THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 220045-48, June 22, 2020 ]

WYETH PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION ("CIAC"), CIAC
ARBITRATORS VICTOR P. LAZATIN, SALVADOR P. CASTRO, JR.
AND MARIO E. VALDERRAMA; SKI CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC.;
AND MAPFRE INSULAR INSURANCE CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

When the award of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission Arbitral

Tribunal becomes the subject of judicial review, courts must defer to its factual
findings by reason of its "technical expertise and irreplaceable experience of
presiding over the arbitral process."[1] A stringent exception would be when the
integrity of the arbitral tribunal itself has been jeopardized[2] which is not
present in this case.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] filed by petitioner Wyeth

Philippines, Inc. assailing the Consolidated Decision/Resolution[4] and
Resolution[5] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 117924, 117925, 117929 &
125648, which modified the Award[6] of the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission Arbitral Tribunal in CIAC Case No. 18-2009.

Petitioner Wyeth Philippines, Inc. (Wyeth) is the project owner of the "Dryer 3
and Wet Process Superstructure Works"[7] located at Canlubang Industrial
Estate, Bo. Pittland, Cabuyao, Laguna. In 2007, Wyeth invited bidders to submit
proposals for its project through its consultant, Jacobs Engineering Singapore
Pte. Ltd.[8]

Respondent SKI Construction Group, Inc. (SKI) submitted its qualified proposal to
undertake the project for P242,800,000.00.[9]

On June 29, 2007, SKI was awarded the bid provided it executes the
superstructure works in accordance with a Notice to Proceed issued by Wyeth.
The Notice to Proceed conformed to by SKI President and CEO Albert Altura
provided for the completion of the project on February 23, 2008, and the
possession of the site on June 29, 2007. It also designated Jacob Constructors
Singapore Pte. Ltd. as Project Manager.[10]

After signing the Notice to Proceed, SKI was given an advance payment of
P72,840,000.00.[11]

As required under the Contract, SKI caused respondent Mapfre Insular

Insurance Corp. (Mapfre) to issue the following bonds in favor of Wyeth:

12.1. Surety Bond No. MAIC/G(25) 9995 (the "Payments Bond"), in the
amount of P48,560,000.00 under which [SKI], as principal, and Mapfre,
as surety, bound themselves unto [Wyeth] to jointly and severally pay
claims for all labor and materials used or reasonably required for use
in the performance of the Contract.

12.2. Surety Bond No. MAIC/G(25) 9994 (the "Advance Payment Bond"),
in the amount of P72,840,000.00 under which [SKI], as principal, and
Mapfre, as surety, bound themselves unto [Wyeth] to indemnify
[Wyeth] for its failure to recoup the Advance Payment granted to [SKI]
by [Wyeth] in connection with the Contract.

12.3. Performance Bond No. MAIC/G(13)4104 (the "Performance Bond"),

in the amount of P48,560,000.00 under which [SKI], as principal, and
Mapfre, as surety, bound themselves unto [Wyeth] to indemnify
[Wyeth] for any loss or damage that [it] may suffer as a consequence of
[SKI's] failure to perform its obligations and comply with the terms and
conditions of the Contract.[12]

On January 25, 2008, the Project Manager directed the cessation of all
construction activities starting from January 26, 2008 until further notice to give
SKI ample time to address internal issues regarding its workforce.[13]

In a letter dated February 6, 2008, Wyeth notified Mapfre that it might need to
call upon the bonds.[14]

On February 8, 2008, Wyeth, through its managing director informed SKI of the
termination of the contract.[15] On February 11, 2008, SKI replied saying the
termination was done without giving them 14 days to address the problems,
pursuant to Clause 8 of the Conditions of the Contract:

"if in the opinion of the Project Manager... the Contractor fails to

proceed regularly and diligently with the Works... then the Project
Manager shall give them Notice by registered post or hand delivery
specifying the defaults and if the Contractor either shall continue such
default for fourteen (14) days after receipt of such notice... then the
Owner... may within ten (10) days after such continuance or
repetition... terminate the Employment of the Contractor."[16]

SKI claimed they essentially only had three days to complete the project from the
time they were informed of their default on January 23, 2008, until the Project
Manager suspended all the construction activities starting January 26, 2008, even
if they supposedly had until February 6, 2008 to complete it.[17]

On February 19, 2008, Wyeth wrote a letter to Mapfre, calling on the

performance of the bonds they issued.[18]

On February 29, 2008, Wyeth wrote another letter to Mapfre, requesting

confirmation that it will not be barred from claiming on the bonds pending
settlement with SKI.[19] On March 4, 2008, Mapfre confirmed that Wyeth will not
be barred from pursuing its claims against the bonds. However, Mapfre stated
that it will only act on the bonds after SKI's liability has been clearly established.
[20]

In a Letter dated January 14, 2009, Mapfre refused to pay the amount under the
payments bond.[21]

On February 10, 2009, Wyeth wrote to Mapfre demanding payment of

P47,371,855.91 representing the unrecouped amount from the advance payment
of P72,840,000.00 given to SKI.[22]

When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement on the claims after
various meetings, they agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration pursuant to
Article 10 of their contract.[23]

After the parties still failed to reach a settlement, Wyeth filed a Complaint before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati to recover the amount under the payments
bond. However, the parties eventually agreed to resolve the dispute through
arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(Commission).

On June 2, 2009, SKI filed a Complaint against Wyeth before the Commission for
the adjudication of its claims.[24] On June 29, 2009, Wyeth filed an Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaims. On July 21, 2009, SKI filed a Reply to Counterclaim.
[25]

In its Order dated July 23, 2009, the Commission apprised the parties of the
composition[26] of the Arbitral Tribunal and the setting of the preliminary
conference on August 6, 2010.[27]

During the preliminary conference, Wyeth filed an Omnibus Motion to implead

Mapfre pursuant to the bonds it issued in favor of Wyeth.[28]
On October 19, 2009, Mapfre filed an Answer[29] claiming that Wyeth was not
entitled to recover anything. It claimed to have acted in good faith in rejecting
Wyeth's claim, because the same had been extinguished by judicial
compensation. However, should it be held liable to Wyeth, Mapfre prayed to be
indemnified by SKI. On November 6, 2009, Wyeth filed its Reply.[30]

On November 11, 2009, the Commission denied the motion filed by Wyeth
seeking to recall the appointment of two members of the tribunal.[31] On
November 17, 2009, SKI, Wyeth, and Mapfre signed the Terms of Reference,[32]
stating admitted facts, positions, claims and counterclaims, issues to be
determined, and amount of arbitration fees.

In its Order dated December 22, 2009, the Arbitral Tribunal granted Wyeth's
Motion for Reconsideration by recalling the appointment of Jose F. Mabanta
from the tribunal, and directing the two members to choose a replacement from
the list of accredited arbitrators who is not a nominee of any of the parties.[33]

On February 1, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal promulgated its Order denying

Wyeth's prayer to declare all proceedings, including the conduct of preliminary
conference, preparation, and signing of Terms of Reference, as vacated.[34] On
April 14, 2010, Wyeth filed a Manifestation and Motion on the Appointment of
Felisberto G.L. Reyes (Reyes), claiming that he was an original nominee of SKI.
[35] On April 19, 2010, Reyes resigned as member of the tribunal.[36] On April 27,
2010, the Commission appointed Salvador P. Castro, Jr. to replace Reyes.[37]

After the conduct of hearings, submission of parties' memoranda and offers of

exhibits, the Arbitral Tribunal issued its December 23, 2010 Award,[38] finding
that Wyeth validly terminated the contract because SKI incurred delay in the
construction of the project. SKI was held liable for the payment of additional
costs incurred by reason of the delay in the performance of its obligation.
However, it awarded SKI the cost of rebars, formworks, safety equipment and
repairs it had made.[39]

In finding SKI liable, the Arbitral Tribunal reasoned out that: (1) the agreed
commitments under various construction programs were not met;[40] (2) the
notes from the project meetings and Wyeth's letters raising causes of delays were
not disputed and some were even acknowledged by SKI;[41] and (3) while SKI's
delays were justified, they failed to raise a timely objection to Wyeth's Variation
Order indicating that the problems they encountered had no time impact to the
project's completion.[42] The Arbitral Tribunal further held that SKI is not
entitled to an extension of time as its justifications were afterthoughts to escape
its liability for the delays. Lastly, its failure to assert its entitlement to damages
within the period allowed under the contract barred it from claiming them.[43]
The Arbitral Tribunal held that Wyeth, as project owner, had a wide latitude in
exercising its prerogative to terminate the contract and that the termination was
valid because SKI could further prejudice the completion of the project should it
be given another chance to discharge its contractual obligations.[44]

The Arbitral Tribunal awarded SKI its valid claims, specifically: (1) the value of
rebars considering that Wyeth had already agreed to SKI's entitlement to this; (2)
the value of safety harness used by Wyeth; (3) the cost of repair of the damaged
tower crane; and (4) the value of the damaged tower crane collar.[45]

However, the Arbitral Tribunal denied SKI's following claims: (1) the additional
labor costs to catch up with the works as it was SKI who caused the delay;[46] (2)
the additional costs due to change in the formworks system because it was SKI's
contractual obligation to supply them;[47] (3) the cost for complying with
additional safety requirements because SKI failed to observe the strict safety
requirements stipulated in the contract;[48] and (4) the additional cost for a Load
Moment Indicator (LMI) which aids in inspecting and certifying the worthiness
of the crane.[49]

The Arbitral Tribunal also denied for lack of merit the other claims of SKI
considering that the termination of the contract was valid:

(1) Additional overhead expenses from March 2008 to December 2008

(2) Loss of profit for undue termination
(3) Loss of profit for deleted items
(4) Standby cost of equipment, formworks, crane, Generator set and
other materials; and
(5) Moral and exemplary damages

On the other hand, the Arbitral Tribunal found the need to evaluate Wyeth's
counterclaims, considering that it far exceed the value of the contract sum of the
project in dispute.[50] Particularly, it held that Wyeth's claim of payment to
various contractors in the amount of P167,588,306.67 is questionable since the
total contract sum is P214,944,802.30 and P108,326,018.64 was already paid to
SKI, leaving only P106,618,783.70 or 49.60% of the total contract sum.[51]

The Arbitral Tribunal held that while Wyeth suffered pecuniary loss, the
evidence it submitted were not clear and convincing as to establish actual
damages. Hence, the Tribunal applied Article 2224 of the Civil Code[52] and the
parties' agreement on liquidated damages[53] as measure for temperate
damages. It awarded Wyeth temperate damages amounting to P24,280,000.00,
the maximum amount permitted under the contract.[54]

The Arbitral Tribunal held that Wyeth failed to present clear and convincing
evidence on the scope, details, costing and reasonableness of some of their
claims, specifically: (1) costs incurred for labor and materials; (2) additional cost
of labor; (3) payment to various contractors; (4) rectification works; (5)
additional cost to retain the site establishment; and (6) payment to other
contractors. However, it found Wyeth's claim of payment to various suppliers in
the amount of P6,852,678.71 as valid and undisputed.[55]

The Arbitral Tribunal further held that the unrecouped down payment is
deemed included in Wyeth's "global" or excess claim after lumping all the cost it
allegedly incurred (including all payments to SKI as well as all other
contractors/suppliers) less the contract price, and granted the unrecouped
amount of P42,293,679.02 in addition to the Temperate Damages.[56]

The Arbitral Tribunal ruled that the cost of arbitration should be equally
shouldered by SKI and Wyeth, Mapfre should shoulder its own costs, and no
party may recover attorney's fees from each other.[57] It further held Mapfre
jointly and severally liable with SKI, on its: (1) Advance Payment Bond, for the
unrecouped down payment; (2) Payment Bond; and (3) Performance Bond equal
to the Temperate Damages awarded.[58] The Arbitral Tribunal held that the right
to file claim on the Payment Bond is not "time-barred" and the referral to
arbitration is based on the agreement between Wyeth and Mapfre, without
objection from SKI.[59] Lastly, it held that Mapfre should be indemnified by SKI
in case it is made to pay Wyeth.[60]

The Award's dispositive portion read:

WHEREFORE, AWARD is hereby made as follows:

A. FOR CLAIMANT
 

Rebar
1. PhP12,298,307.68 
2. Formworks 2,787,795.20 
3. Safety
157,500.01 
Harness
4. Repair of
Damaged Tower 1,172,384.00 
Crane
5. Damage
Tower Crane 1,890,518.28 
Collar
Total PhP18,306,505.17 

B. FOR RESPONDENT

1. Temperate Damages for the following Claims: PhP24,280,000.00

a) Cost incurred for Labor and Materials

b) Additional Cost for Labor

 c) Additional Site Management

d) Payment to Various Contractors
e) Rectification Work
f) Payment to Other Contractors

2. Payment to Various Suppliers              PhP6,852,678.71

3. Unrecouped Down Payment               PhP42,293,670.02

SUMMARY

COMPUTATION

Claimant                                             PhP18,306,505.17

Respondent

 Temperate Damages               PhP24,280,000.00

 Payment to Various

 Suppliers                                      6,852,678.71

Recoupment of Down Payment  PhP42,293,679.02             

(PhP73,426,357.73)

                                                                             ------------------------
Due to Respondent                                                   PhP 55,119,852.56

                                                                                =============

This amount of Php55,119,852.56 due to Respondent from Claimant

shall earn legal interest from the date of this Award until fully paid.

On the Third Party Complaint, the Arbitral Tribunal awards to

Respondent against MAPFRE the maximum amounts as follows:

1. On the
Advance - PhP42,293,679.02 
Payment bond
2. On the
- 6,852,678.71 
Payment Bond
3. On the
Performance - 24,280,000.00 
Bond

but [sic] MAPFRE's liability cannot exceed the net liability of Claimant,
its principal, in the amount of Php55,119,852.56. Moreover, on the
Cross-Claims against Claimant, MAPFRE is awarded the right of
indemnification for any amounts that it may pay to Respondent, with
legal interest from the time of Notice of Payment is served on the
Claimant, [sic]

SO ORDERED.[61]
On February 18, 2011, Wyeth filed a Petition for Review,[62] docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 117929, before the Court of Appeals, praying for the deletion of the award
to SKI of the value of rebars, formworks, safety equipment, and costs of the
damaged tower crane and tower crane collar. It also prayed that its net award be
increased from P55,119,852.56 to P348,573,877.08. Lastly, it prayed that Mapfre
be held solidarily liable with SKI for the entire amount of P348,573,877.08. On
the same day, Mapfre filed a separate Petition for Review,[63] docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 117924. On February 21, 2011, SKI filed its Petition for Review,[64]
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 117925, before the Court of Appeals.

On May 25, 2011, Wyeth filed a Motion for Execution of the Award[65] before the
Commission.

In its March 6, 2012 Resolution,[66] the Arbitral Tribunal denied the motion for
execution on the basis of CIAC Resolution No. 06-2002 or "Policy Guidelines to
Clarify the Policy Guidelines Regarding Execution of a Final Award During
Appeal"[67] and further explained that "allowing [Wyeth] to move for the
execution of the CIAC award as well as question the same award on appeal
results to an absurd and conflicting scenario of a party seeking enforcement of a
final and executory judgment while also seeking the reversal or modification of
the same judgment."[68]

The Arbitral Tribunal ratiocinated that since the Revised Rules[69] is

substantially a reenacted rule regarding the Rule on Execution of Final Award, it
can be regarded that the present rule adopts the interpretation of the previous
rule which under CIAC Resolution No. 06-2002 is that "no execution shall issue
where both parties appeal[ed]."[70]

In its May 25, 2012 Order,[71] the Arbitral Tribunal denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Wyeth.

On July 16, 2012, Wyeth filed a Petition for Mandamus,[72] docketed as CA-GR. SP
No. 125648 before the Court of Appeals, questioning the March 6, 2012
Resolution and May 25, 2012 Order of the CIAC.

In a May 15, 2014 Resolution,[73] the Court of Appeals granted Wyeth's Motion
for Consolidation of Cases filed on June 7, 2013. Thus, the Petitions for Review
filed by Wyeth and SKI were consolidated with the Petition for Review filed by
Mapfre. Subsequently, Wyeth's Petition for Mandamus was also consolidated
with the three (3) other petitions.[74]

In its January 23, 2015 Consolidated Decision/Resolution,[75] the Court of Appeals

held that SKI is liable for the delay, as it is undisputed that SKI did not achieve
the milestones stated in the Conditions of the Contract, and failed to ask for an
extension of time if the delays were indeed not attributable to it.[76]

The Court of Appeals also affirmed the Arbitral Tribunal's ruling that Wyeth
validly terminated its contract with SKI, because SKI did not proceed regularly
and diligently with the project when it failed to supply equipment and materials,
adequate manpower, and sufficient supervision over the project.[77]

The Court of Appeals also found that Wyeth served a Notice of Default to SKI on
January 23, 2008 and the latter had until February 6, 2008, or 14 days from notice
within which to remedy the defaults. However, when asked for an update on
February 5, 2008, SKI said it was still addressing the issues with its workforce
prompting Wyeth to terminate the contract.[78]

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Arbitral Tribunal's findings that SKI's claims
for the following are baseless, since SKI was responsible for the delays in the
construction of the project:

(1) Additional labor cost;

(2) Additional cost due to
change in formworks system;
(3) Additional cost due to additional safety requirements;

(4) Additional cost due to use of cranes with LMI;

(5) Additional overhead expenses from March 2008

to December 2008;
(6) Loss of profit for undue termination;

(7) Loss of profit for deleted items;

(8) Standby cost; and

(9) Moral and exemplary damages.[79]

It also held that while SKI is entitled to the value of rebars, formworks, and costs
of repair, the amount cannot be established with certainty.[80] Thus, the Court of
Appeals only awarded SKI temperate damages amounting P4,500,000.00 and
P157,500.01, for the value of safety harnesses, as the claim was undisputed.[81]

The Court of Appeals held that the Arbitral Tribunal erred in awarding
temperate damages to Wyeth, and instead awarded actual damages amounting
to P90,717,632.06,[82] broken down as follows:

(1) Payment of P5,507,726.50 to Precision Ready Mix, P28,985,790.00 to

Capitol Steel and P3,844,481.14 to Unitan, considering that SKI agreed
to such amounts;

(2) Payment to Chittick of P2,110,763.67, or to the extent covered by

official receipt;
(3) Payment to
SMCC of P9,794,372.29, or to the extent covered by
official receipt;
(4) Payment to
EEI of the total amount of P21,959,311.60, for being
supported by official receipt;
(5) Payment to Cape East
of P12,301,474.21, or only to the extent
 covered by official receipt;
(6) Payment to Freyssinet of P477,105.35 or to the extent covered by
official receipt;
(7) Payment of P5,357,143.00 to RMD, for being covered by an official
receipt;
(8) Payment of P111,607.14 to BCA for being covered by an official
receipt; and
(9) Payment of P122,767.86 to T-Shuttle.[83]

However, it held that the following claims were not proven by Wyeth: (1)
payment to Tetra Pak of P32,572,301.44; (2) additional project costs in the
amount of P101,923,163.14; and (3) payment to Unitan for termination-related
cost of P20,767,401.12.[84]

For Wyeth's claim on the bonds, the Court of Appeals held that:

(1) Wyeth's claim against the Payment Bond is not time-barred because
it filed its claim within a year from the time of its denial.
This made Mapfre liable to perform the Payment Bond
amounting to
P38,337,997.14;
(2) Wyeth's claim
against the Advance Payment Bond is not
extinguished and it is entitled to the unrecouped downpayment of
P42,293,679.02; and
(3) Mapfre is liable
under the Performance Bond up to the extent of
P48,560,000.00, due to SKI's delay.[85]

The Court of Appeals also found it inappropriate to award attorney's fees in

favor of either party and held that each party shall bear its own arbitration cost.
[86]

The Court of Appeals held that the Arbitral Tribunal did not err in refusing to
execute its Award, considering that the 2010 CIAC Rules is silent as to whether a
party may ask for the execution of the award it also assails, and Wyeth failed to
state good reasons why judgment should be executed pending appeal pursuant
to Rule 39, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court.[87]

The dispositive portion of the Consolidated Decision/Resolution read:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby disposes and orders that in CA-G.R. SP

No. 117924, the Decision promulgated on 22 April 2013 is hereby
MODIFIED as will be stated hereunder; in CA-G.R. SP No. 117925, SKI's
Petition for Review is PARTLY GRANTED; in CA-G.R. SP No. 117929,
Wyeth's Petition for Review is PARTLY GRANTED; and in CA-G.R. SP
No. 125648, Wyeth's Petition for Mandamus is DENIED.

Accordingly,

 1. Wyeth is ordered to pay SKI the total amount of PhP4,500,000.00 as

temperate damages and PhP157,500.01 for the value of the safety
harness or a total of PhP4,657,500.01;

2. In addition to the award of unrecouped downpayment in the amount

of PhP42,293,670.02, Wyeth is awarded the amount of PhP90,717,632.06
as actual damages. Hence, SKI is ordered to pay Wyeth the total
amount of PhP133,011,302.08;

3. The above award to SKI and Wyeth shall earn interest at the rate of
6% per annum computed from the date of the assailed Award until
fully paid;

4. Mapfre's liability under the Bonds shall be as follows: under the

Advance Payment Bond, PhP42,293,670.02; under the Payment Bond,
PhP38,337,997.64 and under the Performance Bond, PhP48,560,000.00.
Mapfre is awarded the right of indemnification for any amount it may
pay to Wyeth, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from time of
Notice of Payment is served to SKI until fully paid; and

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

SO ORDERED.[88]

In an August 3, 2015 Resolution,[89] the Court of Appeals denied the respective

motions for reconsideration filed by Wyeth and SKI.

On October 2, 2015, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

On January 13, 2016, the Court required respondents to file a comment.[90] On

March 30, 2016, private respondent SKI filed its Comment.[91] Subsequently,
private respondent Mapfre filed also filed its Comment on April 11, 2016.[92]

On June 20, 2016, this Court granted the motions for extension of time filed by
private respondents, noted their separate comments, and required petitioner to
file a consolidated reply.[93] Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit
Consolidated Reply[94] and a Consolidated Reply[95] on September 22, 2016.

Petitioner avers that whether it is entitled to an execution pending appeal is a

question of law, properly determinable under its Petition for Review filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and the factual issues raised would fall under the
exceptions. Specifically, petitioner claims that the Arbitral Tribunal and the
Court of Appeals have conflicting findings of fact, and manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed details which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion. Also, it claimed that the Court of Appeals' findings
as to the parties' entitlement to claims are contradicted by the evidence on
record.

Petitioner argues that it proved and substantiated all of its monetary claims,
entitling it to an additional award of P377,269,282.64, inclusive of VAT. It claimed
that aside from the official receipts, it proved payment by unrefuted testimonies
of witnesses, parole evidence, and tabular summaries. Petitioner argues that
respondent SKI is not entitled to an award for the value of rebars, formworks,
and costs of repair.

Petitioner also maintains that the liability of respondent Mapfre under the
Advance Payment Bond should be P47,368,910.42, and P48,560,000.00 for the
Payment Bond. Furthermore, petitioner posits that respondents SKI and Mapfre
should be solidarily liable to pay attorney's fees and arbitration costs.

Lastly, Petitioner claims that it is entitled to an execution pending appeal under

the 2010 CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration. It
counters that CIAC Resolution No. 06-2002 is not applicable because: (1) it deals
with entry of judgment and not execution of judgment; (2) it was not published
in the Official Gazette; (3) it was expressly repealed under the 2005 Revised Rules
of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration; and (4) it was not part of the
2010 CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration.

In its Comment, private respondent SKI claims that it is entitled to exemplary

damages, considering that there is substantial evidence that petitioner agreed to
its other claims.

As for petitioner's monetary claims, private respondent SKI maintains that this
Court, not being a trier of facts, is not expected to review the evidence, especially
that a specialized body like the Arbitral Tribunal, and the Court of Appeals had
already evaluated them and ruled that they were not proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty.[96]

In any event, respondent SKI claims that petitioners' claim of P417,845,459.62,

which is almost twice of the total contract sum, was neither substantiated by
evidence nor proven with reasonable certainty.[97]

Respondent SKI posits that both the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court of Appeals
correctly denied the motion for execution filed by the petitioner, being
consistent with the standing policy of the Commission of not granting motions
for execution if parties appealed the decision.[98]

Finally, respondent SKI argues that petitioner failed to justify why it should be
awarded attorney's fees and arbitration costs.[99]

In its Comment, respondent Mapfre avers that petitioner is not entitled to an

award of actual damages considering that its claims were without proof of
official receipts.[100]
Respondent Mapfre maintains that it is not liable under the Payment Bond
because when petitioner terminated the contract, it already paid respondent SKI
P129,590,429.08, and any claim of petitioner for labor and materials should be
deducted from the unspent balance. Similarly, it argues that its liability under
the Advance Payment Bond was extinguished by compensation, because the
unrecovered amount was applied as payment for unpaid billings of respondent
SKI.[101] Furthermore, respondent Mapfre claims that it is not liable for
variations of work only relayed to it after February 23, 2008.[102] It also claims
that it cannot be liable for the alleged cost of rectification works and additional
management costs as these were fraudulent.[103]

Lastly, Respondent Mapfre maintains that petitioner is not entitled to an

execution pending appeal considering that it cannot approve and reject parts of
the award for temperate damages in its favor. As petitioner is not entitled to
recover anything, respondent Mapfre argues that petitioner is likewise not
entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs of arbitration.[104]

In rebuttal, petitioner argues that since both respondents SKI and Mapfre did not
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals, then they are bound to pay the
award ordered by it at the least. Petitioner avers that the issue of respondent
Mapfre's liability under the bonds is already settled, and the only issue
remaining is the amount of its liability.[105]

Petitioner reiterates that it has proven and substantiated its monetary claims,
and respondent SKI is not entitled to temperate damages because it failed to
prove the cost of its repair and the damage is attributable to petitioner.[106]
Petitioner counters that its monetary claims are not unreasonable, considering
that respondent SKI caused the delay, which, in turn, resulted in delay-related
claims by contractors, and additional costs for engaging other contractors and
suppliers to complete and rectify respondent SKI's defective works.[107]

Petitioner further reiterates that it is entitled to execution pending appeal

considering that the Arbitral Tribunal's award of P55,119,852.56 has already
become final and executory.[108]

The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows:

(1) Whether or not the issues petitioner raised are properly determinable under
the present Petition for Review before the Court;

(2) Whether or not respondent SKI is entitled to temperate damages;

(3) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a total of P327,127,827.49 as additional

costs incurred to complete the construction project due to the delay of
respondent SKI;
(4) Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly determined the amount of
liability of respondent Mapfre under the Advance Payment Bond and Payment
Bond; and

(5) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an execution pending appeal of the

Arbitral Tribunal's Award.

This Court denies the petition.

"[T]o encourage the early and expeditious settlement of disputes in the

Philippine construction industry[,]"[109] Executive Order No. 1008, otherwise
known as the Construction Industry Arbitration Law created the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (Commission). Section 4 of the Construction
Industry Arbitration Law lays down the jurisdiction of the Commission, as
follows:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. — The CIAC shall have original and exclusive

jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts
entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines,
whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the
contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes
may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire
jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration.

The jurisdiction of the C1AC may include but is not limited to violation
of specifications for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms
of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and
delays; maintenance and defects; payment, default of employer or
contractor and changes in contract cost.

Excluded from the coverage of this law are disputes arising from
employer-employee relationships which shall continue to be covered
by the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Cognizant of the competence of the Commission, Republic Act No. 9184 or the
Government Procurement Reform Act, affirms its jurisdiction and states that,
"disputes that are within the competence of the [Commission] to resolve shall be
referred thereto."[110] Similarly, Republic Act No. 9285 or the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004, Section 35 provides that the Commission "shall continue
to exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over construction disputes
although the arbitration is 'commercial' pursuant to Section 21 of this Act."[111]

The authority of the Commission proceeds from its technical expertise. The
Construction Industry Arbitration Law states that arbitrators shall be persons of
distinction in whom the business sector, "particularly the stake holders [sic] of
the construction industry[,]"[112] and the government can have confidence.[113]
"They shall possess the competence, integrity, and leadership qualities to resolve
any construction dispute expeditiously and equitably. The Arbitrators shall come
from different professions. They may include engineers, architects, construction
managers, engineering consultants, and businessmen familiar with the
construction industry and lawyers who are experienced in construction
disputes."[114] Technical experts may also aid the arbitrators in resolving the
disputes if requested by the parties, as stated in Section 15 of the Construction
Industry Arbitration Law:

SECTION 15. Appointment of Experts. — The services of technical or

legal experts may be utilized in the settlement of disputes if requested
by any of the parties or by the Arbitral Tribunal. If the request for an
expert is done by either or by both of the parties, it is necessary that
the appointment of the expert be confirmed by the Arbitral Tribunal.

Whenever the parties request for the services of an expert, they shall
equally shoulder the expert's fees and expenses, half of which shall be
deposited with the Secretariat before the expert renders service. When
only one party makes the request, it shall deposit the whole amount
required.

The Commission's authority is expounded in CE Construction Corp. v. Araneta

Center, Inc.:[115]

The CIAC does not only serve the interest of speedy dispute resolution,
it also facilitates authoritative dispute resolution. Its authority proceeds
not only from juridical legitimacy but equally from technical expertise.
The creation of a special adjudicatory body for construction disputes
presupposes distinctive and nuanced competence on matters that are
conceded to be outside the innate expertise of regular courts and
adjudicatory bodies concerned with other specialized fields. The CIAC
has the state's confidence concerning the entire technical expanse of
construction, defined in jurisprudence as "referring to all on-site works
on buildings or altering structures, from land clearance through
completion including excavation, erection and assembly and
installation of components and equipment."[116] (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)

II

Due to the highly "technical nature of the proceedings" before the Commission,
and the voluntariness of the parties to submit to its proceedings, "the
Construction Industry Arbitration Law provides for a narrow ground by which
the arbitral award can be questioned[.]"[117] The Construction Industry
Arbitration Law provides that arbitral awards are final and inappealable, except
only on pure questions of law:

SECTION 19. Finality of Awards. — The arbitral award shall be binding

upon the parties. It shall be final and inappealable except on questions
of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.

In keeping with the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, any appeal from the
Commission's arbitral tribunals must remain limited to questions of law. Its
rationale is explained in Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim Kim Steel Builders,
Inc.:[118]

Section 19 [of Executive Order No. 1008] makes it crystal clear that
questions of fact cannot be raised in proceedings before the Supreme
Court — which is not a trier of facts — in respect of an arbitral award
rendered under the aegis of the CIAC. Consideration of the animating
purpose of voluntary arbitration in general, and arbitration under the
aegis of the CIAC in particular, requires us to apply rigorously the
above principle embodied in Section 19 that the Arbitral Tribunal's
findings of fact shall be final and unappealable.

Voluntary arbitration involves the reference of a dispute to an

impartial body, the members of which are chosen by the parties
themselves, which parties freely consent in advance to abide by the
arbitral award issued after proceedings where both parties had the
opportunity to be heard. The basic objective is to provide a speedy and
inexpensive method of settling disputes by allowing the parties to
avoid the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation which commonly
accompany ordinary litigation, especially litigation which goes through
the entire hierarchy of courts. Executive Order No. 1008 created an
arbitration facility to which the construction industry in the
Philippines can have recourse. The Executive Order was enacted to
encourage the early and expeditious settlement of disputes in the
construction industry, a public policy the implementation of which is
necessary and important for the realization of national development
goals.

Aware of the objective of voluntary arbitration in the labor field, in the

construction industry, and in any other area for that matter, the Court
will not assist one or the other or even both parties in any effort to
subvert or defeat that objective for their private purposes. The Court
will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon the
artful allegation that such body had "misapprehended the facts" and
will not pass upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter
how cleverly disguised they might be as ''legal questions." The parties
here had recourse to arbitration and chose the arbitrators themselves;
they must have had confidence in such arbitrators. The Court will not,
therefore, permit the parties to relitigate before it the issues of facts
previously presented and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal, save
 only where a very clear showing is made that, in reaching its factual
conclusions, the Arbitral Tribunal committed an error so egregious and
hurtful to one party as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction. Prototypical examples would be
factual conclusions of the Tribunal which resulted in deprivation of
one or the other party of a fair opportunity to present its position
before the Arbitral Tribunal, and an award obtained through fraud or
the corruption of arbitrators. Any other, more relaxed, rule would
result in setting at naught the basic objective of a voluntary arbitration
and would reduce arbitration to a largely inutile institution.[119]
(Citations omitted)

The general rule then is that the awards of the Arbitral Tribunal may be
appealed only on pure questions of law, and its factual findings should be
respected and upheld. Since the Construction Industry Arbitration Law does not
provide when an arbitral award may be vacated, we can glean the exceptions
from Spouses David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission:[120]

We reiterate the rule that factual findings of construction arbitrators

are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal,
except when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was
procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was
evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3)
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the
arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of
Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such
disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual,
final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them
was not made.[121] (Citation omitted)

Accordingly, there is a need to determine whether the issues raised by petitioner

involve questions of law or fact. A question of law arises when there is "doubt. . .
as to what the law is on a certain set of facts[,]" while there is a "question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."[122] For a
question to be one of law, there must be no doubt as to the veracity or falsehood
of the facts alleged, but if it involves an "examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented[,]" then the question posed is one of fact.[123]

In the present case, petitioner urges us to resolve the following issues in its
favor:

(1) Whether it is entitled to execution pending appeal and the writ of

mandamus can compel the Commission to execute the award pending
 appeal;
(2) Whether or not the award of temperate damages amounting to
P4,500,000.00 in favor of respondent SKI is supported by the evidence
on record;
(3) Whether it proved and substantiated its monetary claims entitling it
to an additional award of P327,127,827.49, broken down as:

(a) Payment to Tetra Pak Processing System of P32,572,301.44;

(b) Additional amount of PI 47,818,032.88 for payments to

SMCC Philippines, Inc.;

(c) Additional amount
of P2,700,486.33 for payments to
Chittick Fire & Security Corporation;
(d) Additional project management
costs in the amount of
P101,923,163.14;

for termination-related costs paid to Unitan
(e) P20,767,401.12
Construction and Development Corporation;
(f) Additional amount of P14,403,210.44 for
payment to Cape
East Philippines, Inc.; and
(g) Additional payment
of P6,943,232.14 to Freyssinet
Filipinas, Corp.;[124]

(4) Whether it is entited to the full amounts of liability of respondent

Mapfre under the Advance Payment Bond and the Payment Bond; and
(5) Whether it is entitled to recovery of attorney's fees and costs of

arbitration.

Petitioner further submits that:

(1) The issue concerning its entitlement to a motion for execution

pending appeal involves question of law;

(2) The other issues raised involve the resolution of conflicting findings
of fact by the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court of Appeals;
(3) The Arbitral Tribunal and Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and
(4) The findings of the Court of Appeals
are contradicted by the
presence of evidence on record.[125]

Except for the first issue, which involves a question of law, the other issues
raised by petitioner, as admitted by it, are questions of fact, which necessitates a
reexamination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. In
asking this Court to go over each claim submitted by the parties to the Arbitral
Tribunal, petitioner is asking this Court to pass upon claims which are either
clearly factual or require previous determination of factual issues.[126] Petitioner
therefore attempts to re-litigate before us the detailed factual claims it already
made before the Arbitral Tribunal and asserts that its review falls within the
exceptions. However, the reasons raised by petitioner are not among the
exceptional grounds to review the factual findings of the Arbitral Tribunal.

Exceptions allowed in the review of Rule 45 petitions, such as the lower court's
misapprehension of facts or a conflict in factual findings, do not apply to reviews
of the Arbitral Tribunal's decisions.[127] In reviewing factual findings of the
Arbitral Tribunal, exceptions must pertain to its conduct and the qualifications
of the arbitrator, and not to its errors of fact and law, misappreciation of
evidence, or conflicting findings of fact.[128] It is only when "the most basic
integrity of the arbitral process was imperiled" that a factual review of the
findings of the arbitral tribunal may be reviewed.[129] This, the petitioner did not
allege or prove in the present case.

Courts should thus defer to the factual findings of the Arbitral Tribunal as held
in CE Construction Corp. v. Araneta Center, Inc.:[130]

In appraising the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's awards, it is not the province

of the present Rule 45 Petition to supplant this Court's wisdom for the
inherent technical competence of and the insights drawn by the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal throughout the protracted proceedings before it. The
CIAC Arbitral Tribunal perused each of the parties' voluminous pieces
of evidence. Its members personally heard, observed, tested, and
propounded questions to each of the witnesses. Having been
constituted solely and precisely for the purpose of resolving the dispute
between ACI and CECON for 19 months, the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal
devoted itself to no other task than resolving that controversy. This
Court has the benefit neither of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's technical
competence nor of its irreplaceable experience of hearing the case,
scrutinizing every piece of evidence, and probing the witnesses.

True, the inhibition that impels this Court admits of exceptions

enabling it to embark on its own factual inquiry. Yet, none of these
exceptions, which are all anchored on considerations of the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal's integrity and not merely on mistake, doubt, or
conflict, is availing.

This Court finds no basis for casting aspersions on the integrity of the
CIAC Arbitral Tribunal. There does not appear to have been an
undisclosed disqualification for any of its three (3) members or proof of
any prejudicial misdemeanor. There is nothing to sustain an allegation
that the parties' voluntarily selected arbitrators were corrupt,
fraudulent, manifestly partial, or otherwise abusive. From all
indications, it appears that the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal extended every
possible opportunity for each of the parties to not only plead their case
but also to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement. This Court has
ruled, precisely, that the arbitrators acted in keeping with their lawful
competencies. This enabled them to come up with an otherwise
definite and reliable award on the controversy before it.

 Inventive, hair-splitting recitals of the supposed imperfections in the

CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's execution of its tasks will not compel this
Court to supplant itself as a fact-finding, technical expert.

ACI's refutations on each of the specific items claimed by CECON and its
counterclaims of sums call for the point by point appraisal of work,
progress, defects and rectifications, and delays and their causes. They
are, in truth, invitations for this Court to engage in its own audit of
works and corresponding financial consequences. In the alternative, its
refutations insist on the application of rates, schedules, and other
stipulations in the same tender documents, copies of which ACI never
adduced and the efficacy of which this Court has previously discussed
to be, at best, doubtful.

This Court now rectifies the error made by the Court of Appeals. By this
rectification, this Court does not open the doors to an inordinate and
overzealous display of this Court's authority as a final arbiter.

Without a showing of any of the exceptional circumstances justifying

factual review, it is neither this Court's business nor in this Court's
competence to pontificate on technical matters. These include things
such as fluctuations in prices of materials from 2002 to 2004, the
architectural and engineering consequences — with their ensuing
financial effects — of shifting from reinforced concrete to structural
steel, the feasibility of rectification works for defective installations
and fixtures, the viability of a given schedule of rates as against
another, the audit of changes for every schematic drawing as revised
by construction drawings, the proper mechanism for examining
discolored and mismatched tiles, the minutiae of installing G.I. sheets
and sealing cracks with epoxy sealants, or even unpaid sums for
garbage collection.

The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal acted in keeping with the law, its
competence, and the adduced evidence; thus, this Court upholds and
reinstates the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's monetary awards.[131] (Citation
omitted)

Moreover, the parties voluntarily submitted to arbitration any dispute arising

from their contract and acknowledged that an Arbitral Tribunal constituted
under the Commission has full competence to rule on the dispute presented to it.
"An arbitration clause in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of
a construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an existing or
future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction[.]"[132]

Article 6 of the Articles of Agreement of the parties provides that:

If any dispute or difference shall arise as to:

 (1) The interpretation of the Contract Documents, or;

(2) Any dispute on any matter or thing of any nature arising out of or in
connection with this Contract between the Owner (or Project Manager
on the Owner's behalf) and the Contractor either during the progress
or after the completion or abandonment of The Works or after the
termination of the employment of the Contractor, it shall be referred to
arbitration in accordance with Clause 10 of the Conditions of the
Contract.[133]

Clause 10.1 of the Conditions of the Contract provides that:

Provided always that in case any dispute or difference shall arise

between the Owner (or the Project Manager on the Owner's behalf)
and the Contractor, either during the progress or after the completion
or abandonment of The Works as to the construction of this Contract or
as to any matter of whatsoever nature arising thereunder or in
connection therewith (including any matter left by this Contract to the
discretion of the Project Manager or the withholding by the Project
Manager of any certificate to which the Contractor may claim to be
entitled or the measurement and valuation mentioned in the these
Conditions or the rights and liabilities of the parties under these
Conditions), the Owner and the Contractor hereby agree to exert all
efforts to settle their differences or dispute amicably. Failing this effort
then such dispute or difference shall be referred to arbitration by an
Arbitration Tribunal in accordance with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Law of the Philippines [Executive Order No. 1008], as
amended by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 (R.A. No.
9285), including the Rules of Procedures Governing Construction
Arbitration approved and promulgated by the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) and any amendments thereto.[134]

Accordingly, the present dispute is better left to the Commission, a quasi-judicial

body with the technical expertise to resolve disputes outside the expertise of
regular courts.[135]

III

Both the Arbitral Tribunal and Court of Appeals held that since respondent SKI
delayed in the fulfilment of its obligation, petitioner validly terminated the
contract. Considering that respondent SKI did not appeal the findings of the
Arbitral Tribunal and Court of Appeals as to the issues of termination and delay,
the findings on these issues are deemed final as to respondent SKI. "Issues not
raised on appeal are already final and cannot be disturbed."[136]

Thus, the next issues to be resolved involve the monetary claims of petitioner
and respondent SKI.

We uphold the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal as to the rights and monetary
claims of petitioner and respondent SKI.

Petitioner claimed that respondent SKI is not entitled to an award—actual or

temperate damages—for the value of rebars, formworks, and costs of repair to
the damaged tower crane and tower crane collar.[137]

Furthermore, petitioner alleged that it proved and substantiated its claim of an

additional P327,127,827.49 or P377,269,282.64, inclusive of VAT, broken down as:

(1) Payment to Tetra Pak Processing System of P32,572,301.44;

(2) Additional amount of P147,818,032.88 for payments
to SMCC
Philippines, Inc.;

(3) Additional amount of P2,700,486.33 for payments to Chittick Fire &

Security Corporation;
(4) Additional project
management costs in the amount of
P101,923,163.14;
(5) P20,767,401.12
for termination-related costs paid to Unitan
Construction and Development Corporation;
(6) Additional amount of P14,403,210.44 for
payment to Cape East
Philippines, Inc.; and
(7) Additional payment
of P6,943,232.14 to Freyssinet Filipinas, Corp.
[138]

Petitioner points out that, aside from the official receipts, it proved payment by
unrefuted testimonies of witnesses, parole evidence and tabular summaries.

"[A] contract is the law between the parties and, absent any showing that its
provisions are wholly or in part contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the courts[,]"[139]
without the need to resort to other aids in interpretation. Thus, there is basis in
finding petitioner and respondent SKI entitled to some of its claims.

Based on the contract of the parties, particularly Clause 8.3 of the Conditions of
Contract:

3.) In the event of the Employment of the Contractor being Terminated

as aforesaid and so long as it has not been reinstated and continued,
the following shall be the respective rights and duties of the Owner and
Contractor:

1.) The Owner may employ and pay other persons to carry
out and complete The Works and they may enter upon The
Works and use all temporary buildings, plant, tools,
equipment, materials and goods intended for, delivered
to and placed on or adjacent to The Works, and may
purchase (where they are not already paid for) all
 materials and goods necessary for the carrying out and
completion of The Works.

2.) The Contractor shall [except where the Termination occurs

by reason of the Bankruptcy of the Contractor or of the
Contractor having a winding up order made or a petition for
suspension of payment or the appointment of a Rehabilitation
Receiver or Management Committee or (except for the
purposes of reconstruction) a resolution for voluntary
winding up passed] if so required by the Owner or the Project
Manager within fourteen (14) days of the date of Termination,
assign to the Owner without payment the benefit of any
agreement for the supply of materials or goods and/or for the
execution of any work for the purposes of this Contract, but
on the terms that a Supplier or Sub-Contractor shall be
entitled to make any reasonable objection to any further
assignment thereof by the Owner. In any case the Owner may
pay any Supplier or Sub-Contractor for any materials or
goods delivered or works executed for the purposes of this
Contract (whether before or after the date of Termination) in
so far as the price thereof has not already been paid by the
Contractor. Payments made under this sub-clause may be
deducted by the Owner from any sum due or to become due
to the Contractor.[140] (Emphasis supplied)

Clause 8.5 of the Conditions of Contract further provides:

5.) The Contractor shall allow or pay to the Owner in the manner
hereinafter appearing the amount of any direct loss and/or damage
caused to the Owner by the Termination. Until after the Taking Over of
The Works, the Owner shall not be bound by any provision of this
Contract to make any further payment to the Contractor but upon such
Taking Over and the verification within a reasonable time of the
accounts, the Project Manager shall certify the amount of expenses
properly incurred by the Owner and the amount of any direct loss
and/or damage caused to the Owner by the Termination and, if such
amounts when added to the monies paid to the Contractor before the
date of Termination exceed the total amount which would have been
payable on due completion in accordance with this Contract, the
difference shall be a debt payable to the Owner by the Contractor; and
if the said amounts when added to the said monies be less than the said
total amount, the difference shall be a debt payable by the Owner to
the Contractor. Provided that in no circumstances shall the Contractor
be entitled to be paid more than the value of the work properly
executed up to the date of Termination.[141] (Emphasis supplied)

Considering Clause 8.3.1 of the Conditions of Contract of the parties and the
findings of the Arbitral Tribunal and Court of Appeals, respondent SKI is entitled
to the value of rebars, formworks, and the costs of repair to the damaged tower
crane and tower crane collar. Both the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court of
Appeals found it undisputed that: (1) there were rebars and formworks left at
the site; and (2) the tower crane and tower crane collar were damaged. The
Arbitral Tribunal aptly held that respondent SKI is entitled to the value of rebars
since petitioner "agreed to [respondent's] entitlement as evidenced by the
signed-off document during their reconciliation meeting."[142] It also found valid
the claims of respondent SKI for the value of the formworks and the repair of the
damaged tower crane and tower crane collar.

On petitioner's claim, Clause 8.5 of the Conditions of Contract of the parties, and
the findings of both the Arbitral Tribunal and Court of Appeals confirm that
petitioner is entitled to adequate compensation for the amount of expenses
incurred and the direct loss or damage caused by the termination of the project.
The Arbitral Tribunal held that petitioner should be awarded temperate
damages based on the parties' agreement on liquidated damages[143] because
petitioner failed to prove its actual damages with clear and convincing evidence.
It further found that only petitioner's claim of payment to various suppliers in
the amount of P6,852,678.71 was "undisputed" and "valid."[144] It also granted the
unrecouped advance payment of P42,293,679.02 given to respondent SKI in
addition to the temperate damages.[145]

We see no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the Arbitral Tribunal
which has the technical expertise and competence in resolving construction
disputes.

Clause 10.5 and 10.6 of the Conditions of the Contract provides:

5. Subject to the provisions of these Conditions, the Arbitrators shall,

without prejudice to the generality of their powers, have power to
direct such measurements and/or valuations as may in their
opinion be desirable in order to determine the rights of the parties
and to ascertain and award any sum which ought to have been the
subject of or included in any certificate and to open up, review and
revise any certificate, opinion, decision, requirement or Notice and to
determine all matters in dispute which shall be submitted to them
in the same manner as if no such certificate, opinion, decision,
requirement or notice had been given.

6. The award of such Arbitrators shall be final and binding on the

parties. The decision of the Arbitrators shall be a condition precedent
to any right of legal action that either party may have against the other.
[146](Emphasis supplied)

The contract provides that the award of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be final and
binding on the parties, considering that it is granted wide discretion and
necessary powers to determine and settle all disputes submitted to it. Aside from
the contract itself, two (2) principles guide the Arbitral Tribunal in its task: (1)
"the basic matter of fairness[;]" and (2) "the effective dispute resolution or the
overarching principle of arbitration as a mechanism relieved of the
encumbrances of litigation."[147]

Thus, the Arbitral Tribunal is in a better position to adjudicate and determine

the claims and rights of the parties.[148] It fulfilled its task with technical
competence and complied with the requirements of the CIAC Rules of Procedure.
It was also given the full opportunity to exclusively preside over the arbitral
proceedings for 19 months (from June 2009 to December 2010), where it
examined and cross-examined the evidence presented by the parties and
conducted ocular inspection with "proven experts in the field."[149]

Any review by this Court of their findings would require conducting its own
ocular inspection, hiring its own experts, and "[providing] its own
interpretations of the findings of a highly technical agency."[150] Therefore, a
review of these factual findings requires substantial proof "that the integrity of
the arbitral tribunal has been compromised" or that the arbitral tribunal arrived
at its findings "in a haphazard, immodest manner."[151] Absent such proof, this
Court will not disturb the factual findings by the arbitral tribunal.

The Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the factual findings of the
Arbitral Tribunal. In doing so, the Court of appeals based their modification on
neither a legal question nor any exceptional ground requiring it to look into
factual issues. Findings of fact of the Arbitral Tribunal, which has the
competence and technical expertise on matters regarding the construction
industry, should be upheld.[152] Although it agreed with the Arbitral Tribunal as
to respondent SKI's claims, the Court of Appeals held that respondent SKI failed
to present proof of the actual damages it suffered and granted temperate
damages instead.[153] On petitioner's claim, it held that petitioner's monetary
claims are in the nature of actual damages and granted petitioner the amount of
P90,717,632.06, or up to the extent proved by official receipts.[154]

Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides for temperate damages, as follows:

Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than

nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount can not [sic], from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty.

On the other hand, actual damages are provided for under Article 2199 of the
Civil Code:

Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled

to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
 him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual
or compensatory damages.

Further, "[e]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation, [a claimant] is entitled to

an adequate compensation only for pecuniary loss" duly proven.[155] Thus,
actual damages must be proven "with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable"[156] like official receipts
and invoices, as explained in Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. v. Gammon
Philippines:[157]

Actual damages constitute compensation for sustained measurable

losses. It must be proven "with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable." It is
never presumed or based on personal knowledge of the court.

In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Chua:

"Actual damages arc compensation for an injury that will put

the injured party in the position where it was before the
injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually
sustained and susceptible of measurement. . . . Basic is the
rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the
amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.''

....

This Court has, time and again, emphasized that actual

damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an
award, must point out specific facts which could afford a
basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne. An award of actual damages is
"dependent upon competent proof of the damages suffered
and the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on
the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the
court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and
unsubstantial proof." (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

Although official receipts are the best evidence of payment, this Court
has acknowledged that actual damages may be proved by other forms
of documentary evidence, including invoices.

In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangayong Corporation, this

Court did not award actual damages because the claimant failed to
substantiate its claims with official receipts.

 In G.Q. Garments, Inc. v. Miranda, this Court held that an allegation of a

witness must be supported by receipts or other documentary proofs to
prove the claim of actual damages.

In Gonzales v. Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., this Court

noted that petitioners did not back up its claims of actual damages by
documentary proof such as a receipt or an invoice. (Citations omitted)

In concluding that respondent SKI's claims for the value of rebars, formworks,
safety harness equipment, and costs of the repair were validly proven, the
Arbitral Tribunal thoroughly examined and considered the evidence presented
by the parties. Thus, its evaluation of the evidence and findings of fact must be
upheld.

With the same technical expertise and competence, the Arbitral Tribunal held
that petitioner shall be awarded temperate damages based on the parties'
agreement on liquidated damages instead, for failure of petitioner to prove
actual damages with clear and convincing evidence.[158] There is no merit to
petitioner's contention that the testimonies of the witnesses and the tabular
summaries it presented are acceptable to establish its monetary claims because
these must still be supported by official receipt or invoice. Moreover, the tabular
summaries are considered self-serving, since petitioner prepared them.
Petitioner's argument that what it sought to establish by the tabular summaries
is merely the general result of the entire cost it incurred was an argument raised
and rejected in Filipinas (Pre-Fab Bldg.) Systems, Inc., v. MRT Development
Corporation.[159] Similarly, "it is not merely the general result of the evidence
that is sought[,]" but the fact of the cost is also in question, and evidence, such as
receipts, "must be adduced to support any claim[.]"[160]

Because the Arbitral Tribunal found that petitioner failed to prove its alleged
substantial pecuniary loss with competent proof and there was no opportunity
for respondent SKI to assess the cost of the works awarded by petitioner to the
contractors, the Arbitral Tribunal aptly awarded petitioner temperate damages
based on the maximum amount of liquidated damages under the agreements
voluntarily executed by the parties. Clause 6.2 of the Conditions of the Contract
provides:

2. If the Contractor fails to complete The Works by the Date for

Completion stated in Appendix A or within any extended time fixed in
accordance with these Conditions, then the Contractor shall pay or
allow to the Owner a sum calculated at the rate stated in Appendix A as
Liquidated Damages for the period during which The Works remain or
have remained uncompleted as Certified in writing by the Project
Manager. Without prejudice to his other remedies available at law or
elsewhere in this Contract, the Owner may deduct such from any
monies due or to become due to the Contractor under this Contract.[161]
(Emphasis supplied)

In the Notice to Proceed:

2.5 Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (L.A.D.) shall be imposed and

become payable by the Contractor to the Owner if the Contractor fails
to complete The Works by the Completion Date and milestones dates
set out in 2.3 and 2.4 above. The L.A.D. for The Works shall be at the
rate of one tenth of one percent (1/10 of 1%) of the Contract Sum per
day or part thereof[.][162]

Considering that there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the Arbitral
Tribunal based on the contract of the parties, this Court affirms the same.

On the costs of the arbitration, the CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing
Construction Arbitration, Rule 16, Section 16.5 states:

Decision as to costs of arbitration. — In the case of non-monetary

claims or where the parties agreed that the sharing of fees shall be
determined by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Final Award shall, in addition
to dealing with the merits of the case, fix the costs of the arbitration,
and/or decide which of the parties shall bear the cost(s) or in what
proportion the cost(s) shall be borne by each of them.

Rule 142 of the Rules of Court governing the imposition of costs likewise
provides the following:

Section 1. Costs Ordinarily follow the result of suit. Unless otherwise

provided in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party as
a matter of course, but the court shall have power for special reasons,
to adjudge that either party shall pay the cost of an action, or that the
same shall be divided, as may be equitable.

The Terms of Reference signed by the parties expressly provides that: "[t]he costs
of arbitration which include the filing, administrative, arbitrators' fees, and
charges for Arbitration Development Fund, including all incidental expenses,
shall be on a pro rata basis, subject to the determination of the Arbitral
Tribunal which of the parties shall eventually shoulder such costs or the mode of
sharing thereof."[163] Based on the rules and the contract, the Arbitral Tribunal
properly exercised its jurisdiction in holding that petitioner and respondent SKI
should equally shoulder the arbitration costs. It likewise properly held that no
party may recover attorney's fees from each other.

IV

Pursuant to the bonds it issued in favor of petitioner, Mapfre is jointly and

severally liable with respondent SKI up to the amount awarded by the Arbitral
Tribunal.

Under the bonds executed by respondent SKI as principal and Mapfre as surety,
they bound themselves to indemnify petitioner the following: (1) in the Advance
Payment Bond, the amount of P72,840,000.00 for failure to recoup the advance
payment granted to respondent SKI;[164] (2) under the Payment Bond, the
amount of P48.56 million to pay for claims for labor and materials used or
reasonably required for use in the performance of the Contract; and (3) under
the Performance Bond, P48.56 million for any loss or damages that petitioner
may suffer as a consequence of failure by respondent SKI to perform its
obligations under the Contract.[165]

Both the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court of Appeals held that respondent Mapfre
is jointly and severally liable with respondent SKI pursuant to the Advance
Payment Bond, Payment Bond and Performance Bond it issued in favor of
petitioner.[166] Respondent Mapfre is clearly bound by its undertaking under the
bonds. Considering that respondent Mapfre did not appeal the Court of Appeals
decision, its joint and several liability under the bonds it issued in favor of
petitioner is "deemed final" with respect to it, since issues not raised on appeal
are already final and cannot be disturbed.[167]

However, petitioner questions the amount of Mapfre's liability under the bonds
and claims that it should be liable for P47,368,910.42 under the Advance
Payment Bond and P42,938,557.46 under the Payment Bond, because the Court of
Appeals failed to include the 12% VAT in the amount it granted.[168]

On this issue, this Court reinstates and affirms the findings of the Arbitral
Tribunal as they are "binding, respected, and final[;]" otherwise, it would have
the effect of "setting at naught the basic objective of a voluntary arbitration and
would reduce arbitration to a largely inutile institution."[169] Petitioner failed to
allege that the present case falls within the exceptional grounds which would
warrant a review of the factual findings by this Court.

Considering that this Court upholds the monetary claims of petitioner as found
by the Arbitral Tribunal, respondent Mapfre is also jointly and severally liable
with respondent SKI to the extent awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal for the
following amounts: (1) P42,293,679.02 under the Advance Payment Bond; (2)
P6,852,678.71 under the Payment Bond; and (3) P24,280,000.00 under the
Performance Bond.

Lastly, petitioner is not entitled to an execution pending appeal because it

appealed the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal.

The CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction (As amended by

CIAC Resolution Nos. 15-2006, 16-2006, 18-2006, 19-2006, 02-2007, 07-2007, 13-
2007, 02-2008, 03-2008, 11-2008, 01-2010, 04-2010, and 07-2010) or the 2010
Revised Rules provides that:

RULE 18 - EXECUTION OF FINAL AWARD

 SECTION 18.1 Execution of Award. — A final arbitral award shall
become executory upon the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof by the parties.

SECTION 18.2 Petition for review. — A petition for review from a final
award may be taken by any of the parties within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.

SECTION 18.3 Entry of judgment. — If a petition for review is filed from

a final award and a temporary restraining order (TRO) is issued by the
appellate court, such award shall become executory only upon the
issuance of the entry of judgment of the appellate court, or upon the
lapse/lifting of the TRO or lifting of the preliminary injunction.

SECTION 18.4 Effect of petition for review. — The petition for review
shall not stay the execution of the final award sought to be reviewed
unless the Court of Appeals directs otherwise upon such terms as it
deems just.

SECTION 18.5 Execution/enforcement of awards. — As soon as a

decision, order or final award has become executory, the Arbitral
Tribunal (or the surviving remaining member/s), shall, motu proprio or
on motion of the prevailing party issue a writ of execution requiring
any sheriff or proper officer to execute said decision, order or final
award. If there are no remaining/surviving appointed arbitrator/s, the
Commission shall issue the writ prayed for.

Notwithstanding the Commissions disagreement with the substance or

merit of the award/decision, if execution is ripe or proper under the CIAC
Rules, it shall release the writ of execution issued by the arbitrator/s.
Hence, once an award/decision becomes executory, the release of the writ
of execution by the Commission is purely ministerial, regardless of
whether or not the arbitrator/s considered the comments of the
Commission, or any of its members, on points of substance in the award
during scrutiny. (Citation omitted, emphasis in the original)

The 2010 Revised Rules was subsequently amended several times to conform to
the Alternative Dispute Resolution law and the international practices and
standards, while preserving the spirit and intent of Construction Industry
Arbitration Law. Thus, since 2010, the Revised Rules has been amended by CIAC
Resolution Nos. 08-2014, 07-2016, 06-2017, 01-2019, 04-2019, and 05-2019.
Particularly, Section 18. 5 paragraph 2 has been amended by CIAC Resolution No.
04-2019 to reflect the following:

SECTION 18.5 Execution/enforcement of awards. - As soon as a decision,

order or final award has become executory, the Arbitral Tribunal (or
the surviving remaining member/s), shall, motu proprio or on motion
 of the prevailing party issue a writ of execution requiring any sheriff
or proper officer to execute said decision, order or final award. If there
are no remaining/surviving appointed arbitrator/s, the Commission
shall issue the writ prayed for.

As a general rule, and if no bond to stay exec lit ion is posted, the
motion for execution pending appeal filed by the prevailing party
may be granted, unless it appealed said award or any portion
thereof. If execution is ripe or proper under the CIAC Rules, the
Commission shall concur with, and release, the writ of execution
issued by the arbitrator/s. Hence, once an award/decision becomes
executory, the release of the writ of execution by the Commission is
purely ministerial. (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

Prior to the 2019 Revised Rules, there has been no clear and categorical
statement in the 2010 Revised Rules as to the effect of a pending appeal to a
motion of execution filed by the prevailing party. Thus, in its March 6, 2012
Resolution, the Arbitral Tribunal denied the Motion for Writ of Execution filed
by petitioner reasoning that: (1) the CIAC Resolution No. 06-2002 or "Policy
Guidelines to clarify the Policy Guidelines Regarding Execution of a Final Award
During Appeal" expresses the policy against interim execution when both parties
appealed from the decision of the arbitrator;[170] and (2) the interim execution is
allowed only with respect to a party who has accepted the award by not
appealing it.

The Commission expresses that this policy "sought to liberalize the rule on
execution during appeal, by allowing a stay of execution rather than hastening
the execution, and thereby give due recognition to the right of the party to avail
of and exhaust the remedies for appeal under the law[.]"[171] The Court of
Appeals agreed with the Arbitral Tribunal and added that petitioner failed to
state good reasons for allowing an execution pending appeal.

As stated in the present 2019 Revised Rules: "[a]s a general rule, and if no bond
to stay execution is posted, the motion for execution pending appeal filed by the
prevailing party may be granted, unless it appealed said award or any portion
thereof." It is clear then that the general rule is that the motion for execution
pending appeal may be granted, and the exception would be if the award or any
portion of it is appealed, by any party or both parties.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation, but only application. The present rule as it stands is consistent
with the interpretation of the Arbitral Tribunal, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. When petitioner appealed the Award, its case fell within the exception
for when a motion for execution pending appeal cannot be granted.
Furthermore, similar to the expressed policy in CIAC Resolution No. 02-2006, the
2019 Revised Rules, "being procedural in nature, may be applied retroactively to
all pending cases," such as in this case. The old rules and all policies issued in
connection with it, as well as policies inconsistent with it, are expressly repealed.
[172]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The December 23,

2010 Award of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission in CIAC Case
No. 18-2009 is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Gaerlan, J., on leave.

November 3, 2020

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 22, 2020 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on November 3, 2020 at 10:05 a.m.
 

Very truly yours,
 
(SGD) MISAEL
  DOMINGO C.
BATTUNG III
  Division Clerk of Court

[1]
CE Construction Corp. v. Araneta Center, Inc., 816 Phil. 221, 229 (2017) [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division].

[2] Id.

[3] Rollo, pp. 123-184.

[4] Id. at 15-49. The Decision dated January 23, 2015 was penned by Associate
Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E.
Villon (Chairperson) and Pedro B. Corales of the Former Fifteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals, Manila.

[5]Id. at 51-58. The Resolution dated August 3, 2015 was penned by Associate
Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E.
Villon (Chairperson) and Pedro B. Corales of the Former Fifteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals, Manila.

[6]Id. at 294-334. The December 23, 2010 award was rendered by the Artbitra
Tribunal composed of Victor P. Lazatin (Chairperson) and Salvador P. Castro, Jr.
and Mario E. Valderrama, as Members.

[7] Id. at 808.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 809.

[13] Id. at 305.

[14] Id.

[15] Id. at 765-767.

[16] Id. at 768-769.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 305.

 
[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 305.

[23] Id. at 810.

[24] Id. at 296.

[25] Id.

[26]The tribunal was composed of Jose F. Mabanta, Mario E. Valderemma, and

Victor P. Lazatin (Chairperson).

[27] Rollo, p. 296.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 748-757.

[30] Id. at 801-805.

[31] Id. at 297.

[32] Id. at 806-818.

[33] Id. at 298.

[34] Id. at 300.

[35] Id. at 301.

[36] Id. at 302.

[37] Id. at 303.

[38] Id. at 294-334.

[39] Id. at 20.

[40] Id. at 311-312.

[41] Id. at 312.

[42] Id.

[43] Id.

[44] Id. at 314.

[45] Id. at 319-320.

[46] Id. at 317.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at 318.

[50] Id. at 321.

[51] Id. at 322.

[52] Id. at 326.

[53] Id.

[54] Id. at 327.

[55] Id. at 323.

[56] Id. at 327.

[57] Id.
 
[58] Id. at 331.

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Id. at 332-333.

[62] Id. at 2065-2110.

[63] Id. at 1966-2002.

[64] Id. at 1810-1965.

[65] Id. at 2119-2129.

[66] Id. at 2036-2041.

[67] Id. at 2038.

[68] Id. at 2040.

[69]Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration as amended

until CIAC Resolution No. 07-2010

[70] Rollo, p. 2038.

[71] Id. at 2042-2043.

[72] Id. at 2003-2035.

[73] Id. at 2395-2397.

[74] Id. at 22.

[75] Id. at 15-49.

[76] Id. at 28.

[77] Id. at 30.

[78] Id.

[79] Id. at 31-34.

[80] Id. at 35.

[81] Id.

[82] Id. at 41.

[83] Id. at 38-41.

[84] Id. at

[85] Id. at 41-44.

[86] Id. at 45.

[87] Id. at 46-47.

[88] Id. at 47-48.

[89] Id. at 51-62.

[90] Id. at 2486-2487.

[91] Id. at 2501-2522.

[92] Id. at 2523-2555.

[93] Id. at 2581-2582.

[94] Id. at 2597-2603.

[95] Id. at 2611-2669.

[96] Id. at 2503.

 
[97] Id. at 2503.

[98] Id. at 2516.

[99] Id. at 2518.

[100] Id. at 2526.

[101] Id. at 2530.

[102] Id. at 2537.

[103] Id.

[104] Id. at 2547-2549.

[105] Id. at 2616.

[106] Id. at 2639 and 2641.

[107] Id. at 2624-2625.

[108] Id. at 2660.

[109] Executive Order No. 1008 (1985), sec. 2.

[110] Republic Act No. 9184 (2003), sec. 59 provides:

SECTION 59. Arbitration. — Any and all disputes arising from the
implementation of a contract covered by this Act shall be submitted to
arbitration in the Philippines according to the provisions of Republic Act No. 876,
otherwise known as the "Arbitration Law": Provided, however, That, disputes that
are within the competence of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
to resolve shall be referred thereto. The process of arbitration shall be
incorporated as a provision in the contract that will be executed pursuant to the
provisions of this Act: Provided, That by mutual agreement, the parties may
agree in writing to resort to alternative modes of dispute resolution.

[111] Rep. Act No. 8285 (2004), sec. 35 provides:

Coverage of the Law. — Construction disputes which fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (the
"Commission") shall include those between or among parties to, or who are
otherwise bound by, an arbitration agreement, directly or by reference whether
such parties are project owner, contractor, subcontractor, fabricator, project
manager, design professional, consultant, quantity surveyor, bondsman or issuer
of an insurance policy in a construction project.

The Commission shall continue to exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction

over construction disputes although the arbitration is "commercial" pursuant to
Section 21 of this Act.

[112]CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration (June

22, 2019), Rule 8, sec. 8.1.

[113] Executive Order No. 1008 (1985), sec. 14.

[114]CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration (June

22, 2019), Rule 8, sec. 8.1.

[115] 816 Phil. 221, (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[116] Id.
[117] Metro Bottled Water Corp. v. Andrada Construction & Development Corp.,
Inc., G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/4380/> [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division].

[118] 298-A Phil. 361, 361-362 (1993) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division].

[119] Id.

[120] 479 Phil. 578 (2004) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

[121] Id. at 590-591.

[122] Id. at 584.

[123] Id.

[124] Rollo, pp. 38-41.

[125] Id. at 141.

[126]Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim Kim Steel Builders, Inc., 298-A Phil. 361
(1993) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division].

[127] Metro Bottled Water Corp. v. Andrada Construction & Development Corp.,
Inc., G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/4380/> [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division] citing CE Construction Corp. v. Araneta Center, Inc., 816
Phil. 221 (2017), [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[128] Id.

[129] Id.

[130] 816 Phil. 221 (2017), [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[131] Id. at 283-284.

[132]CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration (June

22, 2019), Rule 4, sec. 4.1.

[133] Rollo, p. 394.

[134] Id. at 454.

[135]Camp John Hay Development Corp. v. Charier Chemical and Coating Corp.,
G.R. No. 198849, August 7, 2019, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/6600/> [Per J. Leonen,
Third Division].

[136] Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-

Trijointventure, 818 Phil. 27 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

[137] Rollo, pp. 1966-2002.

[138] Id. at 38-41.

[139] Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-

Trijointventure, 818 Phil. 27, 70 (2017), [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

[140] Rollo, p. 447.

[141] Id. at 448.

[142] Id. at 319.

[143] Id. at 326.

[144] Id. at 323.

[145] Id. at 327.

[146] Id. at 455.

[147] Tondo Medical Center v. Rante, G.R. No. 230645, July 1, 2019
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/6024/> [Per J. Reyes, J., Second Division].

[148] Metro Bottled Water Corp. v. Andrada Construction & Development Corp.,
Inc., G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/4380/>, [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division].

[149] Id

[150] Id.

[151] Id.
[152] Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-
Trijointventure, 818 Phil. 27, 53-54 (2017), [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

[153] Rollo, pp. 326-326.

[154] Id. at 228.

[155] Id.

[156]
Oceaneering Contractors (PHILS.), INC. v. Barretto, 657 Phil. 607, 617 [Per J.
Perez, First Division].

[157] G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018

<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63930> [Per J. Leonen,
Third Division].
 
[158] Filipinas (Pre-Fab Bldg.) Systems. Inc. v. MRT Development Corporation, 563
Phil. 184, 215 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Second Division].

[159] Id.

[160] Id

[161] Rollo, p. 438.

[162] Id. at 611.

[163] Terms of Reference, Article VIII.

[164] Rollo, p. 328.

[165] Id.

[166] Id. 

[167] Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-

Trijointventure, 818 Phil. 27, 72 (2017), [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

[168] Rollo, p. 2621.

[169]Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. v. Gammon Philippines, G.R. No.

200401, January 17, 2018
<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63930>, [Per J. Leonen,
Third Division].

[170] Rollo, p. 2226.

[171] Id. at 2227.

[172]CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration (June

22, 2019), Rule 23, sec. 23.1.

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