Deism and Dualism
Deism and Dualism
Deism and Dualism
Scott has just made a case that naturalism and theism are incompatible
philosophies. I emphasize “philosophies” because they are not realms or realities, with
naturalism associated with the natural and theism associated with the spiritual. They are,
instead, competing systems of ideas, or even ideologies. Still, we are quite aware that the
popularity of these intellectual systems in Western culture has led many to attempt their
rapprochement. In other words, naturalism and theism have commonly been assumed to
be combinable, despite their incompatibility. I just want to take a few minutes to review
briefly the two main lines of attempted combination – deism and dualism.
Perhaps the most common approach to combining naturalism and theism is some
form of deism – God created the naturalistic order of the world but this divinity is no
longer involved in its ongoing operation (cf. Borg, 1997; Johnson, 1995; Richards &
Bergin, 1997; Wacome, 2003). With this conception, no reference to God would seem
independently of Him. The obvious problem, however, is that a deism is not a theism.
That is to say, this kind of deism obviates those religions that believe in a presently
solve this problem. Rene Descartes (1641/1952) perhaps framed the prototypical dualism
with his claim that the mind or soul permitted God’s actions and influences but that the
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body was mechanistically autonomous. In this sense, God was only inactive for part of
the world. Donald Wacome (2003), in the book Science and the Soul, illustrates a
variation of this form of dualism when he holds that God is involved with some entities
Christians, unlike deists, believe that God miraculously intervenes in his creation,
experience; and, above all, in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus—not to
things coming about by natural processes that are what they are in the world God
has created without feeling the need to postulate divine interventions (emphasis
added, p. 200).
Here, Wacome (2003) distinguishes his position from deism because he believes God is
currently active in the events of humans (e.g., their history, experience). However, he
then postulates a deism of nature where God created the processes of nature but they now
“come about by natural processes.” This conception is a great example of the modern
attempt to integrate theism and naturalism, because God is active in human experience
but inactive in nature, where the laws of nature and naturalistic philosophy take over.
Of course, any such dualism begs the usual interactional questions: How do the
two realms – soul and body, human experience and nature – interact? What if, for
example, there is good reason to believe that our minds are our brains? Where does the
soul and our experience leave off and our biology and nature begin? If the mind
agentically or spiritually controls the body, then the “natural processes” discussed by
Wacome do not control the body. If, on the other hand, the laws of our biological nature
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control our brains, as many neuroscientists seem to contend, then these laws, not God or
our human agency, govern our human experience. We cannot have it both ways because
Some will undoubtedly say here that God is not only the creator of these laws but
also their sustainer. However, this is little more than a technical variation on dualism.
As Griffin (2000) and other scholars have long shown, the notion that God upholds the
laws does not allow God to be “active” in any meaningful theistic sense because God’s
upholding of the laws means that He cannot act otherwise than the laws. Because this
ability to “act otherwise” is the basis of any freedom of action, God enjoys no such
freedom. Moreover, God cannot minister to His children uniquely or modify his actions
in the light of changing circumstances because the laws of nature are themselves the same
Now I realize that we won’t solve the mind/body problem today. I also know that
there are hundreds of variations on these combination themes, with each variation
attempting to bring together two seemingly commonsensical ideas for many in our
Western culture – naturalism and theism. The problem with all these variations on
dualism and deism is that do not, in principle, resolve the incompatibility of these two
philosophies; they, in fact, interface the two by recognizing their incompability. In other
words, the extent to which they work is the extent to which they assign these two
the soul from the body, and Wacome separating human experience from nature.
Deism, in this sense, is merely dualism across time, with God having been active
at one point in time (as creator) but now, at another point in time, being essentially
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passive – two separate realms of time. Indeed, this separation of the naturalistic (no
divine intervention) from the theistic (active and current divine intervention) in both
time or in space, the fundamental premise of deism and dualism is that the two
philosophies apparently cannot co-exist in the same time and place. No dualism or deism
would be necessary if they were really compatible. The important point, for our present
investigate one side of this dualism – the godless side (Hedges, in press; Slife & Hopkins,
in press), making their conceptual foundations incompatible with the God-filled side of
theism.