Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, Vol. 24, No.

2, Summer 2006 (Ó 2006)

DOI: 10.1007/s10942-006-0027-0
Published Online: June 28, 2006

IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AND UNCONDITIONAL

SELF-ACCEPTANCE. I. CORRELATIONAL
EVIDENCE LINKING TWO KEY FEATURES
OF REBT
Martin F. Davies
Goldsmiths University of London, UK

ABSTRACT: In a study with 102 non-clinical adults, relationships between

measures of irrational beliefs, unconditional self-acceptance, self-esteem and
the Big-5 personality dimensions were investigated. As expected, uncondi-
tional self-acceptance was highly correlated with self-esteem. In line with key
tenets of REBT, individuals who scored highly on unconditional self-
acceptance scored low on irrational beliefs even after self-esteem had been
partialled out. Unconditional self-acceptance was found to be significantly
(negatively) correlated with Neuroticism but not with other Big-5 personality
dimensions. Irrational beliefs were found to correlate positively with Neu-
roticism and negatively with Openness. Factor analysis of the unconditional
self-acceptance scale did not show a simple one-dimensional structure.
A revised version of the scale comprising those items that did not load on a
self-esteem factor produced a purer measure of unconditional self-acceptance
that did not correlate significantly with self-esteem. The findings have
implications for investigating unconditional self-acceptance in studies of
therapeutic outcome.

KEY WORDS: Big 5; irrational beliefs; REBT; self-acceptance; self-esteem.

A key aspect of REBT is that people are not disturbed by events

per se but by the views and beliefs they have of the events (Epictetus,
cited in Ellis, 1962). Irrational beliefs are illogical, rigid and inconsis-
tent with reality whereas rational beliefs are logical, flexible and

Address correspondence to Martin F. Davies, Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths University

of London, SE14 6NW New Cross, London, UK; e-mail: m.davies@gold.ac.uk.

113 Ó 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

114 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

consistent with reality. As a consequence of holding irrational beliefs,

people develop unhealthy emotions, dysfunctional behaviors and psy-
chological disturbance. By disputing their irrational beliefs, people
can acquire more rational and realistic ways of thinking that will pro-
duce greater acceptance of the self and greater satisfaction with life
(for reviews, see Dryden & Neenan, 2004; Ellis, 1994).
Although a good deal of research has been carried out on irrational
beliefs, little work has been done on self-acceptance. One possible
reason for this is the lack of a reliable and valid measure of self-
acceptance. Although there are plenty of measures of self-esteem (for
a review, see Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991), REBT does not consider
this to be relevant to self-acceptance. Indeed, according to Ellis, self-
esteem is anathema to self-acceptance. Any evaluation of one’s self on
a global measure of self-worth is unhealthy and dysfunctional. First,
it is irrational because there are no objective bases for making global
evaluations of one’s self. Second, focussing on one’s self-esteem will
make a person vulnerable to life’s little setbacks, rejections or mis-
takes, so that even people with generally high self-esteem may be
predisposed to blow these out of proportion with resultant negative
consequences. Third, a concern about self-worth can lead to a preoc-
cupation with comparing oneself with others at the expense of engag-
ing in healthy and productive endeavors and pursuits. It is well known
that low self-esteem is associated with psychological dysfunction, such
as depression (e.g., Beck, Steer, Epstein, & Brown, 1990), but even
high self-esteem can be associated with psychological dysfunction, such
as emotional vulnerability to criticism (e.g., Schlenker, Soraci,
& McCarthy, 1976) and proneness to violence (e.g., Baumeister,
Smart, & Boden, 1996).
Ellis (1977) argued that people should abandon the quest for
self-esteem and instead work toward achieving unconditional
self-acceptance. They should unconditionally accept themselves whe-
ther or not they behave competently or correctly and whether or not
others are likely to express approval or respect. Recently, Chamber-
lain and Haaga (2001a) devised a measure of unconditional self-
acceptance (USAQ) consisting of 20 statements reflecting the various
philosophical and practical aspects of unconditional self-acceptance
distilled from the REBT literature. In non-clinical adult samples,
Chamberlain and Haaga (2001a, b) found that unconditional self-
acceptance was positively associated with life satisfaction and happi-
ness measures, and negatively associated with anxiety, depression
Martin F. Davies 115

and depression-proneness. Unfortunately, unconditional self-accep-

tance was also highly correlated with self-esteem. To overcome this
problem, they partialled out self-esteem from the other correlations.
When this was done, the significant correlations with depression and
life satisfaction/happiness became non-significant. Although the
Chamberlain and Haaga measure of unconditional self-acceptance is
far from being a ‘‘pure’’ measure, partialling out self-esteem
(although a conservative method) is one way of removing a signifi-
cant amount of impurity.
In the present study, the relation between irrational beliefs and
unconditional self-acceptance was investigated. In addition to the
inclusion of self-esteem as a control measure, the study also included
measures of the Big-5 personality dimensions (Costa & Widiger,
1994), because these have not been investigated before with respect
to either irrational beliefs or unconditional self-acceptance (and also
because nowadays it seems de rigeur to include these measures in
correlational studies involving almost any variables). It was expected
that USAQ would be significantly correlated with self-esteem and
that scores on measures of irrational beliefs would be negatively cor-
related with scores on the USAQ even when self-esteem was par-
tialled out. Specific predictions about the correlations of these
measures with the Big-5 personality dimensions were not made due
to the lack of previous research.

METHOD

Participants and Procedure

Complete data were obtained from 84 female and 18 male under-

graduate students aged 18–40 (M = 22.43) who completed a number
of questionnaires for course credit in mass-testing sessions.

Measures

Unconditional self-acceptance was measured with the USAQ

(Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001a), a questionnaire consisting of 20
statements to which participants respond on a scale from 1 (‘‘almost
always untrue’’) to 7 (‘‘almost always true’’). Nine items are worded
such that higher scores represent greater unconditional self-
acceptance (e.g., ‘‘I avoid comparing myself to others to decide if I am
116 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

a worthwhile person’’), while 11 items are reverse-scored such that

low scores represent greater unconditional self-acceptance (e.g., ‘‘I set
goals for myself that I hope will prove my worth’’). Chamberlain and
Haaga report a Cronbach alpha of .72 which is an acceptable level of
internal consistency.
Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale
(RSE; Rosenberg, 1965), a questionnaire consisting of 10 statements
to which participants respond on a scale from 1 (‘‘strongly agree’’) to
4 (‘‘strongly disagree’’). To avoid confusion in the interpretation of
results, items were scored so that high scores represented high self-
esteem. The Rosenberg scale is the most widely used measure of
self-esteem and has been found to have high reliability and internal
consistency. For example, Fleming and Courtney (1984) report a
Cronbach alpha of .88.
One measure of irrational beliefs was the Irrational Beliefs scale
(IBS; Malouff & Schutte, 1986), a questionnaire consisting of 20
statements representing the 10 irrational beliefs described by Ellis
and Harper (1961) to which participants respond on a scale from 1
(‘‘strongly disagree’’) to 5 (‘‘strongly agree’’). Malouff and Schutte
report a test–retest reliability of .89 and a Cronbach alpha of .80.
A second measure of irrational beliefs was the Shortened General
Attitude and Belief scale (SGABS; Linder, Kirkby, Wertheim &
Birch, 1999), a questionnaire consisting of 26 statements to which
participants respond on a scale from 1 (‘‘strongly disagree’’) to 5
(‘‘strongly agree’’). This scale is a short version of Bernard’s (1990)
55-item General Attitude and Belief scale and consists of items mea-
suring need for achievement, need for approval, need for comfort,
demand for fairness, self-downing and other-downing. Linder et al.
report a test–retest reliability of .91 for total irrationality and
Cronbach alphas > .79 for the subscales.
Measures of the Big-5 personality dimensions were obtained using
the 10-item short version of the NEO (Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann,
2003) which consists of pairs of adjectives representing each pole of
the five personality dimensions (neuroticism, extraversion, openness,
agreeableness and conscientiousness) to which participants respond
on a scale from 1 (‘‘disagree strongly’’) to 7 (‘‘agree strongly’’). Gosling
et al. report an average test–retest reliability for the scales of .72,
and a somewhat low average Cronbach alpha of .55. However, the
scales of the 10-item version of the Big-5 correlated on average .77
with the full version of the Big-5 scales.
Martin F. Davies 117

RESULTS

Summary descriptive statistics for the various variables are shown

in Table 1.
These statistics are similar to those published in the literature
(USAQ—Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001a, b: RSE—Chamberlain &
Haaga, 2001a, b: IBS—Malouff & Schutte, 1986: SGABS—Linder,
Kirkby, Wertheim, & Birch, 1999: Big-5—Gosling et al., 2003).

Intercorrelations among Variables

Zero-order Pearson correlations among the various variables are

shown in Table 2.
As can be seen, USAQ correlated highly positively with RSE
(r = .59, p < .001) in line with Chamberlain and Haaga’s findings.
USAQ correlated highly negatively with irrational beliefs (IBS
r = ).59, p < .001; SGABS r = ).67, p < .001) as did RSE. When RSE
was partialled out, these correlations remained significant (IBS par-
tial r = ).51, p < .001; SGABS partial r = ).55, p < .001). These find-
ings therefore support the underlying thesis of REBT that irrational
beliefs are associated with low unconditional self-acceptance. USAQ
correlated significantly negatively with Big-5 Neuroticism (r = ).46,
p < .001) and Conscientiousness (r = ).30, p < .01) as did RSE, but
when RSE was partialled out, these correlations were no longer sig-
nificant (r = ).18, p = .07 and r = ).08, p = .43 respectively). The two

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

Mean SD

Unconditional self-acceptance (USAQ) 88.88 14.41

Self-esteem (RSE) 31.17 5.19
IBS Irrational Beliefs (IBS) 58.81 11.20
SGABS Irrational Beliefs (SGABS) 44.58 11.73
Big-5 Extraversion 6.83 2.95
Big-5 Neuroticism 6.56 2.63
Big-5 Agreeableness 10.39 2.06
Big-5 Conscientiousness 5.99 2.64
Big-5 Openness 10.30 2.11
118 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

Table 2

Zero-Order Pearson Correlations among Variables

Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Unconditional — — — — — — — —
self-acceptance (USAQ)
2. Self-esteem (RSE) .59*** — — — — — — —
3. Irrational beliefs (IBS) ).59*** ).34*** — — — — — —
4. Irrational beliefs (SGABS) ).67*** ).49*** .73*** — — — — —
5. Big-5 Extraversion ).13 ).21* ).02 .08 — — — —
6. Big-5 Neuroticism ).46*** ).57*** .37*** .38*** .28** — — —
7. Big-5 Agreeableness .09 .14 ).14 ).05 .08 ).18 — —
8. Big-5 Conscientiousness ).30** ).40*** .20* .26** ).14 .26** ).18 —
9. Big-5 Openness .16 .11 ).28** ).22* ).25** ).16 .05 .05

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).

measures of irrational beliefs (IBS and SGABS) were highly corre-

lated with each other (r = .73, p < .001). Both measures of irrational
belief correlated positively with Neuroticism (IBS r = .37, p < .001;
SGABS r = .38, p < .001) and Conscientiousness (IBS r = .20, p < .05;
SGABS r = .26, p < .01), and negatively with Openness (IBS r = ).28,
p < .01; SGABS r=).22, p < .05). However, these correlations were
significantly reduced when RSE was partialled out and all but disap-
peared for Conscientiousness (Neuroticism with IBS partial r = .23,
p = .02; with SGABS partial r = .14, p = .15: Conscientiousness with
IBS partial r = .07; with SGABS partial r = .06; Openness with IBS
partial r = ).27, p < .01; with SGABS partial r = ).19, p < .06).

Factor Analysis of the USAQ

Chamberlain and Haaga (2001a, b) did not carry out a factor anal-
ysis of the USAQ scale items. This was done with the present data
using principal components analyses. A KMO value of .716 for the
correlations indicated that the scale-item intercorrelations were good
for factoring. Six components had eigenvalues > 1. However, inspec-
tion of the scree plot suggested that either a one-, two- or three-
component solution could fit the data. The first component accounted
for only 24.8% of the total variance. By comparison, factor analysis of
the RSE scale items produced a clear one-component solution with
the first component accounting for 44.8% (nearly half) of the
Martin F. Davies 119

variance. Therefore, it can be concluded that a one-factor solution fits

the RSE scale items very well but does not fit the USAQ scale items.
Further analysis was carried out on the USAQ and RSE scale
items together to discover which USAQ items are relatively uncon-
taminated by self-esteem. A KMO value of .777 for the correlations
again indicated that the combined USAQ and RSE scale items were
good for factoring. Eight components had eigenvalues > 1, but
inspection of the scree plot suggested that a two-component solution
best fitted the data.
Table 3 shows the loadings of the RSE and USAQ items on the two
components after Varimax rotation. All the RSE items loaded highly
on component 1 which can therefore be said to represent a self-
esteem factor. Of the USAQ items, items 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 14, 17, 18 and
19 loaded highly on component 1 without loading highly on compo-
nent 2. These nine items seem to be measuring self-esteem rather
than a separate construct such as self-acceptance.
It could be argued that the remaining USAQ items (1, 4, 7, 8, 9,
10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20) represent a measure of unconditional self-
acceptance relatively uncontaminated by self-esteem because they
load higher on component 2 than on component 1. However, items 8
and 16 loaded negatively on component 2 which suggests some sort of
psychometric problem with these two items (‘‘I set goals for myself
with the hope that they will make me happy [or happier]’’ and ‘‘I feel
that the best part about being praised is that it helps me know what
my strengths are’’). The nature of this problem is not immediately
obvious from their content.
An additional psychometric problem arose from the factor analysis,
namely that seven out of the nine items that loaded highly on compo-
nent 2 were reverse-scored items, whereas only three out of the nine
items that loaded highly on component 1 were reverse-scored.
Although it is good psychometric practice to have a balanced scale
using reverse-scored items, these findings suggest that, in the case of
the USAQ, two distinct subscales may have been created.
A revised USAQ score was calculated based on just the remaining
nine items (see Table 4). The revised 9-item USAQ scale gave a Cron-
bach alpha of .68 (compared with .76 for the full 20-item scale) which
is very good considering that the revised scale is less than half as
long as the original scale. Although the revised USAQ scale corre-
lated significantly (r = .40, p < .001) with the original 20-item scale,
it did not correlate significantly with the RSE scale (r = .18, p > .05).
120 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

Table 3

Rotated Component Matrix for RSE and USAQ Items

Rotated Component Matrixa

Component

1 2

rse1 .573 .013

rse2 .538 .012
rse3 .736 .022
rse4 .484 ).152
rse5 .637 .026
rse6 .756 .102
rse7 .780 .133
rse8 .378 .341
rse9 .550 .007
rse10 .601 .040
usa1 ).152 .620
usa2 .666 ).142
usa3 .390 .085
usa4 .068 .526
usa5 .783 .081
usa6 .423 .274
usa7 ).021 .605
usa8 ).096 ).618
usa9 .180 .558
usa10 .368 .537
usa11 .525 ).013
usa12 .249 .319
usa13 .060 .414
usa14 .620 .263
usa15 .211 .535
usa16 .161 ).422
usa17 .673 .064
usa18 .619 .129
usa19 .497 .326
usa20 .067 .115

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a
Rotation converged in three iterations.

Therefore, it could be concluded that the revised scale is a purer

measure of unconditional self-acceptance than the original scale. The
revised USAQ scale correlated significantly with the IBS (r = ).24,
Martin F. Davies 121

Table 4

Item Content of the Revised 9-Item USAQ Scale

Item No. Item Content

1 Being praised makes me feel more valuable as a person.

4 I feel that some people have more value than others.
7 To feel like a worthwhile person, I must be loved by the people who
are important to me.
9 I think that being good at many things makes someone
a good person overall.
10 My sense of self-worth depends a lot on how I compare with others.
12 When I receive negative feedback, I often find it hard to be open to what
the person is saying to me.
13 I set goals for myself that I hope will prove my worth.
15 I think that people who are successful in what they do are especially
worthwhile people.
20 I don’t think it is a good idea to judge my worth as a person.

p < .05) and SGABS (r = ).40, p < .001) measures of irrational belief.
The revised USAQ scale did not correlate significantly with any of
the Big-5 personality scales.

DISCUSSION

Overall, the findings of the present study are clearly in line with
predictions. High scores on the irrational beliefs measures were asso-
ciated with much lower scores on unconditional self-acceptance even
when self-esteem was controlled for. This is consistent with the basic
tenets of REBT that irrational beliefs lead people to develop
unhealthy emotions, dysfunctional behaviors and psychological dis-
turbance, and that, by disputing their irrational beliefs, people can
acquire more rational and realistic ways of thinking that result in
greater acceptance of the self. However, the present findings were
correlational in nature and therefore it cannot be concluded that
holding more rational beliefs causes greater unconditional self-
acceptance. Indeed, it could well be that accepting oneself uncondi-
tionally leads to more rational thinking. To investigate the causal
relations between these constructs requires the use of experimental
designs.
122 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

With respect to the correlations with the Big-5 personality dimen-

sions, it seems plausible that unconditional self-acceptance should be
negatively related to Neuroticism: people who accept themselves
unconditionally should be more emotionally stable. However,
although the zero-order correlation was very high, it dropped to only
marginal significance when self-esteem was partialled out. The corre-
lations of irrational beliefs with Neuroticism and Openness were
more robust to the partialling out of self-esteem. Given that holding
irrational beliefs is associated with absolutist, demanding, and rigid
thinking, it might have been expected that the correlations of irratio-
nal beliefs with Openness should have been much larger than they
were.
Although the USAQ has been shown to have good internal consis-
tency, more research is needed on its psychometric properties, such
as test–retest reliability and concurrent and discriminant validity,
especially since the factor analysis threw up some unexpected psy-
chometric problems. The revised and shortened version of the USAQ
eliminated these problems and seemed to produce a ‘‘purer’’ measure
of self-acceptance relatively uncontaminated by self-esteem. However,
just as depression and anxiety tend to be co-morbid and ‘‘pure’’
depressives are rare creatures, so unconditional self-acceptance and
high self-esteem tend to co-occur naturally in the general population.
For example, the RSE item ‘‘All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am
a failure’’ could be reasonably included in a scale of unconditional
self-acceptance (reverse-scored). Similarly, the USAQ item ‘‘I feel
worthwhile even if I am not successful in meeting certain goals that
are important to me’’ could be included in a scale of self-esteem.
Thus, people who accept themselves unconditionally may still find
themselves sometimes making positive comparisons of their worth
with other people’s worth. Although partialling out self-esteem in
analyses of USAQ correlations may be a rather crude method for
dealing with self-esteem, using a ‘‘factor purity’’ approach to remove
scale items with a high self-esteem component may not necessarily be
a better method since it could result in the removal of important fac-
ets of self-acceptance.
It remains to be seen what practical role unconditional self-accep-
tance plays in the outcomes of REBT and other therapies. If it plays
as central a role as that accorded by Ellis, then just as self-esteem
had a task force set up to promote it (California Task Force to Pro-
mote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility; Mecca,
Martin F. Davies 123

Smelser, & Vasconcellos, 1989), so unconditional self-acceptance may

one day have its own promotional task force.

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