JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

VOLUME XM. NUMBER 4, 1966

Architectural Programming,
Environmental Design, and
Human Behavior
Raymond G. Studer and David Stea
There is some question regarding the relevance of the concept of
environmental design to what has been traditionally referred to as
architecture, planning, landscape architecture, interior design, and SO
forth. Beyond the fact that it recognizes no arbitrary boundaries be-
tween “inside” and “outside,” large or small domains, the term environ-
mental desi has come to connote a technical commitment to the
P
evolution o environment as an integral aspect of human biological
and non-biological systems. The environmental designer’s task is to
bring the designed environment into equilibrium with these human
systems; -“architectural” form, structure and space, no longer consid-
ered ends in themselves, become the means which may be employed
to establish. this equilibrium. Formally stated, the problem of en-
vironmental design is the accommodation of the biological and non-
biological requirements of the human organism through the appropri-
ate organization of relevant variables in the designed environment.
The decision-making structure in an environmental design problem
involves the description of a system of human requirements in a par-
ticular problem domain on all possible objective levels and then the
evolution, or invention, of an environment which precisely responds to
these. If this is what designers have traditionally attempted to do, then
this has not always been clear, and the incremental demands for
higher over-all performance, along with the increasing complexity of
decision-making in the designed environment, makes the likelihood of
127
128 RAYMOND G. STUDER AND DAVID STEA

success within the traditional framework increasingly remote. For it is

within this framework that the designer’s dilemma is found.

T h e Designer’s Dilemma
The history of the production of architectural artifacts has been
depicted as a “search for form.” This search has transpired within a
polemic ( 2 ) which finds the “art” on the one hand, and the humans
which condition its production on the other. The design disciplines
have, for the most part, shifted their resources from producing esoteric
symbols for the privileged elite to more viable objectives; however, by
far the greatest portion of the man-made environment is controlled not
by trained designers, but by human “wants,” which are both condi-
tioned and fulfilled by those outside the design disciplines. Whether
the entrepreneur or the artist-designer (to choose two extremes in
the polemic) is better equipped to understand the problems of or-
ganizing the human environment is perhaps debatable; each has been
criticized for misunderstanding the problem in his own way. Gross
malfunctions in man-environment systems are occuring on such a
scale as to alert even the most insensitive elements in the culture to the
fact that something very basic is going wrong. (The federal govern-
ment’s launching of a somewhat desperate “beautification” program
provides a rather interesting example.)
Each discipline naturally sees the problem of environmental de-
sign differently; to the economist decisions grow out of a cost-benefit
analysis; to the political scientist it involves understanding the power
structure; to the planner it is one of investigating land resources, trans-
portation and city form; to the architect it is one of giving form to the
human habitat, and so forth. They are all correct to some extent, but
if effective multi-level decisions are to be made, the increasing com-
plexity of environmental problems demands that some means be found
to focus the resources of each relevant discipline upon those aspects of
the problem which are common to all. Barring “designer obsolescence”
( 3 ) , the environmental designer may be a key figure in the process.
The following discussion concerns some of the problems which must
be faced by the environmental designer as a consequence of the in-
creasing complexity of decisions he must necessarily make.
A discussion of the designer’s dilemma is usually introduced by
way of a brief historical review of the emergence and development of
modern architecture; of how the Bauhaus, perhaps the most symbolic
manifestation of modern design precepts, was founded upon an alli-
ance between the arts and craft of the machine age, firmly grounded
in a broad (but unspecified) sociological context, and so forth. (Both
the generating forces and the objectives of modem architecture can be
interpreted rather freely, since the speculations by and about the in-
 ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAMMING 129

tentions of designers are rarely isomorphic with the performance of

their artifacts in the real world). After a few comments concerning the
elegant solutions of unselfconscious “honest Indians,” this review cus-
tomarily concludes with a cataloging of the failures of current archi-
tectural efforts, and the assertion that either designers ought to under-
stand people, or that people ought to understand designers, or both.
We would like to enter the colloquy here, and suggest, as an initial
illustration of a developing shift in orientation, a re-examination of
functionalism.
Functionalism is often considered, particularly by those outside
the discipline, as the characteristic concept which differentiates mod-
ern design objectives from those of the past. Within the design disci-
plines functionalism is a rather tired issue; it may be worth re-exam-
ining, however, because it embodies some of the key problems in the
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polemic which et prevails. The precept of functionalist tradition is
simple: form fo lows function. It remains commonplace for desi ners
and laymen alike to refer to this or that object as “functionaf” as
though it were a special class. A form is often referred to as “express-
ing” the function of the constituent materials, method of assembly, or
the physical forces acting upon the constituent materials. As conceived
by designers, functionalism is really a synonym for expressionism; as
such, it can have no operational value in a rational approach to en-
vironmental design because neither the form, nor the function, nor the
relation between them has been adequately described or empirically
verified.
A re-formulation of functionalist goals may provide an interesting
context for exploring a possible resolution of that polemic inhibiting
the development of a viable environmental design. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that we change the precept to environment follows function,
and specify as the class of relevant variables the requirements of the
articipating humans. However difficult to implement, this would de-
Ene a program with relatively clear design and research goals. Such
dichotomies as those between “efficiency” and %eautyyn as well as
other circular concepts, would be rendered quite meaningless, for to
be functional the designed environment1 as it interacts with the hu-
man participants, would be in a state of equilibrium, with all the diffi-
cult implications such a proposition entails. A. E. Paar has hinted at
this kind of “functionalism” for some time in suggesting that elements
in the environment be chosen in response to psychological variables
as well as other (“functional”) ones (6). Such a move seems reason-
able enough; we simply desi n environments for all classes of needs
relative to the participating tumans. But the designer’s dilemma is
1 The designed environment, for the purpose of this discussion, will be de-
fined as that subset of the universal set of physical elements, or stimuli, which are
under the control of the environmental designer.
130 RAYMOND C. STUDER A N D DAVID STEA

obviously not so easily resolved. The accommodation of all relevant

human needs would include the interaction of highly complex human
systems of which our knowledge is hardly complete. On the other
hand, we are no longer entirely ignorant of such systems; at any rate
we are quite committed, for “. . . innocence once lost, can never be
regained. . . .” (1)
The “designer’s dilemma” in this historical situation can be sum-
marized somewhat as follows: he must make design decisions involv-
ing: more people emitting more complex behaviors, more communi-
cation, more knowledge about what is required, and more complex
means for finding solutions. Having traditionally functioned in an
artistic framework, the environmental designer finds himself generally
operating outside the scientific community; as one consequence, his
knowledge of the techniques for objectivity analyzing and organizing
complex human systems is minuscule. Finally, he must make highly
complex design decisions with linguistic ( conceptual) tools which are
both inappropriate and clumsy. The current search within the design
disciplines for a “systems approach ( 4 ) to desi ning the human en-
P
vironment is in response to precisely such prob ems as these. James
Q.Wilson recently put it this way:
.
. . cities are systems of people living together or collections of systems
of people living together. I think that people who have to work on prob-
lems concerning cities know too little about systems and too little about
people, but they know a good deal about what is in between ( 14).
Least we be accused of the kind of unbounded cynicism which
prevails among too many critics of the environmental designer’s efforts,
we should add parenthetically that while he is faced with a dilemma
of sorts, he has also contributed a unique kind of knowledge. When
properly applied, this howledge can significantly influence the illumi-
nation and enrichment of the cultural milieu.

Environmental Problem Formulation2

Environmental design processes fall generally into two classes:
those necessary in formulating the problem, and those necessary in
developing a solution to that problem. Historically too little has been
said about the first, and perhaps too much has been said about the sec-
ond. Environmental problems have been erroneously formulated, in
most instances, due to the tacit assumption that what is required is a
particular class of (or collection of) physical entities, e.g. a “building,”
a “school,” a “house,” a “civic-center,’’ a “city,” an “Indian village,” ( a
variety of) “rooms.” While any environmental problem typically re-
quires some sort of physical system as a solution, problem definitions
2 For a more detailed development of this analysis see Studer (13).
 ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAMMING 131

such as these are manifestations of lin uistic (and conceptual) re-

Fi
scation, not rational processes of formu ating problems; the imposed
bias places both cognitive and logical constraints on environmental
decision-making which are rarely overcome. The problem is not one
of simply “redefining terms” but of evolving an entirely new tax-
onomy of roblem formulation.
F
The “ unctional origins” (1) of environmental problems are to be
found not in the domain of hysical entities (see analysis of “why is a
wall” below) but in the be% l topographies of the human par-
uimal
ticipants. To develop a modus operandi for formulating environmental
problems we must have a (conceptual) understanding of how the de-
signed environment affects the human organism. If we assess the ef-
fects of the designed environment through its influence on the beha-
vioral system related to it, then it follows that in designing environ-
ments, human behavior constitutes the class of independent variables
and the designed environment the class of dependent variables. In en-
vironment-behavior research when we are interested in the effects of
extant environments upon behavior which occurs within them, the
physical system typically (but not always) constitutes the class of in-
dependent variables and human behaviors the class of dependent
variables.
The technical procedures required in formulating environmental
problems should but very often do not begin with the question:
“Does a problem really exist?” The designer customarily enters the
problem only after it has been assumed to exist, and after the defini-
tion of that problem is essentially complete; after which the larger
context is examined. We must find the means for reversing this
process. Problems in the designed environment are often assumed,
when it may be another aspect of the system which is in dise uilibrium
7
-the social environment, the economic environment, and so orth. The
Hawthorne studies provide us with a classic example of how such
problems can be misclassified. (7) In one instance, experimental ma-
nipulation of an environmental variable was assumed to be the cause
of an increase in productivity until it was found that the experimenters
were unknowingly also manipulating motivation, and this eclipsed
the hypothesized ”improvement” in the physical environment.
An environmental problem exists if and only if w e can detect a
malfunction between the designed environment and the system of hu-
man behaviors which is to be accommodated. Due to the nature of
dependency, environmental problems must not only be detected but
also delimited and structured in the context of a larger behavior-
environmental continuum. The attempts of urban designers and plan-
ners to attain continuity in the designed environment are very often
aborted; this may be due to their emphasis upon continuity in the
physical system, to the general exclusion of the behavioral system.
132 RAYMOND G. STUDER AND DAVID STEA

In lieu of definitions such as “buildings,” we are suggesting that

environmental problems be defined operationally in terms of the be-
havioral system under investigation. Defining a behavioral system for
a particular problem domain is no simple operation and defining such
a system for an informal organization of humans is considerable more
complex than for a formal one. Also difficult is the differentiation be-
tween the “oughts” of the operating value system and the “musts” of
the behavioral system which supports it. It is well known that defining
a fully extended set of human behaviors for a particular organization
involves complex (but available) analyses of the organizational goals,
sub-goals, i.e. means-ends hierarchy ( 8 ) and the system and sub-sys-
tems of behaviors necessary to attain these. A demonstration of the
precise manipulations required for realizing a behavioral system would
be unwieldy; it should be ointed out, however, that the data which
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impinge on the structure o a behavioral system for a !articular prob-
lem domain must be developed in the context of know edge and tech-
niques derived from various areas of related research. Principles de-
veloped in organizational psychology, for example, cannot affect the
form of a physical system per se, only the form of the behavioral sys-
tem which the physical form accommodates. This could be a helpful
insight for the environmental designer.
In gathering data (and identifying resources), the designer ex-
hibits his most spurious behavior for he has not always been clear
about the class of data which is relevant. “Research” for the designer
often consists of investigating the physical characteristics of the par-
ticular “building type” in question. By investigating the problem do-
main at this level, i.e. a class of physical entities, it is unlikely that the
unique characteristics of the behavioral system will be revealed. As a
result, the solution is usually over-generalized, or simply inappropriate
to support the required behaviors. In the context of our previous com-
ments, the test for data relevancy is simply stated: data, both endo-
genous and exogenous, are admitted if and only if they contribute to
the definition of the system of behaviors to be emitted by the pariici-
pating humans. Assuming that we understand the correlations (and
this is a bit of wishful thinking) between the behavioral units and the
physical units in the designed environment, a behavioral system speci-
fied according to the above criteria yields a related system of physical
contingencies (quantitative and qualitative). When these operations
are com lete, the designed environment or architecture can be said
g
to have een programmed to accommodate a specific set of humans,
emitting a specific set of behaviors.
Beyond the fact that this conceptualization grossly oversimplifies
the manipulations necessary to demonstrate its operational capabilities,
one can anticipate several objections on the basis of what has been
presented. One of these concerns the possibility of changes in the goals
 ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAMMING 133

and structure of activities to be accommodated. The fact that we can-

not precisely predict such future requirements does not preclude the
possibility of specifying the environmental contingencies; it only means
that the physical system must be programmed to change its state when
disequilibrium occurs. The design of such physical systems may very
well define the conceptual and technical challenge of the future for
environmental designers. If the culture elects to reinforce designers for
inventing the appropriate physical system, rather than for creating
“timeless” objects, we will no doubt develop the appropriate means
to respond to the changing needs of cultures, sub-cultures, and their
individual members.

Some Aspects of Synthesis

r
The process of realizing the required s stem of physical contin-
gencies in a specific real world context, usual y referred to as synthesis,
is one of transforming the specified physical system (symbolically rep-
resented) into a real world formal system ( a physical entity). When
the specified system of variables (stimuli) interacts with physical vari-
ables in the real world, e.g. gravity, climatic variables, etc., this pro-
duces a decision-making situation of great complexity-the heuristics
of synthesis, as those of “creative” problem solving, are little under-
stood. Rather than addressing ourselves to the structural characteris-
tics of synthesis, we will attempt to illustrate some of the problems in,
and possibilities of, developing certain decision-making criteria for or-
ganizing behavior-contingent physical systems.
In light of the difficulties experienced by behavioral scientists in-
vestigating even very simple environment-behavior relationships in the
laboratory (e.g. studies utilizing “Skinner boxes”) ,it is understandable
that the task of defining the much more complex relationships which
might (and do) occur in the “real world” of environmental design
seems formidable indeed. It would be encouraging (to the authors as
well as to the readers) to be able to produce a “worked example” of a
large environmental system. As it is, we must be content with simply
indicating the kinds of research that would be relevant to an example
of a contained and artifically impoverished micro-system, together with
a few details concerning one of its elements and the influence of this
element on another micro-system.
If a situation could be so simplified that the general class of rele-
vant behavior were well-defined and entirely quantifiable, and the gen-
eral environmental class were also known and quantifiable, the bansla-
tion of behavioral data to environmental data would not be so difficult
to illustrate. Consider a behavioral sub-system labeled “informal social
and formal conference interaction.” For the sake of illustration, as-
sume that: 1) we have determined that a “controlled space” is in fact
134 RAYMOND G . STUDER AND DAVID STEA

required; 2 ) we are manipulating only the volume and general shape

of the space (holding other factors, e.g. light, color, etc., constant),
and the physical placement of those elements of “interior design”
which directly accommodate the speci6ed behaviors; 3) no-one is
to occupy the space, continuously, for more than a relatively brief
period of time, and, 4 ) the range in size of groups which will occupy
the space is known and not large (e.g. 15 or 25 adults).
In a situation of this kind, we are asking primarily about maximal
and minimal interpersonal distances for effective communication (the
specified behavior). Under these grossly simplified conditions, then,
behavioral requirements may be translated into spatial dimensions
fairly directly. In effect, such a translation involves the techniques and
data developed in at least four areas of research activity (Sommer,
(9, 10, 11); Little, (5); and many others): the first deals with personal
space; the second with the analysis of pair-wise seating position (lo-
cation and separation), and its relation to frequency of interaction;
the third with “room geography” (the seating configurations most
conductive to interactions of a given type); and the fourth with the
relation between perceived and actual spatial volume, As an example,
a consideration of minimal interaction distances for the maximum
expected size of group under the most formal conditions should yield
minimal space requirements ( a boundary condition).
To avoid inordinate speculation, let us terminate this example
rather abruptly and move to an even smaller level of analysis. Here,
we choose to examine the characteristics of an element of a possible
environment for the behavior previously specified. The element se-
lected shall be termed a barrier, although it has traditionally been
called a “wall.” We then ask “why is a wall?,” and pause to emphasize
that the difference between this and the usual “what is a wall?” is sig-
nificant. The usually confident answer to this usual question includes
a phrase about “separating rooms” and thus puts forth a definition de-
pendent upon common understanding and acceptance of such am-
biguous entities as “room.”
Taking a different approach, we start with behavior. It is then
possible to define a behavior system consisting of two or more be-
haviors produced by two or more persons in the same general region
(12). Suppose we find that the behaviors emitted by one person are
in some way incompatible with those produced by another. Assuming
we can specify the stimulus dimension, e.g. vision, along which the
incompatibility exists, we have a problem which calls for one of two
strategies: 1) an alteration in one, some, or all of the behaviors to
eliminate the source of the incompatibility, or 2) a barrier preventing
the transmission of the incompatible stimuli. If the second alternative
is more feasible than the first, we devise a barrier, and that is “why a
wall.” Defined thus, a wall’s function is highly specific (and specifi-
 ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAMMING 135

able); so that if, for example, only auditory stimuli are incompatible, a
transparent partition may serve perfectly well.
Consider the system of spaces with which we are all most familiar,
the “private residence.” Within the residence, various behaviors gen-
erate stimuli which are considered, by most, to be incompatible with
other behaviors. An examination of the spatial requirements of certain
activities (which would include considerations of territoriality, social
interaction distances, etc. ) together with the nature of these activities
would provide specifications for both the proper placement and nature
of barriers. That is an unlikely achievement with preconceived no-
tions of “rooms” or “flexibility requirements” is illustrated in problems
spawned by the importation of the Japanese house style into America.
This design, with its removable partitions, has served as the prototype
for a number of residences within our own culture. However, our tra-
ditions and patterns of living are such that the family rarely utilizes
the flexibility provided. Further, because of the expense involved, the
movable partitions do not provide good acoustical insulation, a serious
drawback for those who value quiet. Thus, as the charm fades, the
noise increases. Had the necessity of applying unusual techniques in
order to combine the aesthetic system of one culture with the environ-
mental value-system of another, been foreseen, the problem could
perhaps have been avoided. This has rarely been the case.
Clearly, the above is an example of the requirement for “privacy,”
a term implying insulation from the stimuli emitted by other humans
(Chermayeff and Alexander, 1963). The olfactory stimuli generated
by cooking, the auditory stimuli generated by small children at play,
the visual stimuli generated by a television set may all be incompatible
with, say, that behavioral sub-system usually called “concentrated
study.” Nearly all parents regardless of their studiousness are typically
disturbed by constant exposure to the noises produced by their chil-
dren; nevertheless, the children must be supervised, bringing us to a
consideration of another set of behavioral requirements and their re-
flection in further characteristics of a barrier.
If one system (say “concentrated study”) interacts with another
(“supervision”), incompatibility must at least occasionally be tolerated.
One “solution” to this problem has been to accommodate the adult and
juvenile recreational behaviors in the same space, thus maximizing
both the possibility of supervision and the incompatibility of the be-
haviors. If the requirements were more systematically evolved (see
section on environmental problem formulation ) , however, it would
become clear that only periodic supervision is necessary, and that a
barrier which changes state with time is the optimal solution. In CUI-
rent design practice “a wall with a door” is specified. Of course, the
primary purpose of this variable perforation in ingress and egress,
but it also serves the function of auditory and visual observation, if it
136 RAYMOND C. STUDER AND DAMD S T E A

is openable at the parent’s whim (and not lockable at the children’s).

The observation in this case is reciprocal, which may not be desired
In effect, therefore, the “door” is a rather primitive variety perforation.
We can certainly conceive of others, but a discussion of technical de-
tails is inappropriate here.
The physical systems we have chosen to illustrate are perhaps
banal; certainly they represent mere details in a larger scheme. We
feel, however, that this analysis is general in that it can be extended
to the interaction of large and complex behavioral systems with sup-
porting physical systems. Such analyses will perhaps require rather
sophisticated mathematical formulations, com uter technologies and
the utilization of other generally available too s. F
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2. BUSH-BROWN, A. The architectural polemic. Journal of Aesthetics and Art
CritiCLrm, 1959, 18, 143-158.
3. CHERMAYEFF, S . AND C. ALEXANDER.Community and Privacy. New York:
Doubleday, 1963.
4. GEDDES,R. L. Designing the human environment. Proceedings of the 1965
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5. L ~ EK., Personal space. J. Erp. Sac. Psychol., 1965,237-247.
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8. SIMON,H. A. Administrative Behauior. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959.
9. SOMMER, R. Studies in personal space. Sociometry, 1959,22, 247-260.
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13. STUDER, R. G. On environmental programming. Archltectud Association Jour-
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14. WILSON, J. Q. The public contribution to better environment. Proceedings of
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