The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the lower court's decision. It held that:
1) The petitioners acquired the land in question before the other party claimed ownership, and they were innocent purchasers for value.
2) Unlike the petitioner in a previous case, the petitioners' claim to the land was based on a valid Torrens title, not a doubtful document.
3) As innocent purchasers who acquired the land before the case, the petitioners had rights over the property and were proper parties that should have been impleaded in the original case, but were not. Therefore, they could not be bound by the decision or subject to the writ of execution.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the lower court's decision. It held that:
1) The petitioners acquired the land in question before the other party claimed ownership, and they were innocent purchasers for value.
2) Unlike the petitioner in a previous case, the petitioners' claim to the land was based on a valid Torrens title, not a doubtful document.
3) As innocent purchasers who acquired the land before the case, the petitioners had rights over the property and were proper parties that should have been impleaded in the original case, but were not. Therefore, they could not be bound by the decision or subject to the writ of execution.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the lower court's decision. It held that:
1) The petitioners acquired the land in question before the other party claimed ownership, and they were innocent purchasers for value.
2) Unlike the petitioner in a previous case, the petitioners' claim to the land was based on a valid Torrens title, not a doubtful document.
3) As innocent purchasers who acquired the land before the case, the petitioners had rights over the property and were proper parties that should have been impleaded in the original case, but were not. Therefore, they could not be bound by the decision or subject to the writ of execution.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the lower court's decision. It held that:
1) The petitioners acquired the land in question before the other party claimed ownership, and they were innocent purchasers for value.
2) Unlike the petitioner in a previous case, the petitioners' claim to the land was based on a valid Torrens title, not a doubtful document.
3) As innocent purchasers who acquired the land before the case, the petitioners had rights over the property and were proper parties that should have been impleaded in the original case, but were not. Therefore, they could not be bound by the decision or subject to the writ of execution.
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Victor and Honorata Orquiola vs.
merely relied on the title of her predecessors-in-
Tandang Sora Development Corp interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged GR No. 141463 ownership of the land. It is our view that the petitioners are fully entitled to the legal protection FACTS: of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the The petition for review seeks for the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals mere Titulo de Composicion. which dismissed the petition to prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the RTC of Quezon City from The sale to petitioners of the land took place issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners from before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. implementing an alias writ of execution. Petitioners could reasonably relyon Mariano Lising’s Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase owner of Lot 689 in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This was still free from any third-party claim. Hence, parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of considering the circumstances in this case, we the Piedad Estates, registered in the name of conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject Herminigilda Pedro. of this dispute in good faith and for value. On October 29, 1964, the latter sold lots to As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired Mariano Lising who then registered both lots in the the land in question without knowledge of any name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly smaller lots. Certain portions of the subdivided lots afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said were sold to third persons including herein land. As builders in good faith and innocent petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the In 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma, who was then subject property and hence they are proper parties replaced by Tandang Sora Development sa plaintiff, in interest in any case thereon. filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City Consequently, private respondents should have against Lising for allegedly encroaching upon their impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since lot. The RTC rendered decision in favor with the they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached plaintiffs and issued a writ of demolition against by the decision in said case. No man shall be defendants. affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, Petitioners herein filed with the CA a and strangers to a case are not bound by any petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining judgment rendered by the court. In the same order and preliminary injunction alleging that they manner, a writ of execution can be issued only bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and against a party and not against one who did not have for value, hence, they were parties in interest. his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an The CA dismissed the petition and held that action are bound by the judgment therein and by as buyers and successors-in-interest of Mariano writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant Lising, petitioners were considered privies who thereto. derived their rights from Lising by virtue of sale and Petition was GRANTED and lower court decision could be reached by the execution order. was REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
ISSUE: Government of Hong Kong vs. Hon. Olalia
1. WON the alias writ of execution may be GR No. 153675 enforced against petitioner – NO. 2. WON petitioners were innocent FACTS: purchasers for value and builders in Private respondent Munoz was charged good faith – YES. before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage as agent,” in HELD: violation of Sec 9(1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Medina case markedly differ from the present Ordinance of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) case on major points. First, the petitioner in Medina counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. the dispute after the original action was commenced On September 23, 1999, the RTC Manila and became final and executory. In the present issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. case, petitioners acquired the lot before the That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained commencement. Second, the right over the disputed him. land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner On November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong in Medina was based on a title of doubtful Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the authenticity, while the right over the land of the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is private respondent. For his part, private respondent based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Third, filed, in the same case, a petition for bail which was petitioners in this case acquired the registered title opposed by petitioner. in their own names, while the petitioner in Medina The petition for bail was denied but was potential extraditee must prove by “clear and later on granted by respondent judge of Branch 8 convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and subject to following conditions. whill abide with all the orders and processes of the Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate extradition court. the above Order, but it was denied by respondent In this case, there is no showing that private judge. Hence, the instant petition. rspondent presented evidence to whoe that he is not a flight risk. ISSUE: Petition is DISMISSED. The case is REMANDED Whether or not the trial court committed to the trial court to determine whether private grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or respondent is entitled to bail on the bases of “clear excess of jurisdiction in admitting private and convincing evidence.” respondent to bail Jose Jesus Disini vs. Secretary of Justice HELD: GR No. 203335 The Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing FACTS: importance of the individual person in public Petitioners claim that the means adopted international law who, in the 20th century, has by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher cyberspace activities violate certain of their value now being given to human rights in the constitutional rights. However, the government international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of asserts that the law merely seeks to prevent these countries to observe these universal human rights in tomfooleries from happening and punish their fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. this Court to balance the rights of the individual Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the presented in these cases, the Court extended the law on extradition, on the other. original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO), The Philippine authorities are under enjoining respondent government agencies from obligation to make available to every person under implementing the cybercrime law until further detention such remedies which safeguard their orders. fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, ISSUE: we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewisem considering Whether or not the cybercrime law is unconstitutional that the UDHR applies to deportation casee, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition HELD: cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings The Court has in a way found the strict where the innocence or guilt of the person detained scrutiny standard, an American constitutional is not in issue. construct, determining the constitutionality of laws Clearly, the right of a prospective that tend to target a class of things or persons. Such extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must standard was later used to assess the validity of laws be viewed in the light of the various treaty dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for race as well as other fundamental rights, as the promotion and protection of human rights. Thus, expansion from its earlier applications to equal the Philippines should see to it that the right to protection. liberty of every individual is not impaired. In the cases before it, the Court finds Records show that private respondent was nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained applications of strict scrutiny standard since no incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, punishment what is essentially a condemnable act – he had been detained for over two years without accessing the computer system of another without having been convicted of any crime. By any right. It is a universally condemned conduct. standard, such an extended period of detention is a Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these serious deprivation of hid fundamental right to freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is liberty. In fact, it was his prolonged deprivation of a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying liberty which prompted the extradition court to without right the things that belong to others, in this grant him bail. case their computer data, electronic document, or An extradition proceeding being sui generis, electronic data message. There is no such freedom the standard of proof required in granting or denying to destroy other people’s computer systems and bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable private document. All penal laws, like the doubt in criminal cases not the standard of proof of cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The effect, an in terrorem effects. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. In Section 4(a)(6), the law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to theconsitutionality of the above mentioned provision on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless. Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b) (3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be punished. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.