680/2, 16 Sep 44. (New York, 1948), 868.
31. United Kingdom records. 61. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's
32. C.C.S. 680/2, para. 27. Struggle to End the War [Washington], (1946).
62. C.G.S. to A.G., Q.M.G. and M.G.O., 1 Sep 45,
H.Q.S. 9131-33.
BLANK PAGE
BETWEEN
SECTIONS
INDEX -- PART I
GENERAL
Ranks and Decorations of Individuals are as Known at
the Date of Compilation of this Volume
A
Aa River: 267. Aircraft Carriers: 492-3, 518.
Aandalsnes: 258, 260-1. Aire, France: 268.
Abbeville, Abbeville-Drucat: 264-5, 274, 336, 348, Airfields: 6, 172; European Theatre, 42, 291,
384. 300, 322, 402, 408; Dieppe, 327, 330, 336,
ABC-1: 310. 347, 384; Far East and Pacific, 456, 495, 518.
"Abercrombie", Operation: 309. Aisne River: 274.
Abrial, Admiral: 267. Alanbrooke, Field-Marshal The Viscount, K.G.,
Accommodation: in Canada, 6, 39, 47, 56, 73; G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.: 96, 101,
McNaughton report, 54, 64; C.W.A.C., 126; in U.K., 239, 316, 410; Second B.E.F., 274, 276-81,
196-7, 231, 237, 242. 285; C.I.G.S., 297-98; raids, 308, 323;
Active Service Force. See Canadian Active Service Dieppe, 337.
Force. Alaska: 123, 156, 173-4, 495-7, 499-500,
Acton: 196. Appx. "E"
Adak I.: 493, 495-6, 499, 500-1, 506. Alberta: 134, 136, 166, 172.
Adjutant-General's Branch C.M.H.Q.: 196, 200-1, 421, Albert Head: 28, 147, 155.
Appx. "F". Albrighton, H.M.S.: 345, 370,
Adjutant-General's Branch N.D.H.Q.: 42-3, 54, 58, 415, Alderney: 324, 340.
428, 514-15; manpower, 94, 113, 116, 121, 124-5, Aldershot, England: 143, 216; "Z" Force, 85; O.C.T.U.,
134, 139; organization, Appx. 129; Reinforcement Units, 194, 204, 210; training
Adolf Hitler Line: 143. 231-2; Norway, 259-61; France 1940, 266, 268-71,
Advanced Training Centres. See Training Centres. 274, 276, 278, 281; defence of U.K., 204, 287, 284,
Aerodromes. See Airfields. 295, 297; bombing, 291; morale, 419, 421; riot, 433;
Africa. See North Africa. repatriation depots, 434.
Age Limits: 417-19. Aldershot, N.S.: 142.
Air Bombardment: 73, 402; Dieppe, 336, 343-4, Aleutian Is.: 492-505; other refs 123, 172-4,
347-8, 398; Hong Kong, 464, 470, 484; 184-5, 506, 511-12; see also Kiska, Attu.
Aleutians, 493, 495, 502, 504; Japan, 513, 519. Alexander, Field-Marshal The Rt. Hon. Earl,
Air Cover: Dieppe, 327, 330, 348, 383, 386. of Tunis, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.S.I.,
Air Defence: airfields, 6, 42; McNaughton D.S.O., M.C.: 239.
1934-35, 7; money for, 9, 13, 36, 40, 69; Alexander, The Rt. Hon. Viscount, of Hillsborough,
priority, 7, 15, 111; Chief of Air Staff, 18; P.C., C.H.: 268.
programme, 91, 97; Newfoundland, 179, see Alexander, Maj.-Gen. R.O., C.B., D.S.O.: 166,
also Part II, R.A.F., R.C.A.F. 169-73, Appx. "F".
Air Defence of Great Britain: 242, 290, 299. Algeciras, Bay of: 300.
Air Ministry, British: 125, 179. Aliens and Alien Property: 9.
Air Raid Precautions: 9. Alliford Bay: 167, 169.
Air Reconnaissance: 306; R.A.F., 347, 357; enemy, Altmark (German ship) : 258.
346, 355, 390; Hong Kong, 469; Aleutians, 503-4. Alost: 211.
Air Support: 275, 312; training, 235, 250-1; Dieppe, Aluminum Company of Canada: 150, 157, 182.
347-8, 366, 374, 383, 398; Hong Kong, 444, 456, Alresford, H.M.S.: 345.
464. Amboina: 491.
Air Transport: 189, 512. Amchitka: 495-6, 498, 501.
Airborne Landings: 287, 297-8. American Forces, American Troops. See United
Airborne Troops: 297, 330, 343. States Forces.
599
600 INDEX - PART I
Amiens: 339, 355. Armentieres: 265.
Ammunition: 12, 21-3, 268; small arms, 83, 178; Armistice: 281, 286.
training, 446, Hong Kong, 416, 439, 449, 456-7, Armour, Armoured forces, Armoured troops (general):
461, 468, 476, 482. 88-90, 95, 97.
Amphibious Equipment: 318, 326-7, 404; see also Armoured Fighting Vehicles: 88, 90, 330-1,
Landing Craft. 467, Appx. "G".
Amphibious Operations: 293-4, 338, 346, 403; Armoured Personnel Carriers: Appx. "G".
techniques and equipment, 326-7. Armoured Train: 174.
Amphibious Training and Techniques: 241, 247-8, 293, Armouries: 6, 12.
326-7, 499. Armstrong, Ont.: 159.
Anchorage (Alaska): 495. Army Act. See Discipline.
Ancillary Troops: administration, command and training of, 66-8, 70, 213, Army Committee. See Army Council.
218-19, 221, 252; sail for England, 72; for Mobile Force, 31, 70, 162; for Army Council (Canada) : 82, 127, 135, 429-30. Army
Canadian Corps, 74, 76, 91-2, 96; British, 76; for 7th Corps, 86; for Council (U.K.): 66, 78, 230-1, 397. Army
armoured division, 95; for First Canadian Army, 99, 100-1, 108; Programme. See Canadian Army Programme.
Newfoundland, 180; France 1940, 234; anti-invasion, 273, 287-8; 2nd ArmyShow:116,126,207,210.
B.E.F., 278; Far East and Pacific, 443, 512-13; see also Army Troops, ArmyTrain:116.
Base Troops, Corps Troops, G.H.Q. Troops, Line of Communication ArmyTroops:31,43,78,95-6,100-1,103,
Troops. 108-9,218,247,253,516.
Ancona: Appx. "I". ArmyWeek:116.
Anderson, Maj.-Gen. T. V., D.S.O.: C.G.S., 23; coast Arnhem:Appx."I".
defence, 27; technical units, 68, 70; Inspector ArnoRiver:Appx."I".
General, 87; other refs 41, 54, 61-3, 65, 77, Appx. Arques-la-Bataille:330-1,336,347,352,354,
"F". 358.
Andes, transport: 189, 193. Arsenal.SeeDominionArsenals.
Andrews, Lt.-Col. J. G.: 347, 378. Artillery: 23, 66, 167, 180, 246-7, 253, 269; equipment and supply, 20, 22-4, 28,
"Angel Move", Operation: 263, 268, 270. 62, Appx. "G", Appx. "I"; coast, 146, 152-6, 167-74, 456, 475; anti-aircraft,
Angers: 278. 20, 148, 157, 167-74, 290, 299, Appx. "G"; anti-tank, 20, 354, 358, 446,
Anghiari: Appx. "I". Appx. "G"; operations, 401, 403, 456, 499; see also Anti-Aircraft Defence,
Angoville: Appx. "I". CoastDefence,PartII,RoyalCanadianArtillery,Units(Artillery).
Annette I.: 172-3, 497, Appx. "E". Arvida,P.Q.:150,157-60,168,186,Appx."E".
Antelope, H.M.S.: 304. Ashcroft,B.C.:172.
Anthony, H.M.S.: 304. Ashton, Lt.-Gen. E. C., C.B., C.M.G., V.D., M.D., C.M.: 8-10, 20, 22, 23, 26,
Anti-Aircraft Defence: 10, 20, 34, 53, 148-9; 31.
equipment, 6, 20, Appx. "G"; Alaska, 123; C.W.A Astorestate:423.
C., 127; Canadian defences, 157-9, 167-8 171, 174, Atlantic,Battleofthe:209.
180, 184, 186; in the field, 290; U.K., 298; Dieppe, AtlanticCoast:pre-1939,12,27-8;war,41-2,80,176;defences,152,155-6,159,
355, 370; Hong Kong, 456, 473; Aleutians, 496; see 62, 165-6, 172; command arrangements, 164; see also Part 11, Atlantic
also Artillery. Command,CoastDefence.
Anti-Aircraft Training: 242, 246. AtlanticWall:351,405.
Anti-gas Equipment: 8, 25. Anti-gas Training: 232, Atomicbomb:519.
240, 246. Atrocities:488.
Antigua: 181. Attlee, Rt. Hon. Clement R., P.C., O.M., C.H.: 408.
Anti-tank Training: 242, 446. Attu 1.: 173, 493, 495-8, 501-4.
Anti-tank Weapons: 20, 62, Appx. "G"; German, 354, Aubert, Capt., Royal Norwegian Army: 304.
358; Hong Kong Force, 446, 449; see also Artillery. Aurora, H.M.S.: 304-5.
"Anon", Operation: 407. Antonia, transport: 196. Australia: 23, 320, 323, 492, 509-10.
Anzio: 106. Australian Forces.: See Part II.
Appropriations. See Expenditure on Defence. Authie River: 352.
Aqultania, transport- 189-90, 193. Authority to commit Canadian Forces. See
"Arcadia", Conference: 310-11. Command Arrangements C.A.O.S.
Archangel: 304-6. Auxiliary Services: 201,. 204, 207, 421-3, 448.
Ardennes Forest, Belgium: Appx. "I". Avellino: 143.
Argentia, Nfld.: 453. Avonmouth: 194.
Argyll House Organization: 195. A.V.R.E. (Assault Vehicle Royal Engineers):
Arichika, Rokuji, Capt.: 504. 403.
Armament. See Equipment. Awatea, transport: 448-9, 461.
Armament industry. See War industries.
INDEX -- PART I 601
B
Badges of Rank: 106. 126. Biscay, Bay of: 102, 313-14.
Bahama Is.: 123, 151, 181, Appx. "E". Bishop, Lt: Col. W. A., D.S.O., E.D.: 473.
Baillie-Grohman, Vice Admiral H.T., C.B., D.S.O., Bismarck Archipelago: 453.
O.B.E., R.N.: 332. Balkans, The: 88. "Blackboy", Exercise: 245.
Balloons, Japanese: 177. Blackwood, Lt. T. A., M.C.: 482.
Bangalore Torpedoes: 365. "Blazing", Operation: 324.
Barentin: 355. Bleasdale, H.M.S.: 345.
Barentsburg, Spitsbergen: 305. Blucher, Major von: 361.
Barracks. See Accommodation. Blumentritt, Gen. Gunther: 264.
Barrett Battery: 156. Bofors guns: 160, 168-9, 174, 242, 282, 290, Appx.
Barriefield, Camp: 12, 39, 47, 133, 137, 142. "G".
Barry (South Wales): 194. Bombing. See Air Bombardment.
Bartholomew, Gen. Sir William Henry, G.C.B., Booth, Brigadier E. L., D.S.O., E.D.: 417.
C.M.G., D.S.O.: 290. Boots: 18, 57, 232, 244.
Base Troops: 31, 101, 108-9, 218-19, 242, 221, 418, Borden, Camp: 34, 39, 75, 88, 92, 133, 136, 168, 445.
516. Borden, Hon. Sir Frederick, K.C.M.G.: 20-1.
Basic Training Centres. See Training Centres. Borden, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert L., P.C., G.C.M.G.: 225.
Basingstoke: 206. Bordon, Hants.: 129, 204, 207, 240.
Bataan: 169. Borneo: 453, 492, 510.
Batory, transport: 189. Botwood: 154, 179-80, 186.
Battledress: 56. Bowman, Capt. A. S.: 482.
Battle Drill: 136, 240, 243, 251. Bowmanville, Ont.: 397.
Battle Experience: North Africa, 248-9; Normandy, Bradford, Camp: Appx. "E".
253; commanders' lack of, 414-17; Pacific observers, Bramshott: 206.
498, 507, 509. Brandon: 169.
Battle of Britain: 275, 290-1. Breadner, Air Chief Marshal L.S., C.B., D.S.C.: 225.
Bayano, transport: 190. Breckinridge, Camp; Kentucky: 517.
Beachy Head: 244, 398. Bremen: Appx. "I".
Bean, Brigadier W. A., C.B.E., E.D.: 509. Bremse(GunneryTrainingShip):306.
"Beauman Force": 280. BrenGuns:11,12,20,24,37,231,235,290,446,480;contract,25-6.
"Beaver" Exercises: 243-4. Breskens:Appx."I".
Beaver Club: 423. Brest:278-84.
Beaverhill, transport: 190, 192. Briare:277.
Bedford Basin: 150. "Bridoon",Exercise:252.
Belfast: 194. Bridport,Dorset:334.
Belgium, Belgians: 349, invasion of, 73, 76-7, 88, 263- BrigadeGroups:armoured,88-9;organizationinU.K.,234,273,287.
4; Surrender, 270-1; C.W.A.C., 211. Brighton:289,294,425.
Bell I., Nfid.: 154, 178-80. "Brimstone",Operation:411.
Bell, Lt. L. C.: 376. Britain,BritishIsles.SeeUnitedKingdom.
Bella Bella, B.C.: 167, 169, 172. Belle Isle: 176. British Army: 100, 254, 298, 387, 403, 414: administration, 92, 129, 427;
Bellerophon, transport: 282. equipment and dress. 56, 89, 233; Regular Army, 414; Canadians, 338,
"Benito", Exercise: 238. 416;FarEast,444,458,512,515.
Bennett, Cant. E.: 379. British Army Staff, Washington: 192, 510.
Bennett. The Rt. Hon. Viscount, P.C., 7. 13, 30. British Cabinet. See Government, British.
Bennet's Hill: 485-8. British Columbia: coast defence, 27-8, 98, 146, 149,
Benning, Fort, Georgia: 104. 156, 160, 163, 166-7; excitement in, 169-74;
Bergen: 257. Japanese in, 84-5, 169; Aleutians, 437, 495-6, 505.
Berkeley, H.M.S.: 345, 383. British Commonwealth Air Training Plan: 65. 67, 73.
Berlin: 258. 352. British Expeditionary Force: 46, 74, 82. 230, 338;
Bermuda: 123, 181, Appx. "E". Europe 1940, 79, 263-7, 270-1; Second B.E.F., 273-
Berneval: 346, 354, 358-9, 360-1. 84, 287.
Bexhill : 244. British Forces, British Troops: Norway, 257, 261;
Biarritz. transport: 283. France 1940, 264-5, 267, 272, 277, 283; infantry and
Bic, P.Q.: 176. armour, 323; Dieppe, 343, 412. 419; Far East, 449-
Bickersteth, J. B., M.C.: 420. 50. 457, 488, 511-12, 518; Appx "I„
Birkett, Lt. G. A.: 480.
Birmingham: 206, 287.
602 INDEX -- PART I
British Government. See Government, British. Brownrigg, Lt.-Gen. Sir Douglas, K.C.B., C.B., D.S.O.:
British Guiana: 123, 151, 181-2, Appx. "E". 266.
British Joint Staff Mission, Washington: 319-20. Bruges: 272.
British War Cabinet. See War Cabinet, British. Brussels: 211.
British War Medal: 144. Buckee, Lt. H. T., D.S.O., R.N.V.R.: 361.
Brocklesby, H.M.S.: 345, 358-9, 385. Buckner, Lt.-Gen. Simon B.: 173, 498, 501, 506.
Brittany: 273, 407; "redoubt" scheme (1940), 277-81. Budget. See Estimates. "Bumper", Exercise: 239, 249.
Brockville: 105, 131, 138-9. Burckhardt, Dr. C. J.: 397.
Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshal Sir H.R.M., Burma: 453, 458, 492, 509, 511, 518.
G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.: 438-9, Burma Road: 84.
457-8. Burns, Maj.-Gen. E. L. M., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., C.D.:
Brooke, Sir Alan. See Alanbrooke. 195-6, 202, 223, 260, 429, Appx. "F".
Browne, Lt.-Col. G.A., D.S.O.: 365, 368. Browne, Burrard Inlet: 147.
Maj.-Gen. B. W., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.: 124, 183, Bury, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., E.D.: 304.
Appx. "F".
C
Cabinet, Canadian: Defence Committee of, 9-10, 17-18, and C.M.H.Q., 98, 212-15; voluntary service in, 97;
46; defence estimates (193740), 11-12, 15-17, 47; roles, 98, 323; composition of, 100-4, 108-9;
emergency expenditures (August 1939), 29, 40; Parachute Battalion, 104; reinforcements, 121-2,
mobilization of C.A.S.F., 42; troops for overseas, 60- 184, 186; mobile groups, 272-3; training, 129, 135,
1; Emergency Council, 65; changes in personnel, 71; 138,'509; command and control of, 66-7, 212-56,
organization of forces in U.K., 75; coastal defence, 412-18; Dieppe, 387, 395; Norway and the Canaries,
146, 171; reorganization 6th Div., 186; C.A.P.F., 409-11; administrative and personnel problems, 419-
512, 515; Special Committee, C.A.P.F. and 34; Aldershot, 433; Pacific Force, 511-12, 516-17;
occupation of Japan, 514, 519; see also War equipment, Appx. "G"; principal appointments,
Commmittee of the Cabinet. Appx. "F".
Cabinet War Committee. See War Committee of the Canadian Army Planning Committee: 100.
Cabinet. Canadian Army Programme: Anderson's
Caen: 253, 322, 352, 406-7. recommendations, 61; 1941, 87-93, 1942, 93-8,
Calais: 265-7, 271-2, 274, see also Pas de Calais. 1943, 103; other refs 115, 120, 171, 185, 192.
Caldecote, The Rt. Hon. Viscount, P.C., Canadian Army Routine Orders (C.A.R.Os.) 132, 197,
C.B.E.: 78, 79, 83. 397, 418.
Calgary: 12, 47, 53, 150. Canadian Army Staff, Washington: 498.
Calpe, H.M.S.: 345, 348, 360, 367-8, 381-3, 385-6. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation: 116.
Camberley: 140, 232. Cambrai: 406. Canadian Defence Committee: formed, 9; see also
Campbell, Sir Gerald, G.C.M.G., F.R.G.S.: 59, 61. Cabinet, Canadian; War Committee of the Cabinet.
Canadian Active Service Force (C.A.S.F.) organization Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-18: 47-8.
and composition, 42-5, 70-1, 119-21; mobilization, Canadian Force (United Kingdom): 273, 276, 287.
43, 47, 53; re-attested, 63-4; strength 30 Sep 39, 55; Canadian Joint Staff Committee. See Chiefs of Staff
expansion, 77, 79-80, 184; equipment, 83; Army Committee.
Programme, 89; officers, 127-8, 131, 138-9; home Canadian Legion: 420-3.
defence, 148, 150; training, 121, 132-4, 195, 231. Canadian Manufacturers Association: 25.
Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Canadian Military Headquarters (C.M.H.Q.): 194-207;
Defence. See Permanent Joint Board on Defence. terms of reference, 67, 98, 194-6; organization, 198-
Canadian Army, The: redesignated, 89. 203; principal appointments, Appx. "F"; command
Canadian Army Liaison Establishment, London: 434. relationships, 218-29; training, 135, 230-31, 235-6,
Canadian Army Overseas: formation and despatch of 245-7; C.M.H.Q. units, 202-7; Norway proposal,
1st division, 58-66, 70-1; continued build-up in 258-60; France 1940, 274, 284; Spitsbergen, 301-4;
U.K., 73, 76, 85-7, 91, 93; movement overseas, 189- personnel problems, 421-4, 426-34; Japan and Hong
94; C.M.H.Q. and units, 194-207; Forestry Corps, Kong, 443, 452; other refs 79-80, 83, 151, 210, 296,
207-10; C.W.A.C. 210-11; Army Programmes, 87- 345, 414.
97, 103; terms of reference for Army Commander Canadian National Railways: 172, 174.
INDEX - PART I 603
Canadian Planning Staff: 411. Chidley, Cape (Hudson Strait): 163,Chief of the Air
Canadian Red Cross Society: 423. Staff: 6, 9, 16, 18.
Canadian Volunteer Service Medal (C.V.S.M.) 144. Chief of the Air Staff (British): 275.
Canary Is.: 102, 410-11. Chief of Combined Operations. See Combined
"Canloan" officers: 139. Operations; Mountbatten.
Canso: 146, 153-4, Appx. "E". Chief of the General Staff (C.G.S.): 6, 18, 23, 56, 101-
Canton Area (China): 452, 455, 463. Cap Chat. P.Q.: 2, 127, 214, 218, 276, 418; finance, 16-17, 69-70;
176. coast defence, 27-8, 149, 152-3; outbreak of war, 42,
Cape Town, South Africa: 152. 44-6, 53, 61, 66: Iceland, 84, Dieppe, 319, 332-3;
Cardiff: 194. Hong Kong, 442-3, 449; Aleutians, 497, 499-500,
Caribbean Area: 181-2. 506; Pacific Force, 514; list of, Appx. "F";
Carr, Lt.-Gen. L., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.: 239. McNaughton, 21, 30; Ashton, 8; Anderson, 87;
Carriers: 246-7, 282, 284, 448-9, 461, 467, Appx. "G". Crerar, 87, 215; Stuart, 97, 215; Murchie, 185, 223;
Carson, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. W., C.B.: 195. see also by name.
Carton de Wiart, Lt.-Gen. Sir Adrian, V.C., Chief of the Imperial General Staff: 62, 101, 231-2,
K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.: 258-9. 265, 280, 284, 323; Spitsbergen, 301; Dieppe, 337;
Casablanca Conference: 411, 496. Canaries, 411; Hong Kong, 440; Ironside, 63; Dill,
Caserta: 143. 284; Alanbrooke, 298.
Cassino: 106, Appx. "I". Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q.: 198, 203, 222, 224-5, 227-8,
Castelfrentano: Appx. "I". 429, 432, Appx. "F"; see also Senior Officer.
Castiglione: Appx. "I". Chief of the Naval Staff: 16, 18.
Casualties: Appx. "A"; 1914-18, 4, 194; Aleutians, 497, Chief of the Naval Staff (British): 440.
502; anticipated, 135-6, 224, 430; at sea, 193-4; air Chief of Staff, U.S. Army: 497, 513.
bombing, 290-1, 296; civilian, 336, 519; Dieppe, Chiefs of Staff Committee, British: Norway, 260;
own troops, Appx. "H", 361-2, 374, 382, 387-8; France 1940, 270, 273, 276-7; defence of U.K., 291-
Dieppe, enemy, 388-90; France 1940, 284; Hong 2; aid to Russia, 297; role of Canadians, 323;
Kong, own troops, 464, 474, 476, 478-80, 483, 488- operations, 302, 304, 313-17, 320, 322-4, 326, 330,
9; Hong Kong, enemy, 473, 477, 483, 485, 489; 342, 408-12, 438-41, 443-4, 513; raids (Dieppe),
Nfld. personnel, Appx. "I"; replacements for. 103; 325-6, 332-3, 336, 340-1, 343; capital ships in the
training, 245. Channel, 399.
Catterick: 232. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Canadian (Joint Staff
Catto, Lt.-Col. D. E., D.S.O., E.D.: 346, 364-6. Committee) : 9, 54; plans and finance, 10-12, 16-18,
Cavalry: 44, 81. 33, 47, 68; mobilization, 46-70; home defence, 27,
Cavina, transport: 190. 157-8, 161-2, 164-5, 167, 172, 179; Pacific, 511,
Celebes: 453. 513-14.
Censors, Censorship: 69, 394-5, 419, 424, 427, 429. Chilko Lake, B.C.: 172.
Central Canada Aircraft Detection Corps: 159. Chilliwack, B.C.: 131.
Ceremonial: 197, 232. Chiltern Hills: 239.
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Neville, P.C.: 38, 65, 145, 261. Chilwell: 232.
Chaney, Maj.-Gen. James E.: 321. China, Chinese: Hong Kong, 438-9, 455-7, 461, 463-4,
Channel Islands: 324. 468-70, 473, 487; other refs 5, 84, 311, 511-12, 519.
Channels of Communication: C.A.O.S., 213-29 (see Chippawa, Ont.: Appx. "E".
chart 220), 231; Dieppe, 338, 342-3, 348; see also Chiswick: 237.
Command Arrangements. Christopher Point, B.C.: 155.
Charlottetown : 64. Chisholm, Maj.-Gen. G. B., C.B.E., M.C., E.D.: 428.
Chateaubriant: 282. Chungking: 487.
Chatham, England: 232, 271, 289. Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston L. S., K.G., P.C., O.M.,
Chatham, Ont.: 151. C.H., F.R.S.: 81, 261; on war production, 36;
Chatwin, Dr. A. E.: 420. Iceland, 85; armour, 90, 97; operations, 105, 259-60,
Chebucto Head: 152-3. 301, 307, 408-11; defence of Canada, 152, 165;
Chemainus: 500. Dunkirk, 268, 270; 2nd B.E.F., 273-5, 277, 280-1;
Chemical Warfare: 136, 246. invasion threat, 285-6, 290, 292; Washington agree-
Cherbourg: 277, 283, 312, 322, 324, 402, 406-7. ments, 310-11, 313-15; Moscow, 315; strategic
Chester, P.A.: Appx. "F". thinking, 315-18, 412; use of Dominion troops, 323,
Chiang Kai Shek, Generalissimo, Hon. G.C.B.: 440, 412; Dieppe, 324-6, 336-7, 341; North Africa, 408;
487. Hong Kong, 438-42, 453, 486; Pacific, 497, 511-13.
Chichester Harbour: 308. "Churchill" tanks. See Tanks.
604 INDEX -- PART I
Cicala, H.M.S.: 485.

Citta di Castello: Appx. "I". Civil Affairs: 141. Imperial War Conference 1917, 20; Disarmament
Civil Service Commission: 126. Claims: 201. Conference 1932, 18;Imperial Conference 1937, 15;
"Clawhammer", Operation: 324. Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 511.
Clothing and Accoutrements: funds for, 11, 69; lack of, Connaught Camp: 134.
54, 56-7, 232; special, 259, 499. Conscientious Objectors: 119.
Clyde, River: 86, 99, 194, 304, 306. Conscription. See Compulsory Service.
Coal Harbour, B.C.: 167. Control of Profits on Government Armament
Coast Artillery. See Artillery. Contracts, Interdepartmental Committee on.
Coast Defence: 146-9, 151-7; programme, 12, 26-9; 37.
Interim Plan, 28-9, 40, 152-5; Ultimate Plan, 152-3, Convalescent Depots: 143, 206.
155-6; war measures, 46; manning, 32, 41, 43, 53, Convoys: troop, 93, 189-94; to Russia, 301, 341, 408;
58, 121; Halifax and Esquimalt, 10, 18, 27, 152; Dieppe, 356, 358-60, 368, 390-1. Coral Sea: 492.
Maritimes and Quebec, 176; Northern B.C., 167; Corlett, Maj.-Gen. C. H.: 501-2. "Coronet", Operation:
disbandment, 184, 186; German coast defences, 349- 518.
52; Hong Kong, 455-6, 470; see also Coast Defence Corps Troops, British: 86, 278, 280.
Batteries; Treatt, Brigadier B.D.C. Corps Troops, Canadian: 1st Cdn Corps, 74, 78, 91,
Coast Defence Batteries: Canada, 146, 152-7, 179, 186; 412; strength, 95-6, 108-9; training, 238, 244, 247,
enemy, 342. 354, 402; Hong Kong, 470, 473, 475, 253; other refs 31, 43, 66, 92, 516; see also Ancillary
479; see also Coast Defence. Troops. Corregidor: 492.
Cochrane (Ont.): 159. Cossack, H.M.S.: 258.
Colchester: 206, 242, 246. Cotentin: 277.
Cold Bay: 495. "Cottage", Operation: 498.
Cole, Air Vice-Marshal A. T., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., Courseulles: Appx. "I".
M.C.: 348, 383-4. Courtenay, B.C.: 499.
Collinson, Cape, 475. Cove, Hants: 143.
Collinson, Commodore A. C., R.N.: 456, 484, 488. Crecy: 336.
Colonial Conference 1907: 20. Creighton, Cpl. R. J.: 284.
Combined Chiefs of Staff: 311-12, 318, 325; shipping, Crerar, Gen. H. D. G., C.H., C.B., D.S.O., C.D.: pre-
192, 319; Pacific, 171, 497. war service, 10, 28, 40; requests ancillary troops, 66;
Combined Commanders: 317-18, 322, 402. requests 2nd Division, 73; C.G.S., 89, 197, Army
Combined Operations: training, 136, 302, 245, 247, Programme, 87-97, 120, to command 1 Cdn Corps,
302, 308, 329, 334, 344, 411, 499, 501; Chief of, 96, 99, 298, 416; recruiting, 115, compulsory
309, 312; lessons and techniques, 399, 404; other training, 121; defence of Canada, 149, 153, 163,
refs 333, 336; see also Mountbatten. 166-7, 171; C.M.H.Q., 195-6; Canadian Ordnance,
Command Arrangements, Canadian forces overseas: 206; command arrangements in U.K., 212-29,
Chap. VII; with British, 66-8, 254-6, 276, 338; for training overseas, 237, 244; visits Africa, 249;
Dieppe, 342-3, 348; other operations, 259, 449-50, "Spartan", 250; proposed expeditions 1940, 258,
497-8, 500-1; other refs 51-2, 95, 261-3, 308, 333; 261, 265, 268, 270; raids, 308-9; use of Canadian
see also Channels of Communication. forces, 323; Dieppe, 334-6, 338. 342-4, 348, 383-4,
Commander-in-Chief Far East (British): 438-9, 444, 401-2; Canaries, 411; to command First Cdn Army,
454, 456, 458. 416; Italy, 416; morale, 419; rotation leave, 430;
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces. See Part II, B, Hong Kong, 439, 441, 443; Pacific Force, 514-16;
under G.H.Q. Home Forces. appointments, Appx. "F".
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (U.S.): 497, Crerar, Hon. T. A.: 195.
501, 509. Crete: 297, 350.
Commissions: 53, 138, 236; see also Officer Selection. Croil, Air Marshal G. M., C.B.E., A.F.C.: 10
Committee of Imperial Defence: 9. "Cromwell", code word: 292. Crowthorne: 206.
Compulsory Service: Canada, 82, 89, 94, 97, 110-11, Cruikshank, Brig.-Gen. E. A., V.D.: 4.
118-22, 134; U.K., 38. Cuckfield: 206.
Conception Bay, Nfld.: 154, 178. Curacao: 77.
Conferences: of Allied leaders, 311, and see under code Currie, Lt.-Col. D.V., V.C.: 51.
and place names; Colonial Conference 1907, Currie, Lt.-Col. G. S., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.:429,
Appx. "F".
Czechoslovakia: 17, 38.
INDEX - PART I 605
D
D'Aguilar, Cape: 455, 475. evacuated, Appx. "E"; German critiques, 388-93;
Danae, H.M.S.: 450. prisoners, 387, 396-7; lessons and aftermath, 397-
Dathan, Lieut.-Commander J. H., R.N.: 381. 412; German records, 355-6, 358; Combined Report
Davies, Capt. R. M.: 485. on, 327, 344; other refs 244-5, 252, 254, 321, 324.
Davis, Mr. Justice T. C.: 125. Dill, Field-Marshal Sir John G., G.C.B., C.M.G.,
Debert, N. S.: 80, 135, 167, 172, 174-5, 192, Appx. D.S.O.: France 1940, 269-70, 272, 284; other refs
"E". 298, 301, 306, 311, 320, 323.
Declarations of War: 46, 48, 299, 310. Dinant: 264.
Defence Associations: 19. Disarmament Conference 1932: 18.
Defence Committee of the Cabinet (British). See War Discharges: 201.
Cabinet, British. Discipline: 425-7.
Defence Committee of the Cabinet (Canadian) see District Officers Commanding: 30, 36, 42, 46, 57, 114,
Cabinet, Canadian; War Committee of the Cabinet. 120, 130, 133, 163, 166, 176, 180; see also Part II,
Defence Coordination, Standing Interdepartmental Military Districts.
Committee on: 9, 33. Dives-sur-Mer: 352.
Defence Council: 16, 40, 52-4, 69, 152; function of, 81- Divisional Troops: 246, Appx. "E".
2. "Dog", Exercise: 238, 244.
Defence Medal: 144. Doi, Col. Teihichi: 463, 465, 467, 473-4, 478, 482, 484-
Defence of Canada. See Home Defence. 5.
Defence of United Kingdom: 82, 208, 234, 254, 283; Dombaas, Norway: 260.
mobile reserves, 270-4, 285; G.H.Q. Dominion Arsenals: 6, 12, 21-2, 36, 150;
reserve, 75, 297. Quebec Arsenal, 21-2.
Defence Purchasing Board: 24, 47, 57, 62; see also Dominions Office, London: 65, 440-2, 444, 447, 453.
Munitions and Supply, Dept. of. Don Jose, transport: 449, 461.
Defence Schemes: 29-32; No. 3, 27, 30-1, 33, 39, 41-2, Donegal: 193.
44, 46, 49, 70. Dorlin: 247.
Demerara River: 182. Doudeville: 355.
Demobilization: 432. Douglas, Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord,
Dempsey, Gen. Sir Miles C., K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., G.C.B., M.C., D.F.C.: 321-2, 402.
M.C.: 288. Doukhohors: 119.
Denain: 265. Dover: 238, 266-9, 272, 289, 291, 309-10, 321.
Denmark: 76, 257, 351. Dowding, Air Chief Marshal The Lord, G.C.B.,
Denovan, Major J. J.: 404. G.C.V.O., C.M.G.: 275, 291.
Department of National Defence Act. See National Dress and Clothing Committee: 56.
Defence, Department of. Driving and Maintenance: 136, 240, 246.
Dependents: 52, 114, 120. Duhuc, Sgt. P., M.M.: 381.
"Derelict Defense", The: 170. Duchess of Bedford, transport: 190.
Des Rosiers, Lt.-Col. H., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.: 69, Duchess of Richmond, transport: 190.
Appx. "F". Duchess of York, transport: 189.
Devils Battery: 152-3. Duclair: 355.
Devil's Peak Peninsula: 458, 467-8. Duff, Rt. Hon. Sir Lyman, G.C.M.G.: 445, 453.
Dewing, Maj.-Gen. R. H., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.: 258-60, Duke of Wellington, H.M.S.: 364, 366-7.
268-71, 283, 319. Dundurn, Camp: 12, 39, 445, Appx. "E".
De Witt, Lt.-Gen. J. L.: 496-8, 506. Dunfermline: 259-60.
Dieppe, raid (1942) : origins, 324-7; area, 327-30; Dunkirk: 269-73; other refs 69, 79, 82, 235, 265-9, 286,
planning and training, 330-44; command 296, 319, 438.
arrangements, 338, 342-3, 348; own troops, 345, Durnford-Slater, Brigadier J. F., D.S.O.: 346, 360.
389; plan, 346-8; enemy, 349-58; German convoy, Dutch Army. See Part II, Netherlands Army. Dutch
358-60; the operation, 36086, 397-404; army Harbor: 493.
casualties, 361-2, 374, 381, 387-9; enemy casualties, Dyle River: 264
388, 390; air and naval losses, 318, 387-8; number
E
Earnshaw, Brigadier P., D.S.O., M.C.: Appx. Eastwood, Lt.-Gen. Sir T. R., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.:
East Anglia: 239, 252. 281.
East Indies. See Netherlands Indies. Eden, Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony, P.C., M.C.: 85, 90, 268,
270.
606 INDEX - PART I
Edmonton: 47, 151, 168. Dunkirk and after, 82, 271-2 275, 286-7, 2%; Second
Edmundston, N.B.: 163. B.E.F., 282-4; Gibraltar, 300; for raids and
Egypt: 88, 343. amphibious operations, 314, 326; hospital, 423;
Eichstatt: 397. Hong Kong Force, 446-9, 457, 461; Aleutian Force,
Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., Hon. G. 499; Pacific Force, 515; Summary, Appx. "G"; other
C. B., Hon. O.M.: 311, 316, 319, 322, 402, 416. refs 62, 69, 107, 247; see also equipment by types.
Elbe River: Appx. "I". Erria, transport: 192.
Elkins, Maj.-Gen. W. H. P., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.: 163, Esquimalt Fortress Area: 10, 27-8, 36, 64, 1468, 152,
176, Appx. "F". 155, 160, 166-8, 172, 175, 185.
Ellwood, California: 170. Establishments: definition, 49; 1938, 5, 18-19; Field
Ely, Isle of: 287. Force, 100, 102, 109; authority to fix, 217-18, 227;
Emergency Legislation: 9. Hong Kong Force, 444-5; Branches of Department
Emergency Powers Act (U.K.) 1940: 82. of National Defence (Army), Appx. "J" n. 1; other
Empress of Australia, transport: 189. refs 75,127-8, 134, 149, 197-8.
Empress of Britain, transport: 189. Esterel, P.Q.: 136.
Empress of Canada, transport: 302, 304-6. Estevan Point, B.C.: 173.
Empress of Scotland, transport: 189. Estimates: See Expenditure on Defence.
England. See United Kingdom. Ethiopia: 8.
Enlistment: 53-5, 113-15; for general service, Appx. Etretat: 312.
"B", 63, 89, 95, 97, 110-11; Reserve Army, 182-3; Eu: 355.
U.S. citizens, 115; in U.K., 189, 210; in Nfld, Appx. Evatt, Rt. Hon. H.V., P.C.: 320.
"I"; see also Compulsory Service, Voluntary Service. Ewener, Lt: Col. W.A., M.C.: 380.
Ensor, Lt.-Col. J. P., D.S.O., M.B.E.: 309-10. Exchequer, Chancellor of the: 76.
Envermeu: 352, 358. Exercises: Chap. VIII, passim. See also under code
Equipment: Appx. "G"; 1939, 10-11, 20; use of U.S., names.
22, 61-2, 82, 90, 105, 154, 159; shortage of, 6, 8, 35, Expenditure on Defence: 1939-46, Appx. "C", 68-70;
58, 72-3, 83, 87, 89, 119, 157, 164, 170, 232, 234, up to 1939-40, 4, 7, 9, 11-18, 21, 33, 40, 57; 1940-
243; for defence of Canada, 147, 151-7, 159, 164, 41, 78, 91; 1941-42, 93; War Appropriation Act, 49,
170, 174, 178, 182; use of British, 20, 24, 62-3, 76, 68; appropriations, 74, 78, 93; other refs 29, 40, 47.
90; allocation by C.M.H.Q., 221, 224, 227; more External Affairs, Department of: 78, 195, 261-2.
available, 242, 246; for Ancillary troops, 86;
Fagalde,Gen.de:267-8,272. Flushing:Appx."I".
Falaise:355,407,Appx."I". Foch,Marshal:338,
Falmouth:278,281-2. Folkestone:293.
Fanshawe,Lt.-Col.E.L.(BritishArmy):92. Fonblanque, Maj.-Gen. P. de: 281-2. Foote, Hon. Maj.J.W.,V.C.: 377."Ford",
Farnborough:206. Exercises:344.
Farrington,Lt.-Col.J.R.(BritishArmy):92. ForeignOffice,ForeignSecretary:38,315,438,441.
Fecamp:322. Foretd'Arques:390.
Feltre:405. Formosa:456,513.
Fernie,H.M.S.:345,348,368,381. Forts.Seebyname.
Field,Lieut.B.C.:482. FortWilliam,Ont.:151.
FieldArtillery.SeeArtilleryandPartII, Forth,H.M.S.:157.
RoyalCanadianArtillery,FieldSecurity.SeeIntelligence.Fiji:492. Foster,Maj.-Gen.H.W.,C.B.E.,D.S.O.,C.D.:414,499-501,505,Appx."F".
Finance,Departmentof:93. Foster,Maj.-Gen.W.W.,C.M.G.,D.S.O.,V.D.:421.
FinancialArrangementswithU.K.:65-8,75-6,86,208,300-1. Foulkes,GeneralCharles,C.B.,C.B.E.,D.S.O.,C.D.:253,414,Appx."F".
Finland:257. "Fox",Exercise:238,244.
Fire-Controlequipment:28,156,159,282.FireSupport:399,401,403,502;see France, French: defence measures, 38; declares war, 46; B.E.F., 73-4; Canadian
alsoAir troops for, 63, 76, 263; invasion, 77-83; Norway 1940, 258, 261; Second
Support,NavalSupport. B.E.F., 273-6, 281, 284-7; lessons of defeat in, 289; Allied invasion plans,
FirstWorldWar.SeeWorldWar,First. 310, 312-14, 318, 337; enemy strength in, 314, 407; German defences
Flame-throwers:251,Appx."G". 1942,349-52;otherrefs88,107,112,144,151,153,207,222,233-6,336.
Flers:355.
Florence:Appx."I".
INDEX - PART I 607
France and Germany Star: 144. Franz (merchant ship): 260-1, 306; Hong Kong, 483;
390. Fraser River: 156. other refs, Appx. "I".
Frederick, Maj.-Gen. Robert T.: 106. Freetown, Sierra French, Lieut. C. D.: 480. French Indo-China: 451-2.
Leone: 152-3. French North Africa. See North Africa. French-
French Forces, French Troops: France 1940, speaking Canadians: brigade, 44-5; re
77, 254, 261, 264-5, 272, 277, 280, 284; Norway, 257, cruiting, 55-6; other refs 139, 443, 506.
G
Gallipoli: 327. Glasgow: 194, 302.
Gamelin, General Maurice: 265. Glengyle, H.M.S.: 374.
Gantmell, Lt.-Gen. Sir J. A. H., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.: Gneisenau (battleship) : 161.
244, 250. , Goch: Appx. "I".
Gander, Nfld.: 160, 179-80. Good Hope, Cape of: 153.
Ganong, Maj.-Gen. H. N., C.B.E., E.D.: 172, Appx. Goose Bay: 154, 160, 180, Appx. "E".
"F". Gordon Head, B.C..: 138.
Gardiner, Rt. Hon. J. G., P.C.: 118. Goring, Reichsmarschall Hermann: 405.
Garth, H.M.S.: 345, 367-8. Gort, Field Marshal The Viscount, V.C., G.C.B.,
Gaspe: 154, 162, 176, Appx. "E". C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C.: 73, 263, 265, 267,
"Gauntlet", Operation: 304, 306. 269-71, 274, 300.
"Gelb", Operation: 264. Gosport: 344-5.
Genet, Brigadier J. E., C.B.E., M.C., C.D.: 289, 333. Gostling, Lt.-Col. A. C.: 347, 370-1.
Geneva Convention: 423. Goulding, Lieut.-Commander H. W., R.N.: 367.
George Cross: winners by name, footnote 51. Gourock: 194.
Georges, General: 280. Government, British: equipment, 24-5, 85, 181,
Georgetown, British Guiana: 182, Appx. "E". Canadian troops, 58-61, 65, 72, 74, 77-8; Dieppe,
German Forces: Poland, 42; France and Low Countries 333, 357; P.W., 151, 397; Far East, 440, 442, 451,
(1940), 76-7, 267, 277, (1942), 350-1, 406-8; U.K., 453-4; other refs 38, 84, 112, 164, 208, 277, 299,
293-4; plans against, 313, 319-20; Dieppe area, 352- 432; see also War Cabinet, British.
5; Spain, 410; other refs 73, 161, 233, 263. Government, Canadian. See Cabinet, Canadian; War
G.H.Q. Troops: 78, 100, 108-9. Committee of the Cabinet.
Germany, Germans: aggression, 38, 42, 76, 257, 296; Government, French: 274, 277-8, 281.
war declared on, 46, 48-9, 59; Canadian defence Government, United States: 409, 454, 501.
against, 42, 145, 160, 162. 176; Norway, 76, 232, Grasett, Lt.-Gen. Sir A. E., K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.:
234, 257, 263; France and Low Countries, 77, 161, 438-9, 456-7.
254, 264-5, 267, 271, 273-4, 276-8, 281, 283, 285; Grave: Appx. "I".
Britain, invasion threat to and Battle of, 87, 91, 234, Gravelines: 265.
238-9, 243, 245, 250, 252, 285, 291-4; Spitsbergen, Great Britain. See United Kingdom.
301, 306; Russia, 38, 297, 314, 326, 340-2; allied Great Sitkin I.: 501.
strategy against, 88, 310-11, 315-18, 321, 324-6; Greece: 93, 115, 296.
defences in the West 1942, 349-52, 356-7; allied Green Bay, Spitsbergen: 305-6.
prisoners, 396-7; effect of Dieppe raid, 404-8; Spain, "Greenlight", Exercise: 498.
410-11; Japan, 452; defeat, 432, 507, 511-12, 519; Greenock: 194.
other refs 5, 10, 32, 102, 106, 161, 308, 313-14, 318, Greenwich: 346.
346, 401. Gregson-Ellis, Maj.-Gen. P. G. S., C.B., O.B.E.: 329.
General Staff Branch, C.M.H.Q.: 196, 198, 200, 221. Gresham, Maj. A. B.: 480-1.
General Staff Branch, N.D.H.Q.: 29, 92, 412, 415, 441- Grigg, Rt. Hon. Sir James, P.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I.: 410.
2, 515, Vice Chiefs of the, Appx. "F"; organization, Gris Nez, Cape: 312.
Appx. "J". "Grizzly II", Exercise: 252.
Gibraltar: 299-301, 410, 510. Groningen: 352.
Gibson, Maj.-Gen. R. B., C.B., C.B.E., V.D.: Appx. Guadalcanal: 403, 491.
"F". Guam: 453, 462, 492.
Gilbert Is.: 512. Guards: 232, 259, 265; see also Part 11 (B), Divisions,
Gilbride, Brigadier W. P., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D.: 516. Armoured. Guderian, Col.-Gen. Heinz: 264.
Guibon, Georges: 376, 380.
Gin Drinkers Line: 444, 459, 463-8. Guildford: 289.
608 INDEX - PART I
Haase, Lt.-Gen. Conrad: 352. Hitler Line. See Adolf Hitler Line.
Hague, Cap de la: 324. Hodkinson, Major E., D.S.O., E.D.: 483.
Haig, Field Marshal The Earl, O.M., K.T., Hoffmeister, Maj.-Gen. B.M., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.,
G.C.B., K.C.I.E., G.C.V.O.: 338. E.D.: 414, 516, Appx. "F".
Haldenby, Brigadier E. W., C.B.E., M.C., V.D.; 283. Holland. See Netherlands.
Halder, Col.-Gen. Franz: 391. Hollis, Gen. Sir L. C., K.C.B., K.B.E.: 337.
Halifax: defences, 10, 12, 27-8, 152-4, 156-8; defence- Home, Brigadier W. J., M.C., C.D.: 444, 478-9, 487.
of, 41-2, 146, 148, 150, 163-5; sailings, 67, 72, 181, Home Defence: Chap. V, passim; Ashton on, 10;
189, 192; Engineer Training Centre, 133; other refs priority of, 14-15; Defence Schemes, 27, 30;
142, 160-1, 168, Appx. “E” Security forces, 46-7, 79; compulsory service, 82,
Hamilton, Admiral Sir L. H. K., K.C.B., D.S.O.: 411. 121; Crerar's views, 87, 120;
Hamilton, Ont.: 137, 151. "Hammer", Operation: 260. parachute battalion, 103; training, 134,
Hampshire: 252, 298. Hansen, Pte. G.: 260. Harbour, divisions, 93, 139; plan, 161; Kiska, 499;
artificial: 404. Hardelot: 308-9. principal appointments, Appx. "F"; see also Coast
"Hare", Exercise: 238. Defence.
"Harlequin", Exercise: 252. Home Forces. See Part 11, G.H.Q. Home Forces.
"Harold", Exercise: 245. Home Secretary: 426.
Hart, Hon. John: Premier of B.C., 170. Hong Kong: Chap. XIV, passim; G.O.C., 443-4, 450,
Hastings: 298. 457, 461; other refs 169, 492, 498, 519. Honolulu:
Hautot: 371. 449-50.
Havant, Hampshire: 241. Honours and Awards: 107, 144, 284; see also George
Hawaii: 462, 511-12. Cross, Victoria Cross.
Haydon, Maj.-Gen. J. C., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.: 329. Honshu: 519.
Hazebrouck: 265. Hook, Major H. W., E.D.: 483-4.
Headley Court: 288. Hopkins, Harry L.: 312-13, 317-18. 320, 325, 327.
Hearst, Ont.: 159. Horley: 206. Horsham: 206.
Helena, Montana: 106. Hornby, Maj.-Gen. A. H., C.B., C.B.E., M.C.: 268.
Hendry, Corporal J., G.C.: 51. Hospitals: 142-4, 197, 206, 516. Hospitality: 423.
Hennessy, Col. P., D.S.O., M.C.: 443, 484-5. House of Commons, British: 39, 273, 394, 408 394,
Hertzberg, Maj.-Gen. C. S. L., C.B., M.C., V.D.: 289. 408.
Hertzberg, Maj.-Gen. H. F. H., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., House of Commons, Canadian: 37, 60, 73, 78-9. 97,
M.C.: Appx. "F". 111, 121, 262, 286, 514.
Hickerson, J. D.: 497. Howe, Rt. Hon. C. D.: 286, illustration following page
Hicks, Maj. R. C., C.D.- 366. 338.
Hickson, Capt. G. A., D.C.M., M.M., C.D.: 375-6. Hudson Bay: 158. Hudson Strait: 163.
High Commissioner for Canada: 195, 214, 219; see also Hughes, Hon. Lt.-Gen. the Hon. Sir Sam, K.C.B.: 194.
Massey, Rt. Hon. Vincent. Hughes-Hallett, Vice-Admiral John, C.B. D.S.O., R.N.:
Higham Ferrers: 273. 328-9, 337, 340-2, 346, 348, 358, 361, 367-8, 379,
Higuchi, Lt.-Gen.: 473. 384-5, 398, 400-1.
Hill, Capt. A. C., M.C., C.D.: 376. Hull, Cordell-, 454.
Hindhead: 298. Humber River: 273-4.
Hiroshima: 519-20, "Husky", Operation: 411.
Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.: 198. Hutchinson, Spr. F. P., M.M.: 284.
Hitler, Adolf: to power, 5; pact with Russia, 38; seizes Hutt, Sgt. D. G.: 284.
European countries, 38, 42, 46, 82, 146, 258, 264; Hvalfjord, Iceland: 304. Hythe: 232.
threat to U.K., 87, 275, 285, 293-4, 425; West Wall,
350-2, 356; Dieppe, 405; Atlantic Wall and France,
405-7; defeat, 519.
INDEX - PART 1 609
I
Icarus, H.M.S.: 304-5. Interim Plan. See Coast Defence.
Iceland: 45, 78-9, 83-5, 161, 181, 304. lesi: 144. International Red Cross Committee: 397; see also Red
Ilsley, Rt. Hon. J. L.: 49. Cross.
"Imperator", Operation: 315, 324, 338. Internment Camps: 53, 69, 151.
Imperial Conference, 1937: 15, 23-4. Inveraray: 247-8, 302.
Imperial War Cabinet: 195. Invicta, H.M.S.: 369.
Imperial War Conference, 1917: 20. Ironside, Field-Marshal The Lord, G.C.B., C.M.G.,
India, Indian: 438, 457, 510, 512. D.S.O.: 63, 85, 230, 259, 268-9, 272.
Indian Ocean: 190. Isle Maligne: 150, 157.
Information, British Ministry of: 394. Ismay, General The Lord, P.C., G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.:
Inglis, John, Company: 25-6. 7, 337, 438.
Intelligence: invasion, 290-2; Dieppe, 355, 357, Italy, Italians: Special Force, 105-6; Canadians in, 109,
396; on Japan, 443, 452, 454, 464; Pacific, 503-4, 518; 222-3, 412-13, 417, 427, 516; C.W.A.C., 127, 210;
other refs 141, 197-8, 441. leave from, 429-30; other refs 8, 143, 251, 296, 299,
Intercommunication: Dieppe, 367-8, 381-2, 400. 387, 438.
Interdepartmental Committee on Manpower. Ito, Maj.-Gen. Takeo: 463-4, 471, 478.
See Manpower. Iwo Jima: 518.
Jamaica: 77, 123, 181, 443, 446-7, Appx. "E". Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.: 320, 496-7, 507,
Japan, Japanese: in B.C., 85, 169; Allied strategy 513-15.
against, 310-11, 313, 316-17, 431: Hong Kong, Joint Planning Staff, U.S.: 507, 514-15. Joint Planning
Chap. XIV, passim, Aleutians, Chap. XV, passim; Sub-Committee: 161-2. Joint Service Committees:
Imperial Conferences, 438, 451, 454, 519; invasion 164, 172.
project and surrender, 434, 511, 514, 518-19. Joint Staff Committee. See Chiefs of Staff
Japanese Forces, Japanese Troops. See Part II. Committee.
Jasper, Alberta: 172. Jones, Colonel C.E.F., O.B.E.: 208. "Jones", Pte.,
Java: 453, 491. History of: 141-4. Juan de Fuca, Strait of: 155.
Jasperson, Lt.-Col. F. K., D.S.O., E.D.: 346, 377, 385. "Jubilee", Operation. See Dieppe. Judge Advocate
Jefferson, Brigadier J. C., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D.: 417. General: 16, 129, 197. Jumieges: 355.
Johannson, Pte. A.: 260. "Jupiter", Operation: 408-10. Jutland: 349.
Johnstone Strait: 28.
K
Kai Tak Airfield: 456, 464, 467, 489. King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J.: 316-18.
Kamloops: 171. King, H. M. The: 48, 141, 274, 423.
Kapuskasing: 159. King, Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, P.C., O.M., C.M.G.:
Karachi: 510. arsenals, 21, 23; coast defence, 29; conscription,
"Kate", Exercise: 253. 111; emergency, 40, 46; declaration of war, 48;
Keefler, Maj.-Gen. R. H., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D.: 414, home defence, 14, 35, 145, 149, 153, 157, 165;
Appx. "F". "booed" on visit to U.K., 216; Nfld., 179; control
Keitel, Field-Marshal Wilhelm: 349, 351. Keller, Maj.- and use of overseas forces, 73, 78, 87, 214-17, 222,
Gen. R.F.L., C.B.E.: Appx. "F". 263, 409, 412; strategic thinking, 320-1; repatriation,
Kemptville: 136. 431-2; Hong Kong, 441; Pacific Force, 507, 511-14;
Kennedy, Maj.-Gen. H., C.B.E., M.C., ED.: 130, Appx. other refs 8, 11, 15, 65, 79, 105, 195, 261, 276, 313.
"F". Kingston, Jamaica: Appx. "E".
Kennedy, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. N., G.C.M.G., Kingston, Ont.: 41, 128, 140, 150.
K.C.V.O., K.B.E., C.B., M.C.: 101. Kinkaid. Rear-Admiral T. C., U.S.N.: 496, 501, 506.
Kent: 244, 253, 289, 291, 295. Kiska I.: Chap. XV, passim; other refs 106, 123, 173,
Kettering: 273. 185, 437.
610 INDEX - PART I
Kitching, Brigadier G., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.: Kowloon: 450, 455, 459, 462, 464, 467, 470-1, 478,
417, Appx. "F". 487.
"Klondike I", Exercise: 339. Koyl, Lieut. J. E., D.S.C., R.C.N.V.R.: 364, 366.
Knights of Columbus: 421-2. Kristiansand: 257.
Komandorski Is.: 496. Kurile Is.: 493, 502, 506-7.
Konoye, Prince: 451. Kurusu, Saburo: 454.
Kota Bharu: 456. Kyushu: 518.
L
Labatt, Lt: Col. R. R., D.S.O., E.D.: 346, 374, 376, 382. Letitia, Transport: 189.
Labour, Department of: 71, 94, 123. Letson, Maj.-Gen. H. F. G., C.B., C.B.E., M.C.,
Labour Supply Investigation Committee. See E.D., C.D.: 134, 139, 513-14, Appx. "F".
Manpower. Lett, Brigadier Sherwood, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., E.D.,
Labrador: 123, 154, 160, 163, 175, 180. C.D.: 334, 382-3.
LaFleche, Maj.-Gen. L. R., D.S.O.: 23, 33, 69, Appx. Lewes: 245.
"F". Lewisporte, Nfld.: 154, 180, 186.
Lambert, Lt.-Col. H. G.: Appx. "I". Lewis guns and gunners: 20, 178, 231, 259.
Lamone River: 144. Leyte: 509.
Landing Craft: general, 308-9, 315, 318, 327; Dieppe, Libya: 88. Liege: 271.
336, 342, 345-6, 384-5; Japanese, 463-4, 473, 484; Lindsay, Ont.: 22.
types, assault (L.C.A.), 309, 327, 346, 361-2, 374, Line of Communication Troops (L. of C. Troops): 31,
384, 499; support (L.S.C.), 310; infantry landing 43, 95-6, 100-1, 108-9, 218-19, 418.
ships (L.S.I.), 327, 339; 342, 345-6, 360, 374; tank Lingan: 153.
(L.C.T.), 327, 345-6, 378, 403; personnel (L.C.P.(L) Lingfield: 237.
), 342, 345, 358, 360-1, 381; mechanized (L.C.M.), "Link", Exercise: 252.
327, 364; rocket (L.C.T.(R)), 403; gun (L.C.G.), 403. Link Training Plan: 135.
Landivisiau: 279. Lid Valley: 143.
Largs: 248. Liss, Colonel Ulrich: 391.
Larkhill: 232, 236, 247, 268. Little River: 21.
Lauenburg: Appx. "I". Littlehampton: 243.
Laurier, Sir Wilfrid: 20. Liverpool, England: 194.
Lauzon, P.Q.: Appx. "E". Liverpool, N.S.: 27.
Laval, France: 279, 282, 351. Locust, H.M.S.: 345, 347, 374, 385-6, 402.
Law, Lt.-Col. A. T., D.S.O.: 371-2, 392. Loggie, Brigadier G.P.: 62-3.
Lawson, Brigadier J. K.: Hong Kong, 443, 448; on London, England: air attacks on, 197, 292, 296; Crerar
training, 447; terms of reference, 449-50; killed, 481; in, 87, 214; C.M.H.Q., 194 ff.; clubs and hostels,
other refs 453, 455, 460, 464, 469, 480, 487. 423.
League of Nations: 5, 8. London, Ont.: 150.
Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D., U.S.N., Hon. G.C.B.: Longfield, Lt.-Col. R. C.: Appx. "I".
311. Longueville-sur-Scie: 390.
Leatherhead: 288. Los Angeles: 170, 441.
Leathers, Rt. Hon. The Lord, P.C., C.H.: 512. Louisburg, N.S.: 154.
Leave: "Maple Leaf" hostels, 423; to Canada, 427-31. Lovat, Brigadier The Lord, D.S.O., M.C.: 30910, 346,
Leclerc, Maj.-Gen. P. E., C.B.E., M.M., E.D.: 45, 172, 362-3.
Appx. "F". Ludlow: 288.
Lee, Brig.-Gen. Raymond E.: 451. Luton, Maj.-Gen. R.M., C.B.E., M.C., C.D.: 201.
Le Havre: 274, 322, 351, 402. Luzon: 513.
Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief Marshal Sir T. L., Lye Mun Barracks, Passage and Peninsula,
K.C.B., D.S.O.: 332, 335-8, 344, 348, 362, Hong Kong: 455, 468, 470, 473-4.
383-4, 398. Lyme Regis: 293.
Le Mans: 278-81, 285, Lyndon, Major C. A.: 482.
Le Treport: 352, 354-5.
Leith: 194.
INDEX - PART I 611
"M" Test: 131. Maisky, Ivan M., Soviet Ambassador to Britain: 341.
Maas (Meuse) River: 264, Appx. "I". "Majestic", Operation: 518.
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, Hon. Malaya: 169, 440, 453, 455-6, 458, 462, 464, 492, 511.
G.C.B.: 169, 514, 518-19. Maltby, Maj.-Gen. C. M., M.C., D.L.: 456-9, 461, 464-
Macaulay, Fort, Esquimalt: 148. 5, 467-70, 474-6, 479, 481, 483-4, 488-90.
McCarter, Brigadier G. A., C.B.E., C.D.: 242. Manchester: 194.
McClintock, Captain H. V. P., D.S.O., R.N.: 370, 385. Manchuria: 5.
Macdonald, Hon. Angus L.: 81, 442. Manila: 449-50, 492.
Macdonell, Lt.-Gen. Sir Archibald C., K.C.B., C.B., Manion, Col. The Hon. R. J., M.C., M.D.: 111, 422.
C.M.G., D.S.O., E.D.: 4. Manitoba : 178.
Macdougall, Maj.-Gen. A. I., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.: Mann, Maj.-Gen. C. C., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.: 331, 337,
272. 343, 348, 383.
Machine Carbines (Sub-Machine-Guns) : Appx. “G” Manpower: 70, 82, 94, 97, 100, 102, 109, 125, 209,
Machine Guns: Light, 25-6, Appx. "G"; Medium, Appa 224, 227, 247; ceiling, 103, 109; for U.K., 90-1;
"G„ recruiting, 110-15; statistics, 115-18; C.W.A.C., 124;
Mackenzie, District of: 166. rotation leave, 430-1; Pacific, 507, 517.
Mackenzie, Rt. Hon. Ian A.: 8, 11-13, 15, 23, 31, 40-2, Manstein, Field-Marshal Erich von: 264.
46, 307, Appx. "F"; leaves Defence, 71; home Mantes-Gassicourt: 355.
defence, 170. "Maple Leaf" hostels, 423: newspaper, illustration
Mackenzie, Maj.-Gen. J. P., C.B., D.S.O., E.D.: Appx. following 482.
"F". Margate: 293.
Macklin, Maj.-Gen. W. H. S., C.B.E., C.D.: 442. Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. The Viscount, P.C., M.C.:
Maclachlan, Commander K. S., O.B.E.: 69, Appx. "F". 90, 95.
McMorris, Rear Admiral C. H., U.S.N.: 496. Mariana Is.: 512, 518.
McNaughton, Gen. Hon. A. G. L., P.C. (Can.), C.H., Maritime Provinces: 27, 80, 149, 156, 162, 167, 186.
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., C.D.: pre-war policy, 4, 6, 8, Marriage (in U.K.): 424.
18, 30; National Research Council, 8, 25; arsenals, Marshall, General of the Army George C., I-Ion.
22; Chief of General Staff, 21, 30; army G.C.B.: grand strategy, 311-13, 315-17, 496-8; other
organization, 16, 45, 50, 64, 74-6, 96, 98, 100-1, refs 320, 325, 327, 501, 513.
207-8; Iceland, 85; 7th Corps, 86; Canadian Corps, Marshall Is.: 512.
87; illness, 96; army programmes, 91, 94-5, 97-103; Martiniere, Fort: 147.
strategic thinking, 98-9; commands First Cdn. Army, Mary Hill: 147, 155.
99, 101; relinquishes command, 222-3; command Mason-MacFarlane, Lt.-Gen. F. N., K.C.B., D.S.O.,
arrangements, 66-8, 98, 225; terms of reference, 213- M.C.: 300.
21, 256, 307-8, 333; training overseas, 230-39, 245- Massey, Rt. Hon. Vincent, P.C., C.H.: control of Cdn.
6; "Spartan", 249-51; Norway, 260; fall of France, forces, 67, 74-5, 214, 261; Iceland, 78, 84-5; Beaver
261-3, 265-71. 306: 2nd B.E.F., 276, 278-9, 283-5; Club, 423; discipline, 426 other refs 38, 76, 299,
defence of Britain, 273, 287-90, 293, 297; Gibraltar, 432; see also High Commissioner for Canada.
299; Spitsbergen, 301-2, 304, 306; Dieppe, 329, 332- Massey, Mrs. Vincent: 423.
6, 338, 341-4, 348, 394-6; projected operations, 409- Master General of the Ordnance: 26, 56, Appx. "F";
12; commanders and staff, 414, 416, 418; morale, organization of M.G.O. Branch, Appa "J„
420; Pacific Force, 516; other refs 309, 311, 321-2, Matthews, Maj.-Gen. A. B., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D.: 414,
Appx. "F". 417, Appx. "F".
McQueen, Colonel J. G., E.D.: 105. Matthews, Maj.-Gen. H. H., C.M.G., D.S.O.: Appx.
MacQueen, Maj.-Gen. J. H., C.B.E., C.D.: Appx. "F". "F".
MacRae, Colonel D. F., M.C.: 345, 377, 381, 385. Mauretania, transport: 190. Medals. See Honours and
Macready, Lt.-Gen. Sir Gordon, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., Awards.
D.S.O., M.C.: 91. Medical Services. See Part II, Royal Canadian
Madagascar: 327, 403. Army Medical Corps.
Maginot Line: 263. Medical Standards: 52, 112-13, 184, 517.
Mahony, Lt.-Col. J. K., V.C.: 51.
612 INDEX - PART I
Mediterranean: Special Service Force, 106; Canadians Monsano: 143.

in, 221, 226, 252, 412; strategy, 316, 318, 408; other Montague, Lt.-Gen. The Hon. P. J., C.B., C.M.G.,
refs 108, 190, 426, 430. Medway, River: 253. D.S.O., M.C., V.D., C.D.; C.M.H.Q., 195-7, 214;
Meighen, Rt. Hon. Arthur, P.C.: 14. J.A.G., 201; Administration, 222, 225; leave policy,
Menard, Colonel D., D.S.O., C.D.: 347, 381. 429-30, 433; other refs 216, 514, Appx. "F".
Menin: 265. Montesarchio: 143.
Mennonites: 119. Montgomery, Field-Marshal The Viscount, of Alamein,
Mercatello: 143. K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O.: training, 240, 244, 249; roles,
Merritt, Lt.-Col. C.C.I., V.C., E.D.: 51, 346, 370, 373-4. 275, 298, 343; Dieppe planning, 329, 332, 334-6,
Mesnil Val: 354. 338, 340, 343, 398; other refs 308, 416.
Methil (Firth of Forth) : 194. Montigny: Appx. "I".
Middle East: 91, 93, 297, 317, 323, 438. Mont Joli, P.Q.: 176.
Midway I.: 173, 492-3. Montpelier Camp, Jamaica: 446.
Military College of Science: 232. Montreal: 42, 50, 52, 55-6, 150, Appx. "E".
Militia: before 1939, 4-5, 10-11, 18-19, 34; coast Morale: German, 322, 402; Canadian Army Overseas,
defence, 28; mobilized, 43; debt of war time army to, 244, 332, 419-24; civilian, 165, 340; Dieppe, 365-6,
50-1; money for, 13, 15-18, 36, 40, 47, 57, 68-70; 395-6; Hong Kong, 478; Kiska Force, 505.
redesignated, 89; and N.R.M.A., 119-21; C.W.A.C., Morgan, Lt.-Gen. Sir Frederick E., K.C.B.: 398, 411.
125-7; officers, 128-9; staff course, 34-5, 232, 414; Morocco: 88, 408.
vulnerable points, 149-50. Morotai: 509-10, 512.
Militia Act: Section 63, 40-1; Section 64, 42; Section Morrison, Maj.-Gen. Sir E. W. B., K.C.M.G., C.B.,
68, 63, 113. D.S.O.: 4.
Militia Council: 124. Mortars: Appx. "G"; 1939, 20; 3-inch, 234, 240; in
Mills-Roberts, Hon. Brigadier D., C.B.E, D.S.O., M.C.: operations, 372, 446, 457, 499.
362. Moscow: 38, 315, 409.
Minister of Defence (U.K.): 81. Motorcycles: 284, 290, 448.
Minister of National Defence: pre-war policy, 15, 18; Motor Torpedo Boats (M.T.Bs.): 147, 152, 155, 456,
coast defence, 28-9; Borden, 20-1; Sutherland, 30; 484.
use of Mobile Force, 60-1; Air Minister, 81, 307; Motteville: 355.
Naval Minister, 81; control of Cdn. forces, 225, 261, Mountbatten, Admiral The Earl, of Burma, K.G., P.C.,
263, 276; other refs 16, 22, 24,, 56, 244, 394, 410, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O.: Chief
418, 499; see also Ministers by name, Department of of Combined Operations, 309, 325-6; Combined
National Defence. Commanders, 322; Dieppe, 326, 328, 332, 334-42,
Misano: 144. 348, 383, 395, 399; other refs 105, 308, 315.
Mispec Battery: 153. Mounted Police. See Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Missouri, U.S.S.: 519. Movement Control: C.M.H.Q., 194, 197; France 1940,
Mobile Force (Defence Scheme 3) : composition, 32, 279, 283, 285; other refs, 449.
43-5, 70-1; mobilization and role, 32, 39, 42-3, 58, Mozzagrogna: Appx. "I".
60-2; recruiting, 53-4, 58, 113-14; other refs 30, 149, Mulberry harbours. See Harbour.
162. Mules: 468, 510.
Mobile Reserve: Canada, 162-3, 166, 175-6; U.K., 272- Munich Crisis: 17, 33, 124.
3, 287. Munition Production, Munitions Industry. See War
Mobilization: C.A.S.F., 49-53, 57, 113; postponed, 57- Industries.
8; 1st and 2nd Divisions, 43; 3rd and 4th Divisions Munitions and Supply, Department of: 62, 93-4, 105,
and other units, 77-80, 242; armoured formations, 202; see also Defence Purchasing Board.
88-9, 92, statistics, 115; officers, 127-8; for home Murchie, Lt.-Gen. J. C., C.B., C.B.E., C.D.: C.G.S.,
defence, 146-9, 171-2; in U.K., 200; other refs 41-2, 223-4, Appx. "F"; operations, 302, 304, 500;
441; see also Mobilization Planning and Procedure. C.A.P.F., 511, 513; other refs 185, 227.
Mobilization Planning and Procedure: 29, 32-3, 112-15; Murdoch, Colonel W. S., O.B.E., E.D.: 499.
1914-18, 47-8; War Book, 9, 33; see also Murison, Maj.-Gen. C.A.P., C.B., C.B.E., M.C.: 289.
Mobilization. Mussolini, Benito: 405.
Molotov, V.M.: 314, 350. Mytchett: 232.
Molucca Is.: 509.
Monarch of Bermuda, transport: 189.
INDEX - PART I 613
N
"N" Force (Bahamas) : 181. New Guinea: 492, 509-10.

N.A.A.F.I.: 421. New Caledonia: 492.
Nagasaki: 519. Newfoundland: Cdn Army in, 151, 178-80, 186, 443-4,
Nakina, Ont.: 159. 446-7, Appx. "E"; defence measures, 86, 154-5, 157,
Namsos: 258, 260-1. 160-4; airfield defence, 168, 175; foresters from,
Nanaimo: 166-8, 175, 499, 500, Appx. "E". 210; Nfld. army units overseas, Appx. "I"; other refs
Nantes: 278. 59, 123.
Naples: 143. Newfoundland Airport. See Gander. Newhaven: 327,
Narvik: 257-8, 260-1, 403. 342, 345-6, 386.
Nash, Rt. Hon. Walter, P.C.: 320. "New Territories" (Hong Kong): 455, 464.
Nassau, Bahamas: 181, Appx. "E". New Westminster, B.C.: 156, 167-8.
National Defence, Department of: Ministers of, Appx. New York, U.S.A.: 192, 510.
"F"; production of armaments, 20, 24-5; finance, 4, New Zealand: 320.
7, 9, 17, 33, 68-70; deputy ministers, 33, 68-9, 429, Niagara District: 81, 149-50, 166-7.
Appx. "F"; reorganized, 71, 81-2; control of armed Niagara-on-the-Lake: Appx. "E".
forces, 79, 98, 196; repatriation, 432; Pacific, 452; Nicholson, Brigadier C. N.: 265-7.
other refs 62, 66, 149, 159, 183, 213-14, 256, 499; Nigeria, H.M.S.: 304-5.
organization chart, Appx. "J"; see also Ministers by Niimi, Vice-Admiral: 470.
name. Nijmegen: Appx. "I".
National Defence Headquarters: recruiting, 49, 113, Nimitz, Admiral C.: 501, 509, 518. 1939-45 Star: 144.
116; C.W.A.C., 124, 126; home defence, 163, 1761 Niobe, H.M.C.S.: 147.
training, 132, 137-8, 237; relations with C.A.O.S., "Nisei": 518.
212-29; rotation, 428-30; Hong Kong, 450; principal Nogent le Rotrou: 351.
appointments, Appx. "F"; strength, 197 n.; other refs Non-Permanent Active Militia (N.P.A.M.): See Militia.
45, 66, 100, 190, 196, 198, 200, 284. Norfolk, England: 252.
National Defence, Minister of. See Minister of National Norfolk, Virginia: Appx. "E".
Defence. Normandy: 253, 351, 397, 401, 403, 406-8, 417, Appx.
National Film Board: 116. "I".
National Registration: 118. Noron I'Abbaye: Appx. "I".
National Research Council: 8, 25, 105, 156, 159. North Africa: battle experience in, 248-51; Germans in,
National Resources Mobilization Act (N.R.M.A.): 117- 296, 314; invasion of, 300, 311, 316-18, 406-8, 411-
24; other refs 82, 89, 134, 430, 499. 12; security, 341, 406; Canada not informed, 322-3,
N.R.M.A. Soldiers: 119-23, 183-6, 430, 505. 337; other refs 93, 417, Appx. "I".
National War Services, Department of: 118-19, 123, North Vancouver: 168.
125. Northampton: 273-4, 281, 287-8, 419.
National War Services Boards: 119, 122. Northcote, Sir Geoffrey, K.C.M.G., C.M.G.: 438.
Naval Defence: priority, 13, 15, 111; money for, 69; Northern Ireland: 317.
Minister for, 81; programme, 91, 97; see also Part II, North-West Europe: invasion plans, 316, 326; first
Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Navy. assault on, 403-4; invasion of, 412-13, 417, 427,
Naval Support: 398, 402-3, 471, 502. 429; casualties, 387, Appx. "A"; other refs 84, 104,
Navy, Army and Air Supply Committee and sub- 109, 127, 145, 161, 209-11, 222. 228, 251-3, 430,
committees: 9, 26. 512, 516.
Nelles, Admiral P. W., C.B., R.C.N.: 10. Northwest Staging Route: 174.
Nelligan, Hon. Brigadier the Rt. Rev. C.L., E.D.: 421. Norway, Northern Norway: invaded, 76; campaign,
Nerissa, transport: 193. 257, 261; projects, 105, 408; Spitsbergen, 301-7,
Netherlands: 76, 144, 211, 263-4, 349-52, 450, 453-4, raids, 313-14; other refs 232, 234, 349.
Appx. "I". Norwegian Leads: 257.
Netherlands Indies: 462, 491-2. Nova Scotia: 28, 142, 144, 163.
Newall, Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord, Nosworthy, Lt.-Gen. Sir F. P., K.C.B., D.S.O. M .C.:
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., C.B.E.: 268. 287-8.
New Brunswick: 144, 163. Nursing Sisters: 53, 124, 448, 489, 517; see also Part II,
Newcastle, England: 194. R.C.A.M.C.
614 INDEX - PART I
0
Oban: 194. Orders of Detail: 259.

"Octagon" Conference. See Quebec Conferences. Ordnance Services. See Part II, Royal Canadian
Odium, Maj.-Gen. V. W., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.: Ordnance Corps.
45, 75, 235, Appx. "F". Ortona: 143, Appx. "I".
Officers: selection, 39-40, 127-32; training, 13841, 413- Osborn. W.O.2 (C.S.M.) J. R., V.C.: 51, 480-1. Oslo:
19, 498, 507-10, Appx. "D"; other refs 50, 105, 231- 257-8.
2, 236-7, 246, 248; see also Staff Officers. Otter Committee: 4, 31.
Offranville: 372. Otter, Gen. Sir William D., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.B.: 4, 31.
Ogdensburg Meeting: 153. Okada, Lieut: 481. Ouville-la-Riviere: 355, 372.
Okinawa: 509, 518. Overseas Military Forces of Canada, Ministry of: 213.
Olaf Fostenes, transport: 189. Oligarch, H.M.S.: 305. Oxford, England: 273, 287-9.
"Olympic", Operation: 518. Oxford Battery (Sydney, N.S.) : 153.
Operations. See under code names.
Pacific War Council: 320. commissions, 131; staff training, 34-5, 140, 232,
Page, Major C. E., E.D.: 379. 414-15; other refs 443-4.
Page, Maj.-Gen. L. F., C.B., D.S.O.: 80, 84-5, Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Canadian American
180, 204, 242, 442, Appx. "F" (P.J.B.D.) : 153-5, 158, 164, 497.
Paget, Gen. Sir Bernard C. T., G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.: Personal Services: 197, 200, 213.
Dieppe, 321-2, 334-5, 338, 342-3; other refs 96, 288, Petain, Marshal Henri Philippe: 82, 281, 285.
298, 308, 402, 412. Palau Is.: 512. Petawawa, Camp: 39, 41, 47, 136, 174.
Paramushiro: 493, 502, 507. Petit Appeville (Bas de Hautot): 371-3.
Paratroops, British: 324; Dieppe, 328, 331, 342. Phelan, Maj.-Gen. F. R., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., V.D.: 183,
Parcé: 280-2. 204, Appx. "F".
Paris: 161, 273, 324, 350-1. Philip, Capt. R. W., M.C.: 482.
Parminter, Brigadier R. H. R., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.: Philippines: 169, 441, 449, 453, 462, 492, 512-13, 518.
267. Phillipps, Lt: Col. J. P., Royal Marines: 347, 382.
Pas de Calais: 151, 252, 266, 307, 312, 322, 326, 408; Physical Training: 232, 240. Picton: 63.
see also Calais. "Pilgrim", Operation: 411; see also "Tonic".
Pasteur, transport: 189. Patricia Bay, B.C.: 160, 168. Pirbright: 233.
Patton, Lieut. J. M, S., G.C.: 51. Plan "D": 264. Plan "W": 279.
Pay and Allowances: Special Service Battalion, 107, Platoon Sergeant Majors (W.O. III): 128, 237.
drafteesandrecruits,120;C.W.A.C.,126;trades,65,142;PacificForce,516- Platoon Weapons: 232, 236, 240.
17;otherrefs52-3,69,196-7. Plebiscite on compulsory service: 122-30.
Peacehaven: 294. "Plough", Operation: 105, 501.
Peacock, Sir Edward R., G.C.V.O.: 422-3. Plymouth: 278, 280-3, 285.
Pearl Harbor: attack on, 464; results of attack, 146, 148, Point Atkinson, B.C.: 156.
155, 160-1, 165, 168, 176; U.S. enters war, 310, 349; Point Grey, B.C.: 147, 156.
attack force, 454, 462; other refs 451, 492, 519. Poland: 38, 42, 46, 68, 73, 520.
Pearkes, Maj.-Gen. G. R., V.C., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.: 96, Pontorson: 278.
173, 259, 288, Appx. "F"; Pope, Lt.-Gen. M. A., C.B., M.C., C.D., 33, 46, 228,
Pacific, 497-8, 500-1, 506. 319-20, Appx. "F";
Peleliu: 509. Pacific, 497-8, 500, 513.
"Penguin": 105. Port Alberni, B.C.: 175, Appx. "E".
Pensions and National Health, Department of: 47, 71. Portage la Prairie: 445.
Pepinster, Fort: 271. Porteous, Maj. P. A., V.C.: 362.
Percival, Lt.-Gen. A. E., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.: Portsmouth: 232, 293, 298, 345-6, 358, 386, 391.
266. Potsdam Declaration: 519.
Permanent Active Militia (Permanent Force): before Potts, Maj.-Gen. A. E., C.B.E., E.D.: 172, 302, 304-6,
Sep. 1939, 5, 17, 19, 34-5. 39-40; cadre for C.A.S.F., Appx. "F".
44, 51-2, 133; recruiting, 54; cavalry, 92; Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley, G.C.B., O.M.,
G.C.V.O.: 26&
INDEX - PART I 615
Pourville: Dieppe planning, 327-8, 330-1, 3467, 354; Princess Josephine Charlotte, H.M.S.: 339.
Dieppe Raid, 360, 369-74, 385, 390, 393, Appx. "H". Printing and Stationery: 197.
Power, Hon. C. G., P.C. (Can.), M.C,: 81, 179, 307-8, Prison Camps: Oflag VII B, 364, 374, 379, 385, 397;
441, 443. Hong Kong, 489; see also Prisoners of War.
Preparedness: pre-1939, 3-17; situation in 1939, 18-19, Prisoners of War (P.W.): in Canada, 151; Brittany, 284;
33-7; Precautionary Stage 40-2; of Dominions, 287. Hardelot, 309; Dieppe, enemy 330, 355, 363, 390,
Price, Maj.-Gen. C. B., D.S.O., D.C.M., V.D.. C.D.: 92, own troops 355, 361, 366, 387; shackling, 396-7;
Appx. "F". escorts, 428, 430; Hong Kong, 461; other refs 123,
Prime Minister of Canada. See King, Rt. Hon. W. L. 201; see also Prison Camps.
Mackenzie. Profit Control: 24, 37.
Prince Albert, H.M.S.: 362. Promotions: general, 126, 197, 217; from the ranks,
Prince Charles, H.M.S.: 374, 385. 127-32; see also Commissions.
Prince Edward Island: 54, 163. Public Relations: general, 116, 197-8, 207;
Prince George, B.C.: 172, 175, 185, Appx. "E". Dieppe, 393-6; illustration following 482.
Prince Leopold, H.M.S.: 374, 385. Public Works Construction Act: 5.
Prince Robert, H.M.C.S.: 448. Puddicombe, Major G. B.: 473.
Prince Rupert, B.C.: 28, 146-7, 150, 156, 160, 166-7, Puits. See Puys.
173-5, Appa. "E". Puys: Dieppe raid, 327-8, 330, 354, 360, Appx. "H";
Prince of Wales, H.M.S.: 440, 492. disaster 363-9, 392-3.
Princess Astrid, H.M.S.: 339, 364-5, 367. Pyke, Geoffrey: 105.
Princess Beatrix, H.M.S.: 369. "Python" scheme: 427.
Queen, H.M. The: 274, 423.

Quartermaster-General's Branch, C.M.H.Q.: 196-7, Queen of the Netherlands, H.M. The: 264.
201. Queen Charlotte Islands: 167, 172, 174.
Quartermaster-General's Branch, N.D.H.Q.: 36, 39, Queen Elizabeth, transport: 99, 168, 189-90, 192.
415, 449, 515; organization, Appx. "J"; A.Q.M.G. Queen Emma, H.M.S.: 346, 364.
(Movement Control), 449. Quatre Vents Farm Queen Mary, transport: 192.
(Pourville): 370-2. Quebec City: 12, 21, 28, 146-7, Quetta: 140.
150, 153, 512. Quebec Conferences: second, 512-13. Quiberville: 327-8, 331, 354, 362.
Quebec, Province of: 45; recruiting, 55, 111, 116. Quisling, Vidkun: 258.
Radar: general, 156, 159, 246, 291; "Clawhammer", Ramsay, Admiral Sir Bertram, K.C.B., K.B.F., M.V.O.:
324; Dieppe, 330, 334, 336, 358-60, 370, 395; Hong 266, 321, 325, 402. Ramsay, Lieut. N.E.B.,
Kong, 456; Aleutians, 504; Australia, 510. R.N.V.R.: 367. Rangoon: 518.
Raeder, Grand-Admiral Erich: 160, 258. Reading: 250.
Raids, Raiding: Hardelot, 308-10; projects 1942, 312- Ready, Brig.-Gen. Joseph L.: 502.
14, 317, 323-5; St. Nazaire, 326; Dieppe, 325 et seq., Reception Centres: 131, 135.
341, 342; planning, 329, 339; enemy fears, 349-52. Recruiting: general, 40, 47-58. 79-80, 113; 1914-18
Railway Troops (Transportation Units) : 65.. 78-9. veterans, 52; procedures, 49, 110: suspended, 57;
Ralston, Colonel The Hon: J. L., P.C. (Can.), C.M.G., statistics, 53-5, 115-18, Appx. "B"; 2nd Division, 75;
D.S.O., E.D.: appointed Minister of National 3rd and 4th Division, 79-80; organization of, 113,
Defence, 81, Appx. "F"; visits to U.K., 86, 90-1, 95; 116, 131, 141, 182; "A" and "R" recruits, 121-2, 134;
manpower, 94, 115; First Cdn Army, 96; home C.W.A.C., 125; Pacific Force, 516-17; see also
defence, 121, 162; C.W.A.C., 125; officers, 129; Enlistment, Manpower, Mobilization.
control of overseas army, 217, 223-5, 261-3, 308; Red Cross: 397, 423.
resignation, 203; rotation leave, 430; Hong Kong, Redhill : 289.
441-3, 487; Aleutians and Pacific, 498-9, 507; other Reeves, Lt.-Col. G.C.: 404. Regina, Sask.: 150, Appx.
refs 21, 68-9, 203. "E".
Ram. See Tanks. Reid, Capt. J. A. G., M.B.E., E.D.; 489,
616 INDEX - PART I
Reinforcements: general, 103, 109, 112-14, 121, 133-5, Rommel, Field-Marshal Erwin: 283.
143, 197, 224; crisis, 135, 185; officers, 139; enemy, Romsdals: 259.
402; leave, 429; Far East, 445, 455; Pacific, 517; see Roosevelt, President Franklin D.: Churchill, 98, 310-13;
also Enlistment, Manpower, Recruiting. strategic thinking, 315-18, 320-1, 409; Japan, 451,
Rennes: 278, 280, 283. Repatriation Programme: 431-4. 453, 497, 513; repatriation plans, death, 431; other
Repulse, H.M.S.: 440, 492. refs 98, 153, 157.
Repulse Bay, Hong Kong: 474-8, 482-3. Rose, Colonel H. B., M.C.: 481, 483, 485.
Research Enterprises Limited: 159. Rosny: 355.
Reserve Army, Reserve Units: 88-9, 127-8, Ross, Alexander, C.M.G.: Appx. "F".
176, 182-3; see also Canadian Army, Militia. Rosyth: 257.
Reserve of Officers: 127-8, 134. Respirators: 25. Rouen: 352, 355.
Reykjavik: 85. "Roundup", Operation: 322-3.
Reynaud, Paul, Prime Minister of France: 277. Routh, Major R. F., E.D.: 509.
Rhine River: Appx. "I". Rifles. See Equipment. Routine Orders. See Canadian Army Routine Orders.
Rigolet, Labrador: 154. Rimini : 144. Rowlands Castle, Hampshire: 246.
Riviere du Loup, P.Q.: 163. Royal Canadian Mounted Police: 33, 149, 158, 182,
Robb, Air Chief Marshal Sir J. M., G.C.B., K.B.E., 267.
D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.: 329. Royal Military College: 113, 127-8, 140-1, 282, 518.
Roberts, Maj.-Gen. J. H., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.: France Rundstedt, Field-Marshal Gerd von: C.-in-C. West,
1940, 281-2; Dieppe, 329-48, Chap. XI passim, 396, 350-2, 355-7; influenced by Dieppe, 405, 407; other
398, 400; other refs 204, 249, Appx. "F". refs 264, 293, 390-1. Russia, Russians: pact with
Roermond: Appx. "I". Hitler, 38; invasion of, 243, 296; Spitsbergen, 301,
Rogers, Hon. Norman McLeod: becomes M.N.D., 71: 304-6; strategic considerations, 310-12, 314-20, 324-
abroad, 76-7; death, 81; other refs 129, 236, 262-3, 5, 349-50, 357; burden carried by, 314; Dieppe, 326,
Appx. "F". 340-1; convoys to, 301, 341, 408; "Jupiter", 408,
Rolfe, Lt.-Col. G. M., D.S.O., M.B.E.: 383. 410; Japan, 451-2, 507, 519; other refs 162, 207,
Romsinia: 105 257, 407
Rome: 107, 211, Appx. "I". "Rutter", Operation: 329, 335-40, 342-3, 401.
Ste. Anne de Bellevue, P.Q.: 137. Salerno: 185.

St. Aubin: 330, 347. Salisbury Plain: 268, 419.
St. Germain-en-Laye: 352. Salmon, Maj.-Gen. H. L. N., M.C.: 249, Appx. “F”
St. Jerome, P.Q.: 139. Salvation Army: 421-2.
St. John Ambulance Brigade: 457. Samoa: 492.
Saint John, N.B.: 29, 146-7, 150, 153-4, 157, 444, Sandwich Battery, Halifax: 146.
Appx. "E". San Francisco: 169, 501.
St. John's, Nfld.: 154, 180, 446, Appx. "E". Sangatte: 267.
St. Johns, P.Q.: 136. Sano, Lt.-Gen. Tadayoshi: 463.
St. Hubert, P.Q.: 42. San Salvo: Appx. "I".
St. Lawrence, Gulf of: 163, 176. Sansom, Lt.-Gen. E. W., C.B., D.S.O., C.D., 80, 92, 99,
St. Lawrence River: 147, 163, 177, 183. St. LS: 407. 223, 249-50, 259-60, Appx. "F".
St. Lucia, B.W.I.: 181. Sarcee Camp: 134.
St. Malo: 283, 285. Sardinia: 411.
St. Nazaire: 278, 319, 326, 336, 350. Sark: 396.
St. Omer: 266, 268. Sarre: 289.
St. Valery-en-Caux: 352, 355. Saskatchewan: 55-6.
St. Vallier, P.Q.: 147. Sault Ste. Marie: 158, Appx. "E".
Saar: 274. Savio River: 144.
Sable-sur-Sarthe: 280, 281-2. Scapa Flow: 411.
Saguenay River: 163. Scharnhorst (battleship): 161.
Saipan: 509. Scheldt River and Estuary: 264-5, 352, Appx. “F”
Saito, Capt.: 489. Schmidlin, Maj.-Gen. E. J. C., M.C.: Appx. “F”
Sai Wan, Fort, Hill: 473-4. Scholfield, Major G. P.: 365. Schools. See Training..
Sakai, Lt.-Gen. Takashi: 463, 470. Scie River: 327, 331, 369-72, 392.
Sakhalin I.: 452.
INDEX - PART I 617
Scotland: 208-9, 248, 259, 287, 411, 423. Snowmobile: 105.
Scott, Colonel Clyde R.: 42. Soissons: 339.
Sea Island, B.C.: 168. Solomon Is.: 403, 492.
"Sea Lion", Operation: 293-4. Somme River: 273-4, 352. Sorel, P.Q.: 25.
Sea Transport: 67, 72, 86, 93, 190-1, 235, 294; see also South African War: 3, 75.
Convoys. South Beveland: Appx. "I".
Seaford: 247. Southam, Brigadier W. W., D.S.O., E.D.: 334, 383.
Searchlights: 25, 148, 154, 156, 159, 168, 174, 309, Southampton: 194, 247, 268, 283, 345.
473. South-East Asia: 511-12.
Seattle: 169, 173. Soviet. See Russia.
"Second Front": plans for, 311-21, 326, 337, 408-12, Spain, Spanish: 88, 352, 410-11.
511, 513, 518; Russian demands, 314-15, 341; "Spartan", Exercise: 103, 206, 249-52.
German fears of, 350, 352, 357, 390-1, 405-8. Special Committee of the Cabinet: 514, 519.
Security: Dieppe raid, 326, 329, 342, 344; North Spitsbergen: 299, 301-2, 304-8, 333.
African invasion, 341, 406; Japanese, 454-5, 503-4. Spry, Maj.-Gen. D. C., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D. 204, 414,
Sedan: 77, 264. Appx. "F".
Seine River and Estuary: 253, 322. Staff Officers: from P. F., 51-2; shortage of, 99, 232,
Selsey Bill: 390. 413-19; other re/s 218, 224, 295.
Senio River: 144. Staff Training and Organization: staff courses, 34-5,
Senior Air Officer. See Chief of the Air Staff. 140, 232, 237; exercises, 244, 246; combined
Senior Combatant Officer (Canadian Army Overseas): operations training, 248; organization, 92, 202, 415,
213, 215-16, 219, 221, 225-6, 228, 256, Appx. "F". 515; other re/s 399, 509-10.
Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.: 196-7, 212-5, 217-18, 221-2, Stalin, Joseph: 301, 315, 341, 409.
227-8, 278, 416; see also Chief of Staff C.M.H.Q. Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver F. G., P.C.: 76.
Sham Shui Po Camp: 450, 464, 467-8. Stanley Park: 147, 156.
Shelburne, N.S.: 154, 162, Appx. "E". Stanley area (Hong Kong): 455, 471, 475-80, 487-8.
Sherbrooke, P.Q.: 151, Appx. "E". Stapleton, W.O. II (C.S.M.) Cornelius, D.C.M.: 376-7,
Shilo, Camp: 12, 39, 75, 86, 166, 169, Appx.”E” 381.
Shing Mun Redoubt: 465, 467. "Starkey", Operation: 252.
Shipping, Ships: cabinet sub-committee, 9; shortage of, Statute of Westminster: 194.
100, 429; sinkings, 176, 193-4: control of, 192; Stavanger: 257.
assault shipping, 318, 345; enemy invasion barges, Stein, Maj.-Gen. C. R. S.: 99, Appx. "F".
330, 347; see also Sea Transport. Sten guns: 177, Appx. "G".
Shoji, Col. Toshishige: 463, 4734, 478, 481-2. Stevens, Fort, Oregon: 173.
Shoreham: 294, 342, 345. Steveston, B.C.: 156.
Shotover House: 287. Stewart, Brigadier J. C., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.: 289.
Shrewsbury: 288. Stimson, Colonel Hon. Henry L.: 316, 498.
Siberia: 452. Stour River: 289.
Sicily, Sicilian: 108, 221, 248, 249, 251, 411-12. 417. Strengths: general, Appx. "A"; 1914-18, 4; pre-war, 5,
Sifton, Victor, C.B.E., D.S.O.: Appx. "F". Simard, E.: 34, 40, 50-1; recruiting and enlistment, 52-5, 58, 75,
25. 80; Cdn. Army overseas, 93, 100-1, 108-9, 194, 197,
"Simmer", Exercise: 366. 203, 209, 426, 431, 434; Special Service Force, 105;
Simonds, Lt.-Gen. G. G., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.: C.D.: field force, 100-3; total mobilized force,114-19;
223, 237, 249, 414, 416-17, 409, Appx.”F” training centres, 121, 131; C.W.A.C.,127, 210;
Sinclair, Rt. Hon. Sir Archibald, K.T., P.C., C.M.G.: officers in training, 139-40; cadets, 141; home
268. defence force, 150-1, 183; National Defence
Singapore: 169-70, 440, 455-8, 492. Headquarters, 196; P.W.,151; Veterans Guard, 151;
Skeena, B.C.: 174. R.C.A.F., 171; P.C.M.R., 174; Atlantic and Pacific
Slazak, Polish destroyer: 345, 358. Commands, 174-5; St. Lawrence, 177;
"Sledgehammer", Operation: British attitude, 315; Newfoundland, 180; Reserve Army, 183; B.E.F.,
controversy, 316-17; training for, 326; abandoned, 263; Dunkirk and after, 271, 286; Spitsbergen, 304;
341; other refs, 312, 314, 318-19, 321-2, 402, 412. German 1942, 314, 351, 406; U.S. forces in U.K.,
Smith, Brigadier A. A., C.B.E., M.C., E.D.: 265, 269- 317; Dieppe force, own 345-8, enemy, 357-8, enemy
70, 279-80, 282-3. aircraft, 383; in Europe, 433-4; Hong Kong, 439,
Smith, Maj.-Gen. Holland M., U.S.M.C.: 501. 448, 457; Malaya, 440; Canton Area, 452, 462-3;
Smith, Major W. E. L., M.C.: 421. Alen tians, enemy 495, own 500, 502; Pacific Force,
Snow, Brigadier T. E. D'O., O.B.E., C.D.: 136. 517.
618 INDEX - PART I
Submarines: 102, 160-1, 170, 176-7, 293, 347, 496, Sussex, England: 92, 237, 239, 244, 252, 294, 297, 308,
502, 504; see also U-boats. 327, 342, 425.
Stuart, Lt.-Gen. K., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.: manpower, Sussex, N.B.: 80, 163, 167, 172, 192, Appx. "E".
100-1, 103, 171; coast defence 168, 173-4; C.G.S., Sutcliffe, Lt.-Col. J. L. R.: 444, 485, 487, 489.
215; other refs 97, 129, 202-3, 217, 222-7, 322, 497. Sutherland, Colonel Hon. D. M., P.C. (Can.), D.S.O.:
Suffield, Alta.: 136. 30.
Sumatra: 453, 491. Swayne, Lt.-Gen. Sir J. G. des R., K.C.B., C.B.E.: 333.
"Sun", Vancouver: 170. Sweden, Swedish: 257.
Supply, Ministry of (British): 76, 208, 404. "Switchback", Operation: Appx. "I".
Supreme War Council: 257, 277. Sydney, N.S.: 29, 146-7, 153, 192, Appx. "E".
Surrey: 244, 288, 292, 302.
T
Tanaka, Maj.-Gen. Ryosaburo: 463, 471, 473-6, 478, "Totalize", Operation: Appx. "G".
488. Tourcoing: 352.
Tank Delivery Regiment: formed, 103. Tow, Brigadier D. K., O.B.E., E.D.: 200.
Tanks: 1914-18, 406; infantry tanks, 89; supply of, 20, Tradesmen: 125, 127; training, 136-7, 231-2; pay, 144.
62, 90, 99, 242, 245, 283, 286, Appx. "G"; Traffic Control: 238, 244.
"Churchill", 242, 328, 358, 378, 380, 404; at Dieppe, Training: in Canada, Chap. IV, passim; overseas, Chap.
328, 330-2, 344, 372, 375, 398, 400; Japanese, 452; VIII, passim; for Spitsbergen, 302; for Dieppe, 330;
other refs 241, 297, 404; see also Landing Craft for Sicily, 251-2; for Normandy, 252-3; for Hong
(L.C.T.). Kong, 446-7; for Kiska, 498-9, 501.
Taplow: 206, 423. Training Centres: Appx. "D"; see also Part Il
Temiscouata Railway: 163. Transit Camp: 135, 192.
Templer, Major C. R.: 476-7. Transport: general, 8, 197, 232, 243-4, 246, 249, 499,
"Ten Years Rule": 7. 511; lack of, 25, 47; 2nd B.E.F., 279, 282, 285-7;
Terrace, B.C.: 171, 174-5, Appx. "E". Dieppe, 345; Hong Kong Force, 448-9, 460, 468,
Thailand: 452. 470, 487.
Thames River: 273-4, 288-9, 291-2, 298, 390. Transports: 189-90, 500; see also by name.
Theobald, Rear-Admiral R. A., U.S.N.: 497. Treatt, Hon. Brigadier B.D.C., R.A., M.C.: coast
"Third Front": 314. defence 1936, 27-8.
Thomson, Capt. W. B.: 366. Tregantle: 232. Trent River: 253.
Thracian, H.M.S.: 456, 470, 477, 485. "Trident", Conference: 497, 501.
Three Rivers, P.Q.: 130-1, 139. Trinidad: 152, 181.
"Tiger", Exercise: 206, 244. Tripartite Pact: 438.
Tilston, Major F. A., V.C.: 51. Tripoli: 249.
Timor: 453, 491. Triquet, Lt.-Col. Paul, V.C.: 51.
Tobruk: 316, 337. Trist, Lt: Col. G., E.D.: 485.
Tojo, General: 450-2, 519. Tri-Wound Scheme: 430.
Tokunaga, Colonel: 489. Trondheim: 257-9, 261.
Tokyo: 451, 454, 464, 493, 519. Troop Convoys: 189-94; see also Convoys. Truro, N.S.:
"Tonic", Operation: 102, 411; see also "Pilgrim". 80, 163. Tulagi: 403,
"Torch", Operation: 318, 322-3, 406, 408. Tunbridge Wells: Appx. "I".
Toronto: 16, 25, 34, 41, 54, 57, 150, 368, 420, Appx. Tunisia: 248-9, 417, 509, Appx. "I".
"E". Turner, Maj.-Gen. G. R., C.B., M.C., D.C.M., C.D.: 95,
267-8, 288.
U
U-boats, German: 145, 166, 176, 350, 356. 86, 93, 190-1; Canada's cooperation with, Chap. II
Ucluelet, B.C.: 167, 169. and III, passim, 181; Dunkirk and invasion threat,
Uganda, H.M.C.S.: 518. 79, 82, 86-8, 91, 237-8, 285-95, 420; shortage of
Umnak I.: 495. manpower in, 91; theory of war of limited liability,
Unalaska I.: 493. 111-12; training in, 129, 135, 140, Chap. VIII,
Unemployment Relief Act: 5. passim; marriages in, 424; policy in Far East, 438-9,
United Kingdom: as source of equipment, 20, 23, 28, 451-3, 519.
62, 152, 155, 164-5; declaration of war and war
measures, 46-8; arrival of Canadian troops, 45, 72,
INDEX - PART I 619
, 85; Special Service Force, 1-04-8, 123; cooperation
United States Army: 104-7, 181, 202, 318, 416. 428; with Canada, 123, 145, 153, 155-9, 161, 166, 174,
defence of Canada, 158-9, 169, 173; Pacific, 508, 185, 190, 496, 510; Alaska, 173; Nfld., 179;
515, 518. neutrality, 160, 164, 285, 296; enters war, 243, 310;
United States Forces: build-up in U.K., 350, 412; 349: cooperation with U.K., 179, 286, 310-22, 325,
attacking Europe, 313, 317, 393, 401; discipline, 337; relations with Japan, 438, 440, 450-3, 511, 519;
424, 426; North Pacific Force, 496-7, 502, 518; in other refs Appx. "E".
the Pacific, 508, 509, 511-12; other refs 161, 190, United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act: 426.
449, 496, 498. Utterson-Kelso, Maj.-Gen. J. E., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.,
United States of America: defence against, 3, 14, 29-30; M.C., D.L.: 241.
equipment from, 22, 62, 83, 90, 105, 158; Iceland Uxbridge: 338, 348, 383.
V
V Weapons: 296. 451.
Valcartier: 6, 12, 21-2, 39, 75, 150, 167, 172. 175, 447, Vickers Machine Gun (Medium Machine
Appx. "E". Gun) : 240.
Valentine. See Tanks. Victoria, B.C., and Victoria-Esquimalt Fortress:
Vancouver: defence of, 27-8, 146-7, 156, 160, 166-8, 36, 138, 146, 150, 155, 160, 166-8, 174-5,
171; Hong Kong Force, 445, 448-9,489; other refs 42, Appx. "E".
54, 175, 493, 497, 51E. Victoria City (Hong Kong): 467.
Appx "E" Victoria Cross: 51; Canadian V.Cs. by name
Vancouver Island: defence of, 155, 166, 168,172-3, (pre-war forces), 51 n.; awards, 362, 374,
175; other refs 173, 500. 377, 480-1.
Vanier, Maj.-Gen. G. P., D.S.O., M.C., C.D.: 177. Vinchiaturo: Appx. "I".
Varengeville: 346, 354, 362. Vasterival: 362. Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Acts, 1933,
VIE Day: 432-3, 516. The: 255-6; other refs 209, 230, 276,
Vehicles: 25, 278-9, 281-4, 499. Venlo: Appx. "I". 450.
Vergato: Appx. "I". Vladivostok: 452.
"Veritable", Operation: Appx. "I". Verity, H.M.S.: 267- Volk, Trooper G.: 380.
8. Vokes, Maj.-Gen. C., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.,
Vernon, B.C.: 136, 175, Appx. "E". Veules-les-Roses: C.D.: 414, Appx. "F".
352. Voluntary Service: reliance on, 110-18. Vulnerable
Vian, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Philip L., G.C.B., Points: "List Two", 32; other refs 41, 43, 53, 148-51.
K.B.E., D.S.O., R.N.: 302, 304-5. Vichy: 285, 318,
W
Wadi Akarit: 249. Force, 103, 1056; economy, 91-4; Churchill, 97;
Wake Island: 462, 492. control of overseas forces, 98, 217, 222, 308, 333;
Wales: 287, 425. compulsory service, 97, 118, 120-1; C.W.A.C., 125;
Walford, Maj.-Gen. A. E., C.B., C.B.E., -M.M., E.D.: training, 137, 244; P. W. and internees, 151; home
514, Appx. "F". defence, 86, 157-8, 161, 164-7, 170-2, 184;
Walker, Colonel Edwin A., U.S. Army: 106. Caribbean, 181-2; Forestry Corps, 209; Gibraltar,
Walker, Lt.-Col. R. D.: 482. 299; strategic thinking, 319, 409-10; repatriation and
Wallis, Brigadier C.: 460,465-7,469,471,473-6,478-9. demobilization, 432; Hong Kong, 441, 449;
Walsh, Maj.-Gen. G., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.: 304. 417. Aleutians, 498, 500-1; Pacific Force, 507, 513-14,
War Book: 9, 33. Australia, 510; absence of meetings, 513; last
War Cabinet, British: Dunkirk, 270-2; strategy, 316, meeting, 514; see also Defence Committee of the
325, 409; other refs 259, 307, 396, 511. Cabinet; Special Committee of the Cabinet.
War Committee of the Cabinet: composition, etc., 82; War Industries: "a four year task", 36; Canadian
finance, 93; Jamaica, 77; Iceland, 79; formations industrial capacity, 26, 286; other refs 8, 20, 22-4,
authorized, 74-5, 77, 80, 83, 94, 99, 288; army 91, 120, Appx. "G".
programmes, 87, 91, 95, 97, 103; Special Service War Measures Act: 42, 59.
620 INDEX - PART I
War Office (U.K.): Canadian Coast Defence, 27; West Indies: 59, 78-9, 84, 86, 123, 161, 181-2, 186,
equipment, 24-6, 62-3, 159; Canadian formations, 444, 446.
74-5, 86, 90-1, 102; Iceland, 83: Canadian Army West Wall: 349, 352, 405..
Programme, 86-7, 94, 96; Canadian ancillary troops, Westerham: 289.
66, 68, 100, 108; command arrangements with, 68; Westphal, General Siegfried: 264.
Canadian cooperation, 83, 94, 96, 194, 198, 202, "Wetbob", Operation: 322, 402.
209. 213, 219, 225, 227, 299-302, 322, 509; training, Weygand, General Maxime: 265, 272, 274-5, 277, 280.
230, 232, 237, 241, 248-9, 255; Norway, 258-62; Whitaker, Brigadier W. D., D.S.O., E.D.: 376.
France and Low Countries, 265-7, 269; 2nd B.E.F. White, Maj.-Gen. J. B., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D.: 208.
and after, 274, 276, 278-9. 285, 288; lessons of Whitehorse, Yukon: 174.
France, 289-90; Dieppe, 387, 396; Japan and Hong Wight, Isle of: 324, 334, 339, 390, 406.
Kong, 439, 443-4, 452, 456, 461, 464, 487; other William Henry Harrison, Fort: 106.
refs 27, 73, 79 417-18, 420, 431. Williams, General Sir Guy, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.:
War Supply Board. See Department of Muni 290.
tions and Supply, Defence Purchasing Board. Williamson, Col. D. D.: 106. Windsor, H.R.H. the
Wartime Information Board: 116. Duke of: 181.
Warwick, Bermuda: Appx. "E". Windsor, N.S.: 192.
Washington, D.C.: distinguished visitors to, 98, 310-11, Winnipeg: 150, 445-8, Appx. "E"
314-15, 350, 431; C.W.A.C., 127; Pacific War Winterbourne Gunner: 232.
Council, 320; Washington Treaties, 455. Wireless: equipment, 25; Dieppe, facilities 348, 368,
"Waterloo", Exercise: 239. procedure 356, silence 358, 360, enemy 359.
Watford: 206. Wolverhampton: 288.
Watson, General Sir D. G., G.C.B., C.B.E., M.C.: 100. Wong Nei Chong Gap: 467, 475, 477, 480-1, 483-4.
Wavell, Field-Marshal The Viscount, of Cyrenaica and Woodstock, Ont.: 136.
of Winchester, G.C.B., G.C.S.L, G.C.I.E., C.M.G., Woodsworth, J. S., M.P.: 14.
M.C.: 93, 296 World War, First: mobilization procedure, 47-8;
Weapons: general, 235, 398, 499, 518, Appx. "G"; officers, 51, 413; veterans of, 52, 75; conscription
Hong Kong force, 446-7, 449, 457, 460. 1917, 111; women's corps, 124; tanks, 406; other
"Weasel": 105. refs 3-4, 20, 29-30, 35, 190, 194, 207, 415-16.
Weeks, Maj.-Gen. E. G., C.B., C.B.E., M.C., M.M., Worthing: 243, 293.
C.D.: 43, 222, Appx. "F". Worthington, Maj.-Gen. F. F., C.B., M.C., M.M., C.D.:
Welfare: 201, 420-4. 88, 92, 99, Appx. "F".
Welland Canal: 150. Wrong, H. Hume: 320.
Wells, Hon. Brigadier Rt. Rev. G. A.: 421, Wyburd, Commander D.B., R.N.: 360.
Wesel: Appx. "I". Wyman, Brigadier R.A., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D.: 417.
"Weserubung", Operation: 258.
Y
Yalta Conference: 519. Young, Sir Mark, G.C.M.G.: 450, 479, 486, 488.
Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku: 453, 495. Young, Lt.-Col. Peter, D.S.O., M.C.: 361.
Yarmouth Roads, England: 339. Young Men's Christian Association: 421-3.
Yarmouth, N.S.: 142. Youth Training Centres: 137.
Yorke Island, B.C.: 28; 147, 156, 166. Ypres: 265.
Young, Major C. A.: 477. "Yukon", Exercises: 334, 339.
Young, Maj.-Gen. H. A., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.: Yukon Territory: 166, 174.
Appx. "F". Yvetot: 355.
Young, Maj.-Gen. J. V., C.B., C.B.E.: 202, Appx “F”
“Z” Force (Iceland): 83-6 Zeitzler, Col.-Gen. Kurt: 391-2

INDEX-PART II
FORMATIONS, UNITS AND CORPS
A. CANADIAN FORCES
6th: Dieppe, 334, 372, 382-3, 387, 390;
Aerodrome Defence Companies: 175. other refs 43, 45, 54, 75, 86, 166, 244-5.
Air Force. See Royal Canadian Air Force. Airfield 8th: 247.
Defence Battalions: 1'75, 180. 9th: 247.
Army Field Regiments: defined, 66; see also Units, 10th: 166.
Artillery. 11th: 99.
Army, First Canadian: proposed and approved, 94-7; 13th: 150-1, B.C., 166-8, 175, Appx. "E"; overseas,
commander's terms of reference, 98; formation and 185, 204; Aleutians, 498, 500-2, 504-5.
development, 99, 101, 103, 108-9, 134, 198, 209, 14th: 175, 204, Appx. "E".
411-12; relations with N.D.H.Q. and C.M.H.Q., 98, 15th: 167, 175, 204, Appx. "E".
200, 212-15, 217-29; training, 245, 247, 250, 252; 16th: 175, 185, Appx. "E".
Dieppe, 329, 333, 342-3, 399; commanders, 99, 416- 17th-21st: 175, Appx. "E".
17; other refs 72, 211, 430, 499, 515, Appx "F", Training
Apps "I" No. 1 Training Brigade Group: 135-6, 185.
Army Service Corps. See Royal Canadian Army Reserve Brigade Groups—
Service Corps. 31st to 42nd: 182.
Artillery. See Royal Canadian Artillery and General
Index. "C" Force (Hong Kong) : Chap. XIV, passim.
Atlantic Command: G.O.C.'s terms of reference, 163-4; Canadian Active Service Force. See Part I. ]
G.O.Cs., Appx. "F"; other refs 80, 171-2, 175-6, 179, Canadian Armoured Corps: formation of, 8b93, 95-6,
180, 186, Appx. "E"; see also Part I, Atlantic Coast, 102; training centre, 133, 135-6; reconnaissance units, 290; Dieppe, 378;
Coast Defence, Home Defence. otherrefs108,204;seealsoUnits.
Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicles Training Centre:
"B" Force (Bermuda): 181. 34, 88, 133.
Brigades Canadian Army, The. See Part I.
Armoured 1st: 88, 92, 417. Canadian Army Occupation Force: 434, 519.
2nd: 93, 252, 417. Canadian Army Overseas. See Part I.
4th: 252. Canadian Army Pacific Force: 432-4, 512-19.
Army Tank Canadian Army Trades School: 137.
1st: 90-2, 298; training, 238, 242, 244, 248-9; Canadian Chaplain Service: 129, 201, 204, 421, 448.
Dieppe, 334; Sicily, 108, 251, 412. 2nd: 99, Canadian Corps. See Corps, 1st.
101, 104, 418. 3rd: 102-4. Canadian Dental Corps: 19, 201, 204, 206, 448.
Artillery Canadian Forestry Corps: 65, 78-9, 189, 20710; No. 5
1st Anti-Aircraft: 242. Forestry Company, 208.
Infantry Canadian Infantry Corps: formed, 143; see also Units,
1st: "Angel Move", 265-6, 268, 270; France Infantry.
(1940), 279-285, 287; other refs 43, 54, 247, Canadian Intelligence Corps: 197, 204, 207.
516. Canadian Military Headquarters. See Part I.
2nd: Norway, 234, 259; Spitsbergen, 302; Canadian Officer Cadet Training Unit (Cdn.O.C.T.U.):
other refs 43, 54, 85, 516. 129, 138-9, 237, 240.
3rd: Hardelot, 309; other refs 43, 54, 245, Canadian Officers Training Corps: 19, 51, 113, 127,
294, 516. 139, 182.
4th: training, 236, 244-5; Dieppe, 334, 382, 387; Canadian Postal Corps: 19, 197, 207, 448.
other refs 43, 54, 75, 294. Canadian Provost Corps: 93, 127, 151, 201, 204, 207,
5th: 43-5, 54, 75, 244, 294. 232; No. 1 Cdn. Provost Company, 267.
621
622 INDEX - PART II
Canadian School of Army Administration: 136. 2nd: mobilized, proceeded overseas, 43, 45, 54, 58, 70,
Canadian Signal Training Centre: 133, 142. 72-8, 86, 192; Iceland, 83-5; Newfoundland, 179;
Canadian Tank School. See Canadian training, 202, 235-6, 238, 240-1,' 243-7, 250, 252-3,
Armoured Fighting Vehicles Training Centre. 308; defence of U.K., 289, 294-5, 297; Dieppe, 329,
Canadian Technical Training Corps: 137. 331, 334, 338, 343-4, 387, 392-3, 404, Appx. "H";
Canadian Training School (England): 136, 236-7, 240, commanders and staff, 215, 249, 414, 416, Appx.
246. "F"; Normandy, Appx. "I".
Canadian Wives Bureau, C.M.H.Q.: 201, 207, 424. 3rd: mobilized, proceeded overseas, 77-80, 88, 91-2,
Canadian Women's Army Auxiliary Corps: 124. 167, 192; Iceland, 83-5; defence of Canada, 162-3;
Canadian Women's Army Corps: 117-18, 124-7, 137-8, Newfoundland, 179; training, 86, 242-8, 250-2, 329,
189, 210-11, 517. 404; defence of U.K., 298; Canaries, 411;
Commands. See Atlantic Command and Pacific commanders, Appx. "F"; Holland, Appx. "I".
Command. 4th: see Divisions, Armoured, 4th.
Corps 6th: proposed and authorized, 89, 93; home defence,
1st: organized, 74, 76-8, 84-8, 90-1, 236, 249, 290; 166, 171-2, 175, 183-6; Kuriles, 507; other refs 442-
commanders, 96, 99, 215, 222-3, 243, 416, 429, 3, Appx. "E", Appx "F„
Appx. "F"; training, 238-41, 249-50, 252, 294-5; 6th (C.A.P.F.): 516, 518.
role 244-5, 297; Spitsbergen, 301-7; raiding 7th: home defence, 171-2, 175, 183-4, 186, Appx. "E",
projects, 308; Dieppe Raid, 329, 335, 343, 386, Appx. "F".
399; Canaries, 411; other refs 43, 68, 70-1, 108, 8th: home defence, 171-3, 175, 183-4, 186, Appx. "E",
412, 416, 429, 516. Appx. "F".
2nd: proposed, 94-5; formed, 99; commanders, 99, First World War-1st Canadian Division: 21, 51.
223, 417, Appx. "F"; training, 249-50, 252;
North-West Europe, 109, Appx. "I".
Corps of Military Staff Clerks: 19, 194. Eastern Air Command (R.C.A.F.): 164.
Corps Training Centres: 136. Engineers. See Royal Canadian Engineers.
First Canadian Army. See Army, First Canadian.
1st Echelon: 210-11, 219.
Dental Corps. See Royal Canadian Dental Corps. First Special Service Force. See 1st Canadian Special
District Depots: 53, 113-14, 116, 131, 135, 445. Service Battalion under Units, Infantry.
Divisions
Armoured
1st. See Divisions, Armoured, 5th. Holding Units. See Reinforcement Units.
4th: mobilized, 79-80, 84, 88, 91-3; converted to
armour, 95-6, 99; defence of Canada, 167, 172,
176; overseas, 192; training, 86, 247, 252-3; Japanese Language School: 518.
commanders and staff, 417, Appx. "F";
Holland, Appx. "I"; other refs, 442-3, 418.
5th: mobilized, proceeded overseas, 88-90, 92-3, Machine Gun Battalions: 19, 58, 268, 273, 285, 287,
99, 190, 193; training, 242, 245-7, 249-52; 444, 457.
Italy, 412; commanders and staff, 417-18, 516, Medical Corps. See Royal Canadian Army Medical
Appx. "F". Corps.
Infantry Military Districts
1st: mobilized, proceeded overseas, 43-5, 54-8, 67, General, 39, 41, 113, 116, 131, 137, 182, 186;
71-2, 80, 85, 189, 192-3; inspections, 85; mobilization, 49, 55 (table).
employment, 74, 86, 254; command No. 1: 150.
arrangements, 212-14, 256; training, 230-1, 234- No. 2: 128, 150, 445.
8, 241, 243-8, 251-2, 254; proposed operations, No. 3: 150.
260-1, 264-6, 269, 274, 309, 411; 2nd B.E.F., No. 4: 56, 150.
273-4, 276-85; defence of U.K., 80, 273, 287-9, No. 5: 150, 163, 176-7.
294; Sicily, 108, 411-12; Ortona, 143-4, Appx. No. 6:. 142, 144, 150, 163-4, 180-2.
"I"; commanders and staff, 249, 414-17, Appx. No. 7: 150, 163.
"F"; morale, 425, 427-9; Pacific, 515-16; other No. 10: 150, 445.
refs 173, 329. No. 11: 36, 150, 163, 166, 186.
No. 12: 55, 150, 445.
No. 13: 53, 150, 166.
Motorcycle Regiments: 80.
INDEX - PART II 623
"N" Force (Bahamas): 181-2. Divisional Petrol Company: Appx. "E". 7th Divi-
National Defence Headquarters. See Part I. sional Supply Company: Appx. "E". No. 29 General
Navy. See Royal Canadian Navy. Transport Company: Appx. "E".
Non-Permanent Active Militia. See Part I. No. 71 General Transport Company: Appx. "E". 21st
Brigade Group Company: Appx.
Royal Canadian Artillery: A.A. units, 34, 55, 91, 123,
"111 Force": 301. 148-9, 157, 167-8, 186, 290; A.G.R.As., 108-9;
Ordnance Corps. See Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. coast defence, 121, 146, 149, 151, 157, 167, 174,
178, 180, 186; Dieppe, 334; equipment, Appx. "G";
France 1940, 279, 284-5; training, 136, 169, 174,
Pacific Command: 81, 86, 127, 162, 166-7, 171-5, 185- 232-3; other refs 44, 66, 80, 127, 204, 273, 289, 516;
6, 498, 500-1; G.O.Cs., Appx. "F". Pacific Force. Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, see Units Artillery,
See Canadian Army Pacific Force. Field Regiments, 1st R.C.H.A.; see also Units,
Permanent Force (P.F.). See Part I, Permanent Active Artillery.
Militia. Royal Canadian Corps of Signals: general, 47, 65, 85,
Postal Services. See Canadian Postal Corps. 204, 333; formations, 93, 99, 198; training, 133, 135,
232, 250-1; operations, 284, 304, 443, 460, 464, 469,
488, Appx. "H". Units-2nd Canadian Corps Signals:
Radio Location Unit, No. 1 Canadian: 246. 250-1. 6th Divisional Signals: Appx. "E". 7th
Reconnaissance Units: 136, 168, 290. Divisional Signals: Appx. "E". 8th Divisional
Regiments. See Units. Signals: Appx. "E". 12th Divisional Signals: 51. No.
Reinforcement Units: 203-4, 207, 213, 221, 242-3, 247, 1 Special Wireless Group: 510.
249, 434; training brigade, 204; Royal Canadian Dental Corps. See Canadian Dental
C.W.A.C., 210; Pacific Force, 516; Units— Corps.
No. I Cdn. Base Rft. Depot: 143-4. Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers:
No. 7 Cdn. Inf. Rft. Unit: 143. 201, 206, 251; No. I Base Workshop, 206-7.
No. 1 Cdn. Sigs. Rft. Unit: 143. Royal Canadian Engineers, Corps of: 19; officers, 129;
No. 1 Cdn. General Rft. Unit: 204. training, 133, 232, 234, 247, 251; home defence, 41,
No. I Cdn. Engineers Rft. Unit: 240. 168, 180; operations, 285, 334, 444; Dieppe, 380,
Repatriation Depots (U.K.) : 144, 434. Appx. "H"; 1st Pioneer Battalion, 289-90; 5th Field
Royal Canadian Air Force: funds for, 7, 9, 11, 13, 18, Park Company, Appx. "E".
36, 40, 69, 91, 111, 171; programme, 97, 115; Tunnelling Companies
enlistment, 116; women, 125; army guards for, 41, No. 1: 290, 299-301. No. 2: 299-300.
151, 156, 167-9; home defence, 41-2, 158-9, 161, Field Companies—
163-4, 171-3, 175, 177-8; training in U.K., 234-5, 1st: 268, 284. 3rd: 302, 304. 15th: Appx. "E". 21st:
250; Dieppe, 348, 388; Aleutians, 495, 497, 503; Appx. "E". 22nd: Appx. "E". 23rd: Appx. "E".
Pacific, 511-13; other refs 34, 40, 89, 145, 192, 206, 24th: 498, Appx. "E". 25th: Appx. "E". 26th:
225, 256, 296, 423, 432. Appx. "E". 27th: Appx. "E".
Royal Canadian Armoured Corps. See Canadian
Armoured Corps. Royal Canadian Infantry Corps. See Canadian Infantry
Royal Canadian Army Cadets: 141. Corps.
Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps: for U.K., 65; Royal Canadian Navy: funds for, 4, 11, 13, 15, 69, 91,
training, 133, 135-6, 144, 204, 251; hospitals, 142-3, 111; enlistments, 115-16; women, 97, 125; Aleutians
197, 206; welfare, 423; nursing sisters, 124, 517; and Pacific, 497, 512-13, 518; other refs 28, 41, 89,
Hong Kong, 444, 448-9; other refs 93, 197, 201, 428. 145, 161, 163-4, 177, 193, 206, 296, 434, 448; see
Units-Field Ambulances: No. 1: Appx. "E". No. 3: also Part 1, Naval Defence.
Appx. "E". No. 4: 268. No. 5: 302, 304. No. 6: Appx. Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps: 19, 65, 93, 127, 129,
"E". No. 9: 50, 248. No. 19: Appx. "E". No. 20: 197, 201, 204, 251; No. 1 Static Base Laundry, 210;
Appx. "E". No. 21: Appx. "E". No. 25: 498, Appx. No. 2 Army Field Workshop, 291; Central Ordnance
"E". No. 27: Appx. "E". Depot, 206.
Royal Canadian Army Pay Corps: 129, 197, 204, 302,
304. 2nd Echelon: 211, 219, 345, 516.
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps: 65, 80, 93, 133, Signal Units. See Royal Canadian Corps of Signals.
136, 197, 204, 207, 232, 247, 251. 279. Units-6th Special Service Force. See First Special Service Force
Divisional Ammunition Company: Appx. "E". 7th under Inter-Allied Organizations.
Divisional Ammunition Company: Appx. "E". 6th Survey. See Royal Canadian Artillery.
Divisional Petrol Company: Appx. "E". 7th
624 INDEX - PART II
Training Centres: 114, 116. 168, 174, 183; N.P.A.M., Units, Infantry
119, 121, 134; officers, 105, 12732, 134, 138-41; Algonquin Regiment, The: 51, Appx. "E".
basic, 121, 134-6, 138-9, 142, 445; advanced, 121-2, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada
134, 138, 142, 445; trades and specialist, 136-7; (Princess Louise's), The: Appx. "E".
C.W.A.C., 137-8; cadet camps, 141; combined, 302; Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada,
list of, Appx. "D"; see also Part I, Training. The: 45, 52, 54, 179, Appx. "E"; Dieppe, 363-4,
Transportation Units. See Part I, Railway Troops.
366, 389.
Brockville Rifles, The: Appx. "E".
Units, Armoured Calgary Highlanders, The: 45, 54, 241, 389.
Calgary Regiment, The (14th Armd. Regt. ) 92, 244- Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.), The: 54,
5, 248; Dieppe, 334, 344, 346, 374, 378-80, 389, 79, 85.
404, Appx. "H". Canadian Fusiliers (City of London Regiment), The:
Canadian Grenadier Guards, The (22nd Armd. Regt.) 498, Appx. "E".
: 516. Canadian Scottish Regiment, The: Appx.
14th Army Tank Battalion (Regiment). See Calgary Carleton and York Regiment, The: 54, 57, 143-4;
Regiment. Hardelot raid, 308-10.
Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.) (2nd Armd. Regt.) :
Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada,
81, 92.
Ontario Regiment, The (11th Armd. Regt.): 92. The: Appx. "E".
Royal Canadian Dragoons, The (1st Armd. Edmonton Fusiliers, The: Appx. "E".
Car Regt.): 81, 92. Edmonton Regiment, The: See Loyal
30th Reconnaissance Regiment (The Essex Edmonton Regiment, The.
Regiment): Appx. "E". Essex Scottish Regiment, The: 51; D i e p p e , 3 3 4 ,
31st (Alberta) Reconnaissance Regiment: Appx. "E". 345-6, 366, 368, 374, 376-7, 381-2,
Three Rivers Regiment (12th Armd. Regt.) 92. 384-5, 389, Appx. "H".
12th Manitoba Dragoons (18th Armd. Car Regt.) : 1st Airfield Defence Battalion (Le Regiment
168. de Chateauguay) : 180.
1st Canadian Infantry Regiment: 516.
Units, Artillery
Anti-Aircraft Batteries-1st: 168. 2nd: 148, 168. 4th: 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion: 103-4,123, 433.
34, 41. 14th: 158. 34th: Appx. "E". 40th: 159, 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion: 103-8, 501-
Appx. "E". 46th: 498. 2, 505, Appx. "E"; see also First Special Service
Anti-Aircraft Regiments-3rd: 363. 5th: 93. 9th: Force, 2nd Canadian Parachute Battalion.
Appx. "E". 10th: Appx. "E". 21st: Appx. "E". 1st Garrison Battalion: Appx. "E".
22nd: Appx. "E" 23rd: Appx. "E". 24th: Appx. 48th Highlanders of Canada: 48, 54, 268, 280, 282-3,
"E". 25th: Appx "E". 26th: Appx. "E". 27th: Apps 285, 290.
"E". 28th: Appx. "E" Fusiliers de Sherbrooke, Les: Appx. "E".
Anti-Tank Regiments-4th: 92. 8th: Appx. Fusiliers du St. Laurent: 177, 183, Appx.”E”
Army Field Regiments-11th: 302.
Fusiliers Mont-Royal, Les: 45; recruiting, 52, 54-5;
Coast Brigades. See Coast Regiments.
Coast Batteries-role, 147. 59th: 147, Appx. "E". 102nd: Iceland, 45, 85; Dieppe, 334, 342, 347, 381-2,
147. 103rd: Appx. "E". 104th: Appx. "E". 105th: 387, 389, Appx. "H"; 3rd Bn: Appx. "E".
Appx. "E". 106th: Appx. "E". 108th: Appx. "E". Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, The: 54, 63,
Coast Regiments-lst: 146, Appx. "E". 3rd: 146-7, Appx. 268, 282, 284.
"E". 5th: 146, Appx. "E". 15th: 147, Appx. "E". Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment) :
16th: 147, Appx. "E". 17th: Appx. "E". 75, Appx. "B".
Field Batteries--40th: 302. 94th: 147. Kent Regiment, The: Appx. "E".
Field Regiments-1st R.C.H.A.: 44, 279, 281-2, 284. King's Own Rifles of Canada, The: 51, Appx. "E".
3rd: 268. 4th: 363. 11th: 302. 17th: 92. 20th: Appx. Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), The: 176.
"E". 21st: 168, Appx. "E". 22nd: Appx. "E". 23rd:
Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment,
Appx. "E". 24th: 498, Appx. "E". 25th: Appx. "E".
26th: Appx. "E". 27th: Appx. “E” The: Appx. "E".
Heavy Batteries. See Coast Batteries. Lincoln and Welland Regiment, The: Appx. “E
Light Anti-Aircraft: 290, 334; see also Anti Aircraft. Loyal Edmonton Regiment, The: 54,
Medium Batteries: 54. 259, 302, 304. 429.
School of Artillery Overseas, No. 1: 247.
Super-Heavy Batteries: 289.
INDEX - PART II 625
Midland Regiment (Northumberland and Durham), Royal Regiment of Canada, The: 57; Iceland, 83-5;
The: 445, Appx. "E". Dieppe, 334, 339, 346; Puys 363-8, 381, 389.
New Brunswick Rangers, The (10th Independent Royal Rifles of Canada, The: 80, Appx. "E"; Hong
Machine Gun Company): 180, Appx "E„ Kong, 443-8, 460-1, 469-70, 473-9, 483-4, 488,
Oxford Rifles, The: Appx. "E". 490.
Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (P.C.M.R.): 174. Royal 22e Regiment, 34, 44-5, 51, 54.
Parachute Battalion. See 1st Canadian Parachute Royal Winnipeg Rifles, The: 79, Appx. "E".
Battalion. Saint John Fusiliers (M.G.), The: 498, Appx. "E"
Pictou Highlanders, The: 181, Appx. "E". Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.), The: 54, 248, 260,
Prince Albert Volunteers, The: Appx. "E". 304, 516.
Prince Edward Island Highlanders, The: Appx. "E". Sault Ste. Marie and Sudbury Regiment,
Prince of Wales Rangers (Peterborough Regiment), The: Appx. "E".
The: Appx. "E". Scots Fusiliers of Canada, The: Appx. "E".
P r i n c e s s o f W a l e s ' O w n R e g i me n t ( M . G . ) , Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, The: 51, 54, 259.
The: Appx. "E". 2nd Airfield Defence Battalion (The Regina Rifle
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry: 54, 259, Regiment): 175.
302. 2nd Canadian Infantry Regiment: 516.
Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, The: 2nd Canadian Parachute Battalion: 105, Appx. "E";
54; Dieppe, 334, 337, 342, 347, 370-4, 384, 389, see also 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion.
Appx. "H". 2nd/10th Dragoons C.I.C.: Appx. "E".
Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, The: 179, Appx. "E". South Saskatchewan Regiment, The: 54; Dieppe,
Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment), 334, 346-7, 369-74, 389, Appx “H”
The: Appx. "E". 10th Independent Machine Gun Company. See New
Regiment de Chateauguay, Le (1st Airfield Brunswick Rangers.
Defence Battalion): 180, Appx. "E". 3rd Canadian Infantry Regiment: 516.
Regiment de Gaspe-Bonaventure, Le: 177. Toronto Scottish Regiment (M.G.), The: 283, 389.
Regiment de Hull, Le: 498, 500, 506, Appx. Victoria Rifles of Canada, The: Appx. "E".
Regiment de Joliette, Le: Appx. "E". Voltigeurs de Quebec, Les: Appx. "E".
Regiment de la Chaudiere, Le: 45, 78, 79. Westminster Regiment (Motor), The: 51, 210.
Regiment de Levis, Le: Appx. "E". West Nova Scotia Regiment, The: 54, 144.
Regiment de Maisonneuve, Le: 52, 55, .Appx “E” Winnipeg Grenadiers, The: 51, 54, Appx. "E";
Regiment de Montmagny, Le: Appx. "E". West Indies, 181; Hong Kong, 443-8, 460-1, 467,
Regiment de Quebec, Le: Appx. "E". 469, 480-8, 490; Aleutians, 498.
Regiment de St. Hyacinthe, Le: Appx. "E". Winnipeg Light Infantry, The: Appx. "E".
Regina Rifle Regiment, The: 175, Appx. "E".
Rocky Mountain Rangers, The: 498, Appx. Veterans Guard of Canada, The (formerly The Veterans
Royal Canadian Regiment, The: 268, 282. Home Guard) : 79, 151, 167, 169, 180-2, 510.
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, The: Dieppe, 334,
346, 370, 374-7, 381-2, 389, Appx. "W" Force (Newfoundland): 180, Appx. "H". Western
Royal Montreal Regiment, 54, 516. Command: 186.
"Z" Force (Iceland): 84-5.

626 INDEX - PART II
B. BRITISH AND ALLIED FORCES
BRITISH (UNITED KINGDOM) FORCES

AIR FORCE
Auxiliary Air Force. See Royal Air Force. Airborne—
Bomber Command: 291, 331. 6th: 104.
Coastal Command, R.A.F.: 193. Infantry
Fighter Command: 275, 291, 312, 314, 321. 3rd: 244, 275, 286.
No. 11 Fighter Group: 332, 335, 338, 348. Groups, 43rd: 250, 286-8.
Composite, 250-1. 46th: 245.
Royal Air Force: Auxiliary Air Force, 39; W.A.A.F., 47th (London): 241.
125; in 1940, 275, 291-3; Dieppe, 330, 335-6, 347-8, 51st (Highland): 271, 274, 278.
362, 374, 383-4, 386, bombing 398, losses 388, 52nd (Lowland): 271, 274, 278, 280-1,
press 394; Normandy, 403; Far East and Pacific, 283, 287.
444, 456-8, 464, 512; other refs 79, 106, 162, 193, 53rd: 250. 55th: 297.
250-1, 257, 291, 293, 324. 61st: 252.
Women's Auxiliary Air Force: 125. 78th: Appx. "I".
ARMY
Aldershot Command: 231, 294. Eastern Command: 239, 250, 290, 292.
Anti-Aircraft Command: 242. Expeditionary Force. See Part 1, British Expeditionary
Armies Force.
First: 248, 251, 417, 509.
Second: 288, Appx. "I". Far East Command: 444.
Eighth: 249, 343, 417, 429, Appx. "I".
Fourteenth: 509. G.H.Q. Home Forces: command arrangements, 219,
Army Group, 21st: 109, 211, 219, 224, 427. 231; training, 85, 239, 246, 24951; defence of U.K.,
Auxiliary Territorial Service: 124-5. 272-3, 287-9, 292; Dieppe, 312-14, 321, 323, 328-9,
Brigades 333, 338, 343, 399; cross channel operations, 412.
G.H.Q. Reserve: 75, 239, 273, 287, 289, 295, 297.
Infantry
24th Guards: Appx. "I". Home Guard: 285, 292, 298, 424.
148th: 257.
Parachute— Reconnaissance Corps: 290.
3rd: 104. Royal Army Ordnance Corps: 206, 282, 285.
British Expeditionary Force. See Part I. Royal Artillery: 275, 298, 468, 488; Newfoundland
British Troops in China, China Regiments, Appx. "I"; see also Units.
Command: 438, 464, 477.
Royal Engineers: 304, 331, 347, 457, 485; 22nd Fortress
Commandos: 240, 324; Dieppe, 342-3, 361, 392-4; see Company, 457; 40th Fortress Company, 457.
also Units.
Corps Scottish Command: 208-9.
1st: 252, Appx. "I". South East Asia Command: 509.
2nd: 274, 278. South Eastern Command: command arrangements, 219,
4th: 74, 230, 239, 241, 264, 287, 291-2, 297. 298; training, 238-9, 241, 244; operations, 309, 329,
5th: Appx. "I". 342-3. Southern Command: 239, 292. Special
7th: 86-7, 234-5, 288-9, 291-2, 295. Service Brigade: 396. Sussex District: 299.
8th: 250.
10th: Appx. "I". 21st Army Group. See Army Groups. Training
11th: 250. Establishments: 231-4, 236-7, 247-8.
12th: 244-5, 250, 295, Appx. "I".
30th: Appx. "I Units
Divisions Artillery
Armoured 5th Anti-Aircraft Regiment: 457.
1st: 238, 274, 278, 280, 283, 288, 295. 8th Coast Regiment: 457.
2nd: 288. 12th Coast Regiment: 457.
6th: 240. 965th Defence Battery: 457.
8th: 239. 57th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment: Appx "I"
9th: 252. 59th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment:Appx. "I".
Guards: 249-51.
INDEX - PART II 627
NAVAL FORCES
11th Field Regiment: Appx. "I".
166th (Newfoundland) Field Regiment: . Appx. Admiralty: 192, 259-60, 398, 402, 450.
"I". Force "A", Royal Navy: 304, 306.
Commando Force "J", Royal Navy: 404.
No. 3 Commando: 342, 346, 358-63, 368, 392. Home Fleet: 257, 302.
No. 4 Commando: 309, 346, 362-3, 369, 390, 392, Royal Navy: 79, 161-2, 260, 278; Spitsbergen, 301-6;
Appx. "G". Hardelot, 309; Combined Commanders, 321-2;
No. 10 Commando (Inter-Allied): 345. See also Dieppe, 330, 334-5, 342, 345, 364, 367; Pourville,
Royal Marines. 373, 375, 377; evacuation, 384-6, 392; losses, 387-8;
Infantry lessons, 399-402; Gibraltar and Canaries, 410; Japan
Buffs: 248. and Hong Kong, 455-8, 481, 485-7; Pacific, 512;
King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry: 260. other refs 193; see also ships, units and formations
King's Shropshire Light Infantry: 181. by name.
Middlesex Regiment, 1st Battalion: 457-8, 460, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve: 400.
469, 475-6, 479, 480, 483, 486-7. Units and Formations
Royal Scots, 2nd Battalion: 457-9, 461, 465, 467, 3rd Battle Squadron: 157.
469, 480-1, 483, 485-7. 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotillas: 345.
Portsmouth Command: 358, 402.
MISCELLANEOUS
Combined Operations Headquarters: training, 245-7, ROYAL MARINES
302; operations, 308-10, 312, 314, 324-5; Dieppe, "A" Commando: 345, 347, 382, 392. Royal Marines:
324-5, 327-9, 334, 340-1, 344, 363, 388, 394-6, 399- 78, 387, 485, Appx. "G".
404; functions of, 326-7, 411; see also Part I,
Combined Operations, Mountbatten.
COMMONWEALTH AND EMPIRE FORCES

(OTHER THAN UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA)
Australian Forces: 508-100. Units
Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery: 457. 14th Punjab Regiment, 2nd Bn: 457-9, 464, 467-
Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps: 457, 461, 475-6, 9, 480, 486.
479, 481-2. 7th Rajput Regiment, 5th Bn: 457-9, 467-71, 473,
Indian Army: general, 457, 460, 486, 488, 512. 475, 486.
Corps Newfoundland Militia: 180, Appx. "I".
15th: 509. Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit: 210.
Divisions Newfoundland Regiment: 180.
4th: Appx. "I". New Zealand Air Force, Royal: 348.
8th: Appx. "I". New Zealand Force (in United Kingdom) 288, 295,
Brigades 428.
17th: Appx. "I". New Zealand Forces: 508; 2nd New Zealand Division,
Appx. "I".
UNITED STATES FORCES
Air Force, U.S. Army: 172, 181, 311; Dieppe, 348, 356, National Guard: 5.
384, 398; other zones, 403, 495, 518. North Pacific Force (U.S.): 496-7.
Alaska Defense Command: 496, 498. Ranger Battalion, 1st U.S.: 345, 362.
Armies 671st Signal Air Warning Reporting Company:159.
First: 519. Special Service Force, First. See Inter-Allied
Fifth: Appx. "I". Organizations.
Sixth: 518-19. Task Force 8. See North Pacific Force.
Eighth: 519. United States Army. See Part I.
Tenth: 519. United States Marines: 403, 509.
Divisions United States Navy: 173, 193, 318, 449, 492,
7th: 496. 496, 503, 518.
1st Marine: 509. United States Pacific Fleet: 451, 462, 492, 518.
85th: Appx. "I". Western Defense Command: 496, 498.
G.H.Q. South West Pacific Area: 509.
628 INDEX - PART 11
ALLIED FORCES (OTHER THAN U.S.)

BELGIAN
Belgian Army: 265, 269. ITALIAN
Belgian Air Force: 348.
Italian Army: 184th Italian Infantry Brigade, Appx. "1".
CHINESE
NETHERLANDS
Chinese Forces: 452, 487.
Netherlands Army: 77, 264.
CZECHOSLOVAK
NORWEGIAN
Czechoslovak Air Force: 348.
Royal Norwegian Air Force: 348. Norwegian Infantry:
FRENCH 304.
Armies POLISH
First: 264.
Tenth: 280-1. 1st Polish Armoured Division: 252. Polish Air Force: 348.
Divisions U.S.S.R.
60th: 272.
68th: 272. Russian Forces: 452; see also Part 1.
French Air Force: 348. Russian Navy: 301.
French Army: 280, 284.
French Navy: 277, 347.
INTER-ALLIED ORGANIZATIONS
First Special Service Force: 104-8, 500-2, 505; see also 1st
Combined Chiefs of Staff: 311, 319, 325; see also Part 1. Canadian Special Service Battalion.
Combined Commanders. See Part I.
Commando, No. 10 (Inter-Allied). See under British
(United Kingdom) Forces, Units.
C. ENEMY FORCES
GERMAN
Air Force: general, 42, 260, 318, 339, 350, 355, 359, 363, Panzer
408, 420, 425; Poland, 42; diversion from Russian S.S. Panzer: 351.
front, 252, 312-13, 317; Battle of Britain, 275, 290-4, S.S.
296; Dieppe, 383; Dieppe losses, 318, 388; 3rd Air Corps H.Q. (Motorized). See Panzer above.
Fleet, 355.
Divisions
Armies Infantry
Seventh: 390. 110th: 358.
Fifteenth: 352, 356, 392. 165th (Reserve): 407,
302nd: 352, 354-9, 361, 364, 366, 370, 372, 376,
Army: general, 272, 308; Dieppe, 351-5, 388, 390; France
383, 390-1, 393.
1940, 263-4; France 1942,406-8; Norway, 257, 408;
Spain, 410. Panzer
Army Headquarters, Berlin (O.K.H.): 352. 1st S.S. (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler): 350-1, 355,
Army Groups: 390, 405. 407.
Artillery: 354, 407. 2nd S.S. (Das Reich): 350-1, 407.
Commander-in-Chief West (G.H.Q. West) authority, 352; 3rd S.S. (Totenkopf): 350.
Dieppe raid, 355-9, 362; comments on Dieppe raid, 6th: 350-1.
379, 390-1; Atlantic Wall, 405-8; see also Part I, Rund- 7th: 283, 350-1.
stedt. 10th: 339, 350-1, 355, 373, 390.
23rd: 350.
Corps
Infantry Parachute
81st: 352, 357, 359, 362, 379-80, 390-2, 398. 7th Flieger: 350, 355, 407.
INDEX -- PART II 629
Luftwaffe. See Air Force. Army: 451-3, 465, 470, 511.
Navy: general, 16, 160-1, 294, 306-7, 350; Naval Group Artillery: 463, 469-70, 485.
West, 359, 391; Operations Staff, 383, 391; Dieppe,
390; see also Part I, ships by name, U-Boats. Brigades
23rd Inf.: 452.
Units 35th Inf.: 452.
Goring Regt.: 350.
571st Infantry Regt.: 355, 359, 367, 370, 372, 374. Divisions
23rd (Heavy) Aircraft Reporting Company: 366. 9th: 471.
18th: 452.
38th: 452, 462-3, 491.
104th: 452.
JAPANESE
Engineers: 463, 471.
Air Force: Hong Kong, 463-4, 468-9; Aleutians, 493, 495.
Araki Detachment: 463, 487. Regiments
66th Inf.: 463.
Armies 228th Inf.: 452, 463-5, 471, 491.
China Expeditionary: 462. 229th Inf.: 452, 463-4, 471, 473, 491.
Twenty-Third: 462-3, 473. 230th Inf.: 463-5, 471, 491.
Navy: general, 451, 453, 462, 470-1, 473; C.-in-C.
Combined Fleet, 453-4; naval formations, 462, 493,
504; Aleutians, 495-6. 502.

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Official History of the Canadian Army

in the Second World War

SIX YEARS OF WAR

SIX YEARS OF WAR

Published by Authority of the Minister of National Defence

EDMOND CLOUTIER, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., OTTAWA, 1955 QUEEN'S

II. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND THE MOBILIZATION

III. THE EXPANSION OF THE ARMY, 1939-1943

IV. RECRUITING AND TRAINING IN CANADA

V. DEFENDING THE SOIL OF CANADA, 1939-1945

VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN FORCES

VIII. TRAINING THE ARMY OVERSEAS

XIII. SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

The War Against Japan, 1941-1945

XIV. THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG, DECEMBER 1941

XV. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE ALEUTIANS

Pre-War Appropriations for the Department of National Defence ......................................................... 13

Historical Section (G.S.),

Organization, Training and Home Defence

THE CANADIAN MILITIA ON THE EVE OF WAR

The Canadian Tradition

*Appointed C.G.S. 1 January 1929.

The general election of 14 October 1935 resulted in the replacement of the

Liberal administration headed by Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King. It fell to this new

1. Fortification of Pacific Coast prior to Atlantic Coast.

PRE-WAR APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF

Mr. Mackenzie ended by presenting to the Conference the following "conclusions":

The New Programme Develops, 1937-1939

*See below, page 28.

The Reorganization of the Militia

The Problem of Supply

industry designed to diminish our dependence on external sources of supply". He

*Appointed Chief of the General Staff as of 21 November 1938.

The Coast-Defence Programme

Defence Schemes and Mobilization Planning

The Last Days of Peace

The General State of Preparation, 1939

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND THE

The Approach of War

"Adopt Precautionary Stage Against Germany"

War in Europe: The Mobile Force is Mobilized

Reference Defence Scheme Number Three Mobilize entire Mobile Force.*

Canada Goes to War

On 3 September-their final representations to Hitler having failed to check the attack

We have already noted the Government's evident determination to meet Parliament

Estimates should be held down to very moderate level.

The Militia estimates submitted under these instructions ultimately amounted to

Before passing on to discuss the problems of mobilization as they presented

District Officers Commanding,

G.S. 201 Reference Defence Scheme Number Three

Mobilizing the Units of the Active Service Force

This vague instruction was interpreted in some places, notably in Montreal, as a

The Response of the Country

It is time to turn to the statistics of enlistment as they presented themselves at

STRENGTH OF THE CANADIAN ACTIVE SERVICE FORCE55

The Decision to Send Troops Overseas

The Technical Troops for Britain