ARMYHISTORY

Winter 2011 PB 20-11-1 (No. 78) Washington, D.C.

In This Issue

6
Death at the Hands
Handa of Friends: The Oran
Frtl"': 1be
Hamor Raid durtng
Harbor OplLatIon TORCH
during Operation
..,
By I11III:
Mark ... R.Bdan
J. Reardon

Enllny Combatants: Black

Enemy
u.s.
32
Tarnished Brass: Is the U.S.
Tamished Soldiers in Confederate Prisons
PII8on8
Military proll::~lne?
Military Profession in Decline?
.,
By ..... dlLlCllkU
Richard H. Kohn
27 By Thomas J. Ward Jr.

The Professional Bulletin of Army Histor y

1
 The Professional Bulletin of Army Histor y

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.

General, United States Army Military coalitions invariably join armed forces
Chief of Staff with distinctive national traditions in a common
cause. Mark J. Reardon opens this issue of Army His-
Official: tory with an account of the impact of the decision of
then–Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to accept the
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the more aggressive approach of his British naval deputy,
Secretary of the Army Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, over the rec-
ommendations of senior United States admirals on
Acting Director, Center of Military History how to secure Oran harbor during the North African
Col. Peter D. Crean landings in November 1942. While the British had
Managing Editor had the opportunity to learn from three years of war
Dr. Charles Hendricks with Hitler’s Germany and two years of occasional
military encounters with the Vichy French regime, the
Book Review Editor operational plan implemented in Oran harbor proved
Bryan J. Hockensmith disastrous, particularly for the nearly four hundred
Editor men of the 3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, tasked
Diane Sedore Arms with seizing port facilities.
Thomas J. Ward Jr. examines in the second article
Layout and Design the quandary faced by the Confederacy when con-
Michael R. Gill fronted with the problem of how to handle black
The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes Army His- Union soldiers, some of them escaped slaves, whom
tory (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development the secessionists captured in battle. He finds that the
of Army historians and as Army educational and training litera- executive branch of the Confederate government in
ture. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, Richmond and at least some Confederate state au-
noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well thorities gradually came to recognize that the threat of
as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical
work or Army educational and training programs. severe punishment of the black Unionists contained
Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribu- in a law adopted by the Confederate Congress could
tion of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to not be implemented without jeopardizing the safety
Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military of the captured members of their own forces. While
History, 103 Third Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5058, the Confederates viewed their opponent’s employ-
or sent by e-mail to army.history1@conus.army.mil.
Those individuals and institutions that do not qualify for free ment of former slaves to be an illegal act that would
copies may opt for paid subscriptions from the U.S. Government justify extreme countermeasures, they were forced
Printing Office. The cost of a subscription is $20 per year. Order by circumstances to largely accept this aspect of the
by title and enter List ID as ARHIS. To order online, go to http:// Union’s method of waging war.
bookstore.gpo.gov. To order by phone, call toll free 866-512-1800, In a commentary he titles “Tarnished Brass: Is the
or in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, 202-512-1800; by
fax, 202-512-2104; or by e-mail, contactcenter@gpo.gov. Send mail U.S. Military Profession in Decline?” Richard H.
orders to U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Kohn argues that one factor in the difficulties this
Louis, MO 63197-9000. nation’s military has encountered in the last decade
The opinions expressed in Army History are those of the au- in subduing insurgents in much smaller and poorer
thors, not the Department of Defense or its constituent elements. nations in Asia is a decline in military professional-
The bulletin’s contents do not necessarily reflect official Army
positions and do not supersede information in other official Army ism. Kohn’s pointed critique of U.S. military officers’
publications or Army regulations. The bulletin is approved for of- strategic vision, political entanglements, and possible
ficial dissemination of material to keep the Army knowledgeable ethical lapses, which he supports with a well-informed
of developments in Army history and to enhance professional selection of facts from the last two decades of the
development. The Department of the Army approved the use of military’s history, raises questions that, I believe, merit
funds for printing this publication on 7 September 1983.
The reproduction of images not obtained from federal sources the serious consideration of all those who wish to see
is prohibited. this nation’s military services prosper. We welcome
debate on the issues raised by this essay.
Cover: Men of the 107th Infantry, U.S. Colored Troops, which served
in Virginia in 1864 and in North Carolina in 1865/Library of Congress Charles Hendricks
Page 33, left: President Lincoln, 1863/Library of Congress
Managing Editor

Page 33, right: Jefferson Davis, c. 1860/Library of Congress

 The Chief’sCol.
Corner
Peter D. Crean

O
n 30 July 2010, Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke retired allocations, optimal levels and standards of support to
after a remarkable 39-year career at the U.S. our various chains of command. The reduced postwar
Army Center of Military History. As the au- budgets the Army anticipates in the coming years will
thor of a book in the U.S. Army in Vietnam series and only sharpen this challenge unless we can achieve the
coauthor of another in the series on the U.S. Army in enhanced cooperation the coordinating committee is
World War II, he made significant contributions to the seeking. The Army’s history community must funda-
writing of the history of the Army. His and Robert R. mentally alter its thought process to see each member as
Smith’s Riviera to the Rhine remains a definitive study of a cooperative resource and potential partner early in any
the invasion of Southern France, an important campaign endeavor in order to tap its myriad strengths and to en-
that has suffered in the shadow of the Normandy land- sure continuity of support. The Army’s history divisions
ings. Even more critical to the overall health of the Army and the history departments of its educational institu-
Historical Program, Dr. Clarke gave new direction to the tions could collaborate more efficiently with branch and
Center of Military History and to the entire program after field historians to create historical products relevant to
the Army named him as the first career civilian to serve their fields of expertise; U.S.-based historians must help
as chief of military history after six decades of military plan the in-theater collection efforts of military history
leadership. The departure of a historian of his stature is detachments and command historians; what is today a
a milestone for any organization, and the Center is no loose Army museum community must move toward a
exception. As acting director, I believe that now is a good more cohesive Army Museum System.
time to evaluate the core mission of the organization and The adaptation required of the historical field is even
assess how well we are doing. more fundamental than identifying cooperative business
As Dr. Clarke wrote in the Fall issue of Army History, practices among history community members. The aver-
the Army Historical Program and its products represent age consumer of the Center’s products has changed over
“the gold standard against which the historical programs the last twenty years. The digital age has revolutionized
of every Army and every federal agency have been mea- our field, and, as with all revolutions, there are great
sured.” The high professional and academic standards of opportunities to be harnessed and great challenges to
the publications, research products for the Army’s senior be recognized and overcome. The future leadership of
leadership, organizational history work, and care of the the Army is presently found in Iraq and Afghanistan in
Army’s material culture undertaken by elements of the the ranks of captain, lieutenant, and junior noncom-
Army Historical Program represent in Clausewitzian missioned officer. These future leaders are much more
terms our “center of gravity.” As such, they must remain comfortable with the tools of modern technology than
the focus of our efforts and must be rigorously enforced. are their elders, and they gather most of their news and
However, our assessment must also recognize how tech- information from the Internet and other non-print
nological advances have affected the study of military media. Historians today must also become comfortable
history and how we as historical professionals must adapt with nontraditional teaching methods if they intend to
to better serve the Army and to help the Army Historical reach this new and growing audience. Admittedly, the
Program meet its goals. message taught by the Army’s history is more important
During the 2010 Military History Coordinating Com- than the media we use to convey it, but we must explore
mittee meeting, leaders from the Army’s various history new avenues for transmitting this message if we are to
programs identified the need for better communication remain relevant as the Army’s junior officers grow into
and cooperation across agencies. The community’s em- senior military leaders.
phasis in recent years has been on our individual agen- How valuable would it be to any researcher to have
cies, the boundaries of our respective mandates, and the available at hand a tool linking written historical work
daily challenge of maintaining, within available resource
Continued on page 57

3
 Winter 2011
Features

27



Commentary:

Tarnished Brass
Is the U.S. Military
Profession in Decline?
By Richard H. Kohn

44 Book Reviews

58 Chief Historian’s
Footnote

Articles

6 32
Enemy
Death at the Hands Combatants:
of Friends: Black Soldiers
The Oran Harbor in Confederate
Raid during Prisons
Operation Torch By Thomas J. Ward Jr.

By Mark J. Reardon
Colonel Crean Takes Charge at through his mother to Maj. Gen. Wil- opportunity to submit a formal paper
the C enter of M ilitary H istory liam J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, who com- for consideration.
manded an infantry battalion in the Each prospective panel member
Col. Peter D. Crean, who was assigned 42d Division in World War I and led should send a detailed topic proposal
as deputy director of the U.S. Army the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and academic biography either by mail
Center of Military History in May 2010, in World War II. to Conference of Army Historians,
assumed the leadership of the organiza- U.S. Army Center of Military History,
tion at the start of August 2010, upon ATTN: DAMH-FPF, 103 Third Av-
the retirement of the Center’s director, Call for Papers: 2011 Conference enue, Fort McNair, DC 20319-5058,
Dr. Jeff Clarke. Colonel Crean holds a of A rmy H istorians or via e-mail to CMHhistoriansConf@
bachelor’s degree in political science conus.army.mil.
from Indiana University and a master’s The U.S. Army Center of Military Further information about the exact
degree in logistics management from History is soliciting papers for the conference location and other specifics
the Florida Institute of Technology. He conference of Army historians that relating to the gathering will, as plans
also attended the U.S. Army Command will held in Arlington, Virginia, on for the event develop, be posted at the
and General Staff College. 26–28 July 2011. The theme of this conference of Army historians page of
Commissioned in May 1988, Crean symposium will be “Armies in Persis- the Center of Military History’s Web
served in Operations Desert Shield tent Conflict.” site, http://www.history.army.mil/
and Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia This biennial conference has tra- CAH.
and Iraq as a platoon leader in the sup- ditionally featured presentations on
ply and transport battalion of the 82d joint and combined military history Center of Military History Issues
Airborne Division. In 1994 to 1996 he as well as papers focusing on the U.S. New Publications
commanded the 574th Supply Compa- Army. It has brought together military
ny in Germany. Beginning in December and civilian historians working in the The U.S. Army Center of Military
1995, that company supplied from bases government, academia, and elsewhere. History has published an account of
in Hungary and Croatia units engaged The Center again invites members the counterinsurgency operations in
in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bos- of the international and academic Iraq of a division task force during the
nia, and it received an Army Superior communities both to attend and to last two years of the George W. Bush
Unit Award for its work. He was aide participate in the panels. administration, a history of U.S. Army
de camp to the commanding general Papers may deal with any aspect of engineer operations in the Vietnam
of the 21st Theater Army Area Com- protracted warfare or other armed War, a book that describes and ana-
mand in Kaiserslautern, Germany, in interventions throughout history, lyzes the impact of logistical challenges
1996 to 1997 and aide de camp to the including frontier conflicts; constabu- on U.S. Army ground operations in
commanding general of the U.S. Army lary, stability, counterinsurgency, and Grenada in 1983, and three posters
Quartermaster Center and School in contingency operations; and Cold War featuring maps and chronologies of
1999. He served as operations officer standoffs. Papers that focus on force successive periods of Operation Iraqi
and executive officer of the 260th Quar- structure and rebalancing during pro- Freedom.
termaster Battalion in Kuwait and Iraq longed conflicts, manpower issues in Dale Andrade’s book Surging South
from January to November 2003 and protracted wars, retaining institutional of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Divi-
commanded the 240th Quartermas- knowledge after extended conflicts, the sion and Task Force Marne in Iraq,
ter Battalion at Fort Lee, Virginia, in socio-political and economic conse- 2007–2008, presents an in-depth study
2006 to 2008. Both of these battalions quences of fighting long wars, and the of U.S. Army counterinsurgency op-
handled petroleum supplies. He com- use of armies in domestic disturbances erations in a zone of more than sixty
manded the 49th Quartermaster Group are especially welcome. thousand square kilometers south of
(Forward) at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, for Participants should be prepared to the Iraqi capital. During the period
a year beginning in January 2009; the speak for twenty minutes. The Center covered by the volume, five additional
group managed the Army’s use of fuel of Military History has published se- brigades “surged” into Iraq to defeat
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. lected papers given at previous confer- attacking insurgents. The two brigades
Colonel Crean has a lively interest ences. Should the Center decide to do of the 3d Infantry Division that de-
in military history, and he is related so again, presenters will be offered an ployed to Iraq in March and June 2007
Continued on page 42
5
 National Archives
ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR
Retired Army Lt.
Col. Mark J. Reardon
is a senior historian at
the U.S. Army Center
of Military History.
Commissioned as an
Armor officer in 1979
upon graduation
from Loyola College
of Baltimore, he
served in the United
States, Korea,
Germany, Haiti, and
Saudi Arabia. He
was first assigned to
the Center in 2002
as an active duty
officer. Soon after
retiring from the
military in 2006, he
rejoined the Center
as a civilian historian,
and he is now acting
chief of the Center’s
Contemporary
Histories Branch.
Reardon is the
author of Victory at
Mortain: Stopping
Hitler’s Panzer
Counteroffensive
(Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas,
2002) and coauthor
of American Iliad: A
History of the 18th
Infantry Regiment in
World War II (Bedford,
Pa.: Aberjona Press,
2004) and From
Transformation to
Combat: The First
Stryker Brigade at War
(Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Army Center
of Military History,
2007). He contributed
several chapters to
two 2009 Center
publications, A History
of Innovation: U.S.
Army Adaptation in
War and Peace and Tip
of the Spear: U.S. Army
Small-Unit Actions in
Iraq, 2004–2007. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill confer at Casablanca, Morocco, in January 1943.
 AT THE HANDS OF
FRIENDS
The O ra n Ha rb or Raid dur ing O per ation T ORCH

By Mark J. Reardon

S
taff Sergeant. Ralph Gower, a double line of coal barges strung across of French North Africa learned that
37-year-old Californian who the entrance to the harbor. U.S. troops were “advancing rapidly”
joined the U.S. Army when Gower then heard the chattering in the face of weak resistance. The
war broke out in September 1939, nev- of nearby automatic weapons as the only setback of note involved two
er imagined he would take part in an Walney slowed for a minute or two. Allied ships lost at the Algerian port
amphibious invasion of French North Moments later, the cutter’s intercom of Oran.2 Six days later, a story filed
Africa. The light machine-gun squad echoed with orders for Gower and his by United Press correspondent Phil
leader was normally responsible for comrades to prepare to disembark. As Ault revealed that six hundred Allied
providing fire support to half-track– Sergeant Gower and the others filed soldiers and sailors attempted to enter
mounted riflemen of the 1st Armored toward the outer hatchway, a heavy the harbor aboard two U.S. Coast
Division. In the predawn darkness of 8 caliber shell slammed into their com- Guard cutters with the intention
November 1942, Gower found himself partment. Gower remembered, “I never of securing its facilities and docks.
off the Algerian coast sailing aboard heard a sound. . . . It just went ‘shisht- “That daring foray met a disastrous
HM cutter Walney, an ex–U.S. Coast ppfftt. . . . Then I passed out. When I end,” he reported, when the cutters
Guard vessel transferred to the Royal came to everything was quiet. I thought encountered resistance from French
Navy, with almost two hundred other the battle was over. The ship was full shore batteries, a light cruiser, and
American soldiers from Companies of ammonia and smoke. . . . I finally several anchored destroyers.3
G and I, 6th Armored Infantry. As the started climbing a ladder. When I stuck While Ault made no mention of
cutter drew closer to the port of Oran, my head out on deck I couldn’t hear losses, the New York Times on that
the sound of cannon fire punctuated anything, but the air was full of tracer same day broached the possibility of
the rhythmic slapping of waves against bullets. Then I realized there were dead heavy Anglo-American casualties dur-
the hull. Moments later, a shiver went men lying on the deck. I passed out.”1 ing the attempt to secure Oran harbor.
through the entire ship as the cutter’s On 9 November 1942, Americans In an accompanying piece focusing on
bow sliced through a cable linking a eager for news about the invasion the wounding of correspondent Leo

7
Roosevelt faced mounting criticism from
the Republican Party about his failure
to launch a second front in the war
S. Disher, who had been aboard one was announced by Lt. Gen. Dwight account of his wartime career obliquely
of the vessels, Americans learned that D. Eisenhower, commander in chief touched on the raid when he accepted
“fire from shore batteries sunk both of the Anglo-American forces in the responsibility for approving “direct
cutters. It was believed that there was North African operation. Eisenhower and admittedly desperate assaults by
only one survivor from one of the ves- also told reporters that Peters had been selected forces against the docks of
sels. He was identified only as Captain recommended for the Distinguished Algiers and Oran, in an effort to pre-
Peters, a 53-year-old rugged seafarer.”4 Service Cross, a U.S. decoration second vent sabotage and destruction and so
The next day, the same newspaper only to the Medal of Honor.5 preserve port facilities for our future
reported that Captain Peters, now After the war ended, additional use.”6 While U.S. Navy Capt. Harry
identified as the commander of one details about the raid on Oran har- C. Butcher described the Oran raid’s
of the vessels, had been killed in a bor continued to emerge in uneven repercussions in a draft manuscript
plane crash. Captain Peters’ death fashion. General Eisenhower’s 1948 recounting his experiences as Eisen-
hower’s naval aide, his published diary
does not include this key passage.7
Across the Atlantic, British accounts
General Eisenhower at work in Gibraltar, 5 November 1942 shed a bit more light on events. While
Eisenhower’s naval deputy for Opera-
tion Torch, British Admiral Sir An-
drew B. Cunningham, mentioned the
failed Oran harbor attack in his 1951
autobiography, readers were unaware
that his version of events glossed over
significant information contained in
yet-to-be-released classified records.
British V. Adm. Bertram H. Ramsay,
chief naval planner for Torch, died in
a wartime plane crash. His biographer,
R. Adm. W. S. Chalmers, omitted all
mention of Oran in the 1959 volume
chronicling Ramsay’s life. British
Commodore Thomas H. Troubridge,
commander of the Center Naval Task
Force during Torch, entered the pub-
lic literary eye as the subject of one of
the biographical essays that composed
Cdr. Kenneth Edwards’ 1945 book
Seven Sailors. Edwards’ narrative pro-
vides some detail not found in other
descriptions, but supplies little infor-
mation about the raid’s planning. A full
recounting of the raid on Oran harbor
would not be possible until classified
National Archives

British Admiralty records were un-

sealed in 1972. By then, interest in the
topic had waned so much that another
thirty years would pass before author
Rick Atkinson painted a vivid picture

8 Army History Winter 2011

National Archives

Sergeant Gower, second from left, chats with newspaper correspondent Ernie Pyle, third from left, at the 38th Evacuation Hospital in
Algeria, where the soldier was convalescing, 2 December 1942.

of events in his Pulitzer Prize–winning inclined to accept that reasoning. They be completed in all details as soon as
work, An Army at Dawn. Atkinson’s objected that a Mediterranean opera- possible.”10 The continuing failure to
account of Oran rightly focuses on tion would not, in the words of a later achieve a solid consensus on future
the dramatic moments leading up War Department staff study, “result in offensive options prompted President
to and following the breaking of the removing one German soldier, tank, Roosevelt to dispatch General Mar-
boom outside the harbor entrance. or plane from the Russian front.” shall; Admiral Ernest J. King, chief
The origins of the Oran harbor assault, Marshall believed that the war could of naval operations; and Harry L.
however, make for an instructive tale only be brought to a successful conclu- Hopkins, one of the president’s clos-
of coalition politics, the difficulties of sion if the Germans were defeated in est advisers, as emissaries to London,
interservice planning, and the process western Europe. American opposition where they arrived on 18 July. In addi-
by which senior commanders plan, re- to a North African invasion in favor of tion to stalled strategic talks, New Deal
source, and execute military operations western European landings, combined Democrat Roosevelt faced mounting
of great complexity and risk.8 with the pressure of Pacific needs and criticism from the Republican Party
The decision to invade French heavy shipping losses, produced a about his failure to launch a second
North Africa can be traced to the strategic impasse on the question of front in the war as congressional mid-
Anglo-American Arcadia strategy future offensives throughout the entire term elections drew closer. Roosevelt’s
meetings held in Washington, D.C., in conference.9 domestic concerns were captured in
late December 1941 and January 1942. A second Anglo-American summit his instructions to Marshall and Hop-
Although both Americans and British convened on 19 June with President kins, which specified that “if Sledge-
recognized the need for offensive ac- Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime hammer [a 1942 invasion of western
tion against Nazi Germany, the former Minister Winston Churchill meet- Europe] is finally and definitely out of
preferred invading mainland Europe ing initially at Hyde Park, New York, the picture, I want you to . . . determine
while the latter supported a Mediterra- and their military advisers confer- upon another place for U.S. Troops to
nean venture in the French territories ring in Washington, D.C., where the fight in 1942.”11
of North Africa, a proposed operation political leaders later joined them. Faced with unyielding British op-
they would code-name Gymnast. The Americans resumed pressing for position after three days of meetings
The British had much to gain because a cross-Channel invasion while the in London, the emissaries reported to
eliminating Hitler’s bridgehead on British stood firmly against it. While Roosevelt that the way ahead remained
the African continent would shorten a complete agreement could not deadlocked. The president responded
the lines of communications between be reached before the meetings ad- by directing the men to approve any
England and India as well as begin the journed, General Marshall conceded one of five strategic options. The
process of “closing the ring” around on 24 June that “the possibilities of president’s first preference was for an
the Axis. American military leaders, operation Gymnast will be explored Anglo-American operation against ei-
including U.S. Army Chief of Staff carefully and conscientiously [by the ther Algeria or Morocco, or both. After
General George C. Marshall, were less U.S. War Department], and plans will two more days of dickering, Marshall

9
 Scene of Operations
Pointe de l’Aiguille

Arzew

Pointe Canastel

Mers el Kébir

Les Andalouses
Oran

Philippeville Tunis
Gibraltar
Algiers Bône

Oran

Casablanca

10 Army History Winter 2011

National Archives

Admiral Bennett, fourth from left, gathers with Admiral King, third from left, and other senior Navy officers, April 1944.

and King agreed to postpone a cross- England only since June following a staff, marshal the necessary forces,
Channel invasion until at least 1943 three-month stint as chief of General assemble the invasion fleets, finalize
and committed the United States to Marshall’s Operations Division. Al- plans, and issue written orders.
large-scale military operations against though most of his career had involved The initial directive for invading
the north and northwest coasts of Af- service on high-level staffs rather than North Africa reached the British chief
rica by late 1942.12 command of troops and some of his naval planner, Admiral Bertram H.
Marshall and King consented to hav- subordinate commanders had served Ramsay, on 31 July. Ramsay provided
ing British joint planners produce an as general officers for years, General General Eisenhower with a draft out-
outline plan for the offensive as soon Eisenhower had the self-assurance and line plan within eight days. Ramsay’s
as possible. They and their British political savvy to focus his energies staff then experienced firsthand the
counterparts also agreed to change the on “the elimination of the frictions bickering that characterized the deci-
operation’s code name from Gymnast which are bound to arise when two sion to launch Torch as the Ameri-
to Torch and to the appointment of armies—and two peoples—are in daily cans and British argued over specific
an American commander for Torch, and inescapable contact.”15 landing sites for another month. The
who from headquarters in London In addition to his coalition respon- British wanted to land in Algeria in
would be responsible for all training sibilities, Eisenhower faced challenges order to position Anglo-American
and planning for the invasion. When during Torch that were dissimilar to ground forces for a rapid westward
Marshall and King, upon their return any he would encounter later in the dash into neighboring Tunisia that
to Washington, expressed reservations war. Unlike future landings, the Anglo- would threaten the supply lines of the
about the London agreement’s impact American alliance did not have firm German Afrika Korps opposing the
on plans for a 1943 invasion of western control of the seas or skies in 1942. In British Eighth Army in Egypt. The
Europe, Roosevelt reminded them that addition, the objective of the invasion American planners, on the other hand,
“he, as Commander-in-Chief, had [al- was to turn the Vichy French into co- were more concerned about the risk
ready] made the decision that Torch belligerents rather than defeat them. that Spanish dictator Francisco Franco
would be undertaken at the earliest The fact that the French and British had would respond to the Allied invasion
possible date.”13 clashed several times over the previous by assisting the Germans to seize Gi-
General Eisenhower, who had been two years meant that the burden of the braltar and thus cut the Allied naval
named commander of U.S. Forces in initial assault would fall to the untried supply line. U.S. planners favored land-
the European Theater less than two Americans. The U.S. troops landing ing the bulk of the Anglo-American
months earlier, learned of his impend- in North Africa would thus have to force in French Morocco.16
ing selection as Allied commander in exert just the right amount of armed Eisenhower himself came to prefer
chief of Torch on 26 July.14 This latest force to subdue the defenders in order eliminating the Moroccan option and
assignment reflected Eisenhower’s me- to prevent the creation of long-lasting staging landings in Algeria at Oran, Al-
teoric rise to high command. He had enmity between the French and Anglo- giers, Philippeville, and Bône. The Brit-
advanced in rank and position from Americans. With the timing of the ish position shifted in late August once
a lieutenant colonel commanding an landings still uncertain, Eisenhower the chief of the Imperial General Staff,
infantry battalion in the summer of had only a few months at most to be- General Alan Brooke, upon his return
1940 to a three-star general in just two come acquainted with his component from the Middle East and the Soviet
years. Indeed, Eisenhower had been in commanders, organize a combined Union, pointed out “that it was militar-

11
ily unsound to by-pass Morocco. . . . destruction of several Italian cruis- kept secret, even within the military.
The landings at Philippeville [proposed ers off Cape Matapan in Greece; the Rather than recall Cunningham from
in his absence by the British Chiefs of bloodless immobilization of a French his latest assignment as senior British
Staff Committee] and Bône appeared to naval squadron at Alexandria, Egypt; naval representative in the United
him too hazardous to undertake unless the evacuation of British ground forces States, Admiral Ramsay flew to Wash-
more air support was forthcoming.” from Greece and Crete; and the ongo- ington, D.C., in early September 1942
After yet another exchange between ing defense of Malta. General Eisen- to brief him. After spending two weeks
Churchill and Roosevelt, Casablanca, hower, after meeting Cunningham, together, Ramsay and Cunningham
Oran, and Algiers were agreed on as later remarked, “He was the Nelsonian departed together for London on 20
the Torch landing sites.17 type of admiral. He believed ships went September. Cunningham planned to
While Admiral Ramsay had hoped to sea in order to find and destroy the remain in the British capital for a week
to command the naval expedition to enemy. He thought in terms of attack, before returning to the United States
North Africa, he soon learned that never of defense.”20 once again to wind up unfinished
that assignment had been reserved for Cunningham’s fame initially result- business.21
61-year-old Admiral Cunningham. ed in his appointment as Eisenhower’s Before leaving to meet with Cun-
Shortly after he entered the Royal Navy, naval component commander being ningham, Admiral Ramsay directed
Cunningham’s intelligence and forceful
personality had resulted in his being
marked for advancement to senior Admiral Cunningham
ranks. As a sixteen-year-old midship-
man aboard HMS Doris during the
Imperial War Museum

Boer War, he volunteered for duty on

shore with the Naval Brigade primarily
because it offered an opportunity for
adventure and excitement.18 During
the first three years of World War I,
Cunningham commanded a destroyer,
HMS Scorpion, in the Mediterranean,
where he would earn a promotion
to commander and a Distinguished
Service Order. In December 1917,
Cunningham departed the Mediter-
ranean and soon took command of the
destroyer HMS Termagant assigned to
the Dover Patrol. Cunningham sup-
ported the British bombardment of the
Belgian port of Zeebrugge and agreed
to try to scuttle an obsolete battleship,
HMS Swiftsure, at the entrance to
the harbor at Ostend, Belgium, used
by German U-boats. Cunningham’s
unyielding belief in aggressive battle
tactics emerges in his autobiography
when he wrote, “I still think it a pity the
Swiftsure operation never came off.”19
After a successful interwar career
that saw him assigned as an aide de
camp to the king and knighted, Cun-
ningham received command of the
Mediterranean Fleet with the rank of
full admiral in May 1939. Italy’s entry
into the war as an ally of Germany in
June 1940 transformed that posting
from an undermanned backwater to
a central fighting front. Cunningham
oversaw a number of key battles to
include a night aerial attack on Ital-
ian battleships in Taranto harbor; the

12 Army History Winter 2011

 National Archives
National Archives
View of Oran from the
Mediterranean Sea

View of Oran harbor looking east from the

Chapel of Santa Cruz

his staff to develop a draft plan for the

landings at Casablanca, Oran, and
Algiers. Sometime around 12 Septem-
ber, U.S. R. Adm. Andrew C. Bennett,
commander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet’s
Advance Group Amphibious Force at
Rosneath, Scotland, received a sum-
mons from the Torch planning cell.
Bennett, a submariner who earned which involved Admiral Bennett’s the basins also diminished in size as
the Navy Cross in World War I, had headquarters and several reconnais- one progressed inward, the last being
captained the light cruiser Savannah sance parties deploying to Oran, would only 76 yards wide.25 If the French suc-
for the two years prior to his current take place after the 1st Infantry Divi- ceeded in scuttling the ships moored
assignment. After arriving in London sion obtained the surrender of the city’s there, they could deny use of the port’s
with several members of his staff, Ben- garrison. The final phase involved the facilities for a considerable period. As
nett learned that he would be respon- dispatch of a combined naval operat- a result, Bennett’s force included naval
sible for operating one major and two ing party to take charge of the Mers el salvage experts and several hundred
minor ports in the wake of the Oran Kébir naval anchorage located several Army engineers trained to put the
landings conducted by the Torch miles west of Oran.24 harbor back into full operation as soon
Center Naval Task Force.22 While Arzew and Mers el Kébir were as possible.
Bennett’s representatives, in close expected to fall into Anglo-American Admiral Bennett’s decision to wait
cooperation with Ramsay’s staff, settled hands intact, Admiral Bennett antici- several days before deploying to Oran
on a three-phased operation designed pated a great deal of French mischief had been influenced by the port’s sea-
to sequentially secure the ports in the at Oran. Protected by a 3,000-yard ar- ward defenses. Thirteen coast artillery
Oran area. The first consisted of send- tificial breakwater running diagonally batteries manned by four thousand per-
ing a combined naval party and the along its entire length from the west sonnel were arrayed in an overlapping
U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion to Arzew, to the northeast, the harbor was, in belt from Mers el Kébir to Arzew. Vichy
located twenty-five miles east of Oran, Bennett’s view, particularly susceptible troops also manned Fort Lamoune
to capture all dock facilities and an- to sabotage. At the port’s easternmost situated on a promontory overlook-
chored ships.23 The Rangers were the edge, a smaller breakwater projected ing Oran harbor.26 In addition, the
only commando-trained American seaward to form a 160-yard-wide French Navy had recently established
unit in England. The U.S. 1st Infantry entrance. The breakwaters limited the a considerable presence at Oran under
Division, reinforced by a brigade-size harbor’s width to 800 yards at its widest V. Adm. André Rioult. On 1 October,
combat command from the U.S. 1st point. Four large docks projecting from the 7th Destroyer Division, consisting
Armored Division, would then land shore separated the interior basins, of the Tramontane, the Typhon, and
at Arzew and Les Andalouses, located each of which was narrower than the the Tornade, had arrived at Oran from
fifteen miles west of Oran. Phase Two, previous one. The passages between its previous base at Bizerte, Tunisia.

13
 Action in the Port of Oran
Broken Boom

t
tligh
Spo
JET
TY

Fort Lamoune JETTY

Typhon
Quai
Eper
d’Alger vier

Quai de
Dunkerque
upuy
Quai Bea

Ravin Blanc
Army History Winter 2011

CITY of ORAN
14

Route of the Walney Route of the Hartland Route of the Tornade

North
 The trio of 1,500-ton Bourrasque-class Anglo-American intelligence sources decided to revise the plan developed
vessels each mounted four 5.1-inch to determine the location and number by Ramsay and the Americans. To
cannon, two 37-mm. and two 13.2-mm. of Vichy warships moored in the har- preclude any chance of widespread
antiaircraft guns, and six torpedo tubes. bor at any given time.28 French sabotage, the British admiral
Dockyard workers were also wrapping In the midst of the session conducted decided to sail a task force carrying
up a five-month overhaul on the 2,441- by Bennett and Ramsay’s staff, Admi- an American infantry battalion into
ton flotilla leader Epervier. Still in dry ral Cunningham arrived in London. Oran harbor on D-day. He justified the
dock at the western end of the harbor, Cunningham spent the next week and change by explaining that “it was also
the Aigle-class destroyer mounted five a half meeting with King George VI, highly important that, if possible, the
5.5-inch guns, four 37-mm. and four Churchill, Eisenhower, and family. harbour installations and shipping in
13.2-mm. antiaircraft guns, and six Cunningham also learned who would the ports of Algiers and Oran should
torpedo tubes.27 serve as his naval task force command- not be destroyed before our forces
While the four warships enhanced er during Operation Torch. Commo- gained control of them.” After about
Oran’s sense of security, they also dore Troubridge, who led the Center twelve days in Great Britain, Cunning-
exacerbated the overcrowding within Naval Task Force bound for Oran, ham flew back to the United States.30
the harbor. As a main node for the had served in the Mediterranean Fleet Cunningham’s decision to launch
transportation of people and goods to under Cunningham as commanding a direct assault against Oran harbor
metropolitan France, Oran had always officer of the battleship Nelson and the called for subject-matter experts fa-
been a busy port. In addition to the aircraft carrier Indomitable. Crippling miliar with mounting those types of
destroyers, a dozen or more merchant damage inflicted on the Indomitable by operations. At Cunningham’s request,
ships, seven submarines, five patrol German dive bombers during a convoy the Combined Operations Command
vessels, and several minesweepers were to Malta had forced Troubridge and his sent Royal Navy Capt. Frederic Thorn-
anchored there. While one or more ship to return to England.29  ton Peters, a Canadian, to work with
Vichy destroyers were absent as they When Cunningham finally had an Ramsay’s staff. Peters had won the
escorted convoys, the warships rotated opportunity to review the draft plan for Distinguished Service Order, second
among the available wharves, which securing Oran, he objected to Ramsay’s to the Victoria Cross, for action during
included the Quai de Dunkerque near willingness to accept a certain amount the North Sea Battle of Dogger Bank
the entrance, the Quai Beaupuy in of French sabotage as American port on 24 January 1915. He had returned
the center, and Quai d’Alger at the parties waited in Arzew for the 1st to civilian life in 1920, departing at
western end. The periodic departure Infantry Division to capture the city. the rank of lieutenant commander.
of the destroyers, coupled with their With little time remaining before he He reentered the service in December
rotating berths, made it difficult for departed once again, Cunningham 1939, subsequently commanding an

The French destroyer Le Malin, a ship of similar size and design as the Epervier, docked at Casablanca after suffering damage in an
engagement with U.S. ships during Operation TORCH
National Archives

15
 Imperial War Museum
antisubmarine trawler, heading a naval Reservist detachment, with Lt. (jg) to seize other Vichy naval vessels.33
intelligence staff section, and com- John M. Gill Jr. as Dickey’s second in In addition to the U.S. soldiers and
manding a school that trained British command.32 combined naval parties, the Reservist
intelligence agents, before assuming Aware of Cunningham’s preference force included twelve British Special
command of the auxiliary antiaircraft for a direct assault, Captain Peters Boat Section (SBS) operatives manning
cruiser HMS Tynwald in August 1941. championed the plan to sail a pair of six folding kayaks equipped with mo-
After a brief tour of duty in Far Eastern Banff-class cutters, each carrying sev- bile mines. The mines would be used
waters, Peters returned in England eral hundred U.S. infantry and a party to destroy the inner and outer booms,
in August to assume new duties as a of U.S. naval personnel and marines, consisting of two parallel lines of coal
special operations and naval planner into Oran. The soldiers, numbering barges roped together, barring access
for Torch.31 approximately a battalion, would seize to the mouth of the harbor.34
Admiral Bennett, who returned Fort Lamoune and the coastal battery The decision to employ the Banff-
to Rosneath before Cunningham at Ravin Blanc. The naval parties would class cutters Walney and Hartland
modified the original plan, remained secure all ships anchored in the harbor, for the assault stemmed from the fact
unaware of the British admiral’s in- with special attention paid to ensuring they were originally commissioned as
tervention for several days. Not until merchant vessels were not scuttled in the U.S. Coast Guard 250-foot cutters
6 October did Bennett learn that the place. The ships would sail under the Sebago and Ponchartrain. Transferred
plan, now code-named Operation U.S. flag in the hope that the French to the Royal Navy in early 1941, both
Reservist, called for preventing might not open fire on what appeared of the 1,511-ton vessels were reconfig-
French sabotage of the dock and to be American ships. ured as convoy escorts. The conversion
harbor facilities in Oran either before Peters made arrangements to neu- included mounting light antiaircraft
or immediately following the city’s tralize the Epervier at the onset of the weapons and welding depth-charge
capitulation. On 9 October, Bennett operation. One of the cutters would racks onto the stern. The additional
also received a formal directive from tie up alongside the French destroyer- weapons augmented the cutter’s origi-
General Eisenhower to make avail- leader while American troops cleared nal foredeck armament of a five-inch
able the U.S. Navy portion of the the opposing vessel’s deck with auto- gun, flanked by a pair of lighter dual-
Reservist force. With the main body matic weapons fire. A specially trained purpose cannon, and a three-inch gun
of his command not due to arrive in party of soldiers and British sailors aft. Despite British modifications, the
Algeria before D plus 3, the Ameri- would then board the Epervier for two ex-cutters retained their unique
can admiral reorganized the advance the purpose of seizing control of that lines, which lent credence to the use
parties slated for Arzew to obtain the ship. While the British and Americans of U.S. colors as the vessels entered
required twenty-five naval personnel believed that at least seven submarines Oran. The Walney and the Hartland
and six U.S. marines. Bennett selected and five minesweepers were docked at were detached from Convoy SL 122
Lt. Cdr. George D. Dickey to head the Oran, no special provisions were made en route from Freetown to Liverpool

16 Army History Winter 2011

 HMS Walney

Admiral Cunningham, fourth from left, pointing, reviews

plans for Operation TORCH with General Eisenhower, sixth
from left, and other officers and officials in Gibraltar six
days before the North African landings.

on 6 October. The cutters arrived at

Londonderry on 13 October, where

National Archives
they began fitting out for the assault.35
The issues of timing and rules of
engagement for Operation Reserv-
ist remained to be resolved. Although
Peters preferred to “go in if he could
at H plus 15 minutes with all guns fir-
ing,” Cunningham and Commodore
Troubridge were less enthusiastic specialized 393-man assault force built account intimates that Ramsay’s staff
about the prospect of Allied ships around Companies G and H, each aug- and Bennett had little opportunity to
opening fire on the port’s defenders.36 mented by a rifle platoon from Com- influence the production of the written
Cunningham wanted to avoid opening pany I. The troops started intensive order. Bringing in his own planners
hostilities with the French to mini- training in commando-type tactics, to also suggests Cunningham wanted
mize the chance of resistance. After include cross-country marches, hand- to ensure the order bore his personal
some discussion on the timing issue, to-hand combat, bayonet fighting, imprint, as had every operation he
Admiral Cunningham decreed that combat firing, and wall scaling.38 commanded while head of the Medi-
Reservist would start two hours after Even as the components of Reserv- terranean Fleet.
the first landing craft touched down ist were being assembled, Admiral Unable to convince Cunningham
near Arzew. The British admiral did Bennett’s lingering doubts about the to change the plan, Admiral Ben-
not elaborate upon this decision be- soundness of the operation grew more nett sent a letter of protest to Gen-
yond noting his belief that “if we could pronounced. He lodged both verbal eral Eisenhower on 17 October. In the
land sufficient troops at the places we and written protests with Commodore memorandum, Bennett wrote, “The
had chosen, I was sure that the French Troubridge, Admiral Cunningham, operation as originally conceived and
opposition, half-hearted as I expected and General Eisenhower, noting that, as approved by you appears to me to
it to be, would soon collapse.”37 Dis- “if determined resistance is met from be sound, but the idea of turning it
satisfied with his role as a combined the French Navy, which seems to be the into a frontal assault, as conceived by
operations planner, Captain Peters had general opinion, it is believed that this Captain Peters, is believed to be un-
lobbied for command of the assault. small force will be wiped out before the sound.”41 Bennett concluded with the
Before he returned to Washington in Army can enter the city if they go in at observation that “I am not convinced
early October, Cunningham granted H plus two.”39 . . . that Captain Peters means to wait
the Canadian officer’s request.  Drafting of the formal order for for a favorable moment. . . . it appears
After conducting a survey of U.S. naval operations in support of Torch that his intention is to enter the port at
Army forces in England to determine had been deferred until Cunningham’s a pre-determined time regardless of the
which unit would be available for Re- return to England. As the British admi- status of the progress of the Army. This
servist, Eisenhower’s staff chose the ral later recounted, “I already had three attitude and conception of the mission
3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, members of my old Mediterranean is believed to be wrong and at variance
under the command of Lt. Col. George staff in London with me. . . . I came with the mission approved by you.”42
F. Marshall, an element of Maj. Gen. to the conclusion that the only way to Three days previously, General Eisen-
Orlando Ward’s 1st Armored Division. get the plan written was to augment hower’s headquarters had issued Annex
Within a day of learning of his mis- these three knowledgeable officers 5a to the Center Task Force operation
sion, Colonel Marshall left Newcastle, with a fourth from my old Mediterra- plan to govern “Operation Reservist,
Northern Ireland, bound for Head- nean team. . . . I believe he dictated for Seaborne Assault on Port of Oran.” The
quarters, European Theater of Opera- about four days without stopping with document was signed by Eisenhower’s
tions, in London to obtain maps and four Wren stenographers on duty and operations officer, Brig. Gen. Lyman L.
other necessary data. On 9 October, another four standing off and waiting Lemnitzer, and approved on the com-
Marshall’s battalion reorganized into a to come on.”40 Indeed, Cunningham’s mander’s behalf by his chief of staff, Brig.

17
Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. It announced
the operation’s objective as seizing “the
first favorable opportunity to enter the
harbor, with a view to preventing the
shipping and dock installations from
being sabotaged.” The order specified
that the operation would be conducted
on D-day, with its exact timing deter-
mined by the Center Task Force’s naval
commander.43 After receiving Bennett’s
reclama, a very busy Eisenhower passed
it to Cunningham for resolution.44
Unused to having his orders ques-
tioned, Admiral Cunningham re-
acted with dismay when he learned
of Bennett’s attempt to persuade
Eisenhower to cancel the Oran harbor
strike. His reaction is understandable
in that Cunningham had very little
operational experience working with

Imperial War Museum

Allies willing to forcefully express
viewpoints contrary to British desires.
In his memoirs, Cunningham record-
ed, “the timing of the assault upon the
harbour defenses at Oran came under
fierce criticism from Rear-Admiral
A. C. Bennett U.S.N. . . . While not
much caring for the method in which Commodore Troubridge
the matter was raised I considered
there was something to be said for
Bennett’s criticisms. The time for Hartland. 48 The 3d Battalion, 6th Colonel Marshall’s troops spent the
the direct assault on the harbour was Armored Infantry, embarked aboard following day, 7 November, preparing
too rigidly fixed, so the orders were the SS Leinster on the morning of 24 for the mission. Just before lunch, all
modified to give Commodore Trou- October for a twelve-day voyage to of the officers and men were called
bridge a free hand as to the moment Gibraltar.49 together. As the unit history recorded,
the attack should be launched.”45 The At 2230 on 6 November, Colonel “Now we were to learn the situation,
time chosen for entering Oran har- Marshall’s troops debarked from the and what we were expected to do.
bor, as events would show, remained Leinster anchored at Gibraltar. Navy When the conference was over, all
unchanged. tugs ferried the soldiers and equip- else was forgotten, except pouring
On the morning of 17 October, Colo- ment to the Walney and the Hartland. [sic] over the maps, and aerial photo-
nel Marshall’s battalion left Northern The transfer went smoothly enough, graphs, so that when we got to Oran,
Ireland for Rosneath. Upon the attack but the Walney ran aground while each man would know what his part
troops’ arrival in Scotland, they spent shifting to a different anchorage. A was and where he was supposed to
several days training with the U.S. na- tug arrived a few minutes later to pull go.”51 Upon learning of the task force’s
val contingent and the crews of both the Walney off the rocks. As a result, destination, correspondent Disher
the Walney and the Hartland. The two “Peters sent out a call for a destroyer recorded, “Now two years after a great
cutters sailed on 23 October with Com- and ordered all troops to transfer.” Just naval battle between the British and
mander Dickey’s naval party aboard before the destroyer arrived, Captain French at Mers-el-Kébir, the Walney
the Hartland.46 First Lt. John S. Cole, Peters asked the chief engineer to and her sister-ship, the Hartland, and
a member of Colonel Marshall’s staff, report to the bridge. The engineering two launches, were going to carry the
and an American correspondent, Leo officer assured Peters that the Walney war again to the sprawling ant-hill
S. Disher, were aboard the Walney.47 had not suffered enough damage to port.”52 Two armed motor launches,
Three kayak teams from No. 2 Special warrant replacement by another war- HMMLs 480 and 483, joined the Wal-
Boat Section, commanded by British ship. Anxious to preserve the cover ney and the Hartland as the vessels lay
Army Capt. Harold V. Holden-White, afforded by the cutter’s distinctive at anchor. The motor launches would
sailed with the Walney, while three American silhouette, Peters withdrew accompany the cutters to Oran, where
kayak crews under Lt. E. J. A. Lunn the request and canceled orders to off- they were to lay down a smokescreen
were transported to Gibraltar on the load the soldiers.50 to cover the passage of the cutters

18 Army History Winter 2011

“No shooting thus far; landings unopposed.
. . . Don’t start a fight unless you have to.”
through the harbor entrance should the bridge, where he soon reported to Disher noticed Peters speaking with
the French resist. de Feraudy that all antiaircraft posi- the vessel’s captain, British Lt. Cdr.
The Center Naval Task Force ele- tions were manned and ready. As the Peter C. Meyrick. Disher watched as
ments at Gibraltar weighed anchor crews of the Vichy warships stood at Meyrick called out, “‘Turn her . . . we’re
in the late afternoon and evening their duty stations, the men exchanged going back!’ In that moment Peters had
of 6 November and linked up with guesses on the cause of the unexpected made his decision and the orders were
vessels sailing direct from England. alert. Some thought it merely an exercise being carried out.”59
Upon completion of the rendezvous, while others voiced the opinion that As the Walney came about in a
the ships re-formed into nine assault the British were somehow behind the tight circle, Royal Navy Lt. Paul E. A.
groups bound for four separate landing commotion.55 When additional news Duncan broadcast over a loudspeaker
sites. The Walney and the Hartland, of sporadic fighting at Arzew reached in French, which he spoke with an
which had been escorting Group 5 Rioult’s headquarters, the French admi- American accent, “‘Cease firing,’ he
bound for “Z” Beach near Arzew, took ral ordered all warships in Oran harbor said. We are your friends. We are
up a course for Oran harbor after de- to make preparations to sail.56 Americans.”60 The volume of incoming
taching from the convoy.53 At 0230, lookouts on the Walney fire did not decrease, probably because
At 0001 on 8 November, the Walney sighted a ship off Oran signaling “De none of the Vichy gun crews heard or
and the Hartland went to action sta- Alerte” followed by the letters “DCA.” believed Duncan. The Walney steered
tions in preparation for entering Oran Fifteen minutes later, as the cutters toward the outer boom as it increased
harbor. Final arrangements for launch- passed Pointe Canastel, about seven- speed to fifteen knots. In the midst of
ing the SBS kayaks and disembarking and-a-half miles northeast of Oran, the the smoke and gunfire, HMML 480 ran
troops were made. The forward- city blacked out as air raid sirens were onto the outer boom, causing HMML
mounted five-inch guns on both ves- sounded. At 0250, the Walney received 483, which turned sharply to the right
sels were left unmanned because they a somewhat ambiguous message from to avoid hitting 480, to slam into the
could not be fired without endangering Commodore Troubridge aboard the side of the Walney. Seconds later, at
the crews of the dual-purpose cannon. Center Task Force command ship. The perhaps 0305, the cutter sliced through
The cutters, escorted by HMMLs 480 message read, “No shooting thus far; both harbor booms.61 Royal Navy Lt.
and 483, turned on a westerly course of landings unopposed. . . . Don’t start a Wallace D. Moseley, manning the
six knots after making landfall at 0200 fight unless you have to.”57 aft steering compartment, remem-
off Pointe de l’Aiguille, a prominent At 0255, a searchlight from Fort bered, “we stopped engines and broke
land mass twelve miles northeast of Lamoune briefly illuminated the Wal- through both booms with barely a
Oran. The motor launches cruised ney before shutting off. Immediately noticeable tremor. . . . I went on deck
close to the shore, with the cutters afterward a light machine gun on shore and all [three Special Boat Section]
keeping farther out to sea.54 directed a burst of tracer bullets at the canoes were slipped with their crews
The landings at Arzew, which began lead cutter. In response, Captain Peters and stores in them. The three canoes
at 0116, alerted French military au- ordered HMML 480 to begin making were slipped in less than a minute, and
thorities in Oran to the Anglo-American smoke. When other French positions all reported themselves clear and under
invasion fleet’s arrival. Shortly before started engaging the Hartland, HMML way, though it is believed one had been
0200, Seaman Jean Meirat awoke to 483 also began laying a smokescreen to damaged by enemy action before low-
the general-quarters klaxon aboard obscure it.58 Both cutters then turned ering and sank shortly afterwards.”62
French Navy Cdr. Adrien de Feraudy’s seaward to avoid the Vichy fire. On the While lowering the kayaks, the
destroyer Tramontane. Meirat ran to bridge of the Walney, correspondent Walney endured “heavy but inaccurate

“‘C ease firing ,’ he said . W e are

your friends . W e are A mericans .”
19
The cutter continued to trade shots with
the French warship for almost an hour
close range fire” from several antiair- not engage the Walney. The Surprise Tommy guns until a hail of shell frag-
craft guns mounted on the harbors would not be the only French vessel ments ended their lives. With its en-
jetties and moles. The artificial smoke encountered by the Walney. As the cut- gines inoperable and many of its crew
generated by the motor launches ter continued westward at low speed, and passengers dead, the Walney began
off the harbor entrance, which had it met the destroyer Tornade leaving drifting helplessly toward the Epervier.
drifted westward parallel to the course Quai Beaupuy. The Vichy ship un- Although the cutter lacked pro-
followed by the Walney, cloaked the leashed a full broadside at close range pulsion, the crew of the Walney had
British ship sufficiently to prevent the into the Walney. Two shells pierced not yet given up the fight. When the
port’s defenders from drawing a clear the cutter’s hull, causing heavy casual- Epervier attempted to illuminate the
bead on it. While the French weapons ties and destroying the lubricating oil crippled British ship, the cutter’s aft
did succeed in scoring several hits, tanks. The fusillade ended as suddenly antiaircraft mount extinguished the
damage was confined to the commu- as it began, as the Tornade continued French searchlight with an accurate
nications system linking the aft of the toward the harbor entrance. The loss burst. As the crippled cutter drifted
ship with the bridge.63 of lubricating oil meant that the Wal- even closer to the Epervier, both French
As the Walney crept further into ney had only a few minutes before its destroyers were forced to cease fire
the smoke enshrouded harbor, Com- propulsion system failed.65 to avoid hitting shore installations.
mander Meyrick ordered the boarding The imminent loss of engine power The antiaircraft guns aboard the Tra-
parties readied. Several members of proved the least of Meyrick’s worries montane and the Epervier took up the
the crew started up the forward power as the damaged cutter drew closer to fight as the British ship approached
winch as deck parties took up stations the western end of the harbor. As the within fifty yards of the Quai d’Alger.
at the head and stern lines. Meyrick Walney emerged from the smoke into Two submarines anchored near the
planned to winch his ship alongside the view, the Epervier and the Tramontane Tramontane also began firing machine
Epervier using grappling lines shot over opened fire. The portside forward gun guns at the Walney.
the French destroyer’s superstructure. of the British ship blasted off at least The Walney responded with a blast
The boarding party, which was split one round in return, just missing the of automatic weapons fire to port that
into two groups each consisting of a Epervier before being silenced. The riddled the bridge, fire control direc-
British naval officer, six naval enlisted Tramontane, firing directly at the for- tor, and searchlight platform of the
men, and seven American soldiers, ward part of the Walney, scored hits Epervier. British gunners manning the
manned the port lifeboats. As soon as on the ward room, bridge, captain’s cutter’s starboard antiaircraft position
the men were in place, the boats were cabin, and steering compartment. The wounded six members of the Tramon-
swung out to allow the occupants shell that burst onto the bridge killed tane’s forward gun crews.67 The latter
to drop onto the deck of the Vichy everyone except Captain Peters, corre- then slipped its moorings and headed
warship after the Walney had been spondent Disher, and Lieutenant Cole, toward the harbor entrance, leaving the
winched alongside the Epervier. Six- all of whom were severely wounded. Epervier to deal with the drifting Brit-
teen other soldiers, including Colonel Only Disher and Peters managed to ish vessel. As the Tramontane churned
Marshall, took up positions behind a make their way off the mangled bridge past the Walney, the British gunners
sandbag parapet erected on the bow of before flames swept through it. Mo- stitched a burst across the French de-
the cutter. Their job would be to clear a ments later, a 5.5-inch shell from the stroyer’s 37-mm. antiaircraft mount,
way for the boarding parties huddled in Epervier penetrated into the boiler wounding the officer in charge.68
the lifeboats by tossing hand grenades room and exploded, killing most of the Under cover of the fire provided by
onto the deck of the French warship.64 engine room personnel.66 the aft antiaircraft position, Lieutenant
As the Walney proceeded further The soldiers of the 6th Armored Dempsey used a converted depth-
into the harbor, it met the French Infantry waited in vain for orders to charge carrier to heave a line across the
minesweeper sloop Surprise departing disembark. Seconds later, another shell Epervier. The lack of electrical power,
to investigate reports of landings at exploded among the American infan- however, prevented the Walney from
Andalouses Bay. Commander Meyrick trymen sheltering in the mess deck. winching itself alongside the Vichy
tried to ram the sloop but missed due Dozens of Company G soldiers were ship. Dempsey and Captain Peters,
to the cutter’s sluggish handling at killed or severely wounded without an who made his way from the bridge
slow speed. As the ships passed only opportunity to fire a shot. On the bow despite a head wound, then managed
a matter of yards apart, the Surprise, of the cutter, Colonel Marshall and the to tie a mooring line to the adjacent
mounting a single 65-mm. gun, did detachment of grenadiers fired their jetty. Their efforts were in vain because

20 Army History Winter 2011

Natonal Archives

HMS Aurora

none of the boarding parties had sur- unleashing a shrill blast of steam that located a small overhead hatch lead-
vived unhurt. The cutter continued to rendered inaudible any attempt to ing to the upper deck. Kline wriggled
trade shots with the French warship for communicate. A second explosion through the opening and crawled along
almost an hour before flames forced sprayed the bridge with shrapnel, kill- the deck swept by intense machine-gun
the surviving British gunners away ing and wounding several. The Hart- fire until he came upon a larger hatch
from their guns. Lieutenant Dempsey, land slammed into the northern end of that he succeeded in opening. Kline
as the senior unwounded naval officer the jetty as Billot, half-blinded by blood helped forty-two men to safety, several
on the cutter, ordered the survivors to streaming from one eye, misjudged his of whom were unconscious. Kline then
abandon ship. approach. After reversing its engine, assisted a U.S. Navy chief petty officer
The fate of the other cutter proved the damaged cutter wrenched itself in firing a Browning automatic rifle
no less dramatic. When the Walney loose from the jetty. The encounter (BAR) at the Typhon. While loading
first entered the harbor, British Navy with the jetty, when coupled with the clips for the BAR, Kline was killed by
Lt. Cdr. Godfrey P. Billot, the captain five-minute delay, resulted in the Hart- return fire.72
of the Hartland, waited five minutes land sailing into Oran ten minutes after The Vichy destroyer Tornade, which,
before steering his vessel toward the the Walney first entered.70 with the Tramontane and the Typhon,
entrance. The delay proved costly as Commander Billot’s cutter lacked
a rising westerly wind blew the smoke both the cover of smoke and the dose
created by the motor launches away of good luck that enabled the Walney Lieutenant Gill
from the entrance. The Hartland be- to transit almost the entire length of
came the target of a coastal battery and the harbor without serious damage.
a French destroyer after a searchlight As U.S. Navy Lt. John M. Gill aboard
from Fort Lamoune settled on the ship. the Hartland recorded, “Still under
While Commander Billot ordered his machinegun fire she [the cutter]
men to return fire, the crews of the came opposite the end of the mole
foredeck antiaircraft weapons were and prepared to turn when a French
mowed down after responding with destroyer on the west side of the mole
only three shots. Bullets also riddled (later found to be the Typhon) opened
the SBS kayaks as the British comman- fire with two 4.7-inch [sic] stern guns,
dos were preparing to launch them.69 range approximately 100 feet.”71 One of
Although the British cruiser Aurora the shells exploded in a compartment
Natonal Archives

sailing six thousand yards offshore occupied by a combined Army-Navy

knocked out the searchlight, French boarding party. With all surviving
gunners scored several more direct members threatened by asphyxiation
hits as the cutter headed into the har- or burning to death, U.S. Navy Electri-
bor. One shell severed a boiler pipe, cian’s Mate 1st Class Stanley F. Kline

21
was in the process of leaving the harbor it remained afloat, burning furiously, Brilliant sank the Surprise when it
to engage the Allied fleet, also opened with the American flag visible in attempted to interfere with Allied
fire on the Hartland. Both French ships the light of the flames. The Epervier landing operations. The trio of Vichy
scored direct hits on the forward mess- finally disentangled itself from the destroyers heading for Arzew Bay suf-
ing compartment, aft living spaces, fire Walney, which drifted several hundred fered similar fates. The Tramontane
room, and the wardroom, which was yards before coming to rest against received several hits from the British
being used as an emergency first-aid the seawall. Sometime after 0700, cruiser Aurora. Low in the water and
station, and set fire to the bridge. The the Walney capsized after a large with wounded and dead littering its
Tornade ceased fire a moment later as explosion. The French flotilla leader, decks, the ship ran aground near Cape
Hartland drifted alongside the Typhon. which sustained a number of casualties de l’Aiguille. The damaged Tornade, a
Commander Billot, now suffering from and considerable damage to its upper sitting duck at half-speed, suffered the
three wounds, ordered his crew and the works, did not join the other destroyers same fate. The patrol vessel Ajacienne
American soldiers to abandon ship. bound for Arzew Bay. Three hours later recovered twenty-four wounded
The SBS commandos and American after its consort capsized, a second and four dead from the beached de-
sailors distinguished themselves by large explosion resulted in the sinking stroyers. Only the Typhon made it
saving a number of wounded soldiers. of the Hartland.76 back to Oran, with one stack shot away
Other infantrymen were less fortunate While the Anglo-American raid and half its ammunition expended. On
as the French continued firing at swim- on the port failed, Vichy resistance 9 November, the Epervier and the Ty-
mers in the water. Upon making their had not ended. The British destroyer phon attempted to break through the
way to shore or to French launches,
however, the oil-soaked survivors Fire engulfs the Hartland in Oran harbor, 8 November 1942.
were no longer fired on. Armed
parties from the Typhon, aided
by troops from the nearby coast

Natonal Archives
defense batteries, began collecting
those Americans and British who
made their way ashore. All of the
unwounded personnel from the
Hartland, along with the remaining
raiders and crewmembers from the
Walney, were held briefly in the city
jail before being taken into French
Army custody.73
The parting shots of the battle
of Oran harbor were not fired by a
Vichy warship. Sheltering alongside
one of the moles, two of the SBS
kayaks from the Walney sighted
the Tornade leaving the harbor. The
No. 1 kayak commanded by Cap-
tain Holden-White paddled out to
launch a mobile mine as the Vichy
warship sailed past. Holden-White
claimed a possible hit on the French
vessel. The No. 2 kayak, crewed by
Cpls. C. Blewett and R. W. Loasby,
attempted to engage but decided
against launching its mobile mines
to avoid hitting the Hartland.74
Whether because it swerved to
avoid the threat posed by the kayak
or due to poor visibility, the Tor-
nade slammed into the entrance
jetty. Sporting a crumpled bow,
the Vichy destroyer reduced speed
to six knots as it limped seaward.75
At 0525, a large explosion
occurred aboard the Hartland, but

22 Army History Winter 2011

Only 47 soldiers from Colonel Marshall’s
393-man force avoided death or wounds.
British naval forces screening Oran. By comparison, the combined An- against the harbour of ALGIERS and
The effort failed, with the Epervier glo-American force that conducted ORAN (Operations Terminal and
suffering twelve killed and thirty-four a similar assault on Algiers harbor Reservist) were in no sense planned
wounded from shells delivered by lost 23 killed or died of wounds and as imitations of ZEEBRUGGE but were
the cruisers Aurora and Jamaica. It 51 wounded. Although the French intended to be launched just before the
joined the other French ships aground compelled that raiding force to sur- surrender or capture of the ports with
outside Oran. The Typhon put back render, Vichy officials did not order the purpose of preventing sabotage of
into port, but it was blown up at the the destruction of harbor facilities and ships and port installations.”83 In the
entrance to the harbor when Admiral shipping before Algiers surrendered.80 same report, Cunningham conceded
Rioult scuttled all of the French ves- The final death suffered by the Op- Bennett’s point with regard to the tim-
sels in Oran shortly before the city eration Reservist force took place ing of the assault when he admitted,
surrendered.77 three days following the fall of Oran. “the moment chosen could hardly have
Oran harbor on 10 November, at On 13 November, Captain Peters been less fortunate, since the FRENCH
least from the viewpoint of the Ameri- departed Gibraltar aboard a Royal alarm to arms was in its first full flush
can troops who captured the city, Australian Air Force Sunderland fly- of Gallic fervour and they had not
appeared to be a graveyard of ships. ing boat piloted by Flying Officer (1st yet been intimidated by bombing or
Twenty-five hulks, including the Hart- Lt. equivalent) Wynton Thorpe bound bombardment, whilst darkness pre-
land and the Walney, littered its waters, for England. Lightning, hail, sleet, and vented any American complexion to
along with three floating docks. With forty-knot headwinds were encoun- the operation being apparent.”84
a moral flexibility that might seem tered during the flight. Seven and a half Repercussions and awards both
incomprehensible to Anglo-Saxon hours later, Thorpe radioed a message followed in the wake of Operation
minds, the French immediately placed to his base at Mount Batten, located Reservist. The latter issue proved
all of their salvage assets at Admiral near Plymouth, stating, “May force to be an extremely delicate one as
Bennett’s disposal. Unloading opera- land outside breakwater.” At 1956 that recognized by General Eisenhower.
tions commenced as soon as Bennett’s day, the Sunderland crashed into the Aware that many French lives had
command opened a small channel into sea approximately one and a half miles also been lost during Torch, he
the harbor. Work progressed as fast as offshore. All five passengers, including informed General Marshall that “in
possible, with two dry docks and nine Peters, were killed. The Sunderland’s order to promote cooperative action
French merchant ships being salvaged eleven-man crew survived, although between this expedition and available
by 9 December. Not until early January three suffered serious injuries.81 French units, particularly while we
were all of the remaining obstructions The failed assault, in light of Admiral need their help in Tunisia, I have tried
in the harbor, to include the super- Bennett’s prophetic criticisms, which to avoid the creation of animosities.
structure of the Hartland, removed or were also sent to the upper echelons . . . Consequently I have deliberately
destroyed by demolitions.78 of the U.S. Navy, did little to solidify used understatement in describing
The losses suffered during Opera- Anglo-American naval relations. In publicly some of the earlier operations,
tion Reservist were as staggering as an immediate postmortem assessment although in certain instances the
Admiral Bennett predicated. The 95- of the failed coup de main, Lieutenant fighting was quite sharp.”85
man crew of the Hartland lost 33 killed Moseley stated, “It is my opinion that The British, who had fought a quasi-
or died of wounds while the Walney the naval side of the operation might war against the Vichy French for two
suffered 79 fatalities. 79 Eighty-six have been successful if carried out by years beginning in July 1940, were
members of the Royal Navy were also two modern fleet destroyers and that a little less concerned about French
wounded. Nine U.S. naval personnel even the cutters themselves could opinion. Less than one month after the
and three marines aboard the Hartland have accomplished it if they had en- assault, Royal Navy Lt. Cdr. Tommy
were killed or wounded. The 3d Bat- tered the harbor two hours earlier.”82 Woodroffe related a detailed account
talion, 6th Armored Infantry, lost 189 Admiral Cunningham, no doubt in of the operation to BBC listeners.
killed or missing and 157 wounded. response to criticism by U.S. naval of- While Admiral Cunningham recom-
Sergeant Gower was among the latter ficers, took special pains in his official mended that “silence is the best policy”
group. Only 47 soldiers from Colonel Torch after action report to observe, with regard to awards for Oran, he
Marshall’s 393-man force avoided in a statement that was not entirely recommended Peters for Great Brit-
death or wounds. accurate, “The direct assaults planned ain’s highest decoration for valor, the

23
Victoria Cross. The Admiralty awards talion, 6th Armored Infantry, under- regard to the decision to wait two
board noted relative to this honor, went reconstitution from December hours after the first landings before
“As the story of this action, and the 1942 to late January 1943 before re- sending the cutters into the harbor.
part played in it by Captain Peters, is ceiving its baptism of fire at Kasserine Operation Torch has been rightly
now probably known both at home Pass in mid-February. described as one of the most complex
and in Oran, it will presumably not Repercussions, whether symbolic amphibious operations of World
be possible to restrain the Press from or real, were limited to the U.S. War II. General Eisenhower, a gifted
comment.” The award was published chain of command as British service staff officer, found himself appointed
in May 1943.86 culture seemed inclined to accept supreme Allied commander based
Initial reports submitted to the that failed enterprises could be re- on his team-building approach to
1st Armored Division headquarters deemed by the gallantry shown by coalition politics, firm leadership, and
by the surviving officers of Colonel participants. In late January 1943, organizational skills. Focusing on his
Marshall’s unit included recom- General Eisenhower took it upon strengths, which included operational
mendations for a Medal of Honor himself to apologize for Reservist to planning, strategic guidance, and talent
and seven Silver Stars.87 After much the Combined Chiefs of Staff during for building sound politico-military
deliberation, Distinguished Service the Casablanca Conference. Captain relationships, Eisenhower rightly de-
Crosses were posthumously awarded Butcher recorded in his diary that ferred to a British naval component
to Colonel Marshall, 1st Lt. Victor H. “Harry [Hopkins] spoke especially commander when it came to tactical
Karpass, Tg4c. Glynn W. Hicks, 1st of the Oran Affair in which Ike took planning. However, Admiral Cun-
Lt. A. Thomas Rowe, and Sgt. Billie the blame before the Combined ningham, who relied on a small team of
S. Layton. Karpass and Hicks were Chiefs for delaying the Reservist Mediterranean Fleet planners, did not
both medical personnel, while Rowe Operation (the two sloops, destroy- seem predisposed to take suggestions
and Layton were in Company H. Cpl. ers, or corvettes that tried to rush the from other British, U.S., or Canadian
Francis J. Mulligan of Company I harbor, got shot up by close coastal sources. Operation Reservist serves
survived to receive his Distinguished batteries and 215 [sic] men lost) to remind us that the learning curve
Service Cross. All of their citations, but Harry said Ike shouldn’t blame for newly minted generals, and very
in keeping with security regulations, himself for that as it was simply a experienced admirals, can cost a great
mentioned only that the awards were part of a successful military opera- deal in blood and treasure.
earned for extraordinary heroism in tion.”89 Butcher’s account, which did
connection with military operations not appear in the published version,
against an armed enemy.88 The 3d Bat- suggests fault was found only in

Brig. Gen. John T. Lewis, commander of the Military District of Washington, pins on the young son of Colonel Marshall the
Distinguished Service Cross awarded him posthumously, as his widow watches, 15 March 1943.

Natonal Archives

24 Army History Winter 2011

Notes dom Military Series (London: Her Majesty’s Springboard to Berlin (New York: Thomas Y.
Stationery Office, 1956–1976), 4:113, quote. Crowell, 1943), p. 112. Detailed maps of the
1. Ernie Pyle, Here Is Your War (New York: 16. Chalmers, Full Cycle, p. 137; Sainsbury, harbor appear in Jean Meirat, Les marins de la
Henry Holt, 1943), p. 22. North African Landings, pp. 128–29; Eisen- Tramontane (Paris: Editions France-Empire,
2. Charles Hurd, “4 Points Invaded,” New hower, Crusade in Europe, p. 80. 1960), pp. 175, 201.
York Times, 9 Nov 1942, p. 1, Historians files, 17. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 29. Edwards, Seven Sailors, pp. 227–31.
U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), 79–80; Butler, Grand Strategy, 4:121–36, 30. Cunningham, Sailor’s Odyssey, pp. 472,
Washington, D.C. quote, p. 125. 479 (quote).
3. Phil Ault, “Capture of Oran Told Step by 18. Cunningham, Sailor’s Odyssey, pp. 9, 31. Summary of holdings, Frederic Thornton
Step,” New York Times, 15 Nov 1942, p. 18. 21–23. Peters Collection, Public Archives and Records
4. “U.S. Reporter Wounded,” New York 19. Ibid., pp. 53–94, quote, p. 94. Office of Prince Edward Island, http://www.
Times, 15 Nov 1942, p. 51. 20. Ibid., pp. 97–458; Cunningham biogra- archives.pe.ca/peiain/fondsdetail.php3?fonds
5. “Two British Officers Killed in Plane phy posted at http://www.unithistories.com/ =Acc4452; Frederic Thornton Peters biography,
Crash,” New York Times, 16 Nov 1942, p. 3. officers/RN_officersC4.html; Eisenhower, http://www.unithistories.com/officers/RN_of-
6. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe Crusade in Europe, p. 89, quote. ficersP.html. Both in Historians files, CMH.
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 227. 21. Cunningham, Sailor’s Odyssey, pp. 32. Ltr, R Adm A. C. Bennett, Commander
7. Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The 471–72; Chalmers, Full Cycle, p. 143. of U.S. Naval Operating Bases, Oran Area,
War in North Africa 1942–1943 (New York: 22. U.S. Navy Bureau of Personnel, Biog- to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Henry Holt, 2002), p. 555; Harry C. Butcher raphy of Andrew Carl Bennett, Operational 30 Nov 1942, sub: Operations of U.S. Naval
Diary, entry for 20 Jan 1943, p. A-174, box 166, Archives Branch, Naval History and Heritage Forces, Center Task Force, Operation Torch,
Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, Dwight D. Command, Washington Navy Yard, D.C.; Rus- pp. 3–4, file A16–3, Warfare Operations, box
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.; Harry C. sell C. Jacobs, Biography of Rear Adm. Andrew 11, Naval Operating Base, Oran, Algeria, RG
Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Carl Bennett, U.S. Navy, posted at http://www. 181, NACP; OPLAN 1–42, Entry and Prepara-
Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, arlingtoncemetery.net/acbennett.htm, copy in tion TUFTON, U.S. Naval Forces Center, U.S.
USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, Historians files, CMH. Naval Base II, 5 Oct 42, an. Q, lists the Navy
1942 to 1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 23. Memo, Capt Walter Ansel for Cdr, and Marine Corps personnel.
1946), p. 241. U.S. Naval Forces, Center Task Force, 19 33. OPLAN 1–42, Entry and Preparation
8. Andrew B. Cunningham, A Sailor’s Nov 1942, sub: Operations of U.S. Naval TUFTON, U.S. Naval Forces Center, U.S.
Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of Advance Party, Port of Arzeu, Algiers, 8 Naval Base II, 5 Oct 1942, an. I, pt. 1, p. 4; Ltr
the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope November 42, Encl E to Ltr, R Adm A. C. of Proceedings, Lt Wallace D. Moseley, Royal
(London: Hutchinson & Co., 1951), pp. 479, Bennett to Commander in Chief, United Navy, to Flag Officer Commanding Force H, 17
489; William Scott Chalmers, Full Cycle: The States Fleet, 30 Nov 1942, file A16–3, War- Nov 1942, p. 2, file ADM 1/11915, Secretariat
Biography of Admiral Sir Bertram Home Ram- fare Operations, box 11, Naval Operating of the Admiralty, Records of the Admiralty,
say (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1959); Base, Oran, Algeria, Record Group (RG) United Kingdom National Archives, Kew,
Kenneth Edwards, Seven Sailors (London: 181, Records of Naval Districts and Shore London (UKNA).
Collins Clear-Type Press, 1945), pp. 232–35; Establishments, National Archives at Col- 34. Edwards, Seven Sailors, pp. 232–33.
Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, pp. 69–77. lege Park, Maryland (NACP). 35. Geoffrey B. Mason, Service Histories
9. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, 24. OPLAN 1–42, Entry and Preparation of Royal Navy Ships in World War 2, HMS
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, TUFTON, U.S. Naval Forces Center, U.S. Walney (Y 04)–ex-US Coast Guard Cutter,
1941–1942, United States Army in World Naval Base II, 5 Oct 42, file A16–3, Warfare posted at http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-
War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center Operations, box 11, Naval Operating Base, Chrono-16CGC-Walney.htm.
of Military History, 1953), pp. 97–114, 242, Oran, Algeria, RG 181, NACP. 36. Ltr, Bennett to Eisenhower, 17 Oct 1942,
quote, p. 242; Keith Sainsbury, The North 25. Ibid., an. I, Details of Ports, Bluff, pp. 1–6. sub: Orders of Commanding Officer Reserv-
African Landings 1942: A Strategic Decision 26. George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seiz- ist – Operation Reservist, p. 1, at Encl B to
(1976; Newark: University of Delaware Press, ing the Initiative in the West, United States Ltr, Bennett to Commander in Chief, United
1979), p. 76. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. States Fleet, 30 Nov 1942.
10. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Army Center of Military History, 1993), p. 193. 37.Cunningham, Sailor’s Odyssey, p. 480.
Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, pp. 236–44, 27. Marc Saibène, Les torpilleurs de 1500 38. Short History of the Third Battalion,
quote, p. 244. tonnes du type Bourrasque (Nantes: Marines Sixth Armored Inf., p. 2, file 601–Inf(6)7–0.1,
11. Ibid., pp. 272–78, quote, p. 277. éditions, 2001), pp. 113–14; Charles Moran, box 12123, entry 427, World War II Opera-
12. Ibid., pp. 278–81. The Landings in North Africa, November 1942 tion Reports, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant
13. Ibid., pp. 281–83, quote, p. 283. (1944; Washington D.C.: Naval Historical General’s Office, NACP.
14. Ibid., pp. 196–97, 286; Eisenhower, Cru- Center, 1993), p. 81; Paul Auphan and Jacques 39. Ltr, Bennett to Eisenhower, 17 Oct 1942,
sade in Europe, pp. 71–72. Mordal, The French Navy in World War II, p. 2, quote; Ltr, Bennett for Commander in
15. Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower (New York: translated by A. C. J. Sabalot (Annapolis, Md.: Chief, United States Fleet, 30 Nov 1942, p. 4.
Random House, 1999), pp. 134–40, 155–60; J. United States Naval Institute, 1959), p. 225. 40. Cunningham, Sailor’s Odyssey, p. 475.
R. M. Butler, ed., Grand Strategy, 6 vols., His- 28. Saibène, Les torpilleurs de 1500 tonnes, 41. Ltr, Bennett to Eisenhower, 17 Oct
tory of the Second World War, United King- pp. 113–14; John A. Parris Jr. and Ned Russell, 1942, p. 1.

25
 42. Ibid., p. 3. 58. Troubridge, Report on the Expedition and the Hartland on 8 November 1942 are
43. Brig Gen W. B. Smith, an. 5a to Center into Oran Harbor, 13 Nov 1942, p. 1. listed at this Web site. One sailor from the
Task Force Outline Plan, Operation Reservist, 59. Parris and Russell, Springboard to Berlin, latter vessel died of wounds while in French
Seaboard Assault on the Port of Oran, 14 p. 117. captivity on 9 November 1942. Captain Peters
Oct 1942, file 95–TF1–3.17, box 169, North 60. Ibid., p. 118. is considered the 113th Royal Navy death of
African–Mediterranean Theater, entry 427, RG 61. Troubridge, Report on the Expedition Operation Reservist, even though he died in
407, NACP. into Oran Harbor, 13 Nov 1942, pp. 1–2. a plane crash off the English coast.
44. Cunningham, Sailor’s Odyssey, p. 479. 62. Ltr, Moseley to Flag Officer Command- 80. Ltr, Bennett to Commander in Chief,
45. Ibid. ing Force H, 17 Nov 1942, p. 2. United States Fleet, 30 Nov 1942, p. 6; Atkin-
46. Ltr, Lt (jg) John M. Gill Jr. to Cdr, U.S. 63. Ibid. son, An Army at Dawn, p. 76; George F. Howe,
Naval Forces, Center Task Force, 26 Nov 1942, 64. Ibid. The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division,
sub: Operation of the U.S. Naval Detachment, 65. Ibid.; Auphan and Mordal, The French “Old Ironsides” (Washington, D.C.: Combat
Reservist Party, Operation Torch, in As- Navy in World War II, p. 226. Forces Press, 1954), pp. 29, 31; Howe, North-
sault of Oran, 8 November 1942, Encl D to Ltr, 66. Ltr, Moseley to Flag Officer Command- west Africa: Seizing the Initiative, pp. 241–44.
Bennett to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, 30 ing Force H, 17 Nov 1942, pp. 2–3. 81. K. C. Baff, Maritime Is Number Ten: A
Nov 1942, box 11, Naval Operating Base, Oran, 67. Saibène, Les torpilleurs de 1500 tonnes, History of No 10 Squadron RAAF: The Sunder-
Algeria, RG 181, NACP. p. 119. land Era (1983; Traralgon, Australia: Murray
47. Short History of the Third Battalion, 68. Meirat, Le marins de la Tramontane, Tucker, 2005) pp. 248–49.
Sixth Armored Inf., p. 3; Parris and Russell, pp. 205–06. 82. Ltr, Moseley to Flag Officer Command-
Springboard to Berlin, p. 99. 69. Memo, Lt Cdr G. P. Billot for Com- ing Force H, 17 Nov 42, p. 3.
48. Ltr, W. D. Stephens, Director of Trade mander in Chief, Centre Expeditionary Force, 83. Rpt, Cunningham to the Secretary of the
Division, to War Office, 1 Feb 1944, sub: At- 15 Nov 1942, sub: Loss of H.M.S. ”Hartland”, Admiralty; Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; et
tack on Oran–Recommendations for Award, on 8th November 1942, pp. 1–2, ADM 1/11915, al., 30 Mar 1943, Operation Torch—Report
and attachments, file ADM 1/29425, UKNA; UKNA. of Proceedings, p. 3, file 6–8.3003/43, Distrib
Parris and Russell, Springboard to Berlin, p. 99. 70. Ibid., p. 2. of Cin C Med–Ser No. Med (W) 00200–Rpt
49. Short History of the Third Battalion, 71. Ltr, Gill to Cdr, U.S. Naval Forces, Center of Proceedings North Africa–(RS 8–971),
Sixth Armored Inf., pp. 2–3. Task Force, 26 Nov 1942. box 19368, entry 427E, Special Files, World
50. Ibid., p. 3; Parris and Russell, Springboard 72. Ibid., p. 2. War II Operation Reports, RG 407, NACP,
to Berlin, p. 106. 73. Gill, Stenographic Report of the Opera- quotes; Admiralty Naval Staff, TSD/Historical
51. Short History of the Third Battalion, tions of Reservist Party, Operation Torch, Section, Operation “Torch,” Invasion of North
Sixth Armored Inf., p. 3. in the Assault of Oran, Algeria, 8 November, Africa, p. 39.
52. Parris and Russell, Springboard to Berlin, pp. 3–4, at Encl A to Ltr, Gill to Cdr, U.S. Na- 84. Rpt, Cunningham to the Secretary of the
p. 108. val Forces, Center Task Force, 26 Nov 1942; Admiralty; Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; et
53. Admiralty Naval Staff, TSD/Historical Saibène, Les torpilleurs de 1500 tonnes, p. 119. al., 30 Mar 1943, p. 4.
Section, Operation “Torch,” Invasion of North 74. Award recommendations for Capt Harry 85. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. et al., eds.,
Africa, November 1942 to February 1943, Battle V. Holden-White, Cpl C. Blewett, and Cpl R. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 21
Summary 38, B.R. 1736 (31), 1948, pp. 19, W. Loasby, attached to Ltr, W. D. Stephens to vols. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press,
76–77, copy in CMH library. War Office, 1 Feb 1944. 1970–2001), 2:725.
54. Ltr of Proceedings, Lt Wallace D. Mose- 75. Saibène, Les torpilleurs de 1500 tonnes, 86. Memo, B. Forbes Adam for Head,
ley, Royal Navy, to Flag Officer Commanding pp. 119, 121. Honours and Awards Committee, 6 Feb 1943,
Force H, 17 Nov 1942, file ADM 1/11915, 76. Gill, Stenographic Report of the Opera- quote, and subsequent notations, Award of
UKNA. tions of Reservist Party, Operation Torch, in Medals for Gallantry during Attack on Oran
55. Meirat, Les marins de la Tramontane, the Assault of Oran, Algeria, 8 November 1942, Harbour, ADM 1/11915, UKNA.
p. 182. p. 3; Ltr, Moseley to Flag Officer Commanding 87. Entry dtd 121030 Dec 1942, G–1 Journal
56. Auphan and Mordal, The French Navy Force H, 17 Nov 1942, p. 3. & File, 1st Armored Division, file 601–G1–0.1,
in World War II, p. 225. 77. Saibène, Les torpilleurs de 1500 tonnes, RG 407, NACP.
57. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the pp. 119–23; Auphan and Mordal, The French 88. The citations for the awards can be
Initiative, p. 203; Troubridge, Report on the Navy in World War II, pp. 226–27; Samuel found at http://www.militarytimes.com/
Expedition into Oran Harbor, 13 Nov 1942, Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval citations-medals-awards/search.php, along
p. 1, file 6–8.1311/42 (17011), British Navy Operations in World War II, 15 vols. (Boston: with information about the orders in which the
Landing Officers–Commodore Expedition- Little, Brown, 1947–1962), 2:237. awards were originally announced. Copies are
ary Force–Staff & Organization Orders for 78. Morison, History of United States Naval in Historians files, CMH.
Commanding Officers of H.M. Ships–rpt. on Operations, 2:251. 89. Harry C. Butcher Diary, entry for 20
the Expedition into Oran Harbor, box 19368, 79. Don Kindell, Casualty Lists of the Royal Jan 1943.
Special Files, World War II Operation Reports, Navy and Dominion Navies, 1st–14th Novem-
RG 407, NACP. DCA is the French military ber 1942, posted at http://www.naval-history.
abbreviation for défense contre avions or an- net/xDKCas1942-11NOV1.htm, Historians
tiaircraft defense. files, CMH. Personnel losses for the Walney

26 Army History Winter 2011

 Tarnished Brass
Is the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?

By Richard H. Kohn change; and international crime in the ability to establish an effective working
Nearly twenty years after the end form of piracy, smuggling, narcotics partnership or collaboration with the
of the Cold War, the American mili- trafficking, and other forms of orga- civilian political leadership regardless
tary, financed by more money than nized lawlessness. Very few of these of party or faction. The third challenge
the entire rest of the world spends threats can be countered by the high- to professionalism is what I would call
on its armed forces, failed to defeat tempo, high-technology conventional moral or ethical: the honor, integrity,
insurgencies or fully suppress sectar- military power that has become the honesty, and self-sacrifice of the officer
ian civil wars in two crucial countries, specialty—almost the monopoly—of corps, the commitment of individual
each with less than a tenth of the U.S. the United States, shaped and sized to officers to the norms and values of
population, after overthrowing those fight conventional wars against other personal and organizational behavior
nations’ governments in a matter of nation-states. that permit them to lead, and their
weeks. Evidence of overuse and un- Another factor is the role the United subordinates to follow, in the heat and
derstrength in the military abounds: States has assumed for itself as the stress of battle.
the longest individual overseas deploy- world’s lone superpower—the guaran- A failure in the first area—strat-
ments since World War II and repeat- tor of regional and global stability and egy—is obviously the most dangerous.
ed rotations into those deployments champion of human rights, individual After remarkable success prior to and
and the common and near-desperate liberty, market capitalism, and political during World War II in creating and
use of bonuses to keep officers and democracy, even though promoting executing strategy in the largest and
enlisted soldiers from leaving. Nor those values may simultaneously un- most complex war in human history,
is it only the ground forces that are dermine the nation’s security. the American military began a slow
experiencing the pinch. The U.S. Air A third factor in the disjuncture decline. Ironically, this decline came
Force has had to cut tens of thou- between the needs of American se- at a time when the military was gaining
sands of people to buy the airplanes it curity and the abilities of the military enormous influence in the making of
believes it needs. The U.S. Navy faces establishment is not much discussed: foreign and national security policies
such declining numbers of ships that deficiencies in American military pro- in the government reorganization of
it needs allies to accomplish the var- fessionalism. This problem, hidden the 1940s: the unification of the armed
ied demands of power projection, sea because our military regularly demon- forces and the creation of the National
control, and the protection of world strates its operational effectiveness in Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
commerce. battle, is the focus of this essay. the unified and specified commands,
Why such a disjunction between The challenge to military profes- the Central Intelligence Agency and
enormous expenditures and declin- sionalism in the twenty-first century other intelligence organizations, and
ing capability? One factor is that the lies in three interconnected areas. The the various mobilization, munitions,
Department of Defense

threats currently facing the United first is intellectual: the ability to wage and logistics boards and agencies.
States, many of them building for a war successfully in a variety of circum- While prior to the war military
generation or more, do not yield to stances without wasting the lives of sol- planners were reduced to poring over
the kind of conventional war that our diers or their equipment and supplies the newspapers and parsing public
military is designed to fight. The chal- (which are always limited, even for a statements by the White House to
lenges to global stability are less from superpower at the zenith of its relative discern foreign policy, afterwards
massed armies than from terrorism; strength). The second is political: the uniformed officers were integrated
economic and particularly financial absence from the officer corps of par- into (and increasingly influential on)
instability; failed states; resource tisan political divisions, its subordina- a complex interagency coordination
scarcity (particularly oil and potable tion to the legally constituted civilian and policy-making process. But the
water); pandemic disease; climate authorities in charge of the state, and its military never gained full control of

27
 “strategic leaders,” teaches “about strat-
egy,” in the words of a faculty member
there, but not “how to develop strategy.”
From the introduction of nuclear
weapons in the 1940s, the Navy seems
actually to have subordinated strategy
to the capabilities of its fleets rather than
designing its fleets to fit the larger needs
of American foreign policy and national
security strategy. The Air Force contin-
ued its torrid love affair with strategic

© Corbis
bombing to the point of blinding itself
to the application of any kind of warfare
other than total war against another
General Shalikashvili speaks to the Democratic National Convention in Boston, 28 July 2004. nation-state. Even after Vietnam, when
it finally got the message that obliterat-
nuclear weapons, and increasingly Saddam government in three weeks but ing whole societies from the face of the
in the 1950s lost primacy in nuclear failed to provide for occupying or secur- earth was not going to be American na-
strategy to the new think tanks and to ing the country, or even to advise the tional policy, the Air Force has had dif-
the private sector. At the same time, Defense Department adequately about ficulty adapting aviation to the full suite
the services adopted business models his needs in that regard. His successor of possible military conflicts the nation
of management and to some extent on the ground in Iraq failed to partner might experience. The most adaptable
leadership that reflected a growing with civilian authorities, devise opera- American service has been the Marine
partnership with American industry. tions and tactics to prevent the onset of Corps, but only at the operational and
(Significantly, William Westmoreland an insurgency, and then to combat it tactical levels; it remains relentlessly a
was the first active-duty Army officer effectively. The American forces failed light infantry shock force whose officer
to graduate from the Harvard Business to train Iraqi security forces or to over- corps seems to understand strategy
School.) The services also embraced see contracts competently or to rebuild almost wholly in terms of figuring out
operations research, systems analysis, Iraq—and even the tactics and opera- when and where they can insert their
and economic theory partly to defend tions of the American forces have come men into the fight.
themselves against Robert McNamara under withering criticism. In effect, in The Iraq War is not the only example
and his whiz kids. Nonetheless, the the most important area of professional of strategic deficiency. In October 2002,
services began to use those disciplines, expertise—the connecting of war to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
along with the traditional supports of policy, of operations to achieving the asked his chief military and civilian
science and engineering, to manage objectives of the nation—the American subordinates for an assessment of the
their institutions, formulate policy, and military has been found wanting. The “Global War on Terrorism,” noting
eventually to wage war. excellence of the American military in that “we lack metrics to know if we are
The result was the withering of strat- operations, logistics, tactics, weaponry, winning or losing” and asking numerous
egy as a central focus for the armed and battle has been manifest for a gen- broad yet focused questions, all of which
forces, and this has been manifest in a eration or more. Not so with strategy. came down to the question of strategy.
continual string of military problems: a Now there are many other factors in It took several years, and still the Joint
Vietnam War in which Americans won the Iraq War about which the Ameri- Chiefs of Staff required help from con-
every single battle and campaign and lost can civilian leadership was even more tractors—contractors—to come up with
the war almost from the very beginning; derelict than the military. But for all of a system to measure what is clearly the
failed interventions like Lebanon in 1983 the pronouncements about preparing most pressing security threat facing the
and Somalia in 1993; the Gulf War, for “full spectrum conflict,” and the United States in a generation.
which ended, contrary to American discussions about Operations Other Contracting has been a growing trend
wishes, with Saddam Hussein still in Than War, the American military since for nearly two decades throughout the
power and his most lethal armed forces the end of the Vietnam War has been defense establishment: in the Army, for
intact; and initially successful campaigns focused like a laser on organization, example, not simply for kitchen police
in Afghanistan (designed by the CIA) weapons, doctrine, training, and the or security for stateside bases, which
and the Iraq War, which metastasized assignment and advancement of offi- makes eminent sense, but increasingly
into interminable and indecisive guer- cers—on high-tempo, technology-rich for core military functions like doctrine,
rilla wars of attrition that have tried conventional warfare. Discovering the after-action analysis, and the training of
American patience and will. so-called operational level of war in the foreign armies. Some of this has resulted
Iraq has become the metaphor for 1970s, the Army seemed to lose interest from the pressure of too many missions
an absence of strategy. The theater in strategy. Even the Army War College, and too few people. But whether because
commander brilliantly overthrew the dedicated to the mission of educating of resources or convenience, too much

28 Army History Winter 2011

has been willingly given up by the armed
forces. A profession that surrenders
jurisdiction over its most basic areas of
expertise, no matter what the reason,
risks its own destruction.
The second area of diminished pro-
fessionalism in the armed forces is in
politics, and by that I mean the officer
corps’ understanding of its proper role in
government and society. For a century,
at least, officers understood that they

© Corbis
must be completely apolitical: neither
for nor against any party or creed, to
the point where most officers in the
first half of the twentieth century even General Franks gestures as he addresses the Republican National Convention in New York,
abstained from voting. Not that the 2 September 2004.
military eschewed politics altogether;
throughout their history, the American very old, and significant, tradition. In leadership, for the military to stand up
armed forces have maneuvered for bud- its aftermath, Generals Colin Powell to civilians who are ignoring or decid-
gets, roles, and missions—policies that and Norman Schwarzkopf declared ing against military judgment—to the
benefited their war-fighting capacity— as Republicans and played prominent point of speaking out or otherwise
and officers, obviously, have lobbied roles in the election of 1996. In 2000, preventing a decision from going
for personal advancement. A few top even more retired four-stars backed forward, or resigning to alert the
leaders ran for office after retirement, an George W. Bush, and in 2004, retired public to a disaster in the making. The
old American practice. But officers on chairman General John Shalikashvili roots of these impulses extend back to
active duty understood their role to be appeared with other flags to speak at Vietnam when officers accused their
not only non-partisan but un-partisan— the Democratic National Convention, leadership of going along with policies
completely outside party politics—and as did retired General Tommy Franks and decisions they knew would fail.
their function purely to be advisers to at the Republican gathering. Out of that conflict came a generation
civilian leaders on matters of policy and In April 2006, several retired generals that, in Colin Powell’s words, “vowed
strategy from a military perspective, and attacked Donald Rumsfeld’s handling that when our turn came to call the
to execute the decisions of those leaders of the Iraq War, calling for his ouster, shots, we would not quietly acquiesce
in peace and in war. again violating a tradition that retired in halfhearted warfare for half-baked
In the last generation, however, this officers do not criticize an administra- reasons that the American people could
understanding has become so compro- tion they served until it leaves office, not understand or support.” Powell’s
mised that Secretary of Defense Robert and most certainly not when Ameri- predecessor as chairman of the joint
Gates felt constrained to instruct of- can forces are still engaged in combat. chiefs admitted in his memoirs that he
ficers graduating from the Naval and They appeared over two dozen times schemed to achieve policies of his own
Air Force Academies in 2007 about in the press; two of them participated choosing even when his own secretary
the necessity for being “non-political.” in video advertisements attacking the of defense opposed them. The head of
Officers now vote, in substantially president and Iraq policy, in effect U.S. Central Command, Admiral Wil-
higher percentages than the general joining the Democrats’ war opposition liam Fallon, spoke so often and so freely
population; they identify themselves as in Congress. In the fall of 2007, retired to the press that he was forced to retire
Republican or Democrat, and less as in- Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, who abruptly in March 2008 after airing
dependent or non-partisan, much more commanded the Multi-National Force his disagreements over Iraq strategy,
than the American people as a whole. in Iraq in 2003–2004, attacked the Bush boasting privately that he would try
The most glaring manifestation of administration’s handling of the war to stymie any unprovoked attack on
partisanship has been the sudden emer- in explicit, incendiary language in a Iran, and criticizing the Congress for
gence of endorsements for presidential luncheon speech to military reporters considering a resolution that labeled
candidates by retired four-star generals and editors. Weeks later, he delivered the Turkish massacre of Armenians in
and admirals, begun most notably in the same message in the Democrats’ 1915 genocide.
1992 when retired chairman of the reply to the president’s weekly radio Just how politicized some of the mili-
joint chiefs, Admiral William Crowe, address, introducing himself “not as a tary’s leading members have become is
and several other retired flag officers representative of the Democratic Party, illustrated by General David Petraeus.
endorsed Bill Clinton, an act that bol- but as a retired military officer.” Aide or assistant to three different
stered Clinton’s fitness to be command- More disturbing than partisanship generals during his career and with
er in chief. It was a direct intervention have been the calls, in the wake of a doctorate in political science from
in politics that, while legal, violated a Rumsfeld’s abusive and intimidating Princeton, the general published an op-

29
ed in the Washington Post lauding the aborted career of Maj. Gen. Antonio uses and limitations of such power in
progress of the Iraqi Army just before Taguba, who investigated the Abu war. A few years ago, the Army War
the 2004 presidential election. Pushed Ghraib prison horror; and of course College created an advanced strategic
front and center by the president as the Abu Ghraib itself. Twice the Army has arts program for a select group of of-
person who would decide force levels suppressed its own studies of the Iraq ficers in each class. The Army chief of
and strategy and define success or fail- War in fear that the conclusions would staff has noted publicly the complexities
ure in Iraq, Petraeus became for a time anger Donald Rumsfeld, an egregious that will challenge the cultural compre-
the virtual public face of the Iraq War. breach of honesty that threatens the hension of Army leaders in future war
No matter how carefully he phrased his indispensable after-action feedback and recently opened up a Center for
assessments or hedged his predictions loop upon which success in future Professional Military Ethics at the U.S.
of future conditions in that stricken battle depends. Military Academy.
country in his congressional testimony Such incidents occurred in the past The American military has certainly
and public statements, some in the and will undoubtedly occur again; mal- demonstrated in the past an ability to
press and in Congress labeled him a feasance and breaches of ethics occur transform, particularly in response to
“front man” for the administration. in every profession. What is troubling changes in technology. One only has
Partisan politicization is a cancer in is the lack of accountability and the to go back to the introduction of steel
the military, particularly inside the of- fact that these ethical lapses go unpun- and steam in the Navy, the adoption of
ficer corps. It has the potential to divert ished. The military has well-developed aviation by both services, and the devel-
soldiers from their tasks and to affect systems of criminal investigation and opment of strategic bombing, amphibi-
their morale, and thus their fighting justice and other investigative chan- ous doctrine and practice, combined
ability. Surely partisanship undermines nels that are designed to expose and arms and armored land warfare, and
public confidence in the objectivity punish crime, misbehavior, and viola- carrier and submarine forces in the
and loyalty of the military, and, by as- tions of rules and regulations. But in 1920s and 1930s to see all of the armed
sociation, in the policies of their civilian recent years, few if any senior officers services innovating in organization,
masters. A number of senior officers have been identified, punished, or held weapons, doctrine, operations, and
recognized these dangers. On taking to account. As Lt. Col. Paul Yingling tactics. Indeed, in what I have argued
office in 2008, the new Air Force chief wrote, in a stinging attack on the Army is the most important area of special
of staff warned his generals explicitly: brass, “A private who loses a rifle suffers expertise—strategy—American officers
“You will deal with politics . . . but you greater consequences than a general performed magnificently during the
must remain apolitical . . . now and in who loses a war.” interwar period and in World War II in
retirement.” Whether politicization That two Air Force and two Army dealing with what was perhaps the most
can be contained in an age of instant generals had to be reprimanded in dangerous foreign threat the country
worldwide communication remains 2007 for appearing in uniform in a has ever faced.
to be seen. As the prominent military video promoting evangelical religion But if the military is to repair its
lawyer Eugene Fidell, head of the Na- indicates a decline in the understand- professionalism without a massive (and
tional Institute of Military Justice, says ing of proper professional behavior. inevitably messy) intervention by civil-
of Iraq, “This is the first post internet, This was not a big thing, one might say; ian authorities, piecemeal approaches
post digital American war.” but these individuals were at the top will not suffice. Almost any academic
Related to these strategic and political of their services, role models as well as would immediately target professional
failures are possible moral deficiencies leaders. The fact that they did not “get military education (PME) as the point
among the officer corps, which have it” suggests a lack of understanding that of leverage, focusing on curriculum in
arisen in the last few years. At its heart may extend more widely in the officer an attempt to renew among officers
is a growing careerism that has led to corps than heretofore thought. That the critical expertise and the norms and
micromanagement from above and a secretary of defense in his first eighteen values of their professional world. But
sense that any defect will derail a career, months in office had to replace several the services are far too action-oriented,
which in turn leads to risk aversion and top generals and an admiral (along with too busy and strained, too focused on
sometimes to cover-ups, avoidance of a service secretary) suggests that those recapitalizing and modernizing their
responsibility, and other behaviors that most knowledgeable about the military weapons systems, and in truth too anti-
harm the ability of the armed forces also recognize these problems. intellectual for PME to suffice. Most
to succeed in battle. These failures of There is a longstanding argument treat “schooling” as something distinct
professional conduct have appeared among scholars about the ability of from serving, therefore making it for
in such cases as the misrepresenta- military institutions to reform them- most officers an experience only to be
tions of Pfc. Jessica Lynch’s battlefield selves. To some degree, I think that endured. (Only very recently has the
experiences; the handling of the death the services do recognize their weak- Navy made war college a prerequisite
of Cpl. Pat Tillman (the altered reports, ness. The Air Force in the 1990s began for flag rank.) Rather, a more system-
changing stories, and botched investi- a school of advanced air power (and atic, comprehensive solution is needed,
gations); the scandalous treatment of now space power) studies to produce imposed from the top by either the
wounded soldiers at Walter Reed; the officers who could think through the civilian or military leadership in ways

30 Army History Winter 2011

that cannot easily be undone by bureau- be required to apply to staff and war servers of the military raised questions
cratic sloth or subsequent leadership. colleges, passing entrance examina- of strategic competence, politicization,
First, the uniformed chiefs and civil- tions to qualify, or writing a statement and integrity in the officer corps. Part
ian secretaries of each of the services of interest and submitting an essay on of the current strain on the American
should together instruct promotion a professional subject to demonstrate military has roots that reach back a
boards for flag officers to choose a their seriousness of intent. Profes- generation at least, and in some ways
greater proportion of candidates with sional readings should be part of the into the very culture of each of the
demonstrated intellectual as well as op- preparation, with officers allowed to armed services. (Some may be endemic
erational and command ability: people take the examination again if they fail, to military organization.) The civilian
who have advanced civilian schooling as a certain percentage will if the tests and military leadership must address
in disciplines particularly suited to are demanding enough. these problems in a holistic way, treat-
the formulation of strategy; who have Fourth, the service academies and ing them as connected, part of a pattern
demonstrated moral as well as physi- ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training that threatens professionalism. To the
cal courage and a willingness to take Corps) should revise their curricula to extent that the leaders of each of the
risk; who are original, innovative, and make certain that officers at commis- services avert their eyes from these
indeed conceptual in their thinking; sioning are fluent in a foreign language problems, it jeopardizes not only the
and who may not have pursued typical and conversant with a foreign culture, national defense but the long-term
careers or served in assignments that in and senior service schools should revise health of our military. Sooner or later
the past would be necessary for promo- theirs so that strategy, leadership, and the adulation of the American people,
tion to flag rank. command are the focus of a war college and the fear and respect shown our ser-
Second, each of the services should education. This may require further de- vices by Washington, will revert back to
be ordered to review its promotion and emphasis of mathematics, science, and something closer to the historical norm.
assignment policies to ensure that of- engineering at the academies, on the Our military leaders should conduct
ficers of this type will be attracted to the grounds that war is first and foremost a a rigorous professional self-inventory
services, educated properly, retained, human phenomenon, not a technical or now before the politicians decide that
and assigned in such a way as to develop engineering problem. While it is criti- they must step in and perform this task
the desired characteristics while at the cally important, the operation of com- for them. Professions that rely on out-
same time rising competitively into the plex equipment is not more important siders to correct their own deficiencies
leadership. Specifically, the top civilian than an understanding of war in all of are in decline—and unlikely to survive
and military leadership of each of the its uncertainty and complexity or of the in their present form.
services must undertake a systematic basic norms and values of the military
effort to eradicate the careerism, anti- profession. At all levels these ideals and
intellectualism, and politicization of ethics need to be emphasized.
their officer corps—in other words, Professions that cannot change
to change the organizational culture, themselves from within, cannot re-
particularly in their flag ranks. spond to the needs of their clients, and
Still another indispensable reform cannot enforce standards of behavior
concerns the officer evaluation system, so as to maintain the confidence of Richard H. Kohn is a professor
of history at the University of North
specifically diluting the “top-down” their constituencies while also inspir- Carolina at Chapel Hill. He was chief
system of officers being judged by their ing the admiration and loyalty of their of Air Force history for the U.S. Air
superiors only. Fitness for promotion— own members are in trouble. Just how Force, 1981–1991. He is the editor
and particularly the characteristics rec- deeply these problems extend into the of The United States Military under
ommended here—requires assessment officer corps of the American armed the Constitution of the United States,
1789–1989 (New York: New York Uni-
by peers and subordinates as well as su- forces is hard to tell. Certainly the Army versity Press, 1991), and coeditor of Sol-
pervisors and commanders. However, and Marines have fought bravely and diers and Civilians: The Civil-Military
such an innovation must be carefully served faithfully in Iraq without com- Gap and American National Security
crafted, for it can and will be “gamed” plaint, perhaps the most important (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
by officers, itself a commentary on pro- test of military professionalism. Few This essay is adapted from the Alvin H.
Bernstein Lecture at the Paul H. Nitze
fessionalism and its challenges. people suggest that the Army’s (or the School of Advanced International
Third, the services need to institute other services’) organizational climate Studies, John Hopkins University.
programs of continuing education to is pervaded by the kind of moral decay
be pursued by officers on their own, discovered in the famous “Study on
separate from and in addition to in- Military Professionalism” completed Richard H. Kohn, “Tarnished Brass: Is the
termediate and advanced professional at the Army War College in 1970, U.S. Military Profession in Decline,” World
military education in residence or by although some echoes are disturbing. Affairs 171, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 73–83, Copy-
correspondence. Other professions Yet even before the stresses intro- right © 2009, is reprinted with permission
possess self-administered systems of duced by the current campaigns in Iraq of the World Affairs Institute, www.World
continuing education. Officers should and Afghanistan, knowledgeable ob- AffairsJournal.org.

31
 National Archives
ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR
Thomas J.
Ward Jr. is an as-
sociate professor of
history at Spring Hill
College in Mobile,
Alabama. He has
conducted oral his-
tory interviews of
African Americans
who were prisoners
of war in World War
II and the Korean
War for the National
Prisoner of War
Museum at Ander-
sonville, Georgia.
He is the author of
Black Physicians in
the Jim Crow South
(University of Arkan-
sas Press, 2003). He
holds a doctorate
in history from the
University of South-
ern Mississippi.

Frederick Douglas, c. 1870

32 Army History Winter 2011

 ENEMY
COMBATANTS

Black Soldiers Confederate Prisons

By Thomas J. Ward Jr.

I
n the final scene of the U.S., let him get an eagle on his but- over to the executive authorities of the
1989 film Glory! the black ton, and a musket on his shoulder, respective States to which they belong,
enlisted men of the 54th and bullets in his pocket, and there to be dealt with according to the law
Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry and is no power on the earth or under of said States.” A joint resolution ad-
their white officers valiantly, but futil- the earth which can deny that he has opted by the Confederate Congress
ity, storm Fort Wagner, the Confeder- earned the right of citizenship in the and signed by Davis on 1 May 1863
ate outpost defending Morris Island United States.”1 Douglass’ assertion, adjusted this policy to provide that
at the entrance to Charleston Harbor. equating military service with both all “negroes or mulattoes,” slave or
While the film leaves the viewer with a manhood and citizenship, was not lost free, taken in arms should be turned
powerful and historically accurate im- on Confederate authorities. If African over to the authorities in the state in
age of the sacrifice of African Ameri- Americans could serve as U.S. soldiers which they are captured and that their
can soldiers and their white officers, (as, of course, they had before), the officers should be tried by Confederate
it does not address the fate of those ideological foundations of slavery and military tribunals for inciting servile
members of the 54th Massachusetts racial inequality would be flawed. The insurrection and be subject, at the dis-
who were not killed but still did not Confederacy could therefore not treat cretion of the court and the president,
return from the attack with their unit, captured black soldiers in the same to the death penalty.2
having been captured on that South way that it treated white soldiers, Despite efforts by the Confederate
Carolina island in July 1863. The en- for to do so would be to legitimize government to articulate the status
trance of black troops—most but by them as both soldiers and men and of captured black soldiers, the treat-
no means all of whom were escaped to implicitly accept the Emancipation ment of African Americans in Con-
slaves—into the Civil War following Proclamation. Therefore, Confederate federate custody varied tremendously
the Emancipation Proclamation cre- President Jefferson Davis included in throughout the war, depending on the
ated a dilemma for the Confederate an aggressive proclamation against time, the place, and the commander
authorities—what to do with black perceived unlawful behavior by the into whose hands they fell. Atroci-
soldiers in Union blues taken prisoner Union Army that was issued on 24 ties committed against black soldiers
on the battlefield? December 1862, eight days before during the war, such as the infamous
In his almost two-year battle to con- President Abraham Lincoln’s proc- massacre of surrendering black troops
vince the United States government lamation would take effect, a chilling at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, have been
to allow African Americans to fight warning to potential African Ameri- well documented. Indeed, some
for the Union, Frederick Douglass can soldiers. He instructed the Con- Confederate officers encouraged the
stated that “once let the black man federate Army “that all negro slaves killing of African American soldiers
get upon his person the brass letters captured in arms be at once delivered rather than taking them prisoner,

33
 all blacks were assumed, by law, to be
slaves unless they could prove otherwise
and there are numerous accounts cause and recommended that they be the determination arrived at that and
of captured black soldiers being “received to Mercy & returned to their announced not to execute them during
executed by Confederate forces. In owners.”3 There is little way of know- the war.” However, Seddon asserted at
Alabama, Col. John Tattnal reported ing exactly how many black soldiers this point that no black soldier should
in November 1862 that “I have given were executed after surrendering to be treated as a prisoner of war.4
orders to shoot, wherever & whenever Confederate forces, but, at least by the The black soldiers captured around
captured, all negroes found armed summer of 1863, official Confederate Charleston during the summer of 1863
and acting in concert with the aboli- government policy disapproved of the illustrate the difficulties Confederate
tion troops.” In June 1863, Lt. Gen. practice of executing black prisoners. authorities faced in determining the
Edmund Kirby Smith, commander One of the difficulties for the Con- status of captured African American
of the Department of the Trans- federacy in establishing a policy for soldiers. The assault on Fort Wagner
Mississippi, wrote a subordinate that captured black soldiers was dealing and related actions on the South Caro-
he had been “informed, that some of with the distinction between Union lina coast that summer resulted in the
your troops have captured negroes in soldiers who were runaway slaves and capture by Confederates of between
arms–I hope this may not be so, and those who were freemen when the fifty and a hundred troops of the 54th
that your subordinates . . . may have war began. Officially, neither Davis Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry;
recognized the propriety of giving no nor the Confederate Congress dealt four black sailors were also captured
quarter to armed negroes and their with the question of free blacks, as and interned in Charleston. Confed-
officers, in this way we may be relieved in many Southern states, like South erate authorities had to scramble to
from a disagreeable dilemma.” Smith Carolina, all blacks were assumed, figure out what to do with their black
was uncertain about the Confederate by law, to be slaves unless they could prisoners. On 16 July 1863, Brig. Gen.
government’s policy, however, and prove otherwise. As for the question of Johnson Hagood, who commanded
sought clarification. In response, the what to do with free blacks captured Confederate forces on Morris Island,
Confederate War Department advised by Confederate troops, on 23 August reported to his superior headquar-
the general to consider captured black 1863 Confederate Secretary of War ters, “Thirteen prisoners Fifty-fourth
troops as “deluded victims” who had James Seddon stated that “free negroes Massachusetts, black. What shall I
been duped into serving the Yankee should be either promptly executed or do with them?” Hagood also stated

Castle Pinckney

National Archives

34 Army History Winter 2011

that all but two of the captured blacks
were freemen, not escaped slaves.
Also unsure what to do with the cap-
tured Massachusetts soldiers, General
Pierre G. T. Beauregard, commander
of the Department of South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida, ordered that,
although they had been stripped of
their uniforms, they would be held at
the military prison at Castle Pinckney
on an island in Charleston Harbor.5
The Union prisoners—both white
and black—were marched through
the streets of Charleston, where they
were taunted by the citizenry, before

Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives

the badly wounded were separated
and taken to a hospital. The Charles-
ton Courier reported, “A chief point
of attraction in the city yesterday was
the Yankee hospital in Queen Street,
where the principal portion of the
Federal wounded, negroes and whites,
have been conveyed.” One of the
members of the 54th Massachusetts
captured at Fort Wagner, Pvt. Daniel
States, was brought to the hospital
where, he recalled, he received good
treatment and food but the black pris-
oners were separated from the whites
and received treatment last.6 Governor Bonham
Meanwhile, a debate raged between
General Beauregard and South Caro- inquired again, “What shall be done be not brought to trial” for fear of
lina Governor Milledge L. Bonham, with negro prisoners who say they are Union retaliation, made the decision
who wanted the captured black sol- free?” Confederate Secretary of War to try the four captured Union sol-
diers turned over to him. The general James A. Seddon informed Beauregard diers who were alleged to have been
understood that Davis’ instruction that the Confederate Congress had slaves. The trial turned out to be an
that captured slaves should be turned ruled that all captured blacks should embarrassment for the governor, as
over to the state in which “they be- be “delivered to the authorities of the the court ruled that, as a civil court, it
long” remained in effect and that this State or States in which they shall be lacked jurisdiction to try the cases of
referred to the state in which they had captured, to be dealt with according individuals alleged to have committed
been bondsmen, not where they had to the present or future laws of such offenses as soldiers in the forces of
been captured. There was no evidence State or States.” Beauregard therefore the enemy, and it remanded the men
that any of the prisoners were South turned twenty-four black prisoners back to Charleston jail. “About fifty
Carolina slaves. Beauregard, however, over to the state of South Carolina, of the colored troops are at the jail in
looked to Richmond for direction and they were transferred from Castle Charleston,” wrote one black prisoner.
about the free black soldiers that had Pinckney to the Charleston jail.7 “They are not confined in cells, but vol-
been seized, asking, “Shall they [the Governor Bonham, acting indepen- unteering to work they are permitted
black prisoners who claim to be free] dently of the Richmond government, to go into the yard. Most of the men
be turned over to State authorities with which on 1 September 1863 recom- have hardly enough clothing to cover
the other negroes?” Four days later, he mended that “the captured negroes them. Their food consists of one pint

“What shall be done with negro

prisoners who say they are free?”
35
 “They took me to . . . Rust, Tex., where
they kept me at work for a long time.”
of meal each day. They receive nothing and eight more died at Florence, which ers were put to forced labor on behalf
else from the Confederate authorities housed as many as fifteen thousand of the Confederate military. Pvt. Rob-
but this meal, and some of them say Union prisoners of war (POWs) at one ert Jones was captured at Milliken’s
they never have enough to eat.” The time and where the poor conditions Bend, Louisiana; he later recalled that,
prisoners remained in Charleston jail, rivaled those of the notorious Con- “They took me to . . . Rust, Tex., where
under state control, until December federate prison camp at Andersonville, they kept me at work for a long time.
1864, when they were turned over to Georgia.8 . . . They had me at work doing every
the Confederate military and placed The confusion in Charleston over kind of work, loading steamboats,
in the prison camp at Florence, South the status of black prisoners was em- rebuilding breastworks, while I was
Carolina. At least three of the more blematic of the lack of uniformity in in captivity.”9 One black prisoner at
than forty imprisoned members of the treating black prisoners throughout Mobile, Alabama, testified that he and
54th Massachusetts died during their the Confederacy. Unlike white POWs, other black prisoners “were placed at
year and a half in the Charleston jail, a number of African American prison- work on the fortifications there. . . .

A soldier in the 103d Infantry, U.S. Colored

National Archives
Troops, which served in South Carolina and
Georgia in 1865 and 1866
Library of Congress

General Butler

36 Army History Winter 2011

We were kept at hard labor and inhu- Following the massacre of black troops Troops regiment stated, “We all felt
manly treated; if we lagged or faltered, at Fort Pillow, Confederate Maj. Gen. that we fought with ropes around our
or misunderstood an order, we were Nathan Bedford Forrest stated that necks.” Believing that surrender would
whipped and abused; some of our men the results of the battle there “will most likely bring death, numerous
being detailed to whip others.”10 Near demonstrate to the Northern people African American units fought under
Fort Gilmer, Virginia, captured black that Negro soldiers cannot cope with a black flag, warning rebels that they
troops were forced to work under en- Southerners.” The opposite, however, should expect no quarter from them,
emy fire in the trenches. In retaliation, seems to have been true. Historian Jo- and would expect none in return. In-
Union Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler seph T. Glatthaar asserts that the Con- deed, there were incidents, such as one
placed an equal number of Confeder- federate policies actually had a positive at Fort Blakely, Alabama, where black
ate POWs on forward trenches as well. effect on the U.S. Colored Troops: troops killed Confederate soldiers who
Within a week, the black prisoners “Black troops . . . realized that these were attempting to surrender.15
were removed from the front lines, white men were voluntarily placing Despite the fact that many black
and Butler withdrew the Confederate their lives in grave jeopardy by serving soldiers vowed to fight under the black
POWs as well.11 in the U.S.C.T. And the white officers, flag, hundreds of African American
Slave owners were also encouraged realizing the perils of surrender, had to troops were taken prisoner during
to retrieve their former slaves or re- depend even more on the performance the course of the war and ended up in
ceive restitution for those in service of their troops in battle, which forced Confederate prisoner-of-war camps
to the Confederacy. In October 1864, them to work a little harder to improve throughout the South. Ira Berlin ar-
the Mobile, Alabama, Advertiser and the fighting ability of the men.” As gues that by 1864 Confederate policy
Register listed the names of 575 black the commander of one U.S. Colored toward captured blacks had softened
prisoners of the 106th, 110th, and
111th U.S. Colored Troops (USCT)
who “are employed by engineer corps
at Mobile, Ala. The owners are noti-
fied in order to receive the pay due Secretary of War Seddon
them.”12 It is unknown if anyone actu-
ally answered the newspaper’s call, but
there were instances where soldiers
were returned to their former own-
ers. Pvt. William Rann was captured
at Athens, Alabama, in October 1864.
“They started with us to Mobile,” he
later recalled, but “at Tuscumbia my
old master [John Rand, a physician]
found me and took me away from
the soldiers and took me home and
kept me there. Whenever soldiers
would come there they would run me
out into the mountains. They kept
me at home until the surrender.”13
Historian Walter Williams recounts
a number of other instances where
black prisoners were enslaved, stat-
ing that “One Confederate colonel
reported . . . that with his general’s
permission he ordered the sale of
black captives, with the proceeds to be
divided among the soldiers,” and that
at Andersonville, “prison commander
Henry Wirz allowed local planters to
go inside the pen and inspect black
prisoners, claiming any they thought
to be theirs.”14
Confederates hoped that threats
of enslavement or death to captured
blacks (and their white officers) would
serve as a deterrent to black troops.

37
considerably from the bombastic Emancipation Proclamation thus Following Fort Wagner and the
rhetoric of 1862, observing that “while stipulated specifically that former adoption of the joint resolution of
never officially granted the rights of slaves “will be received into the armed the Confederate Congress providing
prisoners of war, black freemen seem service of the United States to gar- that captured black soldiers “be put to
to have been treated much as were rison forts, positions, stations, and death or be otherwise punished at the
captured white soldiers.” Records other places, and to man vessels of discretion” of a military court rather
mention black soldiers being held all sorts in said service.” Lincoln in- than be held as prisoners of war, Lin-
in at least nine Confederate prison cluded the limitations to the military coln was convinced that more had to
camps. In some cases, blacks were kept service of these African Americans be done to protect the Union’s black
segregated from white prisoners. At hoping to keep them from falling troops. On 30 July 1863, he issued
Mobile, an old cotton warehouse was into enemy hands. As early as 10 an order, which was published the
converted into a prison that held over January 1863, Lincoln summoned the next day in War Department General
five hundred black prisoners, where secretaries of war and the Navy to the Orders 252, declaring that “the law of
they were attended by a Confederate White House and instructed them to nations . . . permit no distinction as to
surgeon who treated the wounds of station black soldiers and sailors in color in the treatment of prisoners of
many of the men.16 areas where they would not likely war. . . . and if the enemy shall sell or
The decision to effectively treat be captured, such as Memphis. The enslave any one because of his color,
many captured black soldiers as officers commanding black soldiers, the offense shall be punished by retali-
POWs—while still denying them on the other hand, sought to get their ation upon the enemy’s prisoners in
official POW status—came in part units into the fight and pressed the our possession.” If the Confederacy
because of the U.S. government’s issue of combat duty throughout the executed a Union soldier, the Union
response to Confederate policies on first half of 1863, resulting in the as- would retaliate in kind; if the Con-
black prisoners. President Lincoln sault on Fort Wagner. While the men federacy enslaved a Union soldier,
was concerned about the fate of of the 54th Massachusetts were hailed a Confederate prisoner would “be
captured black soldiers, whom he as heroes for their courageous assault, placed at hard labor.” While Jefferson
planned to enlist in more substantial the casualties and prisoners taken Davis publicly denounced Lincoln’s
numbers beginning in 1863. The there confirmed Lincoln’s fears.17 order, it did, for the most part, have the
desired effect, as most black prisoners
were treated much the same as their
Charleston city jail, built in 1802, as it appeared c. 1888

National Archives

Troops of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (African Descent) parade in Beaufort, South Carolina, 1863.

South Carolina Historical Society

38 Army History Winter 2011

 Many Union prisoners of war arrived
at the Andersonville, Georgia, railroad
station en route to the Confederate
prisoner-of-war camp nearby.

Confederates tried to use the Union’s

refusal to exchange prisoners for their
own propaganda purposes
white counterparts during the rest of they received no medicine or medical that the United States had no right
the war, although the Confederacy treatment,” recalled one white POW. to arm slaves against their masters
never officially acknowledged African “They were compelled to load and and believed that the Confederate
Americans as POWs.18 unload the dead who died daily in the Army was under no more obligation
In 1864, following the Confederate stockade. . . . They were treated worse to return slaves than captured can-
victory at the Battle of Olustee, Florida, than dumb brutes, and the language nons or mules.21 As General Robert
numerous black soldiers were taken used toward them by the rebels was of E. Lee wrote Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant
prisoner and seventy or more of them the most opprobrious character.” An- in 1864, “negroes belonging to our
were then confined at Andersonville. other white prisoner recalled that the citizens are not considered subjects
One white POW observed the pres- guards “seemed to have a particular of exchange.”22 Indeed, to exchange a
ence in the stockade of “a dozen or spite toward the colored soldiers, and black prisoner for a white one would
more Negroes, all prisoners of war. . . . they had to go without rations several imply a racial equality that was anath-
Nearly all are minus an arm or leg, and days at a time on account of not daring ema to Confederate leaders.
their wounds are yet unhealed. Many to go forward and get them.”20 By the summer of 1863, Union lead-
of them are gangrened and they will Black prisoners also faced the scorn ers were becoming disenchanted by
all surely die. They keep by themselves of most of their white compatriots. the strategic benefits the Confederacy
and are very quiet. The Rebels have This animosity was rooted in both was deriving from the paroling and
removed every vestige of any uniform racial attitudes and the belief that exchanging of prisoners. The widely
they once wore, and they have noth- African American prisoners were publicized Confederate unwilling-
ing on but old cast off jean trousers the reason for the Union’s refusal to ness to exchange black prisoners
and cotton shirts. All are bareheaded, conduct prisoner exchanges, a belief thus played right into Union hands,
barefooted, and as thin as skeletons.”19 that had merit and was continually allowing the Lincoln administration
At the camp, the black prisoners—and propagated by their captors. During to suspend prisoner exchanges until
their white officers—established their the first two years of the war, cap- the Confederacy agreed to exchange
own, segregated area near the south tured soldiers from both sides were black prisoners equally with whites.
gate—the “Negro Squad”—because paroled and exchanged regularly, and As Richmond refused to negotiate
they were discriminated against by there was no POW crisis on either on this basis, the numbers held in
both their rebel guards and white side of the line. However, because the both Union and Confederate prison
Union POWs. The guards at Ander- Confederacy refused to acknowledge camps grew exponentially in the fall
sonville were notoriously hard on the African Americans as prisoners of war, of 1863. By the autumn of 1864, Davis’
black prisoners. “Some of these [black it would not exchange black prisoners government, realizing that it could
prisoners] were wounded, and the for Confederate soldiers held by the neither adequately care for Union
rebels refused to do anything for them; Union. Confederate leaders argued prisoners nor replace its depleted

39
 tries confirm the idea that many white
POWs blamed Lincoln and black
soldiers for their situation. William
F. Keys, a prisoner at Andersonville,
reflected these sentiments, stating “it
appears that the federal government
thinks more of a few hundred niggers
than of the thirty thousand whites here
in bondage.”24
The ostracism of their brothers
in arms further contributed to the
misery of black prisoners. One black
Massachusetts soldier, imprisoned in
Charleston, wrote, “The privations
of the white soldiers are nothing in
comparison to ours . . . being as it were,
without friends, and in the enemy’s
hands, with an almost hopelessness of
bury, especially in an election year. By being released, and not having heard
Men of the 107th Infantry, U.S. refusing to exchange all black prison- from our families or friends since we
ers, the Confederate government in were captured.” A white Union offi-
Colored Troops, which served in
effect gave Lincoln and Grant political cer imprisoned at Danville, Virginia,
Virginia in 1864 and in North cover to bleed the Confederate Army concurred with this assessment, writ-
Carolina in 1865 white, in the name of protecting black ing, “the negro soldiers suffered most.
soldiers.23 There were sixty-four of them living
Confederates tried to use the Union’s in prison when we reached Danville,
ranks, offered to acknowledge black refusal to exchange prisoners for their October 20, ’64. Fifty-seven of them
soldiers who were freemen before the own propaganda purposes, especially were dead on the 12th of February, ’65,
war began as POWs and make them in the camps. According to Edward when I saw and talked with the seven
eligible for trading. The Union would Roberts, the Confederacy “began a survivors.”25
have none of it, as General Grant op- campaign of disinformation,” where Not until the spring of 1865 would
posed all prisoner exchanges, realizing POWs “were routinely told by Con- the black prisoners’ torment end. As
that the moratorium on exchanges was federate officers that it was Abraham Sherman’s troops closed in and the
working greatly in his favor. Because Lincoln’s concern for Black soldiers Confederacy began to crumble, Union
of the Union’s manpower advantage, that was the reason for their misery.” POWs, black and white, were put on
Grant did not need POW swaps to In his study of Andersonville, William the move as well. Pvt. Alfred Green,
replenish his ranks, but Lee did. Lin- Marvel reported that a Confederate who had been captured in the assault
coln, of course, could not state that surgeon there “found the Union pris- at Fort Wagner, recalled, “We were
it was military policy to leave tens of oners damning their own government taken to Florence Stockade [from
thousands of Union soldiers starving up and down for abandoning them in Charleston] and remained over win-
at Andersonville, Belle Isle, and Salis- the name of racial equality.” Diary en- ter, and from there we were brought

Troops of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (African Descent) parade in Beaufort, South Carolina, 1863.

National Archives

40 Army History Winter 2011

to Raleigh, N.C., and were then taken Jun 1863, second quote; portion of Ltr, H. L. How American Negroes Felt and Acted during
to Wilmington, N.C., and from there Clay, Asst Adj Gen, to Smith, third and fourth the War for the Union (New York: Pantheon
to Goldsboro. . . . We were there when quotes, all printed in Ira Berlin, ed., The Black Books, 1965), p. 225.
our army came up.” After almost two Military Experience, Freedom, A Documentary 16. Berlin, Black Military Experience, p. 568,
years as a Confederate prisoner, Green History of Emancipation, 1861–1867 (New quote; Williams, “Again in Chains,” p. 41; File
was paroled at Goldsboro, North York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 404,448, Pension for Henry Everly, Civil War
Carolina, in March 1865. With the 571, 578–79. Pension Application Files, RG 15, NA.
demise of the Confederacy, black 4. Howard C. Westwood, “Captive Black 17. Cornish, Sable Arm, pp. 161–62; Benja-
POWs were either paroled from the Union Soldiers in Charleston—What to Do?” min Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro (1962; New
remaining Southern prison camps or Civil War History 28 (1982): 28–44, quote, York: Da Capo Press, 1990), p. 174; Proclama-
simply walked away as their guards p. 37. tion by President Abraham Lincoln, 1 Jan 1863,
abandoned them. While it is unknown 5. Ibid., pp. 28–29, 33, 39, quote, p. 28. published in War Dept GO 1, 2 Jan 1863, and
how many black troops may have been 6. Luis F. Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment: printed in OR, ser. 3, vol. 3, pp. 2–3, quote, p.
executed after they surrendered, ac- The History of the Fifty-Fourth Regiment of 3; final draft of the proclamation, 29–31 Dec
cording to a congressional committee Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1863–1865, 1862, printed in Guelzo, Lincoln’s Emancipa-
report (which undoubtedly underes- 2d ed. (1894; New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), tion Proclamation, pp. 257–58.
timates the number of captured black pp. 399–401. 18. Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro, p. 175;
soldiers), 79 black Union soldiers died 7. Westwood, “Captive Black Union Sol- Berlin, Black Military Experience, p. 583,
in Confederate prisons, 77 escaped, diers,” pp. 29–32; OR, ser. 2, vol. 6, pp. 125 quotes.
384 were recaptured by Union forces, (first quote), 134 (second quote), 159 (third 19. Robert Knox Sneden, Eye of the Storm:
236 were paroled at the end of the war, quote), 169. A Civil War Odyssey, ed. Charles F. Bryan Jr.
and “not one enlisted in the service of 8. Westwood, “Captive Black Union Sol- and Nelson D. Lankford (New York: Free Press,
the enemy, or deserted the flag of the diers,” pp. 35–36, 38–40, 43–44, first quote, p. 2000), p. 225, quote; John David Smith, “Let Us
country.”26 38; Emilio, Brave Black Regiment, pp. 398–99, All Be Grateful That We Have Colored Troops
411, 418–19, second quote, pp. 418–19. That Will Fight,” in Black Soldiers in Blue: Afri-
9. File XC–2,536,702, Pension for Robert can American Troops in the Civil War Era, ed.
Jones, Civil War Pension Application Files, John David Smith (Chapel Hill: University of
Record Group (RG) 15, Records of the Depart- North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 49.
ment of Veterans Affairs, National Archives 20. Arthur W. Bergeron Jr., “The Battle of
Notes (NA). Olustee,” in Smith, Black Soldiers in Blue, p.
This article is a revised version of a paper 10. Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So 145; Emilio, Brave Black Regiment, p. 429,
read at the annual meeting of the American Long: The Aftermath of Slavery (New York: quotes.
Historical Association held in San Diego, Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 88. 21. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long, p. 89.
California, in January 2010. 11. Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm: 22. Ltr, General Robert E. Lee to Lt Gen
Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865 Ulysses S. Grant, 3 Oct 1864, printed in OR,
1. Frederick Douglass, “Address for the (1956; Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, ser. 2, vol. 7, p. 914.
Promotion of Colored Enlistments,” 6 Jul 1987), p. 178. 23. Ibid.; Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro,
1863, quoted in Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln’s 12. Ibid.; OR, ser. 2, vol. 8, pp. 26–27, 109, pp. 175–76; Charles W. Sanders Jr., While in
Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slav- quote, p. 27. the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of
ery in America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 13. File XC–2,460,295, Pension for William the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
2004), p. 219. Rann, Civil War Pension Application Files, University Press, 2005), pp. 133–62.
2. Proclamation of Jefferson Davis, Dec 1862, RG 15, NA. 24. Edward F. Roberts, Andersonville Journey
printed in “Important from Richmond: Ter- 14. Walter L. Williams, “Again in Chains: (Shippensburg, Pa.: Burd Street Press, 1998), p.
rible Retaliatory Proclamation of Jeff. Davis,” Black Soldiers Suffering in Captivity,” Civil 16, first and second quotes; William Marvel,
New York Herald, 28 Dec 1862, and, as copied War Times Illustrated 20 (May 1981): 36–41, Andersonville: The Last Depot (Chapel Hill:
in Adjt. and Insp. General’s Office, Richmond, quotes, p. 40. University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p.
Va., GO 111, 24 Dec 1862, reprinted in War 15. Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle: 148, third and fourth quotes.
of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and 25. Emilio, Brave Black Regiment, p. 412,
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies White Officers (New York: Free Press, 1990), first quote; Williams, “Again in Chains,” p.
(hereinafter cited as OR), 128 vols. (Wash- pp. 157 (first quote), 158, 203 (second quote), 43, second quote.
ington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 2, vol. 5, pp. 204 (third quote); OR, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, 26. Westwood, “Captive Black Union Sol-
795–97, first quote, p. 797; Joint Resolution pp. 288–90; Thomas Wentworth Higginson, diers,” p. 44; Emilio, Brave Black Regiment,
of the Confederate Congress, approved 1 May Army Life in a Black Regiment (Boston: Fields, pp. 398, 412, 422–23, 431, first quote, p. 423,
1863, in OR, ser. 2, vol. 5, pp. 940–41, second Osgood, 1870); Ms, William A. Dobak, Free- second quote, p. 431.
quote, p. 940. dom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops,
3. Ltr, Col John R. F. Tattnall to Capt S. 1862–67, chapter 5, Historians files, U.S. Army
Croom, 8 Nov 1862, first quote; Ltr, Lt Gen Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.;
E. Kirby Smith to Maj Gen Richard Taylor, 13 James M. McPherson, The Negro’s Civil War:

41
Continued from page 5
would serve among a mixed Sunni and Army in Vietnam series, describes The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Op-
Shi’ite population, where they were the role of military engineers, espe- erational Logistics in Grenada, 1983,
joined in Task Force Marne by two cially those of the U.S. Army, in the by Edgar F. Raines Jr. provides an
brigades of other U.S. Army divisions Vietnam War. These engineers built account of how Army logistics af-
already in Iraq. The book describes the ports and depots, carved airfields and fected ground operations during the
significant progress made by this more airstrips out of low-lying jungles and Grenada intervention and, in turn,
robust force in preventing insurgent upland plateaus, improved roads and of how combat influenced logistical
elements in the area from recruiting erected bridges, and constructed bases. performance. The narrative ranges
fighters or constructing bombs for use Although most of their construction through all levels of war—the strategic
in Baghdad, as had previously been was temporary in nature, many roads level where President Ronald Reagan
common. Andrade relates how a com- and facilities were designed to be du- grappled in meetings of the National
bination of aggressive combat actions rable assets in the economy of South Security Council with the question of
and vigorous civil reconstruction ef- Vietnam. The book also describes the whether to intervene in the wake of
forts left the region significantly more engineers’ contribution to combat a bloody coup, the operational level
secure upon the division’s departure. missions in support of the South Viet- where the commander of the XVIII
This 429-page book has been issued namese government. The Center has Airborne Corps sought to ensure that
in paperback in the Center’s Global issued this 647-page work in a cloth the needed supplies and appropriate
War on Terrorism series as CMH Pub cover as CMH Pub 91–14 and in pa- logistical units could be dispatched to
59–2–1. Andrade is a senior historian perback as CMH Pub 91–14–1. Traas, the area of operations when needed,
in the Center’s Military Operations a retired Corps of Engineers lieutenant and the tactical level where a sergeant
Branch, and he lived with the division colonel who served two tours in Viet- in combat in Grenada coped success-
in Iraq for several months in 2007 and nam, began the book while assigned to fully with a Cuban ambush despite a
2008. the Center of Military History, where lack of hand grenades. In addition to
Engineers at War by Adrian G. he currently holds the title of visiting furnishing a fascinating account of
Traas, a volume in the United States professor. a complex operation, The Rucksack

42 Army History Winter 2011

War identifies problems that the U.S. may order the materials from the U.S. was initiated by two successive con-
Army continues to face as it prepares Government Printing Office via its tract historians, Matt Matthews and
for possible future calls to participate Web site at http://bookstore.gpo.gov. Douglas Cubbison. Donald Wright as-
in overseas operations. This 649-page The first map poster may be purchased sisted McGrath with the writing of the
book has been issued in cloth as CMH for $5; the prices of the books and 257-page work. McGrath is a retired
Pub 55–2 and in paperback as CMH the remaining posters should be an- Army Reserve officer who has been
Pub 55–2–1; it is an entry in the Cen- nounced by the end of December 2010. a historian at the U.S. Army Combat
ter’s Contingency Operations Series. Studies Institute since 2002. Wright
Its author is a senior historian in the is the chief of the institute’s Research
Center’s General Histories Branch.
Combat Studies Institute Press and Publications Team.
The three Operation Iraqi Freedom Releases New Books Fire for Effect: Field Artillery and
posters feature maps, chronologies, The Combat Studies Institute Press Close Air Support in the US Army,
and major-unit insignia for the periods has issued two new books, one on a re- of which McGrath is the sole author,
March to May 2003, June 2003 to May cent combat encounter in Afghanistan surveys the assistance given by field
2004, and June 2004 to May 2005. The and the other on alternative means artillery and close air support to U.S.
first map was published in 2008 but of providing heavy weapons support Army infantry forces and allied ele-
has not been previously announced to infantry forces. Both books were ments in combat operations, focusing
in Army History. It depicts the move- authored in whole or in part by John on the period since World War I when
ment of large troop units in the drive J. McGrath. the contribution of air power became
that led to the capture of Baghdad and Wanat: Combat Action in Afghani- available. This 185-page monograph
the overthrow of the regime of Saddam stan, 2008, examines the battle fought evaluates the effectiveness of each type
Hussein. The two successive maps show at the isolated village of Wanat in the of aid. It discusses evolving military
the major commands that served in Hindu Kush mountains of Nuristan organizations and their relationships
each of seven regions of the country Province in northeastern Afghanistan as well as developments in equipment
and how those military jurisdictions on 13 July 2008. Nine U.S. soldiers and weaponry.
evolved. Each poster is twenty-four died while defending a newly estab- Digital copies of each of these pub-
inches tall and thirty-six inches wide. lished combat outpost there against lications may be downloaded from
These maps are CMH Pubs 58–1, 58–2, a determined insurgent force armed http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/
and 58–3. with rocket-propelled grenades and csi/csi.asp. Military personnel and
Army publication account hold- automatic weapons. The attack was re- federal employees may request printed
ers may obtain these items from the pulsed by a garrison of forty-nine U.S. copies by following the instructions
Directorate of Logistics–Washington, soldiers and twenty-four members of posted at http://usacac.army.mil/
Media Distribution Division, ATTN: the Afghan National Army after a dif- CAC2/CSI/PubRequest.asp.
JDHQSVPAS, 1655 Woodson Road, ficult four-hour battle that is narrated
St. Louis, MO 63114-6128. Account in detail in this book. The volume
holders may also place their orders at also examines the history of conflict
http://www.apd.army.mil. Individuals in this part of Afghanistan. The study

43
 Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime essays are mere reworkings of second- In his essay titled “America’s War of
Early America: From the Colonial ary sources. Rather, each piece is an 1812,” Richard Barbuto connects an
Era to the Civil War original contribution from primary earlier campaign fought by William
sources. Henry Harrison against the Indians at
An introduction by the editors ties Tippecanoe to the Indian fighting dur-
the essays together. The editors argue ing the War of 1812, which includes
that the experiences of civilians during the offensive against the Creeks in
the wars covered by this volume were the South and the disastrous fight-
so varied that only two generalizations ing at Forts Detroit and Dearborn in
can be made: “that American civilians Michigan. Through its focus on Indian
experienced war” in every generation, fighting, this essay covers numerous
and “that the lines between civilians conflicts on the frontier that do not fit
and combatants were usually blurred” the more formal wars among Europe-
(p. xi). ans and Americans. However, during
Armstrong Starkey writes the the War of 1812, only civilians living
Edited by David S. Heidler and first essay on “Wartime Colonial on the fringes of the United States were
Jeanne T. Heidler America.” Starkey describes the ex- caught up in the fighting, and Barbuto
Greenwood Press, 2007 perience of colonists and Indians, only briefly describes the effects of
Pp. xxix, 248. $65 both of whom experienced atroci- British raids on cities and towns in the
ties and brutal fighting firsthand. Atlantic theater. Most American civil-
The colonists were often not merely ians, he argues, experienced the war
Review by Lincoln Mullen civilians because the militia system mainly through economic difficulty.
A recent trend in military history expected most male civilians to be Gregory Hospodor’s essay, “The
connects the events and institutions soldiers, responsible for their own American Home Front in the Mexican
of warfare to broader themes in social defense. In the colonial wars in par- War,” examines how the Mexican
and cultural history. This book on the ticular, the line between home front War was different from every other
Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime and battle front, civilian and soldier, war in this period because nearly all
Early America, coedited by David was often indistinguishable. This of the fighting took place in a foreign
Heidler and Jeanne Heidler, follows in reviewer wishes that the plan for the country, away from most American ci-
that trend. By studying the home front volume provided for more than one vilians. This distance meant less direct
during the wars of early America, the essay on the colonial wars. This single suffering by noncombatants. It also
essayists examine what the wars reveal essay has to cover two-thirds of the meant that they experienced the war
about society and culture at war. total time span and at least half the primarily through newspapers and let-
This volume is a collection of essays conflicts within the scope of the book. ters. The war was often celebrated by
on the colonial wars, the Revolution- Wayne Lee’s essay discusses “The politicians and clergymen, yet it also
ary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican American Revolution.” Numerous gave rise to significant dissent from
War, and the Civil War. It is a part of civilians in this war faced the problem the likes of Henry David Thoreau and
the Daily Lives of Civilians in War- of maintaining neutrality. Many were Abraham Lincoln.
time series, which is in a still larger neutral, out of political indifference or The Confederate civilian’s experi-
series from Greenwood on Daily Life religious conviction, but the Patriots ence during the Civil War is described
Through History. This publication is and the Loyalists often compelled in James Marten’s “A Very Sad Life:
a reference work, intended more for them to choose a side so that those Civilians in the Confederacy.” South-
academic libraries and students of that chose neutrality often endured as ern civilians witnessed the majority
these specific conflicts than for the much as or more than combatants. For of the fighting because most of it took
general reader. Each essay includes both Patriots and Loyalists, combat place in the South. The proximity of
a helpful annotated bibliography. took place close to home, and both the combat often necessitated that
To describe this book as a reference groups suffered due to the necessity Southerners support large armies
work, however, is not to say that the of provisioning large armies. fighting nearby. The comparatively

44 Army History Winter 2011

small population of the South often thousand of their soldiers were de-
meant that women and children were The War of 1812 in the Age ployed to North America, more than
left behind throughout the Confed- of Napoleon the number of British troops at the
eracy and that they had to keep farms Battle of Waterloo in 1815. The War
and plantations running despite food of 1812’s “far-flung nature,” however,
shortages and severe inflation. The “ensured that there was no major
morale of Southern civilians was high concentration of this force” (p. 165).
during the first several years of the In the war at sea, Black maintains
war, but the sieges of cities like Vicks- that the United States had very good
burg and Atlanta brought the battle ships, while many of the British ships
even closer to home. Southerners were in bad condition and their crews
became increasingly embittered with short of sailors. Also, most of the Brit-
the Union Army and this bitterness ish Navy was required for the blockade
severely hampered Reconstruction of France and French-occupied Eu-
after the war. Slaves, too, were a type rope. The Americans fought well—far-
of refugee from the war, as many es- By Jeremy Black ing better than the British government
caped to the freedom offered by the University of Oklahoma Press, 2009 had anticipated—and their naval vic-
Union Army. Pp. xv, 286. $32.95 tories helped to offset their losses on
Paul Cimbala closes the collection land. Speaker of the House Henry Clay
with an essay on “The Northern Home of Kentucky said of these victories at
Front During the Civil War.” North- sea: “Brilliant as they are however they
ern civilians did not experience much
Review by Roger D. Cunningham do not fill up the void created by our
of the war firsthand, but the mounting In just over a year, Americans will misfortunes on land” (p. 128).
casualty lists and returning wounded begin to stage the first ceremonies As far as the fighting on land is
soldiers made them keenly aware of commemorating the bicentennial of concerned, the author devotes an in-
the suffering they were being spared. the War of 1812. As Jeremy Black, a ordinate amount of text discussing the
Civilian life changed dramatically, professor of history at the University famous Battle of New Orleans, which
though it was not as disrupted or as of Exeter, points out in his book The was fought two weeks after American
terrifying as in the South. Women War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon, and British envoys had agreed to
had to carry on at farms or businesses. the United States conducted that peace terms at Ghent, Belgium, on
Industry changed to support the war war poorly, but it is “etched into the Christmas Eve, 1814. Maj. Gen. An-
effort; commerce was handled with American memory, with the heroic drew Jackson assembled a ragtag force
Union greenbacks. This war, too, had defense of Baltimore in 1814 and New of less than five thousand regulars,
its share of dissidents at home. The Orleans in 1815” (p. 3). In spite of the militiamen, and pirates (under Jean
volume ends at a fitting place, for the war’s great importance in determining Lafitte) and established a strong de-
Civil War was the final major Ameri- the fate of North America, however, fensive position behind a rampart and
can war fought on U.S. soil, and so it is widely forgotten in the author’s canal, with his right flank anchored
the last experienced directly at home. homeland, Great Britain, where it is on the bank of the Mississippi River.
totally overshadowed by the Napole- Jackson was able to defeat a larger
onic Wars. British force under the command of
For the British, the War of 1812 Maj. Gen. Sir Edward Pakenham (the
“was an aggravating sideshow to the Duke of Wellington’s brother-in-law),
much larger conflict in Europe” (p. who was mortally wounded during
Lincoln Mullen is a Ph.D. student 32). About six thousand British troops the attack. The Treaty of Ghent was
at Brandeis University. He studies the
history of early America and religion were sent to North America in 1813, unanimously accepted by the Senate
in America. but more soldiers than that had been (35 to 0) and finally ratified in Febru-
dispatched to Spain. Because the Brit- ary 1815, but, as the author points out,
ish had major military commitments the Battle of New Orleans was not the
elsewhere, they launched no major last fight between the two sides. News
North American offensive in 1813, of the peace took quite a long time to
which gave the Americans a chance reach warships that were sailing on
to consolidate and develop their distant stations, and on 30 June 1815
military system. After a provisional the American sloop Peacock captured
French government deposed Napo- the British East India Company brig
leon Bonaparte, forcing his abdication Nautilus in the Sunda Strait near the
in the spring of 1814, the British no East Indies.
longer required troops and ships for Black argues that the political con-
action against France, and forty-eight sequences of the War of 1812 were

45
more significant than its military it, the various strategies designed to
engagements and outcomes. Among The American Military Frontiers: carry it out, and the specific opera-
other things, the war ensured that the The United States Army in the tions that it entailed. Along the way, he
United States would not “liberate” West, 1783–1900 describes the ongoing tension between
Canada—unfinished business from the needs of the frontier mission and
the previous conflict—which was of the desires of officers to create a mili-
great importance to the fate of North tary establishment that could succeed
America. The postwar history of the against European foes. Organization
United States “would have been very and doctrine, he shows, tended to em-
different had it included Canada and phasize the latter, while constabulary
the Canadians” (p. xii). operations tended to dominate the
The book could have been improved mission, presaging in some ways the
in terms of illustrations and maps. Of debate over missions that took place
the former, there is but one—a fron- in the 1990s, the decade after the end
tispiece painting of the 1812 victory of the Cold War. He also traces the
of the American frigate United States By Robert Wooster political disagreements between the
over the British frigate Macedonian. University of New Mexico Press, 2009 proponents of regular forces and citi-
As far as the maps are concerned, Pp. xvi, 361. $39.95 zen militia, the interplay between the
there are three depicting the Northern, military and the Bureau of Indian Af-
Chesapeake, and Southern theaters of fairs, the role of military forces in law
the war. These maps include symbols enforcement, and the life of the soldier
locating several battles that are not and officer on the frontier.
named, and they also exclude some
Review by Frank N. Schubert Frontier operations mainly revolved
significant battles. One example is From the founding of the Republic around the ongoing conflict with the
the map of the Southern theater that to the end of the nineteenth century, Indians. Sometimes they included
fails to identify General Jackson’s the United States expanded and spread protecting the Indians and their lands
1814 victory over the Creek Indians across the continent and beyond. from settlers and miners who thought
at Horseshoe Bend in the Mississippi This “manifest destiny,” or westward they did not have to respect Indian
Territory (modern-day Alabama), and southward movement, through title under any circumstance. Army
which is discussed on the same page emigration, negotiation, purchase, administration of Indian policy also
(p. 192). and war, was a dominant theme of involved the regulation of trade, the
These shortcomings are quite minor, the period. The United States armed halting of the private purchase of In-
however, and they do not prevent this forces, mainly the Army and to a lesser dian land, and efforts to stamp out the
book from making a significant con- extent the Navy, stood at the center of illicit liquor trade; but mainly frontier
tribution to the historiography of the this movement. As Robert Wooster duty was about forcing the natives
War of 1812. For those readers who notes at the beginning of his excellent onto reservations and keeping them
hope to understand the conflict in its survey of the role of the Army in this there. Between 1790 and 1900, Army
international context, this volume is critical development, “that military units of varying size fought in more
highly recommended. affairs, in their varied dimensions, than eleven hundred combat engage-
were of fundamental importance to ments against native foes who tried
the American frontiers and that the futilely to resist expansion. This is a
United States Army, as the federal large number but amounts to just over
government’s most visible agent of ten engagements a year. Otherwise,
Roger D. Cunningham graduated empire, was central to that experience” frontier military operations included
from West Point in 1972 and retired (p. xii). a mind-numbing routine of garrison
from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the The Army, as historian Robert Utley chores and patrols. As Maj. Gen.
author of The Black Citizen-Soldiers of put it, was “the child of the frontier.”1 Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, the
Kansas, 1864–1901 (Columbia, Mo., It emerged in the last years of the Continental Army’s inspector general,
2008), as well as numerous articles and eighteenth century in response to two accurately predicted, frontier opera-
book reviews, many of which have ap- related matters, the conflict between tions “will be . . . so much more trying
peared in this journal. settlers and the native peoples who to patience than to valour” (p. xiv).
resisted their encroachment, and the Wooster makes clear that while the
inability of short-term volunteer or- Army was the child of the frontier it
ganizations to cope with the problem. was also a parent of what evolved in its
Wooster covers a whole century of wake. Federal money may have been,
frontier warfare, in Florida and other as Wooster claims, “an especially im-
parts of the Southeast as well as in the portant economic multiplier in the arid
West. He traces the policies that drove Southwest” (p. 121), but, throughout

46 Army History Winter 2011

the borderlands, Army posts in the . . . apparent in the soldiers who now
heart of Indian country embodied the occupied a new global empire” (pp. On the Western Front with the
government’s commitment to frontier 269–70). But these responsibilities con- Rainbow Division: A World War I
development. These posts furnished tinued to be significant throughout the Diary
work and business opportunities for entire century, from the occupation of
civilians, while troops linked forts and Hispaniola in 1915 to the post–World
the towns that grew alongside with the War II military government of defeated
rest of the country by building roads enemies, road construction in Afghani-
and telegraph lines. The forces also stan during the Cold War, and most
protected railroads and provided a recently the enforcement of peace in
modicum of security to frontier civil- the Balkans.
ians. Federal money ebbed and flowed, When Frederick Jackson Turner
as William Dobak showed in Fort Riley articulated his concept of the frontier
and Its Neighbors (Norman, Okla., process in 1893, he emphasized the
1998), sort of like rainfall, sometimes trapper, the trader, the scout, and cat-
plentiful and sometimes a trickle but tlemen and farmers—private individu-
always beyond the control of local resi- als all—as representing the vanguard
dents, as it fluctuated with nationwide of American expansion. The Turner- By Vernon E. Kniptash
economic and political changes as well ian model had no place for a number Edited by E. Bruce Geelhoed
as with the strategic needs of the Army. of key frontier participants, among University of Oklahoma Press, 2009
Although unpredictable as the prairie them women, ethnic minorities, and Pp. xiii, 236. $29.95
rain, federal outlays remained “a cor- the Army, which was the key agent
nerstone of many frontier economies.” of the national government in the ad-
The Army’s presence represented a vance across the continent. Even in the
Review by Brian F. Neumann
substantial public investment in the second half of the twentieth century, The war memoir is a staple of mili-
borderland economy, and western the Turnerian mythology endured, tary history, littering the bookshelves
forts, as Wooster notes, became the embodied in the slogan “The West of enthusiasts and academics alike. The
focal points of economic activity. But Wasn’t Won with a Registered Gun.” usefulness of such works, however,
the outcome of this largesse was not But it was indeed won with a registered often depends as much on what read-
uniformly positive, and local per- gun, and a U.S. Army soldier carried ers are searching for as on the specific
sonalities could influence its impact. it. Robert Wooster’s excellent history details covered. Whether a memoir is
Wooster’s own study of Fort Davis, of the Army on the frontier leaves no by a commanding general or a private,
Texas, Crossroads: Fort Davis and the doubt about that. each offers varying degrees of insight
West (College Station, Tex., 2006), into the experience of war. Rarely are
illustrates a case where expenditures Note they comprehensive, nor should they
never proved sufficient to raise a com- be. Instead, memoirs allow students
munity out of its backwater status. 1. Robert M. Utley, “The Contribution of the of history to develop a general under-
Elsewhere, such as the vicinity of Fort Frontier to the American Military Tradition,” standing of war through a variety of
Robinson, Nebraska, local choices in The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military personal perspectives. In this sense,
about milking the military presence History, 1959–1987, ed. Harry R. Borowski Vernon Kniptash’s diary of his service
had the effect of promoting vice and of (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, with the 42d “Rainbow” Division during
dooming whatever slim chance might 1988), p. 533. the First World War is a valuable addi-
have existed for a brighter future. tion to the literature of that increasingly
Overall, these outlays set a precedent forgotten conflict.
for military support of the regional Packed away in storage for years,
economy that persists to this day. Dr. Frank N. Schubert retired from Kniptash’s diary was lost and forgotten
When the frontier moved overseas the Joint History Office, Office of the for all intents and purposes. Only after
to former Spanish possessions at the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in June his death was the diary discovered by
turn of the twentieth century, U.S. 2003. He now divides his time between his son and made available to historians.
units persevered in the constabulary his homes in Virginia and Győr, Hun- On the Western Front with the Rainbow
roles that they had performed in North gary, about halfway between Budapest Division is the product of one historian,
America. American soldiers served and Vienna. E. Bruce Geelhoed, who researched
as explorers, road builders, customs Kniptash’s words and compiled this
officers, teachers, sanitation workers, annotated diary for publication. The
relief experts, and governors. Wooster end result is a solid look into the less-
ends his narrative at the time of the glamorous life of an ordinary soldier
war in the Philippines, observing that who spent most of the war behind the
“the heritage of the frontier army was front lines.

47
 Born in 1897 to German immi- the constant artillery bombardments Paddy: The Colorful Story of
grants in Indianapolis, Indiana, Vernon and attacks by German aircraft. How- Colonel Harry A. “Paddy” Flint
Kniptash showed a clear distaste for all ever, his focus generally shifts between
things Prussian and enlisted in the Na- describing his unit’s progress and the
tional Guard soon after the American daily preoccupations of a soldier: mail
declaration of war. Desiring to serve in from home; the varying quality of food
the artillery, he eventually joined the and billets; and the continual stream of
150th Field Artillery, which was com- rumors, or “snow” as he calls it, which
bined with guard units from other states abounds in any situation where reliable
to form the Rainbow Division. He began information is scarce. When the others
his diary at the time of his enlistment and were limited in their understanding of
maintained it through his release from events, Kniptash’s position as a radio
service two years later. In the interim, operator gave him access to increased
he experienced the awkward transition information regarding other parts of
to a soldier’s life, deployment to Europe, the front. He displays a keen awareness
the strains of living at the front, service of circumstances and comments regu- By Robert A. Anderson
with the Army of Occupation after the larly on the overall state of affairs for the Heritage Books, 2006
war, and the eventual return home. American Expeditionary Forces and its Pp. xvii, 189. $30
Thus, Kniptash’s diary is a rarity in a allies. Kniptash also conveys weariness
field where most people think the story with postwar occupation and in rela-
ends when the shooting stops, providing tions with civilians in France, Belgium,
insight into all phases of the American Luxembourg, and Germany and the
Review by David R. Gray
intervention. As editor, Geelhoed has growing disdain for the regimentation Every war produces heroic officer
created artificial partitions to the diary of Army life as the soldiers await their leaders who inspire emulation on and
to improve readability but has other- return home. off the battlefield. While soldiers tend to
wise faithfully reproduced the original Despite its strengths, the historical gravitate toward the more charismatic
manuscript. value of Kniptash’s diary is largely de- officers to direct them, they really fol-
The story of the Rainbow Division is pendent on the reader. If one is looking low those officers who exhibit superb
well known. James Cooke’s The Rainbow for an engaging combat narrative, there military professionalism in all areas.
Division in the Great War, 1917–1919 are better alternatives (two of which are Acquired over a lifetime of study and
(Westport, Conn., 1994) and numerous mentioned above). If, however, readers practice, officer professionalism in-
biographies of General Douglas MacAr- want to broaden their understanding volves the exercise of special military
thur supply detailed material on the divi- of the experiences of those who served expertise, notably the use of organized
sion’s exploits. Likewise, there are pub- by looking to the rear areas rather than violence in combat on society’s behalf.
lished diaries from other members of the front or to gain the perspective of The subject of this review demonstrated
the 150th Field Artillery, such as Elmer an enlisted soldier working on a regi- both charisma and professionalism in
Straub’s A Sergeant’s Diary in the World mental staff, then the present piece has abundance. In a lively and readable
War (Indianapolis, Ind., 1923) and real merit. As the First World War’s biography, author Robert Anderson
Elmer Sherwood’s Diary of a Rainbow centennial anniversary approaches it is examines the life of Col. Harry A.
Veteran (Terre Haute, Ind., 1929). Addi- refreshing to see an overall upswing in “Paddy” Flint, a little-known World
tionally, the unit’s commanding officer, the publication of material dealing with War II regimental commander whose
Col. Robert Tyndall, kept a diary that has a conflict that was of critical importance character, competence, and leadership
been mined by several historians. These to this nation’s development. exemplified the best attributes of the
works furnish views of the war from professional officer.
the perspective of either soldiers closely Robert Anderson, coauthor of Low
engaged in combat or a commanding Dr. Brian F. Neumann is a historian Level Hell: A Scout Pilot in the Big Red
officer concerned with the regiment’s at the U.S. Army Center of Military One (Novato, Calif., 1992) as well as
overall performance. Where Kniptash’s History. Previously, he was an assistant several other articles on World War II,
diary breaks new ground is in its descrip- professor in the Department of History has produced a lucid and interesting
tion of not only life in the rear areas, but at the United States Military Academy. biography of Harry Flint. In recon-
also the broad scope of his service. The He received his Ph.D. from Texas A&M structing Flint’s life and career, he
initial enthusiasm that accompanied University in 2006 and is currently tapped into unpublished letters to fam-
his enlistment is tempered somewhat working on a biography of Maj. Gen. ily and friends, interviews with family
by the transition to military service and James G. Harbord. and surviving unit members, and unit
the grind of training as well as by the reports. A number of scholarly second-
long delay between his enlistment and ary sources rounded out his research.
the division’s arrival at the front. Like Born and raised in St. Johnsbury,
Straub and Sherwood, Kniptash feared Vermont, in 1888, Harry Flint’s pursuit

48 Army History Winter 2011

of a military career stemmed from his graduating from the Army Air Corps Flint purposely devised these methods
small-town upbringing and his intense Tactical School at Langley, Virginia to build morale and unit cohesion
interest in military affairs. Flint’s per- (1930–1931), and serving as an in- through a shared sense of mission.
sonality and value system derived from structor at Maxwell Air Base, Alabama Perhaps most important, Flint exer-
a local environment that stressed the (1931–1933). Though not all directly cised dynamic leadership at the front.
importance of hard work and persever- related to war fighting, these assign- At the height of his professional skills
ance; participation in outdoor activities ments did provide Flint with an excel- and expertise, Flint took command
such as hunting, fishing, hiking, and lent professional education, leadership of the 39th in Sicily as it fought its
horseback riding; patriotism; and the experience in a variety of settings, and way toward Messina. Within hours
Progressive ideals of the time. Military the decision-making skills essential for of arriving, Flint went to his farthest
service offered the logical path to satisfy success as an Army officer. forward unit to observe the situation.
his childhood’s romantic notions of Throughout his career, Flint culti- Due to his personality, preference, and
leading a courageous, manly life where vated personal and professional rela- experience, Flint gravitated toward
he could earn fame. After a year of tionships that would assist his advance- the front in order to share his troops’
study at both Norwich College and the ment in the Army, a second theme of dangers. Roaming between his forward
U.S. Naval Academy, Flint received an the book. As a West Point cadet, Flint battalions, he spent the next several
appointment to West Point in 1908 and established a circle of close friends days leading and cajoling his troops to
graduated in the middle of the class of drawn from several classes, most no- the regiment’s objective, the town of
1912 as a second lieutenant of cavalry. tably George S. Patton Jr. (1909) and Troina. Flint contemptuously ignored
Anderson sketches out three themes Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar N. enemy fire, telling his troops the Ger-
that affected Flint’s subsequent ca- Bradley (1915). These relationships mans could never shoot straight. The
reer. Flint’s determination to pursue played a key role in advancing Flint into chain of command acknowledged the
professional goals is the book’s most career-enhancing positions at just the 39th’s superb performance and cred-
prominent theme. As a member of the right times. Patton had a direct hand, ited Flint’s leadership by awarding him
profession of arms, Flint desperately for example, in Flint, a 52-year-old a Distinguished Service Cross for his
wanted to command troops in battle. colonel, being assigned to a staff job actions. But his “ride to the sound of the
He vigorously sought out any oppor- in London in 1942, despite an Army guns” leadership style had risks. Prior
tunity to serve with cavalry in action policy that prohibited officers over the to the Normandy invasion, Omar Brad-
where he might prove his courage age of fifty from deploying overseas. ley, First Army’s commanding general,
and leadership abilities. He was often Patton and Bradley later handpicked recognized his friend’s courage but re-
frustrated in this endeavor. Early in Flint to command the 39th Infantry peatedly cautioned Flint to “be careful
his career, Flint missed being part of Regiment during the Sicily campaign as a dead or wounded Colonel is of very
Pershing’s expedition into Mexico in in 1943. limited value and the 39th needs your
1916. He did not deploy overseas until The book’s final theme examines presence” (pp. 117, 119). Flint would
the very end of World War I and missed Flint’s command style. Flint had earned have none of it and, after going forward
active combat while serving as a train- a reputation as an effective and efficient to oversee fighting in the Normandy
ing officer for replacements in a field leader and manager of resources. A bocage, was mortally wounded while
artillery unit. In 1919, he returned to “fixer” with a flair for the dramatic, he engaged in a small-unit firefight. At the
the United States to work in a number was placed in command to improve price of his life, Paddy Flint had accom-
of command and staff positions in the the effectiveness of the 39th, which had plished the most important mission of
peacetime Army. delivered a lackluster performance dur- his life: rejuvenating the fighting spirit
During the interwar period, Flint ing the North African campaign. Like of a combat unit that had lost its edge,
learned that professional officership Patton, Flint relied on a few flamboyant for which he posthumously received a
involved lifelong learning in more areas gimmicks as well as his personal cha- second Distinguished Service Cross.
than just purely military technical mat- risma to inspire his troops. As a cadet, The author succeeds in his purpose
ters. Like many officers of his time, Flint he had adopted the nickname “Paddy,” to illuminate Flint’s life and remark-
performed duties away from tactical a symbolic and romantic moniker that able exploits. He could, however, have
units. He taught cadets as a professor highlighted his great admiration for the cast his net a bit wider and used Flint’s
of military science at two Reserve Of- Irish immigrants who had served in the career to make some broader points
ficers’ Training Corps detachments, frontier cavalry in the West. (Flint was about the profession of arms in the first
oversaw the students’ horsemanship not of Irish origin.) Flint always wore a half of the twentieth century. The work
at Fort Leavenworth, and served as a black scarf around his neck as a “battle would have benefited from a more in-
staff officer in the Chief of Cavalry’s tie” so he could be readily identified depth placement of Flint’s career in
Office in Washington, D.C. He added by his troops. Once in command, Flint the context of the era’s military culture
further to his political-cultural knowl- also instituted the motto “Anything, and standards of professionalism. Prior
edge and military technical expertise Anywhere, Anytime, Bar Nothing” as to World War I, America’s overseas
by attending France’s l’Ecole Super- the 39th’s rallying cry, and he had every imperialism and Progressive idealism
ieure de Guerre in Paris (1926–1928), soldier paint AAA-0 on his helmet. shaped Flint’s motivation to serve the

49
nation as a soldier where he could Destination Normandy: Three ful invasion of Europe, the supreme
achieve martial glory and fame. But the American Regiments on D-Day headquarters had to fight on military,
slaughter of troops during World War political, and social fronts” (p. 48). U.S.
I altered these cultural norms, which units, particularly those such as the
certainly would have challenged Flint’s 116th that were stationed in England for
personal value system. Moreover, almost two years prior to the invasion,
Flint participated in some pivotal ex- integrated into British society, married
periments to convert his beloved horse British women, and fathered a remark-
cavalry into mechanized formations, able 24,000 babies out of wedlock. They
including participation in the Louisiana created their own society that included
Maneuvers in 1941. How these changes baseball and football leagues, dances, and
influenced Flint’s development and charitable organizations.
outlook as an officer deserved further Bennett makes a notable contribu-
analysis. tion to the social history of the invasion
Anderson’s Paddy is an excellent By G. H. Bennett when he describes the great distraction
portrait of a dedicated career officer of Praeger Security International, 2007 that racism internal to the U.S. Army
character that is worth reading. This Pp. xx, 222. $49.95 caused the command. Racial attitudes
book is recommended for those with of U.S. soldiers were intensified as they
a general interest in World War II and interacted with the more tolerant British
officer professionalism. Officers look- society. British women associating with
ing for an inspirational role model will
Review by Thomas W. Spahr black American soldiers frequently ignit-
find one in Paddy Flint. G. H. Bennett enhances the histori- ed a reaction from intolerant white GIs.
In an age of persistent conflict, full- ography of the Normandy campaign An example of one remedy employed by
spectrum operations, and agile and of June 1944 in his operational history U.S. leadership was to segregate units and
adaptive officers, one could easily be- of three U.S. Army regiments. Destina- alternate nights when black and white
lieve that the current officer corps is sig- tion Normandy examines the roles of soldiers could go into towns.
nificantly different than in Flint’s day. the 116th Infantry, the 22d Infantry, Destination Normandy offers an
Anderson’s portrait of Flint argues that and the 507th Infantry surrounding evenhanded analysis of mission train-
there is more continuity in the officer the D-Day invasion. Bennett’s goal is ing. Bennett does not leave out the harsh
corps’ collective historical experience to provide new insight on Operation realities of combat-simulating exercises,
than we generally believe. Today, as Overlord by focusing on three diverse including casualties and destruction of
in Flint’s time, character, competence, units and to correct the sometimes civilian property. He reveals shortfalls
and leadership, exercised in a variety of inaccurate portrayal of the landings with amphibious tanks and difficulties
circumstances, remain the hallmarks of by popular works of history and Hol- hitting drop zones, both of which were
officer professionalism. lywood films. He takes aim at the per- problems on D-Day. He describes the
ception of World War II, particularly gritty details of the Operation Tiger
the Western Front, as a clear conflict training tragedy, when German E-boats
of good versus evil and as a moral bar penetrated the protective barrier and
David R. Gray is a retired Army against which modern wars can be torpedoed three American LSTs, causing
colonel and is currently the president judged; it was in fact a war that con- 749 deaths. The scenes of head-down
of Valley Forge Military Academy and tained many complexities and breaches floating bodies and mauled survivors
College in Wayne, Pennsylvania. A ca- of morality on both sides. Using archi- are powerful.
reer infantryman, he served in a num- val research from three countries and The author’s focus then shifts to the
ber of command and staff assignments including extensive use of newspapers landings and their immediate aftermath.
in the United States and overseas. Prior and several oral histories, the book is His discussion of the 507th contains
to his retirement, he served as chair and valuable for World War II scholars. material about the experiences of small
professor of officership at the United Likewise, military history enthusiasts groups of paratroopers and demon-
States Military Academy. He com- will enjoy the numerous accounts strates how they delayed and decreased
manded the 1st Brigade Combat Team, of individual soldiers. On the other the number of German forces reacting
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), hand, this is not the place to go for an to the D-Day landings. For example, the
in Iraq, 2005–2006. overview of the Normandy campaign “Timmes Group” of approximately one
because Bennett remains focused on hundred and seventy-five men under the
the U.S. infantry regiments. command of Lt. Col. Charles Timmes
An obvious strength of Destination held a strategically located orchard for
Normandy is the author’s discussion four days and prevented thousands of
of the regiments’ experiences as they German reinforcements from moving
prepared for the invasion. Bennett through the region. He also includes
concludes, “In planning for a success- stories of smaller groups of paratroopers

50 Army History Winter 2011

fighting for their lives and sometimes Destination Normandy’s greatest con-
suffering horrible deaths. tribution may be the author’s inclusion Decision at Strasbourg: Ike’s
Destination Normandy contains little and analysis of the moral issues on the Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth
new material on the 116th Infantry Allied side of the conflict. Bennett does Army Group at the Rhine in 1944
but does provide insightful and well- not shy away from addressing the Ameri-
supported analysis. Bennett defends the can atrocities and cites evidence of mas-
command decision to land at Omaha sacres on the beaches and orders given
Beach but argues that overconfidence to paratroopers not to take prisoners. He
led to mistakes that might have been skillfully puts these incidents in context
avoided. Examples of errors are landing for the reader and largely exculpates the
directly on the objectives without the average soldier forced to choose between
cover of darkness or smoke, and sending his own values and survival, particularly
smaller waves of troops first followed by paratroopers behind enemy lines. He is
overwhelming numbers in subsequent less sympathetic to the officers who com-
echelons. The author goes further and manded their men to take no prisoners,
discusses poor leadership decisions made noting that German officers were later
by individual company-level officers that put on trial for similar actions. By David P. Colley
cost many soldiers their lives. In the end, Bennett assumes the reader has a basic Naval Institute Press, 2008
he concurs with the interpretation that understanding of World War II and Pp. xiii, 251. $34.95
the battle was won by the initiative of the Normandy invasion, especially by
small groups of soldiers willing to devi- the unfortunate absence of any maps.
ate from the plan in order to accomplish Despite this and other minor shortcom-
Review by Mark T. Calhoun
the mission. Unfortunately, his valuable ings mentioned, serious World War II David P. Colley, a former U.S. Army
examination of the 116th is marred by scholars will benefit from this work, and ordnance officer and journalist, claims
the adoption of Stephen Ambrose’s military history enthusiasts will enjoy its in his introduction to Decision at
exaggerated assertion of the number of captivating soldier stories. Destination Strasbourg that his book reveals the
casualties sustained in the unit by those Normandy augments our understand- Allies’ lost opportunity, “virtually ig-
hailing from the town of Bedford, Vir- ing of the D-Day invasion and helps nored” by other historians, to end the
ginia. A recent piece appearing in the cut through the mythology built up war with Germany in late 1944 (p. xi).
Journal of Military History makes the around it. The perpetrator of this strategic mis-
valuable point that it is time to put the take, General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
overblown contribution of Bedford to Note canceled a planned crossing of the
rest and report the truth—which is still Rhine into Germany in late Novem-
remarkable.1 1. George D. Salaita, “Notes and Comments ber 1944 by the Sixth Army Group,
The author spends less energy on the Embellishing Omaha Beach,” Journal of Mili- commanded by Lt. Gen. Jacob De-
last of his three regiments: the 22d Infan- tary History 72 (April 2008): 531–34. Salaita vers. Colley argues that the crossing,
try, which led the Utah Beach invasion. argues that only fourteen soldiers from the had Eisenhower approved it, would
He emphasizes that while the casualty town of Bedford were killed, while the other have preempted Hitler’s December
figures were not as shocking as those on thirty or so were from the county and other Ardennes offensive by forcing him
Omaha Beach, the men who landed on nearby regions. to reposition thousands of troops to
Utah were deeply affected; this, not the counter Devers’ assault. Furthermore,
Omaha Beach disaster, was the type of Colley asserts a large-scale Allied as-
engagement that most World War II vet- Maj. Thomas W. Spahr is an active sault into Germany in late 1944 would
erans remember. Bennett’s view is valid, duty Army officer currently assigned have dealt a crushing blow to German
but this reviewer wishes he had done as the S–3, operations officer, of the morale, possibly leading to an early
more. The 22d’s advance inland, a point Army Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) end to the war and saving thousands
the author highlights as critical in the Battalion at the Washington Navy Yard. of Allied soldiers’ lives.
introduction, remains underdeveloped. He holds a master’s degree in military Readers familiar with the Sixth
The relief of Col. Hervey Tribolet, the history from Ohio State University and Army Group’s operations in the
regimental commander, comes as a sur- is working on his Ph.D. dissertation on Vosges will realize Eisenhower’s deci-
prise with little explanation. Addition- the Mexican-American War and the sion to halt Devers at the Rhine is not
ally, this section is under sourced when antebellum Army. Major Spahr led the as obscure to history as Colley sug-
compared to the more popular stories of West Point staff ride to Normandy in gests. Many sources describe the Sixth
the 507th and the 116th; the chapter on March 2009. Army Group’s operations and the
the 22d’s fight inland (Chapter 11) has aborted crossing, including the Army’s
seven footnotes versus the twenty-nine in official history by Jeffrey J. Clarke and
the 507th’s chapter (Chapter 12). Hence, Robert R. Smith, Riviera to the Rhine
the book feels disproportional. (Washington, D.C., 1993); Russell F.

51
Weigley’s Eisenhower’s Lieutenants previous sources, including a lengthy Army Group first reached the Rhine
(Bloomington, Ind., 1981); Keith E. extract from the staff’s final report in March 1945, four months later than
Bonn’s When the Odds Were Even on its plans for the operation. This Devers’ Sixth Army Group.
(New York, 1994); and, most recently, report, published in October 1944, Colley’s counterfactual analysis
Harry Yeide’s and Mark Stout’s First demonstrates that, while Eisenhower makes Decision at Strasbourg stand
to the Rhine (St. Paul, Minn., 2007). may have been surprised that Devers’ apart from earlier studies of Sixth
These earlier accounts also do not army group was the first to reach the Army Group operations. This is a
depict Eisenhower’s decision to halt Rhine, Devers’ recommendation to method that may repel some histo-
Devers as particularly controversial. cross the river and continue the at- rians, but it is sure to spark debate
Rather, they describe his judgment as tack into Germany in November 1944 among those willing to follow his logic
one based on sound tactical reasoning was no hasty improvisation. Rather, and confront his conclusions. Colley
and adherence to a consistent strategy. Devers presented a well-developed is strident in his portrayal of Devers
In it, he emphasized the importance plan to Eisenhower, and his forces as an outstanding commander who
of maintaining contact between Sixth were ready to conduct the offensive. was deprived of a singular opportu-
Army Group’s left flank and Third His staff had not only made extensive nity to bring the war to an early end,
Army’s right, eliminating pockets of preparations, but it also possessed due purely to Eisenhower’s personal
German resistance in the rear before sufficient amphibious assault vehicles, animosity, and was thereby denied his
proceeding eastward, and avoiding the equipment, and supplies to enable a rightful place alongside the war’s great
risk of Devers’ forces getting bogged large-scale crossing at a point where captains. By contrast, Colley depicts
down in the heavily forested terrain reconnaissance patrols had already Eisenhower as “cautious and indeci-
east of the intended crossing site. traversed the Rhine and found the sive” (p. 212) and unable to learn from
Regardless of the fact that the events eastern side essentially undefended. his mistakes and adapt, flaws demon-
explained in Colley’s book may have Nevertheless, Eisenhower issued a strated throughout his service on the
been covered before, Colley’s analysis last-minute order canceling the op- Western Front, and in particular by
is unique both in its specific focus on eration. Colley devotes a chapter to the strategic mistake of halting Devers’
the canceled crossing and in its coun- the possible outcome of the Seventh Sixth Army Group at the Rhine in
terfactual assessment of the potential Army’s planned crossing, had Eisen- November 1944. Colley’s unique argu-
outcome of the operation had Eisen- hower approved it, and another to the ment and provocative conclusions will
hower allowed it to go forward. question of whether the French First likely invoke strong reactions among
While Colley’s novel analysis is the Army could have accomplished the his readers, but regardless whether he
cornerstone of his book, this is not a mission instead of the Seventh Army. convinces them that Eisenhower made
purely speculative work. He provides While these arguments are purely a “strategic mistake,” Colley has added
a detailed exposition of the Sixth speculative and the author states he an engaging and thought-provoking
Army Group’s operations within the has merely presented the facts, leaving entry into a lesser-known aspect of
larger context of the struggle against it up to his readers to draw their own the history of Allied operations on the
Germany in the European theater. His conclusions, Colley is unambiguous in Western Front.
narrative contains familiar themes: his conviction that Eisenhower made
Eisenhower’s strict adherence to a a tragic mistake. In relating the events
broad-front strategy of attrition, rely- leading up to the moment of decision, Mark T. Calhoun is an assistant
ing on overwhelming Allied materiel Colley relies mostly on well-known professor at the U.S. Army School of
superiority to defeat a qualitatively secondary sources to paint a famil- Advanced Military Studies. He is a
superior German Army; fierce rivalry iar picture of high command in the retired Army lieutenant colonel who
and animosity among the Allied gen- European Theater of Operations, but served over twenty years as an aviator
erals; and the imperative of keeping he pays particular attention to Eisen- and plans officer. He holds a bachelor’s
the coalition together, which often hower’s animosity toward Devers, degree in chemistry and master’s de-
led Eisenhower to make suboptimal the result of a grudge stemming back grees in history and advanced opera-
or controversial decisions. Colley’s to the campaign in North Africa. He tional art and is a doctoral candidate
account reflects the standard interpre- describes Bradley and Patton as Eisen- in history at the University of Kansas.
tation of operations in the European hower’s favored lieutenants during the
theater that held sway for decades war and perceptively characterizes the
after the war, but which has come sway these three men held over post-
under criticism in recent years by re- war interpretations, both in histories
visionist historians seeking to restore and the popular media. Meanwhile,
the reputation of America’s combat the ever-reserved and humble Devers
troops. However, Colley furnishes a faded into obscurity after the war,
more detailed chronicle of Sixth Army neglecting to publish a memoir of his
Group’s planning for the Rhine cross- own or speak out against the popular
ing than that available in any of these misconception that Bradley’s Twelfth

52 Army History Winter 2011

 sorts through the fragmented strands First Indochina War, its leading staff
Vietnam: The History of an of the Vietnam story and weaves them members consisted almost entirely of
Unwinnable War, 1945–1975 together into a clear and compelling North Vietnamese officials including
narrative. His arguments are well- several members of the politburo. At
reasoned and superbly annotated; his no time was there an autonomous
prose style is easy to digest. The author southern insurgency, a point worth
brings to life a rich cast of characters, making. Later on in his discussion of
the dominant political figures of the the Tet offensive, Prados has some
era as well as a host of smaller figures trouble with the enemy’s order of
who play walk-on roles in the great battle; he identifies the 2d NLF Bat-
drama. We hear from presidents talion and the Go Mon Battalion as
and generals as well as from student being different units when they were
protesters and combat soldiers, from in fact one and the same. Much to the
Americans as well as from Vietnam- author’s credit, however, he is one
ese, the voices on “the Right” and those of the few historians to properly ap-
on “the Left,” the defenders of “the preciate the central role that student
By John Prados Establishment” and their rivals in the demonstrations were to play during
University Press of Kansas, 2009 antiwar movement. Readers looking the attacks on Saigon. The failure of
Pp. xxvii, 550. $34.95 for a panoramic view of the conflict those students to gather at various
and a cogent examination of why the Viet Cong targets around the city on
United States became embroiled in the night of 30–31 January 1968 goes
Review by Erik B. Villard Vietnam’s wars many years ago will a long way toward explaining why the
Few scholars are as qualified as John find much to admire in this book. enemy sapper attacks at the U.S. Em-
Prados, a senior fellow and director of The author’s analytical footing is bassy and other locations seemed so
the Vietnam Documentation Project typically quite sure; a glance through suicidal but were never intended to be.
at the National Security Archive, to his extensive footnotes and hand- If the book has a structural flaw, it
write a comprehensive survey of the somely annotated bibliography attest is this: Prados wants to write a mag-
Vietnam War. Having already pub- to the depth of his scholarship. He isterial history of the war while at the
lished more than a dozen well-received is particularly strong in the area of same time to tell his own personal
books on topics ranging from Dien presidential politics and national in- story, that of a young graduate stu-
Bien Phu and the Geneva Accords, telligence. The only weakness Prados dent in the early 1970s who played a
the Pentagon Papers, the Ho Chi displays in terms of the source mate- small but spirited role in the antiwar
Minh Trail, the Central Intelligence rial is in the area of North Vietnamese movement. The fact that the author
Agency, and the siege of Khe Sanh, and Viet Cong military affairs. For participated in peace demonstrations,
the author goes for the biggest prize example, in the period covering 1960 actively supported organizations such
of all with his latest book, a sweeping to 1964, he does not sufficiently ac- as the Vietnam Veterans Against the
synthesis of the thirty-year conflict in knowledge the nearly absolute control War and the Winter Soldier move-
Vietnam. As Prados puts it, his inten- that North Vietnam exerted over the ment, and campaigned for George
tion is to overcome the “atomization growing Viet Cong movement. The McGovern in 1972 does not in any
of the literature [which] has impeded National Liberation Front (NLF) that way negate his authority as a scholar
a full understanding” of the war (p. came to life in Tay Ninh Province in (though some politically conservative
xiii). While the product of his labors December 1960 was far more than readers may feel otherwise). Prados
deserves a respected place alongside “a leadership council that included is one of the deans of the “New Left”
other important survey histories such many people from many regions and school of Vietnam War historians, and
as Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam (New occupations” (p. 71) who disliked the it should come as no surprise that he
York, 1983) and George C. Herring’s policies of Ngo Dinh Diem, the auto- still displays a strong affinity for what
America’s Longest War: The United cratic president of South Vietnam. The he calls “the Movement.” One objec-
States and Vietnam, 1950–1975 (New NLF and its associated military wing, tion is that the author spends far too
York, 1979), the book spends too the People’s Liberation Armed Forces, many of his valuable pages discussing
much time discussing the colorful but were formed at the direct behest of the the antiwar movement when even
ultimately marginal antiwar move- North Vietnamese politburo after a he acknowledges that it had only a
ment and the author’s own experi- long and heated internal debate about marginal impact on the course of the
ences as a young protester to feel like how best to foment armed insurrec- war. Likewise, the author’s personal
a truly objective and canonical work. tion in the South. Soon after, when memories from his time in the peace
It is no easy task to bring analytical the politburo reestablished the Central movement were colorful but rather
coherence to thirty years of politics Office for South Vietnam, a military jarring. One cannot help but feel
and war. For the most part, Prados headquarters that had guided the that his book would have been more
succeeds quite admirably. He deftly southern Viet Minh forces during the authoritative if he had refrained from

53
interjecting himself so directly into the of the South Vietnamese government it was simply too inchoate to have had
story. Moreover, the occasional barbs with the iron determination of the a decisive impact on U.S. policy. In the
he throws at former President George North Vietnamese government. Even end, the author rightly concludes that
W. Bush for his admittedly flawed at the lowest point of North Vietnam’s the war was unwinnable not because of
rationale for invading and then oc- fortunes in 1969, the Communists still American attitudes but because of those
cupying Iraq in 2003 may be accurate had more than enough willpower and of the Vietnamese.
in substance but seem too sporadic resources to keep fighting indefinitely;
and arbitrary to deserve inclusion in the records that have emerged from
a book otherwise entirely focused on Vietnam in recent years show that the Erik B. Villard has been a historian
Vietnam. enemy was in no sense defeated. The in the Histories Division of the U.S.
Those quibbles aside, Prados deserves South Vietnamese state, on the other Army Center of Military History since
praise for tackling such an enormous hand, continued to struggle. When July 2000. He received a bachelor’s de-
subject with such a clear and practiced the last American combat troops went gree in history and in English literature
eye. He does a particular service by home in late 1972 and U.S. aid began at Occidental College, Los Angeles,
challenging revisionist scholars, such as to dry up not long afterward, North and a master’s degree and a Ph.D. in
Mark Moyar, author of Triumph For- Vietnam only had to bide its time until history at the University of Washing-
saken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 it was ready to deliver the killing blow. ton, Seattle. He is currently writing a
(New York, 2006), who have argued, Whether that happened in 1975, as it volume in the United States Army in
in essence, that the United States could did, or another five or ten years later, Vietnam series tentatively entitled “The
have won the war if the majority of lib- the Communist North was simply not Tet Offensive: U.S. Army Combat Op-
erals in the media, academia, and Con- going to give up. As for the influence erations in South Vietnam, November
gress had not lost their nerve, poisoned of the antiwar movement in the United 1967–October 1968.”
the well of public opinion, and cut off States, a supposedly fatal virus in the
funding to South Vietnam. Prados skill- American body politic according to
fully demolishes that line of reasoning some conservative scholars, Prados
by contrasting the persistent weakness determines, with obvious regret, that

ARMYHISTORY
Call For Su
or ubmissions
bmissions
A rmy History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic
relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which
it was substantially influenced. The Army’s history extends to the present day, and Army History seeks accounts of
the Army’s actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that
presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that
have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to
the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with
endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript
should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at army.history1@conus.army.mil.
Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish
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Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by
mail to Charles Hendricks, Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 103 Third Avenue,
Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5058.

54 Army History Winter 2011

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See page 5 for more information.

55
 Letter to the Editor

I
n its summer 2010 issue, Army History reprinted from A significant portion of CGSC faculty hold doctorates, but,
the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine an article regardless of academic credentials, all instructors must go
by retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales entitled “Too Busy through a rigorous certification program, periodic reviews,
to Learn.” Putting forth a compelling argument based on his and annual evaluations, and they must be recertified every five
experiences as a historian, educator, and soldier, General Scales years. In addition to teaching and participating in curriculum
opines in this article that now is the time to reform professional development, instructors must perform service to the com-
military education (PME). Comparing today’s U.S. military munity and nation. They must conduct research, write, and be
with the armed forces of the United Kingdom in 1914, the published in peer-reviewed or professional publications. Finally,
general also highlights an analogy that senior leaders should CGSC faculty members maintain currency (“re-green”) either
heed. Unfortunately, in championing the cause of PME reform, by augmenting Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)
General Scales makes two assertions concerning military learn- missions as observers and trainers during unit mission rehearsal
ing institutions that are incorrect. exercises or by accompanying other agencies during unit visits.
First, in arguing that the military prefers action over intellect, With the exception of a handful of technical electives offered
General Scales states, “But sadly, atrophy has gripped the school at CGSC, no courses there are taught to officers by contractors
house, and what was once the shining light of progressivism or subcontractors. Prior to 11 September 2001, the U.S. Army
has become an intellectual backwater, lagging far behind the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) decided to tran-
corporate world and civilian institutions of higher learning.” sition to Title 10 civilian instructors as part of the transforma-
How can this statement be accurate? The author points to past tion from the legacy course to universal ILE. The transition to
accomplishments of Defense Department learning organiza- Title 10 civilian instructors was not the result of the Global War
tions such as the case-study method pioneered by the U.S. on Terrorism or increased operational tempo. The driver for
Army War College, as well as the services’ responsibility for this change was the PME component of Army transformation,
advancing distance learning, diagnostics, and assessments. But preceded by the 2000 Army Training and Leader Development
as most investment professionals will tell you, past results do Program. TRADOC completed ILE transformation in 2004,
not indicate future performance. and today’s CGSC proudly represents the Army as a dynamic,
The service schools must first be jointly accredited as detailed adaptive organization. Its Title 10 civilian faculty is almost
in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01D, exclusively composed of retired lieutenant colonels. Many, if
Officer Professional Military Education Policy, 15 July 2009. not most, have substantial combat experience in command
Additionally, the National Defense University, Marine Corps and leadership positions and are eminently qualified to teach
University, Air University, and other service schools are accred- all subject areas within the ILE curriculum.
ited through organs of the Higher Learning Commission, the The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Title
same bodies that evaluate and accredit Ivy League universities 10 instructors are employees of the United States Army, not
and business schools (including the institutions where General a company. Their allegiance is to the armed forces, not to a
Scales received his undergraduate and graduate degrees, the corporation. They conduct academic operations in accordance
U.S. Military Academy and Duke University). Have any of with the college’s mission and the commandant’s intent, not
the accrediting bodies identified intellectual atrophy at these a statement of work. Their customers are commanders in the
service schools? field and field-grade officers in the classroom, not stockholders
The substance of General Scales’ argument is that because of or a board of directors.
anti-intellectual bias in the military, the services are in this era of In his article, General Scales proposes numerous PME
persistent conflict substituting combat experience for education reforms that are worthy of continued discussion and consid-
and reflection. This leads to his second assertion that requires eration. As a recognized champion of PME reform, General
correction: “The insidious creep of the civilian contractor must Scales finds that people listen when he speaks. Correcting short-
be reversed by requiring that virtually all ROTC (Reserve Offi- comings in PME demands a proper framing of the perceived
cers’ Training Corps), service academy, and staff and war college problem and correctly identifying root causes. Labeling the
faculty positions be filled by uniformed officers.” institutions of military education as an “intellectual backwater”
If General Scales intended to include the U.S. Army Com- requires qualification, and accurately describing faculty com-
mand and General Staff College (CGSC) in this list of PME insti- position demands informed sources. Perhaps General Scales
tutions, his inference that most faculty members are contractors should visit the Army’s Command and General Staff College to
is patently false. All civilian instructors who teach the common observe firsthand what happens in its classrooms and to meet
core and advanced operations courses of intermediate level the faculty in person.
education (ILE) at CGSC are Title 10 Department of the Army
civilian term employees, quite a different entity. Under Title Roland M. “Mike” Edwards
10, the Army does not have to renew a civilian who performs Brian C. Leakey
poorly. Because CGSC is an adaptive, learning organization, Assistant Professors
Title 10 assignments, promotions, and retention are based on Department of Army Tactics
instructor performance, scholarship, service to the community U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
and nation, and understanding of current military practices. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

56 Army History Winter 2011

 The Chief’sCol.
Corner
Peter D. Crean
Continued from page 3

on a battle, oral histories by the battle’s participants, vi- citizens reflecting upon and debating such topics. Military
sual interactive maps showing the progress of the action, historians have a responsibility to help their commanders
artifacts throughout the Army’s Museum System relating frame subjects such as the status of military professionalism
to the clash, and a videotape of a staff ride conducted by a within the context of the Army’s past. If military historians
foremost expert on the engagement? This concept is not are loath to delve into what is considered social history, they
far from becoming a reality because in many cases the raw would do well to remember that the Army as an institution
material discussed above already exists in various places is made of people who must function within the context of
in the Army’s collection, as does the technology needed to the greater American culture.
bring it all together. The issues discussed in Kohn’s article have been dealt
Some will undoubtedly feel newer historical techniques with before. In 1950, Secretary of Defense George C. Mar-
threaten more conventional methods and represent an as- shall directed the publication of The Armed Forces Officer,
sault on the printed word. I do not subscribe to that school a short work based on Marshall’s conviction that officers
of thought; more modern methods and techniques must of all services founded their professional commitment on
complement traditional writing for the long-term health a common moral or ethical grounding. Nearly thirty years
of our field. We must, however, be attentive to identify any later, the challenges of an all-volunteer force and changes in
pitfalls to the use of new media, and we must not allow them America’s culture led the department to revise and reissue
to erode our high standards of research and publishing. this book, as it did again in 2006 as a result of the current
The Center of Military History is expanding its use of new war on terrorism. This book, one of many on the subject of
technologies and learning tools. The Center made substan- professionalism within the officer corps, demonstrates the
tial investments in information management equipment importance of further evaluation and discussion of a topic
and personnel at the end of fiscal year 2010. We look forward that has been debated since the founding of the Army in
with anticipation to being able to supply new products to 1775. As you read Richard Kohn’s article, I challenge you to
complement to our printed work. examine your personal beliefs and judge where our military
One great legacy of Dr. Clarke’s leadership is his deci- stands within the context of the greater profession of arms.
sion that this journal be provocative. Nowhere is this more I encourage you to ponder as well the thought-provoking
apparent than in the presentation in this issue of Army issues posed by the other great articles in this professional
History of Professor Richard Kohn’s views on the state of bulletin.
professional standards within the Army’s officer corps.
The Center does not side with or against Kohn’s thesis, but
it does assert the importance of historians, soldiers, and

The Center of Military History now makes all issues of Army History available to
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57
 Footnote
The Chief Historian’s
Dr. Richard W. Stewart

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM—

Twenty Years After

A
lthough Iraq’s shocking invasion of Kuwait seems The U.S. Army, superbly equipped and trained over
to have occurred only a short time ago, twenty years the previous decade for high-intensity conflict in Central
have passed since the U.S. Army found itself rush- Europe, moved XVIII Airborne Corps to Saudi Arabia in
ing to defend Saudi Arabia in late 1990 and then to liberate near-record time in August and September 1990. There,
Kuwait in early 1991. Operations Desert Shield (August the soldiers sat and watched and trained and trained again
1990–January 1991) and Desert Storm (January–March for months in miserable conditions. President George H.
1991) thrust the United States into the Middle East in a W. Bush, working slowly but patiently through the United
major way, setting the stage for more than a decade of Nations while laying the political groundwork for war in
containment of a still-dangerous Saddam Hussein. This Congress, moved carefully to build and maintain a coalition
has now been followed by nearly another decade of virtu- of nations. That coalition, which included longtime friends
ally continuous struggle, first to overthrow Hussein’s vile such as the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and France, as
regime (done rather quickly) and then to try to establish a well as some truly unlikely allies as Egypt and Syria, joined
stable and more moderate government in its place. (We still together, first simply to protect Saudi Arabia and later to
don’t know how that will come out.) Yet, perhaps as a result force Hussein out of Kuwait, seeking throughout to preserve
of the more recent developments, the military response to the rule of international law and the West’s access to oil.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait appears to many Americans as a After months of deployment, XVIII Airborne Corps was
mere shadowy footnote to the end of the Cold War, barely joined by VII Corps, which deployed from Europe with
worth remembering. its armored and mechanized infantry divisions. Alerted in
However, those operations in the desert twenty years November 1990 and still moving in January 1991, when the
back are much more than just a footnote to history, of in- initiation of air attacks marked the end of Desert Shield
terest only to a handful of military historians. At the time, and the start of Desert Storm, VII Corps would provide
those events were a series of dramatic milestones on a long the heavy “mailed fist” to punch through the Iraqi military
journey towards war for an anxious American public. The and join in liberating Kuwait at the end of February 1991.
entire country was enthralled for months by the drawn-out That mission was accomplished in record time with forty
mobilization and deployment of almost half of the active days (and the biblical forty nights) of precision air strikes
duty U.S. Army and thousands of reservists to the desert. In and four days (and four nights) of lightning-fast ground
1990, the American public’s direct knowledge of war and, warfare. U.S. and allied air and ground units destroyed
to a certain degree, of its own volunteer Army was either much of the Iraqi Army, and coalition forces incurred only
minimal or drenched in the memory of the Vietnam War, minimal casualties as they freed Kuwait from occupation.
which had cost so much and ended in disaster only fifteen Those stirring events of twenty years ago, now over-
years earlier. Even today, when the U.S. engages in military shadowed by over nine years of persistent conflict against
operations around the world in defense of its interests, the an elusive terrorist organization, are important for another
ever-watchful media and their eager and ill-informed read- reason, one of direct impact on the Army’s historical com-
ers often fret that we have become enmeshed in “another munity. For the first time since the Vietnam War, the Army
Vietnam.” (So far, we have been told that we were witness- deployed a substantial number of its Military History De-
ing another Vietnam in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, tachments (MHDs) to a major conflict. (The 44th Military
Colombia, Bosnia, Iraq, and now Afghanistan. None of History Detachment—the U.S. Army’s only active duty
these experiences were anything like that of Vietnam, but a MHD—had in 1983 deployed briefly to Grenada along
nervous public can’t seem to shake the syndrome.) with a Combat Studies Institute team to document the his-

58 Army History Winter 2011

tory of that brief operation.) In a test of the entire concept, are. We have a need to know. After all, we are historians.
the Army sent at least five MHDs and deployed a number of You can trust us.
individual historians to live with units in the field, conduct As always, you can reach me at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.
oral history interviews, collect documents, and prepare the mil
groundwork for writing the history of that conflict. A partial Building on the work of these individuals, the Center has
listing of these Army pioneers of historical collection and published an array of books and other materials on the his-
their units includes Col. Rick Swain, who served with the tory of this conflict. Frank N. Schubert and Teresa L. Kraus
Third Army; Lt. Col. Pete Kindsvatter, VII Corps; Maj. Bob compiled the Center’s initial account, The Whirlwind War:
Wright, XVIII Airborne Corps; Maj. Bill Epley, 22d Support The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and
Command; Maj. Larry Heystek, 44th MHD; Lt. Col. Wes Desert Storm, published in 1995. The Center then issued
Manning, 90th MHD; Maj. Robert Honec and S. Sgt. LaDona two detailed studies, From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: U.S.
Kirkland, 116th MHD; Maj. Dennis Levin and Sgt. Dorothy Army, Europe and the Gulf War (1998) by Army historian
McNeil, 130th MHD; Maj. William Thomas, 317th MHD; Stephen P. Gehring and Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Per-
Maj. Glen Hawkins, CMH; and two guys who hung out sian Gulf War (2002) by Stephen A. Bourque, who was an
with special operations and almost count as Army deployed Army major during the war. Those wishing a shorter ac-
historians, Dr. John Partin with the Joint Special Operations count can now read the Center’s recently published 20th
Task Force and yours truly as a young Maj. with Special Op- anniversary commemorative pamphlet, War in the Persian
erations Command Central. Desert Warriors all! I am also Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, August
sure there are others who should be on the “Army Historians’ 1990–March 1991.
Roll of Desert Shield and Desert Storm Service,” and so,
on this twentieth anniversary, please let me know who you

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Posters Now Available
See pa g e 43.

59
 I WANT YOU
FOR 2011
CONFERENCE OF ARMY HISTORIANS

"ARMIES IN PERSISTENT CONFLICT"

26 - 28 July 2011

The Professional Bulletin of Army Histor y