Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which

at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt.
GR 133876 December 29, 1999 Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner
Facts: then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a splitting a cause of action.
property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party
mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing
four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein
the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually
mortgage, which was granted. foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against
splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action
for damages against the petitioner, for the latters act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real 2. Conflicts of Law
estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan.
Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the
governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its
Issue: security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.
WON petitioners act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery
of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
We rule in the negative.

Held: Yes.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:
that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded
and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election,
his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
in itself.
pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other.
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or
upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial
foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
the sale is to be made. ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our within her right to file the case here because if shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable element involved, is the so called locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into appearing before a court
trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was
committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the
torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of
Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Court of Appeals the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).

297 SCRA 469 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Situs Locus Actus
Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while
she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried
to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her
Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned CASE: PNB vs. Cabansag
her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to
meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a
Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months Date: June 21, 2005
imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with
males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she Ponente: J. Panganiban
was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the
Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for Facts:
damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law
should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job
premises. and eventually applied with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a
private banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. She was
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct. eventually employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job offer, it was stated,
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed among others, that she was to be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her
a motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively employment may be made by either party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1
asked the court to make a determination of Saudia Airliness rights hence a submission to month notice or 1 month pay in lieu of notice upon confirmation. She accepted the terms
the courts jurisdiction. and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was commended for her good work. However, she
was informed by Ruben Tobias, the bank president, that she would have to resign in line
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the with some cost cutting and realignment measures of the company. She refused but was
complaint of Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil informed by Tobias that if she does not resign, he will terminate her instead.
Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because
under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at
bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well
Issues: respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her one months salary in
lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her employment
1. W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction Contract.
2. W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue
3. W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed
CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

FACTS:
Ruling:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian
citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada
1. Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he
employer-employee relations including termination disputes involving all workers, discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This
including OFWs. Here, Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC from the POEA brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually
through the Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in a foreign granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree
country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Although took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to
she may been a direct hire at the commencement of her employment, she became marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce
an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an
the POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists
employment certificate. under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce
by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he
filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of
marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz
2. A migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been
cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he
engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper
resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker. Here, Cabansag
party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which
was a Filipino, not a legal resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its
capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce
branch office in Singapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the
decree.
option where to file her Complaint for illegal dismissal. She can either file at the
Regional Arbitration Branch where she resides or the RAB where the employer is
ISSUE:
situated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has
made a valid choice of proper venue.
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like
Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

3. The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular HELD:
employee at the time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary
period of employment had already ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
281 of the Labor Code: An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary
period shall be considered a regular employee. Indeed, petitioner recognized
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that
FACTS:
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Galela
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according another. In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, marriage being dissolved.
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments.

A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple was able to obtain a
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). In this case,
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of petitioner prayed that:
Court.

(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Citation: G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
Ponente: Carpio; SECOND DIVISION between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

Doctrine:
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue
Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage A recognition of a foreign requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of
tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of the Family Code further confers marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino dismissed as the above rule applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. psychological incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage judgment. Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar as
the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provide the xxx
procedure to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Nial
v. Bayadog which declared that [t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
attacked.
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
ISSUE: condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a the rules of evidence.
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

xxx

HELD:

YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court further held that:

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for

Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of the Family Code
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may
that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.
Valmonte v. CA Digest this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo
D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the
private respondents motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996 petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this
petition.
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.

Service of Summons NO.

There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.

Facts: 1. The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for
the purpose of affecting the defendants interest in a specific property and not to render a
judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found
in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17.
1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes
Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal
and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South
service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for
should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any
this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where
other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
2. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an 2. In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not
action for partition against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is done by means of any of the first two modes. This mode of service, like the first two, must
of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of country where the defendant resides. The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D.
this complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17 and
Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider
Lourdes Arreola Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be found.He the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default
husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons for her failure to file an answer.
were served on her husband.
3. Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior
3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents counsel to her husband
leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19, such leave must
as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of
be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on
summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D.
his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that
he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process 4. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner
server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be
Lourdes A. Valmonte. not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
4. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For
 RAYRAY V. CHAE KYUNG LEE (1966) The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the
[ G. R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966 ] defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,[2] and, in Manila,
LAZARO B. RAYRAY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CHAE KYUNG LEE, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.[3]
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in
consequence of the filing of the complaint herein.[4] Defendant was placed under the
FACTS: jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication.[5]
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or
Plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan, Korea, sometime in 1952, where she binds the whole world. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or
was operating a night club; that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955; that their marriage tie.[6] Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of
they were married in Pusan, Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.[7] plaintiff
certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, herein is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to
written in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and - under plaintiff's theory -still
she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left the is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to
defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for
he then noticed that, on February 16, 1953, defendant was already married, according to annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of,
said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her the forum.[8] Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the
reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-
inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the
with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no marriage between the parties herein.
impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated
and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee.
Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of
RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008)
Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules of Court.
[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]
Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an
FACTS:
answer.
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and
ISSUE: existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby
WON Philippine court has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
RULING: Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption and mudflows.
Yes.
In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
jurisdiction over: (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and
therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.
Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and
of employment contract. choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues
defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. court.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may
agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as Special Sales
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available
Representative Agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioners
the lawsof the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for
court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.

Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a
State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines that renders our local courts determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.
inconvenient forums.

ISSUE:
Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. Consultants v. Kitamura Digest
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. v. Kitamura
CONVENIENS?
G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007
RULING:
Ponente: Justice Nachura
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in
a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties
and theres, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the Facts:
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign
prerogative of the country where the case is filed. 1. The petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co. is a Japanese consultancy firm which
provides technical and management support in the infrastructure project of foreign
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein governments. It entered into a Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent
respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. Under the ICA, the
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary respondent will extend professional services to the petitioner for a year.
appearance in court.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by
thelaws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other
2. Subsequently Kitamura was assigned as project manager of STAR project in 1999. In 2000, G.R. No. 18600 March 9, 1922
he was informed by the petitioner that it will no longer renew the ICA and that he will be
retained until its expiration. Kitamura filed a civil casefor specific performance before the B. E. JOHANNES, husband of Carmen Theodora Johannes, deceased, as a administrator;
RTC of Lipa and damages. CARLOS D'ALMEIDA and IDA JOHANNES, with her husband, J. E. JOHANNES, relators,
vs.
Honorable GEORGE R. HARVEY, as judge of First Instance of Manila, ALFREDO D'ALMEIDA,
brother of Carmen Johannes, as administrator, and PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, as late
3. The lower court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute and denied the petitioner's
guardian for a certain cash deposit of Carmen Johannes, respondent.
motion to dismiss since accordingly, it is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear
the civil case filed by Kitamura. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision.
Amzi B. Kelly for relators.
Fisher & Dewitt and Francis B. Mahoney for respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case MALCOLM, J.:

The relevant facts disclosed by this petition for certiorari and the return thereto may be
HELD: YES stated as follows:

Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee Carmen D'Almeida, died intestate in Singapore, Straits
Settlements, on August 31, 1921. Of her immediate family there remained the husband, B.
1. The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice-of-law rules as raised by the petitioner is E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida and Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister,
inapplicable and not yet called for (reference to lex loci, lex contractus, or state of most Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the husband, the brother Frederick, and the sister Ida,
significant rule). The petitioner prematurelyinvoked the said rules before pointing out any were residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred was in Manila. The Singapore heirs
conflict between the laws of Japan and the Philippines. apparently joined in asking that letters of administration be granted by the Supreme Court
of the Straits Settlements to B. E. Johannes, the lawful husband of the deceased. At least, on
September 19, 1921, the husband of the deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the
2. The doctrine on forum non conveniens cannot be invoked to deprive the RTC of its husband was named the administrator of the property of the deceased wife, which was
jurisdiction. Dismissing the case on this ground requires a factual determination hence the locally situate within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements. (Under
principle is considered to be more a matter of defense. the British law [22 & 23 Charles II c 10, 29 Charles II c 3, and James II c 17], it would seem
that the husband is entitled to the whole of the estate of his wife if she die intestate to the
exclusive of any other next of kin.) On October 1, 1921, the brother Alfred D' Almeida was,
on his petition, appointed administrator of the Manila estate of the deceased consisting of
P109,732.55. This sum it appears, was on deposit in the Manila banks under and by virtue of
guardianship proceedings for the late Carmen Theodora Johannes, which were finally
terminated by the discharge of the guardian, the Philippine Trust Company, on January 16,
1922.

The burden of the relator's contention is that the Honorable George R. Harvey, as judge of
First Instance of the City of Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing Alfred
D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on deposit in the Philippines, and that an
administration in the jurisdiction is unnecessary. Accordingly, relators pray the court to It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an administrator
annul the appointment of Alfred D'Almeida and to issue an order directing the Judge of First is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone else.
Instance to have placed to the credit of B. E. Johannes as administrator of the estate of This preference has particular force under Spanish law precedents. (4 Escriche, Diccionario
Carmen Theodora Johannes all of the funds of the late Carmen D'Almeida Johannes, now on de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, 1085.) However, the Code of Civil Procedure, in section 642,
deposit and subject to the order of the court, with P5,000 as damages. The respondents, while naming the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, as one to whom
Judge Harvey, and the administrator Alfred D'Almeida, in compliance with the order to show administration can be granted, leaves this to the discretion of the court to determine, for it
cause why the writ should not issue, contend that the respondent judge has not in any may be found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility. Moreover,
manner acted in excess of the jurisdiction duly conferred upon and exercised by him in the nonresidence is a factor to be considered in determining the propriety of the appointment,
manner provided by law, and that an order appointing an administrator is a final and and in this connection, it is to be noted that the husband of the deceased, the administrator
appealable order. of the principal administration, resides in Singapore. Undoubtedly, if the husband should
come into this jurisdiction, the court would give consideration to this petition that he be
Certain general observations may possibly serve to clarify the situation. named the ancillary administrator for local purposes. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be
granted to the domicilliary representative, if he applies therefor, or to his nominee, or
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies attorney; but in the absence of express statutory requirement the court may in its discretion
intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, appoint some other person. (24 C. J., 1114.)
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other There is still another aspect to the case. This is that pursuant to section 783 of the Code of
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance appointing an administration of the
grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties
country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is appealable. (Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Lioc
authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person Suy [1907], 8 Phil., 594.)
dies, leaving in a country other than that of his las domicile, property to be administered in
the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed As we reach the conclusion that the Court of First Instance has not acted in excess of its
among his heirs. (23 C. J., 1010, et seq.; 24 C. J., 1109, et seq.; Wilkins vs. Ellett [1882], 108 jurisdiction, and as there in an appeal, certiorari will not lie. Accordingly, the writ prayed for
U. S., 256; Perez vs.Aguerria [1901], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 443; Vaughn vs. Barret [1833], 5 Vt., cannot be granted. Costs against the relators. So ordered.
333.)

The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the late Carmen
Theodora Johannes in Singapore, Straits Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine
Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary administration,
conformable to the provisions of sections 601, 602, and 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay the claims of
creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the surplus to the domiciliary
jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin. Such administration appears to be
required in this jurisdiction since the provisions of section 596 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which permit of the settlement of certain estates without legal proceedings,
have not been met. The decision of this court in Baldemor vs. Malangyaon ([1916]), 34 Phil.,
368), on which relators rely, is then not in point because predicated directly on the
provisions of the section last cited.
Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

San Luis vs. San Luis
Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then
married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. He died
FACTS: with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the
standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd
marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien
Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently
Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a on this.
divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
Facts
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:

1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
2. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before
Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973
3. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in
HELD: California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang
residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
before RTC Makati
reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them -petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of 1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and
the solemnization of the marriage. not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)
2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry
Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it
would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of
a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and
the ff:
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove
proper venue
 Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al
to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue G.R. No. 103493
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition June 19, 1997
FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala
CA: reversed and set aside International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by
shares of stock owned by Ducat.
Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its
physical habitation so petition was properly filed
president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an Agreement,
Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under
whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to
Philippine law
petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC
1. WON Venue properly laid? YES
and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The
-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of
-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of
and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which became due and demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners
may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance and for
continuity and consistency. damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in
misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the
2. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES
Agreement.
As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo
(1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by
an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which were in While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint For Sum
Ma'am's book) of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private respondents in
-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective
ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that
the Filipino spouse to remarry again private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more
than its true value.
---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry
Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not
sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis
pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of
Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both
stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons living
The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements of the
as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.
controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S.,
under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens, even as it noted
that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum
litis pendentia and forum non conveniens. non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
of litis pendentia.
determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.

ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?
HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
NO
TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it
vs.
was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel
TING GUAN TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.
them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
DECISION
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:
BRION, J.:

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign We resolve the petition for review on, certiorari1 filed by petitioner Tung Ho Steel
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: Enterprises Corp. (Tung Ho) to challenge the July 5, 2006 decision2 and the March 12, 2008
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92828.
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to
the thing; The Factual Antecedents
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the Tung Ho is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan, Republic of China.4 On
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, the other hand, respondent Ting Guan Trading Corp. (Ting Guan) is a domestic corporation
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. organized under the laws of the Philippines.5

On January 9, 2002, Ting Guan obligated itself under a contract of sale to deliver heavy
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge metal scrap iron and steel to Tung Ho. Subsequently, Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration
the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights before the ICC International Court of Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore after Ting Guan failed to
of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial deliver the full quantity of the promised heavy metal scrap iron and steel.6
court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or
apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho on June 18, 2004 and ordered Ting Guan to pay Tung Ho
the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case the following: (1) actual damages in the amount of US$ 659,646.15 with interest of 6% per
such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata. annum from December 4, 2002 until final payment; (2) cost of arbitration in the amount of
US $ 47,000.00; and (3) legal costs and expenses in the amount of NT $ 761,448.00 and US $
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the 34,552.83.7
principle of forum non conveniens:
On October 24, 2004, Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the recognition and of jurisdiction. Furthermore, any of the grounds for the dismissal of the case can be raised in
enforcement of the arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch a motion to dismiss provided that the grounds were raised before the filing of an answer.
145. Ting Guan moved to dismiss the case based on Tung Hos lack of capacity to sue and for The CA likewise ruled that Tung Ho properly filed the complaint before the RTC-Makati.12
prematurity. Ting Guan subsequently filed a supplemental motion to dismiss based on
improper venue. Ting Guan argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cebu where Subsequently, both parties moved to partially reconsider the CA decision. Tung Ho
its principal place of business was located.8 reiterated that there was proper service of summons. On the other hand, Ting Guan sought
to modify the CA decision with respect to the proper venue of the case. The CA denied Ting
The Proceedings before the RTC Guans motion for partial reconsideration in an order dated December 5, 2006.13

The RTC denied Ting Guans motion to dismiss in an order dated May 11, 2005. Ting Guan Ting Guan immediately proceeded to file a petition for review on certiorari before this Court
moved to reconsider the order and raised the RTCs alleged lack of jurisdiction over its to question the CAs rulings as discussed below. In the interim (on February 11, 2008), Tung
person as additional ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Ting Guan insisted that Ms. Ho (whose motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was still pending with that court)
Fe Tejero, on whom personal service was served, was not its corporate secretary and was filed a "Motion to Supplement and Resolve Motion for Reconsideration" before the CA. In
not a person allowed under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to receive a summons. this motion, Tung Ho prayed for the issuance of an alias summons if the service of summons
It also asserted that Tung Ho cannot enforce the award in the Philippines without violating had indeed been defective, but its motion proved unsuccessful.14
public policy as Taiwan is not a signatory to the New York Convention.9
It was not until March 12, 2008, after the developments described below, that the CA finally
The RTC denied the motion in an order dated November 21, 2005 and ruled that Ting Guan denied Tung Hos partial motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
had voluntarily submitted to the courts jurisdiction when it raised other arguments apart
from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss. Ting Guans Petition before this Court

The Proceedings before the CA (G.R. No. 176110)

Ting Guan responded to the denials by filing a petition for certiorari before the CA with an Ting Guans petition before this Court was docketed as G.R. No. 176110. Ting Guan argued
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary that the dismissal of the case should be based on the following additional grounds: first, the
injunction.10 complaint was prematurely filed; second, the foreign arbitral award is null and void; third,
the venue was improperly laid in Makati; and lastly, the enforcement of the arbitral award
In its Memorandum, Tung Ho argued that a Rule 65 petition is not the proper remedy to was against public policy.15
assail the denial of a motion to dismiss. It pointed out that the proper recourse for Ting
Guan was to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case. It also posited that beyond On April 24, 2007, Tung Ho filed its Comment dated April 24, 2007 in G.R. No. 176110,
the reglementary period for filing an answer, Ting Guan was barred from raising other touching on the issue of jurisdiction, albeit lightly. Tung Ho complained in its Comment that
grounds for the dismissal of the case. Tung Ho also claimed that the RTC acquired Ting Guan engaged in dilatory tactics when Ting Guan belatedly raised the issue of
jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan since the return of service of summons expressly jurisdiction in the motion for reconsideration before the RTC. However, Tung Ho did not
stated that Tejero was a corporate secretary.11 affirmatively seek the reversal of the July 5, 2006 decision. Instead, it merely stated that
Ting Guans petition "cannot be dismissed on the ground that the summons was wrongfully
In its decision dated July 5, 2006, the CA dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over issued as the petitioner can always move for the issuance of an alias summons to be
the person of Ting Guan. The CA held that Tung Ho failed to establish that Tejero was Ting served". Furthermore, Tung Ho only prayed that Ting Guans petition be denied in G.R. No.
Guans corporate secretary. The CA also ruled that a petition for certiorari is the proper 176110 and for other just and equitable reliefs. In other words, Tung Ho failed to effectively
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to dismiss if the ground raised in the motion is lack argue its case on the merits before the Court in G.R. No. 176110.
On June 18, 2007, we issued our Resolution denying Ting Guans petition for lack of merit. (G.R. No. 182153)
On November 12, 2007, we also denied Ting Guans motion for reconsideration. On January
8, 2008, the Court issued an entry of judgment in Ting Guans petition, G.R. No. 176110. In its Comment, Ting Guan submits that the appeal is already barred by res judicata. It also
stresses that the Court has already affirmed with finality the dismissal of the
After the entry of judgment, we referred the matter back to the RTC for further complaint.17 Ting Guan also argues that Tung Ho raises a factual issue that is beyond the
proceedings. On January 16, 2008, the RTC declared the case closed and terminated. Its scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.18
order stated:
The Issues
Upon examination of the entire records of this case, an answer with caution was actually
filed by the respondent to which a reply was submitted by the petitioner. Since the answer This case presents to us the following issues:
was with the qualification that respondent is not waiving its claim of lack of jurisdiction over
its person on the ground of improper service of summons upon it and that its petition to this 1) Whether the present petition is barred by res judicata; and
effect filed before the Court of Appeals was acted favorably and this case was dismissed on
the aforementioned ground and it appearing that the Decision as well as the Order denying 2) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan,
the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner now final and executory, the Order of specifically:
November 9, 2007 referring this petition to the Court Annexed Mediation for possible
amicable settlement is recalled it being moot and academic. This case is now considered a) Whether Tejero was the proper person to receive the summons; and
closed and terminated.
b) Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary appearance before the trial court.
On February 6, 2008, Tung Ho moved to reconsider the RTC order. Nothing in the records
shows whether the RTC granted or denied this motion for reconsideration. The Courts Ruling

Tung Hos Petition before this Court We find the petition meritorious.

(G.R. No. 182153) I. The Court is not precluded from ruling on the jurisdictional issue raised in the petition

On May 7, 2008, Tung Ho seasonably filed a petition for review on certiorari to seek the A. The petition is not barred by res judicata
reversal of the July 5, 2006 decision and the March 12, 2008 resolution of the CA. This is the
present G.R. No. 182153 now before us. Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
Tung Ho reiterates that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan. It also suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.19 For res judicata to apply, the
claims that the return of service of summons is a prima facie evidence of the recited facts final judgment must be on the merits of the case which means that the court has
i.e., that Tejero is a corporate secretary as stated therein and that the sheriff is presumed to unequivocally determined the parties rights and obligations with respect to the causes of
have regularly performed his official duties in serving the summons. In the alternative, Tung action and the subject matter of the case.20
Ho argues that Ting Guans successive motions before the RTC are equivalent to voluntary
appearance. Tung Ho also prays for the issuance of alias summons to cure the alleged Contrary to Ting Guans position, our ruling in G.R. No. 176110 does not operate as res
defective service of summons.16 judicata on Tung Hos appeal; G.R. No. 176110 did not conclusively rule on all issues raised
by the parties in this case so that this Court would now be barred from taking cognizance of
Respondent Ting Guans Position Tung Hos petition. Our disposition in G.R. No. 176110 only dwelt on technical or collateral
aspects of the case, and not on its merits. Specifically, we did not rule on whether Tung Ho under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts; we cannot
may enforce the foreign arbitral award against Ting Guan in that case. re-examine, review or re-evaluate the evidence and the factual review made by the lower
courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, we will not deviate from the rule that factual
B. The appellate court cannot be ousted of jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case findings of the lower courts are final and binding on this Court.22

The courts jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted until it finally disposes of the case. B. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court
When a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is retained.21 A judge is However, we cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the appellate court reached, given
competent to act on the case while its incidents remain pending for his disposition. the established facts.23 To our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court in
view of the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary appearance is
The CA was not ousted of its jurisdiction with the promulgation of G.R. No. 176110. The July equivalent to service of summons.24
5, 2006 decision has not yet become final and executory for the reason that there remained
a pending incident before the CA the resolution of Tung Hos motion for reconsideration As a basic principle, courts look with disfavor on piecemeal arguments in motions filed by
when this Court promulgated G.R. No. 176110. In this latter case, on the other hand, we the parties. Under the omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment,
only resolved procedural issues that are divorced from the present jurisdictional question or proceeding shall include all objections then available.25 The purpose of this rule is to
before us. Thus, what became immutable in G.R. No. 176110 was the ruling that Tung Hos obviate multiplicity of motions and to discourage dilatory motions and pleadings. Party
complaint is not dismissible on grounds of prematurity, nullity of the foreign arbitral award, litigants should not be allowed to reiterate identical motions, speculating on the possible
improper venue, and the foreign arbitral awards repugnance to local public policy. This change of opinion of the courts or of the judges thereof.
leads us to the conclusion that in the absence of any ruling on the merits on the issue of
jurisdiction, res judicata on this point could not have set in. In this respect, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires the defendant to file a
motion to dismiss within the time for, but before filing the answer to the complaint or
C. Tung Hos timely filing of a motion for reconsideration and of a petition for review on pleading asserting a claim. Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand,
certiorari prevented the July 5, 2006 decision from attaining finality commands the defendant to file his answer within fifteen (15) days after service of
summons, unless a different period is fixed by the trial court. Once the trial court denies the
Furthermore, under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Tung Ho may file a petition for motion, the defendant should file his answer within the balance of fifteen (15) days to which
review on certiorari before the Court within (15) days from the denial of its motion for he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but the remaining period cannot be less
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. Tung Hos timely filing of a than five (5) days computed from his receipt of the notice of the denial.26
motion for reconsideration before the CA and of a Rule 45 petition before this Court
prevented the July 5, 2006 CA decision from attaining finality. For this Court to deny Tung Instead of filing an answer, the defendant may opt to file a motion for reconsideration. Only
Hos petition would result in an anomalous situation where a party litigant is penalized and after the trial court shall have denied the motion for reconsideration does the defendant
deprived of his fair opportunity to appeal the case by faithfully complying with the Rules of become bound to file his answer.27 If the defendant fails to file an answer within the
Court. reglementary period, the plaintiff may file a motion to declare the defendant in default. This
motion shall be with notice to the defendant and shall be supported by proof of the
II. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan failure.28

A. Tejero was not the proper person to receive the summons The trial courts denial of the motion to dismiss is not a license for the defendant to file a
Rule 65 petition before the CA. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the subject
Nonetheless, we see no reason to disturb the lower courts finding that Tejero was not a of a petition for certiorari as the defendant still has an adequate remedy before the trial
corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive the summons court i.e., to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses the case.29 As
exceptions, the defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the Expectedly, Ting Guan did not question the portions of the CA decision favorable to it when
motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant30 or over the it filed its petition with this Court. Instead, Ting Guan reiterated that the CA should have
subject matter.31 included additional grounds to justify the dismissal of Tung Hos complaint with the RTC. The
Court denied Ting Guans petition, leading to the entry of judgment that improvidently
We cannot allow and simply passively look at Ting Guans blatant disregard of the rules of followed. Later, the CA denied Tung Hos partial motion for reconsideration, prompting Tung
procedure in the present case. The Rules of Court only allows the filing of a motion to Hos own petition with this Court, which is the present G.R. No. 182153.
dismiss once.32 Ting Guans filing of successive motions to dismiss, under the guise of
"supplemental motion to dismiss" or "motion for reconsideration", is not only improper but Under the Rules of Court, entry of judgment may only be made if no appeal or motion for
also dilatory.33 Ting Guans belated reliance on the improper service of summons was a reconsideration was timely filed.36 In the proceedings before the CA, if a motion for
mere afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy to avoid the foreign arbitral awards enforcement reconsideration (including a partial motion for reconsideration37) is timely filed by the
which is still at its preliminary stage after the lapse of almost a decade since the filing of the proper party, execution of the CAs judgment or final resolution shall be stayed.38 This rule is
complaint. applicable even to proceedings before the Supreme Court, as provided in Section 4, Rule 56
of the Rules of Court.39
Furthermore, Ting Guans failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person in
the first motion to dismiss is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the In the present case, Tung Ho timely filed its motion for reconsideration with the CA and
RTC when it filed a motion to dismiss and a "supplemental motion to dismiss" without seasonably appealed the CAs rulings with the Court through the present petition (G.R. No.
raising the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over its person. In Anunciacion v. Bocanegra,34 we 182153).
categorically stated that the defendant should raise the affirmative defense of lack of
jurisdiction over his person in the very first motion to dismiss. Failure to raise the issue of To now recognize the finality of the Resolution of Ting Guan petition (G.R. No. 176110)
improper service of summons in the first motion to dismiss is a waiver of this defense and based on its entry of judgment and to allow it to foreclose the present meritorious petition
cannot be belatedly raised in succeeding motions and pleadings. of Tung Ho, would of course cause unfair and unjustified injury to Tung Ho. First, as
previously mentioned, the Ting Guan petition did not question or assail the full merits of the
Even assuming that Ting Guan did not voluntarily appear before the RTC, the CA should have CA decision. It was Tung Ho, the party aggrieved by the CA decision, who substantially
ordered the RTC to issue an alias summons instead. In Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. questioned the merits of the CA decision in its petition; this petition showed that the CA
Intermediate Appellate Court35, we enunciated the policy that the courts should not dismiss indeed committed error and Tung Hos complaint before the RTC should properly proceed.
a case simply because there was an improper service of summons. The lower courts should Second, the present case is for the enforcement of an arbitral award involving millions of
be cautious in haphazardly dismissing complaints on this ground alone considering that the pesos. Tung Ho already won in the foreign arbitration and the present case is simply for the
trial court can cure this defect and order the issuance of alias summons on the proper enforcement of this arbitral award in our jurisdiction. Third, and most importantly, Tung Ho
person in the interest of substantial justice and to expedite the proceedings. properly and timely availed of the remedies available to it under the Rules of Court, which
provide that filing and pendency of a motion for reconsideration stays the execution of the
III. A Final Note CA judgment. Therefore, at the time of the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 176110 in the
Supreme Court on January 8, 2008, the CA decision which the Court affirmed was effectively
As a final note, we are not unaware that the present case has been complicated by its not yet be final.
unique development. The complication arose when the CA, instead of resolving the parties
separate partial motions for reconsideration in one resolution, proceeded to first resolve Significantly, the rule that a timely motion for reconsideration stays the execution of the
and to deny Ting Guans partial motion. Ting Guan, therefore, went to this Court via a assailed judgment is in accordance with Rule 51, Section 10 (Rules governing the CA
petition for review on certiorari while Tung Hos partial motion for reconsideration was still proceedings) which provides that "entry of judgments may only be had if there is no appeal
unresolved. or motion for reconsideration timely filed. The date when the judgment or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry." Incidentally, this procedure
also governs before Supreme Court proceedings.40 Following these rules, therefore, the
pendency of Tung Hos MR with the CA made the entry of the judgment of the Court in the Conflicts Of Law Case Digest: Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. V. CA (1995)
Ting Guan petition premature and inefficacious for not being final and executory.
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
Based on the above considerations, the Court would not be in error if it applies its ruling in Lessons Applicable: Territoriality Principle (conflicts of law)
the case of Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. and Macondray Farms, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al.41 where the Court, in a per curiam resolution, ruled that an entry of FACTS:
judgment may be recalled or lifted motu proprio when it is clear that the decision assailed of Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp & Company (C.F.), through its Japan
has not yet become final under the rules: branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the
Northwest authorized the C.F. to sell its air transportation tickets
The March 6, 1985 resolution denying reconsideration of the January 30, 1985 resolution March 25, 1980: Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, Northwest sued C.F. in
was, to repeat, not served on the petitioners until March 20, 1985 - and therefore the Jan. Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim
30, 1985 resolution could not be deemed final and executory until one (1) full day (March for damages
21) had elapsed, or on March 22, 1985 (assuming inaction on petitioners' part.) The entry of April 11, 1980: writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District
judgment relative to the January 30, 1985 resolution, made on March 18, 1985, was Court of Japan
therefore premature and inefficacious. An entry of judgment does not make the judgment The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because Mr. Dinozo was in Manila
so entered final and execution when it is not so in truth. An entry of judgment merely and would be back on April 24, 1980
records the fact that a judgment, order or resolution has become final and executory; but it April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve the summons but he refused
is not the operative act that make the judgment, order or resolution final and executory. In to receive claiming that he no longer an employee
the case at bar, the entry of judgment on March 18, 1985 did not make the January 30, 1985 After the 2 attempts of service were unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan sent the
resolution subject of the entry, final and executory, As of the date of entry, March 18, 1985, summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
notice of the resolution denying reconsideration of the January 30, 1985 resolution had not Japan> Japanese Embassy in Manila>Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of
yet been served on the petitioners or any of the parties, since March 18, 1985 was also the the Philippines>Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
date of the notice (and release) of the March 6, 1985 resolution denying of Manila who ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit>C.F. Main Office
reconsideration.1wphi1 August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of
summons but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
According to this ruling, the motu proprio recall or setting aside of the entry of final January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered judgment ordering the C.F. to pay 83,158,195
judgment was proper and "entirely consistent with the inherent power of every court inter Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and
alia to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law until payment is completed
and justice [Sec. 5(g), Rule 135, Rules of Court,]. That the recall has in fact served to achieve March 24, 1981: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the
a verdict consistent with law and justice is clear from the judgment subsequently rendered judgment. C.F. did not appeal so it became final and executory
on the merits." This course of action is effectively what the Court undertook today, adapted May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment a RTC
of course to the circumstances of the present case. July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and
void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and
In light of these premises, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the July 5, 2006 decision and proper notice and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and
the March 12, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92828. SP. Proc. No. fact. The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void
11.-5954 is hereby ordered reinstated. Let the records of this case be remanded to the court for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that this is an
of origin for further proceedings. No costs. action in personam. The process of the Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which is
outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in the case
SO ORDERED. before the Japanese Court of the case at bar
 CA sustained RTC: Court agrees that if the C.F. in a foreign court is a resident in the requirement of law made specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every
court of that foreign court such court could acquire jurisdiction over the person requirement of law made of domestic corporations
of C.F. but it must be served in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly
ISSUE: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F. registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light
of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as
such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to
HELD: YES. instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process.
insofar as it denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was
exemplary damages valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of
Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign judgment has the burden of regularity of performance of official duty.
overcoming the presumption of its validity
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and
the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the
Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant
is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made:
(1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or,
(2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to
that effect; or
(3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation
is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction
unless made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government
official designated by law, to wit:
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company
(b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation
(c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made,
the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or
other legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of
such copy is a necessary part of the service.
The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code
Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly
licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic corporations
We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a
discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property
to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every