History Studies Volume 13 His/DIY Studies Volume 13

workings of a centralised political authority. Located within

this general context was the pan-Somali project that

State-building in the Horn of Africa: the pan-
Somali project and Cold War politics during the underpinned all the new Republic's policies for the decade.

1960s Claimed by its proponents as integral to the successful

Sam Mealy development of the state, the relentless pursuit of pan-
Somalism in fact precipitated its takeover by anti-democratic
The conjoining of the Protectorate of Somaliland with the forces. This national-regional narrative intersected with Cold
Italian-administered UN Trust Territory of Somalia on I July War calculations as the Horn became a nare-up point for the
1960 resulted in the Republic of Somalia, an incomplete state superpowers' rivalry. Aware of its strategic geographic
for a geographically contiguous nation. That the newly location, Somali politicians played US and Soviet interests
established Somali state practised multi-pany democracy for against each other in order to extract resources for personal

the following nine years until the accession of Siyad BaITe to projects.
power in 1969 is testament both to the radical ambitions of its This paper argues that internal factors, in the Form of

leading politicians and to significant external support. domestic political agendas and fundamental inconsistencies
Exceptional as the Somali 'democratic experiment' during the underlying the Somali state, were primarily responsible for its
1960s was - in comparison to the proliferation of strong-man vulnerability to military takeover. Acknowledging prominent

dictatorships and one-party systems in most other post- Soviet complicity in the coup d'etat of 1969, Cold War forces
colonial African states - its rather sudden collapse points the are conceptualised within the prism of Somali agency, and are
historian toward the broader problems of state-building in the thus viewed as a catalyst in the above process. The paper is
Horn of Africa.' The Somali state represented a monolithic divided into three sections. First, it explores the problems
administrati ve structure superimposed on a nomadic associated with newly won independence. Secondly, it
socioeconomic culture unused to either the concept or assesses the pan-Somali project within the regional context;
thirdly and finally, it analyses the interaction of the forces of
pan-Somalism and Cold War strategic manoeuvring in the
IA. I. Samalar, 'The dialectics of piracy in Somalia: the rich versus the
poor' in Third world quarterly, vol. 31, no. 8 (2011), p. 1383. Horn of Africa.
114 115
 History Studies Volume 13 Histol)l Studies Volume 13

Like many other newly independent regimes across their birth to their death. s Pastoralism was not a unifying
sub-Saharan Africa, the Republic of Somalia faced ancient experience for all Somali: a small educated elite had grown up
obstacles to state-building: vast underpopulated areas, poor in the major urban areas. Moreover, the southern Somali
communications infrastructure, limited literacy. and the cultivators who combined animal husbandry with agriculture
resistance of nornadic-pastoralisl groups lO the state's arranged themselves in larger, more stable political groups,
extraction of their productive surplus.:! There was no fixed and had more clearly defined systems of authority than their
telephone line between Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, northern nomadic kinsmen. Regardless of these differences,
and Mogadishu. whilst literacy rates in urban areas were as the idea and practice of clearly demarcated, formalised
low as four to eight per cent. 3 Except for the sorghum- political institutions - a centralised state that could regulate
producing areas in the extreme northwest of the Somali and tax, for example - was if not hostile, than certainly
plateau, and the floodplains between the Shibeli and the J uba, outlandish to a people whose concept of authority was fluid
where maize, sugar and bananas grew, the rest was camel and the idea of borders as flexible, dictated by weather rather
country: arid and sparsely populated. Approximately seventy than decree.
per cent of the population in 1960 - some four million - were Compounding the antagonism between a sedentary
engaged in subsistence herding." As a response to a fragile institution of fixed geographic location with a largely nomadic
ecology and inhospitable regional climate, nomadic people was the newly unified Republic's inheritance of two
pastoralism impacted heavily on Somali social and political distinct colonial traditions. Administrators from the south
organisation. The patrilineal clan system limited the size of spoke and wrote Italian, depending on the level of their
effective political groups and ensured decision-making was education, whilst their counterparts in the north were trained in
largely uncentralised, as authority was believed to be vested in English. The Somali language, Afsoomaali, was not
not one person or institution but all males from the time of standardised and established as the national language until
1972. Discrepancies between British common law, Italian law.

2 John IIiffe, AJricans. The history DJ Cl continent (Cambridge, 2007), p.

267. S I. M. Lewis. 'The dynamics of nomadism: prospeclS for
J L M. Lewis. A modem history oJ the Somali (Oxford, 2002). p. 171. sedentarization and social change' in Theodore Monad (ed.).
-I John Drysdale, The Somali displIIe (London, 1964), p. 8. Pastoralism ill tropical Africa (Oxford. 1975). p. 433.
116 117
 History Sit/dies Volume 13 History Sit/dies Volume 13

Islamic sharia and customary law (xeer) were amalgamated exodus of British expatriates withdrew investment from the
into one unified legal system upon independence; the Supreme region. In light of growing unemployment and the reduction of
Court was unsatisfactorily instructed to establish two separate political prestige, the main political party of the nonh, the
6
sections to deal with cases from the two regions. Somali National League (SNL) boycotted the vote on the
Regional institutional differentiation was aggravated by provisional constitution in 1961, leading to its defeat by a
the political division of power within the new Republic. Under small majority. In December of that year, a group of
British colonial rule, the Issaq clan held the majority of Sandhurst-trained lieutenants who questioned the legitimacy of
administrati ve posts in Somaliland but they became the the union, attempted a military coup - abetted by the SNL -
minority in government upon unification. The newly elected that was quashed by the loyalist sector of the national army.'
president, Adan Abdalla Osman, and prime minister, Independent Somalia during the 1960s provides an
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, were both southerners; in addition, historical illustration of Huntington's 'political gap'
of the fourteen member cabinet only fOUf were northern hypothesis: rapid social change and the consequent
ministers. In total, only 26 per cent of parliamentary seats were mobilisation of new groups into politics often outpaces the
allocated to the nonh.' Notwithstanding that the uneven development of political institutions able to process their
distribution of political posts was somewhat justified - participation and demands. When political participation
southern politicians had a generally more sophisticated suddenly expands without a corresponding increase in
understanding of government having experienced a measure of institutionalisation, instability and disorder results. 9 Political
autonomy under the Italian Trusteeship since 1956 - this parties proliferated until the point whereby Somalia had more
caused discord in the north. Northern malcontent was panies per capita than any other democratic country except
intensified through economic decline: standardising tariffs IsraeL'· 1,002 candidates representing sixty-four panies
meant increasing commodity prices as tax rates of the north
had to rise in line with those of the south, whilst the mass
8 Lewis. A modem history of the Somali, p. 173.
9 Samuel Huntington. Political order in changing societies ( ew
6 1. A. lssa-Salwe, The collapse of the Somali Slate. The impact of the Haven. 1968). p. 25.
colonial legacy (London, 1996), p. 71. 10 D. D. Laitin and S. S. Samatar. Somali: l1atio" in search ofa state
7 Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford, 2008), p. 33. (London. 1987). p. 76.
118 119
 History Studies Volume 13 HislOfY Studies Volume 13

contested the March 1969 elections. High levels of political background, one point for each Somali ethnic region. Somalia
expression were partly fuelled by the dire economic situation. was thus a nation in search of a state.
12
During his first year in
The country had no industrial base, despite the Italians' rather office. Sharmarke summarised the conundrum well:
haphazard attempts to create a textiles sector, and no
significant mineral reserves. Somali G P was approximately Our misfortune is that our neighbouring countries.
fifty-six million dollars, per capita income about twenty-eight with whom. like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote
constructive and harmonious relations. are not our
dollars. Somali politicians' solution strategy to this wealth of neighbours. Our neighbours are our Somali kinsmen
problems was both narrowly specific and broadly unwieldy. It whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate
"arrangements". They have to move across artificial
was to focus all resources on reunifying Greater Somalia. frontiers to their pasturelands. They occupy the same
Underlying the unsteady foundations of the new Somali terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as
ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the
slale was its incompleteness. Although small in absolute terms, same creed, the same culture, and the same traditions.
Somalia represented one of the few terrilorially contiguous How can we regard our brothers as foreigners? Of
course we all have a strong and very natural desire to
ethnic nations in sub-Saharan Africa during the wave of be united. 13
decolonisation In the 1950s and 1960s. The legacy of
colonialism was the division of Somalia across five Domestic and foreign policy revolved around this

jurisdictions. Independence only achieved the unification of dilemma. Sharmarke, President Egal, and other leading

two of these: the British and Italian territories. Somalia's politicians of the I960s committed themselves to extending the

politicians harboured irredentist aspirations to 're-unite' the boundaries of the Somali state to include those Somalis who

lost territories of French Somali land (modem day Djibouti), by dint of colonial borders were citizens of other countries.

the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, and the This proved to be a problematic project. French Somaliland

Ogaden and Haud regions on the Ethiopian-Somali border into had voted against complete emancipation and had chosen to

a Greater Somalia." The pan-Somali project was syntbolised remain an overseas territory of France in the 1958 Gaullist

by the new Republic's flag: a five-pointed white star on a blue

12 Laitin and Samatar, Somali, p. 129.

lJ Somali govemmem infonnation services. The Somali peninsula: a
11 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, p. 24. flew light 011 imperial motil'es (London. 1962). p. vi.
120 121
 History Swdies Volume 13 History Swdies Volume 13

referendum." Although the political landscape had altered totally consistent with the concept of Pan-
dramatically since that referendum, there was no clear Africanism. 16

indication that the Somali elements of French Somali land's

But Sharmarke's and Abdallas ideal of a wholly unified
population were mobilised enough to wrest further change
Somalia did threaten African unity, or at least according to
from the metropolis.
Olher African leaders' conception of that unity. Somali leaders
The situation in Kenya with the FD was even more
invocation of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination for
fraught. On the cusp of achieving independence from Britain,
every people. if applied universally across sub-Saharan Africa,
Kenya's leading politicians were preoccupied with a far-
would essentially institutionalise the right of every ethnic tribe
reaching project of nation-building in the aftermath of the Mau
and clan to its own nation state. This principle was unpopular:
Mau insurgency. The Somali government invited
the idea that the 19bos were entitled to their state in Biafra was
independently Jomo Kenyatta of KANU and Ronald Ngala of
anathema to the Nigerian regime. 17 Kenyatta was cognisant of
KADU to visit the Republic with their party colleagues during
the potential harms posed by the precedent of a Greater
the summer of 1962; the meetings to discuss the problem of
Somalia to a soon-to-be independent, but still highly fractious,
. Iy. "
the NFD took place in July and August respeellve
Kenya. He thus hoped that Somalia would join an East African
Reacting to the charge that the aspirations of Somali and
Federation and hypothesised a possible solution to the NFD
African unity were mutually incompatible, President Abdalla
problem within such a framework. But Kenyatta's public
said at the state dinner in honour of Kenyatta on July 28 that:
pronouncements went further than this. He argued that the
NFD was part of Kenya and as such the issue of the Somali
C..) the principle of self-determination, when used
properly to unify and enlarge an existing state with a community within the NFD was a 'domestic affair of
view towards its absorption in a federal system of Kenya.' 18 This statement caused great consternation
government is neither balkanisation nor fragmentation.
It is a major contribution to unity and stability, and throughout the Somali body politic on both sides of the border.

16 Quoted in OrysdaJe, The Somali dispme. p. 116.

I~ Lewis, A modem histol)' ofthe Somali, p. 131. 17 Laitin and Samatar. Somalia, p. 130.
15 DrysdaJe, The Somali dispute, p. 114. 18 Drysdale, The Somali dispute. p. 118.
122 123
 History SllIdies Volume 13 History Swdies Volume 13

It also informed the British position: the refusal to publicly The relentless quest for national reunification was

endorse reunification and the declaration, by new colonial damaging: not onJy did it divert political salience and material

secretary Duncan Sandys, that the FD was to be brought imo resources away from much-needed internal development but it
19
Kenya's regional constitution. Despite its role as one of also increasingly isolated Somalia from the African

Somalia's biggest foreign aid benefactors, the Somali community. Moreover, ever since the religiously inspired

government formally severed diplomatic relations with Britain struggles of Sayyid Mohammed Hassan during the first two
on 12 March 1963. decades of the twentietlI century, Somali irredentist ambitions

The Republic's actions were gradually isolating it from provided the historical driver of fromier violence. Bolstered by
the rest of the African and international community. At the the support of 200,000 ethnic Somali living in the NFD,
inaugural meeting of Lhe Organisation of African Unity (OAU) irredentists fuelled a four year shifta war there after Britain

at Addis Ababa in May 1963 President Abdalla's speech granted Kenya her independence in 1963." Designs on the
advocating the swift amalgamation of a Greater Somalia was final separated territory, the Ogaden and Haud regions, were
poorly received. All thirty African governments signed the also impossible to fulfil through constitutional means. The
OAU charter, which recognised the sanctity of Africa's Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was founded in
20
colonial borders. Abdalla's radical argument - that territorial 1961, and supported with financial aid from the cemral
integrity represented an outmoded concept, whose roots were government, fought an insurgency war in the Ogaden until

embedded in colonialism and as such was not necessarily defeat to the Ethiopian military in 1964." After a few fruitless
useful or in the best interests of post-colonial states - fell on years of regional politicking, Somali politicians concluded that
deaf ears. their irredentist aspirations required significantly enhanced

military capacity to be realised (despite constitutional

provisions denouncing war as a means of settling international

disputes). The eruption of the first major crisis of the modern

19Lewis. A modern hislOr)' of the Somllli, p. 192.
A. Lefebvre. The United States. Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-
20 J.
Soviet arms deal: containment and the balance of power dilemma in the
Horn of Africa' in Thejollnlll/ ofmodenl African studies, vol. 30, no. 4 21 Bradbury. Becoming Somali/and. p. 35.
(Dec. 1998). p. 631. 22 Laitin and Samatar, Somalia. p. 136.
124 125
 History Studies Volume 13 Histot}' Swdies Volume 13

era in the Ogaden, in conjunction with the ongoing shifta war its ATO allies by speeding up the process. Continuity in US-
in the NFD, sparked off an arms race in the Horn and African foreign policy spanned the Eisenhower-Kennedy-
instigated a relationship between the Soviets and the Somali Johnson administrations. Deeply- held modernisation ideals,
military that would have significant implications for the future support for constitutionalist nationalists, and efforts to contain
development of the state. the Soviets. But furthering these objectives simultaneously
The escalating border disputes between Somalia, Kenya was a delicate balancing act. US support of the British
and Ethiopia coincided with an increasingly precarious proposal to unify Somalia upset her old ally Haile Selassie and
security dilemma between the Cold War superpowers. The precipitated his long-term credit agreement for one hundred
Horn and its environs had been viewed as a strategic zone by million dollars with the USSR in June 1959. 25 The Kennedy
the great powers ever since Britain established a coaling administration was committed to the principle of arms resrraint
station at the harbour city of Aden in present-day Yemen in in sub-Saharan Africa but the Cold War warrior mentality of
1839." Protection of the increasingly dense mercantile traffic the president's New Frontier and the increasing bullishness of
that passed through the Gulf of Aden, and control of the oil Soviet policy in the region forced its hand. The Mc amara-
shipping lanes there. enhanced its geostrategic nalUre. Soviet Merid agreement of ovember 1962 ratcheted up US
policy toward Africa was reoriented after Stalin's death in economic and military assistance to Ethiopia in exchange for
1953. Khrushchev supported communist parties in broad- continued access to Kagnew station, the Americans' crucial
based coalitions in Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa in the communications base in Asmara. 26
struggle for 'national democratic revolution'; such struggles The Kennedy administration attempted to convince the
were seen as incremental steps toward socialism?~ The US Somali government that aid to Ethiopia was in its best
was committed to decolonisalion but did not want to alienate interests. This rang hollow to Sharmarke, who began actively
courting the Soviets. Soviet naval expansionism during the
early 1960s had already begun to threaten US interests in the
23 Garnet Kindervater and Isaac Kamola, 'Sailing the capitalist seas:
piracy and accumulation in the Gulf of Aden' presented at Illtematiollal
swdies association annual meeting, Montreal (Mar. 2011), p. 6. 25 Lefebvre. 'The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-Soviet
2'- Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, The United Stales and Africa. A arms dear. p. 617
hisrory, (Cambridge, 1984), p. 285. " Ibid., p. 625.
126 127
 His/OI)' Sit/dies Volume 13 History Sit/dies Volume 13

Indian Ocean. This threat was made more real by its government could launch a Five Year Development Plan
construction of a military port at Berbera on the coast of (1963-67) of seventy million dollars with half of the capital
Somalia in 1962." The Republic's definitive turn toward the already being available. In the November 1963 municipal
USSR was driven by a combination of internal constraints and elections. the SYL won 665 out 904 seats (seventy-four per
external factors. Although the largely British- and Italian- cent).30
educated governing elite initially supported Western patronage Western powers failed to prevent Mogadishu turning to
and aid, the West's increasing reluctance to move on the pan- Moscow because they were unwilling to augment Somali
Somali issue weakened such ties. Moreover, and partly military capacity for border disputes with Kenya and Ethiopia.
because of the lack of traction on the reunification project, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Williams
Somali Youth League government was begin to strain under understood the impossibiLity of Somali politicians renouncing
opposition pressure and needed to recaplUre public support in their irredentist c1aims. 31 Thus the heightened strategic
light of upcoming elections. Sharmarke thus refused a importance of Kagnew in light of escalating Soviet naval
combined Western military offer worth approximately operations caused Washington to abandon its position of
eighteen million dollars in 1963 and accepted a thirty-million- neutrality on the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict. President Johnson
dnllar package from the USSR in its stead." As part of the authorised advisory and financial support for the former during
deal, the Soviets helped build an army of 14,000 men, sent 300 the 1964 Ogaden War. 32 Exogenous economic shocks
advisors to Somalia, whilst 500 Somali military personnel exacerbated the rising costs associated with Somalia' s border
were trained in the USSR. 29 The Soviet-Somali patron-client conflicts. The closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 and Britain's
relationship was thus institutionalised. The magnitude of
foreign aid flowing into state coffers was such that the
30 Lewis. A modem history of the Somali. p. 201.
31Memorandum from director of office of northern African affairs
( ewsom) to assistant secretary of state for African affairs (Williams)
(26 Aug. 1963) in N. D. Howland and G. W. LaFantasie (eds). Foreign
27 Peter Schwab, 'Cold war on the Horn of Africa', African affairs, vol. relatio"s of the United States. 1961-63. l'o/lIme XXI. Africa. doe. 298
77. issue 306 (t978), p. 8. (http://history.state.govlhistoricaldocumentslfrusI961 -63v2l1d298) (12
28 Lefebvre, 'The United Slates, Ethiopia and the I%3 Somali-Soviet Aug. 2012).
arms deal, p. 6 t2. 32 Lefebvre. 'The United States. Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-Soviet
29 Laitin and Sarnatar, Somalia, p. 78. arms deal. p. 641.
128 129
 History SflIdies Volume 13 History Swdies Volume 13

gradual withdrawal from Aden between 1967 and 1969 nor protested; in fact, they welcomed the arrival of the
resulted in declining foreign revenues from portage and military.

bunkering fees. In addition, Somalia's two largest exports, Histories of the Somali state have inevitably been

bananas and livestock, were hit hard. This deepened the coloured by Barre's subsequent regime of scientific socialism

Somali government's dependence on Soviet aid. Throughout and various failed Western interventions to stabilise the region

the Cold War, Somalia was one of the highest per capita following its collapse in 1991, most infamously U OSOM IJ
recipients of foreign aid in Africa. Most Somalis saw little of and the Black Hawk Down incident. This retrospective context
this large capital influx, however. Somali politicians became - with particular emphasis on Somalia's recent history and its

adept not only at anracting foreign aid but also siphoning it status as a 'failed state' - focuses on the almost unifonnly

away for personal uses. Many leading SYL politicians were negative aspects of the West's historical presence in, and

seen driving around the mostly un paved roads of Mogadishu relationship with, Somalia. Because of this unidirectional
33
in limousines during the latter half of the tumultuous decade. perspective, Somalia ceases to be an historical actor in its own

Such strategies of extraversion further weakened the already right and is conceptualised solely in terms of Western actors

tenuous bonds between the state and its populace." The and interests; thus transformed it becomes an academic and

assassination of Sharmarke - then president - by a police political laboratory in which to test theories of colonialism,

constable on IS October 1969, provided the catalyst for the intervention, sovereign debt politics in developing states, and

Soviet-backed military commander Siyad Barre to seize power so on. This occludes the important role played by Somali
35
in a bloodless coup d'etat. The Somali public neither resisted actors themselves in the development of their state. From the

brief survey of early independence problems and the influence

of the pan-Somali project delineated above it is possible to

33For a vivid depiction of the corrosive atmosphere in the capital al the appreciate the importance of local forces in state formation. As
end of the 19605, see Nuruddin Farah's novel The naked needle a product of colonial administration, the theory and practice of
(London, 1976).
3J J. F. Bayart, 'Africa in the world: a history of extraversion', African a centralised state was ill-equipped with the decentralised
affairs, vol. 99 (2000), p. 222.
35 G. D. Payton, "The Somali coup of 1969: the case for Soviet nature of Somali socio-political organisation. Once established
complicity' , The jOllnlal ofmodem African !>'(lldies, vo\. 18, no. 3 (Sept. and propped up by foreign funding however, it was run and
1980), p. S02.
130 131
 History 51l1dies Volume 13 History 51l1dies Volume 13

exploited by local actors. Decisions made by Somali The Venerable John Joseph Steiner: A German-
politicians to pursue irredentisl and personally selfish Irish Saint?
ambitions at the expense of internal development and support
of political institutions conditioned the collapse of the William Buck
democratic experiment.

There are saintly qualities to be seen in the lifetime devotion to

the Catholic Church of John Joseph Steiner. Formally, a saint
is 'a person acknowledged as holy or virtuous and regarded in
Christian faith as being in heaven after death'.' Coli ins
English Dictionary defines a saint as:

a person who after death is formally recognized by a

Christian Church, especially the Roman Catholic
Church, as having attained, through holy deeds or
behaviour, a specially exalted place in heaven and the
right to veneration; a person of exceptional holiness or
goodness. 2

Born into a German Lutheran family, Steiner was

orphaned at twelve, sought answers to his faith and true calling

I (http://oxforddictionaries.comldefinition/englishlsainl) (8 Aug. 2012).

2 Col/ins English dictionary, complete and ullabridged (Harper Collins
publishe". 1991, 1994, 1998.2000, 2oo3)
(http://www.thefreedictionary.comlsaint)(8Aug. 2012). In defining a
saint and sainthood Manuela Dunn-Mascetti offers phrases like 'models
of piety and virtue', 'holy', 'human incarnations of divine power',
providing an 'example, fellowship, and aid' for others on earth to
follow. 'veneration' and 'the gift to effect changes in the lives of others
(... ) [and] attend to devotees'. SlIitlts. TIle chosen few (New York.
1994). pp 9-29.
132 133