No.

A. Doctrine:

As a general rule, a law declared as unconstitutional produces no effect

whatsoever and confers no right on any person. It matters not whether the
person is a party to the original case, because "not only the parties but all
persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no
one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity." (IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 7 OF THE CIVIL CODE)

B. Case Title: Millarosa vs. Carmel Development Inc., G.R. No. 202950 (J. Sereno)
(27 November 2013)

C. Facts:

Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan

property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. The
property has a total land area of 156 hectares and consists of three parcels of land
registered in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc. under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. (62603) 15634, (62605) 15632 and (64007) 15807. The lot that petitioner presently
occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles above-mentioned.

On 14 September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.

293 (P.D. 293), which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them open for
disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI).

By virtue of P.D. 293, a Memorandum was inscribed on the last page of respondent’s
title.

On the basis of P.D. 293, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a

member of the MHAI, occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there. On the
other hand, respondent was constrained to allow the members of MHAI to also occupy
the rest of Pangarap Village.

On 29 January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason and Remedio V.
Tuason, Attorney-in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan City,
Ministry of Justice and the National Treasurer (Tuason), which declared P.D. 293 as
unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts.

On 17 February 1988, the Register of Deeds then cancelled the Memorandum

inscripted on respondent’s title, eventually restoring respondent’s ownership of the
entire property. Meanwhile, sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue
of an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M. Juan in his favor.

As a consequence of Tuason, respondent made several oral demands on petitioner to

vacate the premises, but to no avail. A written demand letter which was sent sometime
in April 2002 also went unheeded.

On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the
MeTC. After due hearing on 9 November 2007, the trial court rendered a Decision
ordering the defendant to vacate the subject property located at Lot No. 32, Block 73,
Gregorio Araneta Ave., Makatipo, Caloocan City, together with all persons claiming right
under her;

In so ruling, the trial court stated that respondent was the registered owner of the
property until its title was voided by P.D. 293. It had no alternative but to allow
petitioner’s occupancy of the premises. Since the latter’s occupation was only by mere
tolerance of respondent, petitioner was necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
would vacate the property upon demand. Failure to do so would render him liable for
unlawful detainer.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC. On 30 April 2008, it rendered a

Decision reversing the findings of the MTC.

In the opinion of the RTC, respondent’s Complaint did not make out a case for unlawful
detainer. It maintained that respondent’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of petitioner’s possession. Since the possession was
sanctioned by the issuance of P.D. 293, and respondent’s tolerance only came after the
law was declared unconstitutional, petitioner thus exercised possession under color of
title. This fact necessarily placed the Complaint outside the category of unlawful
detainer.

On 24 September 2008, respondent appealed to the CA. The appellate court rendered
a Decision on 25 May 2010 reversing the decision of the CA.

In disposing of the issues, the CA observed that petitioner’s arguments could not be
upheld. The question of whether tolerance had been exercised before or after the
effectivity of P.D. 293 would only matter if what was at issue was the timeliness of the
Complaint or whether the Complaint was one for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Since the Complaint specifically alleged that the possession of respondent was by
petitioner’s tolerance, and that respondent’s dispossession had not lasted for more than
one year, it then follows that the MeTC rightly acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint.

Moreover, with the determination of who was the lawful and registered owner of the
property in question, the owner necessarily enjoyed or had a better right to the
possession and enjoyment there. Hence, petitioner had no right to the continued
possession of the property.
Neither could he be considered a builder in good faith who could avail himself of the
benefits under Article 448 of the Civil Code. From the moment P.D. 293 was declared
unconstitutional and the title to the property restored to respondent, petitioner could no
longer claim good faith. Thus, as provided under Article 449, petitioner loses what he
would be building, planting, or sowing without right of indemnity from that time.

On 25 May 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in a
Resolution issued by the CA on 15 October 2010. Hence, the instant Petition.

On 2 May 2011, respondent filed a Comment on the Petition for Review; and on 17 May
2011, petitioner filed a Reply.

D. Issue/s:

Whether or not Tuason may be applied here, despite petitioner not being a party to the
case

E. Held:

Petitioner argues that respondent has no cause of action against him, because under
the doctrine of operative fact and the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis
praejudicium faciunt, petitioner should not be prejudiced by Tuason; the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of P.D. 293 should not affect the rights of other persons not party
to the case.

Again, petitioner’s argument deserves scant consideration. In declaring a law null and
void, the real issue is whether the nullity should have prospective, not retroactive,
application. Republic v. Court of Appeals is instructive on the matter:

The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as

being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never
existed. x x x.

A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the
effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in
our decisions on the moratorium laws, we have been constrained to recognize the
interim effects of said laws prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we
have likewise been unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play.
x x x.

As a general rule, a law declared as unconstitutional produces no effect whatsoever and

confers no right on any person. It matters not whether the person is a party to the
original case, because "not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration
of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the
courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total
nullity." Thus, petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum
aliis praejudicium faciunt cannot be countenanced. We have categorically stated that
the doctrine does not apply when the party concerned is a "successor in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem,
the judgment in which is binding against him." While petitioner may not have been a
party to Tuason, still, the judgment is binding on him because the declaration of P.D.
293 as a nullity partakes of the nature of an in rem proceeding.

Neither may petitioner avail himself of the operative fact doctrine, which recognizes the
interim effects of a law prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality. The operative fact
doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general
rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied
on the invalid law, but it can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an
unconstitutional act.

In this case, petitioner could not be said to have been unduly burdened by reliance on
an invalid law. Petitioner merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit
allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing petitioner to
occupy the same. However, this Affidavit was executed only sometime in 1995, or
approximately seven years after the Tuason case was promulgated. At the time
petitioner built the structures on the premises, he ought to have been aware of the
binding effects of the Tuason case and the subsequent unconstitutionality of P.D. 293.
These circumstances necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operative fact
doctrine.

WHEREFORE the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105190 are
AFFIRMED.

No. 7

A. Doctrine:

Section 56 (d) of the LGC provides : If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution,
the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. Par. (d) should be
read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word,
"action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be
entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the
sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction
that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all
of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. x x x
laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting provisions are
allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the
moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute. (IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 7 OF
THE CIVIL CODE)

B. Case Title: Ramonito O. Acaac vs. Melquiades D. Azcuna, G.R. No. 187378 (J.
Sereno) (30 September 2013)

C. Facts:

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PETAL Foundation) is

a non-governmental organization, which is engaged in the protection and conservation
of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.PETAL built some
cottages on Capayas Island which it rented out to the public and became the source of
livelihood of its beneficiaries,among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo
Bulawin.

Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued Notices of Illegal
Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the
construction of its buildings in violation of the Building Code ordering it to stop all illegal
building activities on Capayas Island. On July 8, 2002 the Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena
Lopez adopted a Municipal Ordinance which prohibited, among others : (a) the entry of
any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;and (b) the
construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if
authorized by the local government.

On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was
submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn,
conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the
designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government
property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.
A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built on Capayas Island.

Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and
damagesagainst respondents alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and
utilize Capayas Island. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance
on the following grounds : (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by the Local
Government Code (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its
implementation should be enjoined.
Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they
are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as
timberland and property belonging to the public domain.

The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void.

On appeal, the CA held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure
of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance
with Section 56 of the LGC. Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a
municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA
pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.

D. Issue/s:

Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners.

E. Held:

Section 56 (d) of the LGC provides : If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution,
the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

It is noteworthy that petitioner's own evidence reveals that a public hearing

was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than
their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no
publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made.

While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality
or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners
had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do.

In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA, 364 Phil. 683(1999) citing United States v.
Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916), the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the
ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local
government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of : (a) the oppositors
equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local governments non-
compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local governments non-
compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositors cause of action.
Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances
and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to
the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.

WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN
are hereby AFFIRMED.

No. 8

A. Doctrine:

Petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the
time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains.

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property
relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And
under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry." The
husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of
gains.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant
case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article
63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article
256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
law."

(IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE: Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided.)

Baka itanong during recit  "NET PROFIT EARNED" the definition of "net profits" in Article
102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal
partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative
to the provisions on Legal Separation.

Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the
market value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the
totality of the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of
the absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the
properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market value of the
properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.

B. Case Title: Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao et al., G.R. No. 176556 (J. Reyes)
(04 July 2012)

C. Facts:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby
awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is

forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days
later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the
term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does
not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2)
and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order  dated November
8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final
and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner
simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned." Furthermore, the same
Order held:

ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET
PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common
children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the
Family Code.

On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying for
the correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on
January 8, 2007, the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006
was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this
instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

D. Issue/s: WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN

THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF
FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE?

E. Held:

First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family
code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same
are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law
is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law
in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned
is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is
governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the
petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership
of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of
the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is
due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.  First, he was
well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what
the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each
spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s
properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common
mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been
established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally
between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation ½ share
decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children,
Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of

gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in
common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own
property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts
or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation
of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.
The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found
the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July
7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.