UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE – RECOLETOS

SCHOOL OF LAW
Cebu City, Philippines

CASE DIGESTS IN CRIMINAL

LAW
2013-2019
(Supreme Court Cases penned by Associate
Justice Marvic Leonen)

Digested and Compiled by:

BATCH SAMBIGKIS
(USJ-R Law Batch 2020)

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 2014 CASES

CASE TITLE: Alfredo Mendoza v. People and Juno Cars (GR No. 197293, April 21, 2014)

PRINCIPLE: While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole
function of the prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty,
dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not
establish probable cause.

FACTS:
Alfredo Mendoza, trade-in/used car supervisor of Juno Cars, was charged with Qualified
Theft and Estafa for allegedly failing to remit payments of the cars sold or released by him. In the
complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that it conducted a partial audit of the used cars and
discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without the dealer/operator or
the finance manager’s permission. All in all, complainant alleged that Alfredo pilfered a total amount
of P1, 046,000.
Alfredo raised, among others, which Juno Cars’ failed to prove ownership over the five (5)
cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have
suffered damage.
The Prov. Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause and recommended the
filing of the information. Alfredo filed an MR, but was denied. So, he then filed a petition for review
with the DOJ, and subsequently filed a motion for determination of probable cause before the trial
court, and a motion to defer arraignment. Clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not
conducted.
Trial court issued an order dismissing the Complaint, holding that the evidence adduced
does not support a finding of probable cause.
On appeal, Juno Cars argued that the determination of probable cause and the decision
whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor. CA
rendered a decision, reversing the trial court and reinstating the case.
Office of the SolGen, in its comment, since there was no showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Prosecutor, the trial court should respect his determination of probable
cause.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its
own independent finding of lack of probable cause.

RULING:
YES.
Court citing People v. Castillo and Mejia, there are two kinds of determination of probable
cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given
a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination
of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the
discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the
accused and proceed with trial.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the
judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the
judge ex parte.

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CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES (GR 208007,
April 2, 2014)

PRINCIPLE: Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and
(2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done
through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that
there was sexual intercourse.

FACTS:
AAA, a 10 years old Grade 2 student, went home from school when she met accused
Rodrigo. Accused brought her to his room, removed her panties, and inserted his penis into her
vagina then white liquid came out. He gave her five pesos before going back to school. AAA being
tardy was asked by her teacher, she admitted that she came from “Uncle Rod” to ask for money.
AAA was brought to the principal where her panties were inspected. It was confirmed that AAA was
touched as her organ was swelling and her panties wet. A teacher brought her to the hospital and
reported the incident to the police. AAA disclosed during the trial that accused had done the same
to her about 10 times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten or five pesos.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-
appellant was guilty of statutory rape? Was there any aggravating or qualifying circumstances?

RULING:
YES, what the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve
(12) years old. Child’s consent is immaterial due to presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
SC ruled that testimonies of child victims of rape are to be given full weight and credence. Reason
and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and sexuality, is
unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Article 266-B
of the RPC requires that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed in cases of rape state in
the first paragraph of Article of 266-A where there are no aggravating or qualifying circumstances
present.

CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines vs Danilo Feliciano, et al. (GR No. 196735, May 15, 2014)

PRINCIPLE: The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. Hence, it may be present in the commission of the crime if such was
committed in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see the victim.

FACTS:
Sometime in one afternoon of December 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of
the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats
and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization; while, one of them
died from injuries.
Several information for the case of murder and attempted murder were filed against the
accused. The information alleged an aggravating circumstance that the accused wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise and were conspiring, confederating with other persons in committing
the crime.
The witnesses, who were bystanders at the time of the incident, were able to positively
identify the accused because their masks fell off during the commotion.
The accused argued that the prosecution should have not included the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since they were presenting testimonial
evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
The trial court convicted the accused respectively of murder and attempted murder
because conspiracy and treachery were present in the commission of the crime. This decision was
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information
against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off; and

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 2. Whether the lower courts correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that accused
appellants were sufficiently identified.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

An information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge against him to enable
him to prepare his defense.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused
were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is
that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information
was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense
they were being charged with, they tried to
conceal their identity.

Further, the introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing
masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses since the information
charges them of conspiracy.

In sum, all that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have
been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the
offense.

SECOND ISSUE: YES

The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution to be credible considering the swiftness of the incident, there would be slight
inconsistencies in their statements. It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the
occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may
notice while the other may not observe or remember.

Further, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim. It is well-entrenched that
alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to
the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. For
alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused-appellants
merely offered alibis and denials as their defense.

Lastly, the essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape.

As in this case, it is present even if crime was committed in broad daylight with a lot of people who
could see the victims and that there was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the
people in the canteen could have helped the victims. The victims, who were unarmed, were also
attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with their
arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to
fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would
preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident. The
swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even
to defend themselves.

CASE TITLE: MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 181843, July 14,
2014)

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PRINCIPLE: Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the
safety of the accused from the defensive acts of the victim. Unexpectedness of the attack does not
always equate to treachery.

FACTS:
Romeo Austria was playing a lucky nine game at a wake. Cirera arrived, asking money from
Austria so he could buy liquor. Gerardo Naval "arrived and asked Austria to go home." Austria "stood
up and felt that he was stabbed." He ran home and he noticed Cirera "armed with a knife," this time
chasing Naval. Austria was confined for more than a month. On cross-examination, Austria testified
that he saw Miguel attempt to stab him again.
Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home. After he
and Miguel had an exchange of words, he "felt a hard blow on his back." However, he ran away when
he saw Miguel holding a knife. Miguel chased Naval who fell on the ground. When Naval saw that
Miguel was "about to stab him again, he hit Cirera with a bench" and left him lying on the ground.
Naval was also confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days.
RTC convicted Cirera with 2 counts of frustrated murder. The CA confirmed the conviction.
Cirera claims that treachery was not present. He also questions the credibility of the witnesses
because their statements are inconsistent.

ISSUES:
1. Is the qualifying circumstance of treachery present?
2. Are the witnesses credible despite their inconsistent statements?

RULING:
1. NO. Treachery did not exist and, hence, petitioner may only be convicted of two counts of
frustrated homicide.

The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which
could produce the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent of his or her will. A finding of
the existence of treachery should be based on "clear and convincing evidence." Such evidence must
be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. Its existence "cannot be presumed."
The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the
attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental. The
means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the
crime.
In this case, no evidence was presented to show that Cirera consciously adopted or reflected on
the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage. The manner of attack might
not have been motivated by a determination to ensure success in committing the crime. Based on
private complainants’ testimonies, Cirera’s action was an impulsive reaction to being dismissed by
Austria, his altercation with Naval, and Naval’s attempt to summon Austria home.

This type of provocation negates the existence of treachery. This is the type of provocation that
does not lend itself to premeditation. The provocation in this case is of the kind which triggers
impulsive reactions left unchecked by the accused and caused him to commit the crime. Thus, in the
absence of clear proof of the existence of treachery, the crime proven beyond reasonable doubt is
only frustrated homicide.

2. YES. SC held that "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters
best left to the trial court," which is in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor
while being examined in court. SC gives more weight to such findings if affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The exception to the rule is when the trial court misconstrued facts which
if properly appreciated could alter the outcome of the case.

Such exception does not apply to this case, with respect to the findings that: 1) there was intent
to kill; 2) petitioner was the willful author of the stab wounds, which almost killed private
complainants; and that 3) petitioner’s failure to kill private complainants was a result of
circumstances independent of his will. Circumstantial evidence was used to identify the perpetrator
in this case.
The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The combination of the circumstances in this case constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.

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CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO HOLGADO Y DELA CRUZ AND
ANTONIO MISAREZ Y ZARAGA, (G.R. No. 207992 August 11, 2014)

PRINCIPLE: “Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the
chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only
a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused.”

FACTS:
Prior to enforcing a search warrant secured against Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz, the Pasig
City police conducted a buy-bust operation as instructed by their city police chief in January 17,
2007.
Poseur-buyer PO1 Philip Aure, accompanied by a police informant, approached Holgado who
was in a drinking session, and handed P200 bills to Holgado. Holgado called Antonio Misarez who
handed a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to PO1 Aure. Upon the arrival of
police officers, Holgado and Misarez attempted to flee but were eventually arrested.
The search warrant was also then enforced, allegedly yielding several drugs and drug
paraphernalia.
Holgado and Misarez were charged with violating Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs) for
selling five centigrams (0.05 gram) of shabu, 11 (possession of dangerous drugs), and 12 (possession
of drug paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Regional Trial Court found Holgado and Misarez guilty of illegal sale of dangerous. They
were acquitted of the charges pertaining to Sections 11 and 12. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s decision convicting Holgado and Misarez.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Holgado and Misarez was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for selling
dangerous drugs.

RULING:
The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs are settled: In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore,
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in
four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g.,
weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to
the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items
seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this
requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any
manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a
failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this
non-compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.
The prosecution’s sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and
drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction. Not even the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties will suffice. In fact, whatever presumption there is as to the regularity
of the manner by which officers took and maintained custody of the seized items is "negated."
Republic Act No. 9165 requires compliance with Section 21.
In People v. Nandi, this court explained that four (4) links "should be established in the chain
of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to
the court."
While the buy-bust operation team allegedly conducted an inventory of the seized items, it
is unclear if this inventory was limited to those seized pursuant to the enforcement of the search
warrant (i.e., after the conduct of the buy-bust operation) or was inclusive of whatever items seized
during the buy-bust operation. In any case, this inventory was discredited as Holgado was acquitted
by the Regional Trial Court of the charge of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia because the
inventory was found to be unreliable visa-vis the testimony of PO2 Castulo. The paraphernalia to
which PO2 Castulo testified to in court were different from those indicated in the inventory
supposedly made when the search warrant was enforced.
There have been claims to the effect that the search warrant was enforced "in coordination
with a barangay official and in the presence of some media people." However, this "barangay
official" and these "media people" have neither been identified nor presented as witnesses. In any

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case, even if it were to be granted that these individuals took part in the events that transpired in
the evening of January 17, 2007, their participation was alleged to have been only with respect to
the enforcement of the search warrant. It did not extend to the physical inventory and taking of
photographs of the seized items arising from the buy-bust operation, as required by Section 21. For
that matter, it was not even shown that photographs of the sachet marked as "RH-PA" were taken.
Per his own testimony, PO1 Aure himself doubted if any photograph was taken.
The defense also points out that "PO1 Aure . . . failed to disclose who, in particular, held the
sachet of shabu from the crime scene (after it was marked) up to the police station, and finally to the
crime laboratory for the requisite chemical examination."43 It added that "nothing on (sic) the
records showed who, in particular, submitted/brought the specimen to the crime laboratory for
examination."
It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that
"noncompliance of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." However, the
prosecution has not shown that when the buy-bust operation was allegedly conducted on January
17, 2007 and the sachet was supposedly seized and marked, there were "justifiable grounds" for
dispensing with compliance with Section 21. Rather, it merely insisted on its self-serving assertion
that the integrity of the seized sachet has nevertheless been, supposedly, preserved. The omission
became more glaring considering that the prosecution asserted that the events of January 17, 2007
entailed a carefully planned operation, engendered by reports of drug-related activities along C.
Raymundo Street. This planning even led to the application for and issuance of a search warrant.
Apart from the officers’ glaring non-compliance with Section 21, two (2) circumstances are
worth underscoring in this case. First, the shabu supposedly seized amounted to five (5) centigrams
(0.05 gram). This quantity is so miniscule it amounts to only about 2.5% of the weight of a five-
centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin (2.0 grams). Second, Holgado and Misarez were
acquitted by the Regional Trial Court of all other charges (i.e., for possession of dangerous drugs
and for possession of drug paraphernalia).
While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this
circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21. In Malilin v.
People, this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is
greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and
similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives."
Moreover, the Regional Trial Court’s observations which led to accused-appellants’ acquittal for
violations of Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 should have warned the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals that something was amiss.
The events of January 17, 2007 should be taken and appreciated as a whole even as they
gave rise to four (4) distinct criminal cases which were separately docketed. The reasons for
acquitting accused-appellants for the charges of violating Sections 11 and 12 (i.e., the prosecution’s
complete failure to introduce in evidence the drugs seized and the testifying police operative’s own
failure to properly account for the paraphernalia he himself took part in seizing) seriously cast doubt,
not only on accused-appellants’ own guilt, but more so on the soundness and reliability of the
measures taken and procedures followed by the police operatives. These circumstances cast a
heavy shadow on the integrity of the operation and the police operatives themselves.
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No.
9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving
the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for
miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying
fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should
realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and
true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial
resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful
custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting
our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We
stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.
Holgado and Misarez are thereby acquitted.

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GARRY DELA CRUZ Y DE GUZMAN (G.R. NO.
205821 OCTOBER 1, 2014)

PRINCIPLE: The significance of complying with Section 21’s requirements cannot be

overemphasized. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti,
an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By
failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal
of an accused.

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FACTS:
On September 15, 2004, accused-appellant Garry dela Cruz (dela Cruz) was charged with illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in two separate informations. The prosecution
alleged that, dela Cruz was arrested in a buy-bust operation. It was agreed that "PO1 Bobon would
remove his bull cap once the sale of illegal drugs was consummated." The buy-bust team prepared a
_100.00 bill with serial number KM 776896 as marked money.
At around 11:00 a.m. of September 14, 2004, the buy-bust operation team, accompanied by the
informant, went to the target area. The informant initially brokered the sale of shabu. It was PO1
Bobon who handed the marked money to dela Cruz in exchange for one (1) heat-sealed plastic
sachet of suspected shabu. After which, he removed his bull cap. SPO1 Roca then arrested dela Cruz.
Upon frisking dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon supposedly recovered six (6) more heat-sealed sachets of
suspected shabu. PO1 Bobon placed the sachet he purchased from dela Cruz in his right pocket and
the six (6) other sachets in his left pocket. SPO1 Roca recovered the marked _100.00 bill.
For his defense, the accused as he was leaving the comfort room, someone embraced him from
behind, while another poked a gun at him. He was then handcuffed and brought to an L-300 van
which was parked in front of Food Mart. Inside the van, he was asked if he was Jing-Jong, alias Jong-
Jong. Despite his denials, he was brought to the police station. It was when he was already detained
that he learned that he was charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
RTC convicted him of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Thereafter, dela Cruz
filed his notice of appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the chain of custody
requirements under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002?

RULING:
NO. The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs are settled:
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown
that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the
corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.21
The significance of complying with Section 21’s requirements cannot be overemphasized. Non-
compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of
the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an
element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.

CASE TITLE: Office of the Ombudsman vs. Delos Reyes, Jr. (738 SCRA 240, October 13, 2014)

PRINCIPLE: When there are facts that point to an irregularity and the officer failed to take steps to
rectify it, even tolerating it, the Arias doctrine is inapplicable. (Arias doctrine: An officer may rely on
good faith that his subordinates would perform their functions in accordance with the law)

FACTS:
Delos Reyes was advised by COA to promptly deposit the proceeds from lotto sales to a
bank. He failed to do so and it caused the loss of P387, 879. Delos Reyes, along with Driz, his
Assistant, was criminally charged with malversation of public funds and administratively charged
with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty. Delos Reyes argued that he is not accountable for the
proceeds of the lotto sales as it was Driz whose job is to remit the proceeds to the bank. (note: the
usual defense of public officers is that they just relied on their subordinates a.k.a. Arias Doctrine)

Issue/s: Whether or not Arias doctrine is applicable in this case. NO

Or WON Delos Reyes may rely on the Arias doctrine to be exonerated. NO

RULING:
This court’s ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309 (1989), that heads of offices
may rely to a certain extent on their subordinates, will not exonerate respondent in this case. As
held in Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman, 553 SCRA 357 (2008), when there are facts that point to

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an irregularity and the officer failed to take steps to rectify it, even tolerating it, the Arias doctrine is
inapplicable.
It was respondent’s failure to heed COA’s advice to promptly deposit the amount found in
the vault that caused the loss of the subject amount. Moreover, the said vault in which the lost
money was kept is subject to the control and custody of Delos Reyes.

CASE TITLE: People vs. Casio (744 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014)

PRINCIPLE:/s: “Trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.”
“There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when
the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin
of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea
and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into
execution.”
“With regards to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an
entrapment operation’s validity.”

FACTS:
The case is about the Republic Act No. 9208 known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2003. The accused charged under this law is Shirley A. Casio. On May 5, 2008 at 1:00am in Cebu,
Philippines with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a
minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as
their procurer for different customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of
Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. ( a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
On the same month of the year the International Justice Mission (IJM), a non-governmental
organization, coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in
Cebu. They also provided the marked money for team that will be used for entrapment. The team
went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were adjacent to each other.
Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team.
They were able to entrap Casio who offered the police the two girls, AAA and BBB. Casio received
the marked money from there Casio was arrested and the two girls were rescued. They were placed
under the custody of the representatives from IJM and DSWD.
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991 as supported by her birth
certificate. She worked before as a house helper in Mandaue City. However, when she stopped
working as a house helper, she transferred to Cebu City. In Cebu she met Gee Ann who offered her
to worked in a disco club. She agreed since she needed money for his father. Eventually, Gee Ann
brought her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were more customers in that area. There
she was able to meet Casio who gave her customers and was paid Php 400 for every customers
who choose her.
Contrary, Casio testified that she worked as a laundrywoman. On May 2008, went to buy
supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men on board a blue car. The two men asked her if
she knew someone named Bingbing. She replied that she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The
men informed her that they were actually looking for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper with a
number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring companions. When accused arrived home,
she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly, she would be given
money by the two males.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that there was
no prior surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the operation;
(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt even
though there was no evidence presented to show that accused has a history of engaging in human
trafficking; and
(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that AAA
admitted that she works as a prostitute.

RULING:
Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human trafficking.
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 10364 was approved, otherwise known as the "Expanded
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.”
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded
to include the following acts: (1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s

9|Page
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;" (2) The means used include "by means of
threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person" (3) The purpose
of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs"
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their
services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at the time that accused
peddled her services. AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a prostitute because she needed
money. Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as
proven by the testimonies of the witnesses. In regards to the issues raised in the case at bar, the
knowledge or the consent of the minor is not a defense in the RA No. 9208.
As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be
committed even if the victim gives consent. The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one of
the victims was a child.
The accused also argued the validity of the entrapment operation, all relevant facts such as
the accused’s mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing
the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.
Time and again, the court has discussed the difference between entrapment and instigation.
In Chang v. People, 496 SCRA 321 (2006), the court explained that: There is entrapment when law
officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual
commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The
difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens
rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes
from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the
accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. When accused was arrested, she was
informed of her constitutional rights. The marked money retrieved from her was recorded in the
police blotter prior to the entrapment operation and was presented in court as evidence.
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an
entrapment operation’s validity. A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility
is a trait of good police work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long as
the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the
wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the
need for prior surveillance.

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 2015 CASES

Case Title: Ricalde vs. People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015

Principle:
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object rape,"
"gender-free rape," or "homosexual rape and the gravamen of rape through sexual assault is the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person’s genital or anal orifice.

Facts:

It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as he felt pain in his anus and something inserted in his
anus. He saw the accused fondled his penis. XXX then told his mother about the incident. A criminal
complaint was filed before the RTC against the accused for the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The RTC convicted the accused of the crime as charged. The accused, however argued that he
could not be convicted of the crime since XXX was not able to identify the object inserted into his
anal orifice.

Issue: WON the accused is guilty of the crime of rape through sexual assault

Ruling:

Yes. The accused is guilty.

Paragraph 2 of Section 266-A provides that rape through sexual assault can be committed by any
person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Furthermore, in People v. Soria, it was
held that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the
court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed.

In this case, XXX was able to testify that something was inserted into his anus. Thus, the accused is
guilty of the crime as charged.

Case Title: Benito vs People, G.R. No. 204644, February 11, 2015

Principles:
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; So long as the evidence presented show a “common design or
purpose” to commit the crime, all of the accused shall be held equally liable as coprincipals even if
one (1) or more of them did not participate in all the details of the execution of the crime.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; "Mere presence [at the scene of the crime] is not by itself indicative of
conspiracy between [the accused]."

Facts:

Abadilla knew Agbulos and Benito through Abadilla’s friend, Pamintuan. Pamintuan introduced
Agbulos to Abadilla as a jeweler. Abadilla and Agbulos entered into several transactions for the sale
of jewelry, with Agbulos going to Abadilla’s residence at 174 Maginhawa Street, Sikatuna Village,
Quezon City. In all these transactions, Benito accompanied Agbulos.

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On June 9, 1994, Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla. They agreed that Agbulos would
return the pieces of jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell them. Agbulos then issued
Abadilla a check for the value of the jewelry received.

Agbulos received another batch of jewelry from Abadilla on June 14, 1994. She again issued Abadilla
a check, this time for ₱828,000.00. They likewise agreed that Agbulos would return the jewelry in
the afternoon should she fail to sell them.

On June 16, 1994, Agbulos received the last batch of jewelry from Abadilla, issuing a check in the
amount of ₱453,000.00.

On June 21, 1994, Abadilla called Agbulos on the phone, asking for security for the pieces of jewelry
she gave Agbulos. Agbulos then gave as security the owner’s copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 438259.

However, upon verification with the Land Registration Authority, the certificate of title turned out to
be spurious. Abadilla deposited the checks Agbulos issued to her, and all were dishonored by reason
of "closed account." Abadilla then tried to locate Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found.

After several months, Abadilla learned from Agbulos’ sister-in-law that the latter received pawn
tickets from a friend. Abadilla, through her friend Pamintuan, obtained from Agbulos’ sister-in-law
pawn tickets numbered 45227 and 45306 issued by E. Ochoa Pawnshop. Appearing on the pawn
tickets was the name "Linda Chua."

Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify the items described in the pawn tickets. She learned
that the items pawned were among the pieces of jewelry she turned over to Agbulos, specifically, a
men’s diamond ring and a set of diamond ring and earrings. She also learned from Diloria, the
pawnshop appraiser, that the "Linda Chua" who pawned her jewelry was Benito.

The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Agbulos
and Benito conspired to commit estafa. According to the trial court, Agbulos and Benito received
the pieces of jewelry in trust for Abadilla.

Benito appealed before the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

Issue:

Whether Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in committing estafa punished
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code

Ruling:

No. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt Benito’s conspiracy
with Agbulos to commit estafa

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Proof of conspiracy
may be direct or circumstantial. So long as the evidence presented show a "common design or
purpose" to commit the crime, all of the accused shall be held equally liable as co-principals even if
one or more of them did not participate in all the details of the execution of the crime.

Here, only Agbulos received the pieces of jewelry from her, and Benito was merely "present during
the negotiation". Even assuming that Benito accompanied Agbulos in going to Abadilla’s residence,
this does not prove that Benito received any jewelry from Abadilla. As the helper of Agbulos’
brother, Benito may have accompanied Agbulos on her employer’s order. "Mere presence [at the
scene of the crime] is not by itself indicative of conspiracy between [the accused]."

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Case Title: People vs. Casacop, G.R. No. 208685 March 9, 2015

Principle: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot prevail over the
presumption of innocence of accused-appellant.

Facts:

Based on information received, PO1 Rommel Bautista (PO1 Bautista together with Chief
Intelligence Officer SPO1 Alvin Glorioso, other police officers, and two (2) assets, conducted a buy-
bust operation in Laguna against Casacop. One of the assets acted as the poseur-buyer went to the
house of [Casacop] to buy shabu with marked money. 0.04 grams of shabu” was confiscated.

An Information was filed against accused-appellant Rodrigo Casacop (Casacop) for violation of Sec.
5 of RA9165.

However, Casacop testified that on the same day, he was asleep in his home. Suddenly, someone
banged on their door. Casacop was awakened by his wife Zenaida, thinking that he might be
arrested for failing to report to his parole officer. He jumped out of a window but was eventually
arrested by PO1 Bautista.

The Regonal Trial Court found Casacop guilty and affirmed by CA. Accused-appellant alleges that
the chain of custody was broken. He argues that the seized item should have been marked
immediately after it was confiscated. On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argues that
noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not necessarily mean that the arrest
is illegal. What is important is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items.

Issue:

Whether the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
observance of the required procedure in handling the seized item.

Ruling:

Accused-appellant Rodrigo Casacop y De Castro is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to

prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

From the time the transaction took place to the time accused-appellant was arrested, there is
nothing on record to show how the integrity of the seized item was preserved.

The chain of custody required in buy-bust operations as follows:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;

Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;

Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and

Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.

The arguments of the parties in this case show that from the start of the buy-bust operation, there
was failure to observe the chain of custody.

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The first link that must be proven is the seizure and marking of the seized item.

The transaction was between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer, while PO1 Bautista watched
the transaction a few meters away.

His statement that he saw “accused[-appellant] hand over something” creates reasonable doubt
whether the item given by the poseur-buyer to PO1 Bautista is the same “something” that accused-
appellant allegedly gave the poseur-buyer.

Case Title: People v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, March 18, 2015

Principle: Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the seconds
before the commission of the crime. It may build up and strengthen over time until it can no longer
be repressed and will ultimately motivate the commission of the crime.

Facts:

While walking alone, Dolfo Gulane was stabbed by Marcelino Oloverio using a bolo several times.
Gulane died of mortal wounds on the different parts of the body. Oloverio was charged with murder.

In his defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of the incident, Gulane had been accusing
him of having an incestuous relationship with his mother. He allegedly kept his cool and told Gulane
to go home, but the latter continued to mock him by asking in a loud voice, "How many times did you
have sexual intercourse with your mother?" He allegedly asked Gulane to go home again but the
latter angrily replied, "Who are you to tell me to go home?"

Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by drawing his own bolo.
They grappled with it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up stabbing Gulane, which resulted in the
latter's death.

Oloverio surrendered to the authorities and admitted to the crime since he could no longer bear the
insulting remarks against him.

The Regional Trial Court found Oloverio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder.

2. Whether or not passion and obfuscation is present in this case.

Ruling:

1. No, accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The presence of treachery, however, has not been sufficiently established. For treachery to
be appreciated, the following elements must be proven: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and
(b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.

The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the sole basis in finding treachery. There
must be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means
of execution to ensure its success.

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 At the time of the incident, Gulane was already 83 years old. Accused-appellant was
standing behind him. He already had the advantage of surprise with Gulane's back turned.
Gulane's advanced age and position would have ensured his death as it would have
prevented him from being able to retaliate.

Instead, accused-appellant tapped Gulane on the shoulder as if to call his attention. He

waited until Gulane was facing him before he started stabbing. The medico-legal report
indicates stab wounds on the chest and extremities, proving that Gulane was stabbed from
the front.

The attack, while sudden, cannot be said to have been unexpected or unprovoked. Accused-
appellant alleged that before the attack, Gulane had been insulting him and mocking him in a
loud voice, "How many times did you have sexual intercourse with your mother?"41 This
utterance, along with testimonies of Gulane's previous insults, would have been sufficient
provocation for accused-appellant to stab him.

Since treachery has not been proven, the crime is merely homicide.

2. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present in this case.

To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the
accused must be able to prove the following elements: that there be an act, both unlawful
and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and that said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The
provocation and the commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable
length of time has passed during which the accused would have calmed down and be able to
reflect on the consequences of his or her actions. What is important is that the accused has
not yet "recovered his normal equanimity" when he committed the crime.

To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be

examined on a case-to-case basis. However, a fight between the accused and the victim
prior to the crime is not always enough to be able to successfully prove that passion and
obfuscation attended it. This court did not appreciate passion and obfuscation in People v.
Rabanillo, where the accused killed the victim 30 minutes after they came to blows.

For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful feelings.
The turmoil and unreason that naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused
with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a
degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement which is inherent in
all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation.

This court has also ruled that acts done in the spirit of revenge cannot be considered acts
done with passion and obfuscation.

In the case at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and after appellant had
sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can be
interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone. It was
simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near appellant in a taunting
manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.

Accused-appellant admitted that he stabbed Gulane but alleged that they had been fighting.
He alleged that Gulane had been hurling insults at him which provoked him to react; in effect,
he alleged that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was present in this
case.

15 | P a g e
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals narrowed its understanding of passion and
obfuscation to refer only to the emotions accused-appellant felt in the seconds before a
crime is committed. It failed to understand that passion may linger and build up over time as
repressed anger enough to obfuscate reason and self-control.

The circumstances of both victim and accused-appellant were also not taken into account
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Accused-appellant referred to Gulane as the "datu" or rich man of Barangay San Pablo.
Gulane enjoyed an economic ascendancy over accused-appellant, a mere barangay tanod.
Gulane not only threatened to molest accused-appellant's daughter but also accused him in
public of having incestuous relations with his mother. Gulane was said to have insulted
accused-appelant in full view of his immediate superior, the barangay captain.

Both victim and accused-appellant lived in the small locality of Palompon, Leyte. As with any
small town, it was a place where a person's degrading remarks against another could be
made the measure of the latter's character. Gulane's insults would have been taken into
serious consideration by the town's residents because of his wealth and stature in the
community. There was neither a reason given why Gulane acted that way towards accused-
appellant nor any evidence to show that accused-appellant had previously wronged him.

Oloverio is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation and of

voluntary surrender.

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 2016 CASES

Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016

Principles:
Criminal Law – In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in possession of a firearm . . .
outside of his residence within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the COMELEC sans
authority. This court also ruled that under the Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or
she has a written authority to possess a firearm is on the accused.

Political Law – The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different from a customs
search. Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed
when "persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in
the enforcement of customs laws."

Facts:

On May 11, 2007, while buying a ticket, Dela Cruz, an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel
allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. Upon X-ray, the x-ray machine operator-on-duty, saw
the impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag. When asked by port
personnel if he was the owner of the bag, Dela Cruz answered in the affirmative and consented to
the manual inspection of the bag. A Port Police Officer was called and was told that there were
firearms in a bag owned by Dela Cruz. The bag was then inspected and the following items were
found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman's book; other personal items; and four (4)
live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper documents for
the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative and denied that he was the owner of the firearms.
He was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law as well as of his
constitutional rights.

In the Information, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal
possession of firearms. Subsequently, another Information was filed charging him with the violation
of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764 (Gun Ban), in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.

Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment. After trial, RTC found
Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban. The trial court also finds the
search conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused's
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and
ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even
without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and
ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against the
accused.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment.

Dela Cruz claims that he "well-acquainted with the inspection scheme at the ports. He argues that
there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search. He knew in all honest belief that when his
luggage would pass through the routine x-ray examination, nothing incriminating would be
recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the examination of his luggage.

Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz's right to unreasonable search and
seizure, thus warranting his conviction. Dela Cruz was caught in flagrante delicto. The firearms were
seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure.
According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and seizures conducted
by airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures.

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Issues:

1. Whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of the illegal firearms within
the meaning of the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;

2. Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and

3. Assuming that there was no waiver, whether there was a valid search and seizure in this
case.

Ruling:

1. Yes. In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in possession of a firearm . . . outside of
his residence within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the COMELEC sans authority.

Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution’s evidence that he had animus possidendi or the
intent to possess the illegal firearms. In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his possession
of the illegal firearms seized from his bag was "temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless
possession." As put by the trial court, petitioner’s claim that anyone could have planted the
firearms in his bag while it was unattended is flimsy. Petitioner merely claims that someone
must have planted the firearms when he left his bag with the porter. He did not identify who this
person could have been and he did not state any motive for this person to plant the firearms in
his possession, even if there was indeed an opportunity to plant the firearms.

2. Yes. The Constitution safeguards a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays down the
exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive

searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of
persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and
port police officers in this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law
enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under Article III of the Constitution.
The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-
related function. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not
unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports
are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of
travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his
belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine. The presentation of
petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to
present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or
inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a
crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard
the passengers passing through ports or terminals.

3. Yes, the search and seizure is valid. The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is
different from a customs search. Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid

18 | P a g e
 search warrant, are allowed when "persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . .
effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of customs laws.

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search
warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy
should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety
of the traveling public.

Case Title: Howard Lescano vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016

Principle:
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to
establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-
compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.

Facts:
Lescano was charged with illegal sale of drugs. He was arrested during the buy-bust operation
conducted by the police after the informant gave a tip that drug-pushing activities were taking
place in Tulio and Tabacuhan Sts. In Olongapo City. After the buy-bust operation, Lescano was
frisked and the buy-bust money was recovered. PO3 Javier marked the medium-sized plastic sachet
with the initials "HJ" and turned it over to SPO1 Delos Reyes. Lescano was then brought to the
CAIDSOT office for investigation. Inside the CAIDSOT office, an inventory was allegedly conducted
and photographs of the marked money and the sachet were taken. The sachet allegedly containing
marijuana weighed 1.4 grams.

A Receipt of Evidence was prepared. P/Insp. Javier asked the Hospital Administrator of the James L.
Gordon Memorial Hospital to conduct a physical examination on Lescano. He also asked the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to examine Lescano’s urine and the contents of the
sachet seized during the buy-bust operation. PO3 Javier and PO1 Mataverde also executed a Joint
Affidavit of Apprehension.

In his testimony, Lescano denied that he was selling marijuana. He claimed that on July 8, 2008, at
around 5:00 p.m., he was at Tulio Street just sitting and passing time when P/Insp. Julius Javier
arrived and introduced himself as a police officer. P/Insp. Javier then frisked Lescano but the search
turned out futile as nothing was recovered from him. Other police officers arrived. PO1 Mataverde
and PO3 Javier then told him that something was confiscated during the frisking. Lescano insisted
that there was nothing confiscated from him. The officers, however, replied by stating: "Don’t worry,
tomorrow there will be." He was then charged with illegal sale of prohibited drugs.

The Regional Trial Court found Lescano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Howard Lescano’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 was established.

Ruling:

No. The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
are settled:

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

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As regards corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as
amended by Republic Act No. 10640 stipulates requirements for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia.

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory
of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or
the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items.

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally
issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon
completion of the said examination and certification[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Compliance with Section 21’s requirements is critical. "Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in

establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-
compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused."

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the
integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of
the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident
allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the
person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement
forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.

By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to
establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-
compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.

In People v. Nandi, this court explained that four (4) links "should be established in the chain of
custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug

20 | P a g e
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist
to the court."

As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2) actions: physical inventory
and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done. As to
when, it must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether
the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical
inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is
served. In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."

Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the
items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National
Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e.,
the accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his
or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the representative of the National
Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present in his or her place.

Case title: De Guzman vs. Fuentes, GR No. 201310, January 11, 2016

Principles:
Direct proof of conspiracy is not imperative and that conspiracy may be inferred from acts of the
perpetrators.
A perpetrator's act of holding the victim's hand while another perpetrator is striking a blow is
indicative of conspiracy

Facts:

Per Marasigan's allegations while he was walking on his way home Marasigan felt someone throw
an object at him from behind. Turning around, he saw Fuentes, who, upon noticing that he had been
seen, disappeared. A witness, Jefferson Pablo (Pablo), spoke with Marasigan and confirmed that it
was Fuentes who threw an object at him.

While he and Pablo were speaking, Fuentes reappeared with Calilan and Lindo, as well as with
another unidentified individual. Fuentes suddenly punched Marasigan on the face, making his nose
bleed. Calilan and Lindo also hit him while their unidentified companion sought to stop them.
Fuentes picked up a stone (i.e., piece of a hollow block) and attempted to hit Marasigan's head with
it. Marasigan parried the stone with his hand, causing his hand to fracture. Fuentes again picked up
the stone. Lindo and Calilan took hold of each of Marasigan's arms.

Several more men who were in Fuentes' home joined in the assault. Marasigan shouted for help.
Gregoria Pablo, Jefferson Pablo's mother, came rushing out of their house and tried to pacify
Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo. They, however, continued to assault Marasigan. It was only upon the
arrival of neighbors Marcelo Maaba and Lauro Agulto that Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo ceased their
assault and fled.He then filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder against Fuentes, Calilan,
Lindo, and one John Doe.

After conducting preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Serrano issued the
Resolution finding probable cause for charging Fuentes and Calilan with less serious physical
injuries and clearing Lindo of any liability.

21 | P a g e
He reasoned that there were no qualifying circumstances to support a charge for murder.
Aggrieved, Marasigan filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. He argued that
the medical findings made on him as well as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength justified prosecution for frustrated murder. He added that Lindo's acts were unambiguous
and indicated his participation in a design to kill him.
In the Resolution dated September 2, 2009, Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla partially granted
Marasigan’s Petition for Review and ordered the provincial prosecutor of Laguna to file
informations for attempted murder against Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo. Undersecretary Malenab-
Hornilla faulted Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Serrano for relying on the medico-legal findings to
the exclusion of other evidence. She reasoned that Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo’s acts, as recounted
by the witnesses Gregoria Pablo, Marcelo Maaba, and Lauro Agulto, indicated a design to kill
Marasigan, which was only stymied by these witnesses’ arrival. She added, however, that precisely
because of the arrival of these witnesses, Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo failed to complete “all the
punching, kicking and stoning needed to kill [Marasigan].” Thus, they could not be charged with
frustrated murder, but only with attempted murder.
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the case before the Secretary of Justice and
on February 8, 2010, Secretary Devanadera issued a Resolution on Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo’s
Motion for Reconsideration. This Resolution absolved Fuentes and Lindo of liability and deemed
that Calilan could only be charged with less serious physical injuries. Secretary Devanadera cited
with approval assistant Provincial Prosecutor Serrano’s statement in his own Resolution that there
was no sufficient showing, or “clear and convincing evidence to prove that the herein respondents
collectively intended to kill [Marasigan].”

Issue:

What is the proper offense to be charged, if any, and for which any or all of the respondents must
stand trial.

Rulings:

The proper offense to be charged is attempted murder against all the respondents.

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

In this case, petitioner alleged that respondents coordinated in assaulting him and that this assault
culminated in efforts to hit his head with a stone or hollow block. Had respondents been successful,
they could have dealt any number of blows on petitioner. Each of these could have been fatal, or,
even if not individually so, could have, in combination, been fatal. That they were unable to inflict
fatal blows was only because of the timely arrival of neighbors who responded to the calls for help
coming from petitioner and witnesses Marcelo Maaba, Lauro M. Agulto, and Gregoria F. Pablo.

In addition it is discernible that respondents took advantage of their superior strength or otherwise
employed means to weaken petitioner’s defense. With this qualifying circumstance, there is ample
basis for pursuing respondents’ prosecution for murder, albeit not in its consummated stage.
Further, It is apparent that respondents acted out of a common design and, thus, in conspiracy. It is
settled that direct proof of conspiracy is not imperative and that conspiracy may be inferred from
acts of the perpetrators.
In this case, petitioner averred that respondents Calilan and Lindo took hold of each of his arms
while respondent Fuentes was about to strike him with a hollow block. It is, therefore, apparent that
all three of them acted out of a common design as is indicative of a conspiracy. We sustain the
22 | P a g e
conclusion of Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla that there is basis for prosecuting respondents for
murder in its attempted, and not in its frustrated stage.

Case Title: People vs Dimaano y Tipdas

Principle:
Human memory is not infallible. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in
cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act may be excused so long as
the identity of the dangerous drugs is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of custody is
established with moral certainty.

Facts:

Bilugot was detailed as a frisker at the departure area of an airport. He felt a hard object bulging
near Cristy’s Dimaano Y. Tipdas buttocks. Cristy was then brought to the C.R. and sachets of white
crystalline were discovered. When asked what they were, Cristy replied, ‘shabu’ and alleged that she
was asked to bring them only. There were inconsistencies in the prosecution’s testimony.

Issue: Was she validly convicted?

Ruling:

Yes, the following was properly observed:

1. The prosecution must prove the existence of the prohibited drug.
2. It must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been preserved.
3. It must present a testimony as to the chain of custody of the seized drugs.

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in cases involving violations of the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act may be excused so long as the identity of the dangerous
drugs is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of custody is established with moral
certainty.

Case Title: Matalam, petitioner vs. People, respondent, G.R. No. 221849-50, April 4, 2016

Principle:
When an act is malum prohibitum, "it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.

"Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is,
by the very nature of things, the crime itself." When an act is prohibited by a special law, it is
considered injurious to public welfare, and the performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself.

Facts:

CASE 1: Criminal Case No. 26707

Sometime in 1997 – Cotabato City, Maguindanao Maguindanao – the accused (Datu, Ansarry, and
Naimah) involved in the remittance of accounts GSIS failed/refused to pay or remit PHP
2,418,577.33 representing DAR-Provincial Office-Maguindanao for the period of January 1997 to
June 1998 to GSIS.

They refused to pay or remit despite the notice from GSIS. DATU GUIMID MATALAM, ANSARRY
LAWI and NAIMAH UNTE were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 52(g)
of R.A. No. 8291.
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CASE 2: Criminal Case No. 26708:
Sometime in 1997 – Cotabato City, Maguindanao – the accused (Datu, Ansarry, and Naimah)
involved in the remittance of accounts to Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG)
failed/refused to pay or remit PHP 149,100.00 representing DAR-Provincial Office-Maguindanao
for the period of January 1997 to June 1998 to GSIS.

They refused to pay or remit despite the notice from PAG-IBIG. ANSARRY LAWI and NAIMAH
UNTE are hereby ACQUITTED of this offense. REASON FOR AQCUITTAL: According to the
Sandiganbayan, it is the employer who is penalized for the non-remittance to Pag-IBIG Fund.
(Acquitted due to lack of basis)

DATU GUIMID MATALAM, being the employer, is found guilty of Violation of Section 1, Rule XIII of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7742.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of non-remittance of
the employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.

Ruling:

YES. Petitioner, Datu Matalam is liable for the non-remittance of the contributions to GSIS and Pag-
IBIG Fund.

The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the duty to remit the required amounts falls to his co-
accused. Republic Act No. 8291, Section 52(g) clearly provides that heads of agencies or branches
of government shall be criminally liable for the failure, refusal, or delay in the payment, turnover, and
remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS.

Similarly, the refusal or failure without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent to comply with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7742, with respect to the collection and remittance of employee
savings as well as the required employer contributions to the Pag-IBIG Fund, subjects the employer
to criminal liabilities such as the payment of a fine, imprisonment, or both.

Indeed, non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is criminally punishable.

The non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum. What the relevant
laws punish is the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause in remitting or paying
the required contributions or accounts.

In Saguin v. People, the Court ruled that non-remittance of Pag-IBIG Fund premiums without lawful
cause or with fraudulent intent is punishable under the penal clause of Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 1752. However, the petitioners in Saguin were justified in not remitting the premiums on
time as the hospital they were working in devolved to the provincial government and there was
confusion as to who had the duty to remit.

In this case, however, petitioner failed to prove a justifiable cause for his failure to remit the
premiums. Court did not subscribe to petitioner's defense that the funds for the remittances were
not directly credited to DAR-ARMM but to the account of the Office of the Regional Governor of the
ARMM, which had the obligation to remit to the various line agencies of the ARMM the specific
amounts provided to them.

As the Sandiganbayan found from the testimonies of the witnesses and evidence on record, the
amounts meant for remittance to GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund were indeed deposited into the bank
account maintained by DAR-ARMM for its Fund 101. It is settled that factual findings of the trial
court are entitled to respect and finality unless it is shown that such findings are patently misplaced
or without any basis. Hence, petitioner's duty to ensure the remittance of the amounts to GSIS and
Pag-IBIG Fund was triggered by the availability of the funds in DAR-ARMM's account.

24 | P a g e
Case title: Ariel Lopez vs People, GR No. 212186, June 29, 2016

Principle:
To sustain a conviction for cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle must be proven with
certainty. Otherwise, the accused must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

A “request for appearance” issued by law enforcers to a person identified as a suspect is akin to an
invitation. Thus, the suspect is covered by the rights of an accused while under custodial
investigation. Any admission obtained from the request for appearance without the assistance of
counsel is inadmissible in evidence.

Facts:

Petitioner Lopez was charged with violation of PD 533 the Anti-cattle Rustling Law. Mario Lopez
(private respondent) testified that he purchased a female carabao as evidence by a certificate of
transfer of large cattle. Perez narrated that he tied his carabao to a coconut tree inside the property
of Genosas. At around 5:00 am the next day, he discovered that the female carabo was missing.

Prosecution witness Alderete testified that it was him and Lopez who untied the carabao and
delivered it to Malagos. Alderete said that he was not told by Lopez who the owner of the carabao is.
After learning about the lost carabao, Aderete sought help from the barangay police and a request
for Lopez’s appearance was issue but no custodial investigation as conducted. In the police station
Lopez wanted to settle by paying the price. During trial Lopez denied stealing the carabao.

Trial court found Lopez guilty of cattle-rustling. On appeal Lopez argued that the prosecution was
unable to prove that the carabao allegedly stolen was the same owned by Perez. He also argued that
the request for appearance issued by the police was in violation of his custodial rights. CA sustained
the ruling of the trial court. Lopez moved for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, Lopez filed a
petition for review on certiorari.
Respondent argued that Lopez’s statement during the meeting at the police station was made
spontaneously; thus, it is admissible in evidence. And that petition raises questions of fact which are
not allowed in Rule 45 petition for review.

Issues:

I. Whether the court should deny the petition for raising questions of fact;
II. Whether all the elements of the crime of cattle-rustling were proven; and
III. Whether petitioner’s uncounseled admission during the confrontation at the barangay police
office is admissible in evidence

Ruling:
I.
The general rule is that R45 petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of law.
However, there are instances when the court allows questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition for
review. These instances include the following:
1. When there is grave abuse of discretion;
2. When the findings are grounded on speculations;
3. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
4. When the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the factual findings are conflicting;
6. When the Ca went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of the parties;
7. When the Ca overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion;

25 | P a g e
 8. When the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
9. When the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and
10. When the findings of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted
by the evidence on record.
There is a question of law “when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.” And
there is a question of fact “when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
In this case, petitioner asked the court to review the evidence and argues that the prosecution was
unable to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner raised a question of fact.
Nevertheless, this court gives due course to the petition because it falls under the exceptions. A
review of the record shows that the trial court and the CA misapprehended the facts, and their
findings are contradicted by the evidence presented.

II.
Under PD 533, the elements of cattle rustling are: 1) large cattle is taken; 2) it belongs to another; 3)
the taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser; 4) the taking is done y any means,
method or scheme; 5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and 6) the taking is
accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.

In this case, not all the elements of cattle-rustling were proven by the prosecution. The carabao
transported by petitioner and Alderete was not sufficiently proven to be the same carabao owned
by Perez. The description of the carabao transported is too generic and did not mention any
distinguishing marks.
III.
Petitioner’s uncounseled admission during the confrontation at the police station is inadmissible in
evidence.

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect’s participation therein and which tend to elicit admission. Generally, the
constitution procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
accused orally admits having committed the crime. Further, infractions of the Miranda rights render
inadmissible the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.

In this case, the record shows that petitioner’s appearance before the police station was far from
being voluntary. The so called “request” is no different from the invitation issued by police officers
for custodial investigation. Petitioner was identified as a suspect in the theft of large cattle and was
already singled out as the probable culprit. Thus, he should have had counsel present during his
questioning in the police station.

Case Title: People vs Feliciano, Jr., GR. No. 196735, August 03, 2016

Facts:
Separate Motions for reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated May 5, 2014 which were
filed by accused-appellants Soliva, Zingapan, and Alvir. To recall, the Court affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder
of Dennis Venturina. The incident happened one afternoon when seven members of Sigma Rho
fraternity while eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of UP Diliman, were
attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained
injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.

The trial court convicted the accused-appellants for the crime of murder against Venturina and
attempted murder against the other victims who were members of Sigma Rho fraternity. Since the
penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, it was brought to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
However, due to the amendment on the Rules on Appeal, the case was remanded to the Court of
26 | P a g e
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the case was brought
before the Court for review which also affirmed the decision of the appellate court.

Accused-appellants sought reconsideration of the May 5, 2014 Decision, to wit:

(a) Accused Soliva argued that his conviction was merely based on Natalicio’s lone
testimony, which he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent;
(b) Accused Alvir argued that Lachica’s identification of him was uncorroborated and hazy.
He argued that Lachica’s statement that he was still able to raise his head while parrying blows was
impossible; and
(c) Accused Zingapan’s main argument was based on the sufficiency of the Information filed
against him, which he argued, violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him.

Issue: Would the arguments presented by the accused-appellants warrant the reversal of the
Court’s May 5, 2014 Decision?

Ruling: No.
On Soliva’s Argument:
The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is enough to prove the guilt
of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Soliva argues that Natalicio was not able to identify his attackers since he was seen by Tan" lying
face down as he was being attacked. On the contrary, Natalicio's and Tan's testimonies were
consistent as to Natalicio's position during the attack.Natalicio explained that he was attacked
twice. During the first attack, he tried to stand up and was able to identify two (2) of his attackers.
He fell to the ground when he was attacked the second time. This is consistent with Tan's testimony,
where he stated:
Answer: During the second waive [sic], your honor, [Natalicio] tried to get up but immediately
after the first waive [sic] another group of persons attacked, your honor.
COURT Question: When he tried to get up, he was still facing the ground?
Answer: He was a bit tilted, your honor. He was no longer lying face down or "nakadapa, " your
honor.

Tan failed to identify the attackers only because he did not know their names. His testimony
corroborates Natalicio's testimony that some of the attackers were masked and some were not,
although Tan could not identify them because he was not familiar with their names.

On Alvir’s Argument:
It is in line with human experience that even while Lachica was parrying the blows, he would strive to
identify his attackers. As has been previously stated by this Court:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of
their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of
the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily
erased from their memory.

Lachica testified that he was able to identify Alvir while he was being attacked. When Lachica ran
away and looked back at the scene of the crime, he was also able to identify two (2) more of the
attackers, Zingapan and Medalla. He did not deny seeing Alvir, but only added that he was able to
identify two (2) more people.

On Zingapan’s Argument:
For an information to be sufficient, Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that it state:

the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

27 | P a g e
The purpose of alleging all the circumstances attending a crime, including any circumstance that
may aggravate the accused's liability, is for the accused to be able to adequately prepare for his or
her defense:

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the
information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the
crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense.
It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged
with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which
he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense
and with the requirements of plain justice.

Here, the aggravating circumstance of "masks and/or other forms of disguise"[37] was alleged in
the Informations to enable the prosecution to establish that the attackers intended to conceal their
identities. Once this is established, the prosecution needed to prove how the witnesses were able to
ft identify the attackers despite the concealment of identity

Zingapan was sufficiently informed that he was being charged with the death of Dennis Venturina,
committed through the circumstances provided.

Based on this Information, Zingapan's counsel was able to formulate his defense, which was that of
alibi. He was able to allege that he was not at Beach House Canteen at the time of the incident
because he was having lunch with his cousin's husband in Kamuning. His defense had nothing to do
with whether he might or might not have been wearing a mask during the December 8, 1994
incident since his main defense was that he was not there at all.

Zingapan's right to be informed of the cause or nature of the accusation against him was not
violated. The inclusion of the aggravating circumstance of disguise in the Informations did not
prevent him from presenting his defense of alibi.

Case title: Ruel Tuano y Hernandez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205871, September 28,
2016

Principle:
The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore.

Facts:
Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11(3) of Republic
Act No. 9165 before Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for having in his possession one
(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with 0.064 grams of shabu. After trial on the merits, the
RTC convicted the accused in the Decision dated May 4, 2010. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto
the ruling of the RTC in the Decision dated June 8, 2012. Accused moved for reconsideration on July
4, 2012, but the Motion was denied by the CA in the Resolution dated February 12, 2013. On April 16,
2013, accused filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari questioning the CA’s June 8,
2012 Decision and February 12, 2013 Resolution. On June 23, 2014, this Court sustained the
conviction of accused, thus affirming the ruling of the CA. On August 7, 2014, accused moved for
reconsideration, questioning this Court’s June 23, 2014 unsigned Resolution and praying for his
acquittal. On February 25, 2015, this Court required respondent People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, to file a Comment on accused’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment dated March 27, 2015 and a
Comment dated April 20, 2015.

28 | P a g e
Accused through the Public Attorney’s Office filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply
dated September 16, 2015 and a Reply on September 22, 2015. On June 27, 2016, this Court issued
a Resolution reconsidering its June 23, 2014 unsigned Resolution. This Court acquitted accused for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, an Order of Release
was issued and sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.

On July 22, 2016, this Court received from the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections a letter
dated July 15, 2016 informing this Court that accused died on March 1, 2015, prior to the issuance of
this Court’s June 27, 2016 Resolution.

On August 22, 2016, this Court received a memorandum from the Division Clerk of Court requesting
instructions on the proper date of finality of this Court’s June 27, 2016 Resolution, in light of
accused’s death prior to the Resolution’s issuance.

Issue:
What is the proper date of finality of a case where the Court issued a Resolution acquitting the
accused without having been informed of his prior death?

Ruling:

The death of accused extinguishes his criminal liability. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code provides: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. Likewise, the civil liability of the accused arising from his criminal liability is extinguished
upon his death.

In People v. Bayotas. 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in
this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict.

Therefore, when accused died on March 1, 2015, during the pendency of his appeal and prior to this
Court’s Resolution dated June 27, 2016, his criminal liability has already been extinguished. From
the point on, the criminal action had no defendant upon which the action is based. This Court’s June
27, 2016 Resolution had become ineffectual and must be set aside. Likewise, the criminal action
must be dismissed.

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 2017 CASES

Case title: Torres y Salera v. People, G.R No. 206627 January 18 , 2017

Facts:

On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for
the conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from
fishing.

CCC's wife, who was also with them at the barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the
conciliation proceedings to answer for his liability. Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's
multicab. In the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged
CCC's multicab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. Torres told AAA not to pry in the affairs
of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not stop. However, AAA refused to keep
silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's multicab. Infuriated with AAA's
meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. Torres continued to hit AAA causing
the latter to fall down from the stairs.

CCC came to his nephew's defense and punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until
they were separated by Barangay Captain Hermilando Miano. Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three
(3) times. Based on the physical examination conducted by Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustain a
contusion. In his defense Torres argued that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC
badgered him to answer for the damage he had allegedly caused to CCC's multicab. AAA abruptly
interrupted the heated discussion between the two men. Angered by what AAA had done, Torres
told AAA to stop making unfounded accusations or he would be forced to whip him. AAA called
Torres' bluff, which further provoked Torres. Torres attempted to hit AAA but was thwarted by the
timely intervention of CCC, who suddenly attacked him. Torres claimed that CCC filed this case to
preempt him from filing a complaint for physical injuries against CCC.

Issue: Whether or not Torres is liable for Child Abuse

Ruling:

Yes, he is liable for child abuse. Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable
members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under

Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."

Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades, and
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked several
times in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age.

Petitioner, as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-control rather than retaliate against
a 14- year-old child. The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident occurred. As such AAA is
entitled to protection under Republic Act No. 7610. Thus, Torres is liable for Child Abuse.

Case Title: People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong, accused-
appellant, GR No.: G.R. No. 219829 January 18 , 2017

Facts:

30 | P a g e
 Accused-appellant during in an entrapment operation sold POl Marlon Takazi M. Look, who
acted as poseur-buyer, a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing
0.0604 grams of shabu. Then, accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
illegal sale of 0.0604 gram of shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine.
However, on appeal, Jaafar argued that the shabu was not formally offered as evidence during trial;
rather, it was only presented during the hearing for the application for bail. Hence, the Regional Trial
Court should not have considered the shabu as evidence. Jaafar further argued that the prosecution
failed to show an unbroken chain of custody of the shabu allegedly obtained from him. He pointed
out that the police officers neither photographed nor inventoried the seized shabu sachet and
emphasized that there were no representatives from the media and the Department of Justice as
well as an elected public official to witness the proceedings.

On the other hand, the People of the Philippines argued that the alleged non- compliance
with the chain of custody rule was not fatal to the prosecution’s case considering that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. The Court of Appeals ruled that
although the sachet of shabu was not formally offered in evidence during trial, it was nevertheless
identified by PO1 Look and the forensic chemist. Being part of their direct testimonies, the shabu
formed part of the records of the case. Hence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial
Court did not err in considering the shabu as evidence.

The Court of Appeals also agreed with the Regional Trial Court with regard to the alleged
violation of the chain of custody rule. Although there was a departure in the procedure mandated
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, the Court of Appeals ruled that it did not automatically
render the confiscated drugs inadmissible since the integrity of the seized shabu had been kept
intact. Aggrieved, Jafaar filed a notice of appeal.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the
non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of the Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

NO, the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt for the non-
observance of the Chain of Custody Rule. In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165,
the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction.
Hence, the identity of the dangerous drug must be clearly established.

Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and nature,
they must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to
alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized
from the accused are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as
evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts
involving the identity of seized drugs are removed.

While it may be true that noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not
fatal to the prosecution’s case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the
existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule. This Court finds that the
prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant noncompliance with the
mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Although the buy-bust team
marked and conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of shabu, the records do not show
that the seized sachet had been photographed. Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence to
show that the physical inventory was done in the presence of accused-appellant or his
representative, representatives from the media and the Department of Justice, and an elected
public official. People vs. Jaafar, 815 SCRA 19, G.R. No. 219829 January 18, 2017

31 | P a g e
Case Title: Amparo vs. People, G.R No.: G.R. No. 204990, February 22, 2017

Facts:

On April 26, 2007, four accused armed with bladed weapons boarded a passenger jeepney
and announced a holdup. They were able to take away a Nokia cellphone of one of the passengers.
Police officers arrived at the crime scene and arrested the accused. Upon frisking the accused, the
police officers recovered kitchen knives. The accused were charged before the RTC of the crime of
robbery by a band.

Issue:

WON the accused are guilty of the crime as charged

Ruling:

Yes. The accused are guilty of the crime as charged. Under Article 294 (5) in relation to
Article 295, and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when four (4)
or more malefactors take part in the robbery. All members are punished as principals for any assault
committed by the band, unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the
commission of the crime. Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle
on a public highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or
brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532. It is highway robbery only when it can be proven that
the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of committing that crime.

In this instance, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused were guilty of robbery in band. Thus, they are guilty of the crime of robbery by a band.

Case Title: MEDEL CORONEL y SANTILLAN, RON ALDO PERMEJO y ABARQUEZ, NESTOR
VILLAFUERTE y SAPIN and JOANNE OLIVAREZ y RAMOS, Petitioners; VS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 214536 , March 13, 2017

Facts:

A PDEA team implemented a search warrant covering a building at No. I 734 F. Mufioz
Street, Tramo Street, Barangay 43, Zone 6, Pasay City. Three (3) persons, identified as Olivarez,
Erlinda Fetalino, and Benjie Guday, were found inside the subject building. Coronel, Permejo, and
Villafuerte were apprehended after trying to escape out of the window.

During the search, the team recovered, among others, transparent plastic sachets,
aluminium foils, containers of white crystalline substance and white powdery residue, disposable
lighters, improvised plastic scoops, a total amount of ₱580.00 in assorted bills, and ₱165.00 in coins.

They were arrested and apprised of their constitutional rights. The confiscated items were
also inventoried, photographed, and marked in their presence, as well as in the presence of the
Barangay officials and the Department of Justice and media representatives.

The arrested suspects were brought to the PDEA Headquarters for investigation and
mandatory drug testing, together with the seized objects, one of which was identified as shabu.
Coronel, Villafuerte, Permejo, and Olivarez tested positive for shabu.

The RTC and CA found Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte, and Olivarez (accused) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Sections 7 and 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. The SC denied
the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the accused.

Issue:

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 Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

No.

On Motion for Reconsideration, the SC found that the prosecution failed to establish that
the accused knowingly visited a drug den. Before a person may be convicted under Section 7, it
must be shown that he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still visited the place
despite this knowledge. The prosecution established that petitioners knew that the place was a
drug den, based solely on the positive drug test results.

True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs some time
before their arrest. However, assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den before
their arrest, there was no showing how long petitioners were at the alleged drug den, or how long
the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no basis to assume that petitioners used
drugs at the moment immediately before arrest, and thus, at the location of the arrest.

Assuming that persons who test positive for drugs used them at the place of arrest is not
sufficient to show that they were aware of the nature of the suspected drug den before visiting it,
absent any other circumstantial evidence.

There was no attempt to show that petitioners knew the nature of the alleged drug den, or
even that they used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found to be in possession of
any drugs. When petitioners were arrested, nobody was found “in the act of using, selling or buying
illegal drugs, nor packaging nor hiding nor transporting the same” There were no acts alleged or
evidence found, which would tend to show a familiarity with the nature of the place as a drug den.

Thus, the accused are not guilty of violating Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9165. He
must be acquitted.

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee vs JUANITO ENTRAMPAS,

Accused-Appellant, G.R. No. 212161, March 29, 2017

Principle:
Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance, truth, or
weight of the victim's testimonies. "Minor inconsistencies may be expected of [a girl] of such tender
years ... who is unaccustomed to a public trial,” particularly one where she would recount such a
harrowing experience as an assault to her dignity. Jurisprudence has consistently given full weight
and credence to a child's testimonies.64 "Youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity.
" "Leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past
incidents of abuse."

Facts:

Accused Entrampas and BBB were common-law spouses, cohabitating for 8 years. AAA is
BBB’s daughter from a previous relationship. Sometime in February 2003, at about 5:00 PM, AAA
arrived from school to cook for her family. She was interrupted by Entrampas and was asked to go
to the room upstairs, to which she replied. She was 11-years-old by then. Once in the room,
Entrampas forced AAA to lie down on the floor. He was warned by accused-appellant that if she
shouted, he would kill her. She was also warned that if she told her mother about what he was about
to do, he would kill them. Entrampas took off the child's panty, undressed himself, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain as he penetrated her. She cried and pleaded him to stop. As he
consummated the act, she noticed a knife on the wall within his reach. She became more fearful.
After satisfying himself, he again warned the child that he would kill her and her mother if she
informed anyone about the incident.

33 | P a g e
 The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003, and again in the following
months. It was in July 2003 when BBB noticed changes in AAA’s body. By September 2003, her
belly had become noticeably bigger. She was found to be pregnant.
Fearing for her life, AAA refused to reveal the identity of the father of her child. BBB asked
Entrampas, who admitted to be the father. On September 8, 2003, Entrampas and BBB went to
BBB’s brother, CCC, to confess to the crime. CCC immediately reported the matter to the police and
Entrampas was charged with 2 counts of qualified rape. He was convicted in the RTC, but appealed,
contesting the alleged inconsistent statements of AAA regarding the time the first and second rape
happened, and whether she was awake or asleep before the molestation.

Issue:
Whether or not the inconsistencies in AAA’s statement would affect her credibility.

Ruling:

The alleged inconsistencies "are collateral and minor matters which do not at all touch upon
the commission of the crime nor affect [the minor victim]'s credibility." AAA's inability to recall the
precise date and time of the rape is immaterial as these are not elements of the crime.59 Moreover,
"rape victims are not expected to cherish in their memories an accurate account of the dates,
number of times[,] and manner they were violated."

Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance, truth, or
weight of the victim's testimonies. "Minor inconsistencies may be expected of [a girl] of such tender
years ... who is unaccustomed to a public trial,” particularly one where she would recount such a
harrowing experience as an assault to her dignity.

Neither do these alleged discrepancies, not being elements of the crime, diminish the
credibility of AAA's declarations. Jurisprudence has consistently given full weight and credence to a
child's testimonies.64 "Youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity. " "Leeway should be
given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse."

As she had no reason to concoct lies against Entrampas, AAA was found to be credible, and
Entrampas remained convicted.

Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance, truth, or weight
of the victim's testimonies. "Minor inconsistencies may be expected of [a girl] of such tender years ...
who is unaccustomed to a public trial,” particularly one where she would recount such a harrowing
experience as an assault to her dignity.

Case Title: ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 210266, June
7, 2017

Facts:

Cruz allegedly tried to purchase two bottles of Calvin Klein perfume worth from Duty Free
Philippines Fiesta Mall. Wong, the cashier at the Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid for the
purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card. The transaction was approved, although Wong doubted
the validity of the credit card since the number at the back was not aligned.

Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a pair of Ferragamo shoes. Lim, the cashier on duty,
facilitated the sales transaction. Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card bearing
the name "Gerry Santos." When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping card, Cruz presented a
shopping card with the name of "Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked for another identification card, and
Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the name "Gerry Santos."

34 | P a g e
 Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit card for approval. The
card was approved, but the last four (4) digits of the card were not properly embossed and its
validity date started in November 2006. She called Citibank to verify the credit card. Citibank
informed Lim that the credit card was counterfeit and that the real Gerry Santos was the Head of
Citibank's Fraud Risk Management Division. Cruz tried to escape with the help of Atty. Abad Santos.
The security officers, however, were able to close the mall's main gate, which prevented their
escape.

Cruz filed a Demurrer to Evidence asserting that the credit card was inadmissible since it
was presented and offered by the prosecution in violation of A.M. No. 03-1- 09-SC. Cruz that the
corpus delicti or the alleged counterfeit credit card is inadmissible since it was not marked and
identified during pre-trial. But it was denied. He was convicted for violating RA 8484.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Cruz can be held guilty of violating RA 8484

RULING:

1. Yes.

A counterfeit access device is "any access device that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or
an identifiable component of an access device or counterfeit access device." Under Section 9(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the possession and use of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what
is prohibited is the possession and use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus delicti
of the crime is not merely the access device, but also any evidence that proves that it is counterfeit.

Cruz was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos." He used
the same credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes at Duty Free Fiesta Mall. Citibank Visa credit
card as later proven to be a counterfeit access device.

Case Title: People vs Gacusan, G.R. No. 27776, April 26, 2017

Facts:

Gacusan was BBB's common-law partner. BBB moved in to Gacusan's house, bringing with
her, AAA. Within eight (8) months of BBB's common-law relationship with Gacusan, she died. AAA
continued living with Gacusan, despite her paternal grandmother being alive.

At around 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of October 14, 2009, AAA was trying to sleep beside
Gacusan when she felt Gacusan's hand touching her private parts inside her shorts. AAA said that
she did not attempt to remove Gacusan's hand because she was already used to it. Gacusan brought
out his penis and inserted it through the leg opening of AAA's shorts. Gacusan was able to
penetrate AAA's vagina then proceeded to do a "'push and pull' movement". According to AAA,
although she felt pain when Gacusan raped her, "she did not shout because she was “afraid of him”.
She was afraid to lose a family and she depended on Gacusan for support. AAA confessed that
Gacusan was already molesting her two (2) years after BBB's death.

Issue:

The sole issue for resolution is whether Gacusan's guilt was proven beyond reasonable
doubt despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove that Gacusan employed force, threat,
or intimidation in raping AAA.

35 | P a g e
Ruling:

Yes.

In rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-
law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. (Pp vs. Corpuz [cited case]).
Moreover, in Pp vs. Fraga, the SC held that, “accused-appellant, as the common-law husband of
their mother, he gained such moral ascendancy over complainants that any more resistance than
had been shown by complainants cannot reasonably be expected.” Lastly, in Pp vs. Robles, the court
ruled that, “Actual force or intimidation need not even be employed for rape to be committed where
the over powering influence of a father over his daughter suffices.”

In this case, AAA’s failure to react during the sordid act is a clear showing that, to the mind of
AAA, if she did so otherwise, her only chance of support would be taken from her. Unfortunately, her
so called saviour was the one who took her childhood innocence. It is clear therefore, that Gacusan
had moral influence over AAA who, at the time of the rape, was just a mere 15 year old minor, and is
being supported by him.

Case Title: People v. Avancena y Cabanela, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017

Facts:
Avancena approached Rizaldo and told him that one of the former’s companions noticed
that Rizaldo received illegal drugs. Rizaldo denied Avancena’s accusations. Avancena instructed
Rizaldo that they should board Rizaldo’s vehicle because Avancena was going to introduce him to
the group’s team leader, Tony Abalo. Another person, later identified as Taytay, opened the
passenger’s side door, boarded the vehicle, and handcuffed him.

The group started hurting him; Taytay was strangling him on his left side, Nazareno was
holding him on his right side, and Popioco was punching him. Rizaldo pleaded with them to no avail.

Upon arriving at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot, Avancena told Rizaldo
that they would release him if his father Alfonso would pay them P150,000.00. Later, his father
arrived and told Avancena that he did not have the money requested.

After breakfast, the group came back and one of them took off Rizaldo’s handcuffs. Alfonso
followed the group and approached Avancena to hand him money, saying, “Pare, this is the only
money I have, just call me by cellphone and I will give the remaining balance later.” They returned to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot to get Rizaldo’s vehicle. Then, Rizaldo drove
home with his father following him.

While reporting the crime to AIDSOTF in Camp Crame, Alfonso received a call from
Avancena demanding the payment of P150,000.00. Because of the continued demands for
payment, NAKTAF had the opportunity to setup an entrapment operation. Alfonso gave AIDSOTF
P6,000.00, which NAKTAF prepared as marked money and placed in a plastic bag.

Accused claim that they were agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency’s Task
Force Hunter but were unable to present any evidence to substantiate their claim.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused are guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
5. Whether or not the accused are guilty of robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal
Code.

Ruling:

36 | P a g e
 1. Yes, they are guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following elements: “1)
the accused was a private person; 2) he [or she] kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived
another of his or her liberty; 3) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and 4) the victim was
kidnapped or detained for ransom.”

In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that the victim was “forcefully
transported, locked up or restrained.” It must be proven that the accused intended “to deprive the
victim of his liberty.” The act of handcuffing Rizaldo and physically harming him to prevent escape
falls under this definition.

The fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused does not remove the element of
deprivation of liberty if the victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the
victim would not have done so.” Rizaldo would not have gone with the accused-appellants had they
not misrepresented themselves as Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents who allegedly
caught him selling illegal drugs.

Accused also told Rizaldo that he would only be released if Alfonso paid them P150,000.00.
“The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an unlawful physical or
mental restraint against the person’s will, and with a willful intent to so confine the victim.” If Rizaldo
was indeed free to leave, there would have been no reason for Alfonso to come rushing to his son’s
aid.

2. Yes, they are guilty of robbery.

The elements of simple robbery are “a) that there is personal property belonging to another;
b) that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and d) that
there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.”

In this case, there was a taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso by means of
intimidation. “Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if [the offender] has no opportunity to dispose of the thing.” The marked money was
recovered from the accused when they were arrested, which proves that they were able to gain
possession of Alfonso’s money.

Case Title: People vs Corpuz Y Flores, G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017

Facts:

Allan was charged with four (4) counts of rape against AAA, 14 years old with a mental age
of a 5 year old child. AAA became pregnant as a result.

AAA was 14 years old when she had her neuropsychiatric examination with a psychologist.
The examination revealed that at the time of examination, AAA's Intelligence Quotient was 42 and
her level of intelligence was equal to Moderate Mental Retardation. Also, she had a mental age of a
five (5)-year-and-eight (8)-month-old child.

During the trial, AAA testified and was asked by the prosecution: “what did Allan do to you
that made (him) the father of your daughter?”

A "lniyot nak[,] sir" (he had sex with me).

Q How many times did Allan ha[ve] sex with you?

37 | P a g e
 A Four (4) times, sir.

Q How old were you then when Allan had sex with you?

A I was 13 years old, sir.

AAA failed to testify when and where she was raped as she was not oriented with place, date, and
time.

Issues:

I.What crime was committed by Allan?

II.Whether AAA is, an intellectually disabled person, eligible from testifying in court.
III.Whether Allan should be acquitted due to AAAs failure to testify when and where she was
raped.
IV.Whether the defense may raise the objection on the reliability of the DNA testing for the first
time on appeal.

Ruling:

Allan's acts amounted to rape under Article 266-A 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape is Committed-

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

....

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the accused remains liable for
rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts. The reason behind the rule "is simply that if
sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape, it must thereby follow that carnal
knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a child below twelve years should likewise be
constitutive of rape."

Here, In this case, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA were clearly established by the
victim's testimony. Apart from identifying her offender, AAA was also able to recount the sordid
acts committed against her. Also, although AAA was already 19 years old at the time she testified,
her mental age was that of a child aged five (5) to seven (7) years. She is considered incapable of
giving rational consent because she is not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that
gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality.

II

AAA is eligible from testifying in court.

To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether he [or she] can perceive and, perceiving, can make
known his [or her] perception to others," Rule 130, ROC. Therefore, an intellectually disabled person
is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. "He or she can be a witness,
depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. "If an intellectually disabled victim's
testimony is coherent (i.e. she is capable, logical and consistent in narrating her experience), it is
admissible in court.

38 | P a g e
Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person
with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her
perception to others.

In affirming the finding of the accused's guilt, this Court is aware that "when a woman says that she
has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to show that she had indeed been raped." If
her testimony withstands the test of credibility, like in this case, "the rapist may be adjudged guilty
solely on that basis."

III.
This Court underscores that the date, place, and time of the incidents need not be accurately
established since these are not elements of rape.

Allan cannot exculpate himself, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
since AAA was allegedly not oriented to date, time, and place. AANs failure to offer any testimony
as to when and where she was raped does not matter.

IV
No. To emphasize, it is the defense that moved for a DNA testing. It failed to assail the result and the
dependability of the procedure before the trial court. It is only now that it is questioning the test's
accuracy given that the results are not favorable to it. For this reason, this Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the defense is already "estopped from questioning, much less, objecting the
reliability of the DNA testing methodology conducted on the specimens submitted."

NOTE: The 3 possible results of DNA testing - “Exclusion”, “Inconclusive”, “Inclusion”

In resolving a crime, an evidence sample is "collected from the scene of the crime or from
the victim's body for the suspect's DNA." This sample is "then matched with the reference
sample taken from the suspect and the victim." DNA testing is made to "ascertain whether
an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample." Hence, the
collected samples "are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile"
which may provide any of these three (3) possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the
analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more
conclusive result; or

3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In
such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the similarity.

Case Title: MARIANO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 224102, July 26, 2017

Principles:
Reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity.

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One who is assaulted does not have the time nor sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and
choose the weapon to be used.

Facts:

Mariano went to the house of Pamela, his common-law wife, where he saw Natividad and
Yuki arguing. Natividad went berserk, slapped Yuki, and kicked Pamela’s daughter, Pia. Mariano
went inside to tell his mother-in-law and Pamela that Natividad was hurting Yuki and Pia. Pamela
confronted Natividad, who then punched Pamela on the face and shoulder. Mariano pushed
Natividad to the ground. Natividad stood back up and got a piece of wood and kept hitting Mariano.
Petitioner Mariano evaded Natividad’s blows because Natividad was drunk and staggering. Mariano
picked up a knife and stabbed Natividad on his buttocks. Due to Natividad’s continuous hitting,
Mariano stabbed Natividad again, this time on the right side of his body.
A case for frustrated homicide was filed against Mariano. But, Mariano claimed that he acted in self-
defense and in defense of a relative.

The trial court found Mariano guilty of frustrated homicide. It held that Mariano failed to establish
his defense with clear and convincing evidence and concluded that Natividad was not an unlawful
aggressor. Even with unlawful aggression, the means used by Mariano were unreasonable.
Natividad was drunk and staggering, which made it easy for Mariano to evade Natividad’s
continuous attempts to hit him.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It was testified by the
Accused’s own witnesses, i.e. Pamela Rivera, that the Complainant was merely shouting. Also, the
witnesses were all inside the house at the time the Accused stabbed the Complainant. Hence, there
was no longer any imminent danger on the lives of his relatives as they are all in the safety of their
home. The second element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, i.e., reasonable means
employed to prevent or repel the alleged aggression, could not have been present in the absence of
any unlawful aggression on the part of the Complainant.

Issue:
Whether or not Mariano can avail of a justifying circumstance.

Ruling:

Yes. At the very least, petitioner acted in defense of a stranger. Article 11(1) and (3) of the Revised
Penal Code provide:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances.—The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided, that the following circumstances
concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
....
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

First, an attack showing the aggressor’s intention is enough to consider that unlawful
aggression was committed. Thus, the attack on Pamela should have been considered as unlawful
aggression for purposes of invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger.

Second, the state of mind of the accused during the alleged act of self-defense or defense
of a stranger must be considered in determining whether a person’s means of repelling an
aggressor were reasonable.

“Reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is
assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons which

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can easily be made in the calmness of the home. It is not the indispensable need but the rational
necessity which the law requires. In each particular case, it is necessary to judge the relative
necessity, whether more or less imperative, in accordance with the rules of rational logic. The
defendant may be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether he employed rational
means to repel the aggression.”

The reasonable necessity of the means employed in the defense, according to the jurisprudence of
courts, does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.
Here, although the offended party was drunk, and therefore, was not able to land his blows, his
attacks were incessant. He had already attacked three (3) other persons — two (2) minors as well as
petitioner’s common-law wife — and was still belligerent. While it may be true that Pamela, Pia, and
Yuki had already gone inside the house at the time of the stabbing, it then appeared to the petitioner
that there was no other reasonable means to protect his family except to commit the acts alleged. It
is unreasonable for courts to demand conduct that could only have been discovered with hindsight
and absent the stress caused by the threats that the petitioner actually faced.

Finally, petitioner was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The victim himself,
Natividad, testified that he had no issues with petitioner before the incident. Thus, all the elements
to invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger were present in this case.
Considering that petitioner was justified in stabbing Natividad under Article 11, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, he should be exonerated of the crime charged.

Note.—The requisites of defense of strangers are, namely: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (c) the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. (People vs. Del Castillo, 663 SCRA 226 [2012])
The burden of proving unlawful aggression belonged to the petitioners. (Rustia, Jr. vs. People, 805
SCRA 311 [2016])

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ABENIR BRUSOLA Y

BARAGWA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT., G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017

Facts: Abenir and Delia, together with their children, were at home on July 12, 2006 at around
6:45PM. Their house was a one (1)-storey building and had an open sala, a kitchen, and one (1)
bedroom. Kristofer was asleep in the bedroom. Joanne was eating with her back turned to her father,
who was preparing for work. Jessica, Abegail, and Delia were watching the television, with Delia
seated on the floor near the toilet. Joanne would occasionally glance at her father and noticed that
he seemed restless. Suddenly, Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second blow
hit the cement wall. Joanne yelled, "Tay!" and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he did it. Abenir said
he saw a man in the bathroom with Delia. Joanne looked in the bathroom but saw no one. Kristofer
was awoken. When he emerged from the bedroom, he saw his father still holding the maso while his
sisters Joanne and Abigail were attending to Delia, who was on the floor and had blood on her head.
Kristofer held Abenir. Delia was rushed to the hospital by their neighbors. Joanne lost consciousness
but arose when their neighbors massaged her head. Abenir was brought to the police station. The
next day, their neighbor Joy Tabarno informed the Brusola siblings that Delia had passed away.
Abenir was charged with parricide and during arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Trial of the
case followed. The trial court found Abenir guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of parricide
and was sentenced to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, he argued that there were
inconsistencies in the testimonies of his children, Joanne and Abegail. Moreover, Joanne, the
prosecution's lone eyewitness to the attack, purportedly had ill motive against him since he had
opposed her plans of early marriage. Further, in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the trial
court did not consider the mitigating circumstances of passion, obfuscation, and voluntary
surrender.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in Abenir’s argument and affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Hence this petition.

Issue:

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 Was the accused Abenir guilty for the crime of parricide?

Ruling:

Yes. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court appreciated the evidence presented by the parties, considered the credibility
of their respective witnesses, and found that all the elements of the crime of parricide were
sufficiently proved by the prosecution. There was no dispute as to the relationship between the
accused-appellant and the victim.
As for the act of killing, the trial court held:
With respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly testified
that she suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's
straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and credible evidence,
sufficient to convict the accused. Well settled is the rule that it is unnatural for a relative, in this case
the accused's own child, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other
than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing to indicate
that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations
made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.
As to the penalty imposed, the Court found the penalty imposed by the trial court correct
and proper. The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to
death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating
circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of
death on appellant was thus proper.
Accused-appellant Abenir cited People v. Genosa to support the imposition of a lower
penalty in light of the mitigating circumstance. True, this Court in Genosa applied Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, instead of Article 63, to determine the penalty for parricide:
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been
found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1)
degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 of the same Code. The penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken
into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were
shown to have attended the commission of the offense. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree — prision
mayor — and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum.
Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be
released from detention on parole.[31] (Citations omitted)

However, there is no basis to apply Article 64 to the crime of parricide. Considering that the
penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties—reclusion perpetua to death—Art. 63,
and not Art. 64, is applicable. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

Case Title: People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Sagana Y De Guzman, G.R. No. 298471, August 2,
2017

PRINCIPLE: The accused in all criminal prosecutions is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof lies with the
prosecution. Thus, it must depend on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the
case for the defense. Moreover, proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient
to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is necessary to surmount the presumption of innocence.

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FACTS:
Police officers coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to act on a tip by a
confidential informant. P/Insp. Gerardo Macaraeg, Jr., PO3 Lucas Salonga (PO3 Salonga), PO3
Christian Carvajal (PO3 Carvajal), PO1 Allan Emerson Daus, and PO1 Ferdinand Lopez carried out a
buy-bust operation in Sagana’s residence at Muslim Tondaligan, Dagupan City.

PO3 Salonga posted as the poseur-buyer. Five (5) 100.00 bills served as buy-bust money,
marked with PO3 Salonga’s initials, “LCS”. Allegedly before the operation, PO3 Salonga had
arranged the transaction through a phone call with Sagana, who set the meeting at his house. The
operation ensued. Upon arrival at Sagana’s house, Sagana invited PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carvajal
inside. Once inside, PO3 Salonga informed Sagana that he would purchase P500 worth of
shabu. When Sagana asked for the payment, PO3 Salonga gave him the marked money. After
counting the money, Sagana handed him one (1) plastic sachet of shabu. Thereafter, PO3 Salonga
confronted Sagana and introduced himself as a police officer. PO3 Carvajal apprehended Sagana’s
wife and another lady who also peddled him shabu. After a body search on Sagana, PO3 Salonga
recovered the marked money and retrieved five (5) more plastic sachets of shabu. PO3 Salonga
marked the articles with his initials, “LCS”. Accordingly, he made the confiscation receipt before
delivering Sagana to the police station.

At the police station, the incident was entered in the police blotter. They took photos of
Sagana and the confiscated items in the presence of a representative from the Department of
Justice, media representatives, and an elected barangay official. Based on the chemistry reports of
P/Sr. Ins. Myrna Malojo, the heat-sealed plastic sachets were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

The Regional Trial Court found Sagana guilty of the charges. On appeal, Sagana asserted
that the police officers failed to comply with Section 21 of Rep. Act No. 9165 and its implementing
rules. He argued that the trial court allegedly erred in finding him guilty of the charges.

ISSUE:

Was there compliance with the chain of custody rule?

RULING:

There was no compliance with the chain of custody rule.

In compliance with the chain of custody, the prosecution must identify the person involved
in handling the seized articles from confiscation up to their presentation as
evidence. Concomitantly, the prosecution should also offer statements pertaining to each link of
the chain in such a way that every person who touched the illegal drugs would describe how and
from whom they were received, whey they were and what happened to them, and their condition
upon delivery.

The prosecution’s narration of events reveals that the police officers did not conform with
the chain of custody. According to the prosecution, the items were immediately marked and
inventoried in Sagana’s residence after confiscation. However, it failed to offer any reason why the
mandated photographing was not concurrently done with the inventory and was only made when
Sagana was already in the police station.

Every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it was handled and
preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching or replacement. In a number of drug
cases, this Court ruled that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimonies of the persons
who had direct contact with the confiscated items without ample explanation casts doubt on
whether the allegedly seized shabu were the very same ones presented in court.

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Case Title: PEOPLE v. PO3 JULIETO BORJA, G.R. No. 199710, August 2, 2017

Facts:

At about 10:00 a.m. on May 26, 2004, Ronalyn Manatad (Ronalyn) and her friend,
Vicky Lusterio (Lusterio), were walking along Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, a man
who was later identified as PO3 Borja, grabbed Ronalyn by her right forearm and forcibly took her
inside a gray van where three (3) other men were waiting. Both Ronalyn and Lusterio shouted for
help but no one came to their rescue. Lusterio managed to escape. She immediately reported the
incident to Ronalyn's mother, Adelina Manatad (Adelina). Edwin, the brother of Ronalyn sought
assistance from Sergeant Abet Cordova (Sgt. Cordova) of the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force
(NAKTAF).

An entrapment operation was conducted. However, despite the successful entrapment

operation, the authorities failed to rescue Ronalyn. While she was inside the van, Ronalyn heard one
(1) of her abductors say that PO3 Borja was entrapped. The others cursed her and said, "Putang ina,
iyung kapatid mo. Tumawag ng taga-NAKTAF." Afterwards, she was taken by her captors to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency where she was charged with illegal sale of shabu.
RTC convicted Borja for kidnapping with ransom. PO3 Borja appealed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. He argued that Ronalyn was not deprived of her liberty because she was lawfully
arrested and charged with violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

Issue:

Whether accused-appellant PO3 Julieto Borja is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

kidnapping punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

Yes.

Ronalyn's apprehension for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not automatically
negate the criminal liability of accused-appellant. It also does not exclude the possibility of the
commission of the crime with which accused-appellant is charged. The buy-bust operation carried
out against Ronalyn and her kidnapping are events that can reasonably coexist. Furthermore, a
violation of Republic Act No. 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation to the crime of kidnapping.
Ronalyn's arrest and conviction are immaterial to the determination of accused-appellant's criminal
liability. In other words, Ronalyn's innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor negate the
commission of the crime of kidnapping against her. Therefore, the resolution of this case will
depend solely on whether the prosecution has established all the elements of kidnapping under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

A conviction for the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) The offender is a private individual; (2) That individual
kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of liberty; (3) The act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; (4) In the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days, it is
committed by one who simulates public authority, any serious physical injury is inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained, or any threat to kill that person is made and the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, a female or a public officer. Although the crime of kidnapping can only be
committed by a private individual, the fact that the accused is a public official does not
automatically preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping against him. A public officer who
detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom cannot be said to be acting in an official
capacity. In People v. Santiano, this Court explained that public officials may be prosecuted under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if they act in their private capacity.

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Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PANGAN, G.R. No. 206965 April 26, 2017

Principle: It is settled that in proceedings involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the
testimonies of police officers as prosecution witnesses are given weight for it is assumed that they
have performed their functions in a regular manner. Thus, this presumption stands except in cases
when there is evidence to the contrary or proof imputing ill motive on their part.

FACTS
On April 11, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an Information against Pangan for
violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 for having in her possession and control 14.16 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, without being authorized by law to
possess the same. However, the accused pleaded not guilty and the rial on the merits
commenced.

The prosecution presented several witnesses among them is PO1 Carillo, who was Intelligence
Operative of the Capiz Police Provincial Office. He conducted a test-buy operation on Pangan at
B&T Merchandising. A police asset had reported that the shop was owned by Pangan and her live-in
partner, Mario Tupaz (Tupaz). He applied for search warrant and requested for a team to conduct
buy-bust operation. They were able to confiscate drug paraphernalia and were marked accordingly.
The arresting team brought Pangan to the police station. The confiscated articles were recorded in
the police blotter.

The arresting team then brought the return of service of the search warrant and the seized
items to the court. P/S Insp. Batiles wrote a letter to Judge Fantilanan, requesting to withdraw the 4
sachets of suspected shabu for laboratory examination. The trial court granted the request causing
the items to be forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/C Insp. Baldevieso issued Chemistry
Report No. D-145, which verified that the seized items tested positive for shabu.

On the other hand, the defense’s witnesses were Pangan; her live-in partner, Tupaz; her 17-
year- old nephew, Ronel Compa (Compa); a tricycle driver, Wilson Villareal (Villareal); and Radio
Mindanao Network reporter, Bulana. The defense have a different version of their narrative, where
Pangan only received a package under the name of Gemma and it is where two police men
approached her. One of them struggled to possess the package while the other poked a gun at
Compa, instructing him to stay still. Pangan claimed that the package was sealed when it was
delivered. She asserted that she was already inside the vehicle when the search warrant was shown
to her.

The RTC found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of 14.16 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Pangan appealed the conviction, attesting that the prosecution
failed to prove the identity of the confiscated drugs. Allegedly, the police officers failed to observe
the guidelines provided for under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Neither the marking of the
confiscated drugs or the signing of the inventory receipt was made in her presence. The CA ruled
against the accused and further denied their appeal. Hence, this appeal was filed before this Court.

ISSUE
Whether the testimony of Culili can prove her guilt considering that the delivery man has no
personal knowledge of the package’s contents?

RULING
YES.
It is settled that in proceedings involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the
testimonies of police officers as prosecution witnesses are given weight for it is assumed that they
have performed their functions in a regular manner. Thus, this presumption stands except in cases
when there is evidence to the contrary or proof imputing ill motive on their part, which is wanting in
this case.

45 | P a g e
 In the case at bar, Pangan failed to adduce any evidence which could overturn the well-
entrenched presumption in favor of the police officers. Hence, he is deemed guilty.

Case Title: People V Balao Y Lopez , G.R. No. 207805, November 22, 2017

Principle:
Every conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. This standard does not entail
absolute certainty but only moral certainty or that which "ultimately appeals to a person's very
conscience." The main consideration of every court is not whether or not it has "doubts on the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains such doubts on his guilt."

The trial courts' assessment of a witness' credibility is generally given great weight and
respect by the appellate courts. Trial courts are in the best position to gauge whether or not a
witness has testified truthfully since they had "the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on
the stand."

Facts:

Christopher Villarand and his friend were walking along Tejeron Street near Don Mariano
Marcos High School in Sta. Ana, Manila. Roberto "Obet" Espejo (Espejo) suddenly came out of
nowhere, poked him with an arrow, and then left. The next day, Christopher asked Espejo why he
poked him the previous night to which Espejo replied, "Wala kang pakialam, gago ka. " This enraged
Christopher. A fistfight ensued between them, Espejo lost and threatened Christopher by saying,
"Isusumbong kita kay Cesar Balao." On the same day, Francisco was in front of Don Mariano Marcos
High School. He narrated that he saw Wilfredo on a bicycle, engaged in a conversation with Espejo
and a certain Purong. Francisco overheard Espejo inquiring about Christopher's whereabouts. While
the three (3) were chatting, Balao suddenly appeared behind Wilfredo and stabbed him in the chest
with a fan knife. Espejo, Purong, and Balao immediately fled from the scene. Wilfredo alighted from
his bicycle and tried to chase them but he fell down. Wilfredo was immediately rushed to Trinity
General Hospital. However, he was pronounced dead on arrival. On the other hand, Balao interposed
the defense of alibi that on the same date and time, he and his family boarded a bus bound for
Cagayan Province. His eldest sister, Luzviminda, arrived from Japan and wanted to visit Piat Church.
They stayed for one (1) night at a relative's house in Catotoran, Camalaniugan. The next day, they
went to Piat Church. After hearing mass, Balao and Luzviminda took photographs to commemorate
their visit. A photograph of Balao's visit to Piat Church and a photograph purportedly showing Balao
with his family in Camalaniugan River were both presented in court.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding Balao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder.
Issue/s:

1. Whether or not accused-appellant Cesar Balao is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

2. Whether or not the fact only one eyewitness was presented by the prosecution during trial would
be sufficient to overturn accused-appellant's conviction.

Ruling:

1. Yes.

Under the law, Every conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. This standard does
not entail absolute certainty but only moral certainty or that which "ultimately appeals to a person's
very conscience." The main consideration of every court is not whether or not it has "doubts on the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains such doubts on his guilt." The immense

46 | P a g e
responsibility of discharging this burden lies with the prosecution, who must establish the identity
of the perpetrator of the crime with equal certainty as the crime itself "for, even if the commission
of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being
likewise clearly ascertained."

In this case, the conviction of accused-appellant rests on the testimony of Francisco, the
sole eyewitness presented by the prosecution during trial. The Court of Appeals found no reason to
re-evaluate the trial court's assessment of Francisco's credibility holding that his testimony was
"clear and positive in its vital points.

Therefore, Balao is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

2. No.

Under the law, the trial courts' assessment of a witness' credibility is generally given great
weight and respect by the appellate courts. Trial courts are in the best position to gauge whether or
not a witness has testified truthfully since they had "the direct opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand."However, if there is a clear showing that the assessment was made
arbitrarily or that "the trial court . . . plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if
considered might affect the result of the case," then appellate courts would not hesitate to review
the trial court's findings, especially when a person's fundamental right to liberty is at stake. Also, the
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime is regarded as more important than
ascertaining the name of the accused.

In this case, the Court has pored over the records of the case and has found no significant
evidence that would support an acquittal. Francisco, the sole eyewitness, was familiar with accused-
appellant and knew accused-appellant's identity and reputation even before the stabbing incident
took place. Although Francisco did not know accused-appellant's name, Francisco knew accused-
appellant's identity. Francisco's testimony on how Wilfredo was killed does not appear to be tainted
with any irregularity. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime gave him a fair
opportunity to observe the events that transpired.

Thus,Accused-appellant's conviction is affirmed.

Case Title: People vs. Castro, G.R. No. 211053, Nov. 29, 2017

Principle:
For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2)
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

Facts:
An Amended Information dated December 1, 1998, Manuel D. Osir (Osir), Orozco, Maturan, and
Castro were charged with the crime of murder, having allegedly killed the victim through treachery.

On the evening of November 15, 1998, Susan Lalona was at Murillo's Restaurant, Magallanes
Street, Surigao City with her friend and herein victim, Julius Mata (Mata). Later, Orozco, Osir, Castro,
and Maturan, apparently drunk, entered and occupied the table in front of Lalona and Mata. Shortly
after they ordered beer, Orozco approached Mata from behind and stabbed him twice with a small
bolo. Mata shouted that he was stabbed. Lalona grabbed Orozco and wrestled with him, but he
pushed her back. When Mata tried to run out, the rest of the accused caught him. While Maturan
and Osir held Mata's arms, Castro stabbed him in the chest. The four (4) accused continued stabbing
Mata and ran away when Lalona shouted for help. Mata was pronounced dead on arrival upon
arriving at a hospital.

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Issue:

WON that the qualifying circumstance of treachery should not have been applied to all the
accused.

Ruling:

No, treachery should be applied to all the accused.

To sustain a conviction under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must
prove that a person was killed, that the accused killed him, that the killing was not parricide or
infanticide, and that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
under this Article. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

In this case, Mata was completely helpless. His hands were held by two other persons while he
was stabbed. To make matters worse, four persons, who were armed with knives, ganged-up on
Mata. Certainly, Mata was completely deprived of any prerogative to defend himself or to retaliate.

Case title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABUNDIO M. SARAGENA

G.R. No. 210677

One-liner: When the quantity of the confiscated substance is miniscule, the requirements of Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
must be strictly complied with.

Facts:

SPO1 Paller received information that a certain "Tatay" was selling illegal drugs at Sitio
Sindulan, Brgy. Mabolo, Cebu City. A buy-bust team was formed, SPO1 Paller called the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for coordination on the buy-bust operation.

Outside accused-appellant's house, PO1 Misa convinced the suspect to sell him shabu. PO1
Misa handed the P100.00 bill as payment, for which he received a "pack of white crystalline
substance." SPO1 Paller and SPO3 Magdadaro then rushed to the scene and introduced themselves
as police officers. SPO1 Paller conducted a body search on accused-appellant and recovered the
buy-bust money. Accused-appellant was brought to the police station.

At the police station, PO1 Misa turned over the plastic pack to their team leader, SPO3
Magdadaro, who then marked it with the letters "AS." The incident was logged in the police blotter.
PO1 Misa with SPO1 Paller delivered SPO3 Magdadaro's letter-request and the seized plastic pack
to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Cebu City. A certain PO2 Roma received the
letter-request and the specimen from PO1 Misa and then delivered these items to P/S Insp. Sayson-
Acog, a forensic chemist.

P/S Insp. Acog found the plastic pack marked as "AS" to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. She entered her findings in her Chemistry Report No. D-89G-2005,[41] marked the
specimen as "D-890-05," and put her initials, "PSA."

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 Saragena, on the other hand, claimed that he was at home when three armed police officers
kicked the door of his house. He recognized PO1 Misa, SPO1 Palter, and SPO3 Magdadaro as they
frequented illegal cockfights. The police officers held accused-appellant. One of them searched his
pockets but found nothing. They also searched his house.

Despite the lack of contraband found, he was sent to the Mabolo Police Station. He inquired
why he was being arrested. The buy-bust team told him that they were able to buy shabu from him.
Denying this accusation, accused-appellant asserted that they planted the evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant Abundio Mamolo Saragena can be held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

RULING:

NO.

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes any person who sells a dangerous drug,
regardless of quantity. To successfully convict an accused under this provision, the prosecution
must establish the identities of the buyer and the seller, the item sold, and the consideration given
for it. There must be an actual sale, consummated through delivery and payment. Finally, the corpus
delicti must be presented in court as evidence.

In this case, the chain of custody requires bt law was notduly established. The allegation of
having "clearly" seen the exchange of money and the pack of shabu between accused-appellant and
PO1 Misa was not sufficiently established. PO1 was not presented and the failure of such casts
doubt on the charge that an illegal sale of drugs took place. No evidence was adduced to show
specifically how the police officers handled, stored, and safeguarded the seized shabu pending its
offer as evidence. Prosecution has not given a justifiable ground for applying the exception. All it
has done is to assert a self-serving claim that the integrity of the seized pack has been preserved
despite the numerous procedural lapses it has committed.

Case title: DAAYATA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 205745

Principles:

The prosecution's case must rise on its own merits, not merely on relative strength as
against that of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, acquittal must
follow as a matter of course.

Facts:

On December 17, 1995, Rolando O. Bahian alleged that Capistano Daataya et al, conspiring
mutually, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, assaulted, box, kick and struck Bahian. This
incident happen a day after a commotion incident between the parties in the basketball court.
Bahian Farther alleged that a stone was thrown to his head by petitioners that causes depress
frontal fracture, open frontal bone, left, and advice for surgery. The petitioners pleaded not guilty.

The defense, apart from the three petitioners, offered the testimonies of Delfin Yafiez
(Delfin), Rodolfo Yafiez (Rodolfo), Danzon Daayata (Danzon) and Rosemarie Daayata (Rosemarie ).
Petitioners Salisi and Malacat claimed that they were having coffee at the house of Vicente Daayata
(Vicente), in the morning of December 17, 1995. Bahian arrived with Kagawad Abalde, and called for
Salisi to come out. When Salisi acceded, Bahian challenged him to a fight and threw the first punch
that started a scuffle. In the course of the melee, Bahian took a swing for Salisi, who ducked, causing

49 | P a g e
Bahian to lose his balance. Bahian then fell on the pavement and hit his head. Kagawad Abalde then
drew a gun, poked it at Salisi, and threatened to kill him. For his part, petitioner Daayata claimed that
he was in his house, some 50 meters away from Vicente's house when the incident recalled by
petitioners Salisi and Malacat transpired. He rushed to Vicente's house upon hearing a commotion.
Farther said the Barangay Captain Yafiez arrived after an hour. They added however, that in the
evening of December 16, while they were on their way home, Bahian waited for them to pass by his
house, where he challenged them to a fight. Defense witness Rodolfo allegedly pacified Bahian.

Frustrated murder case was file against petitioners, the petitioners ordered guilty by
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners
appealed in the court of appeals but affirmed guilty. However, Bahian Medical Certificates showed
no injury other than that on forehead. Bahian during the questioning admitted that the injury on the
forehead was cause by accidentally he hit the edge of the concrete pavement.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of petitioners beyond
reasonable doubt, a ground for acquittal of the petitioners.

Ruling:

Yes, the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of petitioners beyond reasonable doubt,
a ground for acquittal of the petitioners.

The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is guaranteed under Section
14(2), Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This fundamental right of the
accused is also embodied under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which specifically states
that "in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR
No. 27951 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido
Malacat, Jr. are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Any amount they each paid by way of a bail bond is ordered RETURNED. SO
ORDERED.

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 2018 Cases

Case Title: People v. Concepcion

Principle: Although the initial abduction of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape,the
continued detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the
detention continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for
the crime of rape.

Key Facts:
Concepcion was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. He detained the complainant inside a house and forcibly and with intimidation
and lewd design, have sexual intercourse twice against her will and consent. Mayor Ostrea's
arrival interrupted the rape. He tried, but failed, to convince Concepcion to release AAA. Then, to
electrocute those who might enter the room, Concepcion installed electric wires on the door. The
police officers used their vehicle to create noise outside, starting its engine and honking its horn.
They forcibly entered Concepcion;s room, breaking the window and the door. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the crime of rape absorbed the crime of forcible abduction.

Issue:
Whether the crime of forcible abduction was absorbed in the crime of rape.

Ruling:
No. The crimes of rape and slight illegal detention are committed by Concepcion. The felony
of slight illegal detention has four (4) elements: (1) That the offender is a private individual; (2) That
he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of his liberty; (3) That the act of
kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) That the crime is committed without the attendance of any
of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 267. The elements of slight illegal detention are all present
here. Accused-appellant is a private individual. The Court of Appeals found that after raping AAA,
accused-appellant continued to detain her and to deprive her of her liberty. It also appreciated
AAA's testimony that accused- appellant placed electrical wires around the room to
electrocute anyone who might attempt to enter it. He refused to release AAA even after his
supposed demands were met. The detention was illegal and not attended by the circumstances that
would render it serious illegal detention.

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V. BELEN MEJARES Y VALENCIA

Principle:

a. The penalty is based on the value proven during trial, and not merely on the Information or
uncorroborated testimonies presented by the prosecution.

b. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate of the stolen items, the
courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 of the RPC or fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.

Key Facts:
Mejares was charged with qualified theft of cash and jewelry amounting to P1,556,308.00.
Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft of assets amounting to P1,056,308.00 and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Article 310 vis à vis Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is ordered to pay to
Jacqueline Aquino Gavino the sum mentioned in actual damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision in toto.

Issue/s:

a. Is the amount of the stolen property, from which the penalty shall be based, correct?

b. Considering the effectivity of RA No. 10951 and the proper computation of the amount of the
stolen
property, how should the court compute its penalty?
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Ruling:
a. No, since the penalty in cases of theft is dependent on the value of stolen personal
properties, the penalty is based on the value proven during trial, and not merely on the Information
or uncorroborated testimonies presented by the prosecution. Here, a perusal of the records leads to
the conclusion that while the RTC reduced the value of the stolen jewelry from P1,000,000.00 to
P500,000.00 on the basis of the complainants; social standing, such determination is devoid of
evidentiary basis.

In People v. Paraiso and People v. Marcos, in Francisco v. People, this Court explained that
an ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry" and that courts cannot take judicial
notice of the value of properties when [it] is not a matter of public knowledge [or] unquestionable
demonstration"; thus: The value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable
of unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence
besides the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for the
stolen jewelry.

b. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may
either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on
the
attendant circumstances of the case. Given that the value of the stolen personal properties in this
case was not determined by reliable evidence independent of the prosecution;s uncorroborated
testimonies, this Court is constrained to apply the minimum penalty under Article 309(6) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 81 of Republic Act No. 10951, which is arresto mayor.

However, in view of Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code concerning qualified theft,[50]
accused- appellant must be meted a penalty two (2) degrees higher, i.e., prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods with a range of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to six (6)
year. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, where there are no modifying circumstances and
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty is computed from the full range of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is medium of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period,
accused-appellant must only suffer a minimum indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor to a maximum of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional. Hence, the accused-appellant is now entitled to immediate release for having
fully served her sentence.

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSHUA QUE Y UTUANIS

Principle: The chain of custody requirements in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act are cast
in precise, mandatory language. They are not stringent for stringency's own sake. Rather, they are
calibrated to preserve the even greater interest of due process and the constitutional rights of
those who stand to suffer from the State's legitimate use of force, and therefore, stand to be
deprived of liberty, property, and, should capital punishment be imposed, life. This calibration
balances the need for effective prosecution of those involved in illegal drugs and the preservation
of the most basic liberties that typify our democratic order.

Key Facts:
In two (2) separate Informations, both dated July 27, 2003, accused appellant Que was
charged with violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

An informant reported that a person identified as "Joshua," later identified as

Que, was selling shabu. Acting on this report, P/C Insp. Nickson Babul Muksan (P/C Insp. Muksan)
organized a buy-bust operation with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer. At the area of Fort Pilar, the
informant introduced PO3 Lim to Que. PO3 Lim then told Que that he intended to purchase
P100.00 worth of shabu. Que then handed him shabu inside a plastic cellophane. In turn, PO3 Lim
handed Que the marked P100.00 bill and gave the pre-arranged signal to have Que arrested. After
the arrest, the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were recovered from Que. Que was then
brought to the police station where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill were turned over to
the investigator, SPO4 Eulogio Tubo (SPO4 Tubo), who then marked these items with his initials. He
also prepared the letter request for laboratory examination of the sachets contents. Arresting
officer SPO1 Jacinto also testified to the same circumstances recounted by PO3 Lim.

In his defense, Que recalled that in the morning of July 26, 2003, he went to Fort Pilar Shrine
to light candles and to pray. Mid-transit, six (6) persons blocked the tricycle he was riding and told

52 | P a g e
him to disembark. After getting off the tricycle, he was brought to a house some five (5) meters
away. Two (2) men, later identified as PO3 Lim and SPO1 Jacinto, searched his pockets but found
nothing. About 30 minutes later, another man arrived and handed something to SPO1 Jacinto. Que
was then brought to the police station and turned over to SPO4 Tubo and was subsequently
detained at the Zamboanga City Police Station.

Issues: Whether or not accused appellant Joshua Que's guilt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
No. The buy-bust team's failures bring into question the integrity of the corpus delicti of the
charge of sale of illegal drugs against accused-appellant. This leaves reasonable doubt on the guilt
of accused-appellant Joshua Que. Necessarily, he must be acquitted.

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that
(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti
must be established beyond reasonable doubt.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the
obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance
of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an
act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof The presumption applies when
nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official
duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In
light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and
examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the
origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody
immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.

Case title: Perez v. People of the Philippines

Principle:

There is no standard behavior for a victim of a crime against chastity.' Moreover, “behavioral
psychology teaches that people react to similar situations dissimilarly." x x x … Thus, “ rape
can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within
school premises and even inside a house where there are other occupants or where other members
of the family are also sleeping”

Facts:
An Information was filed against Perez, charging him with violation of Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No.7610 or the Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act. Perez pleaded not guilty during arraignment. AAA testified that she met Perez
for the first time on November 6, 1998 when she attended her cousin's birthday party. The next day,
November 7, 1998, she saw Perez again when she visited her friend CCC at her house. AAA recalled
that she was wearing a sleeveless blouse, a skirt, and cycling shorts under her skirt that day. AAA
narrated that she “went to the kitchen to drink water.” She saw Perez following her. After drinking,
Perez “kissed her on the nape and simultaneously told her to keep silent.” Then, Perez slid his finger
in her vagina while mashing her breasts. Perez succeeded in his sexual advances, which lasted for
around ten seconds. He then told her not to tell anybody about what happened. AAA later narrated
what happened to her other cousin FFF who disclosed the incident to AAA's parents.

In his defense Perez narrated that on the day of the alleged incident, he and his aunt, Nena Rodrigo,
went to a school in New Manila. He left her aunt around 6:00p.m. and went straight home. Alma,
Perez’s sister testified that she noticed that AAA liked her brother Perez. She was also surprised
when AAA gave her a love letter for her brother. The Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment,
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finding Perez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610,
in relation to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision. In his pleadings, petitioner asserts that the situation created by AAA is improbable and not
in line with common human experience, given her tight fitting clothes at the time of the incident.
Although not impenetrable, her attire was restricting and the time needed to consummate the
alleged act was enough for her to ask for help from her companions. AAA likewise fails to mention
how petitioner subdued her in spite of her resistance. Petitioner stresses that the alleged crime
occurred in close proximity of other persons. It is then impossible that nobody noticed what was
happening.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the testimony of AAA is sufficient to establish that the crime has
been committed.
2. Whether all the elements of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 are present in this
case.

Ruling:

1. Yes. Jurisprudence provides that the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not
make
voluntary the victim's submission to the criminal acts of the accused.” Rape is subjective and not
everyone responds in the same way to an attack by a sexual fiend. No standard form of behavior can
be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement, particularly a child who could not be
expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. People react differently to emotional stress and
rape victims are no different from them.” Lust is no respecter of time and place.” Thus, rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school
premises and even inside a house where there are other occupants or where other members of the
family are also sleeping.

Even if it were true that AAA was infatuated with the accused, it did not justify the indignity done to
her. At the tender age of 12, adolescents will nominally be misled by their hormones and mistake
regard or adoration for love. The aggressive expression of infatuation from a 12-year-old girl is
never an invitation for sexual indignities. Certainly, it does not deserve the accused's mashing of her
breasts or the insertion of his finger into her vagina.

2. Yes, all the elements are present. Under Section 5(b), the elements of sexual abuse are: (1)
The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act is
performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) The child, whethe
male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In this case, the presence of the first and third elements is already established. As to the
second
element, in a similar case, the court ruled that children who are likewise coerced in lascivious
conduct are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. When
petitioner inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA, a minor, with the use of threat and coercion, he
is already liable for sexual abuse.

Case title: Florencia Garcia-Diaz Vs. Sandiganbayan

Principle: When a contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government is
entered into, the persons involved—whether public officers or private persons—may be charged for
violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and suffer the same penalty if found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts:
Flora L. Garcia, filed an application for registration of a property before the CFI. The property
was surveyed and its technical description provided in Bureau of Lands (BL) Plan II-6752. The
Republic of the Philippines opposed Garcia' s application on the ground that the property sought to
be registered formed part of Fort Magsaysay per Presidential Proclamation No. 237 dated
December 19, 1955. The CFI granted Garcia's application for registration. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision and dismissed Garcia's application for registration finding that the
possessory information title under the name of Padilla was unreliable. Garcia died and was
substituted by Garcia-Diaz. During the
pendency of Garcia-Diaz own motion for reconsideration, she chose to amicably settle with the
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Republic. Garcia-Diaz submitted a draft Compromise Agreement to then Solicitor General Bello.
Under the Compromise Agreement, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority
(NAMRIA) was authorized to conduct the final preliminary evaluation survey and to clarify the
technical description of the reservation in Proclamation No. 237 to determine which portion of the
property coincided with the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay. NAMRIA Administrator Solis
directed Senior Remote Sensing Technologists Valencia and Viernes to "relocate the tie
points and corners 6 and 7 of Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation." In their Summary Report,
they confirmed that they were able to relocate the actual ground positions of comers 6 and 7 of Fort
Magsaysay. They found that the Bureau of Lands Location Monuments remained in the position as
earlier computed and plotted in the topographic map referred to in Presidential Proclamation No.
237. Solis then wrote Solicitor General and in his February 12, 1998 Letter, Solis essentially stated
that the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay did not match with the technical description as
provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. Specifically, the team that surveyed the military
reservation supposedly found corner points 6 and 7 in the technical description misleading and that
the cannot be located, hence comparison with BL Plan II-6752 cannot be effected. Based on the
findings, the Republic, through Solicitor General Galvez, and Garcia-Diaz signed and jointly filed a
Motion for Approval of Amicable Settlement. In the Compromise Agreement, Garcia- Diaz agreed to
withdraw her application for registration of the property covered by BL Plan II-6752 that was within
Fort Magsaysay in exchange for the Republic' s withdrawal of its opposition to the registration of
the portion outside the reservation. In the meantime, the new NAMRIA Administrator, Fajardo,
formed a team to investigate the alleged anomaly involving the Compromise Agreement. The
Investigating Committee declared inaccurate the statement of then Administrator Solis in his
February 12, 1998 Letter that a portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 was outside the
technical description of Fort Magsaysay based on Map SP 203, a plotting of technical description
provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, which showed that the entire property described in
BL Plan II-6752 was within the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay. In an Information,
NAMRIA official Solis, and private person Garcia-Diaz were charged for violating Section 3(g) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and falsification of public documents under the Revised Penal
Code. The Sandiganbayan found Garcia-Diaz and Solis guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Aside from the graft charge, Solis was found guilty of falsification
by a public officer punished under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Solis argued
that the prosecution failed to prove his part in the conspiracy to execute the Compromise
Agreement. First, he was not a party to it. Second, he had never met Solicitor General Galvez, the
solicitor general who entered into the Compromise Agreement. He only dealt with Solicitor General
Bello, who requested for his opinion. Lastly, there was nothing on record to prove that he knew
Garcia-Diaz so as to establish conspiracy. With respect to his conviction of falsification, Solis argued
that the prosecution failed to prove the second element. He allegedly had no legal obligation to
disclose the truth in his February 12, 1998 Letter for he merely expressed an opinion there.

Issue:
1. whether or not conspiracy exists even if the public officer is not a party to the
contract or transaction that caused a gross and manifest disadvantage to the
government; and
2. whether or not petitioner Jose G. Solis violated a legal obligation to disclose the truth
when he executed his February 12, 1998 Letter.

Ruling:

1. Yes. A finding of conspiracy means that all the accused are deemed to have
"consented to and adopted as their own, the offense [of the other accused]. Co-conspirators
are answerable collectively and equally, regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime,
because it is the common scheme, purpose, or objective that is punished, not the individual acts of
each of the accused.
So while it is true that petitioner Solis was not the party who entered into the Compromise
Agreement on behalf of the government, it was his recommendation in his February 12, 1998 Letter
that served as the basis for its execution. Without this recommendation, there would be nothing to
compromise on in the first place. The segregation of 4,689 hectares of land of the public domain, to
be registered in the name of a private person, was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. It is immaterial that the registration in the name of petitioner Garcia-Diaz did not push
through. Further, it is immaterial that petitioner Solis knew Solicitor General Galvez and petitioner
Garcia-Diaz personally. Their collective acts nevertheless show the common purpose of giving the
Compromise Agreement a semblance of legitimacy. Petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis remain
equally liable as co-conspirators. In sum, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis. They conspired to make it appear that a 4,689-hectare
portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside the reservation described in
Presidential Proclamation No. 237.

2. Yes. Contrary to petitioner Solis' argument, he did not make a mere opinion but
55 | P a g e
deliberately made an untruthful statement in his February 12, 1998 Letter. To recall, he wrote that
finding[s] disclose that the military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets
referred to in the technical description in Proclamation No. 237," referring to the findings of
Remote Sensing Technologists Valencia and Viernes in their Summary Report. Nothing in the
Summary Report, however, indicates that the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside the
military reservation as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. NAMRIA is the government
agency responsible for conducting geophysical surveys as well as managing resource information
needed by both the public and private sectors. Because of the agency's special competence,
petitioner Solis was requested by the Republic, through the Solicitor General, to conduct a re-survey
of Fort Magsaysay. He was informed at the outset that his agency's findings would determine
whether or not the government would enter into a compromise with petitioner Garcia-Diaz. To allow
petitioner Solis to claim that he had no legal obligation to disclose the truth in his letter will be
contrary to NAMRIA's functions. It will erode the public's confidence in NAMRIA and all its
issuances and research findings.

Case title: MELKY CONCHA AND ROMEO MANAGUELOD VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Principle: An out-of-court identification such as a police show-up is inadmissible if it is tainted with

improper suggestions by police officers.

Facts:

The two accused conspiring together and helping one another, armed with assorted firearms
pointed their firearms towards Macutay who was the driver and in possession of a Honda Wave 100
cc motorcycle owned by one Cacho, take, steal and bring away the said motorcycle.

Macutay's group was traversing the road between Lallauanan and Liwanag, the motorcycle had a
flat tire. The group decided to push the motorcycle. They chanced upon a parked white car on the
highway. As they got near the car, four (4) armed persons emerged from it and one of them pointed
a gun at Macutay and declared "holdup." The armed men then took his Seiko watch, t-shirt, and
wallet, which contained P400.00 in cash and his license. They told Macutay to run.

Tumauini police received information from the police station at Cabagan, Isabela that they had
recovered a white Mitsubishi Lancer. When SPO4 Anapi opened the car's trunk, he and Chief Alobba
discovered Plate No. BI-8085, the plate of Cacho's Honda Wave motorcycle. This discovery was
also witnessed by a police officers and by Macutay and a Balabbo.

The police presented to Macutay five (5) persons that they had apprehended. Macutay pointed to
Managuelod, Concha, and Caliguiran as the persons who robbed him. He claimed that Managuelod
was the one who declared "holdup" and drove the motorcycle, while Concha wore the t-shirt they
got from him. RTC held that both Concha and Managuelod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
carnapping. It held that Macutay "was able to identify the culprits who committed the robbery in the
lineup at the Philippine National Police Station.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2 accused can be held liable carpanapping.

RULING:

No.

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Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru
line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

SC held that the out-of-court identification conducted by the police was a police show-up not police
line-up, since only four (4) persons were shown to the prosecution's witness for the purpose of
identifying his four (4) assailants. The totality of circumstances test was not duly complied. The out-
of-court identification was tainted with improper suggestion.

Case title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NADY MAGALLANO, JR. Y FLORES G.R.

Principle: The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim
without the slightest provocation on his part. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, two (2) things must be proven: (1) that during the attack, the victim could not have
defended himself or herself from the offender; and (2) that the offender deliberately chose a form of
attack which would render him or her immune from risk or retaliation by the victim.

Facts:
Witness Pineda testified that when he peeked through his window he saw Magallano and
Tapar, ganging up on Ronnie Batongbakal. Magallano repeatedly strike the victim with a dos por
dos,while Tapar watched.
As Magallano was hitting Batongbakal, a Magallano and Tapar then jumped inside a tricycle and
chased the woman, who suddenly bolted from the fray. However, both accused returned after a few
minutes. and Magallano threw the stones on Batongbakal' s head and body, while Tapar prevented
him from crawling away.
The RTC gave much weight to Pineda's testimony pointing to Magallano and Tapar as Batongbakal
killers. It found Pineda's testimony to be "straightforward, credible and consistent. The Court
of Appeals upheld the RTC's findings that Magallano and Tapar conspired to kill Batongbakal, and
that treachery attended his killing.

Issue:
Whether or not CA is correct.
Ruling:
NO. In People v. Abadies, this Court held that the essence of treachery is the swift and
unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part, provided
that two (2) conditions must be established by the prosecution for a killing to be properly qualified
by treachery to murder:
(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself
(2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method[,] or form of attack
employed by him.
The prosecution failed to show the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Pineda's
testimony began when accused-appellants were in the middle of mauling the victim, and there was
no testimony to prove that the victim did not provoke them or expect their attack. The prosecution
57 | P a g e
did not present evidence that would show that accused-appellants reflected on and decided on the
form of their attack to secure an unfair advantage over the victim. Even when accused-appellants
returned after chasing the screaming woman and hit the crawling victim with rocks, treachery is still
absent. This is because the second attack was not a surprise, as shown by the victim's attempt to go
back to the safety of his own house.
.

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 2019 Cases

Case Title: TUPAZ v. THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS

Principle:

Public prosecutors must address the different dimensions of complaints raised before them. When
they provide well-reasoned resolutions on one (1) dimension, but overlook palpable indications that
another crime has been committed, they fail to responsibly discharge the functions entrusted to
them. This amounts to an evasion of positive duty, an act of grave abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.

Key Facts:

Tupaz claimed that her mother was the registered owner of a parcel of lot in Northern Samar
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT). He also claimed that Atty. Abella of the Register of
Deeds of Northern Samar canceled the OCT and in its stead, issued Transfer of Certificate of Title
(TCT) Genaro represented by his attorney-in-fact, Macrina.

Tupaz maintained that Atty. Abella: (1) issued a spurious owner's duplicate copy of OCT; (2) tolerated
the use of an equally spurious Certificate Authorizing Registration and Deed of Conveyance; and (3)
enabled the issuance of specious TCT, with Genaro as beneficiary. Hence, she filed a Complaint
asserting that Atty. Abella, along with Macrina, were criminally liable for falsification and graft and
corrupt practices; and administratively liable for misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed Tupaz's Complaint for being
"premature" and declined to file criminal informations—both for falsification and graft and corrupt
practices—against Atty. Abella and Macrina. It reasoned that the issue on the possible criminal
liability of the respondents and the administrative liability of respondent Atty. Abella is closely
intertwined with the issue on ownership of the subject property.

Issue: Whether the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding probable cause to charge Atty.
Abella of Registrar of Deeds with Macrina for the violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

Ruling: Yes.

When "there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor"
in declining to prosecute specific persons for specific offenses, a writ of certiorari may be issued to
set aside the prosecutor's initial determination.

In this case, Atty. Abella's official acts of canceling OCT, and issuing in its stead TCT in the name of
Genaro, appear to be attended by gross inexcusable negligence. While he did not act with Macrina
out of a shared malevolent design, he nonetheless relied on manifestly defective and tellingly
suspicious documents that Macrina presented. The criminal informations must be filed against the
grossly erring registrar of deeds and the private person at whose urging he performed his errant
official acts, private respondents must stand trial for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

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Case Title: Santiago, Jr. y Santos v. People G.R. No. 213760. July 1, 2019

Principle:
The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanour,
conduct and attitude on the witness stand. The exception is when either or both lower
courts have overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts which could have effected the
outcome of the case.

Key Facts:

On September 26 and 27, 2011, TV 5 segment producer Espenida and his crew went to Plaza Morga
and Plaza Mariones in Tondo, Manila to investigate the alleged prostitution operations in the area.
They had earlier designed a confidential asset, alias “Romeo David” on whom a lapel microphone
was clipped, to pose as a customer and transact with the alleged pimps for a night with a minor.

During the transaction, the pimps allegedly asked for 500.00. At around 11:00 p.m., the team and
David arrived at Plaza Morga. After surveying the area, David pointed to the pimps, who, upon
seeing the police, ran away but were eventually caught and arrested.

After the arrest, the team proceeded to the hotel where the trafficked person, AAA, had been
waiting. The officers took her into custody and brought her to the Regional Intelligence Division at
Camp Bagong diwa.

According to AAA, at around 1:30 a.m. on September 30, 2011, she was about to buy coffee at Plaza
Moriones when Santiago called her, offering to pay her to spend a night with a customer. He
allegedly promised to pay AAA P350.00 out of the P500.00 that the customer would pay for the
transaction. Later, she and Santiago went to the hotel, which was 15 meters away from Plaza Mori
ones. 20 There, the police came and took them both into custody. AAA later confirmed during trial
that Santiago was the pimp, but said that she only saw Castillo and Legazpi for the first time upon
getting into the van bound for the police station.

Issue/s:

Whether or not petitioner Reynaldo Santiago , Jr is guilty of violating Section 4(a) of the anti-
trafficking in Person Act.

Ruling:

YES.

Under Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, it shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical,
to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those
done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage.

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The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3 (a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, (1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders." (2)
The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another; and (3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

In this case, the information sufficiently averred that: (1) petitioner committed an act of qualified
trafficking in persons by offering AAA to David for sex or exploitation; (2) the act was done for a fee;
and (3) for prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude of the
offense but its description in the complaint or information. The rule is settled that "what controls is
not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint or information.

Hence, the court affirmed the conviction of petitioner for violation of R.A no. 9208, section 4 (a), as
punished under section 10(a).

Case title:Regalado y Laylay v. People

Principle: The absence of those required by law to be present during the physical inventory —
absent any justifiable ground—cast doubt on the integrity of the seized items and can be fatal to the
prosecution's cause.

Facts:
A team of five (5) police officers led by Special Police Officer 2 Quirino Peñascosas (SPO2
Peñascosas), with designated poseur-buyer PO1 Dario Pedrigal (PO1 Pedrigal), PO2 Rodrigo Llante
(PO2 Llante), PO1 Macrino Romeo Palma, and PO1 Manuelito Palma, conducted a buy-bust
operation. At around 2:00 p.m. that day, PO1 Pedrigal went to Regalado's house There, PO1 Pedrigal
asked Regalado's wife, Marilyn, "Meron kayo ngayon, bibili ako? Regalado then asked PO1 Pedrigal
the quantity he sought to buy, to which the latter replied that he wanted two.

Regalado went into his house, returning with a plastic sachet suspected to contain marijuana, which
he then exchanged with PO1 Pedrigal's marked bills amounting to P200.00. Regalado took the
money and put it in his pocket. At this point, PO1 Pedrigal scratched his head—the pre-arranged
signal signifying to the team that the transaction had been consummated. The rest of the team
rushed to Regalado's house and identified themselves as police officers. They arrested Regalado
after PO1 Pedrigal retrieved the marked money from his pocket.

Upon the arrest, PO1 Pedrigal asked Regalado, "Meron pa itong kasamahan?"12 to which Regalado
admitted having more, pointing to the roof of his house. He turned over to PO1 Pedrigal a milk box
that allegedly had two (2) plastic sachets and four (4) sticks of marijuana. PO1 Pedrigal kept all the
confiscated pieces of evidence

The police officers informed Regalado of his constitutional rights in Tagalog. Then, after informing
Barangay Captain Isidro Palomares of what had transpired, they brought Regalado to the police
station. The trial court convicted Regalado for violating Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No.
9165.

On appeal, Regalado argued that the trial court erred when it appreciated the evidence despite the
apprehending team's failure to prove the integrity and identity of the seized items.Further, accused

61 | P a g e
contended that there was no elected official, media representative, or Department of Justice
representative present during the physical inventory of the seized items and that the seized items
were not immediately marked after his arrest, casting doubt on their origin.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of an elective official, a representative from the media, and a
representative from the Department of Justice during the buy-bust operation, as well as the non-
presentation of the photographs of the seized marijuana before the trial court warrants petitioner's
acquittal.

Ruling:
No. For the conviction of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: "(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited
or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.

In this case petitioner admitted in open court that the police officers had found the three (3) plastic
sachets and four (4) sticks of marijuana in his possession during his arrest on December 17, 2002.
He admitted telling the law enforcers where he had hidden the rest of the marijuana because he was
scared. Petitioner's free and conscious possession of the dangerous drug has been established,
warranting his conviction

Nonetheless, police officers are reminded that lapses like the absence of those required by law to
be present during the physical inventory —absent any justifiable ground—cast doubt on the
integrity of the seized items and can be fatal to the prosecution's cause.

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIOSCORO COMOSO TUREMUTSA, G.R. No.
227497, April 10, 2019

Principle:

“In prosecution of drug cese, the prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers' lapses under
the mantle of the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. This
presumption only applies when nothing in the evidence shows that the police officers deviated from
the standard procedures required by law.”

Facts:

On March 26, 2005, the Anti-Drug Special Operation Task Force and Drug Enforcement Action
Division planned a buy-bust operation after receiving information from their civilian asset that a
certain "Coro" was selling illegal drugs in Quimson, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City.

At around 2:30 p.m., Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and Police Officer 3 Jose
Fernandez (PO3 Fernandez) proceeded to the area of the operation

Soon after, Coro/Comoso arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing
marijuana in exchange for the asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in turn, removed his hat—the pre-
arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated.

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the scene and
arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet from the asset, while PO3
Fernandez frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust money, one (1) used marijuana stick, and a
lighter. PO2 Aquino then marked both the plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his initials
"FJA."

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As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick and lighter. He
then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items. On April 8, 2005, about two (2) weeks after the
buy-bust operation, Police Superintendent Julita T. De Villa (Superintendent De Villa), a forensic
chemist at the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory Office, MIMAROPA, received
the samples of seized items and a letter-request for laboratory examination. In Chemistry Report
No. D-017-05, she found that the specimens tested positive for marijuana.

Comoso was charged with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, particularly for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The Regional Trial Court found Comoso guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

Comoso appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti was not properly established. The CA, however, sustained his conviction.

Maintaining that the chain of custody was established, the Court of Appeals excused the absence of
photographs of the seized items since there were justifiable reasons for noncompliance. It found
that the prosecution had duly established that PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, had custody
of the seized items from their seizure until their turnover to the crime laboratory. Since Comoso
failed to present any evidence that the prosecution witnesses had ill motives against him, the Court
of Appeals held that the regularity in the performance of official duty should be presumed

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemusta's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act despite not strictly complying with the requisites for preserving the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti

Ruling

The sale of illegal drugs is punished under Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: "(1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence."

Evidence proving that a transaction took place "must be credible and complete." In buy-bust
operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-buyer. In proving the second
element of the offense, the prosecution must establish compliance with the chain of custody
requirements outlined in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10640.

Every link in the chain of custody, as summarized in People v. Nandi,42 must be established: First,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

Here, PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic sachet from
accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that he had also prepared the
Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items to the crime laboratory.

However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the inventory before
accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant; and (3) PO2 Aquino turned
the items over to an investigating officer

The prosecution further presented evidence that Superintendent De Villa, the forensic chemist,
only received the seized items on April 8, 2005,46 or 10 working days after the buy-bust operation
on March 26, 2005. This is obviously beyond the 24-hour period required by law, a delay for which
the prosecution has not been able to explain. This creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal
drug turned over to the forensic chemist was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant.

63 | P a g e
Worse, nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required to be present and sign the
inventory—an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media—were present, even though this was a pre-planned entrapment operation. Moreover, the
prosecution did not justify the law enforcement officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody.
It merely stated that "the integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing
of bad faith, ill will[,] or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.

The prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers' lapses under the mantle of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. This presumption only applies
when nothing in the evidence shows that the police officers deviated from the standard procedures
required by law.

Because the prosecution was unable to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the presumption of innocence must prevail. Accused-appellant must, thus, be acquitted

Case: People vs Lahmodin Ameril y Abdul @ “Amor/Mhong”

Principle: At the core of every prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs is the constitutional mandate
of the State to adduce proof on the identity and integrity of the seized illegal drugs. The wisdom
behind this burden is to ensure that the items seized were neither tampered nor contaminated.
Failure to overcome such burden calls for the acquittal of the accused.

Facts: In a buy bust operation, accused sold 3 sachets of shabu in which he was charged with
violation of Article II, Section 5 of RA 9165. Accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. During trial,
prosecution presented Special Investigator Fernandez who forgot where he actually marked them.
Despite of this the Regional Trial Court convicted accused. Aggrieved, accused appealed the case
which he argued that prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti, as the documents and
testimonies revealed flaws in prosecution’s handling of illegal drugs allegedly seized from him
where he emphasized that the details of the seized items’ marking took place were not recorded
which compromised the integrity of the seized items. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that
accused was substantially apprised of the crime charged against him. Undaunted, accused file a
notice of appeal which the Court of Appeals gave due course.

Issue/s: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the conviction of the accused-
appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of RA 9165, or the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.

Ruling: No, In sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, "the following elements
must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."

The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Its existence must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. "Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering
exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this
function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed."

Failing to comply with Article II, Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 implies "a
concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti," and
"produces doubts as to the origins of the seized illegal drugs."

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 Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, which the Court of Appeals
relied on in its Decision, "stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the
regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of
regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused."

The totality of the evidence presented shows that the arresting officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation were remiss in the performance of their official functions. They made
discrepancies in the markings of the seized illegal drugs, and failed to comply with the chain of
custody. Consequently, the presumption of regularity in favor of arresting officers is negated.

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE VS JAYSON MERANDO y AVES

PRINCIPLE/S:
Unjustified noncompliance with the chain of custody procedure will shroud in doubt the identity and
integrity of the dangerous drug allegedly seized. When there is reasonable doubt, an accused’s
acquittal must ensue.

KEY FACTS:
An information was charged with violation of Art. II, Sec. 5 of RA 9165 for selling, delivering and
giving away to PO1 Edmon Reyes, one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2.17 grams
of dried suspected marijuana.

A buy-bust operation was conducted in Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City by the police. At the place of
arrest and in the accused’s presence, PO1 Reyes signed the plastic sachet containing suspected
marijuana and marked the same. An in the same place, PO1 Reyes photographed and inventories the
seized item.

With the seized items in his custody, PO1 Reyes and his team proceeded to Manggahan Barangay
Hall. There, the team asked 2 barangay officials to sign the inventory.

The trial court rules that the prosecution established the elements of the crime with proof beyond
reasonable doubt and found that the identity and evidentiary value of the seized item were
preserved even though none of the required third-party witnesses were present in inventorying and
photographing the seized items.

On appeal, the accused argued that the trial court erred in convicting him despite the police officers’
noncompliance with Sec. 21 particularly in their failure to secure the 3rd party representative while
the Office of the Solicitor general argued that the law only required substantial and not perfect
adherence.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the accused was correctly convicted for violation of Art. II, Sec. 5 of RA 9165.

RULING:
NO. The following requisites must be established to sustain a conviction involving illegal sale of
dangerous of drugs, namely; (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus or the illicit drug as evidence. The dangerous drug seized from
an accused constitutes the corpos delicti of the offense. Its existence must be proved beyond

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reasonable doubt. The transacted drugs must not only be proven to actually exist, but must also be
ascertained to be the same drug examined and presented in court.

Sec. 21 of RA 9165 demands strict compliance which requires the presence of the accused,
representative from the DOJ, and the media, and am elected public official during the actual seizure
of the evidence and their subsequent inventory and photographing.

Here, the RTC found that none of the required 3rd party witnesses were present. The prosecution
merely testified that after having marked, photographed, and inventoried the suspected marijuana
seized at the place of arrest, PO1 Reyes and his team brought the accused to the barangay hall.

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOMAR CASTILLO Y MARANAN, G.R. No. 238339,
August 7, 2019

Principle: “The requirement of conducting inventory and taking of photographs immediately after
seizure and confiscation necessarily means that the required witnesses must also be present during
the seizure and confiscation.” The presence of third-party witnesses is not an empty formality in the
conduct of buy-bust operations. It is not a mere rubberstamp to validate the actions taken and self-
serving assurances proffered by law enforcement officers. Far from a passive gesture, the
attendance of third-party witnesses ensures the identity, origin, and integrity of the items seized.

Key Facts:

Jomar Castillo was arrested in a buy-bust operation near a basketball court in Barangay 7, Lipa City.
The police seized the marked money, sachet subject of the buy-bust, and four plastic sachets
containing crystalline substances suspected to be shabu, which were placed inside a plastic case of
playing cards.

The officers brought the items inside their vehicle parked near the place of arrest. There, the
marking and photographing of the items seized. The seized items were also inventoried, as
witnessed by Limbo, the Department of Justice representative, Barangay Chair Christopher Latayan,
SPO2 Danilo Yema, and Castillo.

The Regional Trial Court found Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of Republic Act 9165. The Court of Appeals sustained his
conviction.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant’s guilt
for the crimes charged.

Ruling:

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, “the illicit drugs confiscated from the
accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges.” Thus, their identity and integrity must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. It is the prosecution’s duty to “ensure that the illegal drugs
offered in court are the very same items seized from the accused.”

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The seizure and marking of the dangerous drugs from the accused to the apprehending officer from
the first crucial link in the chain of custody. While the marking of the dangerous drugs seized from
the accused does not explicitly form part of the chain of custody requirements under Section 21, it is
indispensable in ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs have been
preserved.

Such significance impels the presence of third-party witnesses during the actual seizure and
marking, which must immediately follow seizure. The presence of third-party witnesses during
seizure and marking ensures that whatever items are subsequently inventoried, photographed,
examined, and presented in court are the same substances that were initially obtained from the
accused.

Here the absence of witnesses during seizure and marking casts reasonable doubt on the actual
origin and identity of the drugs introduced in evidence as those allegedly seized from the accused-
appellant. Ultimately, this same absence casts reasonable doubt on accused-appellant’s guilt for the
offenses with which he is charged.

The prosecution maintains that after the alleged confiscation of items from accused-appellant, the
buy-bust team went inside their vehicle parked near the place of arrest, and there did the marking.
This claim alone acknowledges the ostensibly clandestine conduct of the police officers. Moreover,
there is no independent guarantee on the integrity of whatever it was that the police officers did
next. Other than them and their self-serving assurances, no other person could attest to how they
conducted themselves at the place of arrest and ultimately, in the isolation of their own vehicle.

It was also only at the police station that Limbo, the DOJ representative, and Barangay Chair
Latayan were called in to witness the inventory and photographing. It is clear that the required
witnesses themselves had no personal knowledge of the supposed sale and subsequent
apprehension, search, seizure, and marking.

Having third-party witnesses present only during the subsequent physical inventory and
photographing renders the whole requirement of their presence futile. Securing third-party
witnesses provides a layer of protection to the integrity of the items seized and forecloses any
opportunity for the planting of dangerous drugs. Having their presence only at a very late stage
reduces them to passive automatons, utilized merely to lend hollow legitimacy by belatedly affixing
signatures on final inventory documents despite lacking authentic knowledge on the items
confronting them. They are then reduced to rubberstamps, oblivious to how the dangers sought to
be avoided by their presence may have already transpired.

Even when overlooking the absence of third-party witnesses during the actual sale, arrest, search,
seizure, and marking, it remains that the required witnesses were incomplete during the subsequent
inventory and taking of photographs. No representative from the media was present alongside with
Limbo and Barangay Chair Latayan. Worse, while an inventory was done, such inventory had already
been prepared by the time Limbo arrived at the police station. These procedural lapses could only
raise greater doubt on to the identity, origin, and integrity of the items allegedly seized from the
accused-appellant.

Noncompliance with Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act is not, in all cases, fatal
to the prosecution. Conviction can ensue as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated items are properly preserved.

Here, the prosecution has never bothered to prove, let alone plead, any justifiable ground
accounting for the buy-bust team’s deviation from the prescribed procedure. All it offered were
sweeping and self-serving assurances of compliance and integrity. These cannot serve to condone
the police officer’s deviation.

Accused-appellant is acquitted.

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 229862, June 19, 2019

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Principles:

Rape is committed —
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Facts:
AAA had fallen asleep after doing laundry, while her stepfather, ZZZ, was doing carpentry works.
Suddenly, she woke up and found ZZZ on top of her, his lower body naked. He then sat on the floor
with his penis showing and removed her short pants and underwear, after which he went back on
top of her and masturbated. He took AAA's hands and put them on his penis, telling her that if she
became pregnant, "he [would] be happy." ZZZ then inserted his penis into her vagina "and sat, kissed
her face, touched her vagina and kissed her breast."

AAA later reiterated on cross-examination that ZZZ put his penis into her vagina. She failed to see
the act, but felt it. She also felt pain on her vagina's side, caused by the penis' insertion.

Dr. Dacula, who conducted the medical examination on AAA, testified that she had found redness
and abrasion on the right side of the victim's labia minora, "caused by a smooth, soft object" as
indicated in the Medico-Legal Report.

Accused-appellant argues that the crime of statutory rape was not proven because the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish AAA's minority, which the trial court also noted

Assuming that the prosecution established her age, accused-appellant contends that he was still
wrongly convicted of statutory rape. Pointing out that AAA's alleged age in the Information was 14
years old, he argues that under the law and jurisprudence, the victim must be below 12 years old for
the crime to be statutory rape.

Accused-appellant avers that since the case does not involve statutory rape, the presence of force,
intimidation, threat, fraud, or grave abuse of authority must be established in the alleged crime's
commission. He contends that the prosecution failed to show these circumstances.

Issue:
whether or not accused-appellant ZZZ's guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
Accused-appellant's contentions have no merit.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines rape as:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

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2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

After a careful examination of the case records, this Court holds that the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of raping AAA. The trial court
also found AAA's testimony credible and supported by evidence:

The candid, straightforward and unrehearsed testimony of victim [AAA] who declared against the
bestial acts of the accused on her person and maintained that she was required to hold his penis and
thereafter, again, rode on top of her placing his penis on her vagina is corroborated by the unrefuted
findings of Dr. Edalin L. Dacula who found that the abrasion and redness in color on the right side of
the labia minora is caused by a smooth, soft object. A smooth, soft object is a penis and that the
abrasion and redness in color on the right side of the labia minora is caused probably by the friction
of the hardened and erected penis of the accused. That was why the victim complained that she felt
pain on her vagina.

There is also no merit in accused-appellant's argument that force, intimidation, threat, fraud, or
grave abuse of authority was not present. In People v. Gacusan, this Court reiterated that "the
abuse of moral influence is the intimidation required in rape committed by the common-law father
of a minor."

As to the inclusion of the word "statutory" in the dispositive portion of the trial court Judgment, this
Court holds that it was erroneously added by the trial court judge.

In People v. Dalan:
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To
convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the
complainant; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge
between the accused and the complainant. (Citation omitted)

Here, the Information against accused-appellant did not allege AAA to be below 12 years old, but 14
years old, when the crime was committed upon her. The trial court even held that without
documentary or testimonial evidence, the prosecution failed to substantiate the qualifying
circumstance of minority. Despite this, it still found him guilty of simple statutory rape and imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Nonetheless, this Court finds that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is correct as it is the
penalty for offenders who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code.

Case title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZZZ

Principle: In the absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary
in proving the commission of rape.

Facts:

ZZZ, 15 years old, hadsexual intercourse with AAA against her will and consent and assaulted her
that caused her death. BBB testified that he was the uncle of both AAA and ZZZ. The victim's father,

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CCC, was his brother, and ZZZ's mother is his second cousin. ZZZ's mother and AAA's father are
relatives, making them related.

BBB testified that at around 7:00p.m., he was on his way to the store to buy cigarettes when he saw
ZZZ dragging AAA by the wrist toward the school. Though it was dark and he was about 10 meters
away, he was able to see them using a flashlight he was carrying. The following day, news spread
that AAA was missing.

A couple of days later, the barangay officials found a lifeless AAA in a bamboo grove near the school.
BBB said that her niece's naked body had already blackened due to decomposition. On the same day,
he said he found ZZZ in his house-the last time he had ever seen him. CCC, the victim's father,
testified that AAA was 11 years old when she was raped and killed.

RTC convicted ZZZ and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused-appellant ZZZ is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide.
2. Whether or not ZZZ can be exempted of the crime because he is a minor.

RULING:
1. Yes.

The elements of special complex crime of rape with homicide are the following:(1) the appellant had
carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force,
threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.

The commission of the crime of rape may be proven not only by direct evidence, but also by
circumstantial evidence.Circumstantial evidence are "proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience."

The trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the following circumstantial evidence in
convicting accused-appellant: (1) BBB testified seeing him dragging AAA to the school on the night
of the incident; (2) accused-appellant's brother, YYY, testified going home with him and AAA, but
accused-appellant asked him to leave them behind; (3) after AAA's body had been found, accused-
appellant fled town and hid his identity using an alias; and (4) the post-mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Mejia and Dr. Bandonill confirmed that the cause of AAA's death was a traumatic
cerebral contusion, while the dried blood from her vagina was caused by a tear inside the genital
area.

There is no showing that the trial court erred in giving credence to BBB's testimony. As BBB
explained, he reprimanded ZZZ and AAA when he saw them, but he was not suspicious since the
two were relatives. Moreover, the prosecution established that BBB was not a suspect in the crime,
and nor was there any proof that BBB had motive to erroneously implicate ZZZ.

2. No.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings m

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accordance with this Act. SC defined discernment as the "mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act."

If they acted with discernment, they shall not be exempt from criminal responsibility. Once the child
in conflict with the law is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not immediately
execute its judgment; rather, it shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence. The suspension shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant acted with discernment in
carrying out the crime. First, he perpetrated the crime in a dark and isolated place. Second, after
knowing that he had been tagged as the suspect, he evaded authorities by fleeing to Tarlac and
concealing his identity. Third, as confirmed by the social worker assigned to him, he knew and
understood the consequences of his acts. Lastly, Dr. Bandonill concluded that AAA was raped by
means of force, as evidenced by the contusions all over her body and by the tear from her vaginal
area.

As can be gleaned from these facts, accused-appellant committed the crime with an understanding
of its depravity and consequences. He must suffer the full brunt of the penalty of the crime.

Considering that accused-appellant is already over 30 years old when he was convicted, the
automatic suspension of the sentence provided under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, in
relation to Section 40, may no longer be applied.

Case: De Guzman vs. People G.R. No. 224742 August 7, 2019

Principle: A person cannot unilaterally declare his marriage void. The law provides that a judicial
declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage.

Facts:
On April 8, 1994, Prudencio and Arlene were married. In 2007, Prudencio abandoned his wife and
children. In December 2009, a friend informed Arlene that Prudencio contracted a second marriage
with a certain Jean Basan on December 17, 2009. Arlene then filed a Complaint against Prudencio
for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

In his defense, Prudencio argued that his marriage with Arlene was void because the copy of their
Marriage Contract, which was secured from the National Statistics Office, did not bear the
solemnizing officer's signature.

Issue:
Whether or not Prudencio is guilty of bigamy

Ruling:
Yes.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.

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Prudencio cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that there was no legal impediment
for him to remarry based merely on the National Statistics Office's issuance of a Certificate of No
Marriage Record. Based on Prudencio and Arlene's Marriage Certificate, along with the photos of
the wedding ceremony, they were married on April 8, 1994.

Case title: People of the Philippines vs Larry Sultan y Almada

Principle:

Unless an unbroken chain of custody over items allegedly seized during drug operations is
established, the constitutional right to be presumed innocent prevails. Ultimately, doubt in the
corpus delicti – the drugs and drug paraphernalia that were the alleged objects of a drug offence—
impels the acquittal of an accused.

Facts:

Two separate information were filed against accused for violating the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. One is for violation of Section 5 for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and the
other is for violation of Section 11 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

According to the prosecution, at around 2:00 pm on December 6, 2012, Superintendent Rapiz was
informed that a certain Larry Sultan was engaging in the illegal trade of shabu. Accordingly, he
assemble a buy-bust team, designation PO2 Hechanova as the poseur-buyer. PO2 Hechanova
received a marked P1, 000.00 bill for the transaction. Later that day, PO2 Hechanova and the
confidential asset rode a jeep to the Sea Breeze hotel. Upon arrival, they approached accused, who
was standing at the hotel’s main door. The asset inquired if accused has P1000 worth of shabu.
Confirming that he had it, accused handed PO2 Hechanova an elongated sachet containing a white
crystalline substance in exchange for the marked money. As soon as the transaction occurred, the
asset, placed a missed call to the team, which then rushed to the scene. Upon frisking, 3 plastic
sachets of suspected shabu was recovered from the left pocket of the accused. Accused was the
brought to the barangay hall of Barangay 12 of Bacolod City, where the plastic sachets were marked.
The inventory and photographing of the seized items were made in the presence of Punong
Barangay and a kagawad.

The trial court found Accused guilty. CA affirmed the trial court decision. Upon notice of appeal,
accused assails the unjustified marking of the seized items at the barangay hall instead of at the
place of confiscation.

Issues:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article 2, sections 5 and 11 of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

Ruling:

No, accused is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: 1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and 2) the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that
1) the accused was in possession on an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug, 2) such possession is not authorized by law, and 3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.

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The identity of the corpus delicti is established and safeguarded by the chain of custody as it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Section 21 of the RA 9165 or the Rules on chain of custody, requires that the apprehending team,
shall immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or his/her representative, with an elected
official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service, or the media.

Because the buy-bust occurred in 2012, prior to Section 21’s amendment, the prosecution failed to
show police officer’s strict compliance with Section 21. Two barangay officials witnessed the
marking, inventory, and photographing. Beyond that, no representatives from both the media and
Department of Justice was present.

Moreover, Section 21 mandates the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs “immediately
after seizure and confiscation,” which means that these must be done at the place of arrest.
Although the same may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer whichever is practicable, the barangay hall, as in this case, is not an alternative.
While deviations may be condone under justifiable grounds, the prosecution must plead and prove
that justifiable ground. In this case, the prosecution never bother to prove, let alone plead any
situation to excuse the police’s deviation from the chain of custody requirements. This casts doubt
on the integrity of the items supposedly seized and, ultimately on the commission of the crimes.

Further, officers who come into possession of seized drugs must show how they handled and
preserved the integrity of the seized drugs while in their custody. In this case, the bare assertion the
PO2 Hechanova had possession of the items, without so much as a simulation of safekeeping
measures is a blatant gap in the chain of custody.

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs RONALD PALEMA y VARGAS, RUFEL PALMEA y
BAUTISTA, LYNDON SALDUA y QUEZON, and VIRGO GRENGIA, G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019

Principle: In the prosecution of robbery with homicide, the State must prove that the offender's
original intent was to commit the crime of robbery. The killing of the victim must only be incidental.
Nevertheless, the act of taking the victim's life may occur before, during, or even after the robbery.
So long as the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, the offense
committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

FACTS:
Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Grengia, along with Ladra, Manzanero, and Marqueses were charged with
the crime of robbery with homicide

On arraignment, Ladra, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, Manzanero, and Grengia pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Marvin, meanwhile, remained at large.

After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution revealed that at around 11:00 p.m. on November 10, 2007,
Enicasio Depante (Enicasio), his common-law spouse, his son Erickson Depante (Erickson), and his
stepdaughter Jamie Rose Baya (Jamie) were sitting on the benches at the Calamba Town Plaza.
That was when three (3) men, who were later identified as Palema, Palmea, and Manzanero,
approached Enicasio.

Suddenly, Palmea threw a punch at Enicasio in an attempt to grab his phone. Palema
simultaneously pulled out a knife and tried to stab him in the abdomen, but was warded off by
Jamie, making him drop his knife. Once he retrieved his knife, Palema stabbed Enicasio on the right

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thigh, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Grengia and Saldua arrived at the scene and joined in
beating Enicasio.

Seated on the bench near Enicasio, Erickson stood and tried to help his father, stopped but Ladra
him. When he resisted, Ladra attempted to stab him, but he was able to evade the attack and
immediately look for a weapon. Upon reaching his father, however, he saw that Enicasio had already
collapsed from the stab wounds. Erickson brought his father to the Calamba Medical Center, but he
later died from blood loss.

Meanwhile, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, and Grengia denied the accusations against them. They
insisted that while all of them were at the Plaza during the incident, they were not there as a group,
but with different people. They maintained that the police officers mistook them for the men who
attacked Enicasio.

Ladra, for his part, changed his plea to guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence. The
Regional Trial Court then directed him to take the witness stand to answer some clarificatory
questions.

Ladra testified that he was with Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Marqueses, and Manzanero at the night of
the incident. All of them drunk, they decided to eat gruel at the Plaza. Later, Palema's girlfriend
approached them and complained that a man in a red shirt had acted indecently toward
her. Believing that the man was Enicasio, the group attacked and mugged him. When he saw
Enicasio fighting back, he took Marqueses' knife and stabbed Enicasio twice. Ladra added that
Grengia was not with them and did not participate in the attack. The Regional Trial Court found
Ladra guilty beyond reasonable doubt:

On April 15, 2013, the Regional Trial Court rendered another Decision, convicting Palema, Palmea,
Saldua, and Grengia of the crime of robbery with homicide. The Regional Trial Court found that the
four (4) men conspired in committing the crime charged. It brushed aside their defense of denial and
decreed that they failed to offer any evidence showing that they performed an overt act that would
have prevented the assault from happening.

On appeal, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, and Grengia argued that the Regional Trial Court erred in giving
credence to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. They maintained that while Jamie testified that
her stepfather was stabbed in the right thigh, the post-mortem examination revealed that the sole
stab wound sustained by the victim was on the right side of his buttocks. They also questioned
Erickson's ability to testify, alleging that he was not fully focused on the incident since he was
texting before the crime happened.

Moreover, assuming that the prosecution sufficiently identified the assailants, the men contended
that it still failed to establish the existence of conspiracy in committing the offense. They insisted
that while they allegedly attacked the victim, there was no community of interest among them.

In its assailed May 18, 2016 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the group's appeal and
affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision. It ruled that the trial court's appreciation of the
witnesses' credibility is entitled to great respect and would not be disturbed on appeal absent any
showing that it overlooked the material facts that could have affected the results of the case.

The Court of Appeals further declared that while Erickson was using his phone when the incident
occurred, this did not affect the value of his testimony. It noted that since he was seated near
Enicasio at the time of the assault, it was impossible for him not to witness the events that
transpired.

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The Court of Appeals dispelled the group's claim that there was no conspiracy, ruling that the
prosecution has proved that the men acted in unison in committing the offense. It further noted that
in his confession, Ladra himself admitted the existence of conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of accused-appellants Ronald
Palema y Vargas, Rufel Palmea y Bautista, Lyndon Saldua y Quezon, and Virgo Grengia for the crime
of robbery with homicide; and

RULING:

Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime punished under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code. It is perpetrated when, by reason or on the occasion of robbery, homicide is committed.
Article 294(1) states: Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer: The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

To hold a person liable for this crime, the prosecution must establish the following elements with
proof beyond reasonable doubt: the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation
against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with animo
lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide was committed.

In People v. De Jesus, this Court had the opportunity to comprehensively discuss the nature of the
crime of robbery with homicide: In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may
take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of
the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery and homicide, must be consummated.

In convicting accused-appellants, the Regional Trial Court gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, who recounted that the accused men were the ones who had
simultaneously assaulted Enicasio. Based on their testimonies, Manzanero and accused-appellants
Palema and Palmea all approached Enicasio and took his cellphone. When Enicasio tried to fight
back, Palema stabbed him, causing him to fall. Immediately after, the other accused joined the fray
and beat Enicasio. It is clear that accused-appellants' primary objective was to rob Enicasio. But, by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery, Enicasio was stabbed and died as a result Finally, while
accused appellants argued that the Regional Trial Court erred in giving weight to the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies, they failed to present evidence to the contrary.

CASE TITLE: Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
[G.R. No. 225696. April 8, 2019]

PRINCIPLE: In falsification of public documents under Article 171 (2) of the RPC, the prosecution
must prove that these elements exist:

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 1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. That he takes advantage of his official position;
3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding; and
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.

FACTS:
A Petition for Probate of Severino Cabrales’ (or “Severino”) Last Will and Testament was filed
before the RTC. The document was notarized by Atty. Bernardo Constantino (or “Atty.
Constantino”), and the witnesses who signed therein were Rosalinda Cu (or “Cu”), Dr. Justino
Balintona and his wife Mary Balintona (or “Balintona Spouses”), and Dr. Eliezer Asuncion (or “Dr.
Asuncion”).

Upon learning of the probate proceedings, Fernando Cabrales (or “Fernando”), a son of Severino,
claimed that the signature in the document was not Severino’s. Also, Ferndando immediately spoke
to Dr. Asuncion, who told him that the latter signed the document in his clinic, and not in the
presence of the Severino and the other witnesses.

Later on, an Information was filed against Atty. Constantino, charging him with falsification of a
public document under Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

In his defense in addressing the absence of Dr. Asuncion, whose name was indicated as an
instrumental witness, Atty. Constantino assured Severino that only 3 witnesses were needed for
the document. After the document was signed by Severino together with the 3 witnesses, he then
instructed Severino to leave the document as it was and not to make any erasures or crossing-out
on it. On his way out, Atty. Constantino alleged that Teresita Saliganan (or “Teresita”), a daughter of
Severino, took his copy of the document, telling him that Dr. Asuncion had already arrived.
Sometime later, Teresita returned the copy, but Atty. Constantino stated that he did not check if Dr.
Asuncion had signed it.

The RTC found Atty. Constantino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of a public
document under Article 171 (2) of the RPC. It ruled that Atty. Constantino is liable for making it
appear that Dr. Asuncion appeared before him and witnessed the execution of the Last Will and
Testament. Atty. Constantino appealed to the CA, however the latter affirmed the Decision of the
RTC.

Hence, Atty. Constantino filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Atty. Constantino argues that it would have been difficult for him to remove Dr. Asuncion’s name at
the time of signing due to his muscular dystrophy, making it difficult for him to go up the steep
stairway at the house of Severino. Due to his physical condition, he has relied on his secretary to file
the office documents, and, as such, was not able to check the Last Will and Testament when
Teresita returned it to his secretary. While he admits that he had been negligent for failing to cross
out Dr. Asuncion’s name in the document, he asserts that it should not be taken against him, but on
Dr. Asuncion, who admitted to signing the document without reading it.

The Office of the Solicitor General (or “OSG”) countered that Atty. Constantino raises questions of
fact which is improper in a Rule 45 petition. It further argued that since all the elements of the crime
of falsification of a public document under Article 171 (2) of the RPC were duly proven by evidence
on record, there was no reversible error on the finding of Atty. Constantino’s guilt.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the the questions of fact in this Petition may be reviewed.

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 2. Whether or not the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that Atty. Constantino
was guilty of falsifying a public document under Article 171 (2) of the RPC.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Rules of Court provides that Rule 45 mandates that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. As such, generally, great respect must be given
to the factual findings of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’
demeanor during trial and assess their testimonies. However, it is also a well-settled rule
that an appeal in criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and it becomes
the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from,
whether they are assigned as errors or not. In the case at bar, since the Petition involves a
criminal case, questions of facts may be reviewed.
2. No. In falsification of public documents under Article 171 (2) of the RPC, the prosecution
must prove that these elements exist:

1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;

2. That he takes advantage of his official position;
3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding; and
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.

Here, the third and fourth requisites were not proven by the prosecution. Since Dr. Asuncion did not
sign the Joint Acknowledgement before it was notarized, it follows that he cannot be considered as
having attested and subscribed to its due execution at the time of its notarization. Therefore, when
Atty. Constantino certified that the persons who attested and subscribed to the document were
present before him, there could have been no falsity. It was not Atty. Constantino who made it
appear that Dr. Asuncion participated in the execution of the Joint Acknowledgement, but Dr.
Asuncion himself. As such, the prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Atty.
Constantino was guilty of falsifying a public document under Article 171 (2) of the RPC.

Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs LINA ACHIENG NOAH,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 228880 March 6, 2019

Principle: Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized items
at each stage, from seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized items shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and
time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.

The essential element for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the movement of
the dangerous drug from one (1) place to another. To establish the accused's guilt, it must be proven
that: (1) the transportation of illegal drugs was committed; and (2) the prohibited drug exists.

FACTS:

Customs Examiner Marius Landicho (Landicho) testified that at around 5:23 p.m. on February 24,
2012 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 1, Noah, a Kenyan national who arrived from
Kenya via Dubai, approached Lane Number Five (5) of the Customs Arrival Area. He asked her to
present her passport and Baggage Declaration.

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Landicho then asked her to open her luggage: a black trolley bag, which was three (3) feet tall and
less than two (2) feet wide. In it was a smaller bag described as a laptop bag. Upon inspection,
Landicho noticed that while the smaller bag was empty, its flap was hard and thick and its sidings
were suspiciously padded and had tampered stitches. Noting that it was odd for such a bag to be
hard, Landicho asked Noah to follow him to the exclusion room for further examination of her
luggage.

In the exclusion room, Landicho examined the bag before: (1) Noah; (2) three (3) airport employees;
(3) Bureau of Customs Narcotics Group; (4) agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency; and
(5) other government officers. The inspection revealed seven (7) rectangular packages, wrapped in
vacuum-sealed aluminum foil, on which Landicho affixed his initials and signature.

Landicho then prepared an Inventory Report as witnessed by: (1) officers of the Customs Task Force
on Dangerous Drugs; (2) Anti-Narcotics Group; (3) Prosecutor Dolores Rillera (Prosecutor Rillera); (4)
Julie Fabroa (Fabroa), the airport's media representative; and (5) Barangay Councilor Mel Anthony
Bajada (Barangay Councilor Bajada). Landicho then turned over the Inventory Report, along with
Noah's personal belongings, to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs Task Force.

Special Agent I Alejandro R. Noble (Special Agent I Noble), a Customs officer, testified that he went
to the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 1 for an anti-illegal drug
operation. There, he saw Noah show Landicho her Customs Declaration and luggage. He added that
Noah had been invited to the exclusion room for further examination and interrogation.

In Noah's presence, Special Agent I Noble and Landicho inspected the luggage and found hidden
compartments. Inside were compressed foil packs containing white crystalline substance. Upon
testing samples using Marquis Reagent No. 2, the white crystalline substance yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Special Agent I Noble added that before Noah's arrest,
he asked her if she could understand English. When she said yes, he apprised her of her Miranda
rights.

Corroborating Landicho's account, Special Agent I Noble further testified that they conducted an
inventory of the seized items in the presence of Noah, an elective official, Prosecutor Rillera, and
Fabroa. In addition, pictures showing Noah with Landicho and other witnesses were taken during
the field-testing, marking, and inventory.

Agent Adrian Fajardo (Agent Fajardo), a member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
Special Enforcement Service, testified that he brought the seized items to Forensic Chemist Ariane
Arcos (Forensic Chemist Arcos) for proper documentation and laboratory examinations. The test
results showed that the seized items contained shabu, with a confirmatory test yielding the same
outcome.

In her defense, Noah denied transporting the illegal drugs, claiming that she went to the Philippines
for a job opportunity. She added that the luggage was only given to her while she was in her
recruiter's office in Cameroon, Central Africa. She allegedly met an unidentified man who, while
discussing her travel details, also offered the black trolley bag after commenting that her bag was
soiled. He also supposedly helped her transfer all her things from her old bag to the new luggage.

In its January 16, 2014 Decision, the Regional Trial Court found Noah guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. It held that the warrantless search and arrest of Noah was "lawful, valid,
and effective" because searches done in airport premises fell under consented searches. It found
that Noah had known she was in possession of illegal drugs considering that animus possidendi is
presumed. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the presumption of regularity of duty on the airline
personnel's placing of the bag tags at the airport of origin established that Noah was the real owner
of the luggage. It ruled that there was compliance with Article II, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165.

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On March 11, 2015, Noah filed an Appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In its July 29, 2016 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the Appeal and affirmed Noah's conviction.

On August 31, 2016, Noah filed her Notice of Appeal. Subsequently, the records of the case were
elevated to this Court for review.

On April 26, 2017, accused-appellant filed her Supplemental Brief. She stresses that the chain of
custody in handling the evidence against her had gaps, which raise serious doubts on the
authenticity of the seized shabu. She argues that the integrity and evidentiary value of the packages
recovered from her were not preserved. While Landicho testified to marking the seized items, she
points out that the records show that the marking was neither immediately made upon seizure nor
was it made in her presence.

Accused-appellant concedes that compliance with Section 21(a) of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act's Implementing Rules and Regulations may be relaxed if the State can explain reasonable
lapses in its handling of evidence. Here, however, the prosecution neither recognized any lapse in
the disposition of the seized items nor offered any explanation for such lapse. Hence, she argues
that the guidelines under Section 21(a) cannot be relaxed, and that this broken chain of custody is
enough to raise reasonable doubt on her guilt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not accused-appellant Lina Achieng Noah's guilt for violation of Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Whether or not the prosecution established the unbroken chain of custody of the drug
seized from accused-appellant.

RULING:

1. Yes. To sustain a conviction for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs, the
transportation and the identity and integrity of the seized drugs must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

The essential element for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the
movement of the dangerous drug from one (1) place to another. To establish the accused's
guilt, it must be proven that: (1) the transportation of illegal drugs was committed; and (2) the
prohibited drug exists.

Proof of ownership of the dangerous drugs seized is immaterial. What is important is that
the prosecution prove the act of transporting as well as the identity and integrity of the
seized drugs.

In the ordinary course of business, check-in officers attach airline bag tags to the owner's
check-in luggage at the airport of origin. As appreciated by both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, the luggage had a bag tag attached to its handle clearly bearing the name "Lina
Achieng Noah." Accused-appellant exercised control and took possession of the luggage
and its corresponding claim stub. It must be stressed that the act of transporting illegal

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 drugs is a malum prohibitum. Consequently, proof of ownership and intent are not essential
elements of the crime.

Accused-appellant was apprehended inside the airport upon her arrival from Ethiopia to
Manila via Dubai. Shabu was found in her possession, contained in seven (7) packs of
vacuum-sealed aluminum foil and concealed in a laptop bag inside her luggage. This satisfies
the elements of the crime because she was found transporting illegal drugs to the
Philippines.

2. Yes. Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
items at each stage, from seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized
items shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

Here, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused appellant was indeed
transporting the illegal drugs. Although she had initially denied ownership of the luggage
and illegal drugs found, accused appellant's claim is disputed by the evidence on record.

The following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.

The four links of chain of custody of evidence were proven: (1) Landicho seized and marked
the shabu obtained from accused-appellant; (2) he turned them over to Agent Fajardo; (3)
Agent Fajardo delivered them to Forensic Chemist Arcos; and (4) from the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, the drugs were presented in court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO RAMOS y BONDOC, G.R. No. 225325. August 28, 2019.

Principle: In buy-bust operations, the apprehending team's inadequate preparations are not
justifiable grounds for its noncompliance with the requirements under Section 21 (1) of Republic Act
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Facts:

At 8:35 a.m. that day, before conducting the buy-bust operation, PO2 Navarro, PO3 Yco,
and the confidential informant went to the Quebiawan barangay hall to coordinate with the local
officials. However, they were only able to coordinate with the Bantay Bayan as there was no
elected official present then.

Then, the police officers proceeded to Don Tomas Avenue in Barangay Quebiawan
where Billy was located. The informant approached Billy and told him that PO2 Navarro wanted
to buy shabu. Billy handed a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance to
PO2 Navarro in exchange for the marked P500.00 bill. Afterwards, PO2 Navarro threw his
cigarette to signal that the transaction had been consummated, prompting PO3 Yco to
approach. PO3 Yco and PO2 Navarro introduced themselves as police officers and informed

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 Billy of his constitutional rights, after which PO3 Yco asked Billy to take out the sachets he had
from his pocket. PO3 Yco confiscated 17 heat-sealed sachets containing white crystalline
substance, as well as the marked money, which he gave to PO2 Navarro.

The items were not immediately marked after seizure, PO2 Navarro explained, as none
of the required witnesses under the law were then present. PO3 Yco, meanwhile, testified that
the markings were not placed at the time of arrest because he and PO2 Navarro did not bring
pens.

Instead, PO2 Navarro said he put the seized items in a plastic container, separating the
sachet he had bought from Ramos from the 17 sachets found in Ramos' left pocket. With the 18
sachets in his custody, PO2 Navarro went to the police station while PO3 Yco brought Ramos.

At the police station, Ramos was turned over to PO2 Carlo Zaragosa (PO2 Zaragoza).
Meanwhile, in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Palo, media representative Talao, and
Department of Justice representative Manuel Villanueva (Villanueva), PO2 Navarro removed the
sachets from their respective plastic containers. The sachet he bought from Ramos was marked
with his initials, "AQN," while the other 17 sachets were marked with the initials "ACY." PO2
Navarro and PO3 Yco later signed a Confiscation Receipt issued by PO2 Zaragosa, who also
prepared a Turn-Over Receipt. Billy, using his name Isidro Ramos, and witnesses Palo, Talao,
and Villanueva also signed the Confiscation Receipt.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant Isidro Ramos y Bondoc is guilty of violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11
of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

Ruling:

No. Accused-appellant is acquitted of the crimes charged.

Before a court may convict someone for the crimes of illegal possession and sale of drugs,
it must be certain that dangerous drugs were seized, and that the "drugs examined and presented
in court were the very ones seized." To convince the court of this, the prosecution must show that
the apprehending team followed the stringent requirements on the custody of the seized drugs,
as provided under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. It states, in part:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. — . . .

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

The prosecution here failed to show that the buy-bust team had strictly complied with
the requirements under Section 21. Thus, it failed to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The first step in the mandatory procedure for chain of custody is the immediate marking,
physical inventory, and photographing of the seized items, which must be done in the presence
of certain witnesses. Although the law states that the apprehending officers may conduct the
physical inventory and photographing at the nearest police station, or their nearest office, this
Court has clarified that this is an exception to the rule — allowed only in cases of warrantless
seizures, when immediate marking, inventory, and photographing are not practicable.

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 Here, the apprehending officers admitted that they did not mark, photograph, or
inventory the seized items immediately after confiscation. Instead, they waited to complete this
first step until they arrived at the police station, around 20 minutes away from the scene of the
buy-bust operation. When asked why, PO3 Yco testified that they did not bring pens to mark
the items. PO2 Navarro, for his part, testified that they could not immediately mark the items
since the required witnesses were not present then.

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