1-UTAK v. COMELEC (Paul) placement of political advertisements.

a. PUV’s and their terminals can be seen by all and therefore, they
can be classified as public places.
PETITIONER: 1-United Transport Coalition 4. 1-Utak assailed the validity of the aforementioned COMELEC provisions
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections because it violates their right to free speech.
5. They also assail that it regulates not only the franchise or permit to
SUMMARY: 1-Utak assails COMELEC’s Resolution No. 9615 which operate but their ownership which infringes on their right to property.
implements R.A. 9006. The said resolution classifies PUV’s and public transport
terminals and states that the posting of campaign materials therein are prohibited.
ISSUES:
If this is not followed, the operator/owner of the PUV’s/terminals will be held
1. MAIN: Does the COMELEC Resolution violate the equal protection
liable for violating election laws. The Court held that the questioned resolution is
clause? - YES
beyond COMELEC’s power because it not only regulates the operation of the
PUV’s and terminals but their ownership per se. There can be no valid
classification between the ownership of the PUV’s/terminals and the ownership RULING: Petition granted. Sections 7(g) items (5) and (6) of COMELEC
of private vehicles. Even if the PUV’s/terminals are enjoyed by the public, its Resolution no. 9615 are unconstitutional.
ownership is still private. The classification is also not germane to the purpose of
the law. RATIO:
1. The assailed regulations do not fall within the COMELEC’s power to
DOCTRINE: Four requisites of a valid classification: (1) it must be based upon supervise or regulate.
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it 2. COMELEC has the authority in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. IX-C) to
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to regulate the franchises or permits for the operation of transport utilities
all members of the class. during the election period.
3. Jurisprudence (National Press Club, Adiong, Social Weather Stations) state:
Apr. 14, ’15 | Reyes, J. | Regulation of PUV’s during elections a. It cannot extend to the very freedom of an individual to express his
FACTS: preference of candidates.
1. R.A. 9006 - Fair Elections Act was passed; Sec. 9 states that political b. Should be limited to ensuring equality of opportunity, time, and
parties, party-list groups, and candidates may be authorized to elect space for all candidates.
common poster areas - plazas, barangay centers, etc. 4. It does not extend to ownership per se of PUV’s and transport terminals.
a. They may post lawful propaganda: 5. Tatad v. Garcia: The right to operate a public utility may exist
i. Private places - with consent of owner independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities.
ii. Public places/property shall be allocated equitably and a. One can own facilities without operating them and vice-versa.
impartially among candidates. 6. The franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is a privilege
2. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 to implement the above granted to certain persons to engage in the business - it does not refer to the
provision and Sec. 7 prohibits the following: ownership of the vehicles per se.
a. (f) Posting materials outside authorized common poster areas, in 7. It can limit certain aspects of the ownership, but not the totality of rights of
public places, or in private properties without the consent of the the owner over the vehicle.
owner. a. Examples of valid considerations - safety of passengers, routes of
b. (g) states that public places in (f) includes PUV’s (item 5) and operation, maintenance of vehicles, reasonable fares, etc.
premises of public transport terminals (item 6). 8. A regulations on the expression of ideas or opinions of an owner of the
c. Violating items 5 and 6 shall be a cause for revocation of the PUV by posting campaign materials - regulation on very ownership.
public utility franchise and will make the owner/operator of the 9. Concrete example of the regulating the operation:
transport service liable for an election offense. a. Posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses can be
3. COMELEC En Banc said that they are in the power of COMELEC to regulated because it hinders authorities form seeing if passengers
ensure equality of opportunity, time, and space for all candidates in the inside are safe - direct relation to the operation.
 10. COMELEC cannot also regulate public transport terminals owned by 1. Regulation is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine.
private persons. 2. The doctrine states that when al listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape
11. The ownership of the terminals, even if available for public commuters, from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted.
remains private. 3. Supposes that the listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted
12. Again, regulation can only pertain to circumstances affecting its operation. message in circumstances where communication cannot be avoided.
13. The posting of campaign material on vehicles used for PUV’s and terminals 4. Commuters are not compelled to read the materials posted.
is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership 5. The case of Lehman prohibited the posting of political advertisements on
— it has nothing to do with the PUV/terminal’s operation. buses that the city government owned. The case now pertains to private
14. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situation ownership.
should be treated alike as to both rights conferred and responsibilities 6. Current laws such as R.A. 9006 and R.A. 7166 which ensure the equality of
imposed. opportunity, time, and space for all candidates are already enough.
15. Similar subjects cannot be treated differently so as to give undue favor to 7. There is no need to curtail the free speech of owners of PUV’s and transport
some, and unjustly discriminate against others. terminals.
16. The equal protection clause of aimed at all official state actions, not just
legislature’s.
17. It does not pertain to the treatment of persons merely as such, but according
to the circumstances that surround them - equality, not identity of rights.
18. There are four requisites for the classification to be valid: (1) it must be
based upon substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it
must apply equally to all members of the class.
19. Here, the assailed classification in the COMELEC Resolution is not based
on substantial distinction and not germane to the law.
20. There is a distinction between PUV’s/transport terminals and private
vehicles because the former needs to secure a franchise/permit for its
operation.
21. As mentioned, the resolution regulates the ownership per se and nothing
with regard to its operation.
22. With regard to ownership, there is no substantial distinction between
owners of PUV’s/terminals and the owners of private vehicles/properties.
23. As said, ownership is private even if they are available for private use.
24. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express
their political ideas by posting campaign materials, there is no reason to
deny the same privilege to owners of PUV’s/terminals.
25. Yes, posting materials on PUV’s/terminals will expose it to a lot of people,
but so will the act of posting it on private establishments frequented by the
public - e.g. commercial establishments.
26. The classification is also not germane to the purpose of the law: it does not
equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in elections.
27. Again, they are private properties.

Additional notes on free speech that ma’am might relate to equal protection: